How choice reveals and shapes expected hedonic outcome

Choice enhances touch pleasantness

We value what we choose more than what is imposed upon us. Choice-induced preferences are extensively demonstrated using behavioural and neural methods, mainly involving rewarding objects such as money or material goods. However, the impact of choice on experiences, especially in the realm of affective touch, remains less explored. In this study, we specifically investigate whether choice can enhance the pleasure derived from affective touch, thereby increasing its intrinsic rewarding value. We conducted an experiment in which participants were being touched by an experimenter and asked to rate how pleasant their experience of touch was. They were given either a choice or no choice over certain touch stimulus variables which differed in their relevance: some were of low relevance (relating to the colour of the glove that the experimenter would use to touch them), while others were of high relevance (relating to the location on their arm where they would be stroked). Before and during touching, pupillometry was used to measure the level of arousal. We found that having a choice over aspects of tactile stimuli-especially those relevant to oneself-enhanced the pleasant perception of the touch. In addition, having a choice increases arousal in anticipation of touch. Regardless of how relevant it is to the actual tactile stimulus, allowing one to choose may positively enhance a person's perception of the physical contact they receive.

Gender Dysphoria and Sexual Euphoria: A Bayesian Perspective on the Influence of Gender-Affirming Hormone Therapy on Sexual Arousal

Self-reported sexual orientation of transgender individuals occasionally changes over transition. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we tested the hypothesis that neural and behavioral patterns of sexual arousal in transgender individuals would shift from the assigned to the experienced gender (e.g., trans women's responses becoming more dissimilar to those of cis men and more similar to those of cis women). To this aim, trans women (N = 12) and trans men (N = 20) as well as cisgender women (N = 24) and cisgender men (N = 14) rated visual stimuli showing male-female, female-female or male-male intercourse for sexual arousal before and after four months of gender-affirming hormone therapy. A Bayesian framework allowed us to incorporate previous behavioral findings. The hypothesized changes could indeed be observed in the behavioral responses with the strongest results for trans men and female-female scenes. Activation of the ventral striatum supported our hypothesis only for female-female scenes in trans women. The respective application or depletion of androgens in trans men and trans women might partly explain this observation. The prominent role of female-female stimuli might be based on the differential responses they elicit in cis women and men or, in theory, the controversial concept of autogynephilia. We show that correlates of sexual arousal in transgender individuals might change in the direction of the experienced gender. Future investigations should elucidate the mechanistic role of sex hormones and the cause of the differential neural and behavioral findings.The study was registered at ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT02715232), March 22, 2016.

Distinguishing between intrinsic and instrumental sources of the value of choice

Considerable evidence suggests that people value the freedom to choose. However, it is unclear whether this preference for choice stems purely from choice's intrinsic value, or whether people prefer to choose because it tends to provide instrumental information about desirable outcomes. To address this question, participants completed a novel choice task in which they could freely choose to exert choice or not, manipulating the level of instrumental contingency between participants' choices and eventual outcomes, which we operationalized using the information-theoretic concept of mutual information. Across two experiments (N = 100 each), we demonstrate a marked preference for choice, but importantly found that participants' preference for free choice is weakened when actions are decoupled from outcomes. Taken together, our results demonstrate that a significant factor in people's preference for choice is an assumption about the instrumental value of choice, suggesting against a purely intrinsic value of choice.

Characterizing Human Habits in the Lab

Habits pose a fundamental puzzle for those aiming to understand human behavior. They pervade our everyday lives and dominate some forms of psychopathology but are extremely hard to elicit in the lab. In this Registered Report, we developed novel experimental paradigms grounded in computational models, which suggest that habit strength should be proportional to the frequency of behavior and, in contrast to previous research, independent of value. Specifically, we manipulated how often participants performed responses in two tasks varying action repetition without, or separately from, variations in value. Moreover, we asked how this frequency-based habitization related to value-based operationalizations of habit and self-reported propensities for habitual behavior in real life. We find that choice frequency during training increases habit strength at test and that this form of habit shows little relation to value-based operationalizations of habit. Our findings empirically ground a novel perspective on the constituents of habits and suggest that habits may arise in the absence of external reinforcement. We further find no evidence for an overlap between different experimental approaches to measuring habits and no associations with self-reported real-life habits. Thus, our findings call for a rigorous reassessment of our understanding and measurement of human habitual behavior in the lab.

Computational Social Psychology

Social psychologists attempt to explain how we interact by appealing to basic principles of how we think. To make good on this ambition, they are increasingly relying on an interconnected set of formal tools that model inference, attribution, value-guided decision making, and multi-agent interactions. By reviewing progress in each of these areas and highlighting the connections between them, we can better appreciate the structure of social thought and behavior, while also coming to understand when, why, and how formal tools can be useful for social psychologists.

Intrinsic motivation for choice varies with individual risk attitudes and the controllability of the environment

When deciding between options that do or do not lead to future choices, humans often choose to choose. We studied choice seeking by asking subjects to first decide between a choice opportunity or performing a computer-selected action, after which they either chose freely or performed the forced action. Subjects preferred choice when these options were equally rewarded, even deterministically, and traded extrinsic rewards for opportunities to choose. We explained individual variability in choice seeking using reinforcement learning models incorporating risk sensitivity and overvaluation of rewards obtained through choice. Model fits revealed that 28% of subjects were sensitive to the worst possible outcome associated with free choice, and this pessimism reduced their choice preference with increasing risk. Moreover, outcome overvaluation was necessary to explain patterns of individual choice preference across levels of risk. We also manipulated the degree to which subjects controlled stimulus outcomes. We found that degrading coherence between their actions and stimulus outcomes diminished choice preference following forced actions, although willingness to repeat selection of choice opportunities remained high. When subjects chose freely during these repeats, they were sensitive to rewards when actions were controllable but ignored outcomes-even positive ones-associated with reduced controllability. Our results show that preference for choice can be modulated by extrinsic reward properties including reward probability and risk as well as by controllability of the environment.

Choice Reminder Modulates Choice-Induced Preference Change in Older Adults

OBJECTIVES

Choices not only reflect preference but also shape preference. The choice-induced preference change (CIPC) occurs when making a decision modifies people's attitudes about the options. When people rate a series of items and then must choose between 2 items rated as equally attractive, they later rate the unchosen item as less attractive than before. One explanation is that the choice and the equal preference for 2 options cause a psychological discomfort known as cognitive dissonance, which can be reduced by changing the preference. The current study aims to investigate the age-related differences in the CIPC effect, and how an explicit reminder of the previous choice modulates this effect.

METHODS

Using an artifact-controlled free-choice paradigm, with a sample of 79 younger and 76 older participants, we manipulated the choice reminder in 2 experiments.

