Neuronal correlates of subjective visual perception

Ultrahigh Field fMRI Reveals Different Roles of the Temporal and Frontoparietal Cortices in Subjective Awareness

A central question in consciousness theories is whether one is dealing with a dichotomous ("all-or-none") or a gradual phenomenon. In this 7T fMRI study, we investigated whether dichotomy or gradualness in fact depends on the brain region associated with perceptual awareness reports. Both male and female human subjects performed an emotion discrimination task (fear vs neutral bodies) presented under continuous flash suppression with trial-based perceptual awareness measures. Behaviorally, recognition sensitivity increased linearly with increased stimuli awareness and was at chance level during perceptual unawareness. Physiologically, threat stimuli triggered a slower heart rate than neutral ones during "almost clear" stimulus experience, indicating freezing behavior. Brain results showed that activity in the occipitotemporal, parietal, and frontal regions as well as in the amygdala increased with increased stimulus awareness while early visual areas showed the opposite pattern. The relationship between temporal area activity and perceptual awareness best fitted a gradual model while the activity in frontoparietal areas fitted a dichotomous model. Furthermore, our findings illustrate that specific experimental decisions, such as stimulus type or the approach used to evaluate awareness, play pivotal roles in consciousness studies and warrant careful consideration.

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

Conscious Experience of Stimulus Presence and Absence Is Actively Encoded by Neurons in the Crow Brain

The emergence of consciousness from brain activity constitutes one of the great riddles in biology. It is commonly assumed that only the conscious perception of the presence of a stimulus elicits neuronal activation to signify a "neural correlate of consciousness," whereas the subjective experience of the absence of a stimulus is associated with a neuronal resting state. Here, we demonstrate that the two subjective states "stimulus present" and "stimulus absent" are represented by two specialized neuron populations in crows, corvid birds. We recorded single-neuron activity from the nidopallium caudolaterale of crows trained to report the presence or absence of images presented near the visual threshold. Because of the task design, neuronal activity tracking the conscious "present" versus "absent" percept was dissociated from that involved in planning a motor response. Distinct neuron populations signaled the subjective percepts of "present" and "absent" by increases in activation. The response selectivity of these two neuron populations was similar in strength and time course. This suggests a balanced code for subjective "presence" versus "absence" experiences, which might be beneficial when both conscious states need to be maintained active in the service of goal-directed behavior.

Negligible contribution of adaptation of ocular opponency neurons to the effect of short-term monocular deprivation

Introduction

Modeling work on binocular rivalry has described how ocular opponency neurons represent interocular conflict. These neurons have recently been considered to mediate an ocular dominance shift to the eye that has viewed a backward movie for long during which time the other eye is presented with a regular movie. Unlike typical short-term monocular deprivation, the visual inputs are comparable across eyes in that "dichoptic-backward-movie" paradigm. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the ocular opponency neurons are also responsible for the short-term monocular deprivation effect which is prevalently explained by the homeostatic compensation theory. We designed two experiments from distinct perspectives to investigate this question.

Methods

In Experiment 1, we mitigated the imbalance in the activity of opponency neurons between the two eyes during monocular deprivation by presenting video stimuli alternately. In Experiment 2, we directly evaluated the response of opponency neurons before and after monocular deprivation using SSVEP techniques.

Results

Consistent with each other, both experiments failed to provide reliable evidence supporting the involvement of ocular opponency neurons in the short-term monocular deprivation effect.

Discussion

Our results suggest that ocular opponency neurons may not play an essential role in the short-term monocular deprivation effect, potentially due to interference from the homeostatic plasticity mechanism.

Computational components of visual predictive coding circuitry

If a full visual percept can be said to be a 'hypothesis', so too can a neural 'prediction' - although the latter addresses one particular component of image content (such as 3-dimensional organisation, the interplay between lighting and surface colour, the future trajectory of moving objects, and so on). And, because processing is hierarchical, predictions generated at one level are conveyed in a backward direction to a lower level, seeking to predict, in fact, the neural activity at that prior stage of processing, and learning from errors signalled in the opposite direction. This is the essence of 'predictive coding', at once an algorithm for information processing and a theoretical basis for the nature of operations performed by the cerebral cortex. Neural models for the implementation of predictive coding invoke specific functional classes of neuron for generating, transmitting and receiving predictions, and for producing reciprocal error signals. Also a third general class, 'precision' neurons, tasked with regulating the magnitude of error signals contingent upon the confidence placed upon the prediction, i.e., the reliability and behavioural utility of the sensory data that it predicts. So, what is the ultimate source of a 'prediction'? The answer is multifactorial: knowledge of the current environmental context and the immediate past, allied to memory and lifetime experience of the way of the world, doubtless fine-tuned by evolutionary history too. There are, in consequence, numerous potential avenues for experimenters seeking to manipulate subjects' expectation, and examine the neural signals elicited by surprising, and less surprising visual stimuli. This review focuses upon the predictive physiology of mouse and monkey visual cortex, summarising and commenting on evidence to date, and placing it in the context of the broader field. It is concluded that predictive coding has a firm grounding in basic neuroscience and that, unsurprisingly, there remains much to learn.

Tug-of-Peace: Visual Rivalry and Atypical Visual Motion Processing in MECP2 Duplication Syndrome of Autism

Extracting common patterns of neural circuit computations in the autism spectrum and confirming them as a cause of specific core traits of autism is the first step toward identifying cell-level and circuit-level targets for effective clinical intervention. Studies in humans with autism have identified functional links and common anatomic substrates between core restricted behavioral repertoire, cognitive rigidity, and overstability of visual percepts during visual rivalry. To study these processes with single-cell precision and comprehensive neuronal population coverage, we developed the visual bistable perception paradigm for mice based on ambiguous moving plaid patterns consisting of two transparent gratings drifting at an angle of 120°. This results in spontaneous reversals of the perception between local component motion (plaid perceived as two separate moving grating components) and integrated global pattern motion (plaid perceived as a fused moving texture). This robust paradigm does not depend on the explicit report of the mouse, since the direction of the optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) is used to infer the dominant percept. Using this paradigm, we found that the rate of perceptual reversals between global and local motion interpretations is reduced in the methyl-CpG-binding protein 2 duplication syndrome (MECP2-ds) mouse model of autism. Moreover, the stability of local motion percepts is greatly increased in MECP2-ds mice at the expense of global motion percepts. Thus, our model reproduces a subclass of the core features in human autism (reduced rate of visual rivalry and atypical perception of visual motion). This further offers a well-controlled approach for dissecting neuronal circuits underlying these core features.

