Is auditory awareness graded or dichotomous: Electrophysiological correlates of consciousness at different depths of stimulus processing

The level-of-processing (LoP) hypothesis postulates that transition from unaware to aware visual stimuli is either graded or dichotomous depending on the depth of stimulus processing. Humans can be progressively aware of the low-level features, such as colors or shapes, while the high-level features, such as semantic category, enter consciousness in an all-or none fashion. Unlike in vision, sounds always unfold in time, which might require mechanisms dissimilar from visual processing. We tested the LoP hypothesis in hearing for the first time by presenting participants with words of different categories, spoken in different pitches near the perceptual threshold. We also assessed whether different electrophysiological correlates of consciousness, the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) and late positivity (LP), were associated with LoP. Our findings indicate that LoP also applies to the auditory modality. AAN is an early correlate of awareness independent of LoP, while LP was modulated by awareness, performance accuracy and the level of processing.

Taking consciousness for real: Increasing the ecological validity of the study of conscious vs. unconscious processes

The study of consciousness has developed well-controlled, rigorous methods for manipulating and measuring consciousness. Yet, in the process, experimental paradigms grew farther away from everyday conscious and unconscious processes, which raises the concern of ecological validity. In this review, we suggest that the field can benefit from adopting a more ecological approach, akin to other fields of cognitive science. There, this approach challenged some existing hypotheses, yielded stronger effects, and enabled new research questions. We argue that such a move is critical for studying consciousness, where experimental paradigms tend to be artificial and small effect sizes are relatively prevalent. We identify three paths for doing so-changing the stimuli and experimental settings, changing the measures, and changing the research questions themselves-and review works that have already started implementing such approaches. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, we call for increasing ecological validity in consciousness studies.

How (not) to demonstrate unconscious priming: Overcoming issues with post-hoc data selection, low power, and frequentist statistics

One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.

The nature of consciousness in anaesthesia

Neuroscientists agree on the value of locating the source of consciousness within the brain. Anaesthesiologists are no exception, and have their own operational definition of consciousness based on phenomenological observations during anaesthesia. The full functional correlates of consciousness are yet to be precisely identified, however rapidly evolving progress in this scientific domain has yielded several theories that attempt to model the generation of consciousness. They have received variable support from experimental observations, including those involving anaesthesia and its ability to reversibly modulate different aspects of consciousness. Aside from the interest in a better understanding of the mechanisms of consciousness, exploring the functional tenets of the phenomenological consciousness states of general anaesthesia has the potential to ultimately improve patient management. It could facilitate the design of specific monitoring devices and approaches, aiming at reliably detecting each of the possible states of consciousness during an anaesthetic procedure, including total absence of mental content (unconsciousness), and internal awareness (sensation of self and internal thoughts) with or without conscious perception of the environment (connected or disconnected consciousness, respectively). Indeed, it must be noted that unresponsiveness is not sufficient to infer absence of connectedness or even absence of consciousness. This narrative review presents the current knowledge in this field from a system-level, underlining the contribution of anaesthesia studies in supporting theories of consciousness, and proposing directions for future research.

Contributions of Artificial Intelligence to Decision Making in Nursing: A Scoping Review Protocol

BACKGROUND

Artificial intelligence (AI) techniques and methodologies for problem solving are emerging as formal tools essential to assist in nursing care. Given their potential to improve workflows and to guide decision making, several studies have been developed; however, little is known about their impact, particularly on decision making.

OBJECTIVE

The aim of this study was to map the existing research on the use of AI in decision making in nursing. With this review protocol, we aimed to map the existing research on the use of AI in nursing decision making.

METHODS

A scoping review was conducted following the framework proposed by the Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI). The search strategy was tailored to each database/repository to identify relevant studies. The contained articles were the targets of the data extraction, which was conducted by two independent researchers. In the event of discrepancies, a third researcher was consulted.

RESULTS

This review included quantitative, qualitative and mixed method studies. Primary studies, systematic reviews, dissertations, opinion texts and gray literature were considered according to the three steps that the JBI has defined for scoping reviews.

CONCLUSIONS

This scoping review synthesized knowledge that could help advance new scientific developments and find significant and valuable outcomes for patients, caregivers and leaders in decision making. This review was also intended to encourage the development of research lines that may be useful for the development of AI tools for decision making.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

The functional contributions of consciousness

The most widely endorsed philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness assume that it contributes a single functional capacity to an organism's information processing toolkit. However, conscious processes are a heterogeneous class of psychological phenomena supported by a variety of neurobiological mechanisms. This suggests a plurality of functional contributions of consciousness (FCCs), in the sense that conscious experience facilitates different functional capacities in different psychological domains. In this paper, I first develop a general methodological framework for isolating the psychological functions that are associated with conscious experience. I then use this to show that the leading accounts-Global Workspace Theories, Higher Order Thought Theory and Information Integration Theory-all fail to acknowledge this functional pluralism, which limits their applicability as theories of consciousness.

Informative neural representations of unseen contents during higher-order processing in human brains and deep artificial networks

A framework to pinpoint the scope of unconscious processing is critical to improve models of visual consciousness. Previous research observed brain signatures of unconscious processing in visual cortex, but these were not reliably identified. Further, whether unconscious contents are represented in high-level stages of the ventral visual stream and linked parieto-frontal areas remains unknown. Using a within-subject, high-precision functional magnetic resonance imaging approach, we show that unconscious contents can be decoded from multi-voxel patterns that are highly distributed alongside the ventral visual pathway and also involving parieto-frontal substrates. Classifiers trained with multi-voxel patterns of conscious items generalized to predict the unconscious counterparts, indicating that their neural representations overlap. These findings suggest revisions to models of consciousness such as the neuronal global workspace. We then provide a computational simulation of visual processing/representation without perceptual sensitivity by using deep neural networks performing a similar visual task. The work provides a framework for pinpointing the representation of unconscious knowledge across different task domains.

