What is the subjective cost of cognitive effort? Load, trait, and aging effects revealed by economic preference

Context effects in cognitive effort evaluation

When given a choice, people will avoid cognitively effortful courses of action because the experience of effort is evaluated as aversive and costly. At the same time, a body of work spanning psychology, economics, and neuroscience suggests that goods, actions, and experiences are often evaluated in the context in which they are encountered, rather in absolute terms. To probe the extent to which the evaluation of cognitive effort is also context-dependent, we had participants learn associations between unique stimuli and subjective demand levels across low-demand and high-demand contexts. We probed demand preferences and subjective evaluation using a forced-choice paradigm as well by examining effort ratings, taken both on-line (during learning) and off-line (after choice). When choosing between two stimuli objectively identical in terms of demand, participants showed a clear preference for the stimulus learned in the low- versus high-demand context and rated this stimulus as more subjectively effortful than the low-demand context in on-line but not off-line ratings, suggesting an assimilation effect. Finally, we observed that the extent to which individual participants who exhibited stronger assimilation effects in off-line demand ratings were more likely to manifest an assimilation effect in demand preferences. Broadly, our findings suggest that effort evaluations occur in a context-dependent manner and are specifically assimilated to the broader context in which they occur.

Investigating an effort avoidance account of attentional strategy choice

People often choose suboptimal attentional control strategies during visual search. This has been at least partially attributed to the avoidance of the cognitive effort associated with the optimal strategy, but aspects of the task triggering such avoidance remain unclear. Here, we attempted to measure effort avoidance of an isolated task component to assess whether this component might drive suboptimal behavior. We adopted a modified version of the Adaptive Choice Visual Search (ACVS), a task designed to measure people's visual search strategies. To perform optimally, participants must make a numerosity judgment-estimating and comparing two color sets-before they can advantageously search through the less numerous of the two. If participants skip the numerosity judgment step, they can still perform accurately, albeit substantially more slowly. To study whether effort associated with performing the optional numerosity judgment could be an obstacle to optimal performance, we created a variant of the demand selection task to quantify the avoidance of numerosity judgment effort. Results revealed a robust avoidance of the numerosity judgment, offering a potential explanation for why individuals choose suboptimal strategies in the ACVS task. Nevertheless, we did not find a significant relationship between individual numerosity judgment avoidance and ACVS optimality, and we discussed potential reasons for this lack of an observed relationship. Altogether, our results showed that the effort avoidance for specific subcomponents of a visual search task can be probed and linked to overall strategy choices.

Risky effort

Decision-making involves weighing up the outcome likelihood, potential rewards, and effort needed. Previous research has focused on the trade-offs between risk and reward or between effort and reward. Here we bridge this gap and examine how risk in effort levels influences choice. We focus on how two key properties of choice influence risk preferences for effort: changes in magnitude and probability. Two experiments assessed people's risk attitudes for effort, and an additional experiment provided a control condition using monetary gambles. The extent to which people valued effort was related to their pattern of risk preferences. Unlike with monetary outcomes, however, there was substantial heterogeneity in effort-based risk preferences: People who responded to effort as costly exhibited a "flipped" interaction pattern of risk preferences. The direction of the pattern depended on whether people treated effort as a loss of resources. Most, but not all, people treat effort as a loss and are more willing to take risks to avoid potentially high levels of effort.

The Neurobiology of Cognitive Fatigue and Its Influence on Effort-Based Choice

Feelings of cognitive fatigue emerge through repeated mental exertion and are ubiquitous in our daily lives. However, there is a limited understanding of the neurobiological mechanisms underlying the influence of cognitive fatigue on decisions to exert. We use functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine brain activity while participants make choices to exert effort for reward, before and after bouts of fatiguing cognitive exertion. We found that when participants became cognitively fatigued, they were more likely to choose to forgo higher levels of reward that required more effort. We describe a mechanism by which signals related to cognitive exertion in dlPFC influence effort value computations, instantiated by the insula, thereby influencing an individual's decisions to exert while fatigued. Our results suggest that cognitive fatigue plays a critical role in decisions to exert effort and provides a mechanistic link through which information about cognitive state shapes effort-based choice.

Mind the instructions: Reward cues are liked first, wanted later

Current theories propose that mental effort is invested only when the anticipated benefits, such as rewards, outweigh the associated costs, like task difficulty. Yet, it remains unclear whether this motivational and mitigating aspect of reward processing is reflected in the evaluation of reward/difficulty cues as such, and to what extent it depends on task experience. In a pre-registered experiment (N = 84), we used the affect misattribution procedure (AMP) to gauge affective evaluations of nonword cues predicting reward and task difficulty levels. Contrary to previous studies, the AMP was administered at the outset, after cue instructions, and after the cues were used in a random dot motion (RDM) task. Compared to baseline, cues predicting a larger reward were evaluated more positively after RDM task experience, and most importantly, already after cue instructions, with no difference between the two phases. This evaluative effect manifested in increased performance after larger reward cues in the RDM task. Our results suggest that AMP effects may generally capture performance expectations which are independent of task experience. Importantly, these instructed expectations of reward and difficulty play a crucial role in the evaluation and subsequent investment of mental effort.

Short-Term Memory Capacity Predicts Willingness to Expend Cognitive Effort for Reward

We must often decide whether the effort required for a task is worth the reward. Past rodent work suggests that willingness to deploy cognitive effort can be driven by individual differences in perceived reward value, depression, or chronic stress. However, many factors driving cognitive effort deployment-such as short-term memory ability-cannot easily be captured in rodents. Furthermore, we do not fully understand how individual differences in short-term memory ability, depression, chronic stress, and reward anticipation impact cognitive effort deployment for reward. Here, we examined whether these factors predict cognitive effort deployment for higher reward in an online visual short-term memory task. Undergraduate participants were grouped into high and low effort groups (n HighEffort = 348, n LowEffort = 81; n Female = 332, n Male = 92, M Age = 20.37, Range Age = 16-42) based on decisions in this task. After completing a monetary incentive task to measure reward anticipation, participants completed short-term memory task trials where they could choose to encode either fewer (low effort/reward) or more (high effort/reward) squares before reporting whether or not the color of a target square matched the square previously in that location. We found that only greater short-term memory ability predicted whether participants chose a much higher proportion of high versus low effort trials. Drift diffusion modeling showed that high effort group participants were more biased than low effort group participants toward selecting high effort trials. Our findings highlight the role of individual differences in cognitive effort ability in explaining cognitive effort deployment choices.

The experience of effort in ADHD: a scoping review

Background

Mental effort plays a critical role in regulating cognition. However, the experience of mental effort may differ for individuals with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), a disorder for which sustained mental effort 'avoidance' or 'dislike' is a criterion in the DSM. We conducted a scoping review to characterize the literature on the experiences of effort in ADHD.

Methods

This systematic scoping review adhered to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses (PRISMA) Extension for Scoping Reviews and Joanna Briggs Methodology. PsycINFO (OVID), PsycINFO (ProQuest) and PubMed were searched for studies published in English before February 14, 2023. Studies must have included an ADHD population or a measure of ADHD symptomatology, in addition to a self-report measure of the experience of effort or the use of an effort preference paradigm. Two researchers reviewed all abstracts, and one researcher reviewed full-text articles.

