Bioethics: why philosophy is essential for progress

The importance of global bioethics to paediatric health care

The paradigm of values adopted by the global health community has a palpable, albeit often unseen, impact on patient health care. In this Viewpoint, we investigate an inherent tension in the core values of medical ethics and clinical practice that could explain why paediatric health care faces resource constraints despite compelling economic and societal imperatives to prioritise child health and wellbeing. The dominant narrative in the philosophy of medicine tends to disproportionately underscore values of independence and self-determination, which becomes problematic in the context of paediatric patients, who by their very nature epitomise vulnerability and dependence. A double-jeopardy situation arises when disadvantaged children see their inherent dependence leveraged against them. We illustrate this predicament through specific examples relating to rights and obligations and to autonomy. Alternative value perspectives-communitarianism and relational autonomy-might offer more robust protection for vulnerable children. A shift away from the dominant narrative towards a more explicit and inclusive discussion of values is necessary. Such a shift requires giving a legitimate platform to diverse perspectives, with the presumption that collective moral progress is possible; this endeavour is embodied by global bioethics. Successful implementation of global bioethics, in turn, hinges on close collaboration between practicing clinicians and bioethicists. Taking global bioethics seriously and actively pursuing collaboration could help the global health community achieve more equitable health care.

Bioethics: No Method-No Discipline?

This article raises the question of whether bioethics qualifies as a discipline. According to a standard definition of discipline as "a field of study following specific and well-established methodological rules" bioethics is not a specific discipline as there are no explicit "well-established methodological rules." The article investigates whether the methodological rules can be implicit, and whether bioethics can follow specific methodological rules within subdisciplines or for specific tasks. As this does not appear to be the case, the article examines whether bioethics' adherence to specific quality criteria (instead of methodological rules) or pursuing of a common goal can make it qualify as a discipline. Unfortunately, the result is negative. Then, the article scrutinizes whether referring to bioethics institutions and professional qualifications can ascertain bioethics as a discipline. However, this makes the definition of bioethics circular. The article ends by admitting that bioethics can qualify as a discipline according to broader definitions of discipline, for example, as an "area of knowledge, research and education." However, this would reduce bioethics' potential for demarcation and identity-building. Thus, to consolidate the discipline of bioethics and increase its impact, we should explicate and elaborate on its methodology.

Biases in bioethics: a narrative review

Given that biases can distort bioethics work, it has received surprisingly little and fragmented attention compared to in other fields of research. This article provides an overview of potentially relevant biases in bioethics, such as cognitive biases, affective biases, imperatives, and moral biases. Special attention is given to moral biases, which are discussed in terms of (1) Framings, (2) Moral theory bias, (3) Analysis bias, (4) Argumentation bias, and (5) Decision bias. While the overview is not exhaustive and the taxonomy by no means is absolute, it provides initial guidance with respect to assessing the relevance of various biases for specific kinds of bioethics work. One reason why we should identify and address biases in bioethics is that it can help us assess and improve the quality of bioethics work.

The Place of Philosophy in Bioethics Today

In some views, philosophy's glory days in bioethics are over. While philosophers were especially important in the early days of the field, so the argument goes, the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the "simple" application of existing philosophical principles or concepts, as well as empirical work in bioethics. Here, we address this view head on and ask: What is the role of philosophy in bioethics today? This paper has three specific aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected. We outline how bioethics center directors, funders, and philosopher bioethicists can help.

Effectiveness of interventions on healthcare professionals' understanding and use of conscience: a systematic review protocol

INTRODUCTION

Conscience is central to moral decision making. In the context of morally pluralistic workplaces today, healthcare professionals' conscience may prompt them to make moral decisions to refrain from providing services they morally disagree with. However, such decisions are largely viewed as contentious, giving rise to polarising arguments for and against healthcare professionals' freedom of conscience. Yet, little work has been done to understand and support healthcare professionals' conscience. Instead, the rising polarity related to healthcare professionals' freedom of conscience stems from a central lack of understanding of what conscience is and the relevance it holds for healthcare professionals' clinical practice. Therefore, the degree and extent to which healthcare professionals are supported to understand and use their conscience is unknown. The objective of this review is to critically analyse the scholarly evidence available to ascertain the effectiveness of interventions that support healthcare professionals to understand and use their conscience in care practice.

