Paranoia, sensitization and social inference: findings from two large-scale, multi-round behavioural experiments

Psychotomimetic compensation versus sensitization

It is a paradox that psychotomimetic drugs can relieve symptoms that increase risk of and cooccur with psychosis, such as attention and motivational deficits (e.g., amphetamines), pain (e.g., cannabis) and symptoms of depression (e.g., psychedelics, dissociatives). We introduce the ideas of psychotomimetic compensation and psychotomimetic sensitization to explain this paradox. Psychotomimetic compensation refers to a short-term stressor or drug-induced compensation against stress that is facilitated by engagement of neurotransmitter/modulator systems (endocannabinoid, serotonergic, glutamatergic and dopaminergic) that mediate the effects of common psychotomimetic drugs. Psychotomimetic sensitization occurs after repeated exposure to stress and/or drugs and is evidenced by the gradual intensification and increase of psychotic-like experiences over time. Theoretical and practical implications of this model are discussed.

A social inference model of idealization and devaluation

People often form polarized beliefs, imbuing objects (e.g., themselves or others) with unambiguously positive or negative qualities. In clinical settings, this is referred to as dichotomous thinking or "splitting" and is a feature of several psychiatric disorders. Here, we introduce a Bayesian model of splitting that parameterizes a tendency to rigidly categorize objects as either entirely "Bad" or "Good," rather than to flexibly learn dispositions along a continuous scale. Distinct from the previous descriptive theories, the model makes quantitative predictions about how dichotomous beliefs emerge and are updated in light of new information. Specifically, the model addresses how splitting is context-dependent, yet exhibits stability across time. A key model feature is that phases of devaluation and/or idealization are consolidated by rationally attributing counter-evidence to external factors. For example, when another person is idealized, their less-than-perfect behavior is attributed to unfavorable external circumstances. However, sufficient counter-evidence can trigger switches of polarity, producing bistable dynamics. We show that the model can be fitted to empirical data, to measure individual susceptibility to relational instability. For example, we find that a latent categorical belief that others are "Good" accounts for less changeable, and more certain, character impressions of benevolent as opposed to malevolent others among healthy participants. By comparison, character impressions made by participants with borderline personality disorder reveal significantly higher and more symmetric splitting. The generative framework proposed invites applications for modeling oscillatory relational and affective dynamics in psychotherapeutic contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The effects of paranoia and dopamine on perception of cohesion and conspiracy: a pre-registered, double-blind, placebo-controlled experiment

Paranoia is a common symptom of psychotic disorders but is also present on a spectrum of severity in the general population. Although paranoia is associated with an increased tendency to perceive cohesion and conspiracy within groups, the mechanistic basis of this variation remains unclear. One potential avenue involves the brain's dopaminergic system, which is known to be altered in psychosis. In this study, we used large-N online samples to establish the association between trait paranoia and perceptions of cohesion and conspiracy. We further evaluated the role of dopamine on perceptions of cohesion and conspiracy using a double-blind, placebo-controlled laboratory experiment where participants received levodopa or a placebo control. Our results were mixed: group perceptions and perceptions of cohesion were higher among more paranoid individuals but were not altered under dopamine administration. We outline the potential reasons for these discrepancies and the broader implications for understanding paranoia in terms of dopamine dysregulation.

Interactive cognitive maps support flexible behavior under threat

In social environments, survival can depend upon inferring and adapting to other agents' goal-directed behavior. However, it remains unclear how humans achieve this, despite the fact that many decisions must account for complex, dynamic agents acting according to their own goals. Here, we use a predator-prey task (total n = 510) to demonstrate that humans exploit an interactive cognitive map of the social environment to infer other agents' preferences and simulate their future behavior, providing for flexible, generalizable responses. A model-based inverse reinforcement learning model explained participants' inferences about threatening agents' preferences, with participants using this inferred knowledge to enact generalizable, model-based behavioral responses. Using tree-search planning models, we then found that behavior was best explained by a planning algorithm that incorporated simulations of the threat's goal-directed behavior. Our results indicate that humans use a cognitive map to determine other agents' preferences, facilitating generalized predictions of their behavior and effective responses.