Insights on overflow from failure to report tasks

Theories of consciousness diverge on the functional requirement that a conscious state need be reportable. Some maintain that the perceptual system's capacity for consciousness exceeds that of its capacity for access. Others contend that what is accessed is all there is to consciousness. Here, we suggest a compelling case for access-free consciousness cannot be made reliant on experimental evidence where access is necessarily invoked. However, a bona fide empirical separation of consciousness and report could counter the claim that reportability, and hence access, is all there is to consciousness. We first overview recent neurophysiological findings from no-report tasks, before examining a series of studies in which participants were unable to report features of clearly visible items. These new data present a challenge for a hard "access-only" view of consciousness, as they appear to demonstrate that properties of our visual experience can remain unreportable. In so doing, we highlight the utility and underappreciated value of so-called failure to report tasks.

Task Difficulty Regulates How Conscious and Unconscious Monetary Rewards Boost the Performance of Working Memory: An Event-Related Potential Study

The performance of working memory can be improved by the corresponding high-value vs. low-value rewards consciously or unconsciously. However, whether conscious and unconscious monetary rewards boosting the performance of working memory is regulated by the difficulty level of working memory task is unknown. In this study, a novel paradigm that consists of a reward-priming procedure and N-back task with differing levels of difficulty was designed to inspect this complex process. In particular, both high-value and low-value coins were presented consciously or unconsciously as the reward cues, followed by the N-back task, during which electroencephalogram signals were recorded. It was discovered that the high-value reward elicited larger event-related potential (ERP) component P3 along the parietal area (reflecting the working memory load) as compared to the low-value reward for the less difficult 1-back task, no matter whether the reward was unconsciously or consciously presented. In contrast, this is not the case for the more difficult 2-back task, in which the difference in P3 amplitude between the high-value and low-value rewards was not significant for the unconscious reward case, yet manifested significance for the conscious reward processing. Interestingly, the results of the behavioral analysis also exhibited very similar patterns as ERP patterns. Therefore, this study demonstrated that the difficulty level of a task can modulate the influence of unconscious reward on the performance of working memory.

Effect of the congruity of emotional contexts at encoding on source memory: Evidence from ERPs

Emotion's influence on source memory has proven more elusive and the lack of studies investigates the effect of the congruent emotional contexts on source memory. Here, we investigated these issues using event-related potentials (ERPs) to assess emotional-induced neural correlates. During encoding, congruent word-picture (a word 'shoes' - a picture described shoes) and incongruent word-picture (a word 'pepper' - a picture described shoes) with a prompt (Common? or Natural?) were presented. At retrieval, participants indicated which prompts were concomitantly presented with the word during encoding. Behavioral results revealed that source memory accuracy was enhanced in the neutral contexts compared to the negative contexts, and enhanced in the incongruent condition relative to the congruent condition, suggesting that emotional contexts impaired source memory performance, and incongruent information enhanced source memory. ERPs results showed that early P2 old/new effect (150-250 ms) and FN400 old/new effect (300-450 ms) were observed for words with correct source that had been encoded in the congruent emotional contexts, and that a larger parietal old/new effect, between 500 and 700 ms, was observed for words with correct source that had been encoded in the incongruent condition than in the congruent condition, irrespective the nature of context. The ERPs results indicate that retrieval of source details for the associated emotionally congruent information supports the idea that emotional events could attract more attentional resources, and reflects the contribution of familiarity-based process. Meanwhile, retrieval of source details for the associated incongruent information reflects a stronger contribution of recollection-based process.

Emotions as Abstract Evaluation Criteria in Biological and Artificial Intelligences

Biological as well as advanced artificial intelligences (AIs) need to decide which goals to pursue. We review nature's solution to the time allocation problem, which is based on a continuously readjusted categorical weighting mechanism we experience introspectively as emotions. One observes phylogenetically that the available number of emotional states increases hand in hand with the cognitive capabilities of animals and that raising levels of intelligence entail ever larger sets of behavioral options. Our ability to experience a multitude of potentially conflicting feelings is in this view not a leftover of a more primitive heritage, but a generic mechanism for attributing values to behavioral options that can not be specified at birth. In this view, emotions are essential for understanding the mind. For concreteness, we propose and discuss a framework which mimics emotions on a functional level. Based on time allocation via emotional stationarity (TAES), emotions are implemented as abstract criteria, such as satisfaction, challenge and boredom, which serve to evaluate activities that have been carried out. The resulting timeline of experienced emotions is compared with the “character” of the agent, which is defined in terms of a preferred distribution of emotional states. The long-term goal of the agent, to align experience with character, is achieved by optimizing the frequency for selecting individual tasks. Upon optimization, the statistics of emotion experience becomes stationary.

Modeling the subjective perspective of consciousness and its role in the control of behaviours

Consciousness has been hypothesized to operate as a global workspace, which accesses and integrates multimodal information in a uni_ed manner, supports expectation violation monitoring and reduction, and the motivation, programming and control of action. One important yet open issue concerns how the subjective perspective at the core of consciousness, and subjective properties of manifestation of the environment in such perspective as an embodied experience, play a role in such process. We operationalised the concept of subjective perspective using the principles of the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), based on the projective geometrical concept of Field of Consciousness. We show how these principles can account for documented relationships between appraisal and distance as an inverse distance law, yield a generative model of a_ective and epistemic drives based on purely subjective parameters, such as the apparent size of objects, and can be generalised to implement Theory of Mind, in a manner that is consistent with simulation theory. We used simulations of arti_cial agents, based on psychological rationale, to demonstrate how different model parameters could generate a variety of emergent adaptive and maladaptive behaviours that are relevant to developmental and clinical psychology: the ability to be resilient in the face of obstacles through imaginary projections, the emergence of social approach and joint attention behaviours, the ability to take advantage of false beliefs attributed to others, the emergence of avoidance behaviours as observed in social anxiety disorders, the presence of restricted interests as observed in autism spectrum disorders. The simulation of agents was applied to a speci_c robotic context, and agents' behaviours were demonstrated by controlling the corresponding robots. Our results contribute to advance the scienti_c understanding of the causal relationships between core aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness and its functions in human cybernetics.

