Neural and behavioral evidence for an intrinsic cost of self-control

Investigating an effort avoidance account of attentional strategy choice

People often choose suboptimal attentional control strategies during visual search. This has been at least partially attributed to the avoidance of the cognitive effort associated with the optimal strategy, but aspects of the task triggering such avoidance remain unclear. Here, we attempted to measure effort avoidance of an isolated task component to assess whether this component might drive suboptimal behavior. We adopted a modified version of the Adaptive Choice Visual Search (ACVS), a task designed to measure people's visual search strategies. To perform optimally, participants must make a numerosity judgment-estimating and comparing two color sets-before they can advantageously search through the less numerous of the two. If participants skip the numerosity judgment step, they can still perform accurately, albeit substantially more slowly. To study whether effort associated with performing the optional numerosity judgment could be an obstacle to optimal performance, we created a variant of the demand selection task to quantify the avoidance of numerosity judgment effort. Results revealed a robust avoidance of the numerosity judgment, offering a potential explanation for why individuals choose suboptimal strategies in the ACVS task. Nevertheless, we did not find a significant relationship between individual numerosity judgment avoidance and ACVS optimality, and we discussed potential reasons for this lack of an observed relationship. Altogether, our results showed that the effort avoidance for specific subcomponents of a visual search task can be probed and linked to overall strategy choices.

Cognitive conflict does not always mean high effort: Task difficulty's moderating effect on cardiac response

This article presents an experiment (N = 127 university students) testing whether the previously found impact of conflict primes on effort-related cardiac response is moderated by objective task difficulty. Recently, it has been shown that primed cognitive conflict increases cardiac pre-ejection period (PEP) reactivity-an index of effort intensity-during the performance of relatively easy tasks. This effect could be attributed to conflict-related negative affect. Consequently, as it has been shown for other types of negative affect, we expected conflict primes' effect to be task-context dependent and thus to be moderated by objective task difficulty. In a between-persons design, we manipulated conflict via embedded pictures of conflict-related vs. non-conflict-related Stroop items in a memory task. We expected primed conflict to increase effort in a relatively easy version of the task but to lead to disengagement when task difficulty was objectively high. PEP reactivity corroborated our predictions. Rather than always increasing effort, cognitive conflict's effect on resource mobilization was context-dependent and resulted in weak responses in a difficult task.

The roles of intrinsic motivation and capability-related factors in cognitive effort-based decision-making

Individual differences in cognitive effort-based decision-making can be used to reveal human motivations to invest effort into a given task. Preferences among options that differ by dimensions related to demand levels (i.e., the interaction of task characteristics and performance measures) are also heavily influenced by how likely a person can succeed at a given option. However, most existing cognitive effort-based research has focused primarily on demand-related factors, leading to confounding inferences about the motivation behind these choices. This study used an adaptive algorithm to adjust relative demand levels for three cognitive tasks to investigate general and individual differences in demand preferences. The results highlight an overall pattern of individual differences in intrinsic motivation to perform challenging tasks, supporting research that found cognitive effort aversive to some but attractive to others. These results suggest that relative demand levels and intrinsic task factors drive the motivation to select an action.

Effects of Game-Related Tasks for the Diagnosis and Classification of Gaming Disorder

Gaming disorder (GD) is an addictive behavior characterized by an insatiable need to play video games and shares similar symptoms with the failure of self-control due to a decline in cognitive function. Current GD diagnostic and screening tools rely on questionnaires and behavioral observations related to cognitive functions to assess an individual's capacity to maintain self-control in everyday life. However, current GD screening approaches rely on subjective symptoms, and a reliable diagnosis requires long-term clinical follow-up. Recent studies have measured biosignals along with cognitive functional tasks to provide objectivity to GD diagnosis and to acquire immediate results. However, people with GD are hypersensitive to game-related cues, so their responses may vary depending on the type of stimuli, and the difference in response to stimuli might manifest as a difference in the degree of change in the biosignal. Therefore, it is critical to choose the correct stimulus type when performing GD diagnostic tasks. In this study, we investigated the task dependence of cognitive decline in GD by comparing two cognitive functional tasks: a continuous performance task (CPT) and video game play. For this study, 69 young male adults were classified into either the gaming disorder group (GD, n = 39) or a healthy control group (HC, n = 30). CPT score, EEG signal (theta, alpha, and beta), and HRV-HF power were assessed. We observed differences in the left frontal region (LF) of the brain between the GD and HC groups during online video game play. The GD group also showed a significant difference in HF power of HRV between CPT and online video gaming. Furthermore, LF and HRV-HF significantly correlated with Young's Internet Addiction Test (Y-IAT) score, which is positively associated with impulsivity score. The amount of change in theta band activity in LF and HRV-HF-both biomarkers for changes in cognitive function-during online video game play suggests that people with GD express task-dependent cognitive decline compared with HC. Our results demonstrate the feasibility of quantifying individual self-regulation ability for gaming and underscore its importance for GD classification.

Cognitive effort investment: Does disposition become action?

Contrary to the law of less work, individuals with high levels of need for cognition and self-control tend to choose harder tasks more often. While both traits can be integrated into a core construct of dispositional cognitive effort investment, its relation to actual cognitive effort investment remains unclear. As individuals with high levels of cognitive effort investment are characterized by a high intrinsic motivation towards effortful cognition, they would be less likely to increase their effort based on expected payoff, but rather based on increasing demand. In the present study, we measured actual effort investment on multiple dimensions, i.e., subjective load, reaction time, accuracy, early and late frontal midline theta power, N2 and P3 amplitude, and pupil dilation. In a sample of N = 148 participants, we examined the relationship of dispositional cognitive effort investment and effort indices during a flanker and an n-back task with varying demand and payoff. Exploratorily, we examined this relationship for the two subdimensions cognitive motivation and effortful-self-control as well. In both tasks, effort indices were sensitive to demand and partly to payoff. The analyses revealed a main effect of cognitive effort investment for accuracy (n-back task), interaction effects with payoff for reaction time (n-back and flanker task) and P3 amplitude (n-back task) and demand for early frontal midline theta power (flanker task). Taken together, our results partly support the notion that individuals with high levels of cognitive effort investment exert effort more efficiently. Moreover, the notion that these individuals exert effort regardless of payoff is partly supported, too. This may further our understanding of the conditions under which person-situation interactions occur, i.e. the conditions under which situations determine effort investment in goal-directed behavior more than personality, and vice versa.