RESULTS

We found that compared with young adults, older adults are less susceptible to CIPC when their previous choices were not explicitly reminded. After boosting the salience of choice-preference incongruency by reminding participants of their previous choices, older adults showed comparable CIPC as young adults.

DISCUSSION

Our results suggest that older adults tend to downweigh the information that leads to cognitive dissonance and use this strategy only when such information is relatively implicit. The diminished CIPC in older adults could be one of the emotional regulation strategies that older adults engage in to maintain positive emotional states when making difficult decisions.

Value certainty and choice confidence are multidimensional constructs that guide decision-making

The degree of certainty that decision-makers have about their evaluations of available choice alternatives and their confidence about selecting the subjectively best alternative are important factors that affect current and future value-based choices. Assessments of the alternatives in a given choice set are rarely unidimensional; their values are usually derived from a combination of multiple distinct attributes. For example, the taste, texture, quantity, and nutritional content of a snack food may all be considered when determining whether to consume it. We examined how certainty about the levels of individual attributes of an option relates to certainty about the overall value of that option as a whole and/or to confidence in having chosen the subjectively best available option. We found that certainty and confidence are derived from unequally weighted combinations of attribute certainties rather than simple, equal combinations of all sources of uncertainty. Attributes that matter more in determining choice outcomes also are weighted more in metacognitive evaluations of certainty or confidence. Moreover, we found that the process of deciding between two alternatives leads to refinements in both attribute estimations and the degree of certainty in those estimates. Attributes that are more important in determining choice outcomes are refined more during the decision process in terms of both estimates and certainty. Although certainty and confidence are typically treated as unidimensional, our results indicate that they, like value estimates, are subjective, multidimensional constructs.

Choice Boosts Curiosity

In our connected era, we spend significant time and effort satisfying our curiosity. Often, we choose which information we seek, but sometimes the selection is made for us. We hypothesized that humans exhibit enhanced curiosity in the context of choice. We designed a task in which healthy participants saw two lotteries on each trial. On some trials, participants chose which lottery to play. On other trials, the lottery was selected for them. Participants then indicated their curiosity about the outcome of the to-be-played lottery via self-report ratings (Experiment 1, N = 34) or willingness-to-wait decisions (Experiment 2, N = 34). We found that participants exhibited higher curiosity ratings and greater willingness to wait for the outcome of lotteries they had chosen than for lotteries that had been selected for them (controlling for initial preference). This demonstrates that choice boosts curiosity, which may have implications for boosting learning, memory, and motivation.

Choice perseverance underlies pursuing a hard-to-get target in an avatar choice task

People sometimes persistently pursue hard-to-get targets. Why people pursue such targets is unclear. Here, we hypothesized that choice perseverance, which is the tendency to repeat the same choice independent of the obtained outcomes, leads individuals to repeatedly choose a hard-to-get target, which consequently increases their preference for the target. To investigate this hypothesis, we conducted an online experiment involving an avatar choice task in which the participants repeatedly selected one avatar, and the selected avatar expressed their valence reactions through facial expressions and voice. We defined “hard-to-get” and “easy-to-get” avatars by manipulating the outcome probability such that the hard-to-get avatars rarely provided a positive reaction when selected, while the easy-to-get avatars frequently did. We found that some participants repeatedly selected hard-to-get avatars (Pursuit group). Based on a simulation, we found that higher choice perseverance accounted for the pursuit of hard-to-get avatars and that the Pursuit group had significantly higher choice perseverance than the No-pursuit group. Model fitting to the choice data also supported that choice perseverance can account for the pursuit of hard-to-get avatars in the Pursuit group. Moreover, we found that although baseline attractiveness was comparable among all avatars used in the choice task, the attractiveness of the hard-to-get avatars was significantly increased only in the Pursuit group. Taken together, we conclude that people with high choice perseverance pursue hard-to-get targets, rendering such targets more attractive. The tolerance for negative outcomes might be an important factor for succeeding in our lives but sometimes triggers problematic behavior, such as stalking. The present findings may contribute to understanding the psychological mechanisms of passion and perseverance for one’s long-term goals, which are more general than the romantic context imitated in avatar choice.

Aversive anticipations modulate electrocortical correlates of decision-making and reward reversal learning, but not behavioral performance

Predicting the consequences of one’s own decisions is crucial for organizing future behavior. However, when reward contingencies vary frequently, flexible adaptation of decisions is likely to depend on the situation. We examined the effects of an instructed threat context on choice behavior (i.e., reversal learning) and its electrocortical correlates. In a probabilistic decision-making task, 30 participants had to choose between two options that were either contingent on monetary gains or losses. Reward contingencies were reversed after reaching a probabilistic threshold. Decision-making and reversal learning were examined with two contextual background colors, which were instructed as signals for threat-of-shock or safety. Self-report data confirmed the threat context as more unpleasant, arousing, and threatening relative to safety condition. However, against our expectations, behavioral performance was comparable during the threat and safety conditions (i.e., errors-to-criterion, number of reversal, error rates, and choice times). Regarding electrocortical activity, feedback processing changed throughout the visual processing stream. The feedback-related negativity (FRN) reflected expectancy-driven processing (unexpected vs. congruent losses and gains), and the threat-selective P3 component revealed non-specific discrimination of gains vs. losses. Finally, the late positive potentials (LPP) showed strongly valence-specific processing (unexpected and congruent losses vs. gains). Thus, regardless of contextual threat, early and late cortical activity reflects an attentional shift from expectation- to outcome-based feedback processing. Findings are discussed in terms of reward, threat, and reversal-learning mechanisms with implications for emotion regulation and anxiety disorders.

Choosing to choose or not

To what degree do people prefer to choose for themselves and what drives this preference? Is it memory-based and results from a life-long association between choices and better outcomes, or is the process of choice itself reinforcing? In a new paradigm, across 6 experiments, participants experienced both ’Own Choice’ and ’Computer Picks’ conditions with identical outcomes before selecting which condition to re-experience in the final part of the experiment. Consistent with previous work, an overwhelming majority ( 83%) preferred own-choice. Several variations of the paradigm reveal that (1) Preference For Choice (PFC) is reduced when thinking about the task without actually choosing in it, (2) PFC is substantially reduced by choice-unrelated cognitive load, and (3) Preference For Choice is further diminished when selection is based on criteria other than one’s preferences. Across experiments, participants’ self-rated enjoyment predicted a significant portion of their PFC, while their perceived gains had little to no predictive value. If PFC stems solely from past reinforcement learning (i.e., memory) then neither performing another few scores of choices nor adding cognitive load to that sequence of choices would be expected to dramatically affect it. Hence, our findings suggest that a significant part of this preference stems from the process of choice itself, and that the experience it confers can itself be reinforcing. We discuss the implications of the proposed mechanism for PFC, which leads us to the prediction that PFC may be muted or even reversed under specific conditions and what this means for when the ‘opposite’ effect – sticking with the default – will occur.

