Creation of killer poxvirus could have been predicted

Virology-the path forward

In the United States (US), biosafety and biosecurity oversight of research on viruses is being reappraised. Safety in virology research is paramount and oversight frameworks should be reviewed periodically. Changes should be made with care, however, to avoid impeding science that is essential for rapidly reducing and responding to pandemic threats as well as addressing more common challenges caused by infectious diseases. Decades of research uniquely positioned the US to be able to respond to the COVID-19 crisis with astounding speed, delivering life-saving vaccines within a year of identifying the virus. We should embolden and empower this strength, which is a vital part of protecting the health, economy, and security of US citizens. Herein, we offer our perspectives on priorities for revised rules governing virology research in the US.

Improved understanding of biorisk for research involving microbial modification using annotated sequences of concern

Regulation of research on microbes that cause disease in humans has historically been focused on taxonomic lists of 'bad bugs'. However, given our increased knowledge of these pathogens through inexpensive genome sequencing, 5 decades of research in microbial pathogenesis, and the burgeoning capacity of synthetic biologists, the limitations of this approach are apparent. With heightened scientific and public attention focused on biosafety and biosecurity, and an ongoing review by US authorities of dual-use research oversight, this article proposes the incorporation of sequences of concern (SoCs) into the biorisk management regime governing genetic engineering of pathogens. SoCs enable pathogenesis in all microbes infecting hosts that are 'of concern' to human civilization. Here we review the functions of SoCs (FunSoCs) and discuss how they might bring clarity to potentially problematic research outcomes involving infectious agents. We believe that annotation of SoCs with FunSoCs has the potential to improve the likelihood that dual use research of concern is recognized by both scientists and regulators before it occurs.

Directed attenuation to enhance vaccine immunity

Many viral infections can be prevented by immunizing with live, attenuated vaccines. Early methods of attenuation were hit-and-miss, now much improved by genetic engineering. However, even current methods operate on the principle of genetic harm, reducing the virus’s ability to grow. Reduced viral growth has the undesired side-effect of reducing the host immune response below that of infection with wild-type. Might some methods of attenuation instead lead to an increased immune response? We use mathematical models of the dynamics of virus with innate and adaptive immunity to explore the tradeoff between attenuation of virus pathology and immunity. We find that modification of some virus immune-evasion pathways can indeed reduce pathology yet enhance immunity. Thus, attenuated vaccines can, in principle, be directed to be safe yet create better immunity than is elicited by the wild-type virus.

Live attenuated virus vaccines are among the most effective interventions to combat viral infections. Historically, the mechanism of attenuation has involved genetically reducing the viral growth rate, often achieved by adapting the virus to grow in a novel condition. More recent attenuation methods use genetic engineering but also are thought to impair viral growth rate. These classical attenuations typically result in a tradeoff whereby attenuation depresses the within-host viral load and pathology (which is beneficial to vaccine design), but reduces immunity (which is not beneficial). We use models to explore ways of directing the attenuation of a virus to avoid this tradeoff. We show that directed attenuation by interfering with (some) viral immune-evasion pathways can yield a mild infection but elicit higher levels of immunity than of the wild-type virus.

Information Hazards in Biotechnology

With the advance of biotechnology, biological information, rather than biological materials, is increasingly the object of principal security concern. We argue that both in theory and in practice, existing security approaches in biology are poorly suited to manage hazardous biological information, and use the cases of Mousepox, H5N1 gain of function, and Botulinum toxin H to highlight these ongoing challenges. We suggest that mitigation of these hazards can be improved if one can: (1) anticipate hazard potential before scientific work is performed; (2) consider how much the new information would likely help both good and bad actors; and (3) aim to disclose information in the manner that maximally disadvantages bad actors versus good ones.

Artificially designed pathogens - a diagnostic option for future military deployments

Diagnostic microbial isolates of bio-safety levels 3 and 4 are difficult to handle in medical field camps under military deployment settings. International transport of such isolates is challenging due to restrictions by the International Air Transport Association. An alternative option might be inactivation and sequencing of the pathogen at the deployment site with subsequent sequence-based revitalization in well-equipped laboratories in the home country for further scientific assessment. A literature review was written based on a PubMed search. First described for poliovirus in 2002, de novo synthesis of pathogens based on their sequence information has become a well-established procedure in science. Successful syntheses have been demonstrated for both viruses and prokaryotes. However, the technology is not yet available for routine diagnostic purposes. Due to the potential utility of diagnostic sequencing and sequence-based de novo synthesis of pathogens, it seems worthwhile to establish the technology for diagnostic purposes over the intermediate term. This is particularly true for resource-restricted deployment settings, where safe handling of harmful pathogens cannot always be guaranteed.