Comparing stimulus-evoked and spontaneous response of the face-selective multi-units in the human posterior fusiform gyrus

The stimulus-evoked neural response is a widely explored phenomenon. Conscious awareness is associated in many cases with the corresponding selective stimulus-evoked response. For example, conscious awareness of a face stimulus is associated with or accompanied by stimulus-evoked activity in the fusiform face area (FFA). In addition to the stimulus-evoked response, spontaneous (i.e. task-unrelated) activity in the brain is also abundant. Notably, spontaneous activity is considered unconscious. For example, spontaneous activity in the FFA is not associated with conscious awareness of a face. The question is: what is the difference at the neural level between stimulus-evoked activity in a case that this activity is associated with conscious awareness of some content (e.g. activity in the FFA in response to fully visible face stimuli) and spontaneous activity in that same region of the brain? To answer this question, in the present study, we had a rare opportunity to record two face-selective multi-units in the vicinity of the FFA in a human patient. We compared multi-unit face-selective task-evoked activity with spontaneous prestimulus and a resting-state activity. We found that when activity was examined over relatively long temporal windows (e.g. 100–200 ms), face-selective stimulus-evoked firing in the recorded multi-units was much higher than the spontaneous activity. In contrast, when activity was examined over relatively short windows, we found many cases of high firing rates within the spontaneous activity that were comparable to stimulus-evoked activity. Our results thus indicate that the sustained activity is what might differentiate between stimulus-evoked activity that is associated with conscious awareness and spontaneous activity.

Apical amplification-a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

No Evidence for Neural Overlap between Unconsciously Processed and Imagined Stimuli

Visual representations can be generated via feedforward or feedback processes. The extent to which these processes result in overlapping representations remains unclear. Previous work has shown that imagined stimuli elicit similar representations as perceived stimuli throughout the visual cortex. However, while representations during imagery are indeed only caused by feedback processing, neural processing during perception is an interplay of both feedforward and feedback processing. This means that any representational overlap could be because of overlap in feedback processes. In the current study, we aimed to investigate this issue by characterizing the overlap between feedforward- and feedback-initiated category representations during imagined stimuli, conscious perception, and unconscious processing using fMRI in humans of either sex. While all three conditions elicited stimulus representations in left lateral occipital cortex (LOC), significant similarities were observed only between imagery and conscious perception in this area. Furthermore, connectivity analyses revealed stronger connectivity between frontal areas and left LOC during conscious perception and in imagery compared with unconscious processing. Together, these findings can be explained by the idea that long-range feedback modifies visual representations, thereby reducing representational overlap between purely feedforward- and feedback-initiated stimulus representations measured by fMRI. Neural representations influenced by feedback, either stimulus driven (perception) or purely internally driven (imagery), are, however, relatively similar.

Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics' performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which - hopefully - will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.

Pupil Dilation and the Slow Wave ERP Reflect Surprise about Choice Outcome Resulting from Intrinsic Variability in Decision Confidence

Central to human and animal cognition is the ability to learn from feedback in order to optimize future rewards. Such a learning signal might be encoded and broadcasted by the brain's arousal systems, including the noradrenergic locus coeruleus. Pupil responses and the positive slow wave component of event-related potentials reflect rapid changes in the arousal level of the brain. Here, we ask whether and how these variables may reflect surprise: the mismatch between one's expectation about being correct and the outcome of a decision, when expectations fluctuate due to internal factors (e.g., engagement). We show that during an elementary decision task in the face of uncertainty both physiological markers of phasic arousal reflect surprise. We further show that pupil responses and slow wave event-related potential are unrelated to each other and that prediction error computations depend on feedback awareness. These results further advance our understanding of the role of central arousal systems in decision-making under uncertainty.

The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity

Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness, phi (Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global information transfer (which is what Φ in fact measures) is mistaken. This misidentification has the consequence of requiring the attribution of consciousness to a range of natural systems and artifacts that include, but are not limited to, large-scale electrical power grids, gene-regulation networks, some electronic circuit boards, and social networks. Instead of treating this consequence of the theory as a disconfirmation, IIT embraces it. By regarding these systems as bearers of consciousness ex hypothesi, IIT is led towards the orbit of panpsychist ideation. This departure from science as we know it can be avoided by recognizing the functional misattribution at the heart of IIT's identity claim. We show, for example, what function is actually performed, at least in the human case, by the cortical combination of differentiation with integration that IIT identifies with consciousness. Finally, we examine what lessons may be drawn from IIT's failure to provide a credible account of consciousness for progress in the very active field of research concerned with exploring the phenomenon from formal and neural points of view.

Cortical and subcortical signatures of conscious object recognition

The neural mechanisms underlying conscious recognition remain unclear, particularly the roles played by the prefrontal cortex, deactivated brain areas and subcortical regions. We investigated neural activity during conscious object recognition using 7 Tesla fMRI while human participants viewed object images presented at liminal contrasts. Here, we show both recognized and unrecognized images recruit widely distributed cortical and subcortical regions; however, recognized images elicit enhanced activation of visual, frontoparietal, and subcortical networks and stronger deactivation of the default-mode network. For recognized images, object category information can be decoded from all of the involved cortical networks but not from subcortical regions. Phase-scrambled images trigger strong involvement of inferior frontal junction, anterior cingulate cortex and default-mode network, implicating these regions in inferential processing under increased uncertainty. Our results indicate that content-specific activity in both activated and deactivated cortical networks and non-content-specific subcortical activity support conscious recognition.

