Distinguishing the Neural Correlates of Perceptual Awareness and Postperceptual Processing

Intracranial neural representation of phenomenal and access consciousness in the human brain

After more than 30 years of extensive investigation, impressive progress has been made in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). However, the functional role of spatiotemporally distinct consciousness-related neural activity in conscious perception is debated. An influential framework proposed that consciousness-related neural activities could be dissociated into two distinct processes: phenomenal and access consciousness. However, though hotly debated, its authenticity has not been examined in a single paradigm with more informative intracranial recordings. In the present study, we employed a visual awareness task and recorded the local field potential (LFP) of patients with electrodes implanted in cortical and subcortical regions. Overall, we found that the latency of visual awareness-related activity exhibited a bimodal distribution, and the recording sites with short and long latencies were largely separated in location, except in the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC). The mixture of short and long latencies in the lPFC indicates that it plays a critical role in linking phenomenal and access consciousness. However, the division between the two is not as simple as the central sulcus, as proposed previously. Moreover, in 4 patients with electrodes implanted in the bilateral prefrontal cortex, early awareness-related activity was confined to the contralateral side, while late awareness-related activity appeared on both sides. Finally, Granger causality analysis showed that awareness-related information flowed from the early sites to the late sites. These results provide the first LFP evidence of neural correlates of phenomenal and access consciousness, which sheds light on the spatiotemporal dynamics of NCC in the human brain.

The Role of Momentary Dissociation in the Sensory Cortex: A Neurophysiological Review and its Implications for Maladaptive Daydreaming

Daydreaming, a form of spontaneous and self-generated mental process, may lead to the disintegration of attention from the immediate external environment. In extreme cases, patients may develop maladaptive daydreaming comorbid with dissociation. The examination of dissociative alterations frequently occurs within the framework of complex cognitive processes. While dissociation may be a neurological and psychological dysfunction of integration, transient dissociative occurrences, i.e., momentary dissociation may signify a dynamic interplay between attentional division and orientation within the sensory cortex. Furthermore, previous studies have recorded the interactivity of attention by stimuli onset with P3 event-related potentials and the active suppression of distractor positivity. In this context, during auditory and visual mismatch negativity, the sensory cortex may interact with attentional orientation. Additionally, distractor positivity during task-relevant stimuli may play a crucial role in predicting momentary dissociation since sensory cortices share cerebral correlates with attentional fluctuations during mental imagery. Thus, this theoretical review investigated the cerebral activities associated with attentional orientation and may be extended to mindfulness. By integrating these findings, we aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of dissociative states which may lead to a resolution for dissociative psychopathology.

The influence of spatial and temporal attention on visual awareness-a behavioral and ERP study

Whether attention is a prerequisite of perceptual awareness or an independent and dissociable process remains a matter of debate. Importantly, understanding the relation between attention and awareness is probably not possible without taking into account the fact that both are heterogeneous and multifaceted mechanisms. Therefore, the present study tested the impact on visual awareness of two attentional mechanisms proposed by the Posner model: temporal alerting and spatio-temporal orienting. Specifically, we evaluated the effects of attention on the perceptual level, by measuring objective and subjective awareness of a threshold-level stimulus; and on the neural level, by investigating how attention affects two postulated event-related potential correlates of awareness. We found that alerting and orienting mechanisms additively facilitate perceptual consciousness, with activation of the latter resulting in the most vivid awareness. Furthermore, we found that late positivity is unlikely to constitute a neural correlate of consciousness as its amplitude was modulated by both attentional mechanisms, but early visual awareness negativity was independent of the alerting and orienting mechanisms. In conclusion, our study reveals a nuanced relationship between attention and awareness; moreover, by investigating the effect of the alerting mechanism, this study provides insights into the role of temporal attention in perceptual consciousness.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

Early Electrophysiological Correlates of Perceptual Consciousness Are Affected by Both Exogenous and Endogenous Attention

It has been proposed that visual awareness negativity (VAN), which is an early ERP component, constitutes a neural correlate of visual consciousness that is independent of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms. In the present study, we investigated whether VAN is indeed a specific marker of phenomenal awareness or rather reflects the involvement of attention. To this end, we reanalyzed data collected in a previously published EEG experiment in which awareness of visual stimuli and two aspects that define attentional involvement, namely, the inherent saliency and task relevance of a stimulus, were manipulated orthogonally. During the experimental procedure, participants (n = 41) were presented with images of faces that were backward-masked or unmasked, fearful or neutral, and defined as task-relevant targets or task-irrelevant distractors. Single-trial ERP analysis revealed that VAN was highly dependent on attentional manipulations in the early time window (140-200 msec), up to the point that the effect of awareness was not observed for attentionally irrelevant stimuli (i.e., neutral faces presented as distractors). In the late time window (200-350 msec), VAN was present in all attentional conditions, but its amplitude was significantly higher in response to fearful faces and task-relevant face images than in response to neutral ones and task-irrelevant ones, respectively. In conclusion, we demonstrate that the amplitude of VAN is highly dependent on both exogenous (stimulus saliency) and endogenous attention (task requirements). Our results challenge the view that VAN constitutes an attention-independent correlate of phenomenal awareness.

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

Late Positivity Correlates with Subjective Reports: Evidence from the Low-frequency and High-frequency Reporting Tasks

Identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is an important way to understand the fundamental nature of consciousness. By recording event-related potentials (ERPs) using EEG, researchers have found three potential electrophysiological NCCs: early positive correlate of consciousness (enhanced P1), visual awareness negativity (VAN), and late positivity (LP). However, LP may reflect post-perceptual processing associated with subjective reports rather than consciousness per se. The present experiment investigated the relationship between LP and subjective reports. We adopted two subjective reporting tasks that differed in the requirement for subjective reports. In the low-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in 25% of trials, whereas in the high-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in each trial. Behavioral results showed that the hit rates were lower and false alarm rates were higher on reporting trials in low-frequency reporting tasks than on reporting trials in high-frequency reporting tasks. Unexpectedly, VAN was larger on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task. Importantly, our ERP results showed that LP was larger on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task. Thus, our findings indicated that when the frequency of reports was increased, the task relevance of the stimuli increased, which led to larger LP amplitudes. These findings suggest that LP correlates with subjective reports.