Preferences for Indoor Environmental and Social Comfort of Outpatient Staff during the COVID-19 Pandemic, an Explanatory Study

While the pressure on hospital workers keeps growing, they are generally more dissatisfied with their comfort than other occupants in hospitals or offices. To better understand the comfort of outpatient workers in hospitals, clusters for preferences and perceptions of the indoor environmental quality (IEQ) and social comfort were identified in a previous study before the outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. This qualitative study explains the outpatient workers' main preferences for comfort during the COVID-19 pandemic. Semi-structured interviews and photo-elicitation were used. Contextual changes due to the COVID-19 pandemic were included. The questions in the interviews were based on the characteristics of the profiles, corresponding with the clusters. The data were analyzed with content analysis according to the steps defined by Gioia. Seventeen outpatient workers who had been part of the previous study participated. For some outpatient workers differentiation of preferences was illogical due to interrelations and equal importance of the comfort aspects. The main changes in perceptions of comfort due to the pandemic were worries about the indoor air quality and impoverished interaction. Because the occupants' preferences for comfort can change over time, it was suggested that further development of occupant profiles needs to accommodate changes.

Choosing increases the value of non-instrumental information

Curiosity pervades all aspects of human behaviour and decision-making. Recent research indicates that the value of information is determined by its propensity to reduce uncertainty, and the hedonic value of the outcomes it predicts. Previous findings also indicate a preference for options that are freely chosen, compared to equivalently valued alternatives that are externally assigned. Here, we asked whether the value of information also varies as a function of self- or externally-imposed choices. Participants rated their preference for information that followed either a self-chosen decision, or an externally imposed condition. Our results showed that choosing a lottery significantly increased the subjective value of information about the outcome. Computational modelling indicated that this change in information-seeking behaviour was not due to changes in the subjective probability of winning, but instead reflected an independent effect of choosing on the value of resolving uncertainty. These results demonstrate that agency over a prospect is an important source of information value.

Effective brain connectivity at rest is associated with choice-induced preference formation

Preferences can change as a consequence of making hard decisions whereby the value of chosen options increases and the value of rejected options decreases. Such choice-induced preference changes have been associated with brain areas detecting choice conflict (anterior cingulate cortex, ACC), updating stimulus value (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dlPFC) and supporting memory of stimulus value (hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, vmPFC). Here we investigated whether resting-state neuronal activity within these regions is associated with the magnitude of individuals' preference updates. We fitted a dynamic causal model (DCM) to resting-state neuronal activity in the spectral domain (spDCM) and estimated the causal connectivity among core regions involved in preference formation following hard choices. The extent of individuals' choice-induced preference changes were found to be associated with a diminished resting-state excitation between the left dlPFC and the vmPFC, whereas preference consistency was related to a higher resting-state excitation from the ACC to the left hippocampus and vmPFC. Our results point to a model of preference formation during which the dynamic network configurations between left dlPFC, ACC, vmPFC and left hippocampus at rest are linked to preference change or stability.

The insula, a grey matter of tastes: a volumetric MRI study in dementia with Lewy bodies

Background

Despite the growing number of discoveries during the past decades about its functions, the insula remains a mysterious ‘island’. In addition to its involvement in basic functions such as gustation and interoception, the insular cortex is now considered a key region for integrated functions such as emotion/motivation processing, decision-making and self-consciousness. We hypothesized that this structure, standing at the crossroads of such functions, could ground personal tastes in general, beyond food preferences and aesthetic judgements. Given that dementia with Lewy bodies is characterized by a focal atrophy within the insular cortex from the early stages, this condition provides an opportunity to test such a hypothesis.

Methods

We developed a questionnaire to assess potential changes in personal tastes, submitted it to a cohort of 23 patients with early-stage dementia with Lewy bodies and compared their questionnaire results to those of 20 age-matched healthy controls. Furthermore, we performed a global and regional neuroimaging study to test for a potential correlation between the patients’ scores for changes in personal tastes and their insular cortex volumes.

Results

Our results indicate that the patients presented significant changes in personal tastes compared to the controls, in both food and non-food domains. Moreover, imaging analyses confirmed the involvement of the insular cortex atrophy in the changes in personal tastes using global analysis, and in both food and non-food domains using regional analysis.

Conclusions

These results bring new insights into the role of the insula as a ‘grey matter of tastes’, this structure supporting personal preferences in general, beyond the food domain. The insular cortex could be involved through its role in motivational processes by the representation of subjective awareness of bodily states during the phenomenological experience of stimulus appraisal. However, we also argue that it could support the abstract representations of personal tastes as self-concepts, acutely exemplifying embodied cognition. Finally, the questionnaire on changes in tastes could constitute an interesting tool to help early diagnosis of dementia with Lewy bodies and to assess insular dysfunction more generally.

Trust in artificial intelligence for medical diagnoses

We present two online experiments investigating trust in artificial intelligence (AI) as a primary and secondary medical diagnosis tool and one experiment testing two methods to increase trust in AI. Participants in Experiment 1 read hypothetical scenarios of low and high-risk diseases, followed by two sequential diagnoses, and estimated their trust in the medical findings. In three between-participants groups, the first and second diagnoses were given by: human and AI, AI and human, and human and human doctors, respectively. In Experiment 2 we examined if people expected higher standards of performance from AI than human doctors, in order to trust AI treatment recommendations. In Experiment 3 we investigated the possibility to increase trust in AI diagnoses by: (i) informing our participants that the AI outperforms the human doctor, and (ii) nudging them to prefer AI diagnoses in a choice between AI and human doctors. Results indicate overall lower trust in AI, as well as for diagnoses of high-risk diseases. Participants trusted AI doctors less than humans for first diagnoses, and they were also less likely to trust a second opinion from an AI doctor for high risk diseases. Surprisingly, results highlight that people have comparable standards of performance for AI and human doctors and that trust in AI does not increase when people are told the AI outperforms the human doctor. Importantly, we find that the gap in trust between AI and human diagnoses is eliminated when people are nudged to select AI in a free-choice paradigm between human and AI diagnoses, with trust for AI diagnoses significantly increased when participants could choose their doctor. These findings isolate control over one's medical practitioner as a valid candidate for future trust-related medical diagnosis and highlight a solid potential path to smooth acceptance of AI diagnoses amongst patients.