Results

Only 12 studies met the inclusion criteria. Several gaps and inconsistencies in the research were identified in terms of method, definitions of effort, measurements of ADHD, and sample characteristics. Moreover, the pattern of results on the experience of effort was mixed.

Conclusion

Despite its diagnostic and conceptual significance, the experience of mental effort in ADHD is not well studied. Critical gaps were identified in the existing literature. A three-facet conceptualization of effort is proposed-specifically, task-elicited effort, volitionally exerted effort, and the affect associated with engaging in effort - to guide future explorations of the experience of effort in ADHD.

Cognitive offloading is value-based decision making: Modelling cognitive effort and the expected value of memory

How do people decide between maintaining information in short-term memory or offloading it to external reminders? How does this affect subsequent memory? This article presents a simple computational model based on two principles: A) items stored in brain-based memory occupy its limited capacity, generating an opportunity cost; B) reminders incur a small physical-action cost, but capacity is effectively unlimited. These costs are balanced against the value of remembering, which determines the optimal strategy. Simulations reproduce many empirical findings, including: 1) preferential offloading of high-value items; 2) increased offloading at higher memory loads; 3) offloading can cause forgetting of offloaded items ('Google effect') but 4) improved memory for other items ('saving-enhanced memory'); 5) reduced saving-enhanced-memory effect when reminders are unreliable; 6) influence of item-value: people may preferentially offload high-value items and store additional low-value items in brain-based memory; 7) greatest sensitivity to the effort of reminder-setting at intermediate rather than highest/lowest levels of task difficulty; 8) increased offloading in individuals with poorer memory ability. Therefore, value-based decision-making provides a simple unifying account of many cognitive offloading phenomena. These results are consistent with an opportunity-cost model of cognitive effort, which can explain why internal memory feels effortful but reminders do not.

Approaching lifelong learning: An integrated framework for explaining decision-making processes in personal and professional development

BACKGROUND

Individual differences in commitment to lifelong learning, a process aimed at seizing opportunities for self-development, have not been extensively studied.

OBJECTIVE

Our aim is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the decision-making mechanisms involved in pursuing learning for self-development.

METHOD

We conducted a literature review on the taxing nature of cognitive exertion and its impact on the inclination to engage in cognitively demanding tasks for learning, as well as individual differences in sensitivity to aversive or rewarding outcomes inherent in the learning process.

RESULTS

Our findings indicate that the Expected Value of Control (EVC) theory can elucidate the former, while research on approach-avoidance motivation can shed light on the latter.

CONCLUSION

We propose and develop an integrated framework that incorporates both lines of research. This framework holds relevance for neuropsychology, experimental psychology, and education psychology, offering theoretical guidance for tailoring learning experiences to enhance engagement and commitment to self-development.

Aberrant effort-based reward dynamics in anhedonia

Anhedonia is a transdiagnostic symptom and associated with a spectrum of reward deficits among which the motivational dysfunction is poorly understood. Previous studies have established the abnormal cost-benefit trade-off as a contributor to motivational deficits in anhedonia and its relevant psychiatric diseases. However, it remains elusive how the anhedonic neural dynamics underlying reward processing are modulated by effort expenditure. Using an effort-based monetary incentive delay task, the current event-related potential study examined the neural dynamics underlying the effort-reward interplay in anhedonia using a nonclinical sample who scored high or low on an anhedonia questionnaire. We found that effort prospectively decreased reward effect on the contingent variation negativity and the target-P3 but retrospectively enhanced outcome effect on the feedback-P3 following effort expenditure. Compared to the low-anhedonia group, the high-anhedonia group displayed a diminished effort effect on the target-P3 during effort expenditure and an increased effort-enhancement effect for neutral trials during the feedback-P3 period following effort expenditure. Our findings suggest that anhedonia is associated with an inefficient control and motivation allocation along the efforted-based reward dynamics from effort preparation to effort production.

The roles of intrinsic motivation and capability-related factors in cognitive effort-based decision-making

Individual differences in cognitive effort-based decision-making can be used to reveal human motivations to invest effort into a given task. Preferences among options that differ by dimensions related to demand levels (i.e., the interaction of task characteristics and performance measures) are also heavily influenced by how likely a person can succeed at a given option. However, most existing cognitive effort-based research has focused primarily on demand-related factors, leading to confounding inferences about the motivation behind these choices. This study used an adaptive algorithm to adjust relative demand levels for three cognitive tasks to investigate general and individual differences in demand preferences. The results highlight an overall pattern of individual differences in intrinsic motivation to perform challenging tasks, supporting research that found cognitive effort aversive to some but attractive to others. These results suggest that relative demand levels and intrinsic task factors drive the motivation to select an action.

Insight into differing decision-making strategies that underlie cognitively effort-based decision making using computational modeling in rats

RATIONALE

The rat cognitive effort task (rCET), a rodent model of cognitive rather than physical effort, requires animals to choose between an easy or hard visuospatial discrimination, with a correct hard choice more highly rewarded. Like in humans, there is stable individual variation in choice behavior. In previous reports, animals were divided into two groups-workers and slackers-based on their mean preference for the harder option. Although these groups differed in their response to pharmacological challenges, the rationale for using this criterion for grouping was not robust.

METHODS

We collated experimental data from multiple cohorts of male and female rats performing the rCET and used a model-based framework combining drift diffusion modeling with cluster analysis to identify the decision-making processes underlying variation in choice behavior.

RESULTS

We verified that workers and slackers are statistically different groups but also found distinct intra-group profiles. These subgroups exhibited dissociable performance during the attentional phase, linked to distinct decision-making profiles during choice. Reanalysis of previous pharmacology data using this model-based framework showed that serotonergic drug effects were explained by changes in decision boundaries and non-decision times, while scopolamine's effects were driven by changes in decision starting points and rates of evidence accumulation.

CONCLUSIONS

Modeling revealed the decision-making processes that are associated with cognitive effort costs, and how these differ across individuals. Reanalysis of drug data provided insight into the mechanisms through which different neurotransmitter systems impact cognitively effortful attention and decision-making processes, with relevance to multiple psychiatric disorders.

An experimental manipulation of the value of effort

People who take on challenges and persevere longer are more likely to succeed in life. But individuals often avoid exerting effort, and there is limited experimental research investigating whether we can learn to value effort. We developed a paradigm to test the hypothesis that people can learn to value effort and will seek effortful challenges if directly incentivized to do so. We also dissociate the effects of rewarding people for choosing effortful challenges and performing well. The results provide limited evidence that rewarding effort increased people's willingness to choose harder tasks when rewards were no longer offered (near transfer). There was also mixed evidence that rewarding effort increased willingness to choose harder tasks in another unrelated and unrewarded task (far transfer). These heterogeneous results highlight the need for further research to understand when this paradigm may be the most effective for increasing and generalizing the value of effort.

