Social evaluation or simple association? Simple associations may explain moral reasoning in infants

Rethinking Norm Psychology

Norms permeate human life. Most of people's activities can be characterized by rules about what is appropriate, allowed, required, or forbidden-rules that are crucial in making people hyper-cooperative animals. In this article, I examine the current cognitive-evolutionary account of "norm psychology" and propose an alternative that is better supported by evidence and better placed to promote interdisciplinary dialogue. The incumbent theory focuses on rules and claims that humans genetically inherit cognitive and motivational mechanisms specialized for processing these rules. The cultural-evolutionary alternative defines normativity in relation to behavior-compliance, enforcement, and commentary-and suggests that it depends on implicit and explicit processes. The implicit processes are genetically inherited and domain-general; rather than being specialized for normativity, they do many jobs in many species. The explicit processes are culturally inherited and domain-specific; they are constructed from mentalizing and reasoning by social interaction in childhood. The cultural-evolutionary, or "cognitive gadget," perspective suggests that people alive today-parents, educators, elders, politicians, lawyers-have more responsibility for sustaining normativity than the nativist view implies. People's actions not only shape and transmit the rules, but they also create in each new generation mental processes that can grasp the rules and put them into action.

Neural signatures to prosocial and antisocial interactions in young infants

Preverbal infants appear to be more attracted by prosocial characters and events, as typically assessed using preferential looking times and manual choice. However, infants' neural correlates of observed prosocial and antisocial interactions are still scarce. Here, we familiarized 5-month-old (N = 24) infants with a prosocial and antisocial scene (i.e., a character either helping or hindering) and infants' Event-Related Potentials (ERP) were recorded in response to the presentation of short video clips of the prosocial and antisocial interaction. On a neural level, results revealed that infants could discriminate between helping and hindering events at an early stage of processing, as shown by a larger N290 response to the former compared to the latter. Further, while the Nc - typically indexing attentional processes - was larger for antisocial over prosocial events, the LPP, indexing cognitive evaluation of the stimuli, was larger for prosocial over antisocial actions. Finally, infants' higher scores on the effortful control temperamental subscale were related to infants' increased N290 neural sensitivity to antisocial scenes. Together, these findings provide new evidence of the time course of infants' ERP responses during the observation of helping and hindering interactions, which involves both attentional and socially relevant processes.

Living the DReaM: The interrelations between statistical, scientific and nature of science uncertainty articulations through citizen science

Responsible citizenship and sound decision-making in today's information age necessitate an appreciation of the role of uncertainty in the process of generating data-based scientific knowledge. The latter calls for coordinating between different types of uncertainties, related to three types of relevant reasoning: statistical, scientific, and nature of science uncertainties. This article examines separately the uncertainties that young students articulate as they engage in activities designed to concurrently foster all three types of reasoning, and also explores how these different types can interrelate. The context of Citizen Science is particularly suited for this goal, providing a unique pedagogical opportunity for learning scientific content by engaging learners in authentic scientific practices, including data analysis. Based on literature from the three fields of statistics, science and nature of science education, we offer an integrative framework, Deterministic Relativistic and Middle ground (DReaM), which consists of nine sub-categories of uncertainty articulations. We utilize it to analyze an instrumental case study of a pair of middle school students' (ages 13 and 14) participation in a pilot study of an interdisciplinary extended learning sequence, as part of the Radon Citizen Science Project. The results of an interpretative microgenetic analysis identified all nine DReaM uncertainty articulations sub-categories. These are illustrated in the Findings section with key scenes from the pair's participation. The discussion depicts how these sub-categories manifested in this particular case study and suggests interrelations between them in a more extended depiction of the DReaM framework. We conclude with the pedagogical implications of the extended framework.

Protracted development of motor cortex constrains rich interpretations of infant cognition

Cognition in preverbal human infants must be inferred from overt motor behaviors such as gaze shifts, head turns, or reaching for objects. However, infant mammals - including human infants - show protracted postnatal development of cortical motor outflow. Cortical control of eye, face, head, and limb movements is absent at birth and slowly emerges over the first postnatal year and beyond. Accordingly, the neonatal cortex in humans cannot generate the motor behaviors routinely used to support inferences about infants' cognitive abilities, and thus claims of developmental continuity between infant and adult cognition are suspect. Recognition of the protracted development of motor cortex should temper rich interpretations of infant cognition and motivate more serious consideration of the role of subcortical mechanisms in early cognitive development.

