Decision-Making Under Risk: Integrating Perspectives From Biology, Economics, and Psychology

Balancing long-term and short-term strategies in a sustainability game

Our society is marked by a tension between short-term objectives, such as economic growth, and long-term sustainability goals, including mitigating resource depletion. In such a competitive setting, it is crucial to ascertain whether a system can maintain long-term viability and, if so, how. This article aims to enhance the understanding of this issue by analyzing how sustainability concerns change over time by means of a game, and the effect of this variation on the final status of a system. Leveraging insights from the game, we implement an agent-based model to elicit the tension between short-term objectives and sustainability, emphasizing the influence of individual actions on the overall system. The simulation results suggest that the likelihood of a collapse is contingent upon the availability of resources and the manner in which information regarding these resources is gathered and utilized. Finally, the paper proposes practical suggestions for managing this kind of system.

Physiology of Risk-Taking and Risk Management in Realistic Decision-Making Scenarios

Decisions under risk are a particular case of decisional skills taking place in complex and mostly unpredictable situations, where affective connotation of deciding is highly relevant. We aimed at investigating decisional processes under risk by outlining individual risk-taking (RT) and risk management (RM) attitudes via realistic decision-making and, in keeping with the risk-as-feeling hypothesis, at exploring implicit physiological correlates of such processes. 35 participants were presented with realistic situations where they had to make decisions by choosing between alternatives connoted by different levels of riskiness. Concurrently, autonomic physiological activation (cardiovascular and electrodermal activity) was recorded. Data analysis highlighted that: (i) participants showed higher propensity towards risk management than risk-taking; (ii) the propensity towards both risk taking and risk management was significantly determined by physiological markers of autonomic activity; and (iii) risk taking and risk management indices showed associations with different autonomic measures, respectively heart rate and skin conductance metrics.

Foraging in a non-foraging task: Fitness maximization explains human risk preference dynamics under changing environment

Changes in risk preference have been reported when making a series of independent risky choices or non-foraging economic decisions. Behavioral economics has put forward various explanations for specific changes in risk preference in non-foraging tasks, but a consensus regarding the general principle underlying these effects has not been reached. In contrast, recent studies have investigated human economic risky choices using tasks adapted from foraging theory, which require consideration of past choices and future opportunities to make optimal decisions. In these foraging tasks, human economic risky choices are explained by the ethological principle of fitness maximization, which naturally leads to dynamic risk preference. Here, we conducted two online experiments to investigate whether the principle of fitness maximization can explain risk preference dynamics in a non-foraging task. Participants were asked to make a series of independent risky economic decisions while the environmental richness changed. We found that participants' risk preferences were influenced by the current and past environments, making them more risk-averse during and after the rich environment compared to the poor environment. These changes in risk preference align with fitness maximization. Our findings suggest that the ethological principle of fitness maximization might serve as a generalizable principle for explaining dynamic preferences, including risk preference, in human economic decision-making.

Influence of age and cognitive demand on motor decision making under uncertainty: a study on goal directed reaching movements

In everyday life, we constantly make decisions about actions to be performed subsequently. Research on motor decision making has provided empirical evidence for an influence of decision uncertainty on movement execution in young adults. Further, decision uncertainty was suggested to be increased in older adults due to limited cognitive resources for the integration of information and the prediction of the decision outcomes. However, the influence of cognitive aging on decision uncertainty during motor decision making and movement execution has not been investigated, yet. Thus, in the current study, we presented young and older adults with a motor decision making task, in which participants had to decide on pointing towards one out of five potential targets under varying cognitive demands. Statistical analyses revealed stronger decreases in correctly deciding upon the pointing target, i.e. task performance, from low to higher cognitive demand in older as compared to young adults. Decision confidence also decreased more strongly in older adults with increasing cognitive demand, however, only when collapsing across correct and incorrect decision trials, but not when considering correct decision trials, only. Further, older adults executed reaching movements with longer reaction times and increased path length, though the latter, again, not when considering correct decision trials, only. Last, reaction time and variability in movement execution were both affected by cognitive demand. The outcomes of this study provide a differentiated picture of the distinct and joint effects of aging and cognitive demand during motor decision making.

A critical review of risk-sensitive foraging

Foraging is risk sensitive if choices depend on the variability of returns from the options as well as their mean return. Risk-sensitive foraging is important in behavioural ecology, psychology and neurophysiology. It has been explained both in terms of mechanisms and in terms of evolutionary advantage. We provide a critical review, evaluating both mechanistic and evolutionary accounts. Some derivations of risk sensitivity from mechanistic models based on psychophysics are not convincing because they depend on an inappropriate use of Jensen's inequality. Attempts have been made to link risk sensitivity to the ecology of a species, but again these are not convincing. The field of risk-sensitive foraging has provided a focus for theoretical and empirical work and has yielded important insights, but we lack a simple and empirically defendable general account of it in either mechanistic or evolutionary terms. However, empirical analysis of choice sequences under theoretically motivated experimental designs and environmental settings appears a promising avenue for mapping the scope and relative merits of existing theories. Simply put, the devil is in the sequence.