Control adjustment costs limit goal flexibility: Empirical evidence and a computational account

A cornerstone of human intelligence is the ability to flexibly adjust our cognition and behavior as our goals change. For instance, achieving some goals requires efficiency, while others require caution. Adapting to these changing goals require corresponding adjustments in cognitive control (e.g., levels of attention, response thresholds). However, adjusting our control to meet new goals comes at a cost: we are better at achieving a goal in isolation than when transitioning between goals. The source of these control adjustment costs remains poorly understood, and the bulk of our understanding of such costs comes from settings in which participants transition between discrete task sets, rather than performance goals. Across four experiments, we show that adjustments in continuous control states incur a performance cost, and that a dynamical systems model can explain the source of these costs. Participants performed a single cognitively demanding task under varying performance goals (e.g., to be fast or to be accurate). We modeled control allocation to include a dynamic process of adjusting from one's current control state to a target state for a given performance goal. By incorporating inertia into this adjustment process, our model accounts for our empirical findings that people under-shoot their target control state more (i.e., exhibit larger adjustment costs) when (a) goals switch rather than remain fixed over a block (Study 1); (b) target control states are more distant from one another (Study 2); (c) less time is given to adjust to the new goal (Study 3); and (d) when anticipating having to switch goals more frequently (Study 4). Our findings characterize the costs of adjusting control to meet changing goals, and show that these costs can emerge directly from cognitive control dynamics. In so doing, they shed new light on the sources of and constraints on flexibility in human goal-directed behavior.

Wagers for work: Decomposing the costs of cognitive effort

Some aspects of cognition are more taxing than others. Accordingly, many people will avoid cognitively demanding tasks in favor of simpler alternatives. Which components of these tasks are costly, and how much, remains unknown. Here, we use a novel task design in which subjects request wages for completing cognitive tasks and a computational modeling procedure that decomposes their wages into the costs driving them. Using working memory as a test case, our approach revealed that gating new information into memory and protecting against interference are costly. Critically, other factors, like memory load, appeared less costly. Other key factors which may drive effort costs, such as error avoidance, had minimal influence on wage requests. Our approach is sensitive to individual differences, and could be used in psychiatric populations to understand the true underlying nature of apparent cognitive deficits.

Task performance errors and rewards affect voluntary task choices

Humans are remarkably flexible in adapting their behavior to current demands. It has been suggested that the decision which of multiple tasks to perform is based on a variety of factors pertaining to the rewards associated with each task as well as task performance (e.g., error rates associated with each task and/or error commission on the previous trial). However, further empirical investigation is needed to examine whether task performance still influences task choices if task choices are rewarded but task performance is not. Accordingly, we exposed participants to a novel reward-varying voluntary task switching paradigm where the reward for the performed task gradually decreased while the reward associated for the alternative task was unchanged. Importantly, we rewarded participants' task choices before participants performed the task to investigate the effect of rewards independent from task performance. We examined the effect of (i) reward, (ii) error rates associated with each of the two tasks, and (iii) error commission in the previous trial on voluntary task choices. As expected, we found that participants' task selection was influenced by reward differences between task choices. In addition, error rates associated with a task also influenced task selection, with participants requiring larger reward differences to switch to a task associated with relatively higher error rates, compared to switching to a task with relatively lower error rates. However, errors in n - 1 did not influence participants' probability to switch to the alternative task. These findings contribute to an ongoing discussion on the influence of task performance on task selection.

Active reinforcement learning versus action bias and hysteresis: control with a mixture of experts and nonexperts

Active reinforcement learning enables dynamic prediction and control, where one should not only maximize rewards but also minimize costs such as of inference, decisions, actions, and time. For an embodied agent such as a human, decisions are also shaped by physical aspects of actions. Beyond the effects of reward outcomes on learning processes, to what extent can modeling of behavior in a reinforcement-learning task be complicated by other sources of variance in sequential action choices? What of the effects of action bias (for actions per se) and action hysteresis determined by the history of actions chosen previously? The present study addressed these questions with incremental assembly of models for the sequential choice data from a task with hierarchical structure for additional complexity in learning. With systematic comparison and falsification of computational models, human choices were tested for signatures of parallel modules representing not only an enhanced form of generalized reinforcement learning but also action bias and hysteresis. We found evidence for substantial differences in bias and hysteresis across participants-even comparable in magnitude to the individual differences in learning. Individuals who did not learn well revealed the greatest biases, but those who did learn accurately were also significantly biased. The direction of hysteresis varied among individuals as repetition or, more commonly, alternation biases persisting from multiple previous actions. Considering that these actions were button presses with trivial motor demands, the idiosyncratic forces biasing sequences of action choices were robust enough to suggest ubiquity across individuals and across tasks requiring various actions. In light of how bias and hysteresis function as a heuristic for efficient control that adapts to uncertainty or low motivation by minimizing the cost of effort, these phenomena broaden the consilient theory of a mixture of experts to encompass a mixture of expert and nonexpert controllers of behavior.

Effort discounts reward-based control allocation: A neurodynamic perspective

The amount of cognitive and neural resources allocated to a task is largely determined by the reward we can expect. However, it remains under-appreciated how this reward-expectation-based control allocation is modulated by effort expenditure. The present event-related potential study investigated this issue through the lens of neural dynamics. Thirty-four participants completed an effort-based monetary incentive delay task while their EEG was recorded. Effort demand was manipulated by adding no (low effort) or much (high effort) noise to the target. Behaviorally, participants exhibited reward-related speeding regardless of effort expenditure, as revealed by faster RTs for reward than neutral trials. Our ERP results demonstrated a widespread facilitatory influence of reward expectation on neural dynamics extending from cue evaluation as indexed by the cue-P3, to control preparation as indexed by the contingent negative variation (CNV), and finally to control engagement as indexed by the target-P3. Critically, the neural facilitation was discounted by effort expenditure during both the control-preparation and control-engagement stages instead of the cue-evaluation stage. Overall, this study provides neurodynamic evidence that control allocation is determined by reward and effort via a cost-benefit analysis.

Does stress induction affect cognitive performance or avoidance of cognitive effort?

Previous research has shown that acute psychosocial stress impairs cognitive abilities, but recent studies suggest that this may be due to a decrease in willingness to engage in cognitive effort rather than a direct effect on performance. The aim of the present study was to replicate this last research and verify the influence of acute stress on avoidance of cognitive effort and cognitive performance. Fifty young, healthy individuals (26 females, 24 males) aged between 18 and 40 years were randomly assigned to two groups: a stress condition and a control condition. We used a Demand Selection Task paradigm (DST), in which participants chose between performing tasks that required either high or low cognitive effort. Stress was induced through the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) and measured with both subjective and psychophysiological measurements. The results indicated that acute stress significantly increased participants' preference for less demanding behaviors, while no significant alterations in cognitive performance in task change activities were found. This study offers new perspectives on how stress affects behavior and decision-making in everyday life.