Electrophysiological correlates of sustained conscious perception

Previous research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in visual perception revealed an early event-related potential (ERP), the visual awareness negativity (VAN), to be associated with stimulus awareness. However, due to the use of brief stimulus presentations in previous studies, it remains unclear whether awareness-related negativities represent a transient onset-related response or correspond to the duration of a conscious percept. Studies are required that allow prolonged stimulus presentation under aware and unaware conditions. The present ERP study aimed to tackle this challenge by using a novel stimulation design. Male and female human participants (n = 62) performed a visual task while task-irrelevant line stimuli were presented in the background for either 500 or 1000 ms. The line stimuli sometimes contained a face, which needed so-called visual one-shot learning to be seen. Half of the participants were informed about the presence of the face, resulting in faces being perceived by the informed but not by the uninformed participants. Comparing ERPs between the informed and uninformed group revealed an enhanced negativity over occipitotemporal electrodes that persisted for the entire duration of stimulus presentation. Our results suggest that sustained visual awareness negativities (SVAN) are associated with the duration of stimulus presentation.

Conscious perception of fear in faces: Insights from high-density EEG and perceptual awareness scale with threshold stimuli

Contrary to the extensive research on processing subliminal and/or unattended emotional facial expressions, only a minority of studies have investigated the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) of emotions conveyed by faces. In the present high-density electroencephalography (EEG) study, we first employed a staircase procedure to identify each participant's perceptual threshold of the emotion expressed by the face and then compared the EEG signals elicited in trials where the participants were aware with the activity elicited in trials where participants were unaware of the emotions expressed by these, otherwise identical, faces. Drawing on existing knowledge of the neural mechanisms of face processing and NCCs, we hypothesized that activity in frontal electrodes would be modulated in relation to participants' awareness of facial emotional content. More specifically, we hypothesized that the NCC of fear seen on someone else's face could be detected as a modulation of a later and more anterior (i.e., at frontal sites) event-related potential (ERP) than the face-sensitive N170. By adopting a data-driven approach and cluster-based statistics to the analysis of EEG signals, the results were clear-cut in showing that visual awareness of fear was associated with the modulation of a frontal ERP component in a 150-300 msec interval. These insights are dissected and contextualized in relation to prevailing theories of visual consciousness and their proposed NCC benchmarks.

Feedforward connectivity patterns from visual areas to the front of the brain contain information about sensory stimuli regardless of awareness or report

Current theories of consciousness can be categorized to some extent by their predictions about the putative role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception. One family of the theories proposes that the PFC is necessary for conscious perception. The other postulates that the PFC is not necessary and that other areas (e.g., posterior cortical areas) are more important for conscious perception. No-report paradigms could potentially arbitrate the debate as they disentangle task reporting from conscious perception. While previous no-report paradigms tend to point to a reduction in PFC activity, they have not examined the critical role of the PFC in "monitoring" or "reading out" the patterns of activity in the sensory cortex to generate conscious perception. To address this, we reanalysed electroencephalography (EEG) data from a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm (Shafto & Pitts, 2015). We examined the role of feedforward input patterns to the PFC from sensory cortices. We employed nonparametric spectral Granger causality and quantified the amount of information that reflected the contents of consciousness using multivariate classifiers. Unexpectedly, regardless of whether the stimulus was consciously seen or not, we found that information relating to the current sensory stimulus was present in the pattern of inputs from visual areas to the PFC. In light of these findings, we suggest various theories of consciousness need to be revised to accommodate the fact that the contents of consciousness are decodable from the input patterns from posterior sensory regions to the PFC, regardless of awareness (or report).

Isolating Neural Signatures of Conscious Speech Perception with a No-Report Sine-Wave Speech Paradigm

Identifying neural correlates of conscious perception is a fundamental endeavor of cognitive neuroscience. Most studies so far have focused on visual awareness along with trial-by-trial reports of task-relevant stimuli, which can confound neural measures of perceptual awareness with postperceptual processing. Here, we used a three-phase sine-wave speech paradigm that dissociated between conscious speech perception and task relevance while recording EEG in humans of both sexes. Compared with tokens perceived as noise, physically identical sine-wave speech tokens that were perceived as speech elicited a left-lateralized, near-vertex negativity, which we interpret as a phonological version of a perceptual awareness negativity. This response appeared between 200 and 300 ms after token onset and was not present for frequency-flipped control tokens that were never perceived as speech. In contrast, the P3b elicited by task-irrelevant tokens did not significantly differ when the tokens were perceived as speech versus noise and was only enhanced for tokens that were both perceived as speech and relevant to the task. Our results extend the findings from previous studies on visual awareness and speech perception and suggest that correlates of conscious perception, across types of conscious content, are most likely to be found in midlatency negative-going brain responses in content-specific sensory areas.

Distrust before first sight? Examining knowledge- and appearance-based effects of trustworthiness on the visual consciousness of faces

The present EEG study with 32 healthy participants investigated whether affective knowledge about a person influences the visual awareness of their face, additionally considering the impact of facial appearance. Faces differing in perceived trustworthiness based on appearance were associated with negative or neutral social information and shown as target stimuli in an attentional blink task. As expected, participants showed enhanced awareness of faces associated with negative compared to neutral social information. On the neurophysiological level, this effect was connected to differences in the time range of the early posterior negativity (EPN)-a component associated with enhanced attention and facilitated processing of emotional stimuli. The findings indicate that the social-affective relevance of a face based on emotional knowledge is accessed during a phase of attentional enhancement for conscious perception and can affect prioritization for awareness. In contrast, no clear evidence for influences of facial trustworthiness during the attentional blink was found.

Multimodal acoustic-electric trigeminal nerve stimulation modulates conscious perception

Multimodal stimulation can reverse pathological neural activity and improve symptoms in neuropsychiatric diseases. Recent research shows that multimodal acoustic-electric trigeminal-nerve stimulation (TNS) (i.e., musical stimulation synchronized to electrical stimulation of the trigeminal nerve) can improve consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness. However, the reliability and mechanism of this novel approach remain largely unknown. We explored the effects of multimodal acoustic-electric TNS in healthy human participants by assessing conscious perception before and after stimulation using behavioral and neural measures in tactile and auditory target-detection tasks. To explore the mechanisms underlying the putative effects of acoustic-electric stimulation, we fitted a biologically plausible neural network model to the neural data using dynamic causal modeling. We observed that (1) acoustic-electric stimulation improves conscious tactile perception without a concomitant change in auditory perception, (2) this improvement is caused by the interplay of the acoustic and electric stimulation rather than any of the unimodal stimulation alone, and (3) the effect of acoustic-electric stimulation on conscious perception correlates with inter-regional connection changes in a recurrent neural processing model. These results provide evidence that acoustic-electric TNS can promote conscious perception. Alterations in inter-regional cortical connections might be the mechanism by which acoustic-electric TNS achieves its consciousness benefits.