Adult age differences in risk perception and risk taking

Research on self-reported risk perception and risk taking suggests age-related decrements in risk preference, with older adults less likely to engage in general and domain-specific risk taking (i.e., in financial, health-related, ethical, career, and leisure contexts). Data relating to social risks, however, are inconsistent. With respect to behavioral risk-taking tasks, age-related differences vary depending on task characteristics and older adults' cognitive capacities. Specifically, older adults are less good at learning to take advantageous risks and take fewer risks when faced with gains, especially financial and mortality-based ones. We contextualize these trends by referencing relevant theoretical frameworks (see Frey et al., 2021 [1]) and by drawing on the COVID-19 pandemic to illustrate recent examples of age-related differences in real-life risk responses.

Risky decision-making in major depressive disorder: A three-level meta-analysis

Background

Individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) are usually observed making inappropriate risky decisions. However, whether and to what extent MDD is associated with impairments in risky decision-making remains unclear. We performed a three-level meta-analysis to explore the relationship between risky decision-making and MDD.

Method

We searched the Web of Science, PubMed, Scopus, and PsycINFO databases up to February 7, 2023, and calculated Hedges' g to demonstrate the difference in risky decision-making between MDD patients and healthy controls (HCs). The moderating effect of sample and task characteristics were also revealed.

Results

Across 73 effect sizes in 39 cross-sectional studies, MDD patients exhibited greater risk-seeking than HCs (Hedges' g = 0.187, p = .030). Furthermore, age (p = .068), region (p = .005), and task type (p < .001) were found to have moderating effects. Specifically, patients preferred risk-seeking over HCs as age increased. European patients showed significantly increased risk-seeking compared to American and Asian patients. Patients in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) exhibited a notable rise in risk-seeking compared to other tasks, along with an increased risk aversion in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). The multiple-moderator analysis showed that only task type had significant effects, which may be explained by a tentative framework of "operationalization-mechanism-measure" specificity.

Conclusions

MDD patients generally exhibit higher risk-seeking than HCs. It implies that impaired risky decision-making might be a noteworthy symptom of depression, which should be placed more emphasis for clinical management and psycho-education.

Uncertainty deconstructed: conceptual analysis and state-of-the-art review of the ERP correlates of risk and ambiguity in decision-making

Risk and uncertainty are central concepts of decision neuroscience. However, a comprehensive review of the literature shows that most studies define risk and uncertainty in an unclear fashion or use both terms interchangeably, which hinders the integration of the existing findings. We suggest uncertainty as an umbrella term that comprises scenarios characterized by outcome variance where relevant information about the type and likelihood of outcomes may be somewhat unavailable (ambiguity) and scenarios where the likelihood of outcomes is known (risk).These conceptual issues are problematic for studies on the temporal neurodynamics of decision-making under risk and ambiguity, because they lead to heterogeneity in task design and the interpretation of the results. To assess this problem, we conducted a state-of-the-art review of ERP studies on risk and ambiguity in decision-making. By employing the above definitions to 16 reviewed studies, our results suggest that: (a) research has focused more on risk than ambiguity processing; (b) studies assessing decision-making under risk often implemented descriptive-based paradigms, whereas studies assessing ambiguity processing equally implemented descriptive- and experience-based tasks; (c) descriptive-based studies link risk processing to increased frontal negativities (e.g., N2, N400) and both risk and ambiguity to reduced parietal positivities (e.g., P2, P3); (d) experience-based studies link risk to increased P3 amplitudes and ambiguity to increased frontal negativities and the LPC component; (e) both risk and ambiguity processing seem to be related with cognitive control, conflict monitoring, and increased cognitive demand; (f) further research and improved tasks are needed to dissociate risk and ambiguity processing.

Having less means wanting more: Children hold an intuitive economic theory of diminishing marginal utility

Judgments surrounding resource acquisition and valuation are ubiquitous in daily life. How do humans decide what something is worth to themselves or someone else? One important cue to value is that of resource quantity. As described by economists, the principle of diminishing marginal utility (DMU) holds that as resource abundance increases, the value placed on each unit decreases; likewise, when resources become more scarce, the value placed on each unit rises. While prior research suggests that adults make judgments that align with this concept, it is unclear whether children do so. In Study 1 (n = 104), children (ages 5 through 8) were presented with scenarios involving losses or gains to others' resources and predicted the actions and emotions of the individuals involved. Participants made decisions that aligned with DMU, e.g., expecting individuals with fewer resources to expend more effort for an additional resource than individuals with greater resources. In Study 2 (n = 104), children incorporated information about preferences when inferring others' resource valuations, showing how quantity and preference are both included in children's inferences about others' utility. Our results indicate the early emergence of an intuitive economic theory that aligns with an important economic principle. Long before formal learning on this topic, children integrate quantity and preference information to sensibly predict others' resource valuations, with implications for economic decision-making, social preferences, and judgments of partner quality across the lifespan.