How decisions and the desire for coherency shape subjective preferences over time

Recent findings suggest a bidirectional relationship between preferences and choices such that what is chosen can become preferred. Yet, it is still commonly held that preferences for individual items are maintained, such as caching a separate value estimate for each experienced option. Instead, we propose that all possible choice options and preferences are represented in a shared, continuous, multidimensional space that supports generalization. Decision making is cast as a learning process that seeks to align choices and preferences to maintain coherency. We formalized an error-driven learning model that updates preferences to align with past choices, which makes repeating those and related choices more likely in the future. The model correctly predicts that making a free choice increases preferences along related attributes. For example, after choosing a political candidate based on trivial information (e.g., they like cats), voters' views on abortion, immigration, and trade subsequently shifted to match their chosen candidate.

Reducing the relative value of cigarettes: Considerations for nicotine and non-nicotine factors

Despite notable progress in recent decades, cigarette smoke persists as a leading cause of premature death and preventable disease. To weaken the link between nicotine reinforcement and the toxicity associated with combusted tobacco, the United States Food and Drug Administration is considering a product standard targeting cigarette nicotine content. In this review, we summarize research assessing the potential impacts of reducing nicotine in cigarettes. Evidence to date suggests cigarette smoking, toxicant exposure and dependence would decline following substantial reductions in nicotine content. However, reduced nicotine content may not eliminate smoking entirely. Regulatory efforts that shape the nicotine and tobacco marketplace should consider that non-nicotine reinforcing factors and decision-making biases can contribute to the value of smoking. The impact of reducing nicotine in cigarettes will likely depend on the alternative nicotine products available to current smokers. This article is part of the special issue on 'Contemporary Advances in Nicotine Neuropharmacology'.

Choosing what we like vs liking what we choose: How choice-induced preference change might actually be instrumental to decision-making

For more than 60 years, it has been known that people report higher (lower) subjective values for items after having selected (rejected) them during a choice task. This phenomenon is coined "choice-induced preference change" or CIPC, and its established interpretation is that of "cognitive dissonance" theory. In brief, if people feel uneasy about their choice, they later convince themselves, albeit not always consciously, that the chosen (rejected) item was actually better (worse) than they had originally estimated. While this might make sense from an intuitive psychological standpoint, it is challenging from a theoretical evolutionary perspective. This is because such a cognitive mechanism might yield irrational biases, whose adaptive fitness would be unclear. In this work, we consider an alternative possibility, namely that CIPC is -at least partially- due to the refinement of option value representations that occurs while people are pondering about choice options. For example, contemplating competing possibilities during a choice may highlight aspects of the alternative options that were not considered before. In the context of difficult decisions, this would enable people to reassess option values until they reach a satisfactory level of confidence. This makes CIPC the epiphenomenal outcome of a cognitive process that is instrumental to the decision. Critically, our hypothesis implies novel predictions about how observed CIPC should relate to two specific meta-cognitive processes, namely: choice confidence and subjective certainty regarding pre-choice value judgments. We test these predictions in a behavioral experiment where participants rate the subjective value of food items both before and after choosing between equally valued items; we augment this traditional design with both reports of choice confidence and subjective certainty about value judgments. The results confirm our predictions and provide evidence that many quantitative features of CIPC (in particular: its relationship with metacognitive judgments) may be explained without ever invoking post-choice cognitive dissonance reduction explanation. We then discuss the relevance of our work in the context of the existing debate regarding the putative cognitive mechanisms underlying CIPC.

Common and distinct brain activity associated with risky and ambiguous decision-making

Two often-studied forms of uncertain decision-making (DM) are risky-DM (outcome probabilities known) and ambiguous-DM (outcome probabilities unknown). While DM in general is associated with activation of several brain regions, previous neuroimaging efforts suggest a dissociation between activity linked with risky and ambiguous choices. However, the common and distinct neurobiological correlates associated with risky- and ambiguous-DM, as well as their specificity when compared to perceptual-DM (as a 'control condition'), remains to be clarified. We conducted multiple meta-analyses on neuroimaging results from 151 studies to characterize common and domain-specific brain activity during risky-, ambiguous-, and perceptual-DM. When considering all DM tasks, convergent activity was observed in brain regions considered to be consituents of the canonical salience, valuation, and executive control networks. When considering subgroups of studies, risky-DM (vs. perceptual-DM) was linked with convergent activity in the striatum and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), regions associated with reward-related processes (determined by objective functional decoding). When considering ambiguous-DM (vs. perceptual-DM), activity convergence was observed in the lateral prefrontal cortex and insula, regions implicated in affectively-neutral mental processes (e.g., cognitive control and behavioral responding; determined by functional decoding). An exploratory meta-analysis comparing brain activity between substance users and non-users during risky-DM identified reduced convergent activity among users in the striatum, cingulate, and thalamus. Taken together, these findings suggest a dissociation of brain regions linked with risky- and ambiguous-DM reflecting possible differential functionality and highlight brain alterations potentially contributing to poor decision-making in the context of substance use disorders.

Editors' Introduction: Computational Approaches to Social Cognition

What place should formal or computational methods occupy in social psychology? We consider this question in historical perspective, survey the current state of the field, introduce the several new contributions to this special issue, and reflect on the future.

Effect of aging on choice-induced cognitive conflict

When individuals are forced to choose between similarly preferable alternatives, a negatively arousing cognitive conflict occurs, and the preference attitudes toward the chosen and rejected alternatives diverge. This phenomenon, often referred to as "cognitive dissonance", is of interest in psychological and decision neuroscience research. The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) is involved in representing the cognitive conflict induced by difficult-choice tasks. Previous studies have shown age-related decline of the dACC function. However, whether the heightened activity of the dACC regarding cognitive conflict, and choice-induced preference change that behaviorally occur in young subjects also occur in the elderly is unclear. Furthermore, recent studies have noted substantial methodological flaw with the free-choice paradigm that often used in studies focusing on cognitive dissonance. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a modified free-choice paradigm to formally test the effect of aging on choice-induced cognitive conflict. In the young participants, behavioral data confirmed the existence of cognitive conflict and preference change for the alternatives that they rejected in the difficult-choice trials. The imaging data revealed that the right dACC displayed an interaction effect associated with cognitive conflict. In contrast, we did not observe such effects in the elderly participants. These suggest a possibility that elderly people likely feel less cognitive dissonance.

