Visual Processing of Contour Patterns under Conditions of Inattentional Blindness

The influence of feature-based attention and response requirements on ERP correlates of auditory awareness

In search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), it is important to isolate the true NCCs from their prerequisites, consequences, and co-occurring processes. To date, little is known about how attention affects the event-related potential (ERP) correlates of auditory awareness and there is contradictory evidence on whether one of them, the late positivity (LP), is affected by response requirements. By implementing a GO-NOGO design with target and nontarget stimuli, we controlled for feature-based attention and response requirements in the same experiment, while participants rated their awareness using a perceptual awareness scale. The results showed a prolonged auditory awareness negativity (AAN) for aware trials, which was influenced neither by attention nor by response requirement. The LP was affected by both attention and response requirements. Consistent with the levels of processing hypothesis, the LP was related to consciousness as a correlate of the processing of higher-level stimulus features, likely requiring access to a "global workspace." Our findings further suggest that AAN is a proper ERP correlate of auditory consciousness and thus a true NCC in the auditory modality.

When the WRENCH turns a few heads: Expectation and semantic relatedness in inattentional blindness

Semantic relatedness and expectation were investigated in inattentional blindness-failure to perceive an unexpected object in plain sight when attention is engaged elsewhere. Participants named primary-task pictures and ignored distractor pictures. Four trials preceded a 'critical' trial where an unexpected six-letter-word appeared at fixation, simultaneously with the pictures. In Experiment 1, we found robust effects for both in-lab and on-line-Zoom methodology. More participants reported the unexpected word semantically-related to the primary-task pictures than a semantically-unrelated word. In Experiment 2, expectations were violated, by changing the semantic category of the primary-task pictures. More participants reported the unexpected word semantically-related to the unexpected picture category than a semantically-unrelated word. When attentional resources are consumed by a task, a violation to task expectations is not enough to reorient attention to an unexpected word. Attention reorients to what is meaningful to the task, and what is meaningful is updated in light of unexpected information.

Is auditory awareness graded or dichotomous: Electrophysiological correlates of consciousness at different depths of stimulus processing

The level-of-processing (LoP) hypothesis postulates that transition from unaware to aware visual stimuli is either graded or dichotomous depending on the depth of stimulus processing. Humans can be progressively aware of the low-level features, such as colors or shapes, while the high-level features, such as semantic category, enter consciousness in an all-or none fashion. Unlike in vision, sounds always unfold in time, which might require mechanisms dissimilar from visual processing. We tested the LoP hypothesis in hearing for the first time by presenting participants with words of different categories, spoken in different pitches near the perceptual threshold. We also assessed whether different electrophysiological correlates of consciousness, the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) and late positivity (LP), were associated with LoP. Our findings indicate that LoP also applies to the auditory modality. AAN is an early correlate of awareness independent of LoP, while LP was modulated by awareness, performance accuracy and the level of processing.

Early Electrophysiological Correlates of Perceptual Consciousness Are Affected by Both Exogenous and Endogenous Attention

It has been proposed that visual awareness negativity (VAN), which is an early ERP component, constitutes a neural correlate of visual consciousness that is independent of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms. In the present study, we investigated whether VAN is indeed a specific marker of phenomenal awareness or rather reflects the involvement of attention. To this end, we reanalyzed data collected in a previously published EEG experiment in which awareness of visual stimuli and two aspects that define attentional involvement, namely, the inherent saliency and task relevance of a stimulus, were manipulated orthogonally. During the experimental procedure, participants (n = 41) were presented with images of faces that were backward-masked or unmasked, fearful or neutral, and defined as task-relevant targets or task-irrelevant distractors. Single-trial ERP analysis revealed that VAN was highly dependent on attentional manipulations in the early time window (140-200 msec), up to the point that the effect of awareness was not observed for attentionally irrelevant stimuli (i.e., neutral faces presented as distractors). In the late time window (200-350 msec), VAN was present in all attentional conditions, but its amplitude was significantly higher in response to fearful faces and task-relevant face images than in response to neutral ones and task-irrelevant ones, respectively. In conclusion, we demonstrate that the amplitude of VAN is highly dependent on both exogenous (stimulus saliency) and endogenous attention (task requirements). Our results challenge the view that VAN constitutes an attention-independent correlate of phenomenal awareness.

Late Positivity Correlates with Subjective Reports: Evidence from the Low-frequency and High-frequency Reporting Tasks

Identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is an important way to understand the fundamental nature of consciousness. By recording event-related potentials (ERPs) using EEG, researchers have found three potential electrophysiological NCCs: early positive correlate of consciousness (enhanced P1), visual awareness negativity (VAN), and late positivity (LP). However, LP may reflect post-perceptual processing associated with subjective reports rather than consciousness per se. The present experiment investigated the relationship between LP and subjective reports. We adopted two subjective reporting tasks that differed in the requirement for subjective reports. In the low-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in 25% of trials, whereas in the high-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in each trial. Behavioral results showed that the hit rates were lower and false alarm rates were higher on reporting trials in low-frequency reporting tasks than on reporting trials in high-frequency reporting tasks. Unexpectedly, VAN was larger on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task. Importantly, our ERP results showed that LP was larger on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task. Thus, our findings indicated that when the frequency of reports was increased, the task relevance of the stimuli increased, which led to larger LP amplitudes. These findings suggest that LP correlates with subjective reports.

Electrophysiological correlates of sustained conscious perception

Previous research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in visual perception revealed an early event-related potential (ERP), the visual awareness negativity (VAN), to be associated with stimulus awareness. However, due to the use of brief stimulus presentations in previous studies, it remains unclear whether awareness-related negativities represent a transient onset-related response or correspond to the duration of a conscious percept. Studies are required that allow prolonged stimulus presentation under aware and unaware conditions. The present ERP study aimed to tackle this challenge by using a novel stimulation design. Male and female human participants (n = 62) performed a visual task while task-irrelevant line stimuli were presented in the background for either 500 or 1000 ms. The line stimuli sometimes contained a face, which needed so-called visual one-shot learning to be seen. Half of the participants were informed about the presence of the face, resulting in faces being perceived by the informed but not by the uninformed participants. Comparing ERPs between the informed and uninformed group revealed an enhanced negativity over occipitotemporal electrodes that persisted for the entire duration of stimulus presentation. Our results suggest that sustained visual awareness negativities (SVAN) are associated with the duration of stimulus presentation.