Eristic reasoning: Adaptation to extreme uncertainty

Heuristics (shortcut solution rules) can help adaptation to uncertainty by leading to sufficiently accurate decisions with little information. However, heuristics would fail under extreme uncertainty where information is so scarce that any heuristic would be highly misleading for accuracy-seeking. Thus, under very high levels of uncertainty, decision-makers rely on heuristics to no avail. We posit that eristic reasoning (i.e., self-serving inferences for hedonic pursuits), rather than heuristic reasoning, is adaptive when uncertainty is extreme, as eristic reasoning produces instant hedonic gratifications helpful for coping. Eristic reasoning aims at hedonic gains (e.g., relief from the anxiety of uncertainty) that can be pursued by self-serving inferences. As such, eristic reasoning does not require any information about the environment as it instead gets cues introspectively from bodily signals informing what the organism hedonically needs as shaped by individual differences. We explain how decision-makers can benefit from heuristic vs. eristic reasoning under different levels of uncertainty. As a result, by integrating the outputs of formerly published empirical research and our conceptual discussions pertaining to eristic reasoning, we conceptually criticize the fast-and-frugal heuristics approach, which implies that heuristics are the only means of adapting to uncertainty.

Does higher perceived risk of morbidity and mortality decrease risk-taking?

Previous studies have shown that people change their behaviour in response to negative shocks such as economic downturns or natural catastrophes. Indeed, the optimal behaviour in terms of inclusive fitness often varies according to a number of parameters, such as the level of mortality risk in the environment. Beyond unprecedented restrictions in everyday life, the COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly affected people's environment. In this study, we investigated how people form their perception of morbidity and mortality risk associated with COVID-19 and how this perception in turn affects psychological traits, such as risk-taking and patience. We analysed data from a large survey conducted during the first wave in France on 3353 nationally representative people. We found that people use public information on COVID-19 deaths in the area where they live to form their perceived morbidity and mortality risk. Using a structural model approach to lift endogeneity concerns, we found that higher perceived morbidity and mortality risk increases risk aversion. We also found that higher perceived morbidity and mortality risk leads to less patience, although this was only observed for high levels of perceived risk. Our results suggest that people adapt their behaviour to anticipated negative health shocks, namely the risk of becoming sick or dying of COVID-19.

Searching for the universality of nudging: A cross-cultural comparison of the information effects of reminding people about familial support

Nudging is a method for eliciting a desired behavior. One approach to nudging involves information provision. When information presented for this purpose is designed from an evolutionary perspective, it may reveal a deeper level of rationality within human decision-making that might otherwise appear to be irrational. Based on insights from the evolution of altruism, we previously designed a message to remind people of the benefits they have received from the actions of relatives to realize industrialization. We then demonstrated that using this message in Japan was effective at moderating extreme risk-averse attitudes toward air pollution resulting from industrialization. However, the universality of the intervention effect, including whether it could be affected by exogenous factors, was not explored. Therefore, in the present study, we conducted a randomized controlled trial based on an online survey carried out in Japan, Canada, and the US. The intervention was shown to be effective in all the three countries, but the effect size varied according to segment. Although women showed more intervention effects than men in Japan and the US, no significant sex difference was observed in Canada. In terms of personality traits, higher agreeableness significantly contributed to the intervention effects. The influence of the COVID-19 pandemic, which necessitated many lifestyle changes, was found to weaken the intervention effect by increasing the message effect in the control group. We propose that this effect was caused by an increased perception of familial support in everyday life. These results suggest that the nudge message was universally effective, although the effect size might have been affected by cultural factors and social events.

Developmental risk sensitivity theory: the effects of socio-economic status on children's risky gain and loss decisions

Evolutionary developmental theories propose that early environments shape human risk preferences. Developmental risk sensitivity theory (D-RST) focuses on the plasticity of risk preferences during childhood and makes predictions about the effect of reward size based on a child's social environment. By contrast, prospect theory predicts risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses regardless of environment or status. We presented 4 to 10-year-olds (n = 194) with a set of trials in which they chose between a certain amount and a chance to receive more or nothing. Two trials were equal expected value choices that differed by stake size and two were unequal expected value choices. Children either received gain trials or loss trials. Social environment was assessed using socio-economic status (SES) and subjective social status. Results confirmed the predictions of D-RST for gains based on SES. Children from lower-SES families differentiated between the high- and low-value trials and made more risky decisions for the high-value reward compared with higher-SES children. Children from higher-SES families were more risk averse for both trial types. Decisions for loss trials did not conform completely to either theory. We discuss the results in relation to evolutionary developmental theories.