Estimating individual subjective values of emotion regulation strategies

Individuals have a repertoire of emotion regulation (ER) strategies at their disposal, which they can use more or less flexibly. In ER flexibility research, strategies that facilitate goal achievement are considered adaptive and therefore are subjectively valuable. Individuals are motivated to reduce their emotional arousal effectively and to avoid cognitive effort. Perceived costs of ER strategies in the form of effort, however, are highly subjective. Subjective values (SVs) should therefore represent a trade-off between effectiveness and subjectively required cognitive effort. However, SVs of ER strategies have not been determined so far. We present a new paradigm for quantifying individual SVs of ER strategies by offering monetary values for ER strategies in an iterative process. N = 120 participants first conducted an ER paradigm with the strategies distraction, distancing, and suppression. Afterwards, individual SVs were determined using the new CAD paradigm. SVs significantly predicted later choice for an ER strategy (χ2 (4, n = 119) = 115.40, p < 0.001, BF10 = 1.62 × 1021). Further, SVs were associated with Corrugator activity (t (5, 618.96) = 2.09, p = 0.037, f2 = 0.001), subjective effort (t (5, 618.96) = - 13.98, p < 0.001, f2 = 0.035), and self-reported utility (t (5, 618.96) = 29.49, p < 0.001, f2 = 0.155). SVs were further associated with self-control (t (97.97) = 2.04, p = 0.044, f2 = 0.002), but not with flexible ER. With our paradigm, we were able to determine subjective values. The trait character of the values will be discussed. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on July 19, 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/FN9BT .

An fMRI-Based Brain Marker of Individual Differences in Delay Discounting

Individual differences in delay discounting-how much we discount future compared to immediate rewards-are associated with general life outcomes, psychopathology, and obesity. Here, we use machine learning on fMRI activity during an intertemporal choice task to develop a functional brain marker of these individual differences in human adults. Training and cross-validating the marker in one dataset (Study 1, N = 110 male adults) resulted in a significant prediction-outcome correlation (r = 0.49), generalized to predict individual differences in a completely independent dataset (Study 2: N = 145 male and female adults, r = 0.45), and predicted discounting several weeks later. Out-of-sample responses of the functional brain marker, but not discounting behavior itself, differed significantly between overweight and lean individuals in both studies, and predicted fasting-state blood levels of insulin, c-peptide, and leptin in Study 1. Significant predictive weights of the marker were found in cingulate, insula, and frontoparietal areas, among others, suggesting an interplay among regions associated with valuation, conflict processing, and cognitive control. This new functional brain marker is a step toward a generalizable brain model of individual differences in delay discounting. Future studies can evaluate it as a potential transdiagnostic marker of altered decision-making in different clinical and developmental populations.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT People differ substantially in how much they prefer smaller sooner rewards or larger later rewards such as spending money now versus saving it for retirement. These individual differences are generally stable over time and have been related to differences in mental and bodily health. What is their neurobiological basis? We applied machine learning to brain-imaging data to identify a novel brain activity pattern that accurately predicts how much people prefer sooner versus later rewards, and which can be used as a new brain-based measure of intertemporal decision-making in future studies. The resulting functional brain marker also predicts overweight and metabolism-related blood markers, providing new insight into the possible links between metabolism and the cognitive and brain processes involved in intertemporal decision-making.

Is cognitive conflict really effortful? Conflict priming and shielding effects on cardiac response

Two experiments with N = 221 university students investigated the impact of primed cognitive conflict on effort assessed as cardiac response in tasks that were not conflict-related themselves. Manifest cognitive conflict in cognitive control tasks is confounded with objective response difficulty (e.g., in incongruent Stroop task trials). This makes conclusions about the effortfulness of cognitive conflict itself difficult. We bypassed this problem by administrating pictures of congruent versus incongruent Stroop task stimuli as conflict primes. As predicted, primed cognitive conflict increased cardiac pre-ejection period (PEP) responses in an easy attention task in Experiment 1. Accordingly, cognitive conflict itself is indeed effortful. This effect was replicated in an easy short-term memory task in Experiment 2. Moreover, as further predicted, the primed cognitive conflict effect on PEP reactivity disappeared when participants could personally choose task characteristics. This latter effect corresponds to other recent evidence showing that personal action choice shields against incidental affective influences on action execution and especially on effort-related cardiovascular response.

Implicit cognitive effort monitoring impairments are associated with expressive negative symptoms in schizophrenia

Negative symptoms are a strong predictor of functional impairment in schizophrenia (SZ). Unfortunately, mechanisms underlying negative symptoms are poorly understood and available treatments are minimally effective. The current study evaluated the novel hypothesis that negative symptoms are associated with an implicit cognitive effort monitoring impairment that manifests during tasks requiring sustained allocation of cognitive control. Outpatients with SZ (n = 33) and healthy controls (CN; n = 29) completed an adapted Demand Selection Task (DST) in which subjects made choices between pairs of cognitive tasks that were implicitly and then explicitly made discrepant in effort demands. The SZ group demonstrated a reduced probability of avoiding the high effort cognitive task in the implicit choice condition but were able to become effort avoidant when the demands of the task were made explicit. Implicit cognitive effort monitoring deficits were associated with greater severity of the expressivity dimension of negative symptoms, but not the motivation and pleasure dimension. The association between diminished expressivity and implicit cognitive effort monitoring deficits is interpreted in light of a novel cognitive resource depletion theory, whereby individuals with SZ may become less expressive due to difficulty implicitly monitoring ongoing cognitive effort exertion and dynamically adjusting effort expenditure as task demands fluctuate.

A Question of Method and Subjective Beliefs

Abstract. Need for Cognition (NFC) describes the relatively stable intrinsic motivation to engage in cognitive endeavors. Recent research has revealed the importance of NFC for affective adjustment, especially in combination with self-control. We followed up on those findings by addressing methodological issues as well as processes that may underlie relations of NFC to self-control. Study 1 ( N = 102) examined whether NFC is associated with self-control independently of the measure or facet considered. Implicit willpower theories, that is, subjective beliefs concerning the limitation of self-control resources, were examined as a mediator for NFC predicting self-control. Higher NFC was associated with increased trait self-control but also with believing in unlimited self-control resources. The relation of NFC to willpower theories also mediated the prediction of trait self-control. Study 2 ( N = 188) replicated relations of NFC to self-control. We further pursued the explanatory approach from Study 1 and experimentally manipulated willpower theories to provide insight into their association with NFC. Willpower theories were related to NFC but had no mediating role in predicting self-control. The experimental manipulation had no impact on situation-specific NFC. Altogether, both studies provided first evidence that relations of NFC to self-control depend on the self-control measure and that willpower theories may be crucial for explaining the association with self-control.