Conscious perception of fear in faces: Insights from high-density EEG and perceptual awareness scale with threshold stimuli

Contrary to the extensive research on processing subliminal and/or unattended emotional facial expressions, only a minority of studies have investigated the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) of emotions conveyed by faces. In the present high-density electroencephalography (EEG) study, we first employed a staircase procedure to identify each participant's perceptual threshold of the emotion expressed by the face and then compared the EEG signals elicited in trials where the participants were aware with the activity elicited in trials where participants were unaware of the emotions expressed by these, otherwise identical, faces. Drawing on existing knowledge of the neural mechanisms of face processing and NCCs, we hypothesized that activity in frontal electrodes would be modulated in relation to participants' awareness of facial emotional content. More specifically, we hypothesized that the NCC of fear seen on someone else's face could be detected as a modulation of a later and more anterior (i.e., at frontal sites) event-related potential (ERP) than the face-sensitive N170. By adopting a data-driven approach and cluster-based statistics to the analysis of EEG signals, the results were clear-cut in showing that visual awareness of fear was associated with the modulation of a frontal ERP component in a 150-300 msec interval. These insights are dissected and contextualized in relation to prevailing theories of visual consciousness and their proposed NCC benchmarks.

Using virtual reality to induce multi-trial inattentional blindness despite trial-by-trial measures of awareness

Unconscious processing has been widely examined using diverse and well-controlled methodologies. However, the extent to which these findings are relevant to real-life instances of information processing without awareness is limited. Here, we present a novel inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm in virtual reality (VR). In three experiments, we managed to repeatedly induce IB while participants foveally viewed salient stimuli for prolonged durations. The effectiveness of this paradigm demonstrates the close relationship between top-down attention and subjective experience. Thus, this method provides an ecologically valid setup to examine processing without awareness.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation effects support an oscillatory model of ERP genesis

Whether prestimulus oscillatory brain activity contributes to the generation of post-stimulus-evoked neural responses has long been debated, but findings remain inconclusive. We first investigated the hypothesized relationship via EEG recordings during a perceptual task with this correlational evidence causally probed subsequently by means of online rhythmic transcranial magnetic stimulation. Both approaches revealed a close link between prestimulus individual alpha frequency (IAF) and P1 latency, with faster IAF being related to shorter latencies, best explained via phase-reset mechanisms. Moreover, prestimulus alpha amplitude predicted P3 size, best explained via additive (correlational and causal evidence) and baseline shift mechanisms (correlational evidence), each with distinct prestimulus alpha contributors. Finally, in terms of performance, faster prestimulus IAF and shorter P1 latencies were both associated with higher task accuracy, while lower prestimulus alpha amplitudes and higher P3 amplitudes were associated with higher confidence ratings. Our results are in favor of the oscillatory model of ERP genesis and modulation, shedding new light on the mechanistic relationship between prestimulus oscillations and functionally relevant evoked components.

Feedforward connectivity patterns from visual areas to the front of the brain contain information about sensory stimuli regardless of awareness or report

Current theories of consciousness can be categorized to some extent by their predictions about the putative role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception. One family of the theories proposes that the PFC is necessary for conscious perception. The other postulates that the PFC is not necessary and that other areas (e.g., posterior cortical areas) are more important for conscious perception. No-report paradigms could potentially arbitrate the debate as they disentangle task reporting from conscious perception. While previous no-report paradigms tend to point to a reduction in PFC activity, they have not examined the critical role of the PFC in "monitoring" or "reading out" the patterns of activity in the sensory cortex to generate conscious perception. To address this, we reanalysed electroencephalography (EEG) data from a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm (Shafto & Pitts, 2015). We examined the role of feedforward input patterns to the PFC from sensory cortices. We employed nonparametric spectral Granger causality and quantified the amount of information that reflected the contents of consciousness using multivariate classifiers. Unexpectedly, regardless of whether the stimulus was consciously seen or not, we found that information relating to the current sensory stimulus was present in the pattern of inputs from visual areas to the PFC. In light of these findings, we suggest various theories of consciousness need to be revised to accommodate the fact that the contents of consciousness are decodable from the input patterns from posterior sensory regions to the PFC, regardless of awareness (or report).

Stimulus awareness is associated with secondary somatosensory cortex activation in an inattentional numbness paradigm

While inattentional blindness and deafness studies have revealed neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) without the confound of task relevance in the visual and auditory modality, comparable studies for the somatosensory modality are lacking. Here, we investigated NCC using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in an inattentional numbness paradigm. Participants (N = 44) received weak electrical stimulation on the left hand while solving a demanding visual task. Half of the participants were informed that task-irrelevant weak tactile stimuli above the detection threshold would be applied during the experiment, while the other half expected stimuli below the detection threshold. Unexpected awareness assessments after the experiment revealed that altogether 10 participants did not consciously perceive the somatosensory stimuli during the visual task. Awareness was not significantly modulated by prior information. The fMRI data show that awareness of stimuli led to increased activation in the contralateral secondary somatosensory cortex. We found no significant effects of stimulus awareness in the primary somatosensory cortex or frontoparietal areas. Thus, our results support the hypothesis that somatosensory stimulus awareness is mainly based on activation in higher areas of the somatosensory cortex and does not require strong activation in extended anterior or posterior networks, which is usually seen when perceived stimuli are task-relevant.

