Illusory Essences: A Bias Holding Back Theorizing in Psychological Science

Stop trying to carve Nature at its joints! The importance of a process-based developmental science for understanding neurodiversity

Nature is dynamic and interdependent. Yet we typically study and understand it as a hierarchy of independent static things (objects, factors, capacities, traits, attributes) with well-defined boundaries. Hence, since Plato, the dominant research practice has been to 'carve Nature at its joints' (Phaedrus 265e), rooted in the view that the world comes to us pre-divided - into static forms or essences - and that the goal of science is to simply discover (identify and classify) them. This things-based approach dominates developmental science, and especially the study of neurodevelopmental conditions. The goal of this paper is to amplify the marginalised process-based approach: that Nature has no joints. It is a hierarchy of interacting processes from which emerging functions (with fuzzy boundaries) softly assemble, become actively maintained, and dissipate over various timescales. We further argue (with a specific focus on children with Down syndrome) that the prevailing focus on identifying, isolating, and analysing things rather than understanding dynamic interdependent processes is obstructing progress in developmental science and particularly our understanding of neurodiversity. We explain how re-examining the very foundation of traditional Western thought is necessary to progress our research on neurodiversity, and we provide specific recommendations on how to steer developmental science towards the process-based approach.

A Descriptive Diagnosis or a Causal Explanation? Accuracy of Depictions of Depression on Authoritative Health Organization Websites

INTRODUCTION

Psychiatric diagnoses are descriptive in nature, but the lay public commonly misconceives them as causal explanations. It is not known whether this logical error, a form of circular reasoning, can sometimes be mistakenly reinforced by health authorities themselves. In this study, we investigated the prevalence of misleading causal descriptions of depression in the information provided by authoritative mental health organizations on widely accessed internet sites.

METHODS

We searched for popular websites managed by leading mental health organizations and conducted a content analysis to evaluate whether they presented depression accurately as a description of symptoms, or inaccurately as a causal explanation.

RESULTS

Most websites used language that inaccurately described depression as a causal explanation to depressive symptoms.

CONCLUSION

Leading professional medical and psychiatric organizations commonly confound depression, a descriptive diagnostic label, with a causal explanation on their most prominently accessed informational websites. We argue that the scientifically inaccurate causal language in depictions of psychiatric diagnoses is potentially harmful because it leads the public to misunderstand the nature of mental health problems. Mental health authorities providing psychoeducation should clearly state that psychiatric diagnoses are purely descriptive to avoid misleading the public.

The Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST): A psychometrically validated measure of news veracity discernment

Interest in the psychology of misinformation has exploded in recent years. Despite ample research, to date there is no validated framework to measure misinformation susceptibility. Therefore, we introduce Verification done, a nuanced interpretation schema and assessment tool that simultaneously considers Veracity discernment, and its distinct, measurable abilities (real/fake news detection), and biases (distrust/naïvité-negative/positive judgment bias). We then conduct three studies with seven independent samples (Ntotal = 8504) to show how to develop, validate, and apply the Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST). In Study 1 (N = 409) we use a neural network language model to generate items, and use three psychometric methods-factor analysis, item response theory, and exploratory graph analysis-to create the MIST-20 (20 items; completion time < 2 minutes), the MIST-16 (16 items; < 2 minutes), and the MIST-8 (8 items; < 1 minute). In Study 2 (N = 7674) we confirm the internal and predictive validity of the MIST in five national quota samples (US, UK), across 2 years, from three different sampling platforms-Respondi, CloudResearch, and Prolific. We also explore the MIST's nomological net and generate age-, region-, and country-specific norm tables. In Study 3 (N = 421) we demonstrate how the MIST-in conjunction with Verification done-can provide novel insights on existing psychological interventions, thereby advancing theory development. Finally, we outline the versatile implementations of the MIST as a screening tool, covariate, and intervention evaluation framework. As all methods are transparently reported and detailed, this work will allow other researchers to create similar scales or adapt them for any population of interest.