The hidden face of academic researches on classified highly pathogenic microorganisms

Highly pathogenic microorganisms and toxins are manipulated in academic laboratories for fundamental research purposes, diagnostics, drugs and vaccines development. Obviously, these infectious pathogens represent a potential risk for human and/or animal health and their accidental or intentional release (biosafety and biosecurity, respectively) is a major concern of governments. In the past decade, several incidents have occurred in laboratories and reported by media causing fear and raising a sense of suspicion against biologists. Some scientists have been ordered by US government to leave their laboratory for long periods of time following the occurrence of an incident involving infectious pathogens; in other cases laboratories have been shut down and universities have been forced to pay fines and incur a long-term ban on funding after gross negligence of biosafety/biosecurity procedures. Measures of criminal sanctions have also been taken to minimize the risk that such incidents can reoccur. As United States and many other countries, France has recently strengthened its legal measures for laboratories' protection. During the past two decades, France has adopted a series of specific restriction measures to better protect scientific discoveries with a potential economic/social impact and prevent their misuse by ill-intentioned people without affecting the progress of science through fundamental research. French legal regulations concerning scientific discoveries have progressively strengthened since 2001, until the publication in November 2011 of a decree concerning the "PPST" (for "Protection du Potentiel Scientifique et Technique de la nation", the protection of sensitive scientific data). Following the same logic of protection of sensitive scientific researches, regulations were also adopted in an order published in April 2012 concerning the biology and health field. The aim was to define the legal framework that precise the conditions for authorizing microorganisms and toxins experimentation in France; these regulations apply for any operation of production, manufacturing, transportation, import, export, possession, supply, transfer, acquisition and use of highly pathogenic microorganisms and toxins, referred to as "MOT" (for "MicroOrganismes et Toxines hautement pathogènes") by the French law. Finally, laboratories conducting researches on such infectious pathogens are henceforth classified restricted area or ZRR (for "Zone à Régime Restrictif"), according an order of July 2012. In terms of economic protection, biosafety and biosecurity, these regulations represent an undeniable progress as compared to the previous condition. However, the competitiveness of research laboratories handling MOTs is likely to suffer the side effects of these severe constraints. For example research teams working on MOTs can be drastically affected both by (i) the indirect costs generated by the security measure to be applied; (ii) the working time devoted to samples recording; (iii) the establishment of traceability and reporting to national security agency ANSM, (iv) the latency period required for staff members being officially authorized to conduct experiments on MOTs; (v) the consequent reduced attractiveness for recruiting new trainees whose work would be significantly hampered by theses administrative constraints; and (vi) the limitations in the exchange of material with external laboratories and collaborators. Importantly, there is a risk that French academic researchers gradually abandon research on MOTs in favor of other projects that are less subject to legal restrictions. This would reduce the acquisition of knowledge in the field of MOTs which, in the long term, could be highly detrimental to the country by increasing its vulnerability to natural epidemics due to pathogenic microorganisms that are classified as MOTs and, by reducing its preparedness against possible bioterrorist attacks that would use such microorganisms.

Why has Not There been More Research of Concern?

Amid the renewed concern in the last several years about the potential for life science research to facilitate the spread of disease, a central plank of the policy response has been to enact processes for assessing the risks and benefits of "research of concern." The recent controversy regarding a proposed redaction of work on the modification of a H5N1 avian influenza virus is perhaps the most prominent such instance. And yet, a noteworthy feature of this case is its exceptionalness. In the last 10 years, life science publishers, funders, and labs have rarely identified any research as "of concern," let alone proposed censors. This article takes this experience with risk assessment as an invitation for reflection. Reasons for the low number of instances of concern are related to how the biosecurity dimensions of the life sciences are identified, how they are described, how the assessments of benefits and risks are undertaken, how value considerations do and do not enter into assessments, as well as the lack of information on the outcomes of reviews. This argument builds on such considerations to examine the limitations and implications of the risk-benefit experiment of concern framing, the politics of expertise as well as the prospects for alternative responses.