A Nomothetic Span Approach to the Construct Validation of Sustained Attention Consistency: Re-Analyzing Two Latent-Variable Studies of Performance Variability and Mind-Wandering Self-Reports

The ability to sustain attention consistency is frequently assessed using either objective behavioral measures, such as reaction time (RT) variability, or subjective self-report measures, such as rates of task-unrelated thought (TUT). The current studies examined whether the individual-difference covariation in these measures provides a more construct valid assessment of attention consistency than does either alone. We argue that performance and self-report measures mutually validate each other; each measurement approach has its own sources of error, so their shared variance should best reflect the attention consistency construct. We reanalyzed two latent-variable studies where RT variability and TUTs were measured in multiple tasks (Kane et al. in J Exp Psychol Gen 145:1017-1048, 2016; Unsworth et al. in J Exp Psychol Gen 150:1303-1331, 2021), along with several nomological network constructs to test the convergent and discriminant validity of a general attention consistency factor. Confirmatory factor analyses assessing bifactor (preregistered) and hierarchical (non-preregistered) models suggested that attention consistency can be modeled as the shared variance among objective and subjective measures. This attention consistency factor was related to working memory capacity, attention (interference) control, processing speed, state motivation and alertness, and self-reported cognitive failures and positive schizotypy. Although bifactor models of general attention consistency provide the most compelling construct validity evidence for a specific ability to sustain attention, multiverse analyses of outlier decisions suggested they are less robust than hierarchical models. The results provide evidence for the general ability to sustain attention consistency and suggestions for improving its measurement.

Effort Foraging Task reveals positive correlation between individual differences in the cost of cognitive and physical effort in humans

Effort-based decisions, in which people weigh potential future rewards against effort costs required to achieve those rewards involve both cognitive and physical effort, though the mechanistic relationship between them is not yet understood. Here, we use an individual differences approach to isolate and measure the computational processes underlying effort-based decisions and test the association between cognitive and physical domains. Patch foraging is an ecologically valid reward rate maximization problem with well-developed theoretical tools. We developed the Effort Foraging Task, which embedded cognitive or physical effort into patch foraging, to quantify the cost of both cognitive and physical effort indirectly, by their effects on foraging choices. Participants chose between harvesting a depleting patch, or traveling to a new patch that was costly in time and effort. Participants' exit thresholds (reflecting the reward they expected to receive by harvesting when they chose to travel to a new patch) were sensitive to cognitive and physical effort demands, allowing us to quantify the perceived effort cost in monetary terms. The indirect sequential choice style revealed effort-seeking behavior in a minority of participants (preferring high over low effort) that has apparently been missed by many previous approaches. Individual differences in cognitive and physical effort costs were positively correlated, suggesting that these are perceived and processed in common. We used canonical correlation analysis to probe the relationship of task measures to self-reported affect and motivation, and found correlations of cognitive effort with anxiety, cognitive function, behavioral activation, and self-efficacy, but no similar correlations with physical effort.

Dissociable neural after-effects of cognitive and physical effort expenditure during reward evaluation

The reward after-effect of effort expenditure refers to the phenomenon that previous effort investment changes the subjective value of rewards when obtained. However, the neural mechanisms underlying the after-effects of effort exertion are still not fully understood. We investigated the modulation of reward after-effects by effort type (cognitive vs. physical) through the lens of neural dynamics. Thirty-two participants performed a physically or cognitively demanding task during an effort phase and then played a simple gambling game during a subsequent reward phase to earn monetary rewards while their electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. We found that previous effort expenditure decreased electrocortical activity during feedback evaluation. Importantly, this effort effect occurred in a domain-general manner during the early stage (as indexed by the reward positivity) but in a domain-specific manner during the later and more elaborative stage (as indexed by the P3 and delta oscillation) of reward evaluation. Additionally, effort expenditure enhanced P3 sensitivity to feedback valence regardless of effort type. Our findings suggest that cognitive and physical effort, although bearing some surface resemblance to each other, may have dissociable neural influences on the reward after-effects.

Effects of current and past depressive episodes on behavioral performance and subjective experience during an N-back task

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Depression impairs working memory (WM). And, while many studies have documented impairment in WM during depression remission, those using the N-back task did not find differences between individuals with remitted depression and healthy controls. One reason for these findings may be that certain depression phenotypes, such as the childhood-onset form, which is likely to be associated with persistent WM problems, are underrepresented or unevenly represented in the studies. Because childhood-onset depression (COD) affects individuals while cognitive development is still ongoing, it is more likely to have lasting detrimental effects, as evidenced in residual memory impairment, than depression that onsets later in life. Further, it is unclear if depression episodes have cumulative effects on WM when measured via the N-back.

METHODS

We examined the effects of depression on WM performance (response time, accuracy, signal detection d') and subjective experience (difficulty, mental effort required) during a four-level N-back task among 112 adults with COD (42 currently depressed; 70 remitted depressed) and 80 never-depressed controls.

RESULTS

Compared to never-depressed controls, there was minimal evidence of impaired WM performance among participants with remitted or current depression; the groups also reported overall similar subjective experiences during the N-back. Notably, number of lifetime depressive episodes had a detrimental cumulative effect on response accuracy and d'.

LIMITATIONS

WM was assessed only in regard to verbal memory. The sample size of currently depressed cases was smaller than that of the other groups.

CONCLUSIONS

WM remains largely intact among adults with remitted COD, but increased number of depression episodes worsens WM performance.

Policy abstraction as a predictor of cognitive effort avoidance

Consistent evidence has established that people avoid cognitively effortful tasks. However, the features that make a task cognitively effortful are still not well understood. Multiple hypotheses have been proposed regarding which task demands underlie cognitive effort costs, such as time-on-task, error likelihood, and the general engagement of cognitive control. In this study, we test the novel hypothesis that tasks requiring behavior according to higher degrees of policy abstraction are experienced as more effortful. Accordingly, policy abstraction, operationalized as the levels of contextual contingency required by task rules, drives task avoidance over and above the effects of task performance, such as time-on-task or error likelihood. To test this hypothesis, we combined two previously established cognitive control tasks that parametrically manipulated policy abstraction with the demand selection task procedure. The design of these tasks allowed us to test whether people avoided tasks with higher order policy abstraction while controlling for the contribution of factors such as time-on-task and expected error rate (ER). Consistent with our hypothesis, we observed that policy abstraction was the strongest predictor of cognitive effort choices, followed by ER. This was evident across both studies and in a within-subject cross-study analysis. These results establish at least one task feature independent of performance, which is predictive of task avoidance behavior. We interpret these results within an opportunity cost framework for understanding aversive experiences of cognitive effort while performing a task. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Heads of Worry, Hearts of Joy: Daily Diary Investigations of Self-Location and Well-Being

When people are asked to locate the self, they frequently choose the head and heart regions of the body. These bodily regions, in turn, are linked to an extensive set of metaphors, including those that conceptualize the heart as the locus of authenticity, love, and passion. Based on such considerations as well as frameworks within the self and well-being literatures, four samples of participants in three studies (total N = 527) were asked whether, on particular days, they perceived themselves to be located in their head regions of their bodies or their heart regions. When the self was perceived to be in the heart to a greater extent, participants reported higher levels of affective and eudaimonic well-being, as mediated by processes related to reward perception (Study 1), savoring (Study 2), and social activity (Study 3). In terms of daily experiences, the heart-located self is a happier self.