Preverbal infants' reactions to third-party punishments and rewards delivered toward fair and unfair agents

Rewarding individuals who distribute resources fairly and punishing those who distribute resources unfairly may be very important actions for fostering cooperation. This study investigated whether 9-month-olds have some expectations concerning punishments and rewards that follow distributive actions. Infants were shown simple animations and were tested using the violation-of-expectation paradigm. In Experiment 1, we found that infants looked longer when they saw a bystander delivering a corporal punishment to a 'fair distributor,' who distributed some windfall resources equally to the possible recipients, rather than to an 'unfair distributor,' who distributed the resources unequally. This pattern of looking times was reversed when, in Experiment 2, punishments were replaced with rewards. These findings suggest an early emergence of expectations about punishing and rewarding actions in third-party contexts, and they help to evaluate competing claims about the origins of a sense of fairness.

Third-party punishment by preverbal infants

Third-party punishment of antisocial others is unique to humans and seems to be universal across cultures. However, its emergence in ontogeny remains unknown. We developed a participatory cognitive paradigm using gaze-contingency techniques, in which infants can use their gaze to affect agents displayed on a monitor. In this paradigm, fixation on an agent triggers the event of a stone crushing the agent. Throughout five experiments (total N = 120), we show that eight-month-old infants punished antisocial others. Specifically, infants increased their selective looks at the aggressor after watching aggressive interactions. Additionally, three control experiments excluded alternative interpretations of their selective gaze, suggesting that punishment-related decision-making influenced looking behaviour. These findings indicate that a disposition for third-party punishment of antisocial others emerges in early infancy and emphasize the importance of third-party punishment for human cooperation. This behavioural tendency may be a human trait acquired over the course of evolution.

Infants' preferences for approachers over repulsers shift between 4 and 8 months of age

Despite its adaptive value for social life, the emergence and the development of the ability to detect agents that cause aversive interactions and distinguish them from potentially affiliative agents (approachers) has not been investigated. We presented infants with a simple interaction involving two agents: one of them (the "repulser") moved toward and pushed the other (the "approacher") which reacted by simply moving toward the repulser without contacting it. We found that 8-month-olds (N = 28) looked longer at the approacher than at the repulser (Experiment 1), whereas 4-month-olds (N = 30) exhibited no preference (Experiment 2). To control for low-level cues (such as the preference for the agent that moved after the contact), two new groups of 4- and 8-month-old infants were presented with a series of interactions in which the agents inverted their social roles. Older infants (N = 30) manifested no preference for either agent (Experiment 3), while younger infants (N = 30) looked longer at the first agent to move (Experiment 4). Our results indicated that 8-month-olds' preferences for the approacher over the repulser depended on social information and were finely tuned to agents that display prosocial rather than antisocial behavior. We discuss these findings in light of the development and adaptive value of the ability to negatively evaluate repulsers, to avoid choosing them as partners.

Infants' neural responses to helping and hindering scenarios

A growing literature suggests infants prefer prosocial others over antisocial others. Although recent studies have begun to explore the neural mechanisms underlying these responses (Cowell and Decety, 2015; Gredebäck et al., 2015), these studies were based on relatively small samples and focused on distinct aspects of sociomoral responding. The current preregistered study systematically examined infants' neural responses both to prosocial/antisocial interactions and to prosocial/antisocial characters, using larger samples and two distinct age groups. We found that 6- (but not 12-) month-olds showed higher relative right frontal alpha power (indexing approach motivation) when viewing helping versus hindering scenarios. Consistent with past EEG work, infants showed no group-level manual preferences for the helper. However, analyses of infants' neural responses toward images of the helper versus hinderer revealed that both 6- and 12-month-olds showed differential event-related potential (ERP) responses in the P400 and N290 components (indexing social perception) but not in the Nc component (indexing attentional allocation), suggestive that infants' neural responses to prosocial versus antisocial characters reflect social processing. Together, these findings provide a more comprehensive account of infants' responses to prosocial/antisocial interactions and characters, and support the hypothesis that both motivational and socially relevant processes are implicated in infants' sociomoral responding.