Schizophrenia and Increased Distrust-Based Competitiveness in Interpersonal Interactions: A Serial Process Model

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

Game theory paradigms, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG), have been used to study nonclinical paranoia, though research using clinical populations has been scarce. We test our novel theoretical model that schizophrenia leads to competitiveness in interpersonal interactions, and that this link is serially mediated by trait paranoia, state paranoia, and distrust.

STUDY DESIGN

In this quasi-experimental study, individuals with schizophrenia spectrum diagnoses with current persecutory delusions (n = 46) and a nonclinical control group (n = 43) played the PDG, and completed measures of trait paranoia, state paranoia, and distrust.

STUDY RESULTS

Individuals with schizophrenia competed more in the PDG than the control group. Supporting our theoretical model, all direct effects were significant: schizophrenia was associated with higher trait paranoia (H1); trait paranoia predicted state paranoia in the PDG (H2); state paranoia in the PDG predicted distrust of the opponent in the PDG (H3); and distrust predicted competition in the PDG (H4). The hypothesized indirect effect of schizophrenia on competition in the PDG via trait paranoia, state paranoia, and distrust was supported in a serial mediation model (H5).

CONCLUSIONS

The findings make clear theoretical and methodological contributions. We provide the first evidence for a theoretical process model by which schizophrenia leads to competitiveness in interpersonal interactions via trait paranoia, state paranoia, and distrust. Game theory paradigms, and the PDG in particular, are important for advancing theory and research on paranoia as it occurs in both clinical and nonclinical populations.

Formalising social representation to explain psychiatric symptoms

Recent work in social cognition has moved beyond a focus on how people process social rewards to examine how healthy people represent other agents and how this is altered in psychiatric disorders. However, formal modelling of social representation has not kept pace with these changes, impeding our understanding of how core aspects of social cognition function, and fail, in psychopathology. Here, we suggest that belief-based computational models provide a basis for an integrated sociocognitive approach to psychiatry, with the potential to address important but unexamined pathologies of social representation, such as maladaptive schemas and illusory social agents.

Paranoid thinking and perceived competitive intention

Paranoid thinking, that others are hostile, can be seen even in the general population. Paranoia is considered the expectation that others are competitors who aim to maximize the differences in payoffs rather than maximize their own payoffs. This study examined whether paranoia reflects the irrational belief that others have a competitive intention and is associated with avoiding perceived competition. We recruited 884 US residents via the Internet and conducted a modified Dictator Game, in which monetary allocation was carried out between the Dictator and the Recipient. The Dictator chooses either fair or competitive allocation while selecting the competitive allocation is irrelevant to increasing the Dictator's payoffs. The Recipient decides whether to accept the Dictator's decision or receive sure but low rewards. We found that Recipients with high-level paranoid thinking expected their opponent to select competitive allocation more than those with low levels, even when selecting it was costly for Dictators. Paranoid thinking was not associated with selecting sure rewards or competitive allocations. The results suggest that paranoia reflects the belief that others have a competitive intention but is not related to avoidance behavior against perceived threats and unilateral attacks.

Paranoid beliefs and conspiracy mentality are associated with different forms of mistrust: A three-nation study

Paranoia and conspiracy are terms typically used interchangeably. However, although the underlying content of these types of beliefs might be similar (e.g., seeing others as powerful and threatening), recent research suggests that these constructs differ in important ways. One important feature shared by both constructs is excessive mistrust but this aspect might play different roles in each belief system. In this study we explored the strength of associations of different trust predictors (i.e., trust in institutions, trust in sources of information, perceptual trust, and interpersonal trust) between conspiracy mentality and paranoid beliefs. We tested this association in a large representative multinational sample (United Kingdom n = 2025; Spain n = 1951; and Ireland n = 1041). Confirmatory factor analysis supported a two-factor model of conspiracy and paranoid beliefs in each nation sample. Path and equality of constraints analysis revealed that paranoia was more strongly associated with perceptual mistrust (bias towards mistrusting unfamiliar faces) whereas conspiracy was more strongly associated with mistrust in political institutions. Although interpersonal mistrust and trust in social sources of information were associated significantly with conspiracy their association with paranoid beliefs was stronger. These findings clarify the role of different trust processes in both belief systems. Limitations of this study are discussed.