Cortical and subcortical neural activity supporting conscious object recognition has not yet been well defined. Here, the authors describe these networks and show recognition-related category information can be decoded from widespread cortical activity but not subcortical activity.

Dissociating conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects

The scope of unconscious processing is highly debated, with recent studies showing that even high-level functions such as perceptual integration and category-based attention occur unconsciously. For example, upright faces that are suppressed from awareness through interocular suppression break into awareness more quickly than inverted faces. Similarly, verbal object cues boost otherwise invisible objects into awareness. Here, we replicate these findings, but find that they reflect a general difference in detectability not specific to interocular suppression. To dissociate conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects, we use an additional discrimination task to rule out conscious processes as a cause for these differences. Results from this detection-discrimination dissociation paradigm reveal that, while face orientation is processed unconsciously, category-based attention requires awareness. These findings provide insights into the function of conscious perception and offer an experimental approach for mapping out the scope and limits of unconscious processing.

Delayed access to conscious processing in multiple sclerosis: Reduced cortical activation and impaired structural connectivity

Although multiple sclerosis (MS) is frequently accompanied by visuo‐cognitive impairment, especially functional brain mechanisms underlying this impairment are still not well understood. Consequently, we used a functional MRI (fMRI) backward masking task to study visual information processing stratifying unconscious and conscious in MS. Specifically, 30 persons with MS (pwMS) and 34 healthy controls (HC) were shown target stimuli followed by a mask presented 8–150 ms later and had to compare the target to a reference stimulus. Retinal integrity (via optical coherence tomography), optic tract integrity (visual evoked potential; VEP) and whole brain structural connectivity (probabilistic tractography) were assessed as complementary structural brain integrity markers. On a psychophysical level, pwMS reached conscious access later than HC (50 vs. 16 ms, p < .001). The delay increased with disease duration (p < .001, β = .37) and disability (p < .001, β = .24), but did not correlate with conscious information processing speed (Symbol digit modality test, β = .07, p = .817). No association was found for VEP and retinal integrity markers. Moreover, pwMS were characterized by decreased brain activation during unconscious processing compared with HC. No group differences were found during conscious processing. Finally, a complementary structural brain integrity analysis showed that a reduced fractional anisotropy in corpus callosum and an impaired connection between right insula and primary visual areas was related to delayed conscious access in pwMS. Our study revealed slowed conscious access to visual stimulus material in MS and a complex pattern of functional and structural alterations coupled to unconscious processing of/delayed conscious access to visual stimulus material in MS.

Disentangling perceptual awareness from nonconscious processing in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Scholars have long debated whether animals, which display impressive intelligent behaviors, are consciously aware or not. Yet, because many complex human behaviors and high-level functions can be performed without conscious awareness, it was long considered impossible to untangle whether animals are aware or just conditionally or nonconsciously behaving. Here, we developed an empirical approach to address this question. We harnessed a well-established cross-over double dissociation between nonconscious and conscious processing, in which people perform in completely opposite ways when they are aware of stimuli versus when they are not. To date, no one has explored if similar performance dissociations exist in a nonhuman species. In a series of seven experiments, we first established these signatures in humans using both known and newly developed nonverbal double-dissociation tasks and then identified similar signatures in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). These results provide robust evidence for two distinct modes of processing in nonhuman primates. This empirical approach makes it feasible to disentangle conscious visual awareness from nonconscious processing in nonhuman species; hence, it can be used to strip away ambiguity when exploring the processes governing intelligent behavior across the animal kingdom. Taken together, these results strongly support the existence of both nonconscious processing as well as functional human-like visual awareness in nonhuman animals.

Feature-Based Attentional Weighting and Re-weighting in the Absence of Visual Awareness

Visual attention evolved as an adaptive mechanism allowing us to cope with a rapidly changing environment. It enables the facilitated processing of relevant information, often automatically and governed by implicit motives. However, despite recent advances in understanding the relationship between consciousness and visual attention, the functional scope of unconscious attentional control is still under debate. Here, we present a novel masking paradigm in which volunteers were to distinguish between varying orientations of a briefly presented, masked grating stimulus. Combining signal detection theory and subjective measures of awareness, we show that performance on unaware trials was consistent with visual selection being weighted towards repeated orientations of Gabor patches and reallocated in response to a novel unconsciously processed orientation. This was particularly present in trials in which the prior feature was strongly weighted and only if the novel feature was invisible. Thus, our results provide evidence that invisible orientation stimuli can trigger the reallocation of history-guided visual selection weights.

Subjective visibility report is facilitated by conscious predictions only

Predictions in the visual domain have been shown to modulate conscious access. Yet, little is known about how predictions may do so and to what extent they need to be consciously implemented to be effective. To address this, we administered an attentional blink (AB) task in which target 1 (T1) identity predicted target 2 (T2) identity, while participants rated their perceptual awareness of validly versus invalidly predicted T2s (Experiment 1 & 2) or reported T2 identity (Experiment 3). Critically, we tested the effects of conscious and non-conscious predictions, after seen and unseen T1s, on T2 visibility. We found that valid predictions increased subjective visibility reports and discrimination of T2s, but only when predictions were generated by a consciously accessed T1, irrespective of the timing at which the effects were measured (short vs. longs lags). These results further our understanding of the intricate relationship between predictive processing and consciousness.