Hyperexcitability in the Olfactory Bulb and Impaired Fine Odor Discrimination in the Fmr1 KO Mouse Model of Fragile X Syndrome

Fragile X syndrome (FXS) is the single most common monogenetic cause of autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) in humans. FXS is caused by loss of expression of the fragile X mental retardation protein (FMRP), an mRNA-binding protein encoded on the X chromosome involved in suppressing protein translation. Sensory processing deficits have been a major focus of studies of FXS in both humans and rodent models of FXS, but olfactory deficits remain poorly understood. Here, we conducted experiments in wild-type (WT) and Fmr1 knock-out (KO; Fmr1-/y ) mice (males) that lack expression of the gene encoding FMRP to assess olfactory circuit and behavioral abnormalities. In patch-clamp recordings conducted in slices of the olfactory bulb, output mitral cells (MCs) in Fmr1 KO mice displayed greatly enhanced excitation under baseline conditions, as evidenced by a much higher rate of occurrence of spontaneous network-level events known as long-lasting depolarizations (LLDs). The higher probability of spontaneous LLDs (sLLDs), which appeared to be because of a decrease in GABAergic synaptic inhibition in glomeruli leading to more feedforward excitation, caused a reduction in the reliability of stimulation-evoked responses in MCs. In addition, in a go/no-go operant discrimination paradigm, we found that Fmr1 KO mice displayed impaired discrimination of odors in difficult tasks that involved odor mixtures but not altered discrimination of monomolecular odors. We suggest that the Fmr1 KO-induced reduction in MC response reliability is one plausible mechanism for the impaired fine odor discrimination.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Fragile X syndrome (FXS) in humans is associated with a range of debilitating deficits including aberrant sensory processing. One sensory system that has received comparatively little attention in studies in animal models of FXS is olfaction. Here, we report the first comprehensive physiological analysis of circuit defects in the olfactory bulb in the commonly-used Fmr1 knock-out (KO) mouse model of FXS. Our studies indicate that Fmr1 KO alters the local excitation/inhibition balance in the bulb, similar to what Fmr1 KO does in other brain circuits, but through a novel mechanism that involves enhanced feedforward excitation. Furthermore, Fmr1 KO mice display behavioral impairments in fine odor discrimination, an effect that may be explained by changes in neural response reliability.

Does V1 response suppression initiate binocular rivalry?

During binocular rivalry (BR) only one eye's view is perceived. Neural underpinnings of BR are debated. Recent studies suggest that primary visual cortex (V1) initiates BR. One trigger might be response suppression across most V1 neurons at the onset of BR. Here, we utilize a variant of BR called binocular rivalry flash suppression (BRFS) to test this hypothesis. BRFS is identical to BR, except stimuli are shown with a ∼1s delay. If V1 response suppression was required to initiate BR, it should occur during BRFS as well. To test this, we compared V1 spiking in two macaques observing BRFS. We found that BRFS resulted in response facilitation rather than response suppression across V1 neurons. However, BRFS still reduces responses in a subset of V1 neurons due to the adaptive effects of asynchronous stimulus presentation. We argue that this selective response suppression could serve as an alternate initiator of BR.

Feedback information sharing in the human brain reflects bistable perception in the absence of report

In the search for the neural basis of conscious experience, perception and the cognitive processes associated with reporting perception are typically confounded as neural activity is recorded while participants explicitly report what they experience. Here, we present a novel way to disentangle perception from report using eye movement analysis techniques based on convolutional neural networks and neurodynamical analyses based on information theory. We use a bistable visual stimulus that instantiates two well-known properties of conscious perception: integration and differentiation. At any given moment, observers either perceive the stimulus as one integrated unitary object or as two differentiated objects that are clearly distinct from each other. Using electroencephalography, we show that measures of integration and differentiation based on information theory closely follow participants' perceptual experience of those contents when switches were reported. We observed increased information integration between anterior to posterior electrodes (front to back) prior to a switch to the integrated percept, and higher information differentiation of anterior signals leading up to reporting the differentiated percept. Crucially, information integration was closely linked to perception and even observed in a no-report condition when perceptual transitions were inferred from eye movements alone. In contrast, the link between neural differentiation and perception was observed solely in the active report condition. Our results, therefore, suggest that perception and the processes associated with report require distinct amounts of anterior-posterior network communication and anterior information differentiation. While front-to-back directed information is associated with changes in the content of perception when viewing bistable visual stimuli, regardless of report, frontal information differentiation was absent in the no-report condition and therefore is not directly linked to perception per se.

Aging attenuated theta response during multistable perception

Multistable stimuli are physically unchanging, but elicit spontaneous perceptual reversals between multiple internally generated perceptual alternatives. Perceptual reversal rates seem to decrease in older adults; however, there is no literature on the electrophysiological correlates of this performance decrease. Here, we aimed to identify age-related changes in theta activity that relate to decreased reversal rates of older adults. Electroencephalography (EEG) of young (n = 15) and older adults (n = 15) was recorded during presentation of stroboscopic alternative motion (SAM) and a control stimulus. Time-frequency amplitudes were extracted in 4-8 Hz via Morlet wavelet convolution. Older adults had lower SAM reversals as well as decreased accuracy, increased reaction time (RT) and increased RT variability in the control task. In older adults, reversal-related frontal theta response was diminished, yet parietal theta was intact. In the parietal area, the relationship between theta response and reversal rates was robust, but in the frontal area, was dependent on age-related variance. Result indicated that, in older adults, top-down facilitation of perceptual reversals was impaired. This appears to result in a predominantly bottom-up resolution of perceptual multistability. Age-related degradation of sensory areas in this bottom-up-driven resolution process might have slowed reversals. This study presents the first electrophysiological correlates of age-related impairment in multistable perceptual integration.

Neural representations of competing stimuli along the dorsal and ventral visual pathways during binocular rivalry

Binocular rivalry arises when two discrepant stimuli are simultaneously presented to different eyes, during which observers consciously experience vivid perceptual alternations without physical changes in visual inputs. Neural dynamics tracking such perceptual alternations have been identified at both early and late visual areas, leading to the fundamental debate concerning the primary neural substrate underlying binocular rivalry. One promising hypothesis that might reconcile these seemingly paradoxical findings is a gradual shift from interocular competition between monocular neurons to pattern competition among binocular neurons. Here, we examined this hypothesis by investigating how neural representations of rivalrous stimuli evolved along the visual pathway. We found that representations of the dominant and the suppressed stimuli initially co-existed in V1, which were enhanced and attenuated respectively in extrastriate visual areas. Notably, neural activity in V4 was dictated by the representation of the dominant stimulus, while the representation of the suppressed stimulus was only partially inhibited in dorsal areas V3A and MT+. Our findings revealed a progressive transition from the co-existing representations of the rivalrous inputs to the dictatorial representation of the dominant stimulus in the ventral pathway, and advocated different cortical evolutionary patterns of visual representations between the dorsal and the ventral pathways.

