Adaptation and transmission of a wild duck avian influenza isolate in chickens

A Comparison of Host Responses to Infection with Wild-Type Avian Influenza Viruses in Chickens and Tufted Ducks

Cross-species transmission of influenza A virus (IAV) from wild waterfowl to poultry is the first step in a chain of events that can ultimately lead to exposure and infection of humans. Herein, we study the outcome of infection with eight different mallard-origin IAV subtypes in two different avian hosts: tufted ducks and chickens. We found that infection and shedding patterns as well as innate immune responses were highly dependent on viral subtypes, host species, and inoculation routes. For example, intraoesophageal inoculation, commonly used in mallard infection experiments, resulted in no infections in contrast to oculonasal inoculation, suggesting a difference in transmission routes. Despite H9N2 being endemic in chickens, inoculation of mallard-origin H9N2 failed to cause viable infection beyond 1 day postinfection in our study design. The innate immune responses were markedly different in chickens and tufted ducks, and despite the presence of retinoic acid-inducible gene-I (RIG-I) in tufted duck transcriptomes, it was neither up nor downregulated in response to infection. Overall, we have revealed the heterogeneity of infection patterns and responses in two markedly different avian hosts following a challenge with mallard-origin IAV. These virus-host interactions provide new insights into important aspects of interspecies transmission of IAV. IMPORTANCE Our current findings highlight important aspects of IAV infection in birds that have implications for our understanding of its zoonotic ecology. In contrast to mallards where the intestinal tract is the main site of IAV replication, chickens and tufted ducks show limited or no signs of intestinal infection suggesting that the fecal-oral transmission route might not apply to all bird IAV host species. Our results indicate that mallard-origin IAVs undergo genetic changes upon introduction into new hosts, suggesting rapid adaptation to a new environment. However, similar to the mallard, chickens and tufted ducks show a limited immune response to infection with low pathogenic avian influenza viruses. These findings and future studies in different IAV hosts are important for our understanding of barriers to IAV transmission between species and ultimately from the wild reservoir to humans.

Hemagglutinin Subtype Specificity and Mechanisms of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Genesis

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses (HPAIVs) arise from low pathogenic precursors following spillover from wild waterfowl into poultry populations. The main virulence determinant of HPAIVs is the presence of a multi-basic cleavage site (MBCS) in the hemagglutinin (HA) glycoprotein. The MBCS allows for HA cleavage and, consequently, activation by ubiquitous proteases, which results in systemic dissemination in terrestrial poultry. Since 1959, 51 independent MBCS acquisition events have been documented, virtually all in HA from the H5 and H7 subtypes. In the present article, data from natural LPAIV to HPAIV conversions and experimental in vitro and in vivo studies were reviewed in order to compile recent advances in understanding HA cleavage efficiency, protease usage, and MBCS acquisition mechanisms. Finally, recent hypotheses that might explain the unique predisposition of the H5 and H7 HA sequences to obtain an MBCS in nature are discussed.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses at the Wild-Domestic Bird Interface in Europe: Future Directions for Research and Surveillance

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in wild birds and poultry are no longer a rare phenomenon in Europe. In the past 15 years, HPAI outbreaks—in particular those caused by H5 viruses derived from the A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage that emerged in southeast Asia in 1996—have been occuring with increasing frequency in Europe. Between 2005 and 2020, at least ten HPAI H5 incursions were identified in Europe resulting in mass mortalities among poultry and wild birds. Until 2009, the HPAI H5 virus outbreaks in Europe were caused by HPAI H5N1 clade 2.2 viruses, while from 2014 onwards HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses dominated outbreaks, with abundant genetic reassortments yielding subtypes H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N4, H5N5, H5N6 and H5N8. The majority of HPAI H5 virus detections in wild and domestic birds within Europe coincide with southwest/westward fall migration and large local waterbird aggregations during wintering. In this review we provide an overview of HPAI H5 virus epidemiology, ecology and evolution at the interface between poultry and wild birds based on 15 years of avian influenza virus surveillance in Europe, and assess future directions for HPAI virus research and surveillance, including the integration of whole genome sequencing, host identification and avian ecology into risk-based surveillance and analyses.

Population genomic transformations induced by isolation of wild bird avian influenza viruses (Orthomyxoviridae) in embryonated chicken eggs