Neural correlates of conscious tactile perception: An analysis of BOLD activation patterns and graph metrics

Theories of human consciousness substantially vary in the proposed spatial extent of brain activity associated with conscious perception as well as in the assumed functional alterations within the involved brain regions. Here, we investigate which local and global changes in brain activity accompany conscious somatosensory perception following electrical finger nerve stimulation, and whether there are whole-brain functional network alterations by means of graph metrics. Thirty-eight healthy participants performed a somatosensory detection task and reported their decision confidence during fMRI. For conscious tactile perception in contrast to undetected near-threshold trials (misses), we observed increased BOLD activity in the precuneus, the intraparietal sulcus, the insula, the nucleus accumbens, the inferior frontal gyrus and the contralateral secondary somatosensory cortex. For misses compared to correct rejections, bilateral secondary somatosensory cortices, supplementary motor cortex and insula showed greater activations. The analysis of whole-brain functional network topology for hits, misses and correct rejections, did not result in any significant differences in modularity, participation, clustering or path length, which was supported by Bayes factor statistics. In conclusion, for conscious somatosensory perception, our results are consistent with an involvement of (probably) domain-general brain areas (precuneus, insula, inferior frontal gyrus) in addition to somatosensory regions; our data do not support the notion of specific changes in graph metrics associated with conscious experience. For the employed somatosensory submodality of fine electrical current stimulation, this speaks for a global broadcasting of sensory content across the brain without substantial reconfiguration of the whole-brain functional network resulting in an integrative conscious experience.

Similar history biases for distinct prospective decisions of self-performance

Metacognition can be deployed retrospectively -to reflect on the correctness of our behavior- or prospectively -to make predictions of success in one's future behavior or make decisions about strategies to solve future problems. We investigated the factors that determine prospective decision making. Human participants performed a visual discrimination task followed by ratings of visibility and response confidence. Prior to each trial, participants made prospective judgments. In Experiment 1, they rated their belief of future success. In Experiment 2, they rated their decision to adopt a focused attention state. Prospective beliefs of success were associated with no performance changes while prospective decisions to engage attention were followed by better self-evaluation of the correctness of behavioral responses. Using standard machine learning classifiers we found that the current prospective decision could be predicted from information concerning task-correctness, stimulus visibility and response confidence from previous trials. In both Experiments, awareness and confidence were more diagnostic of the prospective decision than task correctness. Notably, classifiers trained with prospective beliefs of success in Experiment 1 predicted decisions to engage in Experiment 2 and vice-versa. These results indicate that the formation of these seemingly different prospective decisions share a common, dynamic representational structure.

Decoding across sensory modalities reveals common supramodal signatures of conscious perception

An increasing number of studies highlight common brain regions and processes in mediating conscious sensory experience. While most studies have been performed in the visual modality, it is implicitly assumed that similar processes are involved in other sensory modalities. However, the existence of supramodal neural processes related to conscious perception has not been convincingly shown so far. Here, we aim to directly address this issue by investigating whether neural correlates of conscious perception in one modality can predict conscious perception in a different modality. In two separate experiments, we presented participants with successive blocks of near-threshold tasks involving subjective reports of tactile, visual, or auditory stimuli during the same magnetoencephalography (MEG) acquisition. Using decoding analysis in the poststimulus period between sensory modalities, our first experiment uncovered supramodal spatiotemporal neural activity patterns predicting conscious perception of the feeble stimulation. Strikingly, these supramodal patterns included activity in primary sensory regions not directly relevant to the task (e.g., neural activity in visual cortex predicting conscious perception of auditory near-threshold stimulation). We carefully replicate our results in a control experiment that furthermore show that the relevant patterns are independent of the type of report (i.e., whether conscious perception was reported by pressing or withholding a button press). Using standard paradigms for probing neural correlates of conscious perception, our findings reveal a common signature of conscious access across sensory modalities and illustrate the temporally late and widespread broadcasting of neural representations, even into task-unrelated primary sensory processing regions.

Unconscious semantic priming from pictures under backward masking and continuous flash suppression

It is debated whether the meaning of invisible pictures can be processed unconsciously. We tested whether pictures of animals or objects presented under backward masking or continuous flash suppression could prime the subsequent categorization of target words into animal or non-animal. In Experiment 1, the backward masking part failed to replicate the priming effect reported in two previous studies, despite sufficient statistical power (N = 59). Similarly, the continuous flash suppression part provided no evidence for a priming effect. In Experiment 2 (N = 65) we shortened the prime-target SOA from 290 ms to 90 ms, but again failed to obtain unconscious semantic priming under backward masking. Thus, our study did not provide evidence for unconscious semantic processing of pictures. These findings support the emerging view that unconscious processing is rather limited in scope.

Walking Without Awareness

Pedestrians are commonly engaged in other activities while walking. The current study assesses (1) whether pedestrians are sufficiently aware of their surroundings to successfully negotiate obstacles in a city, and (2) whether various common walking practices affect awareness of obstacles and, or, avoidance behavior. To this end, an obstacle, i.e., a signboard was placed on a pavement in the city centre of Utrecht, the Netherlands. The behavioral measure consisted of the distance to the signboard before pedestrians moved to avoid it. After passing, participants were interviewed to obtain thought samples, self-reported route familiarity, a confirmation of secondary task engagement, and to assess awareness through recall and recognition of the signboard and its text. In this study 234 pedestrians participated. More than half of the participants (53.8%) was unaware of the signboard, still none of them had bumped into it. Mind wandering, being engaged in secondary tasks such as talking with a companion or using a mobile phone, and being familiar with a route, did not affect awareness nor avoidance behavior. In conclusion, despite being very common there was no evidence that walking without awareness necessarily results in risk. The absence of awareness does not imply any absence of cognitive and perceptual processing. Pedestrians are still capable of successfully avoiding obstacles in their path, even in visually more challenging environments such as a city centre. It is argued that this is because walking consists of highly automated, skilled behavior.