Poxvirus interleukin-4 expression overcomes inherent resistance and vaccine-induced immunity: pathogenesis, prophylaxis, and antiviral therapy

In 2001, Jackson et al. reported that murine IL-4 expression by a recombinant ectromelia virus caused enhanced morbidity and lethality in resistant C57BL/6 mice as well as overcame protective immune memory responses. To achieve a more thorough understanding of this phenomenon and to assess a variety of countermeasures, we constructed a series of ECTV recombinants encoding murine IL-4 under the control of promoters of different strengths and temporal regulation. We showed that the ECTV-IL-4 recombinant expressing the highest level of IL-4 was uniformly lethal for C57BL/6 mice even when previously immunized. The lethality of the ECTV-IL-4 recombinants resulted from virus-expressed IL-4 signaling through the IL-4 receptor but was not due to IL-4 toxicity. A number of treatment approaches were evaluated against the most virulent IL-4 encoding virus. The most efficacious therapy was a combination of two antiviral drugs (CMX001(®) and ST-246(®)) that have different mechanisms of action.

Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences

The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing of innocents. It is an ethical dilemma for the researcher because of the potential actions of others, e.g., malevolent non-researchers who might steal dangerous biological agents, or make use of the original researcher's work. And it is a dilemma for governments concerned with the security of their citizens, as well as their health. In this article we construct a taxonomy of types of "experiments of concern" in the biological sciences, and thereby map the terrain of ethical risk. We then provide a series of analyses of the ethical problems and considerations at issue in the dual-use dilemma, including the impermissibility of certain kinds of research and possible restrictions on dissemination of research results given the risks to health and security. Finally, we explore the main available institutional responses to some of the specific ethical problems posed by the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences.

Initiation of primary anti-vaccinia virus immunity in vivo

The primary focus of our work is the initiation of an antiviral immune response. While we employ many experimental systems to address this fundamental issue, much of our work revolves around the use of vaccinia virus. Concerns over the negative effects of vaccination have prevented the return of the smallpox immunization program to the general population and underscored the importance of understanding the primary immune response to vaccinia virus. This response is comprised of a complex symphony of immune system components employing a variety of different mechanisms. In this review, we will both highlight the roles of many of these components and touch on the applications of vaccinia virus in the laboratory and the clinic.

Synergistic efficacy of the combination of ST-246 with CMX001 against orthopoxviruses

The combination of ST-246 and hexadecyloxypropyl-cidofovir or CMX001 was evaluated for synergistic activity in vitro against vaccinia virus and cowpox virus (CV) and in vivo against CV. In cell culture the combination was highly synergistic against both viruses, and the results suggested that combined treatment with these agents might offer superior efficacy in vivo. For animal models, ST-246 was administered orally with or without CMX001 to mice lethally infected with CV. Treatments began 1, 3, or 6 days postinfection using lower dosages than previously used for single-drug treatment. ST-246 was given at 10, 3, or 1 mg/kg of body weight with or without CMX001 at 3, 1, or 0.3 mg/kg to evaluate potential synergistic interactions. Treatment beginning 6 days post-viral inoculation with ST-246 alone only increased the mean day to death at 10 or 3 mg/kg but had no effect on survival. CMX001 alone also had no effect on survival. When the combination of the two drugs was begun 6 days after viral infection using various dosages of the two, a synergistic reduction in mortality was observed. No evidence of increased toxicity was noted with the combination either in vitro or in vivo. These results indicate that combinations of ST-246 and CMX001 are synergistic both in vitro and in vivo and suggest that combination therapy using ST-246 and CMX001 for treatment of orthopoxvirus disease in humans or animals may provide an additional benefit over the use of the two drugs by themselves.

The weapon potential of human pathogenic fungi

With the exception of Coccidioides spp., human pathogenic fungi are not found among lists of microbes with potential for biological warfare and bioterrorism against humans. However, many human pathogenic fungi are easily obtainable from the environment, are highly dispersible and can cause significant disease after inhalation with relatively low inocula. When the biological and pathogenic attributes of certain human pathogenic fungi are considered using a formula for calculating the relative weapon potential of a microbe it is as apparent that some organisms such as Coccidioides spp. are comparable to other microbes for which there is significant concern. Our analysis suggests that the current indifference to fungi as potential biological weapons against human populations is probably a perception engendered by their non-communicability, lack of history of use or development as biological weapons, and a relatively low incidence of symptomatic disease following natural infection. Awareness of the weapon potential of human pathogenic fungi is an important consideration for greater preparedness against the threat posed by biowarfare and bioterrorism.