Bistability of prefrontal states gates access to consciousness

Access of sensory information to consciousness has been linked to the ignition of content-specific representations in association cortices. How does ignition interact with intrinsic cortical state fluctuations to give rise to conscious perception? We addressed this question in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) by combining multi-electrode recordings with a binocular rivalry (BR) paradigm inducing spontaneously driven changes in the content of consciousness, inferred from the reflexive optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) pattern. We find that fluctuations between low-frequency (LF, 1-9 Hz) and beta (∼20-40 Hz) local field potentials (LFPs) reflect competition between spontaneous updates and stability of conscious contents, respectively. Both LF and beta events were locally modulated. The phase of the former locked differentially to the competing populations just before a spontaneous transition while the latter synchronized the neuronal ensemble coding the consciously perceived content. These results suggest that prefrontal state fluctuations gate conscious perception by mediating internal states that facilitate perceptual update and stability.

Adaptation in the sensory cortex drives bistable switching during auditory stream segregation

Current theories of perception emphasize the role of neural adaptation, inhibitory competition, and noise as key components that lead to switches in perception. Supporting evidence comes from neurophysiological findings of specific neural signatures in modality-specific and supramodal brain areas that appear to be critical to switches in perception. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to study brain activity around the time of switches in perception while participants listened to a bistable auditory stream segregation stimulus, which can be heard as one integrated stream of tones or two segregated streams of tones. The auditory thalamus showed more activity around the time of a switch from segregated to integrated compared to time periods of stable perception of integrated; in contrast, the rostral anterior cingulate cortex and the inferior parietal lobule showed more activity around the time of a switch from integrated to segregated compared to time periods of stable perception of segregated streams, consistent with prior findings of asymmetries in brain activity depending on the switch direction. In sound-responsive areas in the auditory cortex, neural activity increased in strength preceding switches in perception and declined in strength over time following switches in perception. Such dynamics in the auditory cortex are consistent with the role of adaptation proposed by computational models of visual and auditory bistable switching, whereby the strength of neural activity decreases following a switch in perception, which eventually destabilizes the current percept enough to lead to a switch to an alternative percept.

In search for consciousness in animals: Using working memory and voluntary attention as behavioral indicators

Whether animals have subjective experiences about the content of their sensory input, i.e., whether they are aware of stimuli, is a notoriously difficult question to answer. If consciousness is present in animals, it must share fundamental characteristics with human awareness. Working memory and voluntary/endogenous attention are suggested as diagnostic features of conscious awareness. Behavioral evidence shows clear signatures of both working memory and voluntary attention as minimal criterium for sensory consciousness in mammals and birds. In contrast, reptiles and amphibians show no sign of either working memory or volitional attention. Surprisingly, some species of teleost fishes exhibit elementary working memory and voluntary attention effects suggestive of possibly rudimentary forms of subjective experience. With the potential exception of honeybees, evidence for conscious processing is lacking in invertebrates. These findings suggest that consciousness is not ubiquitous in the animal kingdom but also not exclusive to humans. The phylogenetic gap between animal taxa argues that evolution does not rely on specific neural substrates to endow distantly related species with basic forms of consciousness.

Neurons as will and representation

Memory recollections and voluntary actions are often perceived as spontaneously generated irrespective of external stimuli. Although products of our neurons, they are only rarely accessible in humans at the neuronal level. Here I review insights gleaned from unique neurosurgical opportunities to record and stimulate single-neuron activity in people who can declare their thoughts, memories and wishes. I discuss evidence that the subjective experience of human recollection and that of voluntary action arise from the activity of two internal neuronal generators, the former from medial temporal lobe reactivation and the latter from frontoparietal preactivation. I characterize properties of these generators and their interaction, enabling flexible recruitment of memory-based choices for action as well as recruitment of action-based plans for the representation of conceptual knowledge in memories. Both internal generators operate on surprisingly explicit but different neuronal codes, which appear to arise with distinct single-neuron activity, often observed before participants' reports of conscious awareness. I discuss prediction of behaviour based on these codes, and the potential for their modulation. The prospects of editing human memories and volitions by enhancement, inception or deletion of specific, selected content raise therapeutic possibilities and ethical concerns.

Bi-Stable Perception: Self-Coordinating Brain Regions to Make-Up the Mind

Bi-stable perception is a strong instance of cognitive self-organization, providing a research model for how ‘the brain makes up its mind.’ The complexity of perceptual bistability prevents a simple attribution of functions to areas, because many cognitive processes, recruiting multiple brain regions, are simultaneously involved. The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) evidence suggests the activation of a large network of distant brain areas. Concurrently, electroencephalographic and magnetoencephalographic (MEEG) literature shows sub second oscillatory activity and phase synchrony on several frequency bands. Strongly represented are beta and gamma bands, often associated with neural/cognitive integration processes. The spatial extension and short duration of brain activities suggests the need for a fast, large-scale neural coordination mechanism. To address the range of temporo-spatial scales involved, we systematize the current knowledge from mathematical models, cognitive sciences and neuroscience at large, from single-cell- to system-level research, including evidence from human and non-human primates. Surprisingly, despite evidence spanning through different organization levels, models, and experimental approaches, the scarcity of integrative studies is evident. In a final section of the review we dwell on the reasons behind such scarcity and on the need of integration in order to achieve a real understanding of the complexities underlying bi-stable perception processes.

Representational 'touch' and modulatory 'retouch'-two necessary neurobiological processes in thalamocortical interaction for conscious experience

Theories of consciousness using neurobiological data or being influenced by these data have been focused either on states of consciousness or contents of consciousness. These theories have occasionally used evidence from psychophysical phenomena where conscious experience is a dependent experimental variable. However, systematic catalog of many such relevant phenomena has not been offered in terms of these theories. In the perceptual retouch theory of thalamocortical interaction, recently developed to become a blend with the dendritic integration theory, consciousness states and contents of consciousness are explained by the same mechanism. This general-purpose mechanism has modulation of the cortical layer-5 pyramidal neurons that represent contents of consciousness as its core. As a surplus, many experimental psychophysical phenomena of conscious perception can be explained by the workings of this mechanism. Historical origins and current views inherent in this theory are presented and reviewed.