The exclusionary approach to consciousness

The standard approach in the field of consciousness research involves identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) by comparing neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials. However, this method has been met with criticism due to the lack of consensus on how to operationalize and measure consciousness. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach: the exclusionary approach. Rather than utilizing near-threshold conditions to contrast conscious and unconscious trials, this approach leverages the widely accepted notion that subjective reports are reliable under normal conditions. I propose that this can be done by assessing whether consciousness remains stable across trials while manipulating other factors such as reports, tasks, stimulation, or attention. We can use the resulting contrast to exclude certain kinds of neural activity as candidate NCCs. This method produces results that are less contentious, allowing for the establishment of hard criteria for theories of consciousness. Additionally, this approach does not require the development of new research paradigms, but can incorporate existing studies, particularly those aimed at identifying confounding factors in the standard approach. It is important to note, however, that the proposed exclusionary approach does not negate the value of the identification approach. Rather, they should be considered as complementary methods.

Neural electrophysiological correlates of detection and identification awareness

Humans have conscious experiences of the events in their environment. Previous research from electroencephalography (EEG) has shown visual awareness negativity (VAN) at about 200 ms to be a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC). However, when considering VAN as an NCC, it is important to explore which particular experiences are associated with VAN. Recent research proposes that VAN is an NCC of lower-level experiences (detection) rather than higher-level experiences (identification). However, previous results are mixed and have several limitations. In the present study, the stimulus was a ring with a Gabor patch tilting either left or right. On each trial, subjects rated their awareness on a three-level perceptual awareness scale that captured both detection (something vs. nothing) and identification (identification vs. something). Separate staircases were used to adjust stimulus opacity to the detection threshold and the identification threshold. Bayesian linear mixed models provided extreme evidence (BF10 = 131) that VAN was stronger at the detection threshold than at the identification threshold. Mean VAN decreased from [Formula: see text]2.12 microV [[Formula: see text]2.86, [Formula: see text]1.42] at detection to [Formula: see text]0.46 microV [[Formula: see text]0.79, [Formula: see text]0.11] at identification. These results strongly support the claim that VAN is an NCC of lower-level experiences of seeing something rather than of higher-level experiences of specific properties of the stimuli. Thus, results are consistent with recurrent processing theory in that phenomenal visual consciousness is reflected by VAN. Further, results emphasize that it is important to consider the level of experience when searching for NCC.

Faces capture spatial attention only when we want them to: An inattentional blindness EEG study

Previous research on emotional face processing has shown that emotional faces such as fearful faces may be processed without visual awareness. However, evidence for nonconscious attention capture by fearful faces is limited. In fact, studies using sensory manipulation of awareness (e.g., backward masking paradigms) have shown that fearful faces do not attract attention during subliminal viewings nor when they were task-irrelevant. Here, we used a three-phase inattentional blindness paradigm and electroencephalography to examine whether faces (fearful and neutral) capture attention under different conditions of awareness and task-relevancy. We found that the electrophysiological marker for attention capture, the N2-posterior-contralateral (N2pc), was elicited by face stimuli only when participants were aware of the faces and when they were task-relevant (phase 3). When participants were unaware of the presence of faces (phase 1) or when the faces were irrelevant to the task (phase 2), no N2pc was observed. Together with our previous work, we concluded that fearful faces, or faces in general, do not attract attention unless we want them to.

How 'visual' is the visual cortex? The interactions between the visual cortex and other sensory, motivational and motor systems as enabling factors for visual perception

The definition of the visual cortex is primarily based on the evidence that lesions of this area impair visual perception. However, this does not exclude that the visual cortex may process more information than of retinal origin alone, or that other brain structures contribute to vision. Indeed, research across the past decades has shown that non-visual information, such as neural activity related to reward expectation and value, locomotion, working memory and other sensory modalities, can modulate primary visual cortical responses to retinal inputs. Nevertheless, the function of this non-visual information is poorly understood. Here we review recent evidence, coming primarily from studies in rodents, arguing that non-visual and motor effects in visual cortex play a role in visual processing itself, for instance disentangling direct auditory effects on visual cortex from effects of sound-evoked orofacial movement. These findings are placed in a broader framework casting vision in terms of predictive processing under control of frontal, reward- and motor-related systems. In contrast to the prevalent notion that vision is exclusively constructed by the visual cortical system, we propose that visual percepts are generated by a larger network-the extended visual system-spanning other sensory cortices, supramodal areas and frontal systems. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Information-Theoretic Approaches in EEG Correlates of Auditory Perceptual Awareness under Informational Masking

In informational masking paradigms, the successful segregation between the target and masker creates auditory perceptual awareness. The dynamics of the build-up of auditory perception is based on a set of interactions between bottom-up and top-down processes that generate neuronal modifications within the brain network activity. These neural changes are studied here using event-related potentials (ERPs), entropy, and integrated information, leading to several measures applied to electroencephalogram signals. The main findings show that the auditory perceptual awareness stimulated functional activation in the fronto-temporo-parietal brain network through (i) negative temporal and positive centro-parietal ERP components; (ii) an enhanced processing of multi-information in the temporal cortex; and (iii) an increase in informational content in the fronto-central cortex. These different results provide information-based experimental evidence about the functional activation of the fronto-temporo-parietal brain network during auditory perceptual awareness.