The potential role of fowlpox virus in rational vaccine design

The design of optimal vaccines requires detailed knowledge of how protective immune responses are generated in vivo under normal circumstances. This approach to vaccine development, where the immune correlates of protection are defined and vaccines are designed to elicit the same response, is called rational vaccine design. Poxviruses are attractive candidates for inclusion in such design strategies owing to their large genome, which allows for the inclusion of multiple heterologous genes, including those encoding antigens, co-stimulatory molecules and cytokines. Fowlpox virus, the prototypical member of the Avipoxvirus genus, is particularly suitable, as it is also incapable of replicating in mammalian cells. The potential of recombinant fowlpox virus as a safe vaccine vector is being evaluated currently in a number of clinical trials for diseases, including HIV, malaria and various types of cancer. Despite their promise, intricate details regarding how fowlpox virus interacts with the host immune system have not been resolved. In this review, the issues surrounding the use of fowlpox virus as a vaccine vector and possible strategies for enhancing its efficacy are discussed.

The challenges of developing an antiviral agent for the treatment of smallpox using the animal efficacy rule

Smallpox, eradicated in the late 1970s, is considered a serious worldwide threat because of its potential use as a biological weapon. Attempts to develop an antiviral drug for the prophylaxis and treatment of the disease are complicated by the need to demonstrate effective antiviral activity and propose human dosing paradigms based on data generated in animals infected with related orthopoxviruses. This perspective article reviews the difficulties associated with developing an antiviral agent using animal models and the ‘animal efficacy rule’: a FDA regulation designed for situations where human clinical trials are not an option.

[Scientific progress and new biological weapons]

The biological weapons are different from conventional weapons, because living germs hold an extraordinary and predictable potential for multiplication, propagation and genetic variation during their dissemination in a susceptible population. Only natural pathogens (1rst generation weapons) have been used in the past (smallpox virus, plague, anthrax, toxins...). However, new threats are emerging, due to the rapid progress of scientific knowledge and its exponential worldwide diffusion. It is possible to synthesize microorganisms from in silico sequences widely diffused on Internet (poliovirus, influenza...), thus resulting in the accessibility of very dangerous virus confined today in high-security laboratories (virus Ebola...). It is possible also to "improve" pathogens by genetic manipulations, becoming more resistant or virulent (2nd generation weapons). Finally, one can now create de novo new pathogens by molecular breeding (DNA shuffling), potentially highly dangerous for naive populations (3rd generation weapons). Making biological weapons does not require too much technological resources and appears accessible to terrorists, due to low cost and easy use. Although the destructive consequences are difficult to predict, the psychological and social damages should be considerable, because of the highly emotional burden in the population associated to the transgression by man of a taboo of life.

The ‘supervirus’? Lessons from IL-4-expressing poxviruses

Members of the Poxviridae family are particularly adept at avoiding the host immune system, encoding a plethora of immunomodulatory proteins that subvert host defense. With their large genome, poxviruses are also useful for studying the effect of exogenous genes on virus-host interactions and immune responses. The insertion of the Th2 cytokine interleukin-4 (IL-4) into several poxviruses significantly increases the efficiency of the recombinant virus as a pathogen by directly inhibiting the development of Th1 immunity, which is crucial for viral clearance. In an age in which the fear of genetically modified weaponized pathogens exists, the understanding of how to make viruses more pathogenic further blurs the distinction between fundamental academic research and bioweapons development. Here, the extent of immune evasion by IL-4-expressing poxviruses will be explored, as will the consequences of this increased pathogenicity on protective immune responses.

Bioterrorism: is it a real threat?

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 commits the signatory nations to refraining from the use of biological weapons. However, the terrorist assaults of September 2001 and, subsequently, the anthrax-containing letters are cause for great concerns: new threats to the security of nations are expected, as terrorist organizations seem to increasingly explore novel ways of spreading terror. In this context, naturally emerging diseases such as SARS, monkeypox or West Nile fever assume new importance because it is difficult to distinguish between natural epidemics and possible bioweapon assaults. Great efforts on the part of governments and public health authorities are necessary to counteract these threats.