Consciousness without cortex

Sensory consciousness - the awareness and ability to report subjective experiences - is a property of biological nervous systems that has evolved out of unconscious processing over hundreds of millions of years. From which brain structures and based on which mechanisms can conscious experience emerge? Based on the body of work in human and nonhuman primates, the emergence of consciousness is intimately associated with the workings of the mammalian cerebral cortex with its specific cell types and layered structure. However, recent neurophysiological recordings demonstrate a neuronal correlate of consciousness in the pallial endbrain of crows. These telencephalic integration centers in birds originate embryonically from other pallial territories, lack a layered architecture characteristic for the cerebral cortex, and exhibit independently evolved pallial cell types. This argues that the mammalian cerebral cortex is not a prerequisite for consciousness to emerge in all vertebrates. Rather, it seems that the anatomical and physiological principles of the telencephalic pallium offer this structure as a brain substrate for consciousness to evolve independently across vertebrate phylogeny.

Gestalts at threshold could reveal Gestalts as predictions

We review and revisit the predictive processing inspired “Gestalts as predictions” hypothesis. The study of Gestalt phenomena at and below threshold can help clarify the role of higher-order object selective areas and feedback connections in mid-level vision. In two psychophysical experiments assessing manipulations of contrast and configurality we showed that: (1) Gestalt phenomena are robust against saliency manipulations across the psychometric function even below threshold (with the accuracy gains and higher saliency associated with Gestalts being present even around chance performance); and (2) peak differences between Gestalt and control conditions happened around the time where responses to Gestalts are starting to saturate (mimicking the differential contrast response profile of striate vs. extra-striate visual neurons). In addition, Gestalts are associated with steeper psychometric functions in all experiments. We propose that these results reflect the differential engagement of object-selective areas in Gestalt phenomena and of information- or percept-based processing, as opposed to energy- or stimulus-based processing, more generally. In addition, the presence of nonlinearities in the psychometric functions suggest differential top-down modulation of the early visual cortex. We treat this as a proof of principle study, illustrating that classic psychophysics can help assess possible involvement of hierarchical predictive processing in Gestalt phenomena.

Separable pupillary signatures of perception and action during perceptual multistability

The pupil provides a rich, non-invasive measure of the neural bases of perception and cognition and has been of particular value in uncovering the role of arousal-linked neuromodulation, which alters both cortical processing and pupil size. But pupil size is subject to a multitude of influences, which complicates unique interpretation. We measured pupils of observers experiencing perceptual multistability-an ever-changing subjective percept in the face of unchanging but inconclusive sensory input. In separate conditions, the endogenously generated perceptual changes were either task-relevant or not, allowing a separation between perception-related and task-related pupil signals. Perceptual changes were marked by a complex pupil response that could be decomposed into two components: a dilation tied to task execution and plausibly indicative of an arousal-linked noradrenaline surge, and an overlapping constriction tied to the perceptual transient and plausibly a marker of altered visual cortical representation. Constriction, but not dilation, amplitude systematically depended on the time interval between perceptual changes, possibly providing an overt index of neural adaptation. These results show that the pupil provides a simultaneous reading on interacting but dissociable neural processes during perceptual multistability, and suggest that arousal-linked neuromodulator release shapes action but not perception in these circumstances.

The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity

Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness, phi (Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global information transfer (which is what Φ in fact measures) is mistaken. This misidentification has the consequence of requiring the attribution of consciousness to a range of natural systems and artifacts that include, but are not limited to, large-scale electrical power grids, gene-regulation networks, some electronic circuit boards, and social networks. Instead of treating this consequence of the theory as a disconfirmation, IIT embraces it. By regarding these systems as bearers of consciousness ex hypothesi, IIT is led towards the orbit of panpsychist ideation. This departure from science as we know it can be avoided by recognizing the functional misattribution at the heart of IIT's identity claim. We show, for example, what function is actually performed, at least in the human case, by the cortical combination of differentiation with integration that IIT identifies with consciousness. Finally, we examine what lessons may be drawn from IIT's failure to provide a credible account of consciousness for progress in the very active field of research concerned with exploring the phenomenon from formal and neural points of view.

The dual nature of the BOLD signal: Responses in visual area hMT+ reflect both input properties and perceptual decision

Neuroimaging studies have suggested that hMT+ encodes global motion interpretation, but this contradicts the notion that BOLD activity mainly reflects neuronal input. While measuring fMRI responses at 7 Tesla, we used an ambiguous moving stimulus, yielding the perception of two incoherently moving surfaces—component motion—or only one coherently moving surface—pattern motion, to induce perceptual fluctuations and identify perceptual organization size‐matched domains in hMT+. Then, moving gratings, exactly matching either the direction of component or pattern motion percepts of the ambiguous stimulus, were shown to the participants to investigate whether response properties reflect the input or decision. If hMT+ responses reflect the input, component motion domains (selective to incoherent percept) should show grating direction stimulus‐dependent changes, unlike pattern motion domains (selective to the coherent percept). This hypothesis is based on the known direction‐selective nature of inputs in component motion perceptual domains versus non‐selectivity in pattern motion perceptual domains. The response amplitude of pattern motion domains did not change with grating direction (consistently with their non‐selective input), in contrast to what happened for the component motion domains (consistently with their selective input). However, when we analyzed relative ratio measures they mirrored perceptual interpretation. These findings are consistent with the notion that patterns of BOLD responses reflect both sensory input and perceptual read‐out.

Perceptual rivalry across animal species

This review in memoriam of Jack Pettigrew provides an overview of past and current research into the phenomenon of multistable perception across multiple animal species. Multistable perception is characterized by two or more perceptual interpretations spontaneously alternating, or rivaling, when animals are exposed to stimuli with inherent sensory ambiguity. There is a wide array of ambiguous stimuli across sensory modalities, ranging from the configural changes observed in simple line drawings, such as the famous Necker cube, to the alternating perception of entire visual scenes that can be instigated by interocular conflict. The latter phenomenon, called binocular rivalry, in particular caught the attention of the late Jack Pettigrew, who combined his interest in the neuronal basis of perception with a unique comparative biological approach that considered ambiguous sensation as a fundamental problem of sensory systems that has shaped the brain throughout evolution. Here, we examine the research findings on visual perceptual alternation and suppression in a wide variety of species including insects, fish, reptiles, and primates. We highlight several interesting commonalities across species and behavioral indicators of perceptual alternation. In addition, we show how the comparative approach provides new avenues for understanding how the brain suppresses opposing sensory signals and generates alternations in perceptual dominance.