Feedback information sharing in the human brain reflects bistable perception in the absence of report

In the search for the neural basis of conscious experience, perception and the cognitive processes associated with reporting perception are typically confounded as neural activity is recorded while participants explicitly report what they experience. Here, we present a novel way to disentangle perception from report using eye movement analysis techniques based on convolutional neural networks and neurodynamical analyses based on information theory. We use a bistable visual stimulus that instantiates two well-known properties of conscious perception: integration and differentiation. At any given moment, observers either perceive the stimulus as one integrated unitary object or as two differentiated objects that are clearly distinct from each other. Using electroencephalography, we show that measures of integration and differentiation based on information theory closely follow participants' perceptual experience of those contents when switches were reported. We observed increased information integration between anterior to posterior electrodes (front to back) prior to a switch to the integrated percept, and higher information differentiation of anterior signals leading up to reporting the differentiated percept. Crucially, information integration was closely linked to perception and even observed in a no-report condition when perceptual transitions were inferred from eye movements alone. In contrast, the link between neural differentiation and perception was observed solely in the active report condition. Our results, therefore, suggest that perception and the processes associated with report require distinct amounts of anterior-posterior network communication and anterior information differentiation. While front-to-back directed information is associated with changes in the content of perception when viewing bistable visual stimuli, regardless of report, frontal information differentiation was absent in the no-report condition and therefore is not directly linked to perception per se.

Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness

Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience.

Neural correlates of conscious processing of emotional faces: Evidence from event-related potentials

There is a theoretical debate between the early and late neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Previous studies using neutral face stimuli supported an early NCC and suggested that visual awareness negativity (VAN) is associated with consciousness, while late positivity (LP) reflects post-perceptual activity. However, emotional faces may help to examine the relationship between LP and consciousness due to the differences in late processing between emotional and neutral faces. To explore the effects of facial emotional information on NCCs, the present study manipulated consciousness with the inattentional blindness paradigm and used happy, fearful, and neutral faces as visual stimuli. The results showed that the conscious processing of emotional faces was correlated with VAN and LP, while the conscious processing of neutral faces was associated with VAN. First, the results suggest that VAN is an NCC, and the relationship between LP and consciousness is affected by facial emotional information. Second, VAN reflects the early perceptual experience of emotional faces, whereas LP may reflect the late conscious processing of emotional faces. Furthermore, source localization analysis showed that the LPs of emotional faces were mainly located in the frontal and parietal lobes, whereas those of neutral faces showed no significant activation. This suggests that facial emotional information may affect the brain regions associated with conscious processing. Time-frequency analysis showed that conscious processing is related to the enhancement of alpha and theta oscillation, indicating that conscious processing may be associated with the suppression of irrelevant stimuli. Overall, the present study suggests that the integration of the theories that support early and late NCCs helps explain the conscious processing of emotional faces.

Adaptation in the sensory cortex drives bistable switching during auditory stream segregation

Current theories of perception emphasize the role of neural adaptation, inhibitory competition, and noise as key components that lead to switches in perception. Supporting evidence comes from neurophysiological findings of specific neural signatures in modality-specific and supramodal brain areas that appear to be critical to switches in perception. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to study brain activity around the time of switches in perception while participants listened to a bistable auditory stream segregation stimulus, which can be heard as one integrated stream of tones or two segregated streams of tones. The auditory thalamus showed more activity around the time of a switch from segregated to integrated compared to time periods of stable perception of integrated; in contrast, the rostral anterior cingulate cortex and the inferior parietal lobule showed more activity around the time of a switch from integrated to segregated compared to time periods of stable perception of segregated streams, consistent with prior findings of asymmetries in brain activity depending on the switch direction. In sound-responsive areas in the auditory cortex, neural activity increased in strength preceding switches in perception and declined in strength over time following switches in perception. Such dynamics in the auditory cortex are consistent with the role of adaptation proposed by computational models of visual and auditory bistable switching, whereby the strength of neural activity decreases following a switch in perception, which eventually destabilizes the current percept enough to lead to a switch to an alternative percept.

Neural processing of lateralised task-irrelevant fearful faces under different awareness conditions

The neural fate of task-irrelevant emotional faces under different awareness conditions is poorly understood. Here, we examined the electrophysiological activity during an experiment where the location of target information (contrast-induced line) was manipulated orthogonally to the location of task-irrelevant fearful faces, under subliminal or supraliminal viewing conditions. We found that only target lines elicited an N2-posterior-contralateral (N2pc), indexing spatial attention shifting, in the supraliminal condition. No N2pc was found for the targets in the subliminal condition or for task-irrelevant fearful faces in either conditions. However, the mere presence of a fearful face enhanced early neural activity between 200 and 300 ms only in the subliminal condition. Additionally, the presence of a target line, but not a fearful face, enhanced the P3. Our results suggest that the N2pc is dependent on visual awareness and task-relevancy of the information and that laterally-presented task-irrelevant fearful expressions can be processed without awareness during early visual processing.

Neural correlates of consciousness in an attentional blink paradigm with uncertain target relevance

Several event-related potentials (ERPs) have been proposed as neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), most prominently the early visual awareness negativity (VAN) and the late P3b component. Highly influential support for the P3b comes from studies utilizing the attentional blink (AB), where conscious perception of a first visual target (T1) impairs reporting a second target (T2) presented shortly afterwards. Recent no-report studies using other paradigms suggest that the P3b component may reflect post-perceptual processes associated with decision-making rather than awareness. However, no-report studies are limited in their awareness assessment, and their conclusions have not been tested in an AB paradigm. The present study (N = 38) addressed these issues using a novel AB paradigm, which reduced decision-making processes by omitting a discrimination task on T2 stimuli and rendering their relevance uncertain. Nevertheless, awareness was assessed trial by trial. Comparing ERPs in response to seen versus unseen T2 stimuli revealed a VAN but no enhanced P3b regardless of whether they were marked as distinct from distractor stimuli or not. Our results corroborate the VAN and challenge the P3b as NCC despite rigorous trial-by-trial assessment of conscious perception. Thus, they support the idea that awareness emerges during early sensory processing.

Consciousness as a Memory System

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system-prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system-quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system.

Human visual consciousness involves large scale cortical and subcortical networks independent of task report and eye movement activity

The full neural circuits of conscious perception remain unknown. Using a visual perception task, we directly recorded a subcortical thalamic awareness potential (TAP). We also developed a unique paradigm to classify perceived versus not perceived stimuli using eye measurements to remove confounding signals related to reporting on conscious experiences. Using fMRI, we discovered three major brain networks driving conscious visual perception independent of report: first, increases in signal detection regions in visual, fusiform cortex, and frontal eye fields; and in arousal/salience networks involving midbrain, thalamus, nucleus accumbens, anterior cingulate, and anterior insula; second, increases in frontoparietal attention and executive control networks and in the cerebellum; finally, decreases in the default mode network. These results were largely maintained after excluding eye movement-based fMRI changes. Our findings provide evidence that the neurophysiology of consciousness is complex even without overt report, involving multiple cortical and subcortical networks overlapping in space and time.