Isolation and cultivation of wild-type viruses in model organism cells or tissues is standard practice in virology. Oftentimes, the virus host species is distantly related to the species from which the culture system was developed. Thus, virus culture in these tissues and cells basically constitutes a host jump, which can lead to genomic changes through genetic drift and/or adaptation to the culture system. We directly sequenced 70 avian influenza virus (Orthomyxoviridae) genomes from oropharyngeal/cloacal swabs collected from wild bird species and paired virus isolates propagated from the same samples following isolation in specific-pathogen-free embryonated chicken eggs. The data were analyzed using population genetic approaches including evaluation of single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) frequencies and divergence with pooled-sequencing analyses, consensus sequence placement in neighbor-joining trees, and haplotype reconstruction and networks. We found that propagation of virus in eggs leads to skewed SNP mutation spectra with some SNPs going to fixation. Both synonymous and nonsynonmous SNP frequencies shifted. We found multiple consensus sequences that differed between the swabs and the isolates, with some sequences from the same sample falling into divergent genetic clusters. Twenty of 23 coinfections detected had different dominant subtypes following virus isolation, thus sequences from both the swab and isolate were needed to obtain full subtype data. Haplotype networks revealed haplotype frequency shifts and the appearance or loss of low-frequency haplotypes following isolation. The results from this study revealed that isolation of wild bird avian influenza viruses in chicken eggs leads to skewed populations that are different than the input populations. Consensus sequence changes from virus isolation can lead to flawed phylogenetic inferences, and subtype detection is biased. These results suggest that for genomic studies of wild bird influenza viruses the biological field should move away from chicken egg isolation towards directly sequencing the virus from host samples.

Genetic analysis identifies potential transmission of low pathogenic avian influenza viruses between poultry farms

Poultry can become infected with low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses via (in)direct contact with infected wild birds or by transmission of the virus between farms. This study combines routinely collected surveillance data with genetic analysis to assess the contribution of between‐farm transmission to the overall incidence of LPAI virus infections in poultry. Over a 10‐year surveillance period, we identified 35 potential cases of between‐farm transmission in the Netherlands, of which 10 formed geographical clusters. A total of 21 LPAI viruses were isolated from nine potential between‐farm transmission cases, which were further studied by genetic and epidemiological analysis. Whole genome sequence analysis identified close genetic links between infected farms in seven cases. The presence of identical deletions in the neuraminidase stalk region and minority variants provided additional indications of between‐farm transmission. Spatiotemporal analysis demonstrated that genetically closely related viruses were detected within a median time interval of 8 days, and the median distance between the infected farms was significantly shorter compared to farms infected with genetically distinct viruses (6.3 versus 69.0 km; p < 0.05). The results further suggest that between‐farm transmission was not restricted to holdings of the same poultry type and not related to the housing system. Although separate introductions from the wild bird reservoir cannot be excluded, our study indicates that between‐farm transmission occurred in seven of nine virologically analysed cases. Based on these findings, it is likely that between‐farm transmission contributes considerably to the incidence of LPAI virus infections in poultry.

Different pathogenicity of two strains of clade 2.3.4.4c H5N6 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses bearing different PA and NS gene in domestic ducks

H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have been disseminated to wide geographic regions since 2014. In 2016, five distinct genotypes (C-1 to C-5) of clade 2.3.4.4c H5N6 HPAIVs were detected in South Korea. In this study, we evaluated the pathogenicity, susceptibility to infection, and transmissibility of the two strains representing the C-1 and C-4 genotypes of the H5N6 viruses, which have different PA and NS gene, in domestic ducks. Although the susceptibility to infection of domestic ducks to the two strains was similar, the C-4 genotype virus induced higher mortality in ducks than C-1 genotype virus. A higher titer of viral shedding were detected in ducks challenged with the C-4 genotype virus compared with the C-1 genotype virus. These results indicated that the reassortment of HPAIVs with prevailing low pathogenic avian influenza viruses could effect on the pathogenicity in ducks.

Pathogenicity of two novel human-origin H7N9 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in chickens and ducks

Human infection by low-pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H7N9 subtype was first reported in March 2013 in China. Subsequently, these viruses caused five outbreaks through September 2017. In the fifth outbreak, H7N9 virus possessing a multiple basic amino acid insertion in the cleavage site of hemagglutinin emerged and caused 4% of all human infections in that period. To date, H7N9 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) have been isolated from poultry, mostly chickens, as well as the environment. To evaluate the relative infectivity of these viruses in poultry, chickens and ducks were subjected to experimental infection with two H7N9 HPAIVs isolated from humans, namely A/Guangdong/17SF003/2016 and A/Taiwan/1/2017. When chickens were inoculated with the HPAIVs at a dose of 10⁶ 50% egg infectious dose (EID₅₀), all chickens died within 2-5 days after inoculation, and the viruses replicated in most of the internal organs examined. The 50% lethal doses of A/Guangdong/17SF003/2016 and A/Taiwan/1/2017 in chickens were calculated as 10^3.3 and 10^4.7 EID₅₀, respectively. Conversely, none of the ducks inoculated with either virus displayed any clinical signs, and less-efficient virus replication and less shedding were observed in ducks compared to chickens. These findings indicate that chickens, but not ducks, are highly permissive hosts for emerging H7N9 HPAIVs.