The computational relationship between reinforcement learning, social inference, and paranoia

Theoretical accounts suggest heightened uncertainty about the state of the world underpin aberrant belief updates, which in turn increase the risk of developing a persecutory delusion. However, this raises the question as to how an agent’s uncertainty may relate to the precise phenomenology of paranoia, as opposed to other qualitatively different forms of belief. We tested whether the same population (n = 693) responded similarly to non-social and social contingency changes in a probabilistic reversal learning task and a modified repeated reversal Dictator game, and the impact of paranoia on both. We fitted computational models that included closely related parameters that quantified the rigidity across contingency reversals and the uncertainty about the environment/partner. Consistent with prior work we show that paranoia was associated with uncertainty around a partner’s behavioural policy and rigidity in harmful intent attributions in the social task. In the non-social task we found that pre-existing paranoia was associated with larger decision temperatures and commitment to suboptimal cards. We show relationships between decision temperature in the non-social task and priors over harmful intent attributions and uncertainty over beliefs about partners in the social task. Our results converge across both classes of model, suggesting paranoia is associated with a general uncertainty over the state of the world (and agents within it) that takes longer to resolve, although we demonstrate that this uncertainty is expressed asymmetrically in social contexts. Our model and data allow the representation of sociocognitive mechanisms that explain persecutory delusions and provide testable, phenomenologically relevant predictions for causal experiments.

Everything is connected: Inference and attractors in delusions

Delusions are, by popular definition, false beliefs that are held with certainty and resistant to contradictory evidence. They seem at odds with the notion that the brain at least approximates Bayesian inference. This is especially the case in schizophrenia, a disorder thought to relate to decreased - rather than increased - certainty in the brain's model of the world. We use an active inference Markov decision process model (a Bayes-optimal decision-making agent) to perform a simple task involving social and non-social inferences. We show that even moderate changes in some model parameters - decreasing confidence in sensory input and increasing confidence in states implied by its own (especially habitual) actions - can lead to delusions as defined above. Incorporating affect in the model increases delusions, specifically in the social domain. The model also reproduces some classic psychological effects, including choice-induced preference change, and an optimism bias in inferences about oneself. A key observation is that no change in a single parameter is both necessary and sufficient for delusions; rather, delusions arise due to conditional dependencies that create 'basins of attraction' which trap Bayesian beliefs. Simulating the effects of antidopaminergic antipsychotics - by reducing the model's confidence in its actions - demonstrates that the model can escape from these attractors, through this synthetic pharmacotherapy.

Factors affecting conspiracy theory endorsement in paranoia

Paranoia and conspiracy thinking are known to be distinct but correlated constructs, but it is unknown whether certain types of conspiracy thinking are more common in paranoia than others. In a large (n = 1000), pre-registered online study we tested if endorsement of items on a new Components of Conspiracy Ideation Questionnaire varied according to whether harm was described as being (a) intentional and (b) self-referential. Our predictions were supported: paranoia was positively associated with endorsement of items on this questionnaire overall and more paranoid individuals were more likely to endorse items describing intentional and self-referential harm. Belief in any item on the Components of Conspiracy Ideation Questionnaire was associated with belief in others and items describing incidental harm and harm to others were found to be more believable overall. Individuals who endorsed conspiracy theory items on the questionnaire were more likely to state that people similar to them would as well, although this effect was not reduced in paranoia, counter to our expectations.