Need for cognition moderates the relief of avoiding cognitive effort

When making decisions, humans aim to maximize rewards while minimizing costs. The exertion of mental or physical effort has been proposed to be one those costs, translating into avoidance of behaviors carrying effort demands. This motivational framework also predicts that people should experience positive affect when anticipating demand that is subsequently avoided (i.e., a "relief effect"), but evidence for this prediction is scarce. Here, we follow up on a previous study [1] that provided some initial evidence that people more positively evaluated outcomes if it meant they could avoid performing an additional demanding task. However, the results from this study did not provide conclusive evidence that this effect was driven by effort avoidance. Here, we report two experiments that are able to do this. Participants performed a gambling task, and if they did not receive reward they would have to perform an orthogonal effort task. Prior to the gamble, a cue indicated whether this effort task would be easy or hard. We probed hedonic responses to the reward-related feedback, as well as after the subsequent effort task feedback. Participants reported lower hedonic responses for no-reward outcomes when high vs. low effort was anticipated (and later exerted). They also reported higher hedonic responses for reward outcomes when high vs. low effort was anticipated (and avoided). Importantly, this relief effect was smaller in participants with high need for cognition. These results suggest that avoidance of high effort tasks is rewarding, but that the size off this effect depends on the individual disposition to engage with and expend cognitive effort. They also raise the important question of whether this disposition alters the cost of effort per se, or rather offset this cost during cost-benefit analyses.

Need for Cognition is associated with a preference for higher task load in effort discounting

When individuals set goals, they consider the subjective value (SV) of the anticipated reward and the required effort, a trade-off that is of great interest to psychological research. One approach to quantify the SVs of levels of difficulty of a cognitive task is the Cognitive Effort Discounting Paradigm by Westbrook and colleagues (2013). However, it fails to acknowledge the highly individual nature of effort, as it assumes a unidirectional, inverse relationship between task load and SVs. Therefore, it cannot map differences in effort perception that arise from traits like Need for Cognition, since individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive activities likely do not prefer the easiest level. We replicated the analysis of Westbrook and colleagues with an adapted version, the Cognitive and Affective Discounting (CAD) Paradigm. It quantifies SVs without assuming that the easiest level is preferred, thereby enabling the assessment of SVs for tasks without objective order of task load. Results show that many of the 116 participants preferred a more or the most difficult level. Variance in SVs was best explained by a declining logistic contrast of the [Formula: see text]-back levels and by the accuracy of responses, while reaction time as a predictor was highly volatile depending on the preprocessing pipeline. Participants with higher Need for Cognition scores perceived higher [Formula: see text]-back levels as less effortful and found them less aversive. Effects of Need for Cognition on SVs in lower levels did not reach significance, as group differences only emerged in higher levels. The CAD Paradigm appears to be well suited for assessing and analysing task preferences independent of the supposed objective task difficulty.Protocol registrationThe stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on August 19, 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/CPXTH .

The role of defeatist performance beliefs on cognitive effort-cost decision-making in schizophrenia

Impairments in effort-cost decision-making have been consistently observed in people with schizophrenia (SZ) and may be an important mechanism of negative symptoms. However, the processes that give rise to impairments in effort-cost decision-making are unclear, leading to limited progress in identifying the most relevant treatment targets. Drawing from cognitive models of negative symptoms and goal-directed behavior, this study aimed to examine how and under what type of task conditions defeatist performance beliefs contribute to these decision-making processes. Outpatients with SZ (n = 30) and healthy controls (CN; n = 28) completed a cognitive effort allocation task, the Cognitive Effort-Discounting (COGED) task, which assesses participants' willingness to exert cognitive effort for monetary rewards based on parametrically varied working memory demands (completing N-back levels). Results showed that although participants with SZ demonstrated reduced willingness to work for rewards across N-back levels compared to CN participants, they showed less choice modulation across different N-back conditions. However, among SZ participants with greater defeatist performance beliefs, there was a reduced willingness to choose the high effort option at higher N-back levels (N-back levels 3, 4, and 5 versus 2-back). Results suggest that compared to CN, the SZ group's subjective willingness to expend effort largely did not dynamically adjust as cognitive load increased. However, defeatist beliefs may undermine willingness to expend cognitive effort, especially when cognitive task demands are high. These beliefs may be a viable treatment target to improve effort-cost decision-making impairments in people with SZ.

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex represents subjective value across effort-based and risky decision-making

Decisions that require taking effort costs into account are ubiquitous in real life. The neural common currency theory hypothesizes that a particular neural network integrates different costs (e.g., risk) and rewards into a common scale to facilitate value comparison. Although there has been a surge of interest in the computational and neural basis of effort-related value integration, it is still under debate if effort-based decision-making relies on a domain-general valuation network as implicated in the neural common currency theory. Therefore, we comprehensively compared effort-based and risky decision-making using a combination of computational modeling, univariate and multivariate fMRI analyses, and data from two independent studies. We found that effort-based decision-making can be best described by a power discounting model that accounts for both the discounting rate and effort sensitivity. At the neural level, multivariate decoding analyses indicated that the neural patterns of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) represented subjective value across different decision-making tasks including either effort or risk costs, although univariate signals were more diverse. These findings suggest that multivariate dmPFC patterns play a critical role in computing subjective value in a task-independent manner and thus extend the scope of the neural common currency theory.

Cognitive effort investment: Does disposition become action?

Contrary to the law of less work, individuals with high levels of need for cognition and self-control tend to choose harder tasks more often. While both traits can be integrated into a core construct of dispositional cognitive effort investment, its relation to actual cognitive effort investment remains unclear. As individuals with high levels of cognitive effort investment are characterized by a high intrinsic motivation towards effortful cognition, they would be less likely to increase their effort based on expected payoff, but rather based on increasing demand. In the present study, we measured actual effort investment on multiple dimensions, i.e., subjective load, reaction time, accuracy, early and late frontal midline theta power, N2 and P3 amplitude, and pupil dilation. In a sample of N = 148 participants, we examined the relationship of dispositional cognitive effort investment and effort indices during a flanker and an n-back task with varying demand and payoff. Exploratorily, we examined this relationship for the two subdimensions cognitive motivation and effortful-self-control as well. In both tasks, effort indices were sensitive to demand and partly to payoff. The analyses revealed a main effect of cognitive effort investment for accuracy (n-back task), interaction effects with payoff for reaction time (n-back and flanker task) and P3 amplitude (n-back task) and demand for early frontal midline theta power (flanker task). Taken together, our results partly support the notion that individuals with high levels of cognitive effort investment exert effort more efficiently. Moreover, the notion that these individuals exert effort regardless of payoff is partly supported, too. This may further our understanding of the conditions under which person-situation interactions occur, i.e. the conditions under which situations determine effort investment in goal-directed behavior more than personality, and vice versa.