METHODS AND ANALYSES

At least two reviewers will systematically review 10 interdisciplinary, scholarly databases to examine qualitative, quantitative and mixed-methods studies including clinical trials pertaining to interventions related to conscience for healthcare professionals. Databases to be searched include: the Cochrane Controlled Register of Trials, Medline, EMBASE, PsycINFO, Cumulative Index for Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), Academic Search Complete, ATLA Religion Database, Religion and Philosophy Collection, PhilPapers and Scopus. Databases were searched in May 2021. Study screening, selection, extraction and risk of bias assessments on each study using the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool will be independently conducted by independent reviewers. Descriptive data synthesis will be carried out. Statistical analysis and meta-analysis will be conducted as relevant, based on homogeneity of findings. The quality of the aggregate evidence will be assessed using the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluations criteria.

ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION

Ethical approval is not required for this review. This protocol will not involve individual patient information endangering participant rights. The results will be reported in a peer-reviewed journal and disseminated at conferences.

PROSPERO REGISTRATION NUMBER

CRD42021256943.

The Moral Authority of Consensus

Prompted by recent comments on the moral authority of dialogic consensus, we argue that consensus, specifically dialogic consensus, possesses a unique form of moral authority. Given our multicultural era and its plurality of values, we contend that traditional ethical frameworks or principles derived from them cannot be viewed substantively. Both philosophers and clinicians prioritize the need for a decision to be morally justifiable, and also for the decision to be action-guiding. We argue that, especially against the background of our pluralistic society, it is only via unforced dialogue and properly founded argumentation, aiming for consensus, that we can ascribe rightness or wrongness in a normative fashion to dilemmatic situations. We argue that both the process of dialogue, properly constituted, and the consensual outcome itself have moral authority vested within them. Finally, we argue that the consensual decision made is able to withstand moral scrutiny and is action-guiding, without claiming absolute moral authority in other contexts.

Genital Cutting as Gender Oppression: Time to Revisit the WHO Paradigm

The World Health Organization (WHO) condemns all medically unnecessary female genital cutting (FGC) that is primarily associated with people of color and the Global South, claiming that such FGC violates the human right to bodily integrity regardless of harm-level, degree of medicalization, or consent. However, the WHO does not condemn medically unnecessary FGC that is primarily associated with Western culture, such as elective labiaplasty or genital piercing, even when performed by non-medical practitioners (e.g., body artists) or on adolescent girls. Nor does it campaign against any form of medically unnecessary intersex genital cutting (IGC) or male genital cutting (MGC), including forms that are non-consensual or comparably harmful to some types of FGC. These and other apparent inconsistencies risk undermining the perceived authority of the WHO to pronounce on human rights. This paper considers whether the WHO could justify its selective condemnation of non-Western-associated FGC by appealing to the distinctive role of such practices in upholding patriarchal gender systems and furthering sex-based discrimination against women and girls. The paper argues that such a justification would not succeed. To the contrary, dismantling patriarchal power structures and reducing sex-based discrimination in FGC-practicing societies requires principled opposition to medically unnecessary, non-consensual genital cutting of all vulnerable persons, including insufficiently autonomous children, irrespective of their sex traits or socially assigned gender. This conclusion is based, in part, on an assessment of the overlapping and often mutually reinforcing roles of different types of child genital cutting—FGC, MGC, and IGC—in reproducing oppressive gender systems. These systems, in turn, tend to subordinate women and girls as well as non-dominant males and sexual and gender minorities. The selective efforts of the WHO to eliminate only non-Western-associated FGC exposes the organization to credible accusations of racism and cultural imperialism and paradoxically undermines its own stated goals: namely, securing the long-term interests and equal rights of women and girls in FGC-practicing societies.

COVID-19 Vaccination Should not be Mandatory for Health and Social Care Workers

A COVID-19 vaccine mandate is being introduced for health and social care workers in England, and those refusing to comply will either be redeployed or have their employment terminated. We argue that COVID-19 vaccination should not be mandatory for these workers for several reasons. First, it ignores their genuine concerns, and fails to respect their moral integrity and bodily autonomy. Second, it risks causing psychological reactance, potentially worsening vaccine hesitancy. Third, Black and minority ethnic workers are less likely to have been vaccinated and therefore may be disproportionately impacted by the implications of the mandate. Fourth, a mandate could have a significant negative effect on service provision. Fifth, waning immunity and new variants mean that booster doses are increasingly likely to be regularly required, meaning that what constitutes being 'fully vaccinated' will be a constantly shifting target. Finally, vaccine mandates may have an adverse effect on health and social care recruitment. We argue that daily rapid antigen testing is a viable alternative to a vaccine mandate that is non-coercive and fair. This could also be supplemented by monetary incentives to be vaccinated.