Contribution of the sensorimotor beta oscillations and the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamic circuitry during value-based decision making: A simultaneous EEG-fMRI investigation

In decision neuroscience, the motor system has primarily been considered to be involved in executing choice actions. However, a competing perspective suggests its engagement in the evaluation of options, traditionally considered to be performed by the brain's valuation system. Here, we investigate the role of the motor system in value-based decision making by determining the neural circuitries associated with the sensorimotor beta oscillations previously identified to encode decision options. In a simultaneous EEG-fMRI study, participants evaluated reward and risk associated with a forthcoming action. A significant sensorimotor beta desynchronization was identified prior to and independent of response. The level of beta desynchronization showed evidence of encoding the reward levels. This beta desynchronization covaried, on a trial-by-trial level, with BOLD activity in the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamic circuitry. In contrast, there was only a weak covariation within the valuation network, despite significant modulation of its BOLD activity by reward levels. These results suggest that the way in which decision variables are processed differs in the valuation network and in the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamic circuitry. We propose that sensorimotor beta oscillations indicate incentive motivational drive towards a choice action computed from the decision variables even prior to making a response, and it arises from the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamic circuitry.

Risk sensitive scheduling strategies of production studios on the US movie market: An agent-based simulation

The movie industry is a highly differentiated context where production studios compete in non-price product attributes, which influences the box office results of a motion picture. Because of the short life cycle and the constant entrance of new competitive products, temporal decisions play a crucial role. Time series of the number of movies on release and the sum of the box office results of the ten top motion pictures (ranked by box office result for that week) present a counterphased seasonality in the US movie market. We suggest that a possible reason is a risk sensitivity adaptation in the behaviour of the movie’s distributors. This paper provides a model supporting this hypothesis. We developed an agent-based model of a movie market, and we simulated it for 15 years. A comparable global behaviour exists when producers schedule the movies according to given risk-sensitive strategies. This research improves the knowledge of the US motion picture market, analyzing a real-world scenario and providing insight into the behaviour of existing firms in a complex environment.

Mental States: A Key Point in Scam Compliance and Warning Compliance in Real Life

The internet’s convenience and anonymity have facilitated different types of covert fraud, resulting in economic, mental, and social harm to victims. Understanding why people are deceived and implementing appropriate interventions is critical for fraud reduction. Based on the Bayesian brain theory, individuals’ mental states may be a key point in scam compliance and warning compliance. Fraud victims with different mental states may construct various hypotheses and explanations about the fraud they are exposed to, causing different cognition and behavior patterns. Therefore, we first conducted a semi-structured in-depth interview with online fraud victims to investigate the individual and social factors that affect victims’ mental states. Grounded theory analysis showed five core factors influencing scam compliance: psychological traits, empirical factors, motivation, cognitive biases, and emotional imbalance. Based on our findings of psychological processes and deception’s influential factors, we then designed warnings to inform victims of fraud, particularly for those involving novel types of scams. Tested on a real-life setting, our designed warnings effectively enhanced warning compliance, allowing more fraud victims to avoid financial losses.

Keep your budget together! Investigating determinants on risky decision-making about losses

The present study investigates the influence of framing, different amounts to lose, and probabilities of a risky and sure choice option, time limits, and need on risky decision-making. For a given block of trials, participants were equipped with a personal budget (number of points). On each trial within a block, a specific initial amount is possibly taken from the budget by the outcome of a gamble or the choice of a sure loss option. The goal was to avoid losing points from the budget for not falling below a predefined need threshold. Three different levels of induced need were included. Employing a psychophysical experimental approach, we furthermore tested a sequential component of human risk behavior towards a need threshold inspired by research on animal foraging behavior. Risk-sensitivity models and the Stone-Geary framework serve as generating hypotheses on need thresholds. We found that framing, need, and probabilities influenced risky choices. Time limits and initial amounts moderated the framing effect. No sequential component was observed.