Decoding perceptual awareness across the brain with a no-report fMRI masking paradigm

Does perceptual awareness arise within the sensory regions of the brain or within higher-level regions (e.g., the frontal lobe)? To answer this question, researchers traditionally compare neural activity when observers report being aware versus being unaware of a stimulus. However, it is unclear whether the resulting activations are associated with the conscious perception of the stimulus or the post-perceptual processes associated with reporting that stimulus. To address this limitation, we used both report and no-report conditions in a visual masking paradigm while participants were scanned using functional MRI (fMRI). We found that the overall univariate response to visible stimuli in the frontal lobe was robust in the report condition but disappeared in the no-report condition. However, using multivariate patterns, we could still decode in both conditions whether a stimulus reached conscious awareness across the brain, including in the frontal lobe. These results help reconcile key discrepancies in the recent literature and provide a path forward for identifying the neural mechanisms associated with perceptual awareness.

More than a feeling: Scalp EEG and eye signals in conscious tactile perception

Understanding the neural basis of consciousness is a fundamental goal of neuroscience, and sensory perception is often used as a proxy for consciousness in empirical studies. However, most studies rely on reported perception of visual stimuli. Here we present behavior, high density scalp EEG and eye metric recordings collected simultaneously during a novel tactile threshold perception task. We found significant N80, N140 and P300 event related potentials in perceived trials and in perceived versus not perceived trials. Significance was limited to a P100 and P300 in not perceived trials. We also found an increase in pupil diameter and blink rate and a decrease in microsaccade rate following perceived relative to not perceived tactile stimuli. These findings support the use of eye metrics as a measure of physiological arousal associated with conscious perception. Eye metrics may also represent a novel path toward the creation of tactile no-report tasks in the future.

Early and late electrophysiological correlates of gradual perceptual awareness in- and outside the Attentional Blink window

There is an ongoing debate on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the attentional blink (AB). Theoretical accounts propose that NCC during the attentional blink occur late in the processing hierarchy and that this quality is specific to the AB. We investigated this question by recording event-related potentials during an AB experiment with faces as T2. We analyzed ERPs to T2 stimuli inside (short lag) and outside (long lag) the AB window after carefully calibrating T2 stimuli to ensure equal visibility ratings across lags. We found that the N170, the visual awareness negativity (VAN), and the P3b showed an increased amplitude for seen compared to unseen face stimuli regardless of stimulus lag and that all these components scale linearly with subjective visibility. These findings suggest similar early and late mechanisms of graded perceptual awareness within and outside the AB across perceptual (N170, VAN) and post-perceptual (P3b) processing stages.

Hierarchical processing underpins competition in tactile perceptual bistability

Ambiguous sensory information can lead to spontaneous alternations between perceptual states, recently shown to extend to tactile perception. The authors recently proposed a simplified form of tactile rivalry which evokes two competing percepts for a fixed difference in input amplitudes across antiphase, pulsatile stimulation of the left and right fingers. This study addresses the need for a tactile rivalry model that captures the dynamics of perceptual alternations and that incorporates the structure of the somatosensory system. The model features hierarchical processing with two stages. The first and the second stages of model could be located at the secondary somatosensory cortex (area S2), or in higher areas driven by S2. The model captures dynamical features specific to the tactile rivalry percepts and produces general characteristics of perceptual rivalry: input strength dependence of dominance times (Levelt's proposition II), short-tailed skewness of dominance time distributions and the ratio of distribution moments. The presented modelling work leads to experimentally testable predictions. The same hierarchical model could generalise to account for percept formation, competition and alternations for bistable stimuli that involve pulsatile inputs from the visual and auditory domains.

Awareness and consciousness in humans and animals – neural and behavioral correlates in an evolutionary perspective

Awareness or consciousness in the context of stimulus perception can directly be assessed in well controlled test situations with humans via the persons’ reports about their subjective experiences with the stimuli. Since we have no direct access to subjective experiences in animals, their possible awareness or consciousness in stimulus perception tasks has often been inferred from behavior and cognitive abilities previously observed in aware and conscious humans. Here, we analyze published human data primarily on event-related potentials and brain-wave generation during perception and responding to sensory stimuli and extract neural markers (mainly latencies of evoked-potential peaks and of gamma-wave occurrence) indicating that a person became aware or conscious of the perceived stimulus. These neural correlates of consciousness were then applied to sets of corresponding data from various animals including several species of mammals, and one species each of birds, fish, cephalopods, and insects. We found that the neural markers from studies in humans could also successfully be applied to the mammal and bird data suggesting that species in these animal groups can become subjectively aware of and conscious about perceived stimuli. Fish, cephalopod and insect data remained inconclusive. In an evolutionary perspective we have to consider that both awareness of and consciousness about perceived stimuli appear as evolved, attention-dependent options added to the ongoing neural activities of stimulus processing and action generation. Since gamma-wave generation for functional coupling of brain areas in aware/conscious states is energetically highly cost-intensive, it remains to be shown which animal species under which conditions of lifestyle and ecological niche may achieve significant advantages in reproductive fitness by drawing upon these options. Hence, we started our discussion about awareness and consciousness in animals with the question in how far these expressions of brain activity are necessary attributes for perceiving stimuli and responding in an adaptive way.

The Effects of Spatial Attention Focus and Visual Awareness on the Processing of Fearful Faces: An ERP Study

Previous research on the relationship between attention and emotion processing have focused essentially on consciously-viewed, supraliminal stimuli, while the attention-emotion interplay remains unexplored in situations where visual awareness is restricted. Here, we presented participants with face pairs in a backward masking paradigm and examined the electrophysiological activity in response to fearful and neutral expressions under different conditions of attention (spatially attended vs. unattended) and stimulus visibility (subliminal vs. supraliminal). We found an enhanced N2 (visual awareness negativity -VAN-) and an enhanced P3 for supraliminal compared to subliminal faces. The VAN, indexing the early perceptual awareness, was enhanced when the faces were spatially attended compared to when they were unattended, showing that the VAN does not require spatial attention focus but can be enhanced by it. Fearful relative to neutral expressions enhanced the early neural activity (N2) regardless of spatial attention but only in the supraliminal viewing condition. However, fear-related enhancements on later neural activity (P3) were found when stimuli were both attended and presented supraliminally. These findings suggest that visual awareness is needed for emotion processing during both early and late stages. Spatial attention is required for emotion processing at the later stage but not at the early stage.