The SSVEP tracks attention, not consciousness, during perceptual filling-in

Research on the neural basis of conscious perception has almost exclusively shown that becoming aware of a stimulus leads to increased neural responses. By designing a novel form of perceptual filling-in (PFI) overlaid with a dynamic texture display, we frequency-tagged multiple disappearing targets as well as their surroundings. We show that in a PFI paradigm, the disappearance of a stimulus and subjective invisibility is associated with increases in neural activity, as measured with steady-state visually evoked potentials (SSVEPs), in electroencephalography (EEG). We also find that this increase correlates with alpha-band activity, a well-established neural measure of attention. These findings cast doubt on the direct relationship previously reported between the strength of neural activity and conscious perception, at least when measured with current tools, such as the SSVEP. Instead, we conclude that SSVEP strength more closely measures changes in attention.

Intracranial Recordings Reveal Unique Shape and Timing of Responses in Human Visual Cortex during Illusory Visual Events

During binocular rivalry, perception spontaneously changes without any alteration to the visual stimulus. What neural events bring about this illusion that a constant stimulus is changing? We recorded from intracranial electrodes placed on the occipital and posterior temporal cortex of two patients with epilepsy while they experienced illusory changes of a face-house binocular-rivalry stimulus or observed a control stimulus that physically changed. We performed within-patient comparisons of broadband high-frequency responses, focusing on single epochs recorded along the ventral processing stream. We found transient face- and house-selective responses localized to the same electrodes for illusory and physical changes, but the temporal characteristics of these responses markedly differed. In comparison with physical changes, responses to illusory changes were longer lasting, in particular exhibiting a characteristic slow rise. Furthermore, the temporal order of responses across the visual hierarchy was reversed for illusory as compared to physical changes: for illusory changes, higher order fusiform and parahippocampal regions responded before lower order occipital regions. Our tentative interpretation of these findings is that two stages underlie the initiation of illusory changes: a destabilization stage in which activity associated with the impending change gradually accumulates across the visual hierarchy, ultimately graduating in a top-down cascade of activity that may stabilize the new perceptual interpretation of the stimulus.

Invisible Adaptation: The Effect of Awareness on the Strength of the Motion Aftereffect

The ability to process information despite the lack of perceptual awareness is one of the most fascinating aspects of the visual system. Such unconscious processing is often investigated using adaptation, where any presence of the former can be traced by its footprint on aftereffects following the latter. We have investigated the mechanisms of the motion aftereffect (MAE) using random dot displays of varying motion coherence as well as crowding to modulate both the physical as well as the perceptual strength of the adaptation stimulus. Perceptual strength was quantitatively measured as the performance in a forced-choice direction-discrimination task. A motion-nulling technique was used to quantitatively measure the strength of the MAE. We show that the strength of the dynamic MAE is independently influenced by both the physical stimulus strength as well as the subjective perceptual strength, with the effect of the former being more prominent than that of the latter. We further show that the MAE still persists under conditions of subthreshold perception. Our results suggest that perceptual awareness can influence the strength of visual processing, but the latter is not fully dependent on the former and can still take place at its partial or even total absence.

Methods to assess binocular rivalry with periodic stimuli

Binocular rivalry occurs when the two eyes are presented with incompatible stimuli and perception alternates between these two stimuli. This phenomenon has been investigated in two types of experiments: (1) Traditional experiments where the stimulus is fixed, (2) eye-swap experiments in which the stimulus periodically swaps between eyes many times per second (Logothetis et al. in Nature 380(6575):621-624, 1996). In spite of the rapid swapping between eyes, perception can be stable for many seconds with specific stimulus parameter configurations. Wilson introduced a two-stage, hierarchical model to explain both types of experiments (Wilson in Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 100(24):14499-14503, 2003). Wilson's model and other rivalry models have been only studied with bifurcation analysis for fixed inputs and different types of dynamical behavior that can occur with periodically forcing inputs have not been investigated. Here we report (1) a more complete description of the complex dynamics in the unforced Wilson model, (2) a bifurcation analysis with periodic forcing. Previously, bifurcation analysis of the Wilson model with fixed inputs has revealed three main types of dynamical behaviors: Winner-takes-all (WTA), Rivalry oscillations (RIV), Simultaneous activity (SIM). Our results have revealed richer dynamics including mixed-mode oscillations (MMOs) and a period-doubling cascade, which corresponds to low-amplitude WTA (LAWTA) oscillations. On the other hand, studying rivalry models with numerical continuation shows that periodic forcing with high frequency (e.g. 18 Hz, known as flicker) modulates the three main types of behaviors that occur with fixed inputs with forcing frequency (WTA-Mod, RIV-Mod, SIM-Mod). However, dynamical behavior will be different with low frequency periodic forcing (around 1.5 Hz, so-called swap). In addition to WTA-Mod and SIM-Mod, cycle skipping, multi-cycle skipping and chaotic dynamics are found. This research provides a framework for either assessing binocular rivalry models to check consistency with empirical results, or for better understanding neural dynamics and mechanisms necessary to implement a minimal binocular rivalry model.

A hierarchical model of perceptual multistability involving interocular grouping

Ambiguous visual images can generate dynamic and stochastic switches in perceptual interpretation known as perceptual rivalry. Such dynamics have primarily been studied in the context of rivalry between two percepts, but there is growing interest in the neural mechanisms that drive rivalry between more than two percepts. In recent experiments, we showed that split images presented to each eye lead to subjects perceiving four stochastically alternating percepts (Jacot-Guillarmod et al. Vision research, 133, 37-46, 2017): two single eye images and two interocularly grouped images. Here we propose a hierarchical neural network model that exhibits dynamics consistent with our experimental observations. The model consists of two levels, with the first representing monocular activity, and the second representing activity in higher visual areas. The model produces stochastically switching solutions, whose dependence on task parameters is consistent with four generalized Levelt Propositions, and with experiments. Moreover, dynamics restricted to invariant subspaces of the model demonstrate simpler forms of bistable rivalry. Thus, our hierarchical model generalizes past, validated models of binocular rivalry. This neuromechanistic model also allows us to probe the roles of interactions between populations at the network level. Generalized Levelt's Propositions hold as long as feedback from the higher to lower visual areas is weak, and the adaptation and mutual inhibition at the higher level is not too strong. Our results suggest constraints on the architecture of the visual system and show that complex visual stimuli can be used in perceptual rivalry experiments to develop more detailed mechanistic models of perceptual processing.