Proxyeconomics, a theory and model of proxy-based competition and cultural evolution

Competitive societal systems by necessity rely on imperfect proxy measures. For instance, profit is used to measure value to consumers, patient volumes to measure hospital performance, or the journal impact factor to measure scientific value. While there are numerous reasons why proxies will deviate from the underlying societal goals, they will nevertheless determine the selection of cultural practices and guide individual decisions. These considerations suggest that the study of proxy-based competition requires the integration of cultural evolution theory and economics or decision theory. Here, we attempt such an integration in two ways. First, we describe an agent-based simulation model, combining methods and insights from these disciplines. The model suggests that an individual intrinsic incentive can constrain a cultural evolutionary pressure, which would otherwise enforce fully proxy-oriented practices. The emergent outcome is distinct from that with either the isolated economic or evolutionary mechanism. It reflects what we term lock-in, where competitive pressure can undermine the ability of agents to pursue the shared social goal. Second, we elaborate the broader context, outlining the system-theoretic foundations as well as some philosophical and practical implications, towards a broader theory. Overall, we suggest such a theory may offer an explanatory and predictive framework for diverse subjects, ranging from scientific replicability to climate inaction, and outlining strategies for diagnosis and mitigation.

Decision Making: a Theoretical Review

Decision-making is a crucial skill that has a central role in everyday life and is necessary for adaptation to the environment and autonomy. It is the ability to choose between two or more options, and it has been studied through several theoretical approaches and by different disciplines. In this overview article, we contend a theoretical review regarding most theorizing and research on decision-making. Specifically, we focused on different levels of analyses, including different theoretical approaches and neuropsychological aspects. Moreover, common methodological measures adopted to study decision-making were reported. This theoretical review emphasizes multiple levels of analysis and aims to summarize evidence regarding this fundamental human process. Although several aspects of the field are reported, more features of decision-making process remain uncertain and need to be clarified. Further experimental studies are necessary for understanding this process better and for integrating and refining the existing theories.

That’s not fair! unfair treatment spills over into individual risky financial decisions

Studies indicate that experiencing unfairness may influence subsequent decisions. There is initial evidence that this is also true for gambling decisions made after an experience of unfair treatment in a financial domain. The presented studies test whether this can be extended to other domains of financial risk-taking, such as investments. Moreover, we aim to investigate whether the effects of such experience in one domain generalize to other domains. Three experimental studies were conducted to investigate how unfair treatment coming from varied domains affects individuals’ propensities to make risky investment and gambling choices in subsequent tasks. The experience of being a victim or a beneficiary of unfair treatment in financial and non-financial domains was induced and the propensity to take investment and gambling risks was measured. The results of the experiments indicated that the experience of unfairness influences the propensity to make risky financial choices but the domain in which it is experienced plays an important role. Being a victim of financial unfairness makes people more prone to take investment risk and build riskier investing portfolios with more stocks and fewer bonds than when they are beneficiaries or when they are treated fairly. Moreover, being the beneficiary of unfair treatment in a financial domain makes people less prone to choose a sure option (vs risky) in lottery tasks. The abovementioned relationships are exactly the opposite when the experience of (un)fairness comes from a task in a non-financial context. Specifically, the experience of unfair treatment in a non-financial domain leads people to be less prone to make risky investment choices, and it enhances the propensity to build safer investment portfolios with more bonds and fewer stocks than people from the unfair-beneficiary and fair groups. Furthermore, being the beneficiary of unfair treatment in a non-financial context makes people more prone to choose sure option in lottery task.

Accuracy-Risk Trade-Off Due to Social Learning in Crowd-Sourced Financial Predictions

A critical question relevant to the increasing importance of crowd-sourced-based finance is how to optimize collective information processing and decision-making. Here, we investigate an often under-studied aspect of the performance of online traders: beyond focusing on just accuracy, what gives rise to the trade-off between risk and accuracy at the collective level? Answers to this question will lead to designing and deploying more effective crowd-sourced financial platforms and to minimizing issues stemming from risk such as implied volatility. To investigate this trade-off, we conducted a large online Wisdom of the Crowd study where 2037 participants predicted the prices of real financial assets (S&P 500, WTI Oil and Gold prices). Using the data collected, we modeled the belief update process of participants using models inspired by Bayesian models of cognition. We show that subsets of predictions chosen based on their belief update strategies lie on a Pareto frontier between accuracy and risk, mediated by social learning. We also observe that social learning led to superior accuracy during one of our rounds that occurred during the high market uncertainty of the Brexit vote.

Body dynamics of gait affect value-based decisions

Choosing among different options typically entails weighing their anticipated costs and benefits. Previous research has predominantly focused on situations, where the costs and benefits of choices are known before an action is effectuated. Yet many decisions in daily life are made on the fly, for instance, making a snack choice while walking through the grocery store. Notably, the costs of actions change dynamically while moving. Therefore, in this study we examined whether the concurrent action dynamics of gait form part of and affect value-based decisions. In three experiments, participants had to decide which lateral (left vs. right) target (associated with different rewards) they would go to, while they were already walking. Results showed that the target choice was biased by the alternating stepping behavior, even at the expense of receiving less reward. These findings provide evidence that whole-body action dynamics affect value-based decisions.