Cognitive control in Parkinson's disease

Cognitive control is the ability to act according to plan. Problems with cognitive control are a primary symptom and a major decrement of quality of life in Parkinson's disease (PD). Individuals with PD have problems with seemingly different controlled processes (e.g., task switching, impulsivity, gait disturbance, apathetic motivation). We review how these varied processes all rely upon disease-related alteration of common neural substrates, particularly due to dopaminergic imbalance. A comprehensive understanding of the neural systems underlying cognitive control will hopefully lead to more concise and reliable explanations of distributed deficits. However, high levels of clinical heterogeneity and medication-invariant control deficiencies suggest the need for increasingly detailed elaboration of the neural systems underlying control in PD.

Cognitive Effort Exertion Enhances Electrophysiological Responses to Rewarding Outcomes

Recent work has highlighted neural mechanisms underlying cognitive effort-related discounting of anticipated rewards. However, findings on whether effort exertion alters the subjective value of obtained rewards are inconsistent. Here, we provide a more nuanced account of how cognitive effort affects subsequent reward processing in a novel task designed to assess effort-induced modulations of the Reward Positivity, an event-related potential indexing reward-related neural activity. We found that neural responses to both gains and losses were significantly elevated in trials requiring more versus less cognitive effort. Moreover, time-frequency analysis revealed that these effects were mirrored in gain-related delta, but not in loss-related theta band activity, suggesting that people ascribed more value to high-effort outcomes. In addition, we also explored whether individual differences in behavioral effort discounting rates and reward sensitivity in the absence of effort may affect the relationship between effort exertion and subsequent reward processing. Together, our findings provide evidence that cognitive effort exertion can increase the subjective value of subsequent outcomes and that this effect may primarily rely on modulations of delta band activity.

A meta-analysis of financial self-control strategies: Comparing empirical findings with online media and lay person perspectives on what helps individuals curb spending and start saving

Self-control can be assisted by using self-control strategies rather than relying solely on willpower to resist tempting situations and to make more goal-consistent decisions. To understand how self-control strategies can aid financial goals, we conducted a meta-analysis (Study 1) to aggregate the latest research on self-control strategies in the financial domain and to estimate their overall effectiveness for saving and spending outcomes. Across 29 studies and 12 different self-control strategies, strategies reduced spending and increased saving significantly with a medium effect size (d = 0.57). Proactive and reactive strategies were equally effective. We next examined whether these strategies studied in the academic literature were present in a media sample of websites (N = 104 websites with 852 strategies) and in individuals' personal experiences (N = 939 participants who listed 830 strategies). About half the strategies identified in the meta-analysis were present in the media sample and about half were listed by lay participants as strategies they personally use. In sum, this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the self-control strategies that have been studied in the empirical literature to date and of the strategies promoted in the media and used in daily life, identifying gaps between these perspectives.

Learning to Overexert Cognitive Control in a Stroop Task

How do people learn when to allocate how much cognitive control to which task? According to the Learned Value of Control (LVOC) model, people learn to predict the value of alternative control allocations from features of a situation. This suggests that people may generalize the value of control learned in one situation to others with shared features, even when demands for control are different. This makes the intriguing prediction that what a person learned in one setting could cause them to misestimate the need for, and potentially overexert, control in another setting, even if this harms their performance. To test this prediction, we had participants perform a novel variant of the Stroop task in which, on each trial, they could choose to either name the color (more control-demanding) or read the word (more automatic). Only one of these tasks was rewarded each trial and could be predicted by one or more stimulus features (the color and/or word). Participants first learned colors and then words that predicted the rewarded task. Then, we tested how these learned feature associations transferred to novel stimuli with some overlapping features. The stimulus-task-reward associations were designed so that for certain combinations of stimuli, transfer of learned feature associations would incorrectly predict that more highly rewarded task would be color-naming, even though the actually rewarded task was word-reading and therefore did not require engaging control. Our results demonstrated that participants overexerted control for these stimuli, providing support for the feature-based learning mechanism described by the LVOC model.

Dispositional individual differences in cognitive effort investment: establishing the core construct

BACKGROUND

Individuals tend to avoid effortful tasks, regardless of whether they are physical or mental in nature. Recent experimental evidence is suggestive of individual differences in the dispositional willingness to invest cognitive effort in goal-directed behavior. The traits need for cognition (NFC) and self-control are related to behavioral measures of cognitive effort discounting and demand avoidance, respectively. Given that these traits are only moderately related, the question arises whether they reflect a common core factor underlying cognitive effort investment. If so, the common core of both traits might be related to behavioral measures of effort discounting in a more systematic fashion. To address this question, we aimed at specifying a core construct of cognitive effort investment that reflects dispositional differences in the willingness and tendency to exert effortful control.

METHODS

We conducted two studies (N = 613 and N = 244) with questionnaires related to cognitive motivation and effort investment including assessment of NFC, intellect, self-control and effortful control. We first calculated Pearson correlations followed by two mediation models regarding intellect and its separate aspects, seek and conquer, as mediators. Next, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis of a hierarchical model of cognitive effort investment as second-order latent variable. First-order latent variables were cognitive motivation reflecting NFC and intellect, and effortful self-control reflecting self-control and effortful control. Finally, we calculated Pearson correlations between factor scores of the latent variables and general self-efficacy as well as traits of the Five Factor Model of Personality for validation purposes.

RESULTS

Our findings support the hypothesized correlations between the assessed traits, where the relationship of NFC and self-control is specifically mediated via goal-directedness. We established and replicated a hierarchical factor model of cognitive motivation and effortful self-control that explains the shared variance of the first-order factors by a second-order factor of cognitive effort investment.

CONCLUSIONS

Taken together, our results integrate disparate literatures on cognitive motivation and self-control and provide a basis for further experimental research on the role of dispositional individual differences in goal-directed behavior and cost-benefit-models.

Dispositional cognitive effort investment and behavioral demand avoidance: Are they related?

Individuals tend to avoid cognitive demand, yet, individual differences appear to exist. Recent evidence from two studies suggests that individuals high in the personality traits Self-Control and Need for Cognition that are related to the broader construct Cognitive Effort Investment are less prone to avoid cognitive demand and show less effort discounting. These findings suggest that cost-benefit models of decision-making that integrate the costs due to effort should consider individual differences in the willingness to exert mental effort. However, to date, there are almost no replication attempts of the above findings. For the present conceptual replication, we concentrated on the avoidance of cognitive demand and used a longitudinal design and latent state-trait modeling. This approach enabled us to separate the trait-specific variance in our measures of Cognitive Effort Investment and Demand Avoidance that is due to stable, individual differences from the variance that is due to the measurement occasion, the methods used, and measurement error. Doing so allowed us to test the assumption that self-reported Cognitive Effort Investment is related to behavioral Demand Avoidance more directly by relating their trait-like features to each other. In a sample of N = 217 participants, we observed both self-reported Cognitive Effort Investment and behavioral Demand Avoidance to exhibit considerable portions of trait variance. However, these trait variances were not significantly related to each other. Thus, our results call into question previous findings of a relationship between self-reported effort investment and demand avoidance. We suggest that novel paradigms are needed to emulate real-world effortful situations and enable better mapping between self-reported measures and behavioral markers of the willingness to exert cognitive effort.