Decreased amplitude and reliability of odor-evoked responses in two mouse models of autism

Sensory processing deficits are increasingly recognized as core symptoms of autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). However the molecular and circuit mechanisms that lead to sensory deficits are unknown. We show that two molecularly disparate mouse models of autism display similar deficits in sensory-evoked responses in the mouse olfactory system. We find that both Cntnap2- and Shank3-deficient mice of both sexes exhibit reduced response amplitude and trial-to-trial reliability during repeated odor presentation. Mechanistically, we show that both mouse models have weaker and fewer synapses between olfactory sensory nerve (OSN) terminals and olfactory bulb tufted cells and weaker synapses between OSN terminals and inhibitory periglomerular cells. Consequently, deficits in sensory processing provide an excellent candidate phenotype for analysis in ASDs.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The genetics of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are complex. How the many risk genes generate the similar sets of symptoms that define the disorder is unknown. In particular, little is understood about the functional consequences of these genetic alterations. Sensory processing deficits are important aspects of the ASD diagnosis and may be due to unreliable neural circuits. We show that two mouse models of autism, Cntnap2- and Shank3-deficient mice, display reduced odor-evoked response amplitudes and reliability. These data suggest that altered sensory-evoked responses may constitute a circuit phenotype in ASDs.

Selective Influence and Sequential Operations: A Research Strategy for Visual Search

We discuss the problem of elucidating mechanisms of visual search. We begin by considering the history, logic, and methods of relating behavioral or cognitive processes with neural processes. We then survey briefly the cognitive neurophysiology of visual search and essential aspects of the neural circuitry supporting this capacity. We introduce conceptually and empirically a powerful but underutilized experimental approach to dissect the cognitive processes supporting performance of a visual search task with factorial manipulations of singleton-distractor identifiability and stimulus-response cue discriminability. We show that systems factorial technology can distinguish processing architectures from the performance of macaque monkeys. This demonstration offers new opportunities to distinguish neural mechanisms through selective manipulation of visual encoding, search selection, rule encoding, and stimulus-response mapping.

Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach

In today's society, it becomes increasingly important to assess which non-human and non-verbal beings possess consciousness. This review article aims to delineate criteria for consciousness especially in animals, while also taking into account intelligent artifacts. First, we circumscribe what we mean with "consciousness" and describe key features of subjective experience: qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality and interpretation, integration and the combination of dynamic and stabilizing properties. We argue that consciousness has a biological function, which is to present the subject with a multimodal, situational survey of the surrounding world and body, subserving complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This survey reflects the brain's capacity for internal modeling of external events underlying changes in sensory state. Next, we follow an inside-out approach: how can the features of conscious experience, correlating to mechanisms inside the brain, be logically coupled to externally observable ("outside") properties? Instead of proposing criteria that would each define a "hard" threshold for consciousness, we outline six indicators: (i) goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; (ii) anatomic and physiological substrates for generating integrative multimodal representations; (iii) psychometrics and meta-cognition; (iv) episodic memory; (v) susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and (vi) specific visuospatial behaviors. Rather than emphasizing a particular indicator as being decisive, we propose that the consistency amongst these indicators can serve to assess consciousness in particular species. The integration of scores on the various indicators yields an overall, graded criterion for consciousness, somewhat comparable to the Glasgow Coma Scale for unresponsive patients. When considering theoretically derived measures of consciousness, it is argued that their validity should not be assessed on the basis of a single quantifiable measure, but requires cross-examination across multiple pieces of evidence, including the indicators proposed here. Current intelligent machines, including deep learning neural networks (DLNNs) and agile robots, are not indicated to be conscious yet. Instead of assessing machine consciousness by a brief Turing-type of test, evidence for it may gradually accumulate when we study machines ethologically and across time, considering multiple behaviors that require flexibility, improvisation, spontaneous problem-solving and the situational conspectus typically associated with conscious experience.

Multisensory perceptual awareness: Categorical or graded?

Neural evidence suggests that mechanisms associated with conscious access (i.e., the ability to report on a conscious state) are "all-or-none". Upon crossing some threshold, neural signals are globally broadcast throughout the brain and allow conscious reports. However, whether subjective experience (phenomenal consciousness) is categorical (i.e., transitioning abruptly from unconscious to conscious states) or graded (i.e., characterized by multiple intermediate states) remains an open question. To address this issue, we built a series of artificial neural networks containing distinct feedback connectivity from "multisensory" to "unisensory" cortices. In line with consciousness theories, we operationalized perceptual consciousness by the presence of feedback from higher-order nodes back to unisensory nodes which allow 'neural ignition' - a rapid, non-linear boost in response putatively leading to phenomenal consciousness. When simulating how these networks responded to unisensory and multisensory inputs, we found the fastest responses for multisensory presentations associated with multisensory feedback, and the slowest responses for multisensory presentations without feedback. Most interestingly, despite being built in line with "all-or-none" models of consciousness, multisensory stimuli associated with unisensory feedback (i.e., auditory or visual), and hence consistent with unisensory phenomenology according to theories of consciousness, generated intermediate reaction times. To extend these models to human perception and performance, we conducted extensive psychophysical testing in 29 subjects who each completed 10 h of a multisensory cue-congruency task. Consistent with the modeling results, we found that reaction times to multisensory cues reported as unisensory were intermediate between those of fully aware and fully unaware cues. These results support the existence of graded forms of phenomenological consciousness that can be instantiated by simple neural networks built in line with "all-or-none" models of consciousness.

Symmetric Networks with Geometric Constraints as Models of Visual Illusions

Multistable illusions occur when the visual system interprets the same image in two different ways. We model illusions using dynamic systems based on Wilson networks, which detect combinations of levels of attributes of the image. In most examples presented here, the network has symmetry, which is vital to the analysis of the dynamics. We assume that the visual system has previously learned that certain combinations are geometrically consistent or inconsistent, and model this knowledge by adding suitable excitatory and inhibitory connections between attribute levels. We first discuss 4-node networks for the Necker cube and the rabbit/duck illusion. The main results analyze a more elaborate model for the Necker cube, a 16-node Wilson network whose nodes represent alternative orientations of specific segments of the image. Symmetric Hopf bifurcation is used to show that a small list of natural local geometric consistency conditions leads to alternation between two global percepts: cubes in two different orientations. The model also predicts brief transitional states in which the percept involves impossible rectangles analogous to the Penrose triangle. A tristable illusion generalizing the Necker cube is modelled in a similar manner.

