The Human Affectome

Over the last decades, theoretical perspectives in the interdisciplinary field of the affective sciences have proliferated rather than converged due to differing assumptions about what human affective phenomena are and how they work. These metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions, shaped by academic context and values, have dictated affective constructs and operationalizations. However, an assumption about the purpose of affective phenomena can guide us to a common set of metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. In this capstone paper, we home in on a nested teleological principle for human affective phenomena in order to synthesize metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. Under this framework, human affective phenomena can collectively be considered algorithms that either adjust based on the human comfort zone (affective concerns) or monitor those adaptive processes (affective features). This teleologically-grounded framework offers a principled agenda and launchpad for both organizing existing perspectives and generating new ones. Ultimately, we hope the Human Affectome brings us a step closer to not only an integrated understanding of human affective phenomena, but an integrated field for affective research.

What Do People Think Is an Emotion?

In emotion research, both conceptual analyses and empirical studies commonly rely on emotion reports. But what do people mean when they say that they are angry, afraid, joyful, etc.? Building on extant theories of emotion, this paper presents four new studies (including a preregistered replication) measuring the weight of cognitive evaluations, bodily changes, and action tendencies in people's use of emotion concepts. The results of these studies suggest that the presence or absence of cognitive evaluations has the largest impact on people's emotion attributions, and bodily changes and action tendencies are considered to depend on cognitive evaluations. Implications for theories of emotion (concepts) and the interpretation of emotion reports are discussed.

The Feelings of Goals Hypothesis: Emotional Feelings are Non-Conceptual, Non-Motoric Representations of Goals

This paper proposes and develops the feelings of goals hypothesis (FGH). It has two aims: first, to describe the evolutionary function of emotional feelings (EFs), and second, to describe the content and the format of EFs. According to FGH, the evolutionary function of EFs is to enable motoric flexibility. Specifically, EFs are a component of a psychological mechanism that permits differential motoric reactions to the same stimulus. Further, according to FGH, EF is a special type of mental representation with the content of an action goal, and with a non-motoric, non-conceptual format. This paper thoroughly clarifies the assumptions underlying FGH and discusses its theoretical implications and empirical predictions.

Felt Body as Myth and Reality: On the Bodily Dimension of Felt Sense

This article addresses the function of the felt body in focusing-oriented psychotherapy. Focusing, as defined by its founder Eugene T. Gendlin, innovated the person-centered approach with procedures attending to the bodily “felt sense” of the client’s situation. In a recent series of texts, Campbell Purton questioned the bodily nature of a felt sense, which in his opinion results from a misconception about emotions and language. This article aims to assess the extent to which Purton’s critique is cogent and where, on the contrary, it misses the presence and function of the body in psychotherapy. It is argued that contemporary phenomenological and neo-Jamesian theories of emotions offer ample means of defending the bodily nature of feelings.

Do Emotions Cause Actions, and If So How?

The main purpose of this article is to consider two of the most popular arguments offered in support of the view that emotions do not cause actions. One argument suggests that emotions come after actions and therefore cannot cause them ( argument from timing). The other argument suggests that emotions are not necessarily followed by actions and therefore cannot cause them ( argument from imperfect association). I argue that neither of these two arguments is compelling. At the same time, some of the concerns of causation skeptics can help us better understand what a theory of the causal connection between emotions and actions should explain.

The Legacy of Cognition-Arousal Theory: Introduction to a Special Section of Emotion Review

Schachter’s cognition-arousal theory has been highly influential in emotion psychology and beyond. The six contributions to this special section investigate the origins of Schachter’s theory in his previous work on affiliation; systematize the variety of existing versions of cognition-arousal theory; summarize recent cognition-feeling theories of emotion and associated empirical work influenced by Schachter’s theory; and critically reexamine two assumptions of cognition-arousal theory: the assumption, made in some interpretations of the theory, that cognitive appraisals are components of emotions, and the assumption that bodily feelings cannot alone constitute emotional experiences.

Varieties of Cognition-Arousal Theory

Three main versions of cognition-arousal theory are distinguished depending on how they interpret the theory’s basic postulate, that an emotion is a function of cognition and arousal: objectivist causal theories, attributional theories, and fusion theories. The objectivist causal and attributional theories each comprise a causal-functional and a part-whole version, and the fusion theory subsumes in particular a categorization and a perceptual integration version. In addition, the attributional version of cognition-arousal theory can be reinterpreted as a theory of emotion self-ascription. Although arousal may in fact not be necessary for emotions, a modified cognition-feeling theory that replaces arousal with intrinsically affective feelings, seems still viable. Arguments are presented why the objectivist causal-functional version of this theory should be preferred.