Conscience and conscientious objection in nursing: A personalist bioethics approach

The ability of nurses to act as moral agents in accordance with their conscience is both an essential human freedom and an important part of professional ethics. Recent developments in Canada related to Medical Assistance in Dying have revealed new and important challenges related to conscientious objection - challenges that may require rethinking of how nurses do professional ethics. Notably, the inclusion of a personalist bioethical approach is needed to introduce and explicate what conscience is for nurses to be able to apply it to nursing practice. In this article, we explore the importance of conscience and conscientious objection as ethical concepts to support nurses in addressing issues of conscience amid ethically challenging situations. We discuss how a personalist basis for conscience can support nurses to inclusively engage with one another across diverse moral perspectives.

Good reasons to vaccinate: mandatory or payment for risk?

Mandatory vaccination, including for COVID-19, can be ethically justified if the threat to public health is grave, the confidence in safety and effectiveness is high, the expected utility of mandatory vaccination is greater than the alternatives, and the penalties or costs for non-compliance are proportionate. I describe an algorithm for justified mandatory vaccination. Penalties or costs could include withholding of benefits, imposition of fines, provision of community service or loss of freedoms. I argue that under conditions of risk or perceived risk of a novel vaccination, a system of payment for risk in vaccination may be superior. I defend a payment model against various objections, including that it constitutes coercion and undermines solidarity. I argue that payment can be in cash or in kind, and opportunity for altruistic vaccinations can be preserved by offering people who have been vaccinated the opportunity to donate any cash payment back to the health service.

Payment in challenge studies: ethics, attitudes and a new payment for risk model

Controlled Human Infection Model (CHIM) research involves the infection of otherwise healthy participants with disease often for the sake of vaccine development. The COVID-19 pandemic has emphasised the urgency of enhancing CHIM research capability and the importance of having clear ethical guidance for their conduct. The payment of CHIM participants is a controversial issue involving stakeholders across ethics, medicine and policymaking with allegations circulating suggesting exploitation, coercion and other violations of ethical principles. There are multiple approaches to payment: reimbursement, wage payment and unlimited payment. We introduce a new Payment for Risk Model, which involves paying for time, pain and inconvenience and for risk associated with participation. We give philosophical arguments based on utility, fairness and avoidance of exploitation to support this. We also examine a cross-section of the UK public and CHIM experts. We found that CHIM participants are currently paid variable amounts. A representative sample of the UK public believes CHIM participants should be paid approximately triple the UK minimum wage and should be paid for the risk they endure throughout participation. CHIM experts believe CHIM participants should be paid more than double the UK minimum wage but are divided on the payment for risk. The Payment for Risk Model allows risk and pain to be accounted for in payment and could be used to determine ethically justifiable payment for CHIM participants.Although many research guidelines warn against paying large amounts or paying for risk, our empirical findings provide empirical support to the growing number of ethical arguments challenging this status quo. We close by suggesting two ways (value of statistical life or consistency with risk in other employment) by which payment for risk could be calculated.

Human genome editing: how to prevent rogue actors

BACKGROUND

Human genome editing technologies offer much potential benefit. However, central to any conversation relating to the application of such technologies are certain ethical, legal, and social difficulties around their application. The recent misuse, or inappropriate use, by certain Chinese actors of the application of genome editing technologies has been, of late, well noted and described. Consequently, caution is expressed by various policy experts, scientists, bioethicists, and members of the public with regard to the appropriate use of human germline genome editing and its possible future effect on future generations.

MAIN TEXT

As concerns about the applications of heritable genome editing have grown, so too have the questions around what is to be done to curtail 'rogue actors'. This paper explores various ways in which to regulate genomic editing that are socially beneficial, while being cognisant of legal and ethical principles and rights values. This is done by evolving regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions in an attempt to raise issues, address common principles, and set responsible standards for stewardship of the novel technology.

CONCLUSIONS

It is suggested that robust and concrete regulatory measures be introduced that are culturally and contextually sensitive, inclusive, appropriate, and trustworthy - and are based on public empowerment and human rights objectives. Doing so will ensure that we are perfectly positioned to harness and promote the benefits that novel technologies have to offer, while safeguarding public health and curtailing the ambitions of rogue actors. This it is acknowledged is no easy task, so, as a point of departure, this paper sets out a path forward by means of certain, practical recommendations - by constructing genome editing regulation in a manner that both fulfils the desire to better progress human health and that can withstand legal and ethical scrutiny. The following observations and recommendations are made: Firstly, that a solution of effective, legitimate governance should consist of a combination of national and supranational legislative regulation or 'hard' law, in combination with 'soft' ethics, firmly anchored in and underpinned by human rights values. Second, that efforts to support legal and ethical solutions should be rigorous, practical, and robust, contribute to a reaffirmation of human rights in a contextually sensitive manner, and be transnational in reach. Lastly, that greater harmonisation across jurisdictions and increased public engagement be sought. This it is proposed will address the question of how to implement a normative framework which in turn can prevent future rogue actors.