Poxvirus tropism

Despite the success of the WHO-led smallpox eradication programme a quarter of a century ago, there remains considerable fear that variola virus, or other related pathogenic poxviruses such as monkeypox, could re-emerge and spread disease in the human population. Even today, we are still mostly ignorant about why most poxvirus infections of vertebrate hosts show strict species specificity, or how zoonotic poxvirus infections occur when poxviruses occasionally leap into novel host species. Poxvirus tropism at the cellular level seems to be regulated by intracellular events downstream of virus binding and entry, rather than at the level of specific host receptors as is the case for many other viruses. This review summarizes our current understanding of poxvirus tropism and host range, and discusses the prospects of exploiting host-restricted poxvirus vectors for vaccines, gene therapy or tissue-targeted oncolytic viral therapies for the treatment of human cancers.

Poxvirus host range varies markedly ? some viruses, such as variola and molluscum contagiosum virus (both of which are human-specific), exhibit strict species tropism, whereas others such as cowpox virus are able to infect multiple host species.

Members of four of the eight genera of chordopoxviruses can zoonotically infect man. For example, monkeypox virus can cause severe smallpox-like disease in humans that clinically resembles variola virus.

The species tropism that is exhibited by many poxviruses in terms of causing disease is frequently quite different from the range of cultured cells that can be infected by these viruses.

Specific host-cell receptors do not mediate the distinction between cells that are permissive as opposed to non-permissive for poxvirus infection. Rather, restrictive host cells fail to support the full replication cycle of the infecting poxvirus at a point downstream of binding and entry.

A variety of poxviral host-range genes have been identified that contribute to the control of permissive versus non-permissive infection of cultured mammalian cells. The gene products of these host-range genes regulate the ability of the virus to complete its cytoplasmic replication cycle.

The development of host-restricted vaccines, like modified vaccinia Ankara (MVA), that do not replicate in humans but that retain potent immunogenicity, will provide safer platforms for recombinant vaccines.

Another advance has been the development of poxvirus-based oncolytic vectors that replicate preferentially in human tumour cells.

Responsibility in the life sciences: assessing the role of professional codes

In response to threats from bioweapons, questions are being asked today in some countries about the implications and appropriateness of biological research. Many organizations and governments have suggested that bioscientists adopt what is generally referred to as a "code of conduct" to reduce the security concerns associated with their work. This article examines the potential contribution of such codes. By drawing on past lessons in other areas of professional life, it suggests some key questions, issues, and dilemmas for future consideration. As argued, attempts to establish codes must address demanding questions about their aims and audience--questions whose answers depend on potentially contentious issues regarding arms control, science, ethics, and politics.

Smallpox vaccination and bioterrorism with pox viruses

Bioterrorist attacks occupy a special place amongst the innumerable potential types of terrorist attack, with the intentional release of pox viruses being especially feared in this connection. Apart from the variola virus, the agent responsible for smallpox in humans, the monkeypox virus and numerous other animal pox viruses pose potential risks for humans and animals. This risk scenario also includes recombinations between the various pox viruses, changes in hosts and genetically engineered manipulations of pox viruses. For over 200 years, the method of choice for combatting smallpox was via vaccination with a reproductive, original vaccinia virus. Worldwide eradication of smallpox at the end of the 1970s and the discontinuation of routine smallpox vaccination in 1980 can be credited to such vaccination. Unfortunately, these vaccinations were associated with a large number of postvaccinal impairments, sometimes resulting in death (e.g. postvaccinal encephalitis). The only way to restrict such postvaccinal complications was to carry out initial vaccination within the first 2 postnatal years. Initial vaccination at a later age led to such a sharp increase in the number of vaccines with complications that vaccination had to be discouraged. The dilemma of the smallpox vaccine stocks stems from the fact that a large portion of these stocks are produced with the same vaccinia strains as before. This is irresponsible, especially as the percentage of immune-suppressed persons in the population, for whom vaccination-related complications pose an especial threat, is increasing. One solution to the dilemma of the smallpox vaccine stocks is the MVA strain. It is harmless, protects humans and animals equally well against smallpox and can be applied parenterally.

Coding ethical behaviour: the challenges of biological weapons

Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have increased significantly. With this has come an expansion of those activities in civil society deemed as potential sites for applying security controls. This paper examines the assumptions and implications of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration can take place between security and openness in civilian biomedical research through devising professional codes of conduct for scientists. Future attempts to establish such codes must find a way of reconciling or at least addressing dilemmatic and tension-ridden issues about the appropriateness of research; a topic that raises fundamental questions about the position of science within society.