Conflict monitoring and the affective-signaling hypothesis-An integrative review

Conflict-monitoring theory proposes that conflict between incompatible responses is registered by a dedicated monitoring system, and that this conflict signal triggers changes of attentional filters and adapts control processes according to the current task demands. Extending the conflict-monitoring theory, it has been suggested that conflict elicits a negative affective reaction, and that it is this affective signal that is monitored and then triggers control adaptation. This review article summarizes research on a potential signaling function of affect for cognitive control. First, we provide an overview of the conflict-monitoring theory, discuss neurophysiological and behavioral markers of monitoring and control adaptation, and introduce the affective-signaling hypothesis. In a second part, we review relevant studies that address the questions of (i) whether conflict elicits negative affect, (ii) whether negative affect is monitored, and (iii) whether affect modulates control. In sum, the reviewed literature supports the claim that conflict and errors trigger negative affect and provides some support for the claim that affect modulates control. However, studies on the monitoring of negative affect and the influence of phasic affect on control are ambiguous. On the basis of these findings, in a third part, we critically reassess the affective-signaling hypothesis, discuss relevant challenges to this account, and suggest future research strategies.

Self-Regulation Without Force: Can Awareness Leverage Reward to Drive Behavior Change?

To reach longer-term goals and live aligned with their values, people typically must regulate their behavior. Effortful self-control is one way to achieve this and is usually framed as a forceful struggle between lower-level impulses and higher-level cognitive control processes. For example, people may restrain themselves from eating cake in order to lose weight. An alternative avenue of self-regulation draws on autonomous motivation: Individuals eat healthfully because it is values-congruent or intrinsically satisfying. Recent advances in the understanding of reward valuation on a neural level (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex/orbitofrontal cortex) and emerging treatments on a clinical level (e.g., mindfulness training) suggest a possible mechanistic convergence between brain and behavior that is consistent with a shift from forced to unforced behavior change. Here we propose how an overlooked aspect of reinforcement learning can be leveraged using a simple yet critical feature of experience that is not reliant on willpower: Bringing awareness to one's subjective experience and behavior can produce a change in valuation of learned but unhealthy behaviors, leading to self-regulatory shifts that result in sustainable behavior change without force.

BOLD activity during emotion reappraisal positively correlates with dietary self-control success

We combined established emotion regulation and dietary choice tasks with fMRI to investigate behavioral and neural associations in self-regulation across the two domains in human participants. We found that increased BOLD activity during the successful reappraisal of positive and negative emotional stimuli was associated with dietary self-control success. This cross-task correlation was present in medial and lateral prefrontal cortex as well as the striatum. In contrast, BOLD activity during the food choice task was not associated with self-reported emotion regulation efficacy. These results suggest that neural processes utilized during the reappraisal of emotional stimuli may also facilitate dietary choices that override palatability in favor of healthfulness. In summary, our findings indicate that the neural systems supporting emotion reappraisal can generalize to other behavioral contexts that require reevaluation of rewarding stimuli and outcomes to promote choices that conform with the current goal.

Dissociable mechanisms govern when and how strongly reward attributes affect decisions

Theories and computational models of decision-making usually focus on how strongly different attributes are weighted in choice, for example, as a function of their importance or salience to the decision-maker. However, when different attributes affect the decision process is a question that has received far less attention. Here, we investigated whether the timing of attribute consideration has a unique influence on decision-making by using a time-varying drift diffusion model and data from four separate experiments. Experimental manipulations of attention and neural activity demonstrated that we can dissociate the processes that determine the relative weighting strength and timing of attribute consideration. Thus, the processes determining either the weighting strengths or the timing of attributes in decision-making can independently adapt to changes in the environment or goals. Quantifying these separate influences of timing and weighting on choice improves our understanding and predictions of individual differences in decision behaviour.

The Case of the Cognitive (Opti)miser: Electrophysiological Correlates of Working Memory Maintenance Predict Demand Avoidance

People are often considered cognitive misers. When given a free choice between two tasks, people tend to choose tasks requiring less cognitive effort. Such demand avoidance (DA) is associated with cognitive control, but it is still not clear to what extent individual differences in cognitive control can account for variations in DA. We sought to elucidate the relation between cognitive control and cognitive effort preferences by investigating the extent to which sustained neural activity in a task requiring cognitive control is correlated with DA. We hypothesized that neural measures of efficient filtering will predict individual variations in demand preferences. To test this hypothesis, we had participants perform a delayed-match-to-sample paradigm with their ERPs recorded, as well as a separate behavioral demand-selection task. We focused on the ERP correlates of cognitive filtering efficiency (CFE)-the ability to ignore task-irrelevant distractors during working memory maintenance-as it manifests in a modulation of the contralateral delay activity, an ERP correlate of cognitive control. As predicted, we found a significant positive correlation between CFE and DA. Individuals with high CFE tended to be significantly more demand avoidant than their low-CFE counterparts. Low-CFE individuals, in comparison, did not form distinct cognitive effort preferences. Overall, our results suggest that cognitive control over the contents of visual working memory contribute to individual differences in the expression of cognitive effort preferences. This further implies that these observed preferences are the product of sensitivity to cognitive task demands.

Deliberating trade-offs with the future

Many fundamental choices in life are intertemporal: they involve trade-offs between sooner and later outcomes. In recent years there has been a surge of interest into how people make intertemporal decisions, given that such decisions are ubiquitous in everyday life and central in domains from substance use to climate change action. While it is clear that people make decisions according to rules, intuitions and habits, they also commonly deliberate over their options, thinking through potential outcomes and reflecting on their own preferences. In this Perspective, we bring to bear recent research into the higher-order capacities that underpin deliberation-particularly those that enable people to think about the future (prospection) and their own thinking (metacognition)-to shed light on intertemporal decision-making. We show how a greater appreciation for these mechanisms of deliberation promises to advance our understanding of intertemporal decision-making and unify a wide range of otherwise disparate choice phenomena.