EEG spectral slope: A reliable indicator for continuous evaluation of consciousness levels during propofol anesthesia

The level of consciousness undergoes continuous alterations during anesthesia. Prior to the onset of propofol-induced complete unconsciousness, degraded levels of behavioral responsiveness can be observed. However, a reliable index to monitor altered consciousness levels during anesthesia has not been sufficiently investigated. In this study, we obtained 60-channel EEG data from 24 healthy participants during an ultra-slow propofol infusion protocol starting with an initial concentration of 1 μg/ml and a stepwise increase of 0.2 μg/ml in concentration. Consecutive auditory stimuli were delivered every 5 to 6 s, and the response time to the stimuli was used to assess the responsiveness levels. We calculated the spectral slope in a time-resolved manner by extracting 5-second EEG segments at each auditory stimulus and estimated their correlation with the corresponding response time. Our results demonstrated that during slow propofol infusion, the response time to external stimuli increased, while the EEG spectral slope, fitted at 15-45 Hz, became steeper, and a significant negative correlation was observed between them. Moreover, the spectral slope further steepened at deeper anesthetic levels and became flatter during anesthesia recovery. We verified these findings using an external dataset. Additionally, we found that the spectral slope of frontal electrodes over the prefrontal lobe had the best performance in predicting the response time. Overall, this study used a time-resolved analysis to suggest that the EEG spectral slope could reliably track continuously altered consciousness levels during propofol anesthesia. Furthermore, the frontal spectral slope may be a promising index for clinical monitoring of anesthesia depth.

Faces capture spatial attention only when we want them to: An inattentional blindness EEG study

Previous research on emotional face processing has shown that emotional faces such as fearful faces may be processed without visual awareness. However, evidence for nonconscious attention capture by fearful faces is limited. In fact, studies using sensory manipulation of awareness (e.g., backward masking paradigms) have shown that fearful faces do not attract attention during subliminal viewings nor when they were task-irrelevant. Here, we used a three-phase inattentional blindness paradigm and electroencephalography to examine whether faces (fearful and neutral) capture attention under different conditions of awareness and task-relevancy. We found that the electrophysiological marker for attention capture, the N2-posterior-contralateral (N2pc), was elicited by face stimuli only when participants were aware of the faces and when they were task-relevant (phase 3). When participants were unaware of the presence of faces (phase 1) or when the faces were irrelevant to the task (phase 2), no N2pc was observed. Together with our previous work, we concluded that fearful faces, or faces in general, do not attract attention unless we want them to.

Classification of inattentional blindness using brain dynamics of ERPs

Situational awareness (SA) is vital for understanding our surroundings. Multiple variables, including inattentive blindness (IB), contribute to the deterioration of SA, which may have detrimental effects on individuals' cognitive performance. IB occurs due to attentional limitations, ignoring critical information and resulting in a loss of SA and a decline in general performance, particularly in complicated situations requiring substantial cognitive resources. To the best of our knowledge, however, past research has not fully uncovered the neurological characteristics of IB nor classified these characteristics in life-alike virtual situations. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to determine whether ERP dynamics in the brain may be utilised as a neural feature to predict the occurrence of IB using machine learning (ML) algorithms. In a virtual reality simulation of an IB experiment, 30 participants' behaviour and Electroencephalography (EEG) measurements were obtained. Participants were given a target detection task in the IB experiment without knowing the unattended shapes displayed on the background building. The targets were presented in three different sensory modalities (auditory, visual, and visual-auditory). On the post-experiment questionnaire, participants who claimed not to have noticed the unattended shapes were assigned to the IB group. Subsequently, the Aware group was formed from individuals who reported seeing the unattended shapes. Using EEGNet to classify IB and Aware groups demonstrated a high classification performance. According to the research, ERP brain dynamics are associated with the awareness of unattended shapes and have the potential to serve as a reliable indication for predicting the visual consciousness of unexpected objects.(p/)(p)Clinical relevance- This research offers a potential brain marker for the mixed-reality and BCI systems that will be used in the future to identify cognitive deterioration, maintain attentional capacity, and prevent disasters.

The role of brain-localized gamma and alpha oscillations in inattentional deafness: implications for understanding human attention

Introduction

The processes involved in how the attention system selectively focuses on perceptual and motor aspects related to a specific task, while suppressing features of other tasks and/or objects in the environment, are of considerable interest for cognitive neuroscience. The goal of this experiment was to investigate neural processes involved in selective attention and performance under multi-task situations. Several studies have suggested that attention-related gamma-band activity facilitates processing in task-specific modalities, while alpha-band activity inhibits processing in non-task-related modalities. However, investigations into the phenomenon of inattentional deafness/blindness (inability to observe stimuli in non-dominant task when primary task is demanding) have yet to observe gamma-band activity.

Methods

This EEG experiment utilizes an engaging whole-body perceptual motor task while carrying out a secondary auditory detection task to investigate neural correlates of inattentional deafness in natural immersive high workload conditions. Differences between hits and misses on the auditory detection task in the gamma (30-50 Hz) and alpha frequency (8-12 Hz) range were carried out at the cortical source level using LORETA.

Results

Participant auditory task performance correlated with an increase in gamma-band activity for hits over misses pre- and post-stimulus in left auditory processing regions. Alpha-band activity was greater for misses relative to hits in right auditory processing regions pre- and post-stimulus onset. These results are consistent with the facilitatory/inhibitory role of gamma/alpha-band activity for neural processing. Additional gamma- and alpha-band activity was found in frontal and parietal brain regions which are thought to reflect various attentional monitoring, selection, and switching processes.

Discussion

The results of this study help to elucidate the role of gamma and alpha frequency bands in frontal and modality-specific regions involved with selective attention in multi-task immersive situations.

Towards causal mechanisms of consciousness through focused transcranial brain stimulation

Conscious experience represents one of the most elusive problems of empirical science, namely neuroscience. The main objective of empirical studies of consciousness has been to describe the minimal sets of neural events necessary for a specific neuronal state to become consciously experienced. The current state of the art still does not meet this objective but rather consists of highly speculative theories based on correlates of consciousness and an ever-growing list of knowledge gaps. The current state of the art is defined by the limitations of past stimulation techniques and the emphasis on the observational approach. However, looking at the current stimulation technologies that are becoming more accurate, it is time to consider an alternative approach to studying consciousness, which builds on the methodology of causal explanations via causal alterations. The aim of this methodology is to move beyond the correlates of consciousness and focus directly on the mechanisms of consciousness with the help of the currently focused brain stimulation techniques, such as geodesic transcranial electric neuromodulation. This approach not only overcomes the limitations of the correlational methodology but will also become another firm step in the following science of consciousness.