Cell-mediated cytotoxicity in recovery from poxvirus infections

The availability of mutant and gene targeted knockout mice with defects in components of cellular cytotoxicity mediated by either the Fas or the exocytosis pathway permitted an analysis of their role in recovery from poxvirus infections. Ectromelia (EV), a natural mouse pathogen causing mousepox, the closely related orthopoxviruses cow pox (CPV) and vaccinia virus (VV), each encode serpins that inhibit Fas mediated apoptosis and lysis of target cells. Nevertheless, distinct differences were seen when the three viruses were inoculated into perforin-deficient mice: highly resistant C57Bl/6 mice became susceptible to low doses of EV; resistance to CPV increased whereas there was no effect on VV infections. Absence of the cytolytic granule associated granzymes (gzm) A and B rendered C57Bl/6 mice increasingly more susceptible to EV infections. Lack of both gzms rendered them as susceptible as perforin deficient mice, despite the presence of functionally active perforin. Elevated EV titres in liver and spleen of gzmA x B deficient mice, early after infection and before cytotoxic T cells were detectable, strongly suggests that these two gzms exert an antiviral effect by a mechanism distinct from effector molecules of NK and cytotoxic T cells.

Immunization with hepatitis C virus-like particles protects mice from recombinant hepatitis C virus-vaccinia infection

We have recently demonstrated that immunization with hepatitis C virus-like particles (HCV-LPs) generated in insect cells can elicit both humoral and cellular immune responses in BALB/c mice. Here, we evaluate the immunogenicity of HCV-LPs in HLA2.1 transgenic (AAD) mice in comparison to DNA immunization. HCV-LP immunization elicited a significantly stronger humoral immune response than DNA immunization. HCV-LP-immunized mice also developed stronger HCV-specific cellular immune responses than DNA-immunized mice as determined by using quantitative enzyme-linked immunospot (ELISpot) assay and intracellular cytokine staining. In BALB/c mice, immunization with HCV-LPs resulted in a >5 log10 reduction in vaccinia titer when challenged with a recombinant vaccinia expressing the HCV structural proteins (vvHCV.S), as compared to 1 log10 decrease in DNA immunization. In HLA2.1 transgenic mice, a 1-2 log10 reduction resulted from HCV-LP immunization, whereas no reduction was seen from DNA immunization. Adoptive transfer of lymphocytes from HCV-LP-immunized mice to naive mice provided protection against vvHCV.S challenge, and this transferred immunity can be abrogated by either CD4 or CD8 depletion. Our results suggest that HCV-LPs can induce humoral and cellular immune responses that are protective in a surrogate HCV challenge model and that a strong cellular immunity provided by both CD4 and CD8 effector lymphocytes may be important for protection from HCV infection.

Antigen-dependent release of IFN-gamma by cytotoxic T cells up-regulates Fas on target cells and facilitates exocytosis-independent specific target cell lysis

Effector cytolytic T (Tc) lymphocytes, deficient in the exocytosis-mediated pathway of target cell lysis, induce Fas on target cells and, in turn, delayed cell death and apoptosis via the Fas ligand-Fas interaction. The induction of Fas can be blocked by anti- IFN-gamma Abs. This Fas up-regulation on initially Fas-negative target cells is not mediated by TCR-MHC/peptide signaling per se, but by secreted IFN-gamma from Tc cells after Ag engagement. The Fas up-regulation by Tc cells can be mimicked by treatment of target cells with rIFN-gamma. Tc cells from IFN-gamma knockout mice do not induce Fas expression on target cells. Tc cell-mediated Fas expression on third party, bystander, target cells does not enhance their susceptibility to lysis by these nominal effector cells. The results are discussed as to the possible relevance of the phenomenon in efficiency and regulation of the Tc cell response to infections by viruses.

Smallpox: anything to declare?

Smallpox was eradicated in 1977, but it remains a concern owing to the potential use of the causative agent variola virus in bioterrorism. This article provides an overview of the World Health Organization's spectacular success in achieving the eradication of smallpox. It discusses how variola virus could potentially re-emerge and how prepared we are to counter such a re-emergence. Finally, the potential threat from other orthopoxviruses that exist naturally or that have been genetically engineered is considered. In the words of Rep. Christopher Shay, 'Better to be scared by the improbable possibility than to be unprepared for the catastrophic reality'.