Conquering the inner couch potato: precommitment is an effective strategy to enhance motivation for effortful actions

Letting effort-free gratification derail us from effort-requiring goals is one reason why we fail to realize health-relevant intentions like 'exercise regularly'. We tested the effectiveness of the self-control strategy precommitment in such effort-related conflicts, using a novel laboratory choice paradigm, where participants could precommit to an effort-requiring large reward by pre-eliminating an effort-free small reward from their choice set. Our participants used precommitment frequently and effectively, such that they reached effort-requiring large rewards more often. Using computational modelling and Bayesian model comparisons, we assessed whether participants employed precommitment to avoid anticipated willpower failures (i.e. as a self-regulatory measure) or to maximize their motivation to choose the effort-requiring option (i.e. as a self-motivational measure). Observed choices and precommitment decisions were consistent with the motivation maximization hypothesis, but not the willpower hypothesis. Our findings show that offering precommitment is effective in helping individuals optimize their motivation and choice behaviour and thereby achieve effort-requiring goals, and strongly encourage application of precommitment schemes in exercise and rehabilitation interventions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications'.

Trait self-control does not predict attentional control: Evidence from a novel attention capture paradigm

To what extent are low-level visual and attentional phenomena related to higher-level personality traits? Trait self-control is thought to modulate behavior via two separate mechanisms: 1) by preventing initial temptation and, 2) by inhibiting temptation when it occurs (disengagement). Similarly, the control of visual attention often entails preventing initial distraction by irrelevant but tempting (goal-similar) objects, and disengaging attention when it has been inappropriately captured. Given these similarities, we examined whether individuals higher versus lower in trait self-control would differ in their susceptibility to attention capture using mouse-tracking as a sensitive, online measure of how attentional dynamics resolve over time and space in response to a distracting visual cue. Using a variety of metrics of attention capture, we found that differences among people in trait self-control did not predict initial selection of visual information nor subsequent disengagement. Overall, these results suggest that trait self-control and attention capture operate via separate mechanisms.

Investigating Performance in a Strenuous Physical Task from the Perspective of Self-Control

It has been proposed that one reason physical effort is perceived as costly is because of the self-control demands that are necessary to persist in a physically demanding task. The application of control has been conceptualized as a value-based decision, that hinges on an optimization of the costs of control and available reward. Here, we drew on labor supply theory to investigate the effects of an Income Compensated Wage Decrease (ICWD) on persistence in a strenuous physical task. Research has shown that an ICWD reduced the amount of self-control participants are willing to apply, and we expected this to translate to a performance decrement in a strenuous physical task. Contrary to our expectations, participants in the ICWD group outperformed the control group in terms of persistence, without incurring higher levels of muscle fatigue or ratings of perceived exertion. Improved performance was accompanied by increases in task efficiency and a lesser increase in oxygenation of the prefrontal cortex, an area of relevance for the application of self-control. These results suggest that the relationship between the regulation of physical effort and self-control is less straightforward than initially assumed: less top-down self-control might allow for more efficient execution of motor tasks, thereby allowing for improved performance. Moreover, these findings indicate that psychological manipulations can affect physical performance, not by modulating how much one is willing to deplete limited physical resources, but by altering how tasks are executed.

Neuro-computational Impact of Physical Training Overload on Economic Decision-Making

Overtraining syndrome is a form of burnout, defined in endurance athletes by unexplained performance drop associated with intense fatigue sensation. Our working hypothesis is that the form of fatigue resulting from physical training overload might share some neural underpinnings with the form of fatigue observed after prolonged intellectual work, which was previously shown to affect the cognitive control brain system. Indeed, cognitive control may be required to prevent any impulsive behavior, including stopping physical effort when it hurts, despite the long-term goal of improving performance through intense training. To test this hypothesis, we induced a mild form of overtraining in a group of endurance athletes, which we compared to a group of normally trained athletes on behavioral tasks performed during fMRI scanning. At the behavioral level, training overload enhanced impulsivity in economic choice, which was captured by a bias favoring immediate over delayed rewards in our computational model. At the neural level, training overload resulted in diminished activation of the lateral prefrontal cortex, a key region of the cognitive control system, during economic choice. Our results therefore provide causal evidence for a functional link between enduring physical exercise and exerting cognitive control. Besides, the concept of cognitive control fatigue bridges the functional consequences of excessive physical training and intellectual work into a single neuro-computational mechanism, which might contribute to other clinical forms of burnout syndromes.

Thinking in action: Need for Cognition predicts Self-Control together with Action Orientation

Need for Cognition describes relatively stable interindividual differences in cognitive motivation. Previous research has shown relations of Need for Cognition to Self-Control–a capacity that can be broadly defined as resistance to temptation–yet, the processes underlying this relation remain unclear. One explanation for the prediction of Self-Control by Need for Cognition can be an increased motivation to invest cognitive effort with higher levels of Need for Cognition. Another possible link could be that individual differences in the implementation of Self-Control intentions may play a moderating or mediating role for the predictive value of Need for Cognition. Such individual differences in the self-motivated initiation and maintenance of intentions are described by dispositional Action Orientation. Therefore, in the present study, Action Orientation was examined with regard to its possible role in explaining the relation of Need for Cognition to Self-Control. In a sample of 1209 young adults, Self-Control was assessed with two different self-report instruments and moderation and mediation models of the relationship between Need for Cognition, Action Orientation, and Self-Control were tested. While there was no evidence for a moderating role of Action Orientation in explaining the relation of Need for Cognition and Self-Control, Action Orientation was found to partly mediate this relation with a remaining direct effect of Need for Cognition on Self-Control. These results add to the conceptual understanding of Need for Cognition and demonstrate the relevance of trait variables to predict Self-Control.

Affect and cognitive control: Insights from research on effort mobilization

We present theory and research on effort mobilization that is relevant for understanding the role of affect in cognitive control. We posit that cognitive control and effort are closely related and introduce motivational intensity theory and supporting empirical evidence mainly based on cardiovascular measures of effort. Most important, we discuss the role of affect in the context of effort mobilization and cognitive control from different perspectives. We first present theories predicting affective influences on effort, namely the mood-behavior-model and the implicit-affect-primes-effort model, and supporting empirical evidence. Second, we discuss further implications of the resource conservation principle highlighting the aversive aspect of effort and review evidence for the impact of value and its affective component on effort and cognitive control. Finally, we present a recent integration of the neural mechanisms underlying both effort and cognitive control. We conclude that affective processes are necessary and instrumental for both effort mobilization and cognitive control.