The pursuit of social acceptance: aberrant conformity in social anxiety disorder

The defining pathological features of social anxiety disorder primarily concern the social landscape, yet few empirical studies have examined the potentially aberrant behavioral and neural patterns in this population using socially interactive paradigms. We addressed this issue by investigating the behavioral and neural patterns associated with social conformity in patients with social anxiety disorder. We recorded event-related potentials when healthy subjects (n = 19), and patients with social anxiety disorder (n = 20) made attractiveness judgements of unfamiliar others, while at the same time, being exposed to congruent/incongruent peer ratings. Afterwards, participants were asked to rerate the same faces without the presence of peer ratings. When compared with healthy controls, social anxiety disorder patients exhibited more positive attitudes to unfamiliar others and conformed more with peers-higher feedback. These behavioral effects were in parallel with neural responses associated with social conflict in the N400 signal, showing higher conformity to peers-higher feedback compared with peers-lower or peers-agree feedback among social anxiety disorder patients. Our findings provide evidence on the behavioral and neural patterns of social anxiety disorder during social interactions, and support the hypothesis that individuals with social anxiety disorder are more motivated to pursue social acceptance and possibly avoid social rejection.

Moms in medicine: Job satisfaction among physician-mothers in obstetrics and gynecology

BACKGROUND

Physician satisfaction is linked to positive patient outcomes. Mothers form an increasing fraction of the obstetrics and gynecology (ob/gyn) workforce.

OBJECTIVE

Define factors that affect physician satisfaction among ob/gyn physicians who are also mothers.

METHODS

We constructed and validated a Redcap survey and invited members of online ob/gyn-mom groups to participate. Characteristics of participants' professional and personal lives were evaluated for possible association with the satisfaction outcomes. Comparison testing was performed using Chi-squared test or Fisher's exact test for categorical variables, Student's t-test for parametric variables, and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for non-parametric variables.

RESULTS

Responses were received from 232 participants. A majority reported being unsatisfied with their time to spend with children (66%), partner (70%), and on personal hobbies/activites (75%). Eighty-percent rate professional morale as very/somewhat positive. Women who rated their morale as very/somewhat positive worked fewer hours per week than women with neutral/negative responses (43.6 vs 49.7, p = 0.01). Women with positive morale were also less likely to work over 50 h/week (39.5% vs 56.8%, p = 0.04).

CONCLUSIONS

Ob/gyn physician-mothers have high professional morale but are dissatisfied with time for extra-professional activities. Longer clinical hours correlate with dissatisfaction based on several measurements.

Sour grapes and sweet victories: How actions shape preferences

Classical decision theory postulates that choices proceed from subjective values assigned to the probable outcomes of alternative actions. Some authors have argued that opposite causality should also be envisaged, with choices influencing subsequent values expressed in desirability ratings. The idea is that agents may increase their ratings of items that they have chosen in the first place, which has been typically explained by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance. However, evidence in favor of this reverse causality has been the topic of intense debates that have not reached consensus so far. Here, we take a novel approach using Bayesian techniques to compare models in which choices arise from stable (but noisy) underlying values (one-way causality) versus models in which values are in turn influenced by choices (two-way causality). Moreover, we examined whether in addition to choices, other components of previous actions, such as the effort invested and the eventual action outcome (success or failure), could also impact subsequent values. Finally, we assessed whether the putative changes in values were only expressed in explicit ratings, or whether they would also affect other value-related behaviors such as subsequent choices. Behavioral data were obtained from healthy participants in a rating-choice-rating-choice-rating paradigm, where the choice task involves deciding whether or not to exert a given physical effort to obtain a particular food item. Bayesian selection favored two-way causality models, where changes in value due to previous actions affected subsequent ratings, choices and action outcomes. Altogether, these findings may help explain how values and actions drift when several decisions are made successively, hence highlighting some shortcomings of classical decision theory.

The standard way to explain decisions is the so-called valuation/selection model, which includes 1) a value function that calculates desirability for every possible outcome of alternative actions and 2) a choice function that integrates outcome values and generates selection probability for every action. In this classical view, choices are therefore determined (in a probabilistic sense) by hidden values. However, some authors have argued that causality could also be reversed, meaning that values may in turn be influenced by choices. Yet existing demonstrations of reverse causality have been criticized because pseudo-effects may arise from statistical artifacts. Here, we take a novel computational approach that directly compares models with and without the existence of reverse causality, on the basis of behavioral data obtained from volunteers in a new task. The winning model is a generalization of the reverse causality hypothesis, showing that people tend to like more the items that they previously chose to pursue, and even more if they did obtain these items. These effects were manifest not only in desirability ratings but also in subsequent actions, showing that value changes were more profound than just verbal statements. Altogether, our results invite reconsideration of decision theory, showing that actions are not neutral to the values driving them, hence suggesting that the history of actions should be taken into account.

Hard Decisions Shape the Neural Coding of Preferences

Hard decisions between equally valued alternatives can result in preference changes, meaning that subsequent valuations for chosen items increase and decrease for rejected items. Previous research suggests that this phenomenon is a consequence of cognitive dissonance reduction after the decision, induced by the mismatch between initial preferences and decision outcomes. In contrast, this functional magnetic resonance imaging and eye-tracking study with male and female human participants found that preferences are already updated online during the process of decision-making. Preference changes were predicted from activity in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and precuneus while making hard decisions. Fixation durations during this phase predicted both choice outcomes and subsequent preference changes. These preference adjustments became behaviorally relevant only for choices that were remembered and were in turn associated with hippocampus activity. Our results suggest that preferences evolve dynamically as decisions arise, potentially as a mechanism to prevent stalemate situations in underdetermined decision scenarios.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Most theories of decision-making assume that we always choose the best option available, based on a set of stable preferences. However, what happens for hard decisions when the available options are preferred equally? We show that in such stalemate situations, decision-makers adjust their preferences dynamically during the process of decision-making, and these preference adjustments are predicted by a left prefrontal-parietal network. We also show that eye movements during decision-making are predictive of the magnitude of the upcoming value change. Our results suggest that preferences are dynamic, adjusted every time a hard decision is made, prompting a re-evaluation of existing frameworks of decision-making.

Suggestion of self-(in)coherence modulates cognitive dissonance

While cognitive dissonance is an influential concept of social psychology, its relations with consciousness and episodic memory remain strongly debated. We recently used the free-choice paradigm (FCP) to demonstrate the crucial role of conscious memory of previous choices on choice-induced preference change (CIPC). After choosing between two similarly rated items, subjects reevaluated chosen items as more attractive, and rejected items as less attractive. However such a CIPC was present exclusively for items that were correctly remembered as chosen or rejected during the choice stage, both in healthy controls and in amnesic patients. In the present work, we show that CIPC can be modulated by suggestive quotes promoting self-coherence or self-incoherence. In addition to the crucial role of memory of previous choices, we discovered that memory of the suggestive quotes was correlated to the modulation of CIPC. Taken together these results suggest that CIPC reflects a dynamic homeostatic regulation of self-coherence.