A theory of consciousness: computation, algorithm, and neurobiological realization

The most enigmatic aspect of consciousness is the fact that it is felt, as a subjective sensation. The theory proposed here aims to explain this particular aspect. The theory encompasses both the computation that is presumably involved and the way in which that computation may be realized in the brain's neurobiology. It is assumed that the brain makes an internal estimate of an individual's own evolutionary fitness, which can be shown to produce a special, distinct form of causation. Communicating components of the fitness estimate (either for external or for internal use) requires inverting them. Such inversion can be performed by the thalamocortical feedback loop in the mammalian brain, if that loop is operating in a switched, dual-stage mode. A first (nonconscious) stage produces forward estimates, whereas the second (conscious) stage inverts those estimates. It is argued that inversion produces another special, distinct form of causation, which is spatially localized and is plausibly sensed as the feeling of consciousness.

Classic psychedelics: the special role of the visual system

Here, we briefly overview the various aspects of classic serotonergic hallucinogens reported by a number of studies. One of the key hypotheses of our paper is that the visual effects of psychedelics might play a key role in resetting fears. Namely, we especially focus on visual processes because they are among the most prominent features of hallucinogen-induced hallucinations. We hypothesize that our brain has an ancient visual-based (preverbal) intrinsic cognitive process that, during the transient inhibition of top-down convergent and abstract thinking (mediated by the prefrontal cortex) by psychedelics, can neutralize emotional fears of unconscious and conscious life experiences from the past. In these processes, the decreased functional integrity of the self-referencing processes of the default mode network, the modified multisensory integration (linked to bodily self-consciousness and self-awareness), and the modified amygdala activity may also play key roles. Moreover, the emotional reset (elimination of stress-related emotions) by psychedelics may induce psychological changes and overwrite the stress-related neuroepigenetic information of past unconscious and conscious emotional fears.

Challenges for theories of consciousness: seeing or knowing, the missing ingredient and how to deal with panpsychism

Significant progress has been made in the study of consciousness. Promising theories have been developed and a wealth of experimental data has been generated, both guiding us towards a better understanding of this complex phenomenon. However, new challenges have surfaced. Is visual consciousness about the seeing or the knowing that you see? Controversy about whether the conscious experience is better explained by theories that focus on phenomenal (P-consciousness) or cognitive aspects (A-consciousness) remains, and the debate seems to reach a stalemate. Can we ever resolve this? A further challenge is that many theories of consciousness seem to endorse high degrees of panpsychism-the notion that all beings or even lifeless objects have conscious experience. Should we accept this, or does it imply that these theories require further ingredients that would put a lower bound on beings or devices that have conscious experience? If so, what could these 'missing ingredients' be? These challenges are discussed, and potential solutions are offered.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Memristor in a Reservoir System-Experimental Evidence for High-Level Computing and Neuromorphic Behavior of PbI2

Lead halides in an asymmetric layered structure form memristive devices which are controlled by the electronic structure of the PbX₂|metal interface. In this paper, we explain the mechanism that stands behind the I- V pinched hysteresis loop of the device and shortly present its synaptic-like plasticity (spike-timing-dependent plasticity and spike-rate-dependent plasticity) and nonvolatile memory effects. This memristive element was incorporated into a reservoir system, in particular, the echo-state network with delayed feedback, which exhibits brain-like recurrent behavior and demonstrates metaplasticity as one of the available learning mechanisms. It can serve as a classification system that classifies input signals according to their amplitude.

Competitive Frontoparietal Interactions Mediate Implicit Inferences

Frequent experience with regularities in our environment allows us to use predictive information to guide our decision process. However, contingencies in our environment are not always explicitly present and sometimes need to be inferred. Heretofore, it remained unknown how predictive information guides decision-making when explicit knowledge is absent and how the brain shapes such implicit inferences. In the present experiment, 17 human participants (9 females) performed a discrimination task in which a target stimulus was preceded by a predictive cue. Critically, participants had no explicit knowledge that some of the cues signaled an upcoming target, allowing us to investigate how implicit inferences emerge and guide decision-making. Despite unawareness of the cue-target contingencies, participants were able to use implicit information to improve performance. Concurrent EEG recordings demonstrate that implicit inferences rely upon interactions between internally and externally oriented networks, whereby prefrontal regions inhibit parietal cortex under internal implicit control.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Regularities in our environment can guide our behavior providing information about upcoming events. Interestingly, such predictive information does not need to be explicitly represented to effectively guide our decision process. Here, we show how the brain engages in such real-world "data mining" and how implicit inferences emerge. We used a contingency cueing task and demonstrated that implicit inferences influenced responses to subsequent targets despite a lack of awareness of cue-target contingencies. Further, we show that these implicit inferences emerge through interactions between internally and externally oriented neural networks. The current results highlight the importance of prefrontal processes in transforming external events into predictive internalized models of the world.

The role of ARID1B, a BAF chromatin remodeling complex subunit, in neural development and behavior

Haploinsufficiency of the chromatin remodeling factor ARID1B leads to autism spectrum disorder and intellectual disability. Several independent research groups, including our own, recently examined the effects of heterozygous deletion of Arid1b in mice and reported severe behavioral abnormalities reminiscent of autism spectrum disorders and intellectual disability as well as marked changes in gene expression and decreased body size. Arid1b heterozygous mice also display significant cortical excitatory/inhibitory imbalance due to altered GABAergic neuron numbers and impaired inhibitory synaptic transmission. Abnormal epigenetic modifications, including histone acetylation and methylation, are additionally associated with Arid1b haploinsufficiency in the brain. Treating adult Arid1b mutant mice with a positive GABA allosteric modulator, however, rescues multiple behavioral abnormalities, such as cognitive and social impairments, as well as elevated anxiety. While treating Arid1b haploinsufficient mice with recombinant mouse growth hormone successfully increases body size, it has no effect on aberrant behavior. Here we summarize the recent findings regarding the role of ARID1B in brain development and behavior and discuss the utility of the Arid1b heterozygous mouse model in neurodevelopmental and psychiatric research. We also discuss some of the opportunities and potential challenges in developing translational applications for humans and possible avenues for further research into the mechanisms of ARID1B pathology in the brain.