Neural correlates of conscious processing of emotional faces: Evidence from event-related potentials

There is a theoretical debate between the early and late neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Previous studies using neutral face stimuli supported an early NCC and suggested that visual awareness negativity (VAN) is associated with consciousness, while late positivity (LP) reflects post-perceptual activity. However, emotional faces may help to examine the relationship between LP and consciousness due to the differences in late processing between emotional and neutral faces. To explore the effects of facial emotional information on NCCs, the present study manipulated consciousness with the inattentional blindness paradigm and used happy, fearful, and neutral faces as visual stimuli. The results showed that the conscious processing of emotional faces was correlated with VAN and LP, while the conscious processing of neutral faces was associated with VAN. First, the results suggest that VAN is an NCC, and the relationship between LP and consciousness is affected by facial emotional information. Second, VAN reflects the early perceptual experience of emotional faces, whereas LP may reflect the late conscious processing of emotional faces. Furthermore, source localization analysis showed that the LPs of emotional faces were mainly located in the frontal and parietal lobes, whereas those of neutral faces showed no significant activation. This suggests that facial emotional information may affect the brain regions associated with conscious processing. Time-frequency analysis showed that conscious processing is related to the enhancement of alpha and theta oscillation, indicating that conscious processing may be associated with the suppression of irrelevant stimuli. Overall, the present study suggests that the integration of the theories that support early and late NCCs helps explain the conscious processing of emotional faces.

Revealing robust neural correlates of conscious and unconscious visual processing: activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses

Our ability to consciously perceive information from the visual scene relies on a myriad of intrinsic neural mechanisms. Functional neuroimaging studies have sought to identify the neural correlates of conscious visual processing and to further dissociate from those pertaining to preconscious and unconscious visual processing. However, delineating what core brain regions are involved in eliciting a conscious percept remains a challenge, particularly regarding the role of prefrontal-parietal regions. We performed a systematic search of the literature that yielded a total of 54 functional neuroimaging studies. We conducted two quantitative meta-analyses using activation likelihood estimation to identify reliable patterns of activation engaged by i. conscious (n = 45 studies, comprising 704 participants) and ii. unconscious (n = 16 studies, comprising 262 participants) visual processing during various task performances. Results of the meta-analysis specific to conscious percepts quantitatively revealed reliable activations across a constellation of regions comprising the bilateral inferior frontal junction, intraparietal sulcus, dorsal anterior cingulate, angular gyrus, temporo-occipital cortex and anterior insula. Neurosynth reverse inference revealed conscious visual processing to be intertwined with cognitive terms related to attention, cognitive control and working memory. Results of the meta-analysis on unconscious percepts revealed consistent activations in the lateral occipital complex, intraparietal sulcus and precuneus. These findings highlight the notion that conscious visual processing readily engages higher-level regions including the inferior frontal junction and unconscious processing reliably recruits posterior regions, mainly the lateral occipital complex.

The effects of visual working memory load on detection and neural processing of task-unrelated auditory stimuli

While perceptual load has been proposed to reduce the processing of task-unrelated stimuli, theoretical arguments and empirical findings for other forms of task load are inconclusive. Here, we systematically investigated the detection and neural processing of auditory stimuli varying in stimulus intensity during a stimuli-unrelated visual working memory task alternating between low and high load. We found, depending on stimulus strength, decreased stimulus detection and reduced P3, but unaffected N1 amplitudes of the event-related potential to auditory stimuli under high as compared to low load. In contrast, load independent awareness effects were observed during both early (N1) and late (P3) time windows. Findings suggest a late neural effect of visual working memory load on auditory stimuli leading to lower probability of reported awareness of these stimuli.

Prestimulus oscillatory brain activity interacts with evoked recurrent processing to facilitate conscious visual perception

We investigated whether prestimulus alpha-band oscillatory activity and stimulus-elicited recurrent processing interact to facilitate conscious visual perception. Participants tried to perceive a visual stimulus that was perceptually masked through object substitution masking (OSM). We showed that attenuated prestimulus alpha power was associated with greater negative-polarity stimulus-evoked ERP activity that resembled the visual awareness negativity (VAN), previously argued to reflect recurrent processing related to conscious perception. This effect, however, was not associated with better perception. Instead, when prestimulus alpha power was elevated, a preferred prestimulus alpha phase was associated with a greater VAN-like negativity, which was then associated with better cue perception. Cue perception was worse when prestimulus alpha power was elevated but the stimulus occurred at a nonoptimal prestimulus alpha phase and the VAN-like negativity was low. Our findings suggest that prestimulus alpha activity at a specific phase enables temporally selective recurrent processing that facilitates conscious perception in OSM.

Neural correlates of consciousness in an attentional blink paradigm with uncertain target relevance

Several event-related potentials (ERPs) have been proposed as neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), most prominently the early visual awareness negativity (VAN) and the late P3b component. Highly influential support for the P3b comes from studies utilizing the attentional blink (AB), where conscious perception of a first visual target (T1) impairs reporting a second target (T2) presented shortly afterwards. Recent no-report studies using other paradigms suggest that the P3b component may reflect post-perceptual processes associated with decision-making rather than awareness. However, no-report studies are limited in their awareness assessment, and their conclusions have not been tested in an AB paradigm. The present study (N = 38) addressed these issues using a novel AB paradigm, which reduced decision-making processes by omitting a discrimination task on T2 stimuli and rendering their relevance uncertain. Nevertheless, awareness was assessed trial by trial. Comparing ERPs in response to seen versus unseen T2 stimuli revealed a VAN but no enhanced P3b regardless of whether they were marked as distinct from distractor stimuli or not. Our results corroborate the VAN and challenge the P3b as NCC despite rigorous trial-by-trial assessment of conscious perception. Thus, they support the idea that awareness emerges during early sensory processing.