Decision-making Increases Episodic Memory via Postencoding Consolidation

The ability for individuals to actively make decisions engages regions within the mesolimbic system and enhances memory for chosen items. In other behavioral contexts, mesolimbic engagement has been shown to enhance episodic memory by supporting consolidation. However, research has yet to investigate how consolidation may support interactions between decision-making and episodic memory. Across two studies, participants encoded items that were covered by occluder screens and could either actively decide which of two items to uncover or an item was preselected by the experimenter. In Study 1, we show that active decision-making reduces forgetting rates across an immediate and 24-hr memory test, a behavioral marker of consolidation. In Study 2, we use functional neuroimaging to characterize putative neural markers of memory consolidation by measuring interactions between the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex (PRC) during a postencoding period that reexposed participants to elements of the decision-making context without exposing them to memoranda. We show that choice-related striatal engagement is associated with increased postencoding hippocampal-PRC interactions. Finally, we show that a previous reported relationship between choice-related striatal engagement and long-term memory is accounted for by these postencoding hippocampal-PRC interactions. Together, these findings support a model by which actively deciding to encode information enhances memory consolidation to preserve episodic memory for outcomes, a process that may be facilitated by reexposure to the original decision-making context.

Connectivity between mPFC and PCC predicts post-choice attitude change: The self-referential processing hypothesis of choice justification

Prior research shows that after making a choice, decision makers shift their attitudes in a choice-congruous direction. Although this post-choice attitude change effect is robust, the neural mechanisms underlying it are poorly understood. Here, we tested the hypothesis that decision makers elaborate on their choice in reference to self-knowledge to justify the choice they have made. This self-referential processing of the choice is thought to play a pivotal role in the post-choice attitude change. Twenty-four young American adults made a series of choices. They also rated their attitudes toward the choice options before and after the choices. In support of the current hypothesis, we found that changes in functional connectivity between two putative self-regions (medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus]) during the post-choice (vs. pre-choice) rating of the chosen options predicted the post-choice shift of the attitudes toward the chosen options. This finding is the first to suggest that cognitive integration of various self-relevant cognitions is instrumental in fostering post-choice attitude change. Hum Brain Mapp 37:3810-3820, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Associating a product with a luxury brand label modulates neural reward processing and favors choices in materialistic individuals

The present study investigated the extent to which luxury vs. non-luxury brand labels (i.e., extrinsic cues) randomly assigned to items and preferences for these items impact choice, and how this impact may be moderated by materialistic tendencies (i.e., individual characteristics). The main objective was to investigate the neural correlates of abovementioned effects using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Behavioural results showed that the more materialistic people are, the more they choose and like items labelled with luxury brands. Neuroimaging results revealed the implication of a neural network including the dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex that was modulated by the brand label and also by the participants’ preference. Most importantly, items with randomly assigned luxurious brand labels were preferentially chosen by participants and triggered enhanced signal in the caudate nucleus. This effect increased linearly with materialistic tendencies. Our results highlight the impact of brand-item association, although random in our study, and materialism on preference, relying on subparts of the brain valuation system for the integration of extrinsic cues, preferences and individual characteristics.

Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex Updates Chosen Value According to Choice Set Size

Having chosen an item typically increases the subjective value of the chosen item, and people generally enjoy making choices from larger choice sets. However, having too many items to choose from can reduce the value of chosen items-for example, because of conflict or choice difficulty. In this study, we investigated the effects of choice set size on behavioral and neural value updating (revaluation) of the chosen item. In the scanner, participants selected items from choice sets of various sizes (one, two, four, or eight items). After they chose an item, participants rerated the chosen item, and we quantified revaluation by taking the difference of postchoice minus prechoice ratings. Revaluation of chosen items increased up to choice sets of four alternatives but then decreased again for items chosen from choice sets of eight alternatives, revealing both a linear and a quadratic effect of choice set size. At the time of postchoice rating, activation of the ventrolateral pFC (VLPFC) reflected the influence of choice set size on parametric revaluation, without significant relation to either prechoice or postchoice ratings tested separately. Additional analyses revealed relations of choice set size to anterior cingulate and insula activity during actual choice and increased coupling of both regions to revaluation-related VLPFC during postchoice rating. These data suggest that the VLPFC plays a central role in a network that relates choice set size to updating the value of chosen items and integrates choice overload with value-enhancing effects of larger choice sets.

The intrinsic value of choice: The propensity to under-delegate in the face of potential gains and losses

Human beings are often faced with a pervasive problem: whether to make their own decision or to delegate the decision task to someone else. Here, we test whether people are inclined to forgo monetary rewards in order to retain agency when faced with choices that could lead to losses and gains. In a simple choice task, we show that participants choose to pay in order to control their own payoff more than they should if they were to maximize monetary rewards and minimize monetary losses. This tendency cannot be explained by participants' overconfidence in their own ability, as their perceived ability was elicited and accounted for. Nor can the results be explained by lack of information. Rather, the results seem to reflect an intrinsic value for choice, which emerges in the domain of both gains and of losses. Moreover, our data indicate that participants are aware that they are making suboptimal choices in the normative sense, but do so anyway, presumably for psychological gains.

Self-evaluation of decision-making: A general Bayesian framework for metacognitive computation

People are often aware of their mistakes, and report levels of confidence in their choices that correlate with objective performance. These metacognitive assessments of decision quality are important for the guidance of behavior, particularly when external feedback is absent or sporadic. However, a computational framework that accounts for both confidence and error detection is lacking. In addition, accounts of dissociations between performance and metacognition have often relied on ad hoc assumptions, precluding a unified account of intact and impaired self-evaluation. Here we present a general Bayesian framework in which self-evaluation is cast as a "second-order" inference on a coupled but distinct decision system, computationally equivalent to inferring the performance of another actor. Second-order computation may ensue whenever there is a separation between internal states supporting decisions and confidence estimates over space and/or time. We contrast second-order computation against simpler first-order models in which the same internal state supports both decisions and confidence estimates. Through simulations we show that second-order computation provides a unified account of different types of self-evaluation often considered in separate literatures, such as confidence and error detection, and generates novel predictions about the contribution of one's own actions to metacognitive judgments. In addition, the model provides insight into why subjects' metacognition may sometimes be better or worse than task performance. We suggest that second-order computation may underpin self-evaluative judgments across a range of domains. (PsycINFO Database Record

Relation between choice-induced preference change and depression

Most experimental studies of depressive symptom effects on decision-making have examined situations in which a single correct answer exists based on external circumstances (externally guided decision-making, e.g., gambling task). In addition to such decision-making, for decision-making of other types, no correct answer exists based on external circumstances (internally guided decision-making, e.g., preference judgment). For internally guided decision-making, a phenomenon is known by which preference for the chosen item increases and preference for the rejected item is decreased after choosing between two equally preferred items which is designated as choice-induced preference change. Recent reports suggest that this phenomenon is explainable by reinforcement learning theory just as it is with externally guided decision-making. Although many earlier studies have revealed the effects of depression in externally guided decision-making, the relation between depressive symptoms and choice-induced preference change remains unclear. This study investigated the relation between depressive symptoms and choice-induced preference change using the blind choice paradigm. Results show that depressive symptoms are correlated with change in preference of rejected items (Spearman's r = .28, p = .04): depressed individuals tend to show less decreased preference of rejected items. These results indicate that individual differences of depressive symptoms affect choice-induced preference change. We discuss the mechanisms underlying the relation between depression and choice-induced preference change.