Independent Neural Activity Patterns for Sensory- and Confidence-Based Information Maintenance during Category-Selective Visual Processing

Several influential theories of consciousness attempt to explain how, when and where conscious perception arises in the brain. The extent of conscious perception of a stimulus is often probed by asking subjects to provide confidence estimations in their choices in challenging perceptual decision-making tasks. Here, we aimed to dissociate neural patterns of "cognitive" and "sensory" information maintenance by linking category selective visual processes to decision confidence using multivariate decoding techniques on human EEG data. Participants discriminated at-threshold masked face versus house stimuli and reported confidence in their discrimination performance. Three distinct types of category-selective neural activity patterns were observed, dissociable by their timing, scalp topography, relationship with decision confidence, and generalization profile. An early (∼150-200 ms) decoding profile was unrelated to confidence and quickly followed by two distinct decodable patterns of late neural activity (350-500 ms). One pattern was on-diagonal, global and highly related to decision confidence, likely indicating cognitive maintenance of consciously reportable stimulus representations. The other pattern however was off-diagonal, restricted to posterior electrode sites (local), and independent of decision confidence, and therefore may reflect sensory maintenance of category-specific information, possibly operating via recurrent processes within visual cortices. These results highlight that two functionally independent neural processes are operating in parallel, only one of which is related to decision confidence and conscious access.

How the Level of Reward Awareness Changes the Computational and Electrophysiological Signatures of Reinforcement Learning

The extent to which subjective awareness influences reward processing, and thereby affects future decisions, is currently largely unknown. In the present report, we investigated this question in a reinforcement learning framework, combining perceptual masking, computational modeling, and electroencephalographic recordings (human male and female participants). Our results indicate that degrading the visibility of the reward decreased, without completely obliterating, the ability of participants to learn from outcomes, but concurrently increased their tendency to repeat previous choices. We dissociated electrophysiological signatures evoked by the reward-based learning processes from those elicited by the reward-independent repetition of previous choices and showed that these neural activities were significantly modulated by reward visibility. Overall, this report sheds new light on the neural computations underlying reward-based learning and decision-making and highlights that awareness is beneficial for the trial-by-trial adjustment of decision-making strategies.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The notion of reward is strongly associated with subjective evaluation, related to conscious processes such as "pleasure," "liking," and "wanting." Here we show that degrading reward visibility in a reinforcement learning task decreases, without completely obliterating, the ability of participants to learn from outcomes, but concurrently increases subjects' tendency to repeat previous choices. Electrophysiological recordings, in combination with computational modeling, show that neural activities were significantly modulated by reward visibility. Overall, we dissociate different neural computations underlying reward-based learning and decision-making, which highlights a beneficial role of reward awareness in adjusting decision-making strategies.

Apical Function in Neocortical Pyramidal Cells: A Common Pathway by Which General Anesthetics Can Affect Mental State

It has been argued that general anesthetics suppress the level of consciousness, or the contents of consciousness, or both. The distinction between level and content is important because, in addition to clarifying the mechanisms of anesthesia, it may help clarify the neural bases of consciousness. We assess these arguments in the light of evidence that both the level and the content of consciousness depend upon the contribution of apical input to the information processing capabilities of neocortical pyramidal cells which selectively amplify relevant signals. We summarize research suggesting that what neocortical pyramidal cells transmit information about can be distinguished from levels of arousal controlled by sub-cortical nuclei and from levels of prioritization specified by interactions within the thalamocortical system. Put simply, on the basis of the observations reviewed, we hypothesize that when conscious we have particular, directly experienced, percepts, thoughts, feelings and intentions, and that general anesthetics affect consciousness by interfering with the subcellular processes by which particular activities are selectively amplified when relevant to the current context.

Implicit motivation improves executive functions of older adults

It is widely accepted that while controlled processes (e.g., working memory and executive functions) decline with age, implicit (automatic) processes are not affected by age. In this paper we challenge this view by arguing that high-level automatic processes (e.g., recruiting motivation) decline with age, and that this decline plays an unappreciated role in cognitive aging. Specifically, we hypothesized that due to their decline, automatic motivational processes are less likely to be spontaneously activated in old age; thus, implicit external activation of them should have stronger effects on older (vs. younger) adults. In two experiments we used different methods of implicitly activating motivation, and measured executive functions of younger and older adults using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. In both experiments, implicit modulation of motivation resulted in improved executive functioning for older adults. The framework we propose is general and offers a new look at various aspects of cognitive aging.