Heart Rate Variability and Decision-Making: Autonomic Responses in Making Decisions

Decision-making is one of the most crucial cognitive processes in daily life. An adaptable, rapid, and flexible decision requires integration between brain and body. Heart rate variability (HRV) indexes this brain–body connection and appears to be related to cognitive performance. However, its relationship with decision-making is poorly analyzed. This study investigates the relationship between HRV and the decision-making process, assessed through the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). One hundred and thirty healthy university students (mean age = 23.35 ± 2.50) participated in the study. According to IGT performance, they were divided into high decision-makers (n = 79) and low decision-makers (n = 51). Heart rate variability was measured in the resting, reactivity (i.e., during IGT), and recovery phases. Higher vagally mediated HRV (vmHRV; indexed in frequency domain measures) was evidenced in good decision-makers in the resting, reactivity, and recovery phases. During the task, a higher vagal modulation after a first evaluation was highlighted in good decision-makers. In conclusion, HRV proves to be a valid index of inhibitory circuit functioning in the prefrontal cortex. The relationship with cognitive functions was also confirmed, considering the ability to inhibit disadvantageous responses and make better decisions.

In Search of the Cognitively Complex Person: Is There a Meaningful Trait Component of Cognitive Complexity?

Researchers have long assumed that complex thinking is determined by both situational factors and stable, trait-based differences. However, although situational influences on complexity have been discussed at length in the literature, there is still no comprehensive integration of evidence regarding the theorized trait component of cognitive complexity. To fill this gap, we evaluate the degree that cognitive complexity is attributable to trait variance. Specifically, we review two domains of evidence pertaining to (a) the generalizability of individuals' complex thinking across domains and the temporal stability of individuals' complex thinking and (b) the relationship of complex thinking with conceptually related traits. Cumulatively, the literature suggests that persons' cognitive complexity at any point in time results partially from a stable and generalizable trait component that accounts for a small-to-moderate amount of variance. It further suggests that cognitively complex persons are characterized by chronic trait-based differences in motivation and ability to think complexly.

Variation in primate decision-making under uncertainty and the roots of human economic behaviour

Uncertainty is a ubiquitous component of human economic behaviour, yet people can vary in their preferences for risk across populations, individuals and different points in time. As uncertainty also characterizes many aspects of animal decision-making, comparative research can help evaluate different potential mechanisms that generate this variation, including the role of biological differences or maturational change versus cultural learning, as well as identify human-unique components of economic decision-making. Here, we examine decision-making under risk across non-human primates, our closest relatives. We first review theoretical approaches and current methods for understanding decision-making in animals. We then assess the current evidence for variation in animal preferences between species and populations, between individuals based on personality, sex and age, and finally, between different contexts and individual states. We then use these primate data to evaluate the processes that can shape human decision-making strategies and identify the primate foundations of human economic behaviour. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Building a Taxonomy to Understand Health Care Worker's Response to Workplace 'Pressure' in Complex, Volatile and Emergency Situations

This research aims to better understand performance under pressure as experienced by health and emergency staff in the workplace. Three basic questions underpin the work: (1) how do health and emergency workers experience and make sense of the 'pressures' entailed in their jobs? (2) What impacts do these pressures have on their working lives and work performance, both positively and negatively? (3) Can we develop a useful explanatory model for 'working under pressure' in complex, volatile and emergency situations? The present article addresses the first question regarding the nature of pressure; a subsequent article will address the question of its impact on performance. Using detailed interviews with workers in a range of roles and from diverse settings across Ecuador, our analysis aims to better understand the genesis of pressure, how people respond to it and to gain insights into managing it more effectively, especially with a view to reducing workplace errors and staff burnout. Rather than imposing preformulated definitions of either 'pressure' or 'performance', we took an emic approach to gain a fresh understanding of how workers themselves experience, describe and make sense of workplace pressure. This article catalogues a wide range of pressures as experienced by our participants and maps relationships between them. We argue that while individuals are often held responsible for workplace errors, both 'pressure' and 'performance' are multifactorial, involving individuals, teams, case complexity, expertise and organizational systems and these must be considered in order to gain better understandings of performing under pressure.

Gender differences in the effects of competition and cooperation on risk-taking under ambiguity

Decision theories have made a distinction between risk (i.e., known probabilities) and ambiguity (i.e., unknown probabilities). Prior work has examined the effect of competition and cooperation on risk-taking under risk. However, little is known about whether and how competition and cooperation affect risk-taking under ambiguity and the role of gender in this effect. The current study addresses this research gap. In the present study, a shortened version of a balloon analogue risk task was used to assess risk-taking under ambiguity. The participants completed this task in competition against a peer, in cooperation with a peer, or alone. The results showed that the participants took more risks in the competition and cooperation conditions than in the individual condition, but no differences were found between the competition and cooperation conditions. More important, gender modulated these effects. First, these effects were driven by males, but not by females. Second, males showed more risk-taking under ambiguity than females in the competitive situation, but not in the cooperative situation. Overall, this work contributes to understanding the effect of social interaction on risky decisions under ambiguity.