Event-Related Potential Correlates of Learning to Produce Novel Foreign Phonemes

Learning to pronounce a foreign phoneme requires an individual to acquire a motor program that enables the reproduction of the new acoustic target sound. This process is largely based on the use of auditory feedback to detect pronunciation errors to adjust vocalization. While early auditory evoked neural activity underlies automatic detection and adaptation to vocalization errors, little is known about the neural correlates of acquiring novel speech targets. To investigate the neural processes that mediate the learning of foreign phoneme pronunciation, we recorded event-related potentials when participants (N = 19) pronounced native or foreign phonemes. Behavioral results indicated that the participants' pronunciation of the foreign phoneme improved during the experiment. Early auditory responses (N1 and P2 waves, approximately 85-290 ms after the sound onset) revealed no differences between foreign and native phonemes. In contrast, the amplitude of the frontocentrally distributed late slow wave (LSW, 320-440 ms) was modulated by the pronunciation of the foreign phonemes, and the effect changed during the experiment, paralleling the improvement in pronunciation. These results suggest that the LSW may reflect higher-order monitoring processes that signal successful pronunciation and help learn novel phonemes.

Decoding perceptual awareness across the brain with a no-report fMRI masking paradigm

Does perceptual awareness arise within the sensory regions of the brain or within higher-level regions (e.g., the frontal lobe)? To answer this question, researchers traditionally compare neural activity when observers report being aware versus being unaware of a stimulus. However, it is unclear whether the resulting activations are associated with the conscious perception of the stimulus or the post-perceptual processes associated with reporting that stimulus. To address this limitation, we used both report and no-report conditions in a visual masking paradigm while participants were scanned using functional MRI (fMRI). We found that the overall univariate response to visible stimuli in the frontal lobe was robust in the report condition but disappeared in the no-report condition. However, using multivariate patterns, we could still decode in both conditions whether a stimulus reached conscious awareness across the brain, including in the frontal lobe. These results help reconcile key discrepancies in the recent literature and provide a path forward for identifying the neural mechanisms associated with perceptual awareness.

Neuroscientific Evidence for Processing Without Awareness

The extent to which we are affected by perceptual input of which we are unaware is widely debated. By measuring neural responses to sensory stimulation, neuroscientific data could complement behavioral results with valuable evidence. Here we review neuroscientific findings of processing of high-level information, as well as interactions with attention and memory. Although the results are mixed, we find initial support for processing object categories and words, possibly to the semantic level, as well as emotional expressions. Robust neural evidence for face individuation and integration of sentences or scenes is lacking. Attention affects the processing of stimuli that are not consciously perceived, and such stimuli may exogenously but not endogenously capture attention when relevant, and be maintained in memory over time. Sources of inconsistency in the literature include variability in control for awareness as well as individual differences, calling for future studies that adopt stricter measures of awareness and probe multiple processes within subjects.

The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?

In the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, participants have commonly been instructed to report their conscious content. This, it was claimed, risks confounding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) with their preconditions, i.e., allocation of attention, and consequences, i.e., metacognitive reflection. Recently, the field has therefore been shifting towards no-report paradigms. No-report paradigms draw their validity from a direct comparison with no-report conditions. We analyze several examples of such comparisons and identify alternative interpretations of their results and/or methodological issues in all cases. These go beyond the previous criticism that just removing the report is insufficient, because it does not prevent metacognitive reflection. The conscious mind is fickle. Without having much to do, it will turn inward and switch, or timeshare, between the stimuli on display and daydreaming or mind-wandering. Thus, rather than the NCC, no-report paradigms might be addressing the neural correlates of conscious disengagement. This observation reaffirms the conclusion that no-report paradigms are no less problematic than report paradigms.

Where's My Consciousness-Ometer? How to Test for the Presence and Complexity of Consciousness

Tools and tests for measuring the presence and complexity of consciousness are becoming available, but there is no established theoretical approach for what these tools are measuring. This article examines several categories of tests for making reasonable inferences about the presence and complexity of consciousness (defined as the capacity for phenomenal/subjective experience) and also suggests ways in which different theories of consciousness may be empirically distinguished. We label the various ways to measure consciousness the measurable correlates of consciousness (MCC) and include three subcategories in our taxonomy: (a) neural correlates of consciousness, (b) behavioral correlates of consciousness, and (c) creative correlates of consciousness. Finally, we reflect on how broader philosophical views about the nature of consciousness, such as materialism and panpsychism, may also be informed by the scientific process.

A First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience

Understanding the neural bases of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges of the natural sciences. Higher-order theories of consciousness are typically defended by assessments of neural activity in higher cortical regions during perception, often with disregard to the nature of the neural computations that these regions execute. We have sought to refocus the problem toward identification of those neural computations that are necessary for subjective experience with the goal of defining the sorts of neural architectures that can perform these operations. This approach removes reliance on behaviour and brain homologies for appraising whether non-human animals have the potential to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. Using two basic principles—first, subjective experience is dependent on complex processing executing specific neural functions and second, the structure-determines-function principle—we have reasoned that subjective experience requires a neural architecture consisting of stacked forward models that predict the output of neural processing from inputs. Given that forward models are dependent on appropriately connected processing modules that generate prediction, error detection and feedback control, we define a minimal neural architecture that is necessary (but not sufficient) for subjective experience. We refer to this framework as the hierarchical forward models algorithm. Accordingly, we postulate that any animal lacking this neural architecture will be incapable of subjective experience.

Representational 'touch' and modulatory 'retouch'-two necessary neurobiological processes in thalamocortical interaction for conscious experience

Theories of consciousness using neurobiological data or being influenced by these data have been focused either on states of consciousness or contents of consciousness. These theories have occasionally used evidence from psychophysical phenomena where conscious experience is a dependent experimental variable. However, systematic catalog of many such relevant phenomena has not been offered in terms of these theories. In the perceptual retouch theory of thalamocortical interaction, recently developed to become a blend with the dendritic integration theory, consciousness states and contents of consciousness are explained by the same mechanism. This general-purpose mechanism has modulation of the cortical layer-5 pyramidal neurons that represent contents of consciousness as its core. As a surplus, many experimental psychophysical phenomena of conscious perception can be explained by the workings of this mechanism. Historical origins and current views inherent in this theory are presented and reviewed.

Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness

The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models, and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by Crick and Koch's seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception of conscious perception: it is considered the product of resolved information processing by unconscious mechanisms, produced by a singular event in time and place representing the moment of entry. The conscious percept produced is then automatically retained to be utilized by post-conscious mechanisms. Major debates in the field, such as concern the moment of entry, the all-or-none vs graded nature, and report vs no-report paradigms, are driven by the consensus on these assumptions. We show how removing these assumptions can resolve some of the debates and challenges and prompt additional questions. The potential non-sequential nature of perception suggests new ways of thinking about consciousness as a dynamic and dispersed process, and in turn about the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception. Moreover, it allows us to present a parsimonious account for conscious perception while addressing more aspects of the phenomenon.

Dissociating the Neural Correlates of Consciousness and Task Relevance in Face Perception Using Simultaneous EEG-fMRI

Current theories of visual consciousness disagree about whether it emerges during early stages of processing in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network becomes involved. Moreover, disentangling conscious perception from task-related postperceptual processes (e.g., report) and integrating results across different neuroscientific methods remain ongoing challenges. The present study addressed these problems using simultaneous EEG-fMRI and a specific inattentional blindness paradigm with three physically identical phases in female and male human participants. In phase 1, participants performed a distractor task during which line drawings of faces and control stimuli were presented centrally. While some participants spontaneously noticed the faces in phase 1, others remained inattentionally blind. In phase 2, all participants were made aware of the task-irrelevant faces but continued the distractor task. In phase 3, the faces became task-relevant. Bayesian analysis of brain responses demonstrated that conscious face perception was most strongly associated with activation in fusiform gyrus (fMRI) as well as the N170 and visual awareness negativity (EEG). Smaller awareness effects were revealed in the occipital and prefrontal cortex (fMRI). Task-relevant face processing, on the other hand, led to strong, extensive activation of occipitotemporal, frontoparietal, and attentional networks (fMRI). In EEG, it enhanced early negativities and elicited a pronounced P3b component. Overall, we provide evidence that conscious visual perception is linked with early processing in stimulus-specific sensory brain areas but may additionally involve prefrontal cortex. In contrast, the strong activation of widespread brain networks and the P3b are more likely associated with task-related processes.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does our brain generate visual consciousness-the subjective experience of what it is like to see, for example, a face? To date, it is hotly debated whether it emerges early in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network is activated. Here, we use simultaneous fMRI and EEG for high spatial and temporal resolution and demonstrate that conscious face perception is predominantly linked to early and occipitotemporal processes, but also prefrontal activity. Task-related processes (e.g., decision-making), on the other hand, elicit brain-wide activations including late and strong frontoparietal activity. These findings challenge numerous previous studies and highlight the importance of investigating the neural correlates of consciousness in the absence of task relevance.

Slower access to visual awareness but otherwise intact implicit perception of emotional faces in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders

Schizophrenia-spectrum disorders are characterized by deficits in social domains. Extant research has reported an impaired ability to perceive emotional faces in schizophrenia. Yet, it is unclear if these deficits occur already in the access to visual awareness. To investigate this question, 23 people with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and 22 healthy controls performed a breaking continuous flash suppression task with fearful, happy, and neutral faces. Response times were analysed with generalized linear mixed models. People with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders were slower than controls in detecting faces, but did not show emotion-specific impairments. Moreover, happy faces were detected faster than neutral and fearful faces, across all participants. Although caution is needed when interpreting the main effect of group, our findings may suggest an elevated threshold for visual awareness in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, but an intact implicit emotion perception. Our study provides a new insight into the mechanisms underlying emotion perception in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.

Perceptual awareness negativity: a physiological correlate of sensory consciousness

Much research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has focused on two evoked potentials, the P3b and the visual or auditory awareness negativity (VAN, AAN). Surveying a broad range of recent experimental evidence, we find that repeated failures to observe the P3b during conscious perception eliminate it as a putative NCC. Neither the VAN nor the AAN have been dissociated from consciousness; furthermore, a similar neural signal correlates with tactile consciousness. These awareness negativities can be maximal contralateral to the evoking stimulus, are likely generated in underlying sensory cortices, and point to the existence of a generalized perceptual awareness negativity (PAN) reflecting the onset of sensory consciousness.

Don't tell anyone: the importance of no-report paradigms in neuroscience of consciousness

The neural correlates of perceptual awareness are usually investigated by comparing experimental conditions in which subjects are aware or not aware of the delivered stimulus. This, however, implies that subjects report their experience, possibly biasing the neural responses with the postperceptual processes involved. This Neuro Forum article reviews evidence from an electroencephalography (EEG) study by Cohen and colleagues (Cohen M, Ortego K, Kyroudis A, Pitts M. J Neurosci 40: 4925-4935, 2020) addressing the importance of no-report paradigms in the neuroscience of consciousness. In particular, authors show that P3b, one of the proposed canonical "signatures" of the conscious processing, is strongly elicited only when subjects have to report their experience, proposing a reconsideration in the approach to the neuroscience of consciousness.

Representational dynamics preceding conscious access

Our senses are continuously bombarded with more information than our brain can process up to the level of awareness. The present study aimed to enhance understanding on how attentional selection shapes conscious access under conditions of rapidly changing input. Using an attention task, EEG, and multivariate decoding of individual target- and distractor-defining features, we specifically examined dynamic changes in the representation of targets and distractors as a function of conscious access and the task-relevance (target or distractor) of the preceding item in the RSVP stream. At the behavioral level, replicating previous work and suggestive of a flexible gating mechanism, we found a significant impairment in conscious access to targets (T2) that were preceded by a target (T1) followed by one or two distractors (i.e., the attentional blink), but striking facilitation of conscious access to targets shown directly after another target (i.e., lag-1 sparing and blink reversal). At the neural level, conscious access to T2 was associated with enhanced early- and late-stage T1 representations and enhanced late-stage D1 representations, and interestingly, could be predicted based on the pattern of EEG activation well before T1 was presented. Yet, across task conditions, we did not find convincing evidence for the notion that conscious access is affected by rapid top-down selection-related modulations of the strength of early sensory representations induced by the preceding visual event. These results cannot easily be explained by existing accounts of how attentional selection shapes conscious access under rapidly changing input conditions, and have important implications for theories of the attentional blink and consciousness more generally.