Demandingness and Public Health Ethics

Public health policies often require individuals to make personal sacrifices for the sake of protecting other individuals or the community at large. Such requirements can be more or less demanding for individuals. This paper examines the implications of demandingness for public health ethics and policy. It focuses on three possible public health policies that pose requirements that are differently demanding: vaccination policies, policy to contain antimicrobial resistance, and quarantine and isolation policies. Assuming the validity of the ‘demandingness objection’ in ethics, we argue that states should try to pose requirements that individuals would have an independent moral obligation to fulfil, and therefore that are not too demanding. In such cases, coercive measures are ethically justified, especially if the interventions also entail some benefits to the individuals; this is, for example, the case of vaccination policies. When public health policies need to require individuals to do something that is too demanding to constitute an independent moral obligation, states have an obligation to either provide incentives to give individuals non-moral reasons to fulfil a certain requirement – as in the case of policies that limit antibiotic prescriptions – or to compensate individuals for being forced to do something that is too demanding to constitute an independent moral obligation – as in the case of quarantine and isolation policies.

The independence of medical ethics

This paper discusses the relation between medical ethics and general moral theory, the argument being that medical ethics is best seen as independent from general moral theory. According to this independence thesis, here explicated in terms of what is called a disunitarian stance, the very idea of applied ethics, which is often seen as underlying medical ethics (as well as many other more specific fields of ethics), is misguided. We should instead think of medical ethics as a domain-specific ethical inquiry among other domain-specific ethical inquiries. On this alternative kind of picture, such ethical inquiries should start with looking at the particularities of the domain under consideration and then proceed from there. Some possible consequences of this idea for medical ethics are then identified and discussed.

Let Us Assume That Gene Editing is Safe—The Role of Safety Arguments in the Gene Editing Debate

This paper provides an analysis of the statement, made in many papers and reports on the use of gene editing in humans, that we should only use the technology when it is safe. It provides an analysis of what the statement means in the context of nonreproductive and reproductive gene editing and argues that the statement is inconsistent with the philosophical commitments of some of the authors, who put it forward in relation to reproductive uses of gene editing, specifically their commitment to Parfitian nonidentity considerations and to a legal principle of reproductive liberty.

But, if that is true it raises a question about why the statement is made. What is its discursive and rhetorical function? Five functions are suggested, some of which are more contentious and problematic than others. It is argued that it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the “only when it is safe” rider is part of a deliberate obfuscation aimed at hiding the full implications of the arguments made about the ethics of gene editing and their underlying philosophical justifications.

In pursuit of goodness in bioethics: analysis of an exemplary article

BACKGROUND

What is good bioethics? Addressing this question is key for reinforcing and developing the field. In particular, a discussion of potential quality criteria can heighten awareness and contribute to the quality of bioethics publications. Accordingly, the objective of this article is threefold: first, we want to identify a set of criteria for quality in bioethics. Second, we want to illustrate the added value of a novel method: in-depth analysis of a single article with the aim of deriving quality criteria. The third and ultimate goal is to stimulate a broad and vivid debate on goodness in bioethics.

METHODS

An initial literature search reveals a range of diverse quality criteria. In order to expand on the realm of such quality criteria, we perform an in-depth analysis of an article that is acclaimed for being exemplary.

RESULTS

The analysis results in eleven specific quality criteria for good bioethics in three categories: argumentative, empirical, and dialectic. Although we do not claim that the identified criteria are universal or absolute, we argue that they are fruitful for fueling a continuous constitutive debate on what is "good bioethics."

CONCLUSION

Identifying, debating, refining, and applying such criteria is an important part of defining and improving bioethics.