Spatial attention shifting to fearful faces depends on visual awareness in attentional blink: An ERP study

It remains unclear to date whether spatial attention towards emotional faces is contingent on, or independent of visual awareness. To investigate this question, a bilateral attentional blink paradigm was used in which lateralised fearful faces were presented at various levels of detectability. Twenty-six healthy participants were presented with two rapid serial streams of human faces, while they attempted to detect a pair of target faces (T2) displayed in close or distant succession of a first target pair (T1). Spatial attention shifting to the T2 fearful faces, indexed by the N2-posterior-contralateral component, was dependent on visual awareness and its magnitude covaried with the visual awareness negativity, a neural marker of awareness at the perceptual level. Additionally, information consolidation in working memory, indexed by the sustained posterior contralateral negativity, positively correlated with the level of visual awareness and spatial attention shifting. These findings demonstrate that spatial attention shifting to fearful faces depends on visual awareness, and these early processes are closely linked to information maintenance in working memory.

Hypnotic Induction of Deafness to Elementary Sounds: An Electroencephalography Case-Study and a Proposed Cognitive and Neural Scenario

Hypnosis can be conceived as a unique opportunity to explore how top-down effects can influence various conscious and non-conscious processes. In the field of perception, such modulatory effects have been described in distinct sensory modalities. In the present study we focused on the auditory channel and aimed at creating a radical deafness to elementary sounds by a specific hypnotic suggestion. We report here a single case-study in a highly suggestible healthy volunteer who reported a total hypnotically suggested deafness. We recorded high-density scalp EEG during an auditory odd-ball paradigm before and after hypnotic deafness suggestion. While both early auditory event-related potentials to sounds (P1) and mismatch negativity component were not affected by hypnotic deafness, we observed a total disappearance of the late P3 complex component when the subject reported being deaf. Moreover, a centro-mesial positivity was present exclusively during the hypnotic condition prior to the P3 complex. Interestingly, source localization suggested an anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) origin of this neural event. Multivariate decoding analyses confirmed and specified these findings. Resting state analyses confirmed a similar level of conscious state in both conditions, and suggested a functional disconnection between auditory areas and other cortical areas. Taken together these results suggest the following plausible scenario: (i) preserved early processing of auditory information unaffected by hypnotic suggestion, (ii) conscious setting of an inhibitory process (ACC) preventing conscious access to sounds, (iii) functional disconnection between the modular and unconscious representations of sounds and global neuronal workspace. This single subject study presents several limits that are discussed and remains open to alternative interpretations. This original proof-of-concept paves the way to a larger study that will test the predictions stemming from our theoretical model and from this first report.

P3b Does Not Reflect Perceived Contrasts

It has been shown that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness per se but is instead more closely associated with postperceptual processing (Cohen et al., 2020). Here, we seek to investigate whether human participants’ attentional states are different in the report and the no-report conditions. This difference in attentional states, if exists, may lead to degraded consciousness of the stimuli in the no-report condition, and it therefore remains unknown whether the disappearance of P3b is because of a lack of reportability or degraded consciousness. Results of our experiment 1 showed that participants did experience degraded contents of consciousness in the no-report condition. However, results of experiment 2 showed that the degraded contents of consciousness did not influence the amplitude of P3b. These findings strengthen the claim that P3b is not a signature of perceptual awareness but is associated with postperceptual processing.

Insights on overflow from failure to report tasks

Theories of consciousness diverge on the functional requirement that a conscious state need be reportable. Some maintain that the perceptual system's capacity for consciousness exceeds that of its capacity for access. Others contend that what is accessed is all there is to consciousness. Here, we suggest a compelling case for access-free consciousness cannot be made reliant on experimental evidence where access is necessarily invoked. However, a bona fide empirical separation of consciousness and report could counter the claim that reportability, and hence access, is all there is to consciousness. We first overview recent neurophysiological findings from no-report tasks, before examining a series of studies in which participants were unable to report features of clearly visible items. These new data present a challenge for a hard "access-only" view of consciousness, as they appear to demonstrate that properties of our visual experience can remain unreportable. In so doing, we highlight the utility and underappreciated value of so-called failure to report tasks.

An active inference model of conscious access: How cognitive action selection reconciles the results of report and no-report paradigms

Cognitive theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory and higher-order theories, posit that frontoparietal circuits play a crucial role in conscious access. However, recent studies using no-report paradigms have posed a challenge to cognitive theories by demonstrating conscious accessibility in the apparent absence of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. To address this challenge, this paper presents a computational model of conscious access, based upon active inference, that treats working memory gating as a cognitive action. We simulate a visual masking task and show that late P3b-like event-related potentials (ERPs), and increased PFC activity, are induced by the working memory demands of self-report generation. When reporting demands are removed, these late ERPs vanish and PFC activity is reduced. These results therefore reproduce, and potentially explain, results from no-report paradigms. However, even without reporting demands, our model shows that simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability - maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Therefore, our simulations show that evidence provided by no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.

Temporally resolved neural dynamics underlying handwriting

How do the temporal dynamics of neural activity encode highly coordinated visual-motor behaviour? To capture the millisecond-resolved neural activations associated with fine visual-motor skills, we devised a co-registration system to simultaneously record electroencephalogram and handwriting kinematics while participants were performing four handwriting tasks (writing in Chinese/English scripts with their dominant/non-dominant hand). The neural activation associated with each stroke was clearly identified with a well-structured and reliable pattern. The functional significance of this pattern was validated by its significant associations with language, hand and the cognitive stages and kinematics of handwriting. Furthermore, the handwriting rhythmicity was found to be synchronised to the brain's ongoing theta oscillation, and the synchronisation was associated with the factor of language and hand. These major findings imply an implication between motor skill formation and the interplay between the rhythms in the brain and the peripheral systems.