Is it cognitive effort you measure? Comparing three task paradigms to the Need for Cognition scale

Measuring individual differences in cognitive effort can be elusive as effort is a function of motivation and ability. We report six studies (N = 663) investigating the relationship of Need for Cognition and working memory capacity with three cognitive effort measures: demand avoidance in the Demand Selection Task, effort discounting measured as the indifference point in the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm, and rational reasoning score with items from the heuristic and bias literature. We measured perceived mental effort with the NASA task load index. The three tasks were not correlated with each other (all r's < .1, all p's > .1). Need for Cognition was positively associated with effort discounting (r = .168, p < .001) and rational reasoning (r = .176, p < .001), but not demand avoidance (r = .085, p = .186). Working memory capacity was related to effort discounting (r = .185, p = .004). Higher perceived effort was related to poorer rational reasoning. Our data indicate that two of the tasks are related to Need for Cognition but are also influenced by a participant's working memory capacity. We discuss whether any of the tasks measure cognitive effort.

Estimating individual subjective values of emotion regulation strategies

Individuals have a repertoire of emotion regulation (ER) strategies at their disposal, which they can use more or less flexibly. In ER flexibility research, strategies that facilitate goal achievement are considered adaptive and therefore are subjectively valuable. Individuals are motivated to reduce their emotional arousal effectively and to avoid cognitive effort. Perceived costs of ER strategies in the form of effort, however, are highly subjective. Subjective values (SVs) should therefore represent a trade-off between effectiveness and subjectively required cognitive effort. However, SVs of ER strategies have not been determined so far. We present a new paradigm for quantifying individual SVs of ER strategies by offering monetary values for ER strategies in an iterative process. N = 120 participants first conducted an ER paradigm with the strategies distraction, distancing, and suppression. Afterwards, individual SVs were determined using the new CAD paradigm. SVs significantly predicted later choice for an ER strategy (χ2 (4, n = 119) = 115.40, p < 0.001, BF10 = 1.62 × 1021). Further, SVs were associated with Corrugator activity (t (5, 618.96) = 2.09, p = 0.037, f2 = 0.001), subjective effort (t (5, 618.96) = - 13.98, p < 0.001, f2 = 0.035), and self-reported utility (t (5, 618.96) = 29.49, p < 0.001, f2 = 0.155). SVs were further associated with self-control (t (97.97) = 2.04, p = 0.044, f2 = 0.002), but not with flexible ER. With our paradigm, we were able to determine subjective values. The trait character of the values will be discussed. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on July 19, 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/FN9BT .

Evaluating self-reported retrospective average daily fruit, vegetable, and egg intake: Trustworthy-Sometimes!

Retrospective self-reports are commonly used to assess dietary intake. Yet, their use is criticized as it is unclear whether the underlying assumptions for valid self-reports are met: Individuals have to consider the behavior of all days in the retention interval and weigh the behavior of all days equally. This study examines whether these assumptions for retrospective self-reports are met and whether interindividual differences in self-report performance are relevant regarding these assumptions. Ninety-two participants aged 18-61 years participated in seven sequential 24-h recalls and one retrospective 7-day recall concerning their intake of fruit, vegetables, and eggs. A multiple linear regression approach was used to examine the relation between the daily reported dietary intake and the 7-day recall. In the overall sample, the requirements for retrospective self-reports were not tenable. Distinguishing good and poor self-reporters based on a rational criterion showed that the requirements can be taken as given for good self-reporters, whereas poor self-reporters base their retrospective self-reports mostly on recency effects. The underlying requirements for retrospective self-reports appear to be met in two thirds of the sample, supporting the use of retrospective self-reports to capture dietary behavior. Future research should investigate characteristics separating good from poor self-reporters.

Increased cognitive effort costs in healthy aging and preclinical Alzheimer's disease

Life-long engagement in cognitively demanding activities may mitigate against declines in cognitive ability observed in healthy or pathological aging. However, the "mental costs" associated with completing cognitive tasks also increase with age and may be partly attributed to increases in preclinical levels of Alzheimer's disease (AD) pathology, specifically amyloid. We test whether cognitive effort costs increase in a domain-general manner among older adults, and further, whether such age-related increases in cognitive effort costs are associated with working memory (WM) capacity or amyloid burden, a signature pathology of AD. In two experiments, we administered a behavioral measure of cognitive effort costs (cognitive effort discounting) to a sample of older adults recruited from online sources (Experiment 1) or from ongoing longitudinal studies of aging and dementia (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 compared age-related differences in cognitive effort costs across two domains, WM and speech comprehension. Experiment 2 compared cognitive effort costs between a group of participants who were rated positive for amyloid relative to those with no evidence of amyloid. Results showed age-related increases in cognitive effort costs were evident in both domains. Cost estimates were highly correlated between the WM and speech comprehension tasks but did not correlate with WM capacity. In addition, older adults who were amyloid positive had higher cognitive effort costs than those who were amyloid negative. Cognitive effort costs may index a domain-general trait that consistently increases in aging. Differences in cognitive effort costs associated with amyloid burden suggest a potential neurobiological mechanism for age-related differences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Using connectome-based models of working memory to predict emotion regulation in older adults

Older adulthood is characterized by enhanced emotional well-being potentially resulting from greater reliance on adaptive emotion regulation strategies. However, not all older adults demonstrate an increase in emotional well-being and instead rely on maladaptive emotion regulation strategies. An important moderator of age-related shifts in strategy preferences is working memory (WM) and its underlying neural circuitry. As such, individual differences in the neural integrity underlying WM may predict older adults' emotion regulation strategy preferences. Our study used whole-brain WM networks-derived from young adults using connectome-based predictive modeling-to predict WM performance and acceptance strategy use in healthy older adults. Older adults (N = 110) completed baseline assessments as part of a randomized controlled trial examining the impact of mind-body interventions on healthy aging. Our results revealed that the WM networks predicted WM accuracy but not acceptance use or difficulties in emotion regulation in older adults. Individual differences in WM performance, but not WM networks, moderated relationships between image intensity and acceptance use. These findings highlight that robust neural markers of WM generalize to an independent sample of healthy older adults but may not generalize beyond cognitive domains to predict emotion-based behaviors.

Associations Between Cognitive and Physical Effort-Based Decision Making in People With Schizophrenia and Healthy Control Subjects

BACKGROUND

Effort can take a variety of forms including physical (e.g., button pressing) and cognitive (e.g., working memory tasks). Few studies have examined whether individual differences in willingness to expend effort are similar or different across modalities.

METHODS

We recruited 30 individuals with schizophrenia and 44 healthy control subjects to complete 2 effort-cost decision-making tasks: the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (physical effort) and the cognitive effort discounting task (cognitive effort).

RESULTS

Willingness to expend cognitive and physical effort was positively associated for both individuals with schizophrenia and control subjects. Further, we found that individual differences in motivation and pleasure dimension of negative symptoms modulated the association between physical and cognitive effort. Specifically, participants with lower motivation and pleasure scores, irrespective of group status, showed stronger associations between task measures of cognitive and physical effort-cost decision making.

CONCLUSIONS

These results suggest a generalized deficit across effort modalities in individuals with schizophrenia. Further, reductions in motivation and pleasure may impact effort-cost decision making in a domain-general manner.