Improving the generalizability of infant psychological research: The ManyBabies model

Yarkoni's analysis clearly articulates a number of concerns limiting the generalizability and explanatory power of psychological findings, many of which are compounded in infancy research. ManyBabies addresses these concerns via a radically collaborative, large-scale and open approach to research that is grounded in theory-building, committed to diversification, and focused on understanding sources of variation.

Mechanisms of social evaluation in infancy: A preregistered exploration of infants' eye-movement and pupillary responses to prosocial and antisocial events

Past research shows infants selectively touch and look longer at characters who help versus hinder others (Social evaluation by preverbal infants. Nature, 2007, 450, 557; Three-month-olds show a negativity bias in their social evaluations. Developmental Science, 2010, 13, 923); however, the mechanisms underlying this tendency remain underspecified. The current preregistered experiment approaches this question by examining infants' real-time looking behaviors during prosocial and antisocial events, and exploring how individual infants' looking behaviors correlate with helper preferences. Using eye-tracking, 34 five-month-olds were familiarized with two blocks of the "hill" scenario originally developed by Kuhlmeier et al. (Attribution of dispositional states by 12-month-olds. Psychological Science, 2003, 14, 402), in which a climber tries unsuccessfully to reach the top of a hill and is alternately helped or hindered. Infants' visual preferences were assessed after each block of 6 helping and hindering events by proportional looking time to the helper versus hinderer in an image of the characters side by side. Results showed that, at the group level, infants looked longer at the helper after viewing 12 (but not after viewing 6) helping and hindering videos. Moreover, individual infants' average preference for the helper was predicted by their looking behaviors, particularly those suggestive of an understanding of the climber's unfulfilled goal. These results shed light on how infants process helping/hindering scenarios, and suggest that goal understanding is important for infants' helper preferences.

Cortical Activation to Social and Mechanical Stimuli in the Infant Brain

From the early days of life infants distinguish between social and non-social physical entities and have different expectations for the way these two entities should move and interact. At the same time, we know very little about the cortical systems that support this early emerging ability. The goal of the current research was to assess the extent to which infant's processing of social and non-social physical entities is mediated by distinct information processing systems in the temporal cortex. Using a cross-sectional design, infants aged 6-9 months (Experiment 1) and 11-18 months (Experiment 2) were presented with two types of events: social interaction and mechanical interaction. In the social interaction event (patterned after Hamlin et al., 2007), an entity with googly eyes, hair tufts, and an implied goal of moving up the hill was either helped up, or pushed down, a hill through the actions of another social entity. In the mechanical interaction event, the googly eyes and hair tufts were replaced with vertical black dots and a hook and clasp, and the objects moved up or down the hill via mechanical interactions. FNIRS was used to measure activation from temporal cortex while infants viewed the test events. In both age groups, viewing social and mechanical interaction events elicited different patterns of activation in the right temporal cortex, although responses were more specialized in the older age group. Activation was not obtained in these areas when the objects moved in synchrony without interacting, suggesting that the causal nature of the interaction events may be responsible, in part, to the results obtained. This is one of the few fNIRS studies that has investigated age-related patterns of cortical activation and the first to provide insight into the functional development of networks specialized for processing of social and non-social physical entities engaged in interaction events.

Toddlers' expectations of corporal third-party punishments against the non-defender puppet

Recent research has demonstrated that toddlers expect individuals to approach and reward those who defend a victim from an aggressor rather than those who refuse to do so. This work focused on toddlers' expectations of corporal third-party punishments trought various actions, such as hitting with a stick or repelling someone who refused to defend a social partner following aggression. Using a violation of expectation paradigm (VoE), three experiments were carried out to investigate whether 21-month-olds expect others to apply different kinds of corporal punishments against the non-defender puppet (expected event) rather than the defender puppet (unexpected event), showing a bystander hitting with a stick (Experiment 1) or pushing strongly (Experiment 3) each of the two puppets. In both experiments, toddlers showed to be surprised whent the saw the bystander punish by hitting or pushing the defender puppet rather the non-defender puppet. In a control experiment displaying a non-social condition (Experiment 2), in which the victim puppets were replaced by two inert boxes, toddlers showed no expectation. These results uncovered that toddlers expect others to engage in different corporal punishments toward those who refuse to defend a social partner from an aggressor, by revealing that these expectations are not specific to a single type of punishment. The findings raise questions about the development of corporal third-party punishments, and have implications for the theory on ontogenetic processes underlying sociomoral development.