Trusting and learning from others: immediate and long-term effects of learning from observation and advice

Social learning underpins our species's extraordinary success. Learning through observation has been investigated in several species, but learning from advice-where information is intentionally broadcast-is less understood. We used a pre-registered, online experiment (n = 1492) combined with computational modelling to examine learning through observation and advice. Participants were more likely to immediately follow advice than to copy an observed choice, but this was dependent upon trust in the adviser: highly paranoid participants were less likely to follow advice in the short term. Reinforcement learning modelling revealed two distinct patterns regarding the long-term effects of social information: some individuals relied fully on social information, whereas others reverted to trial-and-error learning. This variation may affect the prevalence and fidelity of socially transmitted information. Our results highlight the privileged status of advice relative to observation and how the assimilation of intentionally broadcast information is affected by trust in others.

Conjecturing Harmful Intent and Preemptive Strike in Paranoia

Paranoia depicts a belief of others having harmful intent. Research using economic games has exhibited the correlation between paranoia and the propensity to characterize ambiguous intentions as harmful. Using a non-clinical sample recruited online from the United States (N=290), we examined whether paranoid thoughts influence aggressive behavior against the subjective perception of harmful intent. We conducted a preemptive strike game wherein aggressive behavior was assumed to be guided by the fear of an opponent. The outcomes indicate that (1) individuals with high paranoia assume harmful intent of an opponent more than those with low paranoia (2) conjecturing an opponent's harmful intent predicted an increase in the probability of a preemptive strike, and (3) paranoia did not have a statistically significant effect on encouraging a preemptive strike. Additionally, the exploratory analysis revealed that paranoia was related to participant's aggressiveness and with suppositions of other's self-interests and competitiveness. This study presents empirical evidence that paranoia is related to the perception of social threats in an uncertain situation. We discuss the possibility that paranoid ideation can promote or inhibit a preemptive strike.

Persecutory ideation and anomalous perceptual experiences in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak in France: what's left one month later?

PURPOSE

Beyond the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on the public's health, the length of lockdown and its possible psychological impacts on populations is heavily debated. However, the consequences of lockdown on psychotic symptoms have been poorly investigated.

METHODS

An online survey was run from April 13 to May 11, 2020; a total of 728 French subjects from the general population were included in the study. We assessed the perceived impact of the COVID-19 outbreak, length of isolation, diagnosis/symptoms/hospitalisation related to the COVID-19 (oneself and family). Paranoid ideations and hallucination-like experiences were assessed via the Paranoia Scale and the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale, respectively. Self-reported measures of negative affect, loneliness, sleep difficulties, jumping to conclusion bias, repetitive thoughts, among others, were also included.

RESULTS

Final regression model for paranoia indicated that socio-demographic variables (age, sex and education), loneliness, cognitive bias, anxiety, experiential avoidance, repetitive thoughts and hallucinations were associated with paranoia (R² = 0.43). For hallucinations, clinical variables as well as the quality of sleep, behavioural activation, repetitive thoughts, anxiety and paranoia were associated with hallucinations in our sample (R² = 0.27). Neither length of isolation nor the perceived impact of the COVID-19 pandemic were associated with psychotic experiences in the final models.

CONCLUSIONS

No evidence was found for the impact of isolation on psychotic symptoms in the general population in France one month after the lockdown. It nevertheless confirms the preeminent role of several factors previously described in the maintenance and development of psychotic symptoms in the context of a pandemic and lockdown measures.

Social reward, punishment, and prosociality in paranoia

Paranoia is the exaggerated belief that harm will occur and is intended by others. Although commonly framed in terms of attributing malicious intent to others, recent work has explored how paranoia also affects social decision-making, using economic games. Previous work found that paranoia is associated with decreased cooperation and increased punishment in the Dictator Game (where cooperating and punishing involve paying a cost to respectively increase or decrease a partner's income). These findings suggest that paranoia might be associated with variation in subjective reward from positive and/or negative social decision-making, a possibility we explore using a preregistered experiment with U.S.-based participants (n = 2,004). Paranoia was associated with increased self-reported enjoyment of negative social interactions and decreased self-reported enjoyment of prosocial interactions. More paranoid participants attributed stronger harmful intent to a partner. Harmful intent attributions and the enjoyment of negative social interactions positively predicted the tendency to pay to punish the partner. Cooperation was positively associated with the tendency to enjoy prosocial interactions and increased with participant age. There was no main effect of paranoia on tendency to cooperate in this setting. We discuss these findings in light of previous research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Reduction in social learning and increased policy uncertainty about harmful intent is associated with pre-existing paranoid beliefs: Evidence from modelling a modified serial dictator game