Two paradigms of bistable plaid motion reveal independent mutual inhibition processes

Perception is sometimes bistable, switching between two possible interpretations. Levelt developed several propositions to explain bistable perception in binocular rivalry, based on a model of competing neural populations connected through reciprocal inhibition. Here we test Levelt's laws with bistable plaid motion. Plaids are typically tristable, either a coherent pattern, transparent with one component in front, or transparent with the opposite depth order. In Experiment 1, we use a large angle between component directions to prevent plaid coherence, limiting the ambiguity to alternations of grating depth order. Similar to increasing contrast in binocular rivalry, increasing component speed led to higher switch rates (analogous to Levelt's fourth proposition). In Experiment 2, we used occlusion cues to prevent one depth order and limit bistability to one transparent depth order alternating with coherence. Increasing grating speed shortened coherent motion periods but left transparent periods largely unchanged (analogous to Levelt's second proposition). Switch dynamics showed no correlation between the experiments. These data suggest that plaid component speed acts like contrast in binocular rivalry to vary switch dynamics through a mutual inhibition model. The lack of correlation between both experiments suggests reciprocal inhibition mediates bistability between a variety of neural populations across the visual system.

Responses of Neurons in Lateral Intraparietal Area Depend on Stimulus-Associated Reward During Binocular Flash Suppression

Discovering neural correlates of subjective perception and dissociating them from sensory input has fascinated neuroscientists for a long time. Bistable and multistable perception phenomena have exhibited great experimental potential to address this question. Here, we performed electrophysiological recordings from single neurons in lateral intraparietal area (LIP) of rhesus macaques during stimulus and perceptual transitions induced by binocular flash suppression (BFS). LIP neurons demonstrated transient bursts of activity after stimulus presentation and stimulus or perceptual switches but only a minority of cells demonstrated stimulus and perceptual selectivity. To enhance LIP neural selectivity, we performed a second experiment in which the competing stimuli were associated with asymmetric rewards. We found that transient and sustained activities substantially increased while the proportion of stimulus selective neurons remained approximately the same, albeit with increased selectivity magnitude. In addition, we observed mild increases in the proportion of perceptually selective neurons which also showed increase magnitude of selectivity. Importantly, the increased selectivity of cells after the reward manipulation was not directly reflecting the reward size per se but an enhancement in stimulus differentiation. Based on our results, we conjecture that LIP contributes to perceptual transitions and serves a modulatory role in perceptual selection taking into account the stimulus behavioral value.

Columnar clusters in the human motion complex reflect consciously perceived motion axis

Existing knowledge of how cortical responses link to conscious content in humans is either inferred from animal models or from human studies limited by lower spatial resolution. While previous studies could relate distinct categorical percepts (faces vs. places) to signal differences across brain areas, measuring responses at submillimeter resolution allowed us to link subcategory conscious percepts (vertical vs. horizontal motion) to amplitude changes of separate populations within the same brain area. Furthermore, preferences for horizontal and vertical motion were organized into columnar clusters. We pave the way for future studies investigating if columnar clusters represent subcategorical distinctions in conscious content different from motion or in high-level perceptual and cognitive phenomena.

The specific contents of human consciousness rely on the activity of specialized neurons in cerebral cortex. We hypothesized that the conscious experience of a specific visual motion axis is reflected in response amplitudes of direction-selective clusters in the human motion complex. Using submillimeter fMRI at ultrahigh field (7 T) we identified fine-grained clusters that were tuned to either horizontal or vertical motion presented in an unambiguous motion display. We then recorded their responses while human observers reported the perceived axis of motion for an ambiguous apparent motion display. Although retinal stimulation remained constant, subjects reported recurring changes between horizontal and vertical motion percepts every 7 to 13 s. We found that these perceptual states were dissociatively reflected in the response amplitudes of the identified horizontal and vertical clusters. We also found that responses to unambiguous motion were organized in a columnar fashion such that motion preferences were stable in the direction of cortical depth and changed when moving along the cortical surface. We suggest that activity in these specialized clusters is involved in tracking the distinct conscious experience of a particular motion axis.

Consciousness: The last 50 years (and the next)

The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern. But for much of the 20th century, ideological and methodological concerns relegated its empirical study to the margins. Since the 1990s, studying consciousness has regained a legitimacy and momentum befitting its status as the primary feature of our mental lives. Nowadays, consciousness science encompasses a rich interdisciplinary mixture drawing together philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience its central discipline. Researchers have learned a great deal about the neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress will depend on specifying closer explanatory mappings between (first-person subjective) phenomenological descriptions and (third-person objective) descriptions of (embodied and embedded) neuronal mechanisms. Such progress will help reframe our understanding of our place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to a wide range of psychiatric and neurological disorders.

Human single neuron activity precedes emergence of conscious perception

Identifying the neuronal basis of spontaneous changes in conscious experience in the absence of changes in the external environment is a major challenge. Binocular rivalry, in which two stationary monocular images lead to continuously changing perception, provides a unique opportunity to address this issue. We studied the activity of human single neurons in the medial temporal and frontal lobes while patients were engaged in binocular rivalry. Here we report that internal changes in the content of perception are signaled by very early (~-2000 ms) nonselective medial frontal activity, followed by selective activity of medial temporal lobe neurons that precedes the perceptual change by ~1000 ms. Such early activations are not found for externally driven perceptual changes. These results suggest that a medial fronto-temporal network may be involved in the preconscious internal generation of perceptual transitions.

Can Contrast-Response Functions Indicate Visual Processing Levels?

Many visual effects are believed to be processed at several functional and anatomical levels of cortical processing. Determining if and how the levels contribute differentially to these effects is a leading problem in visual perception and visual neuroscience. We review and analyze a combination of extant psychophysical findings in the context of neurophysiological and brain-imaging results. Specifically using findings relating to visual illusions, crowding, and masking as exemplary cases, we develop a theoretical rationale for showing how relative levels of cortical processing contributing to these effects can already be deduced from the psychophysically determined functions relating respectively the illusory, crowding and masking strengths to the contrast of the illusion inducers, of the flankers producing the crowding, and of the mask. The wider implications of this rationale show how it can help to settle or clarify theoretical and interpretive inconsistencies and how it can further psychophysical, brain-recording and brain-imaging research geared to explore the relative functional and cortical levels at which conscious and unconscious processing of visual information occur. Our approach also allows us to make some specific predictions for future studies, whose results will provide empirical tests of its validity.

Multi-stability with ambiguous visual stimuli in Drosophila orientation behavior

It is widely accepted for humans and higher animals that vision is an active process in which the organism interprets the stimulus. To find out whether this also holds for lower animals, we designed an ambiguous motion stimulus, which serves as something like a multi-stable perception paradigm in Drosophila behavior. Confronted with a uniform panoramic texture in a closed-loop situation in stationary flight, the flies adjust their yaw torque to stabilize their virtual self-rotation. To make the visual input ambiguous, we added a second texture. Both textures got a rotatory bias to move into opposite directions at a constant relative angular velocity. The results indicate that the fly now had three possible frames of reference for self-rotation: either of the two motion components as well as the integrated motion vector of the two. In this ambiguous stimulus situation, the flies generated a continuous sequence of behaviors, each one adjusted to one or another of the three references.