Connecting the Moral Core: Examining Moral Baby Research Through an Attachment Theory Perspective

Infants care for and are cared for by others from early in life, a fact reflected in infants' morality and attachment. According to moral core researchers, infants are born with a moral sense that allows them to care about and evaluate the actions of third parties. In attachment theory, care manifests through infants' relationships with caregivers, which forms representations called internal working models that shape how babies think, feel, and act. Although accumulating evidence supports the existence of a moral core directed toward others, nevertheless, without a notion of care connected to infants' own lives, the core is an incomplete and underpowered construct. We show how the moral core, like attachment, could emerge in first- and second-person working models that develop through social interaction and incorporate representational forms (embodied, social, cognitive, emotional, moral), which contribute to the emergence of third-person representations and give infants' moral sense its vitality and meaning.

Changing the logic of replication: A case from infant studies

Among infant researchers there is growing concern regarding the widespread practice of undertaking studies that have small sample sizes and employ tests with low statistical power (to detect a wide range of possible effects). For many researchers, issues of confidence may be partially resolved by relying on replications. Here, we bring further evidence that the classical logic of confirmation, according to which the result of a replication study confirms the original finding when it reaches statistical significance, could be usefully abandoned. With real examples taken from the infant literature and Monte Carlo simulations, we show that a very wide range of possible replication results would in a formal statistical sense constitute confirmation as they can be explained simply due to sampling error. Thus, often no useful conclusion can be derived from a single or small number of replication studies. We suggest that, in order to accumulate and generate new knowledge, the dichotomous view of replication as confirmatory/disconfirmatory can be replaced by an approach that emphasizes the estimation of effect sizes via meta-analysis. Moreover, we discuss possible solutions for reducing problems affecting the validity of conclusions drawn from meta-analyses in infant research.

Social evaluation and imitation of prosocial and antisocial agents in infants, children, and adults

The question of whether infants prefer prosocial agents over antisocial agents is contentious. Therefore, the first goal of the present study was to replicate previous findings regarding infants' preference. The second goal was to assess whether infants are more likely to imitate a prosocial agent than an antisocial agent. We tested 9-month-old, 14-month-old, and 4-year-old children. The study used the "opening a box to get a toy" paradigm in which an animal puppet is trying unsuccessfully to open a box and is either helped by a prosocial puppet or hindered by an antisocial puppet. We presented these social events via video, and subsequently administered an imitation task. As an additional control, adults were asked to describe the videos showing the prosocial and antisocial agent. Although most adults were able to identify both agents, the three age groups of children did not prefer the prosocial agent over the antisocial agent, and were not more likely to imitate the prosocial agent. The lack of differences might be explained by methodological issues or by a lack of robustness of the effect.

Mapping the Specific Pathways to Early-Onset Mental Health Disorders: The "Watch Me Grow for REAL" Study Protocol

BACKGROUND

From birth, the human propensity to selectively attend and respond to critical super-stimuli forms the basis of future socio-emotional development and health. In particular, the first super-stimuli to preferentially engage and elicit responses in the healthy newborn are the physical touch, voice and face/eyes of caregivers. From this grows selective attention and responsiveness to emotional expression, scaffolding the development of empathy, social cognition, and other higher human capacities. In this paper, the protocol for a longitudinal, prospective birth-cohort study is presented. The major aim of this study is to map the emergence of individual differences and disturbances in the system of social-Responsiveness, Emotional Attention, and Learning (REAL) through the first 3 years of life to predict the specific emergence of the major childhood mental health problems, as well as social adjustment and impairment more generally. A further aim of this study is to examine how the REAL variables interact with the quality of environment/caregiver interactions.

METHODS/DESIGN

A prospective, longitudinal birth-cohort study will be conducted. Data will be collected from four assessments and mothers' electronic medical records.

DISCUSSION

This study will be the first to test a clear developmental map of both the unique and specific causes of childhood psychopathology and will identify more precise early intervention targets for children with complex comorbid conditions.