Windows of Integration Hypothesis Revisited

In the ongoing research of the functions of consciousness, special emphasis has been put on integration of information: the ability to combine different signals into a coherent, unified one. Several theories of consciousness hold that this ability depends on - or at least goes hand in hand with - conscious processing. Yet some empirical findings have suggested otherwise, claiming that integration of information could take place even without awareness. Trying to reconcile this apparent contradiction, the "windows of integration" (WOI) hypothesis claims that conscious access enables signal processing over large integration windows. The hypothesis applies to integration windows defined either temporally, spatially, or semantically. In this review, we explain the hypothesis and re-examine it in light of new studies published since it was suggested. In line with the hypothesis, these studies provide compelling evidence for unconscious integration, but also demonstrate its limits with respect to time, space, and semantic distance. The review further highlights open questions that still need to be pursued to demonstrate the applicability of the WOI hypothesis as a guiding principle for understanding the depth and scope of unconscious processes.

Dissociating neural correlates of consciousness and task relevance during auditory processing

In recent years, several ERP components have been identified as potential neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), including early negativities and late positivities. Based on experiments in the visual modality, it has recently been shown that awareness is often confounded with reporting it, possibly overestimating the NCC. It is unknown whether similar constraints also exist in the auditory modality. In order to address this gap, we presented spoken words in a sustained inattentional deafness paradigm. Electrophysiological responses were obtained in three physically identical experimental conditions that differed only with respect to the participants' instructions. Participants were either left uninformed or informed about the presence of spoken words while confronted with an auditory distractor task (U/I condition), informed about the words while exposed to the same task as before (I condition), or requested to respond to the now task-relevant speech stimuli (TR condition). After completion of the U/I condition, only informed participants reported awareness of the words. In ERPs, awareness of words in the U/I and I condition was accompanied by an anterior auditory awareness negativity (AAN). Only when stimuli were task-relevant, i.e., during the TR condition, late positivities emerged. Taken together, these results indicate that early negativities but not late positivities index awareness across sensory modalities. Thus, they provide evidence for a recurrent processing framework, which highlights the importance of early sensory processing in conscious perception.

Pre-stimulus alpha predicts inattentional blindness

Pre- and post-stimulus oscillatory activity between 8 and 12 hertz, referred to as the alpha-band, correlates with conscious visual awareness of stimuli across a variety of psychophysical tasks. Within an EEG-adapted inattentional blindness task, the current study sought to examine whether this relationship holds for conscious awareness of stimuli under conditions of inattentional blindness. Noticing rates of the task-irrelevant unexpected stimulus were correlated with a significant decrease in alpha power over bilateral parietal-occipital areas during the pre-stimulus interval, and a significant decrease in alpha power over parietal-occipital regions in the right hemisphere during the post-stimulus interval. Findings are taken to imply alpha-band neural activity represents a valid correlate of consciousness that is not confounded by task relevancy or the need for report.

Implicit processing during inattentional blindness: A systematic review and meta-analysis

The occurrence of implicit processing of visual stimuli during inattentional blindness is still a matter of debate. To assess the evidence available in this debate, we conducted a systematic review of articles that explored whether unexpected visual stimuli presented during inattentional blindness are implicitly processed despite not being reported. Additionally, we employed meta-analysis to combine 59 behavioral experiments and investigate the statistical support for such implicit processing across experiments. Results showed that visual stimuli can be processed when unattended and unnoticed. Additionally, we reviewed the measures used to assess participants' awareness of the unexpected stimuli. We also employed meta-analysis to search for differences in awareness of the unexpected stimuli that may result from adopting distinct criteria to categorize participants as aware or unaware. The results showed that the overall effect of awareness changed depending on whether more demanding or less demanding measures of awareness were employed. This suggests that the choice of awareness measure may influence conclusions about whether processing of the US is implicit or explicit. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of implicit processing and the role of attention in visual cognition.

The predictive global neuronal workspace: A formal active inference model of visual consciousness

The global neuronal workspace (GNW) model has inspired over two decades of hypothesis-driven research on the neural basis of consciousness. However, recent studies have reported findings that are at odds with empirical predictions of the model. Further, the macro-anatomical focus of current GNW research has limited the specificity of predictions afforded by the model. In this paper we present a neurocomputational model - based on Active Inference - that captures central architectural elements of the GNW and is able to address these limitations. The resulting 'predictive global workspace' casts neuronal dynamics as approximating Bayesian inference, allowing precise, testable predictions at both the behavioural and neural levels of description. We report simulations demonstrating the model's ability to reproduce: 1) the electrophysiological and behavioural results observed in previous studies of inattentional blindness; and 2) the previously introduced four-way taxonomy predicted by the GNW, which describes the relationship between consciousness, attention, and sensory signal strength. We then illustrate how our model can reconcile/explain (apparently) conflicting findings, extend the GNW taxonomy to include the influence of prior expectations, and inspire novel paradigms to test associated behavioural and neural predictions.

The attentional blink unveils the interplay between conscious perception, spatial attention and working memory encoding

Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness.

Neurophysiological correlates of emotional face perception consciousness

Aim of the present study was to investigate the neurophysiologic correlates of the conscious and not conscious perception of faces (presented for 14, 40, 80 ms) with happy and sad emotional valence. Electroencephalographic data of 22 participants during a report-based visual task were recorded. Both happy and sad faces presented for 14 ms showed a longer N170 latency compared to the faces presented for 40 and 80 ms. A shorter latency of early components (before N170) was found in the right hemisphere and a longer latency in the left one in response to the happy faces presented for 14 ms compared to those presented for longer times. The faces presented for 14 ms, declared as consciously perceived, evoked a higher brain response compared to those declared as not perceived. Parietal and cingulate brain areas showed a lower intensity of the brain response to the consciously perceived faces in the early components. Happy faces showed a greater brain response when consciously detected, while the sad faces induced a greater brain response when not consciously detected. The findings suggest that the N170 may be the epiphenomenon of an earlier consciously detection. Moreover, these preliminary results seem to support a main role of parietal and cingulate brain areas into not conscious perception.