The Risky Side of Leadership: Conceptualizing Risk Perceptions in Informal Leadership and Investigating the Effects of Their Over-Time Changes in Teams

Despite the common portrait of leadership as a worthy, needed, and frequently rewarded endeavor, individuals do not always step up to lead as informal leaders in their teams. In the present research, we introduce the idea of leadership risk perceptions, arguing that individuals sometimes see risks for themselves if they step up to lead. We conceptualize three types of leadership risk perceptions (interpersonal, image, and instrumental) and investigate how changes in these risk perceptions over time impact the overall level of informal leadership that individuals contribute in their teams, as well as how these risk perceptions’ change trajectories are shaped by the level of conflict in a team. To address these issues, we conducted a series of studies, exploring the relevance of the three risk perceptions qualitatively, developing measures for them, and then testing our hypotheses in a field study following 454 individuals working in 89 master of business administration (MBA) consulting teams. We found that a decrease in an individual’s leadership risk perceptions over time was related to the individual’s overall informal leadership contributions in the team, though the pattern of relationship was not the same for all three risk perceptions. Furthermore, in teams with higher levels of relationship conflict, interpersonal and image risk perceptions decreased less over time, suggesting the importance of the social context in shaping perceived risks. Overall, this research calls attention to the much under-investigated risky side of leadership and highlights a temporal approach to understanding the impact of leadership risk perceptions.

Outcome expectancy and suboptimal risky choice in nonhuman primates

Animals will favor a risky option when a stimulus signaling reward bridges the choice and the outcome. The present experiments investigated signal-induced risky choices and reward-outcome expectations in rhesus and capuchin monkeys. Risky choice was assessed by preference for a large-probabilistic reward over a modest-certain reward. Outcome expectancy was assessed by providing a truncation-response to shorten the delay period. In Experiment 1 both species generally favored the risky option compared to a safe option when the outcomes were signaled and generally shortened the delays except when a signaled-loss stimulus was presented. The use of the delay-truncation response suggested that the monkeys were sensitive to the information conveyed by the stimulus. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to investigate whether the delay-truncation response used by capuchin monkeys was strategically used reflecting explicit decision-making versus a conditioned response to reward stimuli. A perceptual judgment task was included and the selective use of the delay-truncation response on unsignaled correct trials may suggest the involvement of metacognitive processes. The capuchin monkeys generally truncated the delays except under conditions where reward would not be expected (risky-loss or incorrect-judgment). When the outcomes were unsignaled during the delay some capuchin monkeys were less likely to truncate the delay following an incorrect task response. Overall, the monkeys: (1) made more risky choices when the outcomes were signaled - consistent with gambling-like behavior. (2) selectively truncated the unsignaled delays when rewards could be anticipated (even when metacognitive-like awareness guided anticipation) - suggesting that delay truncation responses reflect explicit outcome expectancy.

What is optimal in optimal inference?

Inferring hidden structure from noisy observations is a problem addressed by Bayesian statistical learning, which aims to identify optimal models of the process that generated the observations given assumptions that constrain the space of potential solutions. Animals and machines face similar "model-selection" problems to infer latent properties and predict future states of the world. Here we review recent attempts to explain how intelligent agents address these challenges and how their solutions relate to Bayesian principles. We focus on how constraints on available information and resources affect inference and propose a general framework that uses benefit(accuracy) and accuracy(cost) curves to assess optimality under these constraints.

Taking risks for the best: Maximizing and risk-taking tendencies

Maximizing is characterized by aspirations for the highest standards. The current study explored the relationship between maximizing and risk-taking tendencies in decisions subject to risk. We propose that people first refer to expectation (i.e., the overall utility expected from an alternative) when taking risky decisions. If expectation clearly identifies the best option, maximizing will not be correlated with risk-taking tendencies. If not, people refer to maximizing to reach a decision. Maximizing will be positively associated with risk-taking tendencies because the “upper bound” of risky options helps achieve the goal of seeking the best. Four studies showed that risk-taking tendencies increased with maximizing when the options had similar expectations (Studies 1 to 3). When expectations between options were clearly different (vs. similar), the positive relationship between maximizing and risk-taking tendencies was reduced (Study 4). These findings provide an insight into how maximizing is related to risk seeking.