Do 15-month-old infants prefer helpers? A replication of Hamlin et al. (2007)

Hamlin et al. found in 2007 that preverbal infants displayed a preference for helpers over hinderers. The robustness of this finding and the conditions under which infant sociomoral evaluation can be elicited has since been debated. Here, we conducted a replication of the original study, in which we tested 14- to 16-month-olds using a familiarization procedure with three-dimensional animated video stimuli. Unlike previous replication attempts, ours uniquely benefited from detailed procedural advice by Hamlin. In contrast with the original results, only 16 out of 32 infants (50%) in our study reached for the helper; thus, we were not able to replicate the findings. A possible reason for this failure is that infants' preference for prosocial agents may not be reliably elicited with the procedure and stimuli adopted. Alternatively, the effect size of infants' preference may be smaller than originally estimated. The study addresses ongoing methodological debates on the replicability of influential findings in infant cognition.

Use of Repeated Within-Subject Measures to Assess Infants' Preference for Similar Others

Research employing single-choice paradigms in which an infant is asked to make a single choice between two puppets suggest that infants show a preference for prosocial others and those who are similar to themselves. However, the extent to which infants’ preference for similar others is stable is unknown, as are other factors within the paradigm that may influence infants’ choices. The purpose of this study (two experiments, N = 44 infants, aged 8–15 months) was to replicate and extend previous work by including (1) within-subject repeated measures and (2) an experimental manipulation of a plausible demand characteristic. Results for the first-choice trial indicated a majority of the infants did not choose the similar puppet. Results from the within-subject repeated trials also indicated that a majority of the infants did not choose the similar puppet but a majority did choose a puppet from the same side. The experimental manipulation of the demand characteristic showed no effect on infant puppet choices. These results suggest that a closer examination of the single-choice puppet paradigm for assessing infants’ social evaluation is warranted. These findings also support recommendations made by others, including publishing null findings, standardizing data collection and reporting methods, and examining individual differences by employing within-subject designs with repeated measures.

Do Dogs Prefer Helpers in an Infant-Based Social Evaluation Task?

Social evaluative abilities emerge in human infancy, highlighting their importance in shaping our species' early understanding of the social world. Remarkably, infants show social evaluation in relatively abstract contexts: for instance, preferring a wooden shape that helps another shape in a puppet show over a shape that hinders another character (Hamlin et al., 2007). Here we ask whether these abstract social evaluative abilities are shared with other species. Domestic dogs provide an ideal animal species in which to address this question because this species cooperates extensively with conspecifics and humans and may thus benefit from a more general ability to socially evaluate prospective partners. We tested dogs on a social evaluation puppet show task originally used with human infants. Subjects watched a helpful shape aid an agent in achieving its goal and a hinderer shape prevent an agent from achieving its goal. We examined (1) whether dogs showed a preference for the helpful or hinderer shape, (2) whether dogs exhibited longer exploration of the helpful or hinderer shape, and (3) whether dogs were more likely to engage with their handlers during the helper or hinderer events. In contrast to human infants, dogs showed no preference for either the helper or the hinderer, nor were they more likely to engage with their handlers during helper or hinderer events. Dogs did spend more time exploring the hindering shape, perhaps indicating that they were puzzled by the agent's unhelpful behavior. However, this preference was moderated by a preference for one of the two shapes, regardless of role. These findings suggest that, relative to infants, dogs show weak or absent social evaluative abilities when presented with abstract events and point to constraints on dogs' abilities to evaluate others' behavior.

Children’s Judgments of Epistemic and Moral Agents: From Situations to Intentions

Children’s evaluations of moral and epistemic agents crucially depend on their discerning that an agent’s actions were performed intentionally. Here we argue that children’s epistemic and moral judgments reveal practices of forgiveness and blame, trust and mistrust, and objection or disapproval and that such practices are supported by children’s monitoring of the situational constraints on agents. Inherent in such practices is the understanding that agents are responsible for actions performed under certain conditions but not others. We discuss a range of situational constraints on children’s early epistemic and moral evaluations and clarify how these situational constraints serve to support children’s identification of intentional actions. By monitoring the situation, children distinguish intentional from less intentional action and selectively hold epistemic and moral agents accountable. We argue that these findings inform psychological and philosophical theorizing about attributions of moral and epistemic agency and responsibility.