Loads of unconscious processing: The role of perceptual load in processing unattended stimuli during inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness describes the failure to detect an unexpected but clearly visible object when our attention is engaged elsewhere. While the factors that determine the occurrence of inattentional blindness are already well understood, there is still a lot to learn about whether and how we process unexpected objects that go unnoticed. Only recently it was shown that although not consciously aware, characteristics of these stimuli can interfere with a primary task: Classification of to-be-attended stimuli was slower when the content of the task-irrelevant, undetected stimulus contradicted that of the attended, to-be-judged stimuli. According to Lavie’s perceptual load model, irrelevant stimuli are likely to reach awareness under conditions of low perceptual load, while they remain undetected under high load, as attentional resources are restricted to the content of focused attention. In the present study, we investigated the applicability of Lavie’s predictions for the processing of stimuli that remain unconscious due to inattentional blindness. In two experiments, we replicated that unconsciously processed stimuli can interfere with intended responses. Also, our manipulation of perceptual load did have an effect on primary task performance. However, against our hypothesis, these effects did not interact with each other. Thus, our results suggest that high perceptual load cannot prevent task-irrelevant stimuli that remain undetected from being processed to an extent that enables them to affect performance in a primary task.

Lack of awareness despite complex visual processing: Evidence from event-related potentials in a case of selective metamorphopsia

Visual awareness is thought to result from integration of low- and high-level processing; instances of integration failure provide a crucial window into the cognitive and neural bases of awareness. We present neurophysiological evidence of complex cognitive processing in the absence of awareness, raising questions about the conditions necessary for visual awareness. We describe an individual with a neurodegenerative disease who exhibits impaired visual awareness for the digits 2 to 9, and stimuli presented in close proximity to these digits, due to perceptual distortion. We identified robust event-related potential responses indicating 1) face detection with the N170 component and 2) task-dependent target-word detection with the P3b component, despite no awareness of the presence of faces or target words. These data force us to reconsider the relationship between neural processing and visual awareness; even stimuli processed by a workspace-like cognitive system can remain inaccessible to awareness. We discuss how this finding challenges and constrains theories of visual awareness.

Faces under continuous flash suppression capture attention faster than objects, but without a face-evoked steady-state visual potential: Is curvilinearity responsible for the behavioral effect?

Face perception is a vital part of human social interactions. The social value of faces makes their efficient detection evolutionarily advantageous. It has been suggested that this might occur nonconsciously, but experimental results are equivocal thus far. Here, we probe nonconscious face perception using a novel combination of binocular rivalry with continuous flash suppression and steady-state visually evoked potentials. In the first two experiments, participants viewed either non-face objects, neutral faces (Study 1), or fearful faces (Study 2). Consistent with the hypothesis that faces are processed nonconsciously, we found that faces broke through suppression faster than objects. We did not, however, observe a concomitant face-selective steady-state visually evoked potential. Study 3 was run to reconcile this paradox. We hypothesized that the faster breakthrough time was due to a mid-level visual feature, curvilinearity, rather than high-level category membership, which would explain the behavioral difference without neural evidence of face-selective processing. We tested this hypothesis by presenting participants with four different groups of stimuli outside of conscious awareness: rectilinear objects (e.g., chessboard), curvilinear objects (e.g., dartboard), faces, and objects that were not dominantly curvilinear or rectilinear. We found that faces and curvilinear objects broke through suppression faster than objects and rectilinear objects. Moreover, there was no difference between faces and curvilinear objects. These results support our hypothesis that the observed behavioral advantage for faces is due to their curvilinearity, rather than category membership.

Distinguishing the Neural Correlates of Perceptual Awareness and Postperceptual Processing

To identify the neural correlates of perceptual awareness, researchers often compare the differences in neural activation between conditions in which an observer is or is not aware of a stimulus. While intuitive, this approach often contains a critical limitation: to link brain activity with perceptual awareness, observers traditionally report the contents of their perceptual experience. However, relying on observers' reports is problematic because it is difficult to know whether the neural responses being measured are associated with conscious perception or with postperceptual processes involved in the reporting task (e.g., working memory, decision-making). To address this issue, we combined a standard visual masking paradigm with a recently developed "no-report" paradigm in male/female human participants. In the visual masking paradigm, observers saw images of animals and objects that were visible or invisible, depending on their proximity to masks. Meanwhile, on half of the trials, observers reported the contents of their perceptual experience (i.e., report condition), while on the other half of trials they refrained from reporting about their experiences (i.e., no-report condition). We used electroencephalography to examine how visibility interacts with reporting by measuring the P3b event-related potential, one of the proposed canonical "signatures" of conscious processing. Overall, we found a robust P3b in the report condition, but no P3b whatsoever in the no-report condition. This finding suggests that the P3b itself is not a neural signature of conscious processing and highlights the importance of carefully distinguishing the neural correlates of perceptual awareness from postperceptual processing.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT What are the neural signatures that differentiate conscious and unconscious processing in the brain? Perhaps the most well established candidate signature is the P3b event-related potential, a late slow wave that appears when observers are aware of a stimulus, but disappears when a stimulus fails to reach awareness. Here, however, we found that the P3b does not track what observers are perceiving, but instead tracks what observers are reporting. When observers are aware of simple visual stimuli, the P3b is nowhere to be found unless observers are reporting the contents of their experience. These results challenge the well established notion of the P3b as a neural marker of awareness and highlight the need for new approaches to the neuroscience of consciousness.

Impaired perception of simultaneous stimuli in a patient with posterior cortical atrophy: an attentional account

We assessed visuospatial abilities in PCA. Sequential display of two simple geometric figures enhanced detection and discrimination relative to simultaneous display (Exps 1 & 2). Comparing edges of a single object enhanced discrimination relative to comparing edges of two separate objects, consistent with object-based attention (Exp. 3). Recognition of complex line drawings was spared for a single object but disrupted by an attention-grabbing small circle (Exp. 4). A covert orienting task showed difficulty disengaging from previous locations and attentional bias toward the right visual field (Exp. 5). These findings shed light on the role of visual attention in perceptual awareness.