Monitor yourself! Deficient error-related brain activity predicts real-life self-control failures

Despite their immense relevance, the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying real-life self-control failures (SCFs) are insufficiently understood. Whereas previous studies have shown that SCFs were associated with decreased activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG; a region involved in cognitive control), here we consider the possibility that the reduced implementation of cognitive control in individuals with low self-control may be due to impaired performance monitoring. Following a brain-as-predictor approach, we combined experience sampling of daily SCFs with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in a Stroop task. In our sample of 118 participants, proneness to SCF was reliably predicted by low error-related activation of a performance-monitoring network (comprising anterior mid-cingulate cortex, presupplementary motor area, and anterior insula), low posterror rIFG activation, and reduced posterror slowing. Remarkably, these neural and behavioral measures predicted variability in SCFs beyond what was predicted by self-reported trait self-control. These results suggest that real-life SCFs may result from deficient performance monitoring, leading to reduced recruitment of cognitive control after responses that conflict with superordinate goals.

High Self-Control Reduces Risk Preference: The Role of Connectivity Between Right Orbitofrontal Cortex and Right Anterior Cingulate Cortex

Risk preference, the preference for risky choices over safe alternatives, has a great impact on many fields, such as physical health, sexual safety and financial decision making. Ample behavioral research has attested that inadequate self-control can give rise to high risk preference. However, little is known about the neural substrates underlying the effect of self-control on risk preference. To address this issue, we combined voxel-based morphometry (VBM) with resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) analyses to explore the neural basis underlying the effect of self-control on risk preference across two independent samples. In sample 1 (99 participants; 47 males; 20.37 ± 1.63 years), the behavioral results indicated that the scores of self-control were significantly and negatively correlated with risk preference (indexed by gambling rate). The VBM analyses demonstrated that the higher risk preference was correlated with smaller gray matter volumes in right orbitofrontal cortex (rOFC) and right posterior parietal cortex. In the independent sample 2 (80 participants; 33 males; 20.33 ± 1.83 years), the RSFC analyses ascertained that the functional connectivity of rOFC and right anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) was positively associated with risk preference. Furthermore, the mediation analysis identified that self-control mediated the impact of functional connectivity of rOFC-rACC on risk preference. These findings suggest the functional coupling between the rOFC and rACC might account for the association between self-control and risk preference. The present study extends our understanding on the relationship between self-control and risk preference, and reveals possible neural underpinnings underlying this association.

The transdiagnostic structure of mental effort avoidance

The law of least mental effort states that, everything else being equal, the brain tries to minimize mental effort expenditure during task performance by avoiding decisions that require greater cognitive demands. Prior studies have shown associations between disruptions in effort expenditure and specific psychiatric illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia and depression) or clinically-related symptoms and traits (e.g., anhedonia and apathy), yet no research has explored this issue transdiagnostically. Specifically, this research has largely focused on a single diagnostic category, symptom, or trait. However, abnormalities in effort expression could be related to several different psychiatrically-relevant constructs that cut across diagnostic boundaries. Therefore, we examined the relationship between avoidance of mental effort and a diverse set of clinically-related symptoms and traits, and transdiagnostic latent factors in a large sample (n = 811). Only lack of perseverance, a dimension of impulsiveness, was associated with increased avoidance of mental effort. In contrast, several constructs were associated with less mental effort avoidance, including positive urgency, distress intolerance, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, disordered eating, and a factor consisting of compulsive behavior and intrusive thoughts. These findings demonstrate that deviations from normative effort expenditure are associated with a number of constructs that are common to several forms of psychiatric illness.

Cue awareness in avoiding effortful control

Based on a recent metacognitive account, cognitive effort is the result of an inferential evaluation made over explicitly available cues. Following from this account, we present here a pre-registered experiment that tested the specific hypothesis that explicit awareness of cues that are aligned with cognitive demand is a prerequisite in avoiding effortful lines of action. We attempted to modulate levels of effort avoidance behavior by introducing an incentive (between-subjects) to monitor two lines of action that, unbeknownst to individuals, varied in the probability of a task switch. Importantly, previous research has demonstrated that the difference in these probabilities is relatively opaque to individuals. We did not find strong evidence for our incentive manipulation having an effect on demand avoidance as indexed by individuals' choices in a block of the task where avoiding effort was instructed. However, we do find that being aware of the task-switching cue appears to increase the likelihood of demand avoidance. We consider these results within the context of the metacognition of cognitive effort.

Similar Neural Correlates of Planning and Execution to Inhibit Continuing Actions

Inhibition of action is involved in stopping a movement, as well as terminating unnecessary movement during performance of a behavior. The inhibition of single actions, known as response inhibition (Inhibition of the urge to respond before or after actions) has been widely investigated using the go/no-go task and stop signal task. However, few studies focused on phase and volition-related inhibition after an action has been initiated. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural correlates of planning and execution underlying the voluntary inhibition of ongoing action. We collected fMRI data while participants performed a continuous finger-tapping task involving voluntary and involuntary (externally directed) inhibition, and during the initiation of movement. The results revealed areas of significantly greater activation during the preparation of inhibition of an ongoing action during voluntary inhibition, compared with involuntary inhibition, in the supplementary (SMA) and pre-supplementary motor areas, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), inferior parietal lobe, bilateral globus pallidus/putamen, bilateral insula and premotor cortex. Focusing on the period of execution of inhibition of ongoing actions, an event-related fMRI analysis revealed significant activation in the SMA, middle cingulate cortex, bilateral insula, right IFG and inferior parietal cortex. Additional comparative analyses suggested that brain activation while participants were planning to inhibit an ongoing action was similar to that during planning to start an action, indicating that the same neural substrates of motor planning may be recruited even when an action is ongoing. The present finding that brain activation associated with inhibiting ongoing actions was compatible with that seen in response inhibition (urge to stop before/after actions) suggests that common inhibitory mechanisms for motor movement are involved in both actual and planned motor action, which makes our behavior keep going seamlessly.

Feeling the force: Changes in a left-lateralized network of brain areas under simulated workday conditions are reflected in subjective mental effort investment

Investing mental effort is costly, and the investment has to be matched by a reward to make a person engage in task performance. However, the neural structures underlying the continued management of mental effort are not known. Previous work has identified left-lateralized structures, most prominently the left anterior Insular Cortex (aIC) as regions implied in post-hoc evaluation and also anticipation of mental effort investment. We present a study aimed at identifying neural structures that are sensitive to changes in both task load and fatigue-induced state load. Sixteen healthy participants performed an n-back task before and after a fatigue-inducing day in a helicopter simulator or a free day. Subjective mental effort ratings showed an interaction of the effects of both task and state load changes, with a reduced effect of task load during the fatigued state. Testing for the same interaction effect in a whole-brain functional MRI data, we found a left-lateralized group of clusters in aIC, the anterior cingulate cortex, the dorsal striatum and frontal eye field and M1. We discuss the possible role of these areas and also the relevance of our findings in the light of the proposed opportunity cost model of mental effort.