Cognitive effort-based decision-making in major depressive disorder

BACKGROUND

The association between major depressive disorder and motivation to invest cognitive effort for rewards is unclear. One reason might be that prior tasks of cognitive effort-based decision-making are limited by potential confounds such as physical effort and temporal delay discounting.

METHODS

To address these interpretive challenges, we developed a new task - the Cognitive Effort Motivation Task - to assess one's willingness to exert cognitive effort for rewards. Cognitive effort was manipulated by varying the number of items (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) kept in spatial working memory. Twenty-six depressed patients and 44 healthy controls went through an extensive learning session where they experienced each possible effort level 10 times. They were then asked to make a series of choices between performing a fixed low-effort-low-reward or variable higher-effort-higher-reward option during the task.

RESULTS

Both groups found the task more cognitively (but not physically) effortful when effort level increased, but they still achieved ⩾80% accuracy on each effort level during training and >95% overall accuracy during the actual task. Computational modelling revealed that a parabolic model best accounted for subjects' data, indicating that higher-effort levels had a greater impact on devaluing rewards than lower levels. These procedures also revealed that MDD patients discounted rewards more steeply by effort and were less willing to exert cognitive effort for rewards compared to healthy participants.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings provide empirical evidence to show, without confounds of other variables, that depressed patients have impaired cognitive effort motivation compared to the general population.

Economic Choice and Heart Rate Fractal Scaling Indicate That Cognitive Effort Is Reduced by Depression and Boosted by Sad Mood

BACKGROUND

People with depression typically exhibit diminished cognitive control. Control is subjectively costly, prompting speculation that control deficits reflect reduced cognitive effort. Evidence that people with depression exert less cognitive effort is mixed, however, and motivation may depend on state affect.

METHODS

We used a cognitive effort discounting task to measure propensity to expend cognitive effort and fractal structure in the temporal dynamics of interbeat intervals to assess on-task effort exertion for 49 healthy control subjects, 36 people with current depression, and 67 people with remitted depression.

RESULTS

People with depression discounted more steeply, indicating that they were less willing to exert cognitive effort than people with remitted depression and never-depressed control subjects. Also, steeper discounting predicted worse functioning in daily life. Surprisingly, a sad mood induction selectively boosted motivation among participants with depression, erasing differences between them and control subjects. During task performance, depressed participants with the lowest cognitive motivation showed blunted autonomic reactivity as a function of load.

CONCLUSIONS

Discounting patterns supported the hypothesis that people with current depression would be less willing to exert cognitive effort, and steeper discounting predicted lower global functioning in daily life. Heart rate fractal scaling proved to be a highly sensitive index of cognitive load, and data implied that people with lower motivation for cognitive effort had a diminished physiological capacity to respond to rising cognitive demands. State affect appeared to influence motivation among people with current depression given that they were more willing to exert cognitive effort following a sad mood induction.

Effortfulness of visual working memory: Gauged by physical exertion

Active maintenance of information in working memory (WM) is an essential but effortful cognitive process. Yet, the effortful nature of WM remains poorly understood. Here, we constructed a model to evaluate how perceived effort of WM is directly compared to that of physical exertion. In Experiment 1, participants freely chose to either remember a certain number of colors in a visual WM task or hold a hand dynamometer to a required percentage of maximal voluntary contraction (%MVC) to obtain a fixed task credit upon successful task completion. We found that participants discounted WM-related effort in the same way as they discounted handgrip-related effort based on a computation of expected choice outcomes (hence utility) associated with different task loads. This rationality in an observer's prospective choice in Experiment 1 was generalized to retrospective choice in Experiment 2 where participants reported which task was more effortful immediately after they had performed both tasks in a randomized order without any reward or feedback. Experiment 3 further probed this shared mechanism using a dual-task paradigm. As predicted by our model, we found that physical exertion could disrupt the performance in the concurrent WM task, proportional to the iso-effort relationship between WM and physical exertion when task loads were high for both tasks. Collectively, our findings converge on a shared computational principle connecting task load, perceived effort, and choice utility across physical and cognitive domains. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Is all mental effort equal? The role of cognitive demand-type on effort avoidance

Humans are often termed "cognitive misers" for their aversion to mental effort. Both in and outside the laboratory people often show preferences for low-effort tasks and are willing to forgo financial reward to avoid more demanding alternatives. Mental effort, however, does not seem to be ubiquitously avoided: people play crosswords, board games, and read novels, all as forms of leisure. While such activities undoubtedly require effort, the type of cognitive demands they impose appear markedly different from the tasks typically used in psychological research on mental effort (e.g., N-Back, Stroop Task, vigilance tasks). We investigate the effect disparate demands, such as tasks which require problem solving (e.g., solve the missing number: 1, 3, 7, 15, 31,?) compared to those which require rule-implementation (e.g., N-Back task), have on people's aversion to or preference for increased mental effort. Across four experiments using three different tasks, and a mixture of online and lab-based settings, we find that aversion to effort remains largely stable regardless of the types of cognitive demands a task imposes. The results are discussed in terms of other factors that might induce the pursuit of mental effort over and above the type of cognitive demands imposed by a task.

Learning progress mediates the link between cognitive effort and task engagement

While a substantial body of work has shown that cognitive effort is aversive and costly, a separate line of research on intrinsic motivation suggests that people spontaneously seek challenging tasks. According to one prominent account of intrinsic motivation, the learning progress motivation hypothesis, the preference for difficult tasks reflects the dynamic range that these tasks yield for changes in task performance (Kaplan & Oudeyer, 2007). Here we test this hypothesis, by asking whether greater engagement with intermediately difficult tasks, indexed by subjective ratings and objective pupil measurements, is a function of trial-wise changes in performance. In a novel paradigm, we determined each individual's capacity for task performance and used difficulty levels that are low, intermediately challenging or high for that individual. We demonstrated that challenging tasks resulted in greater liking and engagement scores compared with easy tasks. Pupil size tracked objective task difficulty, where challenging tasks were associated with greater pupil responses than easy tasks. Most importantly, pupil responses were predicted by trial-to-trial changes in average accuracy as well as learning progress (derivative of average accuracy), while greater pupil responses also predicted greater subjective engagement scores. Together, these results substantiate the learning progress motivation hypothesis stating that the link between task engagement and cognitive effort is mediated the dynamic range for changes in task performance.

The costs and benefits of psychedelics on cognition and mood

Anecdotal evidence has indicated that psychedelic substances may acutely enhance creative task performance, although empirical support for this claim is mixed at best. Clinical research has shown that psychedelics might have enduring effects on mood and well-being. However, there is no neurocognitive framework that ties acute changes in cognition to long-term effects in mood. In this review, we operationalize creativity within an emerging cognitive control framework and assess the current empirical evidence of the effects of psychedelics on creativity. Next, we leverage insights about the mechanisms and computations by which other psychoactive drugs act to enhance versus impair cognition, in particular to those that act on catecholamines, the neurophysiological consequences of which are relatively well understood. Finally, we use the same framework to link the suggested psychedelic-induced improvements in creativity with enduring psychedelic-induced improvements in mood.