Strategies, debates, and adversarial collaboration in working memory: The 51st Bartlett Lecture

Frederic Bartlett championed the importance of individual strategy differences when remembering details of events. I will describe how long-running theoretical debates in the area of working memory may be resolved by considering differences across participants in the strategies that they use when performing cognitive tasks, and through adversarial collaboration between rival laboratories. In common with the established view within experimental cognitive psychology, I assume that adults have a range of cognitive functions, evolved for everyday life. However, I will present evidence showing that these functions can be engaged selectively for laboratory tasks, and that how they are deployed may differ between and within individuals for the same task. Reliance on aggregate data, while treating inter- and intra-participant variability in data patterns as statistical noise, may lead to misleading conclusions about theoretical principles of cognition, and of working memory in particular. Moreover, different theoretical perspectives may be focused on different levels of explanation and different theoretical goals rather than being mutually incompatible. Yet researchers from contrasting theoretical frameworks pursue science as a competition, rarely do researchers from competing labs work in collaboration, and debates self-perpetuate. These approaches to research can stall debate resolution and generate ever-increasing scientific diversity rather than scientific progress. The article concludes by describing a recent extended adversarial collaboration (the WoMAAC project) focused on theoretical contrasts in working memory, and illustrates how this approach to conducting research may help resolve scientific debate and facilitate scientific advance.

Are Deep Neural Networks Adequate Behavioral Models of Human Visual Perception?

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are machine learning algorithms that have revolutionized computer vision due to their remarkable successes in tasks like object classification and segmentation. The success of DNNs as computer vision algorithms has led to the suggestion that DNNs may also be good models of human visual perception. In this article, we review evidence regarding current DNNs as adequate behavioral models of human core object recognition. To this end, we argue that it is important to distinguish between statistical tools and computational models and to understand model quality as a multidimensional concept in which clarity about modeling goals is key. Reviewing a large number of psychophysical and computational explorations of core object recognition performance in humans and DNNs, we argue that DNNs are highly valuable scientific tools but that, as of today, DNNs should only be regarded as promising-but not yet adequate-computational models of human core object recognition behavior. On the way, we dispel several myths surrounding DNNs in vision science.

Is Religion Special?

Religion makes unique claims (e.g., the existence of supernatural agents) not found in other belief systems, but is religion itself psychologically special? Furthermore, religion is related to many domains of psychological interest, such as morality, health and well-being, self-control, meaning, and death anxiety. Does religion act on these domains via special mechanisms that are unlike secular mechanisms? These could include mechanisms such as beliefs in supernatural agents, providing ultimate meaning, and providing literal immortality. We apply a critical eye to these questions of specialness and conclude that although it is clear that religion is psychologically important, there is not yet strong evidence that it is psychologically special, with the possible exception of its effects on health. We highlight what would be required of future research aimed at convincingly demonstrating that religion is indeed psychologically special, including careful definitions of religion and careful attention to experimental design and causal inference.

Over-reliance on English hinders cognitive science

English is the dominant language in the study of human cognition and behavior: the individuals studied by cognitive scientists, as well as most of the scientists themselves, are frequently English speakers. However, English differs from other languages in ways that have consequences for the whole of the cognitive sciences, reaching far beyond the study of language itself. Here, we review an emerging body of evidence that highlights how the particular characteristics of English and the linguistic habits of English speakers bias the field by both warping research programs (e.g., overemphasizing features and mechanisms present in English over others) and overgeneralizing observations from English speakers' behaviors, brains, and cognition to our entire species. We propose mitigating strategies that could help avoid some of these pitfalls.

The "Effort Elephant" in the Room: What Is Effort, Anyway?

Despite decades of research in the fields of judgment and decision-making, social psychology, cognitive psychology, human-machine interaction, behavioral economics, and neuroscience, we still do not know what "cognitive effort" is. The definitions in use are often imprecise and sometimes diametrically opposed. Researchers with different assumptions talk past each other, and many aspects of effort conservation remain untested and difficult to measure. In this article, we explain why effort is so difficult to pin down and why it is important that researchers develop consensus on precise definitions. Next, we describe major "hidden" sources of miscommunication: areas in which researchers disagree in their underlying assumptions about the nature of effort without realizing it. We briefly review a number of methods used to both measure and manipulate the effortfulness of thinking and highlight why they often produce contradictory findings. We conclude by reviewing existing perspectives on cognitive effort and integrating them to suggest a common framework for communicating about effort as a limited cognitive resource.