Current computational models suggest that paranoia may be explained by stronger higher-order beliefs about others and increased sensitivity to environments. However, it is unclear whether this applies to social contexts, and whether it is specific to harmful intent attributions, the live expression of paranoia. We sought to fill this gap by fitting a computational model to data (n = 1754) from a modified serial dictator game, to explore whether pre-existing paranoia could be accounted by specific alterations to cognitive parameters characterising harmful intent attributions. We constructed a ‘Bayesian brain’ model of others’ intent, which we fitted to harmful intent and self-interest attributions made over 18 trials, across three different partners. We found that pre-existing paranoia was associated with greater uncertainty about other’s actions. It moderated the relationship between learning rates and harmful intent attributions, making harmful intent attributions less reliant on prior interactions. Overall, the magnitude of harmful intent attributions was directly related to their uncertainty, and importantly, the opposite was true for self-interest attributions. Our results explain how pre-existing paranoia may be the result of an increased need to attend to immediate experiences in determining intentional threat, at the expense of what is already known, and more broadly, they suggest that environments that induce greater probabilities of harmful intent attributions may also induce states of uncertainty, potentially as an adaptive mechanism to better detect threatening others. Importantly, we suggest that if paranoia were able to be explained exclusively by core domain-general alterations we would not observe differential parameter estimates underlying harmful-intent and self-interest attributions.

A great deal of work has tried to explain paranoia through general cognitive principles, although relatively little has tried to understand whether paranoia may be explained by specific changes to social learning processes. This question is crucial, as paranoia is inherently a social phenomenon, and requires mechanistic explanations to match with its dynamic phenomenology. In this paper we wanted to test whether pre-existing and live paranoid beliefs about others specifically altered how an individual attributed harmful intent–the live expression of paranoia–to partners over a series of live interactions. To do this we applied a novel computational model and network analysis to behavioural data from a large sample of participants in the general population that had played a modified Dictator game online, and required them to attribute whether the behaviour of their partner was due to their intent to harm, or their self-interest, on two mutually exclusive scales. Pre-existing paranoid beliefs about others reduced the value of new partner behaviours on evolving attributions of harmful intent. We suggest that both pre-existing paranoid beliefs and momentary paranoia may incur an adaptive cognitive state to better track potentially threatening others, and demonstrate phenomenological specificity associated with mechanisms of live paranoia.

Dopamine manipulations modulate paranoid social inferences in healthy people

Altered dopamine transmission is thought to influence the formation of persecutory delusions. However, despite extensive evidence from clinical studies there is little experimental evidence on how modulating the dopamine system changes social attributions related to paranoia, and the salience of beliefs more generally. Twenty seven healthy male participants received 150mg L-DOPA, 3 mg haloperidol, or placebo in a double-blind, randomised, placebo-controlled study, over three within-subject sessions. Participants completed a multi-round Dictator Game modified to measure social attributions, and a measure of belief salience spanning themes of politics, religion, science, morality, and the paranormal. We preregistered predictions that altering dopamine function would affect (i) attributions of harmful intent and (ii) salience of paranormal beliefs. As predicted, haloperidol reduced attributions of harmful intent across all conditions compared to placebo. L-DOPA reduced attributions of harmful intent in fair conditions compared to placebo. Unexpectedly, haloperidol increased attributions of self-interest about opponents' decisions. There was no change in belief salience within any theme. These results could not be explained by scepticism or subjective mood. Our findings demonstrate the selective involvement of dopamine in social inferences related to paranoia in healthy individuals.