Unpredictability as a modulator of drug self-administration: Relevance for substance-use disorders

Drug self-administration has been regarded as a gold-standard preclinical model of addiction and substance-use disorder (SUD). However, investigators are becoming increasingly aware, that certain aspects of addiction or SUDs experienced by humans are not accurately captured in our preclinical self-administration models. The current review will focus on two such aspects of current preclinical drug self-administration models: 1) Predictable vs. unpredictable drug access in terms of the time and effort put into obtaining drugs (i.e., response requirement) and drug quality (i.e., amount) and 2) rich vs. lean access to drugs. Some behavioral and neurobiological mechanisms that could contribute to excessive allocation of behavior toward drug-seeking and drug-taking at the expense of engaging in nondrug-related activities are discussed, and some directions for future research are identified. Based on the experiments reviewed, lean and unpredictable drug access could worsen drug-seeking and drug-taking behavior in individuals with SUDs. Once more fully explored, this area of research will help determine whether and how unpredictable and lean cost requirements affect drug self-administration in preclinical laboratory studies with nonhuman subjects and will help determine whether incorporating these conditions in current self-administration models will increase their predictive validity.

Embodied Capital and Risk-Related Traits, Attitudes, Behaviors, and Outcomes: An Exploratory Examination of Attractiveness, Cognitive Ability, and Physical Ability

The relative state model posits two nonindependent pathways to risk. The need-based pathway suggests people take risks when nonrisky options are unlikely to meet their needs. The ability-based pathway suggests people take risks when they possess resources or abilities making them more capable of successfully “pulling off” risk-taking. Growing laboratory and field evidence supports need-based risk-taking. However, little is known about ability-based risk-taking. We examined whether three indicators of embodied capital (attractiveness, cognitive ability, and physical dexterity) were associated with risk-related personality traits, risk-attitudes, behavioral risk-taking, and outcomes associated with risk-taking. Among 328 community members recruited to maximize variance on risk-propensity, we demonstrate that embodied capital indices predict various instantiations of risk-propensity consistent with the relative state model.

Experimental subjects do not know what we think they know

Many biological, psychological and economic experiments have been designed where an organism or individual must choose between two options that have the same expected reward but differ in the variance of reward received. In this way, designed empirical approaches have been developed for evaluating risk preferences. Here, however, we show that if the experimental subject is inferring the reward distribution (to optimize some process), they will rarely agree in finite time that the expected rewards are equal. In turn, we argue that this makes discussions of risk preferences, and indeed the motivations of behaviour, not so simple or straightforward to interpret. We use this particular experiment to highlight the serious need to consider the frame of reference of the experimental subject in studies of behaviour.

State-dependent risk-taking

Who takes risks, and when? The relative state model proposes two non-independent selection pressures governing risk-taking: need-based and ability-based. The need-based account suggests that actors take risks when they cannot reach target states with low-risk options (consistent with risk-sensitivity theory). The ability-based account suggests that actors engage in risk-taking when they possess traits or abilities that increase the expected value of risk-taking (by increasing the probability of success, enhancing payoffs for success or buffering against failure). Adaptive risk-taking involves integrating both considerations. Risk-takers compute the expected value of risk-taking based on their state-the interaction of embodied capital relative to one's situation, to the same individual in other circumstances or to other individuals. We provide mathematical support for this dual pathway model, and show that it can predict who will take the most risks and when (e.g. when risk-taking will be performed by those in good, poor, intermediate or extreme state only). Results confirm and elaborate on the initial verbal model of state-dependent risk-taking: selection favours agents who calibrate risk-taking based on implicit computations of condition and/or competitive (dis)advantage, which in turn drives patterned individual differences in risk-taking behaviour.

Dual cognitive pathways to voice quality: Frequent voicers improvise, infrequent voicers elaborate

We investigate the involvement of Working Memory Capacity (WMC, the cognitive resource necessary for controlled elaborate thinking) in voice behavior (speaking up with suggestions, problems, and opinions to change the organization). While scholars assume voice requires elaborate thinking, some empirical evidence suggests voice might be more automatic. To explain this discrepancy, we distinguish between voice quantity (frequency of voice) and voice quality (novelty and value of voiced information) and propose that WMC is important for voice quality, but less for voice quantity. Furthermore, we propose that frequent voicers rely less on WMC to reach high voice quality than people who voice rarely. To test our ideas, we conducted three studies: a between-participant lab-study, a within-participant experiment, and a multi-source field-study. All studies supported our expectation that voice quantity is unrelated to WMC, and that voice quality is positively related to WMC, but only for those who rarely voice. This indicates that the decision to voice (quantity) might be more automatic and intuitive than often assumed, whereas its value to the organization (quality), relies more on the degree of cognitive elaboration of the voicer. It also suggests that frequent and infrequent voicers use distinct cognitive pathways to voice high-quality information: frequent voicers improvise, while infrequent voicers elaborate.