Probing Electrophysiological Indices of Perceptual Awareness across Unisensory and Multisensory Modalities

The neural underpinnings of perceptual awareness have been extensively studied using unisensory (e.g., visual alone) stimuli. However, perception is generally multisensory, and it is unclear whether the neural architecture uncovered in these studies directly translates to the multisensory domain. Here, we use EEG to examine brain responses associated with the processing of visual, auditory, and audiovisual stimuli presented near threshold levels of detectability, with the aim of deciphering similarities and differences in the neural signals indexing the transition into perceptual awareness across vision, audition, and combined visual-auditory (multisensory) processing. More specifically, we examine (1) the presence of late evoked potentials (∼>300 msec), (2) the across-trial reproducibility, and (3) the evoked complexity associated with perceived versus nonperceived stimuli. Results reveal that, although perceived stimuli are associated with the presence of late evoked potentials across each of the examined sensory modalities, between-trial variability and EEG complexity differed for unisensory versus multisensory conditions. Whereas across-trial variability and complexity differed for perceived versus nonperceived stimuli in the visual and auditory conditions, this was not the case for the multisensory condition. Taken together, these results suggest that there are fundamental differences in the neural correlates of perceptual awareness for unisensory versus multisensory stimuli. Specifically, the work argues that the presence of late evoked potentials, as opposed to neural reproducibility or complexity, most closely tracks perceptual awareness regardless of the nature of the sensory stimulus. In addition, the current findings suggest a greater similarity between the neural correlates of perceptual awareness of unisensory (visual and auditory) stimuli when compared with multisensory stimuli.

Prior Expectation Modulates Repetition Suppression without Perceptual Awareness

Stimulus repetition induces attenuated brain responses. This phenomenon, termed repetition suppression (RS), is classically held to stem from bottom-up neuronal adaptation. However, recent studies suggest that RS is driven by top-down predictive mechanisms. It remains controversial whether these top-down mechanisms of RS rely on conscious strategies, or if they represent a more fundamental aspect of perception, coding for physical properties of the repeated feature. The presence of top-down effects in the absence of perceptual awareness would indicate that conscious strategies are not sufficient to explain top-down mechanisms of RS. We combined an unconscious priming paradigm with EEG recordings and tested whether RS can be modulated by the probability of encountering a repetition, even in the absence of awareness. Our results show that both behavioural priming and RS near occipital areas are modulated by repetition probability, regardless of prime awareness. This contradicts previous findings that have argued that RS modulation is a by-product of conscious strategies. In contrast, we found that the increase in theta-band power following unrepeated trials – an index of conflict detection – is modulated only by expectations during conscious primes, implicating the use of conscious strategies. Together, our results suggest that the influence of predictions on RS can be either automatic in sensory brain regions or dependent on conscious strategies.

Dynamic Interactions between Top-Down Expectations and Conscious Awareness

It is well known that top-down expectations affect perceptual processes. Yet, remarkably little is known about the relationship between expectations and conscious awareness. We address three crucial outstanding questions: (1) how do expectations affect the likelihood of conscious stimulus perception?; (2) does the brain register violations of expectations nonconsciously?; and (3) do expectations need to be conscious to influence perceptual decisions? Using human participants, we performed three experiments in which we manipulated stimulus predictability within the attentional blink paradigm, while combining visual psychophysics with electrophysiological recordings. We found that valid stimulus expectations increase the likelihood of conscious access of stimuli. Furthermore, our findings suggest a clear dissociation in the interaction between expectations and consciousness: conscious awareness seems crucial for the implementation of top-down expectations, but not for the generation of bottom-up stimulus-evoked prediction errors. These results constrain and update influential theories about the role of consciousness in the predictive brain.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT While the relationship between expectations and conscious awareness plays a major role in many prediction-based theories of brain functioning, thus far few empirical studies have examined this relationship. Here, we address this gap in knowledge in a set of three experiments. Our results suggest that the effect of expectations on conscious awareness varies between different steps of the hierarchy of predictive processing. While the active use of top-down expectations for perceptual decisions requires conscious awareness, prediction errors can be triggered outside of conscious awareness. These results constrain and update influential theories about the role of consciousness in the predictive brain.

Reexamining unconscious response priming: A liminal-prime paradigm

Research on the limits of unconscious processing typically relies on the subliminal-prime paradigm. However, this paradigm is limited in the issues it can address. Here, we examined the implications of using the liminal-prime paradigm, which allows comparing unconscious and conscious priming with constant stimulation. We adapted an iconic demonstration of unconscious response priming to the liminal-prime paradigm. On the one hand, temporal attention allocated to the prime and its relevance to the task increased the magnitude of response priming. On the other hand, the longer RTs associated with the dual task inherent to the paradigm resulted in response priming being underestimated, because unconscious priming effects were shorter-lived than conscious-priming effects. Nevertheless, when the impact of long RTs was alleviated by considering the fastest trials or by imposing a response deadline, conscious response priming remained considerably larger than unconscious response priming. These findings suggest that conscious perception strongly modulates response priming.

ANKRD11 associated with intellectual disability and autism regulates dendrite differentiation via the BDNF/TrkB signaling pathway

Haploinsufficiency of ANKRD11 due to deletion or truncation mutations causes KBG syndrome, a rare genetic disorder characterized by intellectual disability, autism spectrum disorder, and craniofacial abnormalities. However, little is known about the neurobiological role of ANKRD11 during brain development. Here we show that ANKRD11 regulates pyramidal neuron migration and dendritic differentiation in the developing mouse cerebral cortex. Using an in utero manipulation approach, we found that Ankrd11 knockdown delayed radial migration of cortical neurons. ANKRD11-deficient neurons displayed markedly reduced dendrite growth and branching as well as abnormal dendritic spine morphology. Ankrd11 knockdown suppressed acetylation of epigenetic molecules such as p53 and Histone H3. Furthermore, the mRNA levels of Trkb, Bdnf, and neurite growth-related genes were downregulated in ANKRD11-deficient cortical neurons. The Trkb promoter region was largely devoid of acetylated Histone H3 and p53, and was instead occupied with MeCP2 and DNMT1. Overexpression of TrkB rescued abnormal dendrite growth in these cells. Our findings demonstrate a novel role for ANKRD11 in neuron differentiation during brain development and suggest an epigenetic modification as a potential key molecular feature underlying KBG syndrome.