Vision is considered an active process in humans and higher animals in which the stimulus is interpreted by the subject and can be perceived in different ways if it is ambiguous. We aimed to find out whether this also holds for lower animals, such as the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. To provide ambiguity, we exposed flies to transparent motion stimuli in a flight simulator and found their behavior to be multi-stable. These results show that the visual system of the fly can separate the individual components of a transparent motion stimulus, and that this kind of stimulus is ambiguous to the fly. The extent to which the fly shows component selectivity in its behavior depends on several properties of the stimulus, like pattern contrast and element density. The alternations between the different behaviors exhibit a stochasticity reminiscent of the temporal dynamics in human multi-stable perception.

Can Serial Dependencies in Choices and Neural Activity Explain Choice Probabilities?

During perceptual decisions the activity of sensory neurons covaries with choice, a covariation often quantified as “choice-probability”. Moreover, choices are influenced by a subject's previous choice (serial dependence) and neuronal activity often shows temporal correlations on long (seconds) timescales. Here, we test whether these findings are linked. Using generalized linear models, we analyze simultaneous measurements of behavior and V2 neural activity in macaques performing a visual discrimination task. Both, decisions and spiking activity show substantial temporal correlations and cross-correlations but seem to reflect two mostly separate processes. Indeed, removing history effects using semipartial correlation analysis leaves choice probabilities largely unchanged. The serial dependencies in choices and neural activity therefore cannot explain the observed choice probability. Rather, serial dependencies in choices and spiking activity reflect two predominantly separate but parallel processes, which are coupled on each trial by covariations between choices and activity. These findings provide important constraints for computational models of perceptual decision-making that include feedback signals.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Correlations, unexplained by the sensory input, between the activity of sensory neurons and an animal's perceptual choice (“choice probabilities”) have received attention from both a systems and computational neuroscience perspective. Conversely, whereas temporal correlations for both spiking activity (“non-stationarities”) and for a subject's choices in perceptual tasks (“serial dependencies”) have long been established, they have typically been ignored when measuring choice probabilities. Some accounts of choice probabilities incorporating feedback predict that these observations are linked. Here, we explore the extent to which this is the case. We find that, contrasting with these predictions, choice probabilities are largely independent of serial dependencies, which adds new constraints to accounts of choice probabilities that include feedback.

Single-Neuron Correlates of Conscious Perception in the Human Medial Temporal Lobe

The neuronal mechanisms giving rise to conscious perception remain largely elusive [1]. It is known that the strength of single-neuron activity correlates with conscious perception, especially in anterior regions of the ventral pathway in non-human primates [2-4] and in the human medial temporal lobe (MTL) [5, 6]. It is unclear, however, whether single-neuron correlates of conscious perception are characterized solely by the magnitude of neuronal responses, and whether the correlates of perception are equally prominent across different regions of the human MTL. While recording from 2,735 neurons in 21 neurosurgical patients during 40 experimental sessions, we created experimental conditions in which otherwise identical visual stimuli are sometimes seen and sometimes not detected at all by means of the attentional blink, i.e., the phenomenon that the second of two target stimuli in close succession often goes unnoticed to conscious perception [7]. Remarkably, responses to unseen versus seen stimuli were delayed and temporally more dispersed, in addition to being attenuated in firing rate. This finding suggests precise timing of neuronal responses as a novel candidate physiological marker of conscious perception. In addition, we found modulation of neuronal response timing and strength in response to seen versus unseen stimuli to increase along an anatomical gradient from the posterior to the anterior MTL. Our results thus map out the neuronal correlates of conscious perception in the human MTL both in time and in space.

Intracranial markers of conscious face perception in humans

Investigations of the neural basis of consciousness have greatly benefited from protocols that involve the presentation of stimuli at perceptual threshold, enabling the assessment of the patterns of brain activity that correlate with conscious perception, independently of any changes in sensory input. However, the comparison between perceived and unperceived trials would be expected to reveal not only the core neural substrate of a particular conscious perception, but also aspects of brain activity that facilitate, hinder or tend to follow conscious perception. We take a step towards the resolution of these confounds by combining an analysis of neural responses observed during the presentation of faces partially masked by Continuous Flash Suppression, and those responses observed during the unmasked presentation of faces and other images in the same subjects. We employed multidimensional classifiers to decode physical properties of stimuli or perceptual states from spectrotemporal representations of electrocorticographic signals (1071 channels in 5 subjects). Neural activity in certain face responsive areas located in both the fusiform gyrus and in the lateral-temporal/inferior-parietal cortex discriminated seen vs. unseen faces in the masked paradigm and upright faces vs. other categories in the unmasked paradigm. However, only the former discriminated upright vs. inverted faces in the unmasked paradigm. Our results suggest a prominent role for the fusiform gyrus in the configural perception of faces, and possibly other objects that are holistically processed. More generally, we advocate comparative analysis of neural recordings obtained during different, but related, experimental protocols as a promising direction towards elucidating the functional specificities of the patterns of neural activation that accompany our conscious experiences.

Attention model of binocular rivalry

When the corresponding retinal locations in the two eyes are presented with incompatible images, a stable percept gives way to perceptual alternations in which the two images compete for perceptual dominance. As perceptual experience evolves dynamically under constant external inputs, binocular rivalry has been used for studying intrinsic cortical computations and for understanding how the brain regulates competing inputs. Converging behavioral and EEG results have shown that binocular rivalry and attention are intertwined: binocular rivalry ceases when attention is diverted away from the rivalry stimuli. In addition, the competing image in one eye suppresses the target in the other eye through a pattern of gain changes similar to those induced by attention. These results require a revision of the current computational theories of binocular rivalry, in which the role of attention is ignored. Here, we provide a computational model of binocular rivalry. In the model, competition between two images in rivalry is driven by both attentional modulation and mutual inhibition, which have distinct selectivity (feature vs. eye of origin) and dynamics (relatively slow vs. relatively fast). The proposed model explains a wide range of phenomena reported in rivalry, including the three hallmarks: (i) binocular rivalry requires attention; (ii) various perceptual states emerge when the two images are swapped between the eyes multiple times per second; (iii) the dominance duration as a function of input strength follows Levelt's propositions. With a bifurcation analysis, we identified the parameter space in which the model's behavior was consistent with experimental results.