Neural evidence for the intrinsic value of action as motivation for behavior

The intrinsic value of an action refers to the inherent sense that experiencing a behavior is enjoyable even if it has no explicit outcome. Previous research has suggested that a common valuation mechanism within the reward network may be responsible for processing the intrinsic value of achieving both the outcome and external rewards. However, how the intrinsic value of action is neurally represented remains unknown. We hypothesized that the intrinsic value of action is determined by an action-outcome contingency indicating the behavior is controllable and that the outcome of the action can be evaluated by this feedback. Consequently, the reward network should be activated, reflecting the generation of the intrinsic value of action. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigation of a stopwatch game in which the action-outcome contingency was manipulated. This experiment involved 36 healthy volunteers and four versions of a stopwatch game that manipulated controllability (the feeling that participants were controlling the stopwatch themselves) and outcome (a signal allowing participants to see the result of their action). A free-choice experiment was administered after the fMRI to explore preference levels for each game. The results showed that the stopwatch game with the action-outcome contingency evoked a greater degree of enjoyment because the participants chose this condition over those that lacked such a contingency. The ventral striatum and midbrain were activated only when action-outcome contingency was present. Thus, the intrinsic value of action was represented by an increase in ventral striatal and midbrain activation.

Cognitive states influence dopamine-driven aberrant learning in Parkinson's disease

Individual differences in dopaminergic tone underlie tendencies to learn from reward versus punishment. These effects are well documented in Parkinson's patients, who vacillate between low and high tonic dopaminergic states as a function of medication. Yet very few studies have investigated the influence of higher-level cognitive states known to affect downstream dopaminergic learning in Parkinson's patients. A dopamine-dependent cognitive influence over learning would provide a candidate mechanism for declining cognitive integrity and motivation in Parkinson's patients. In this report we tested the influence of two high-level cognitive states (cost of conflict and value of volition) that have recently been shown to cause predictable learning biases in healthy young adults as a function of dopamine receptor subtype and dopaminergic challenge. It was hypothesized that Parkinson's patients OFF medication would have an enhanced cost of conflict and a decreased value of volition, and that these effects would be remediated or reversed ON medication. Participants included N = 28 Parkinson's disease patients who were each tested ON and OFF dopaminergic medication and 28 age- and sex-matched controls. The expected cost of conflict effect was observed in Parkinson's patients OFF versus ON medication, but only in those that were more recently diagnosed (<5 years). We found an unexpected effect in the value of volition task: medication compromised the ability to learn from difficult a-volitional (instructed) choices. This novel finding was also enhanced in recently diagnosed patients. The difference in learning biases ON versus OFF medication between these two tasks was strongly correlated, bolstering the idea that they tapped into a common underlying imbalance in dopaminergic tone that is particularly variable in earlier stage Parkinsonism. The finding that these decision biases are specific to earlier but not later stage disease may offer a chance for future studies to quantify phenotypic expressions of idiosyncratic disease progression.

Move me, astonish me… delight my eyes and brain: The Vienna Integrated Model of top-down and bottom-up processes in Art Perception (VIMAP) and corresponding affective, evaluative, and neurophysiological correlates

This paper has a rather audacious purpose: to present a comprehensive theory explaining, and further providing hypotheses for the empirical study of, the multiple ways by which people respond to art. Despite common agreement that interaction with art can be based on a compelling, and occasionally profound, psychological experience, the nature of these interactions is still under debate. We propose a model, The Vienna Integrated Model of Art Perception (VIMAP), with the goal of resolving the multifarious processes that can occur when we perceive and interact with visual art. Specifically, we focus on the need to integrate bottom-up, artwork-derived processes, which have formed the bulk of previous theoretical and empirical assessments, with top-down mechanisms which can describe how individuals adapt or change within their processing experience, and thus how individuals may come to particularly moving, disturbing, transformative, as well as mundane, results. This is achieved by combining several recent lines of theoretical research into a new integrated approach built around three processing checks, which we argue can be used to systematically delineate the possible outcomes in art experience. We also connect our model's processing stages to specific hypotheses for emotional, evaluative, and physiological factors, and address main topics in psychological aesthetics including provocative reactions-chills, awe, thrills, sublime-and difference between "aesthetic" and "everyday" emotional response. Finally, we take the needed step of connecting stages to functional regions in the brain, as well as broader core networks that may coincide with the proposed cognitive checks, and which taken together can serve as a basis for future empirical and theoretical art research.

Cognitive dissonance resolution depends on episodic memory

The notion that past choices affect preferences is one of the most influential concepts of social psychology since its first report in the 50 s, and its theorization within the cognitive dissonance framework. In the free-choice paradigm (FCP) after choosing between two similarly rated items, subjects reevaluate chosen items as more attractive and rejected items as less attractive. However the relations prevailing between episodic memory and choice-induced preference change (CIPC) remain highly debated: is this phenomenon dependent or independent from memory of past choices? We solve this theoretical debate by demonstrating that CIPC occurs exclusively for items which were correctly remembered as chosen or rejected during the choice stage. We used a combination of fMRI and intra-cranial electrophysiological recordings to reveal a modulation of left hippocampus activity, a hub of episodic memory retrieval, immediately before the occurrence of CIPC during item reevaluation. Finally, we show that contrarily to a previous influential report flawed by a statistical artifact, this phenomenon is absent in amnesic patients for forgotten items. These results demonstrate the dependence of cognitive dissonance on conscious episodic memory. This link between current preferences and previous choices suggests a homeostatic function of this regulative process, aiming at preserving subjective coherence.