The Development of Anthropomorphism in Interaction: Intersubjectivity, Imagination, and Theory of Mind

Human beings frequently attribute anthropomorphic features, motivations and behaviors to animals, artifacts, and natural phenomena. Historically, many interpretations of this attitude have been provided within different disciplines. What most interpretations have in common is distinguishing children’s manifestations of this attitude, which are considered “natural,” from adults’ occurrences, which must be explained by resorting to particular circumstances. In this article, I argue that anthropomorphism is not grounded in specific belief systems but rather in interaction. In interaction, a non-human entity assumes a place that generally is attributed to a human interlocutor, which means that it is independent of the beliefs that people may have about the nature and features of the entities that are anthropomorphized. This perspective allows us to explain the problems that emerge if we consider anthropomorphism as a belief: (i) adults under certain circumstances may anthropomorphize entities even if they perfectly know that these entities have no mental life; (ii) according to the situation, the same entity may be anthropomorphized or treated as an object; (iii) there is no consistency among the entities that are anthropomorphized; (iv) there is individual variability in anthropomorphization, and this variability derives from affective states rather than from different degrees of knowledge about the entity that is anthropomorphized or greater or lesser naivety of the person who anthropomorphizes. From this perspective, anthropomorphism is a basic human attitude that begins in infants and persists throughout life. The difference between adults and children is not qualitative but rather a matter of complexity.

The ontogeny of intent-based normative judgments

When evaluating norm transgressions, children begin to show some sensitivity to the agent's intentionality around preschool age. However, the specific developmental trajectories of different forms of such intent-based judgments and their cognitive underpinnings are still largely unclear. The current studies, therefore, systematically investigated the development of intent-based normative judgments as a function of two crucial factors: (a) the type of the agent's mental state underlying a normative transgression, and (b) the type of norm transgressed (moral versus conventional). In Study 1, 5- and 7-year-old children as well as adults were presented with vignettes in which an agent transgressed either a moral or a conventional norm. Crucially, she did so either intentionally, accidentally (not intentionally at all) or unknowingly (intentionally, yet based on a false belief regarding the outcome). The results revealed two asymmetries in children's intent-based judgments. First, all age groups showed greater sensitivity to mental state information for moral compared to conventional transgressions. Second, children's (but not adults') normative judgments were more sensitive to the agent's intention than to her belief. Two subsequent studies investigated this asymmetry in children more closely and found evidence that it is based on performance factors: children are able in principle to take into account an agent's false belief in much the same way as her intentions, yet do not make belief-based judgments in many existing tasks (like that of Study 1) due to their inferential complexity. Taken together, these findings contribute to a more systematic understanding of the development of intent-based normative judgment.

Preschoolers Focus on Others' Intentions When Forming Sociomoral Judgments

Many studies suggest that preschoolers initially privilege outcome over intention in their moral judgments. The present findings reveal that, in contrast, even younger preschoolers can privilege intentions when evaluating characters who successfully or unsuccessfully help or hinder a third party in achieving its goal. Following a live-action puppet show originally created for infant populations, children made a forced-choice social judgment (which puppet was liked) and two forced-choice moral judgments (which puppet was nicer, which puppet should be punished), and were asked to explain their punishment allocations. In two experiments (N = 195), 3- and 4-year-olds evaluated characters with distinct intentions to help or to hinder who were associated with either positive or negative outcomes. Both ages judged characters with more positive intentions as nicer, and allocated punishment to characters with more negative intentions; neither of these tendencies depended on the outcomes the characters were associated with. Three-year-olds’ responses were somewhat less consistent than were 4-year-olds’, in that 3-year-olds’ judgments were disrupted by ambiguous harmful intent. Notably, children’s social judgments were less consistent than their moral judgments. In a third and final experiment (N = 100), children evaluated characters with the same intention but who were associated with different outcomes. Children showed inconsistent responding across age and outcome valence, but only 4-year-olds evaluating two characters with positive intentions reliably responded based on outcome. When providing informative responses in all three studies, children most frequently explained their punishment allocations by appealing to the puppet’s (attempted) hindering action or failure to help. These findings raise questions as to what underlies different patterns of response across studies in the literature, and suggests that observing live interactions may facilitate young children’s intention-based moral judgments.

Do infant sociomoral evaluation and action studies predict preschool social and behavioral adjustment?