Where Caring Is Sharing: Evolving Ethical Considerations in Tuberculosis Prevention Among Healthcare Workers

In many settings, the dedication of healthcare workers (HCWs) to the treatment of tuberculosis exposes them to serious risks. Current ethical considerations related to tuberculosis prevention in HCWs involve the threat posed by comorbidities, issues of power and space, the implications of intersectoral collaborations, (de)professionalization, just remuneration, the duty to care, and involvement in research. Emerging ethical considerations include mandatory vaccination and the use of geolocalization services and information technologies. The following exploration of these various ethical considerations demonstrates that the language of ethics can fruitfully be deployed to shed new light on policies that have repercussions on the lives of HCWs in underresourced settings. The language of ethics can help responsible parties get a clearer sense of what they owe HCWs, particularly when these individuals are poorly compensated, and it shows that it is essential that HCWs' contribution be acknowledged through a shared commitment to alleviate ethically problematic aspects of the environments within which they provide care. For this reason, there is a strong case for the community of bioethicists to continue to take greater interest both in the micro-level (eg, patient-provider interactions) and macro-level (eg, injustices that occur as a result of the world order) issues that put HCWs working in areas with high tuberculosis prevalence in ethically untenable positions. Ultimately, appropriate responses to the various ethical considerations explored here must vary based on the setting, but, as this article shows, they require thoughtful reflection and courageous action on the part of governments, policy makers, and managers responsible for national responses to the tuberculosis epidemic.

A CRISPR New World: Attitudes in the Public toward Innovations in Human Genetic Modification

The potential to genetically modify human germlines has reached a critical tipping point with recent applications of CRISPR-Cas9. Even as researchers, clinicians, and ethicists weigh the scientific and ethical repercussions of these advances, we know virtually nothing about public attitudes on the topic. Understanding such attitudes will be critical to determining the degree of broad support there might be for any public policy or regulation developed for genetic modification research. To fill this gap, we gave an online survey to a large (2,493 subjects) and diverse sample of Americans. Respondents supported genetic modification research, although demographic variables influenced these attitudes—conservatives, women, African-Americans, and older respondents, while supportive, were more cautious than liberals, men, other ethnicities, and younger respondents. Support was also was slightly muted when the risks (unanticipated mutations and possibility of eugenics) were made explicit. The information about genetic modification was also presented as contrasting vignettes, using one of five frames: genetic editing, engineering, hacking, modification, or surgery. Despite the fact that the media and academic use of frames describing the technology varies, these frames did not influence people’s attitudes. These data contribute a current snapshot of public attitudes to inform policy with regard to human genetic modification.

Knowing-how to care

This paper advances a new moral epistemology and explores some of its normative and practical, especially bioethical, implications. In the first part, it shows that there is moral knowledge and that it is best understood in terms of knowing-how. Thus, moral knowledge cannot be analysed purely in the traditional terms of knowing-that. The fundamental idea is that one knows-how to act morally only if she is capable of following the right normative standards. In the second part, the paper discusses ways of integrating two expressions of moral knowing-how, namely caring and respecting into a coherent normative theory. It builds up the concept of respectful care as the central ingredient of such a normative theory. Finally, it illustrates how respectful care may transform some of our current clinical bioethical practices.

Reconsidering counselling and consent

In the current era patient autonomy is enormously important. However, recently there has also been some movement back to ensure that trust in the doctor's skill, knowledge and virtue is not excluded in the process. These new nuances of informed consent have been referred to by terms such as beneficent paternalism, experience-based paternalism and we would add virtuous paternalism. The purpose of this paper is to consider the history and current problematic nature of counselling and consent. Starting with the tradition founded by Hippocrates we trace and seek to understand how relevant aspects of the patient-doctor relationship have evolved under the influences of subsequent moral theories. Finally we tentatively endorse certain modes of counselling in the current era in order to promote morally sound, good clinical practice.

Do the Benefits of Male Circumcision Outweigh the Risks? A Critique of the Proposed CDC Guidelines

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have announced a set of provisional guidelines concerning male circumcision, in which they suggest that the benefits of the surgery outweigh the risks. I offer a critique of the CDC position. Among other concerns, I suggest that the CDC relies more heavily than is warranted on studies from Sub-Saharan Africa that neither translate well to North American populations nor to circumcisions performed before an age of sexual debut; that it employs an inadequate conception of risk in its benefit vs. risk analysis; that it fails to consider the anatomy and functions of the penile prepuce (i.e., the part of the penis that is removed by circumcision); that it underestimates the adverse consequences associated with circumcision by focusing on short-term surgical complications rather than long-term harms; that it portrays both the risks and benefits of circumcision in a misleading manner, thereby undermining the possibility of obtaining informed consent; that it evinces a superficial and selective analysis of the literature on sexual outcomes associated with circumcision; and that it gives less attention than is desirable to ethical issues surrounding autonomy and bodily integrity. I conclude that circumcision before an age of consent is not an appropriate health-promotion strategy.