The involvement of the striatum in decision making

Decision making has been extensively studied in the context of economics and from a group perspective, but still little is known on individual decision making. Here we discuss the different cognitive processes involved in decision making and its associated neural substrates. The putative conductors in decision making appear to be the prefrontal cortex and the striatum. Impaired decision-making skills in various clinical populations have been associated with activity in the prefrontal cortex and in the striatum. We highlight the importance of strengthening the degree of integration of both cognitive and neural substrates in order to further our understanding of decision-making skills. In terms of cognitive paradigms, there is a need to improve the ecological value of experimental tasks that assess decision making in various contexts and with rewards; this would help translate laboratory learnings into real-life benefits. In terms of neural substrates, the use of neuroimaging techniques helps characterize the neural networks associated with decision making; more recently, ways to modulate brain activity, such as in the prefrontal cortex and connected regions (eg, striatum), with noninvasive brain stimulation have also shed light on the neural and cognitive substrates of decision making. Together, these cognitive and neural approaches might be useful for patients with impaired decision-making skills. The drive behind this line of work is that decision-making abilities underlie important aspects of wellness, health, security, and financial and social choices in our daily lives.

Tolerant Paternalism: Pro-ethical Design as a Resolution of the Dilemma of Toleration

Toleration is one of the fundamental principles that inform the design of a democratic and liberal society. Unfortunately, its adoption seems inconsistent with the adoption of paternalistically benevolent policies, which represent a valuable mechanism to improve individuals' well-being. In this paper, I refer to this tension as the dilemma of toleration. The dilemma is not new. It arises when an agent A would like to be tolerant and respectful towards another agent B's choices but, at the same time, A is altruistically concerned that a particular course of action would harm, or at least not improve, B's well-being, so A would also like to be helpful and seeks to ensure that B does not pursue such course of action, for B's sake and even against B's consent. In the article, I clarify the specific nature of the dilemma and show that several forms of paternalism, including those based on ethics by design and structural nudging, may not be suitable to resolve it. I then argue that one form of paternalism, based on pro-ethical design, can be compatible with toleration and hence with the respect for B's choices, by operating only at the informational and not at the structural level of a choice architecture. This provides a successful resolution of the dilemma, showing that tolerant paternalism is not an oxymoron but a viable approach to the design of a democratic and liberal society.

Reward Sensitivity Enhances Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex Activation during Free Choice

Expressing one's preference via choice can be rewarding, particularly when decisions are voluntarily made as opposed to being forced. An open question is whether engaging in choices involving rewards recruits distinct neural systems as a function of sensitivity to reward. Reward sensitivity is a trait partly influenced by the mesolimbic dopamine system, which can impact an individual's neural and behavioral response to reward cues. Here, we investigated how reward sensitivity contributes to neural activity associated with free and forced choices. Participants underwent a simple decision-making task, which presented free- or forced-choice trials in the scanner. Each trial presented two cues (i.e., points or information) that led to monetary reward at the end of the task. In free-choice trials, participants were offered the opportunity to choose between different reward cues (e.g., points vs. information), whereas forced-choice trials forced individuals to choose within a given reward cue (e.g., information vs. information, or points vs. points). We found enhanced ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) activation during free choice compared to forced choice in individuals with high reward sensitivity scores. Next, using the VLPFC as a seed, we conducted a PPI analysis to identify brain regions that enhance connectivity with the VLPFC during free choice. Our PPI analyses on free vs. forced choice revealed increased VLPFC connectivity with the posterior cingulate and precentral gyrus in reward sensitive individuals. These findings suggest reward sensitivity may recruit attentional control processes during free choice potentially supporting goal-directed behavior and action selection.

Dopamine Increases a Value-Independent Gambling Propensity

Although the impact of dopamine on reward learning is well documented, its influence on other aspects of behavior remains the subject of much ongoing work. Dopaminergic drugs are known to increase risk-taking behavior, but the underlying mechanisms for this effect are not clear. We probed dopamine's role by examining the effect of its precursor L-DOPA on the choices of healthy human participants in an experimental paradigm that allowed particular components of risk to be distinguished. We show that choice behavior depended on a baseline (ie, value-independent) gambling propensity, a gambling preference scaling with the amount/variance, and a value normalization factor. Boosting dopamine levels specifically increased just the value-independent baseline gambling propensity, leaving the other components unaffected. Our results indicate that the influence of dopamine on choice behavior involves a specific modulation of the attractiveness of risky options-a finding with implications for understanding a range of reward-related psychopathologies including addiction.

Understand after like, viewer's delight? A fNIRS study of order-effect in combined hedonic and cognitive appraisal of art

We investigate neural and behavioral aspects of the interrelation between 'liking' and 'understanding' when both appraisals are made within one judgment task. Our goal was to explore questions regarding how these appraisals combine, and specifically whether there is an order-effect when both are employed in sequence. To this end, we tested a hypothesis derived from new models in neuroaesthetics, and concerning processing of art, which suggest that perception may involve a natural sequence from first processing for hedonic quality (i.e., liking) followed by processing for understanding. Thus, due to the initial liking assessment's capacity to prime deepened cognitive involvement, a Liking-Understanding order may show key differences in final assessments or brain activation when compared to an Understanding-Liking sequence. Thirty-two participants evaluated a range of paintings, balanced for visual appeal and understandability, in a two-part task in which half evaluated for understanding followed by liking and the other half had question order reversed. Brain activity was recorded via functional Near Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS). Results showed no assessment interrelation or order effect in artwork evaluations. However, participants who began with evaluation for liking, and who came to incongruent combinations (i.e., "I like, but I don't understand" or "I don't like, but I understand"), showed significantly higher activation in left medial prefrontal cortex. This area is functionally associated with attention and integration of hedonic/informational elements. Findings provide tentative support for a liking-driven order-effect, as well as for physiological connection between appraisals, which may not appear in behavioral evidence, and suggest need for further consideration of this topic in appraisal research.

Post-response βγ power predicts the degree of choice-based learning in internally guided decision-making

Choosing an option increases a person’s preference for that option. This phenomenon, called choice-based learning (CBL), has been investigated separately in the contexts of internally guided decision-making (IDM, e.g., preference judgment), for which no objectively correct answer exists, and externally guided decision making (EDM, e.g., perceptual decision making), for which one objectively correct answer exists. For the present study, we compared decision making of these two types to examine differences of underlying neural processes of CBL. As IDM and EDM tasks, occupation preference judgment and salary judgment were used, respectively. To compare CBL for the two types of decision making, we developed a novel measurement of CBL: decision consistency. When CBL occurs, decision consistency is higher in the last-half trials than in first-half trials. Electroencephalography (EEG) data have demonstrated that the change of decision consistency is positively correlated with the fronto-central beta–gamma power after response in the first-half trials for IDM, but not for EDM. Those results demonstrate for the first time the difference of CBL between IDM and EDM. The fronto-central beta–gamma power is expected to reflect a key process of CBL, specifically for IDM.