Construction of a computerized adaptive test (CAT-CCNB) for efficient neurocognitive and clinical psychopathology assessment

BACKGROUND

Traditional paper-and-pencil neurocognitive evaluations and semi-structured mental health interviews can take hours to administer and score. Computerized assessment has decreased that burden substantially, and contemporary psychometric tools such as item response theory and computerized adaptive testing (CAT) allow even further abbreviation.

NEW METHOD

The goal of this paper was to describe the application of CAT and related methods to the Penn Computerized Neurocognitive Battery (CNB) and a well-validated clinical assessment in order to increase efficiency in assessment and relevant domain coverage. To calibrate item banks for CAT, N = 5053 participants (63% female; mean age 45 years, range 18-80) were collected from across the United States via crowdsourcing, providing item parameters that were then linked to larger item banks and used in individual test construction. Tests not amenable to CAT were abbreviated using complementary short-form methods.

RESULTS

The final "CAT-CCNB" battery comprised 21 cognitive tests (compared to 14 in the original) and five adaptive clinical scales (compared to 16 in the original).

COMPARISON WITH EXISTING METHODS

This new battery, derived with contemporary psychometric approaches, provides further improvements over existing assessments that use collections of fixed-length tests developed for stand-alone administration. The CAT-CCNB provides an improved version of the CNB that shows promise as a maximally efficient tool for neuropsychiatric assessment.

CONCLUSIONS

We anticipate CAT-CCNB will help satisfy the clear need for broad yet efficient measurement of cognitive and clinical domains, facilitating implementation of large-scale, "big science" approaches to data collection, and potential widespread clinical implementation.

Measuring cognitive effort without difficulty

An important finding in the cognitive effort literature has been that sensitivity to the costs of effort varies between individuals, suggesting that some people find effort more aversive than others. It has been suggested this may explain individual differences in other aspects of cognition; in particular that greater effort sensitivity may underlie some of the symptoms of conditions such as depression and schizophrenia. In this paper, we highlight a major problem with existing measures of cognitive effort that hampers this line of research, specifically the confounding of effort and difficulty. This means that behaviour thought to reveal effort costs could equally be explained by cognitive capacity, which influences the frequency of success and thereby the chance of obtaining reward. To address this shortcoming, we introduce a new test, the Number Switching Task (NST), specially designed such that difficulty will be unaffected by the effort manipulation and can easily be standardised across participants. In a large, online sample, we show that these criteria are met successfully and reproduce classic effort discounting results with the NST. We also demonstrate the use of Bayesian modelling with this task, producing behavioural parameters which can be associated with other measures, and report a preliminary association with the Need for Cognition scale.

Cognitive Effort-Based Decision-Making Across Experimental and Daily Life Indices in Younger and Older Adults

OBJECTIVES

The study investigated whether cognitive effort decision-making measured via a neuroeconomic paradigm that manipulated framing (gain vs. loss outcomes), could predict daily life engagement in mentally demanding activities in both younger and older adults.

METHOD

Younger and older adult participants (N = 310) completed the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm (Cog-ED), under both gain and loss conditions, to provide an experimental index of cognitive effort costs for each participant in each framing condition. A subset of participants (N = 230) also completed a 7-day Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) protocol measuring engagement in mentally demanding daily life activities.

RESULTS

In a large, online sample, we replicated a robust increase in cognitive effort costs among older, relative to younger, adults. Additionally, costs were found to be reduced in the loss relative to gain frame, although these effects were only reliable at high levels of task difficulty and were not moderated by age. Critically, participants who had lower effort costs in the gain frame tended to report engaging in more mentally demanding daily life activities, but the opposite pattern was observed in the loss frame. Further analyses demonstrated the specificity of reward-related cognitive motivation in predicting daily life mentally demanding activities.

DISCUSSION

Together, these results suggest that cognitive effort costs, as measured through behavioral choice patterns in a neuroeconomic decision-making task, can be used to predict and explain engagement in mentally demanding activities during daily life among both older and younger adults.

Determinants of Social Cognitive Aging: Predicting Resilience and Risk

This review focuses on conceptual and empirical research on determinants of social cognitive aging. We present an integrated model [the social cognitive resource (SCoRe) framework] to organize the literature and describe how social cognitive resilience is determined jointly by capacity and motivational resources. We discuss how neurobiological aging, driven by genetic and environmental influences, is associated with broader sensory, neural, and physiological changes that are direct determinants of capacity as well as indirect determinants of motivation via their influence on expectation of loss versus reward and cognitive effort valuation. Research is reviewed that shows how contextual factors, such as relationship status, familiarity, and practice, are fundamental to understanding the availability of both types of resource. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of social cognitive change in late adulthood for everyday social functioning and with recommendations for future research.

Examining tradeoffs between cognitive effort and relief among adults with self-injurious behavior

BACKGROUND

People engage in nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) to reduce negative affect, but it is not clear why they engage in this harmful type of behavior instead of using healthier strategies. The primary goal of this study was to evaluate whether people choose NSSI to reduce negative affect because they perceive it to be less cognitively costly than other available strategies.

METHOD

In experiment one, 43 adults completed a novel, relief-based effort discounting task designed to index preferences about exerting cognitive effort to achieve relief. In experiment two, 149 adults, 52 % with a history of NSSI, completed our effort discounting task.

RESULTS

Our main results suggest that people will accept less relief from an aversive experience if doing so requires expending less effort, i.e. they demonstrate effort discounting in the context of decisions about relief. We also found and that effort discounting is stronger among those with a history of NSSI, but this association became nonsignificant when simultaneously accounting for other conditions associated with aberrant effort tradeoffs.

LIMITATIONS

The use of a control group without NSSI or other potentially harmful relief-seeking behaviors limits our ability to draw specific conclusions about NSSI. The ecological validity of our task was limited by a modestly effective affect manipulation, and because participants made hypothetical choices.

CONCLUSIONS

This study demonstrates that preferences about exerting cognitive effort may be a barrier to using healthier affect regulation strategies. Further, the preference not to exert cognitive effort, though present in NSSI, is likely not unique to NSSI. Instead, effort discounting may be a transdiagnostic mechanism promoting an array of harmful relief-seeking behaviors.

Strategically managing learning during perceptual decision making

Making optimal decisions in the face of noise requires balancing short-term speed and accuracy. But a theory of optimality should account for the fact that short-term speed can influence long-term accuracy through learning. Here, we demonstrate that long-term learning is an important dynamical dimension of the speed-accuracy trade-off. We study learning trajectories in rats and formally characterize these dynamics in a theory expressed as both a recurrent neural network and an analytical extension of the drift-diffusion model that learns over time. The model reveals that choosing suboptimal response times to learn faster sacrifices immediate reward, but can lead to greater total reward. We empirically verify predictions of the theory, including a relationship between stimulus exposure and learning speed, and a modulation of reaction time by future learning prospects. We find that rats' strategies approximately maximize total reward over the full learning epoch, suggesting cognitive control over the learning process.

Effort feels meaningful

People often dislike effort and avoid it when they can, but effort can also imbue tasks with meaning. This is the case for real-life tasks, but also novel tasks devoid of true purpose. Why does effort feel meaningful, under what conditions, and for whom?