Recent studies suggest that infants and toddlers evaluate others based on their prosocial and antisocial behaviors and engage in prosocial behaviors themselves. It is unknown to what extent infants' responses in such studies reveal stable individual differences in social and/or moral competence that persist throughout development. The current study (N = 63) demonstrates that infants' performance in sociomoral evaluation and action studies (mean age = 12 months) predicts social and behavioral adjustment at age 4 years. Specifically, a stronger preference for moral actions as an infant was associated with parent reports of fewer callous-unemotional traits, the domain most conceptually related to sociomoral evaluation and action, during preschool. Critically, preschool moral adjustment was uniquely associated with infants' sociomoral responding and not with other more general aspects of infant functioning. When 2 children with an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis were included in the sample, correlations between infant and preschool functioning were more widespread. Taken together, these results provide evidence for developmental continuity in the sociomoral domain and suggest that infants' early behavioral tendencies may be building blocks for subsequent sociomoral development.

Dogs' recognition of human selfish and generous attitudes requires little but critical experience with people

There is some dispute regarding the role of experience in the development of dogs´ socio-cognitive abilities in their interaction with people. We sought to provide new evidence to this debate by comparing dogs with contrasting levels of experience with humans, in a task involving the discrimination of human generous and selfish attitudes. To this end, we compared the performance of adult family dogs against that of adult shelter dogs and puppies living in people´s homes. In training trials, the generous experimenter (G) signaled the bowl with food and allowed the dog to eat, whereas the selfish experimenter (S) also signaled the baited bowl, but she/he ate the food before the dog could have access to it. Then, subjects were allowed to freely choose between G and S in the choice test. The main finding was that adult subjects (both family and shelter dogs) developed a preference for G over S, but puppies did not. We conclude that the quality and/or quantity of everyday-contact with people did not affect the discrimination of human attitudes in the present protocol, but the amount of experience with people (in years) did matter. Finally, we discuss the relative role of domestication and ontogeny in the development of dogs´ socio-cognitive abilities.

The early emergence of sociomoral evaluation: infants prefer prosocial others

Humans readily evaluate third-parties' prosocial and antisocial acts. Recent evidence reveals that this tendency emerges early in development-even preverbal infants selectively approach prosocial others and avoid antisocial ones. Rather than reflecting attraction toward or away from low-level characteristics of the displays or simple behavioral rules, infants are sensitive to characteristics of both the agents and recipients of prosocial and antisocial acts. Specifically, infants' preferences require that the recipients of positive and negative acts be social agents with clear unfulfilled goals, who have not previously harmed others. In addition, prosocial and antisocial agents must act intentionally, in the service of positive and negative goals. It is an open question whether these prosocial preferences reflect self-interested and/or moral concerns.

Revisiting Young Children's Understanding of the Psychological Causes of Behavior

In 1989, Miller and Aloise challenged the prevailing belief that preschoolers tend to explain others' behavior in terms of external events or a person's physical attributes and have little understanding of psychological causes. That review documented preschoolers' understanding of, and even preference for, psychological causes as part of an emerging renaissance in developmental social-cognitive research. The present, updated review (97 articles, participant ages 3 months to 6 years) suggests the emergence of a transformative new perspective in which social-cognition is balanced between social and cognitive aspects rather than tilted toward cognition. Recent research on infants' awareness of mental states, young children's understanding of social categories and their judgments of the trustworthiness of informants, and cultural context reveals various ways in which preschoolers' social-causal reasoning is social.

Stability of infants' preference for prosocial others: Implications for research based on single-choice paradigms

Some research suggests infants display a tendency to judge others’ prosocial behavior, and in particular, that infants show a strong preference for prosocial others. For example, data from one frequently cited and well-publicized study showed that, after watching a puppet show with three puppets, 74% of infants chose the puppet that “helped” rather than the puppet that “hindered” a third puppet from attaining its goal. The purpose of the current investigation was to replicate these methods and extend them by including a within-subject measure of infant puppet choice across repeated trials to assess the stability of infants’ choice. In the current study, 20 infants viewed a puppet show and chose between two puppets (i.e., helper or hinderer) immediately following the puppet show. Although results were similar to previously published work on the first-choice trial (65% of infants chose the helper puppet on the first trial), infants did not consistently choose the helper across trials; several infants demonstrated a side preference, with 9 infants almost exclusively choosing puppets presented on the right or left side. The current investigation addressed limitations of previous research by including a between-subjects (replication) as well as a within-subjects (extension) repeated measure of choice that allowed for the examination of the stability of the choice measure. Our results, particularly in light of other failed replications, raise questions regarding the robustness of infants’ preference for prosocial others and the reliability and validity of the single-choice paradigm.