ERP signatures of auditory awareness in cross-modal distractor-induced deafness

Previous research showed that dual-task processes such as the attentional blink are not always transferable from unimodal to cross-modal settings. This study investigated whether such a transfer can be stated for a distractor-induced impairment of target detection established in vision (distractor-induced blindness, DIB) and recently observed in the auditory modality (distractor-induced deafness, DID). A cross-modal DID effect was confirmed: The detection of an auditory target indicated by a visual cue was impaired if multiple auditory distractors preceded the target. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were used to identify psychophysiological correlates of target detection. A frontal negativity about 200 ms succeeded by a sustained, widespread negativity was associated with auditory target awareness. In contrast to unimodal findings, P3 amplitude was not enhanced for hits. The results support the notion that early frontal attentional processes are linked to auditory awareness, whereas the P3 does not seem to be a reliable indicator of target access.

The Neural Correlates of Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness Seem to Coincide and Would Correspond to a Memory Center, an Activation Center and Eight Parallel Convergence Centers

An increasing number of authors suggest that the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have no selective, executive, or metacognitive function. It is believed that attention unconsciously selects the contents that will become conscious. Consciousness would have only the fundamental function of transforming the selected contents into a format easily used by high-level processors, such as working memory, language, or autobiographical memory. According to Dehaene, the neural correlates (NC) of access consciousness (AC; cognitive consciousness) constitute a widespread network in the frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices. While Tononi localized the correlates of phenomenal consciousness (PC; subjective consciousness) to a posterior “hot zone” in the temporo-parietal cortex. A careful examination of the works of these two groups leads to the conclusion that the correlates of access and PC coincide. The two consciousnesses are therefore two faces of the same single consciousness with both its cognitive and subjective contents. A review of the literature of the pathology called “neglect” confirms that the common correlates include 10: a memory center, an activation center, and eight parallel centers. From study of the “imagery” it can be deduced that these eight parallel centers would operate as points of convergence in the third person linking the respective eight sensory-motor-emotional areas activated by external perceptions and the corresponding memories of these perceptions deposited in the memory center. The first four centers of convergence appear in the most evolved fish and gradually reach eight in humans.

Dissociating the Neural Correlates of Consciousness and Task Relevance in Face Perception Using Simultaneous EEG-fMRI

Current theories of visual consciousness disagree about whether it emerges during early stages of processing in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network becomes involved. Moreover, disentangling conscious perception from task-related postperceptual processes (e.g., report) and integrating results across different neuroscientific methods remain ongoing challenges. The present study addressed these problems using simultaneous EEG-fMRI and a specific inattentional blindness paradigm with three physically identical phases in female and male human participants. In phase 1, participants performed a distractor task during which line drawings of faces and control stimuli were presented centrally. While some participants spontaneously noticed the faces in phase 1, others remained inattentionally blind. In phase 2, all participants were made aware of the task-irrelevant faces but continued the distractor task. In phase 3, the faces became task-relevant. Bayesian analysis of brain responses demonstrated that conscious face perception was most strongly associated with activation in fusiform gyrus (fMRI) as well as the N170 and visual awareness negativity (EEG). Smaller awareness effects were revealed in the occipital and prefrontal cortex (fMRI). Task-relevant face processing, on the other hand, led to strong, extensive activation of occipitotemporal, frontoparietal, and attentional networks (fMRI). In EEG, it enhanced early negativities and elicited a pronounced P3b component. Overall, we provide evidence that conscious visual perception is linked with early processing in stimulus-specific sensory brain areas but may additionally involve prefrontal cortex. In contrast, the strong activation of widespread brain networks and the P3b are more likely associated with task-related processes.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does our brain generate visual consciousness-the subjective experience of what it is like to see, for example, a face? To date, it is hotly debated whether it emerges early in sensory brain regions or later when a widespread frontoparietal network is activated. Here, we use simultaneous fMRI and EEG for high spatial and temporal resolution and demonstrate that conscious face perception is predominantly linked to early and occipitotemporal processes, but also prefrontal activity. Task-related processes (e.g., decision-making), on the other hand, elicit brain-wide activations including late and strong frontoparietal activity. These findings challenge numerous previous studies and highlight the importance of investigating the neural correlates of consciousness in the absence of task relevance.

Electrophysiological Chronometry of Graded Consciousness during the Attentional Blink

One of the ongoing debates about visual consciousness is whether it can be considered as an all-or-none or a graded phenomenon. While there is increasing evidence for the existence of graded states of conscious awareness based on paradigms such as visual masking, only little and mixed evidence is available for the attentional blink paradigm, specifically in regard to electrophysiological measures. Thereby, the all-or-none pattern reported in some attentional blink studies might have originated from specifics of the experimental design, suggesting the need to examine the generalizability of results. In the present event-related potential (ERP) study (N = 32), visual awareness of T2 face targets was assessed via subjective visibility ratings on a perceptual awareness scale in combination with ERPs time-locked to T2 onset (components P1, N1, N2, and P3). Furthermore, a classification task preceding visibility ratings allowed to track task performance. The behavioral results indicate a graded rather than an all-or-none pattern of visual awareness. Corresponding graded differences in the N1, N2, and P3 components were observed for the comparison of visibility levels. These findings suggest that conscious perception during the attentional blink can occur in a graded fashion.

Neural Basis of Somatosensory Spatial and Temporal Discrimination in Humans: The Role of Sensory Detection

While detecting somatic stimuli from the external environment, an accurate determination of their spatial and temporal properties is essential for human behavior. Whether and how detection relates to human capacity for somatosensory spatial discrimination (SD) and temporal discrimination (TD) remains unclear. Here, participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning when simply detecting vibrotactile stimuli of the leg, judging their location (SD), or deciding their number in time (TD). By conceptualizing tactile discrimination as consisting of detection and determination processes, we found that tactile detection elicited activation specifically involved in SD within the right inferior and superior parietal lobules, 2 regions previously implicated in the control of spatial attention. These 2 regions remained activated in the determination process, during which functional connectivity between these 2 regions predicted individual SD ability. In contrast, tactile detection produced little activation specifically related to TD. Participants' TD ability was implemented in brain regions implicated in coding temporal structures of somatic stimuli (primary somatosensory cortex) and time estimation (anterior cingulate, pre-supplementary motor area, and putamen). Together, our findings indicate a close link between somatosensory detection and SD (but not TD) at the neural level, which aids in explaining why we can promptly respond toward detected somatic stimuli.

An action-observation/motor-imagery based approach to differentiate disorders of consciousness: what is beneath the tip of the iceberg?