Response time distribution parameters show posterror behavioral adjustment in mental arithmetic

After making an error, we usually slow down before our next response. This phenomenon is known as the posterror slowing (PES) effect. It has been interpreted to be an indicator of posterror behavioral adjustments and, therefore, has been linked to cognitive control. However, contradictory findings regarding PES and posterror accuracy cast doubt on such a relation. To determine whether behavior is adjusted after making an error, we investigated other features of behavior, such as the distribution of response times (RT) in a mental arithmetic task. Participants performed an arithmetic task with (Experiments 1 and 2) and without (Experiment 1) an accuracy-tracking procedure. On both tasks, participants responded more slowly and less accurately after errors. However, the RT distribution was more symmetrical on posterror trials compared to postcorrect trials, suggesting that a change in processing mode occurred after making an error, thus linking cognitive control to error monitoring, even in cases when accuracy decreased after errors. These findings expand our understanding on how posterror behavior is adjusted in mental arithmetic, and we propose that the measures of the RT distribution can be further used in other domains of error-monitoring research.

The real-life costs of emotion regulation in anorexia nervosa: a combined ecological momentary assessment and fMRI study

Regulation of emotions is necessary for successful attainment of short-term and long-term goals. However, over-regulation may also have its costs. In anorexia nervosa (AN), forgoing food intake despite emaciation and endocrine signals that promote eating is an example of "too much" self-control. Here we investigated whether voluntary emotion regulation in AN patients comes with associated disorder-relevant costs. Thirty-five patients with acute AN and thirty-five age-matched healthy controls (HCs) performed an established emotion regulation paradigm during functional magnetic resonance imaging after an overnight fast. The task required reducing emotions induced by positively valenced pictures via distancing. We calculated a neural regulation score from responses recorded in a reward-related brain region of interest (ventral striatum; VS) by subtracting activation measured on "positive distance" trials from that elicited under the "positive watch" (baseline) condition. Complementing the imaging data, we used ecological momentary assessment (EMA) to probe disorder-related rumination and affect six times/day for 2 weeks following the scanning session. The neural regulation score indicating reduced VS activation during emotion regulation was used as a predictor in hierarchical linear models with EMA measures as outcomes. No group differences in neural activity were found for the main contrasts of the task. However, regulation of VS activity was associated with increased body-related rumination and increased negative affect in AN, but not in HC. In line with this finding, correlational analysis with longitudinal BMI measurements revealed a link between greater VS regulation and poorer treatment outcome after 60 and 90 days. Together, these results identify a neural correlate of altered emotion regulation in AN, which seems to be detrimental to psychological well-being and may interfere with recovery.

The persuasion network is modulated by drug-use risk and predicts anti-drug message effectiveness

While a persuasion network has been proposed, little is known about how network connections between brain regions contribute to attitude change. Two possible mechanisms have been advanced. One hypothesis predicts that attitude change results from increased connectivity between structures implicated in affective and executive processing in response to increases in argument strength. A second functional perspective suggests that highly arousing messages reduce connectivity between structures implicated in the encoding of sensory information, which disrupts message processing and thereby inhibits attitude change. However, persuasion is a multi-determined construct that results from both message features and audience characteristics. Therefore, persuasive messages should lead to specific functional connectivity patterns among a priori defined structures within the persuasion network. The present study exposed 28 subjects to anti-drug public service announcements where arousal, argument strength, and subject drug-use risk were systematically varied. Psychophysiological interaction analyses provide support for the affective-executive hypothesis but not for the encoding-disruption hypothesis. Secondary analyses show that video-level connectivity patterns among structures within the persuasion network predict audience responses in independent samples (one college-aged, one nationally representative). We propose that persuasion neuroscience research is best advanced by considering network-level effects while accounting for interactions between message features and target audience characteristics.

A Novel Communication Value Task Demonstrates Evidence of Response Bias in Cases with Presbyacusis

Decision-making about the expected value of an experience or behavior can explain hearing health behaviors in older adults with hearing loss. Forty-four middle-aged to older adults (68.45 ± 7.73 years) performed a task in which they were asked to decide whether information from a surgeon or an administrative assistant would be important to their health in hypothetical communication scenarios across visual signal-to-noise ratios (SNR). Participants also could choose to view the briefly presented sentences multiple times. The number of these effortful attempts to read the stimuli served as a measure of demand for information to make a health importance decision. Participants with poorer high frequency hearing more frequently decided that information was important to their health compared to participants with better high frequency hearing. This appeared to reflect a response bias because participants with high frequency hearing loss demonstrated shorter response latencies when they rated the sentences as important to their health. However, elevated high frequency hearing thresholds did not predict demand for information to make a health importance decision. The results highlight the utility of a performance-based measure to characterize effort and expected value from performing tasks in older adults with hearing loss.

Choosing attentional control settings in a dynamically changing environment

Goal-directed attentional control supports efficient visual search by prioritizing relevant stimuli in the environment. Previous research has shown that goal-directed control can be configured in many ways, and often multiple control settings can be used to achieve the same goal. However, little is known about how control settings are selected. We explored the extent to which the configuration of goal-directed control is driven by performance maximization (optimally configuring settings to maximize speed and accuracy) and effort minimization (selecting the least effortful settings). We used a new paradigm, adaptive choice visual search, which allows participants to choose one of two available targets (a red or a blue square) on each trial. Distractor colors vary predictively across trials, such that the optimal target switches back and forth throughout the experiment. Results (N = 43) show that participants chose the optimal target most often, updating to the new target when the environment changed, supporting performance maximization. However, individuals were sluggish to update to the optimal color, consistent with effort minimization. Additionally, we found a surprisingly high rate of nonoptimal choices and switching between targets, which could not be explained by either factor. Analysis of participants' self-reported search strategy revealed substantial individual differences in the control strategies used. In sum, the adaptive choice visual search enables a fresh approach to studying goal-directed control. The results contribute new evidence that control is partly determined by both performance maximization and effort minimization, as well as at least one additional factor, which we speculate to include novelty seeking.

Self-Control as Value-Based Choice

Self-control is often conceived as a battle between "hot" impulsive processes and "cold" deliberative ones. Heeding the angel on one shoulder leads to success; following the demon on the other leads to failure. Self-control feels like a duality. What if that sensation is misleading, and, despite how they feel, self-control decisions are just like any other choice? We argue that self-control is a form of value-based choice wherein options are assigned a subjective value and a decision is made through a dynamic integration process. We articulate how a value-based choice model of self-control can capture its phenomenology and account for relevant behavioral and neuroscientific data. This conceptualization of self-control links divergent scientific approaches, allows for more robust and precise hypothesis testing, and suggests novel pathways to improve self-control.