Interpersonal harm aversion as a necessary foundation for morality: A developmental neuroscience perspective

Growing evidence from developmental psychology and social neuroscience emphasizes the importance of third-party harm aversion for constructing morality. A sensitivity to interpersonal harm emerges very early in ontogeny, as reflected in both the capacity for implicit social evaluation and an aversion for antisocial agents. Yet it does not necessarily entail avoidance toward inflicting pain to others. Later, an understanding that harmful actions cause suffering emerges, followed by an integration of rules that can depend on social contexts and cultures. These developmental findings build on a burgeoning literature, which suggests that the fundamental nature of moral and social cognition, including their motivational and hedonic value, lies in general computational processes such as attention, approach-avoidance, social valuation, and decision making rather than in fully distinct, dedicated neural regions for morality. Bridging the gap between cognition and behaviors and the requisite affective, motivational, and cognitive mechanisms, a developmental neuroscience approach enriches our understanding of the emergence of morality.

The development of moral sense and moral thinking

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

The review critically evaluates recent claims that infants have innate knowledge of morality and examines the sources of moral norms.

RECENT FINDINGS

Many studies show that toddlers readily help adults with daily tasks. A more contentious set of studies suggests that young infants prefer actors who help others to those who hinder them. Some researchers have interpreted these findings as indicating that morality is innately present in humans. Others look to alternative explanations in developmental systems theory.

SUMMARY

Explaining the emergence of morality as innate, or wholly socialized, is problematic; instead morality could emerge in a developmental system in which children's early capacities are shaped by interpersonal engagement. Children's improving ability to coordinate with others at a practical level is later transformed through language and reflective thought, as children gain the ability to talk about what was previously implicit in interaction. Throughout, parents and caregivers have many opportunities to foster children's moral development in daily interactions.

The Origin of Social Evaluation, Social Eavesdropping, Reputation Formation, Image Scoring or What You Will

Social evaluation is a mental process that leverages the preference toward prosocial partners (positivity bias) against the avoidance of antisocial individuals (negativity bias) in a cooperative context. The phenomenon is well-known in humans, and recently comparative investigations looked at the possible evolutionary origins. So far social evaluation has been investigated mainly in non-human and human primates and dogs, however, there are few data on the presence of negativity/positivity bias in client-cleaner reef fish interactions as well. Unfortunately, the comparative approach to social evaluation is hindered by conceptual and procedural differences in experimental studies. By reviewing current knowledge on social evaluation in different species, we aim to point out that the capacity for social evaluation is not restricted to humans alone; however, its building blocks (negativity and positivity bias) may be more widespread separately. Due to its importance in survival, negativity bias likely to be widespread among animals; however, there has been less intensive selective pressure for the identification of prosocial companions, thus the latter ability may have emerged only in certain social species. We present a general framework and argue that negativity and positivity bias evolve independently and can be considered as social evaluation only if a unified behavior and cognitive system deals with both biases in concert.

Probing the Strength of Infants' Preference for Helpers over Hinderers: Two Replication Attempts of Hamlin and Wynn (2011)

Several studies indicate that infants prefer individuals who act prosocially over those who act antisocially toward unrelated third parties. In the present study, we focused on a paradigm published by Kiley Hamlin and Karen Wynn in 2011. In this study, infants were habituated to a live puppet show in which a protagonist tried to open a box to retrieve a toy placed inside. The protagonist was either helped by a second puppet (the “Helper”), or hindered by a third puppet (the “Hinderer”). At test, infants were presented with the Helper and the Hinderer, and encouraged to reach for one of them. In the original study, 75% of 9-month-olds selected the Helper, arguably demonstrating a preference for prosocial over antisocial individuals. We conducted two studies with the aim of replicating this result. Each attempt was performed by a different group of experimenters. Study 1 followed the methods of the published study as faithfully as possible. Study 2 introduced slight modifications to the stimuli and the procedure following the guidelines generously provided by Kiley Hamlin and her collaborators. Yet, in our replication attempts, 9-month-olds’ preference for helpers over hinderers did not differ significantly from chance (62.5% and 50%, respectively, in Studies 1 and 2). Two types of factors could explain why our results differed from those of Hamlin and Wynn: minor methodological dissimilarities (in procedure, materials, or the population tested), or the effect size being smaller than originally assumed. We conclude that fine methodological details that are crucial to infants’ success in this task need to be identified to ensure the replicability of the original result.