BACKGROUND

The evaluation of motor imagery in persons with prolonged Disorders of Consciousness (pDOC) is a practical approach to differentiate between patients with Minimally Conscious State (MCS) and Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS) and to identify residual awareness even in individuals with UWS. Investigating the influence of motor observation on motor imagery could be helpful in this regard.

OBJECTIVE

In order to corroborate the clinical diagnosis and identify misdiagnosed individuals, we used EEG recordings, to assess the influence of the low-level perceptual and motoric mechanisms on motor observation on motor imagery, taking into account the role of the high-level cognitive mechanisms in patients with pDOC.

METHODS

We assessed the influence of motor observation of walking in first-person or third-person view (by a video provision) on motor imagery of walking in the first-person view on the visual N190 (expression of motor observation processing), the readiness potential (RP) (expressing motor preparation), and the P3 component (high-level cognitive processes) in a sample of 10 persons with MCS, 10 with UWS, and 10 healthy controls (CG). Specifically, the video showed a first-view or third-view walk down the street while the participants were asked to imagine a first-view walking down the street.

RESULTS

CG showed greater N190 response (low-level sensorimotor processing) in the non-matching than in the matching condition. Conversely, the P3 and RP responses (high-level sensorimotor processing) were greater in the matching than in the non-matching condition. Remarkably, 6 out of 10 patients with MCS showed the preservation of both high- and low-level sensorimotor processing. One UWS patient showed responses similar to those six patients, suggesting a preservation of cognitively-mediated sensorimotor processing despite a detrimental motor preparation process. The remaining patients with MCS did not show diversified EEG responses, suggesting limited cognitive functioning.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study suggests that identifying the low-level visual and high-level motor preparation processes in response to a simple influence of motor observation of motor imagery tasks potentially supports the clinical differential diagnosis of with MCS and UWS. This might help identify UWS patients which were misdiagnosed and who deserve more sophisticated diagnoses.

Perceptual awareness negativity: a physiological correlate of sensory consciousness

Much research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has focused on two evoked potentials, the P3b and the visual or auditory awareness negativity (VAN, AAN). Surveying a broad range of recent experimental evidence, we find that repeated failures to observe the P3b during conscious perception eliminate it as a putative NCC. Neither the VAN nor the AAN have been dissociated from consciousness; furthermore, a similar neural signal correlates with tactile consciousness. These awareness negativities can be maximal contralateral to the evoking stimulus, are likely generated in underlying sensory cortices, and point to the existence of a generalized perceptual awareness negativity (PAN) reflecting the onset of sensory consciousness.

Dissociating Perceptual Awareness and Postperceptual Processing: The P300 Is Not a Reliable Marker of Somatosensory Target Detection

A central challenge in the study of conscious perception lies in dissociating the neural correlates of perceptual awareness from those reflecting its precursors and consequences. No-report paradigms have been instrumental in this endeavor, demonstrating that the event-related potential P300, recorded from the human scalp, reflects reports rather than awareness. However, these paradigms cannot probe the degree to which stimuli are consciously processed from trial to trial and, thus, leave open the possibility that the P300 is a genuine correlate of conscious access enabling reports. Here, instead of removing report requirements, we took the opposite approach and equated postperceptual task demands across conscious and unconscious trials by orthogonalizing target detection and overt reports in a somatosensory detection task. We used Bayesian model selection to track the transformation from physical to perceptual processing stages in the EEG data of 24 male and female participants and show that the early P50 component scaled with physical stimulus intensity, whereas the N140 component was the first correlate of target detection. The late P300 component was elicited for both perceived and unperceived stimuli and was not substantially modulated by target detection. This was in stark contrast to a control experiment using a classical direct report task, which replicated the P50 and N140 effects but additionally showed a strong effect of target detection in the P300 time range. Our results demonstrate the task dependence of the P300 in the somatosensory modality and show that late cortical potentials dissociate from perceptual awareness even when stimuli are always reported.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The time it takes for sensory information to enter our conscious experience can be an indicator of the neural processing stages that lead to perceptual awareness. However, because many cognitive processes routinely correlate with perception, isolating those signals that uniquely reflect perceptual awareness is not a trivial task. Here, we show that late electroencephalography signals cease to correlate with somatosensory awareness when common task confounds are controlled. Importantly, by balancing report requirements instead of abolishing them, we show that the lack of late effects cannot be explained by a lack of conscious access. Instead, we propose that conscious access occurs earlier, at ∼150 ms, supporting the view that early activity in sensory cortices is a neural correlate of conscious perception.

Don't tell anyone: the importance of no-report paradigms in neuroscience of consciousness

The neural correlates of perceptual awareness are usually investigated by comparing experimental conditions in which subjects are aware or not aware of the delivered stimulus. This, however, implies that subjects report their experience, possibly biasing the neural responses with the postperceptual processes involved. This Neuro Forum article reviews evidence from an electroencephalography (EEG) study by Cohen and colleagues (Cohen M, Ortego K, Kyroudis A, Pitts M. J Neurosci 40: 4925-4935, 2020) addressing the importance of no-report paradigms in the neuroscience of consciousness. In particular, authors show that P3b, one of the proposed canonical "signatures" of the conscious processing, is strongly elicited only when subjects have to report their experience, proposing a reconsideration in the approach to the neuroscience of consciousness.

Bifurcation in brain dynamics reveals a signature of conscious processing independent of report

An outstanding challenge for consciousness research is to characterize the neural signature of conscious access independently of any decisional processes. Here we present a model-based approach that uses inter-trial variability to identify the brain dynamics associated with stimulus processing. We demonstrate that, even in the absence of any task or behavior, the electroencephalographic response to auditory stimuli shows bifurcation dynamics around 250–300 milliseconds post-stimulus. Namely, the same stimulus gives rise to late sustained activity on some trials, and not on others. This late neural activity is predictive of task-related reports, and also of reports of conscious contents that are randomly sampled during task-free listening. Source localization further suggests that task-free conscious access recruits the same neural networks as those associated with explicit report, except for frontal executive components. Studying brain dynamics through variability could thus play a key role for identifying the core signatures of conscious access, independent of report.

Current knowledge on the neural basis of consciousness mostly relies on situations where people report their perception. Here, the authors provide evidence for the idea that bifurcation in brain dynamics reflects conscious perception independent of report.