Hate crime towards minoritized groups increases as they increase in sized-based rank

People are on the move in unprecedented numbers within and between countries. How does demographic change affect local intergroup dynamics? Complementing accounts that emphasize stereotypical features of groups as determinants of their treatment, we propose the group reference dependence hypothesis: violence and negative attitudes towards each minoritized group will depend on the number and size of other minoritized groups in a community. Specifically, as groups increase or decrease in rank in terms of their size (for example, to the largest minority within a community), discriminatory behaviour and attitudes towards them should change accordingly. We test this hypothesis for hate crimes in US counties between 1990 and 2010 and attitudes in the United States and United Kingdom over the past two decades. Consistent with this prediction, we find that as Black, Hispanic/Latinx, Asian and Arab populations increase in rank relative to one another, they become more likely to be targeted with hate crimes and more negative attitudes. The rank effect holds above and beyond group size/proportion, growth rate and many other alternative explanations. This framework makes predictions about how demographic shifts may affect coalitional structures in the coming years and helps explain previous findings in the literature. Our results also indicate that attitudes and behaviours towards social categories are not intransigent or driven only by features associated with those groups, such as stereotypes.

As soon as there was life, there was danger: the deep history of survival behaviours and the shallower history of consciousness

It is often said that fear is a universal innate emotion that we humans have inherited from our mammalian ancestors by virtue of having inherited conserved features of their nervous systems. Contrary to this common sense-based scientific point of view, I have argued that what we have inherited from our mammalian ancestors, and they from their distal vertebrate ancestors, and they from their chordate ancestors, and so forth, is not a fear circuit. It is, instead, a defensive survival circuit that detects threats, and in response, initiates defensive survival behaviours and supporting physiological adjustments. Seen in this light, the defensive survival circuits of humans and other mammals can be conceptualized as manifestations of an ancient survival function-the ability to detect danger and respond to it-that may in fact predate animals and their nervous systems, and perhaps may go back to the beginning of life. Fear, on the other hand, from my perspective, is a product of cortical cognitive circuits. This conception is not just of academic interest. It also has practical implications, offering clues as to why efforts to treat problems related to fear and anxiety are not more effective, and what might make them better. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

Computational Psychiatry Needs Time and Context

Why has computational psychiatry yet to influence routine clinical practice? One reason may be that it has neglected context and temporal dynamics in the models of certain mental health problems. We develop three heuristics for estimating whether time and context are important to a mental health problem: Is it characterized by a core neurobiological mechanism? Does it follow a straightforward natural trajectory? And is intentional mental content peripheral to the problem? For many problems the answers are no, suggesting that modeling time and context is critical. We review computational psychiatry advances toward this end, including modeling state variation, using domain-specific stimuli, and interpreting differences in context. We discuss complementary network and complex systems approaches. Novel methods and unification with adjacent fields may inspire a new generation of computational psychiatry.

People's naïve belief about curiosity and interest: A qualitative study

The purpose of this study was to critically examine how people perceive the definitions, differences and similarities of interest and curiosity, and address the subjective boundaries between interest and curiosity. We used a qualitative research approach given the research questions and the goal to develop an in-depth understanding of people's meaning of interest and curiosity. We used data from a sample of 126 U.S. adults (48.5% male) recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Mage = 40.7, SDage = 11.7). Semi-structured questions were used and thematic analysis was applied. The results showed two themes relating to differences between curiosity and interest; active/stable feelings and certainty/uncertainty. Curiosity was defined as an active feeling (more specifically a first, fleeting feeling) and a child-like emotion that often involves a strong urge to think actively and differently, whereas interest was described as stable and sustainable feeling, which is characterized as involved engagement and personal preferences (e.g., hobbies). In addition, participants related curiosity to uncertainty, e.g., trying new things and risk-taking behaviour. Certainty, on the other hand, was deemed as an important component in the definition of interest, which helps individuals acquire deep knowledge. Both curiosity and interest were reported to be innate and positive feelings that support motivation and knowledge-seeking during the learning process.

Can we get human nature right?

Few questions in science are as controversial as human nature. At stake is whether our basic concepts and emotions are all learned from experience, or whether some are innate. Here, I demonstrate that reasoning about innateness is biased by the basic workings of the human mind. Psychological science suggests that newborns possess core concepts of "object" and "number." Laypeople, however, believe that newborns are devoid of such notions but that they can recognize emotions. Moreover, people presume that concepts are learned, whereas emotions (along with sensations and actions) are innate. I trace these beliefs to two tacit psychological principles: intuitive dualism and essentialism. Essentialism guides tacit reasoning about biological inheritance and suggests that innate traits reside in the body; per intuitive dualism, however, the mind seems ethereal, distinct from the body. It thus follows that, in our intuitive psychology, concepts (which people falsely consider as disembodied) must be learned, whereas emotions, sensations, and emotions (which are considered embodied) are likely innate; these predictions are in line with the experimental results. These conclusions do not speak to the question of whether concepts and emotions are innate, but they suggest caution in its scientific evaluation.