The Cost of Structure Learning

Human learning is highly efficient and flexible. A key contributor to this learning flexibility is our ability to generalize new information across contexts that we know require the same behavior and to transfer rules to new contexts we encounter. To do this, we structure the information we learn and represent it hierarchically as abstract, context-dependent rules that constrain lower-level stimulus-action-outcome contingencies. Previous research showed that humans create such structure even when it is not needed, presumably because it usually affords long-term generalization benefits. However, computational models predict that creating structure is costly, with slower learning and slower RTs. We tested this prediction in a new behavioral experiment. Participants learned to select correct actions for four visual patterns, in a setting that either afforded (but did not promote) structure learning or enforced nonhierarchical learning, while controlling for the difficulty of the learning problem. Results replicated our previous finding that healthy young adults create structure even when unneeded and that this structure affords later generalization. Furthermore, they supported our prediction that structure learning incurred a major learning cost and that this cost was specifically tied to the effort in selecting abstract rules, leading to more errors when applying those rules. These findings confirm our theory that humans pay a high short-term cost in learning structure to enable longer-term benefits in learning flexibility.

A Multilab Preregistered Replication of the Ego-Depletion Effect

Good self-control has been linked to adaptive outcomes such as better health, cohesive personal relationships, success in the workplace and at school, and less susceptibility to crime and addictions. In contrast, self-control failure is linked to maladaptive outcomes. Understanding the mechanisms by which self-control predicts behavior may assist in promoting better regulation and outcomes. A popular approach to understanding self-control is the strength or resource depletion model. Self-control is conceptualized as a limited resource that becomes depleted after a period of exertion resulting in self-control failure. The model has typically been tested using a sequential-task experimental paradigm, in which people completing an initial self-control task have reduced self-control capacity and poorer performance on a subsequent task, a state known as ego depletion Although a meta-analysis of ego-depletion experiments found a medium-sized effect, subsequent meta-analyses have questioned the size and existence of the effect and identified instances of possible bias. The analyses served as a catalyst for the current Registered Replication Report of the ego-depletion effect. Multiple laboratories (k = 23, total N = 2,141) conducted replications of a standardized ego-depletion protocol based on a sequential-task paradigm by Sripada et al. Meta-analysis of the studies revealed that the size of the ego-depletion effect was small with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) that encompassed zero (d = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.15]. We discuss implications of the findings for the ego-depletion effect and the resource depletion model of self-control.

Cognitive states influence dopamine-driven aberrant learning in Parkinson's disease

Individual differences in dopaminergic tone underlie tendencies to learn from reward versus punishment. These effects are well documented in Parkinson's patients, who vacillate between low and high tonic dopaminergic states as a function of medication. Yet very few studies have investigated the influence of higher-level cognitive states known to affect downstream dopaminergic learning in Parkinson's patients. A dopamine-dependent cognitive influence over learning would provide a candidate mechanism for declining cognitive integrity and motivation in Parkinson's patients. In this report we tested the influence of two high-level cognitive states (cost of conflict and value of volition) that have recently been shown to cause predictable learning biases in healthy young adults as a function of dopamine receptor subtype and dopaminergic challenge. It was hypothesized that Parkinson's patients OFF medication would have an enhanced cost of conflict and a decreased value of volition, and that these effects would be remediated or reversed ON medication. Participants included N = 28 Parkinson's disease patients who were each tested ON and OFF dopaminergic medication and 28 age- and sex-matched controls. The expected cost of conflict effect was observed in Parkinson's patients OFF versus ON medication, but only in those that were more recently diagnosed (<5 years). We found an unexpected effect in the value of volition task: medication compromised the ability to learn from difficult a-volitional (instructed) choices. This novel finding was also enhanced in recently diagnosed patients. The difference in learning biases ON versus OFF medication between these two tasks was strongly correlated, bolstering the idea that they tapped into a common underlying imbalance in dopaminergic tone that is particularly variable in earlier stage Parkinsonism. The finding that these decision biases are specific to earlier but not later stage disease may offer a chance for future studies to quantify phenotypic expressions of idiosyncratic disease progression.

On Integrating the Components of Self-Control

As the science of self-control matures, the organization and integration of its key concepts becomes increasingly important. In response, we identified seven major components or "nodes" in current theories and research bearing on self-control: desire, higher order goal, desire-goal conflict, control motivation, control capacity, control effort, and enactment constraints. To unify these diverse and interdisciplinary areas of research, we formulated the interplay of these components in an integrative model of self-control. In this model, desire and an at least partly incompatible higher order goal generate desire-goal conflict, which activates control motivation. Control motivation and control capacity interactively determine potential control effort. The actual control effort invested is determined by several moderators, including desire strength, perceived skill, and competing goals. Actual control effort and desire strength compete to determine a prevailing force, which ultimately determines behavior, provided that enactment constraints do not impede it. The proposed theoretical framework is useful for highlighting several new directions for research on self-control and for classifying self-control failures and self-control interventions.

The relationship between intertemporal choice and following the path of least resistance across choices, preferences, and beliefs

The degree to which individuals prefer smaller sooner versus larger delayed rewards serves as a powerful predictor of their impulsivity towards a number of different kinds of rewards. Here we test the limits of its predictive ability within a variety of cognitive and social domains. Across several large samples of subjects, individuals who prefer smaller more immediate rewards (steeper discounters) are less reflective (or more impulsive) in their choices, preferences, and beliefs. First, steeper discounters used more automatic, less controlled choice strategies, giving more intuitive but incorrect responses on the Cognitive Reflection Test (replicating previous findings); employing a suboptimal probability matching heuristic for a one-shot gamble (rather than maximizing their probability of reward); and relying less on optimal planning in a two-stage reinforcement learning task. Second, steeper discounters preferred to consume information that was less complex and multi-faceted, as suggested by their self-reported Need for Cognitive Closure, their use of short-form social media (i.e., Twitter), and their preferred news sources (in particular, whether or not they preferred National Public Radio over other news sources). Third, steeper discounters had interpersonal and religious beliefs that are associated with reduced epistemic complexity: they were more likely to believe that the behavior of others could be explained by fixed rather than dynamic factors, and they believed more strongly in God and in the afterlife. Together these findings provide evidence for a link between individual differences in temporal discounting for monetary rewards and preferences for the path of least resistance (less reflective and/or more automatic modes of processing) across a variety of domains.