Assessment of low pathogenic avian influenza virus transmission via raw poultry meat and raw table eggs

A rapid qualitative assessment has been done by performing a theoretical analysis on the transmission of low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) via fresh meat from poultry reared or kept in captivity for the production of meat (raw poultry meat) or raw table eggs. A predetermined transmission pathway followed a number of steps from a commercial or non-commercial poultry establishment within the EU exposed to LPAI virus (LPAIV) to the onward virus transmission to animals and humans. The combined probability of exposure and subsequent LPAIV infection via raw poultry meat containing LPAIV is negligible for commercial poultry and humans exposed via consumption whereas it is very unlikely for non-commercial poultry, wild birds and humans exposed via handling and manipulation. The probability of LPAIV transmission from an individual infected via raw poultry meat containing LPAIV is negligible for commercial poultry and humans, whereas it is very unlikely for non-commercial poultry and wild birds. The combined probability of exposure and subsequent LPAIV infection via raw table eggs containing LPAIV is negligible for commercial poultry and humans and extremely unlikely to negligible for non-commercial poultry and wild birds. The probability of LPAIV transmission from an individual infected via raw table eggs containing LPAIV is negligible for commercial poultry and humans and very unlikely to negligible for non-commercial poultry and wild birds. Although the presence of LPAIV in raw poultry meat and table eggs is very unlikely to negligible, there is in general a high level of uncertainty on the estimation of the subsequent probabilities of key steps of the transmission pathways for poultry and wild birds, mainly due to the limited number of studies available, for instance on the viral load required to infect a bird via raw poultry meat or raw table eggs containing LPAIV.

Pathobiology of Clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Infections in Minor Gallinaceous Poultry Supports Early Backyard Flock Introductions in the Western United States in 2014-2015

In 2014 and 2015, the United States experienced an unprecedented outbreak of Eurasian clade 2.3.4.4 H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus. Initial cases affected mainly wild birds and mixed backyard poultry species, while later outbreaks affected mostly commercial chickens and turkeys. The pathogenesis, transmission, and intrahost evolutionary dynamics of initial Eurasian H5N8 and reassortant H5N2 clade 2.3.4.4 HPAI viruses in the United States were investigated in minor gallinaceous poultry species (i.e., species for which the U.S. commercial industries are small), namely, Japanese quail, bobwhite quail, pearl guinea fowl, chukar partridges, and ring-necked pheasants. Low mean bird infectious doses (<2 to 3.7 log₁₀) support direct introduction and infection of these species as observed in mixed backyard poultry during the early outbreaks. Pathobiological features and systemic virus replication in all species tested were consistent with HPAI virus infection. Sustained virus shedding with transmission to contact-exposed birds, alongside long incubation periods, may enable unrecognized dissemination and adaptation to other gallinaceous species, such as chickens and turkeys. Genome sequencing of excreted viruses revealed numerous low-frequency polymorphisms and 20 consensus-level substitutions in all genes and species, but especially in Japanese quail and pearl guinea fowl and in internal proteins PB1 and PB2. This genomic flexibility after only one passage indicates that influenza viruses can continue to evolve in galliform species, increasing their opportunity to adapt to other species. Our findings suggest that these gallinaceous poultry are permissive for infection and sustainable transmissibility with the 2014 initial wild bird-adapted clade 2.3.4.4 virus, with potential acquisition of mutations leading to host range adaptation.IMPORTANCE The outbreak of clade 2.3.4.4 H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus that occurred in the United States in 2014 and 2015 represents the worst livestock disease event in the country, with unprecedented socioeconomic and commercial consequences. Epidemiological and molecular investigations can identify transmission pathways of the HPAI virus. However, understanding the pathogenesis, transmission, and intrahost evolutionary dynamics of new HPAI viruses in different avian species is paramount. The significance of our research is in examining the susceptibility of minor gallinaceous species to HPAI virus, as this poultry sector also suffers from HPAI epizootics, and identifying the biological potential of these species as an epidemiological link between the waterfowl reservoir and the commercial chicken and turkey populations, with the ultimate goal of refining surveillance in these populations to enhance early detection, management, and control in future HPAI virus outbreaks.

Lack of chicken adaptation of newly emergent Eurasian H5N8 and reassortant H5N2 high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in the U.S. is consistent with restricted poultry outbreaks in the Pacific flyway during 2014-2015

In 2014-2015, the U.S. experienced an unprecedented outbreak of Eurasian clade 2.3.4.4 H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, initially affecting mainly wild birds and few backyard and commercial poultry premises. To better model the outbreak, the pathogenesis and transmission dynamics of representative Eurasian H5N8 and reassortant H5N2 clade 2.3.4.4 HPAI viruses detected early in the North American outbreak were investigated in chickens. High mean chicken infectious doses and lack of seroconversion in survivors indicated the viruses were poorly chicken adapted. Pathobiological features were consistent with HPAI virus infection, although the delayed appearance of lesions, longer mean death times, and reduced replication in endothelial cells differed from features of most other Eurasian H5N1 HPAI viruses. Although these initial U.S. H5 HPAI viruses had reduced adaptation and transmissibility in chickens, multi-generational passage in poultry could generate poultry adapted viruses with higher infectivity and transmissibility.

Poultry food products--a source of avian influenza virus transmission to humans?

Global human mobility and intercontinental connectivity, expansion of livestock production and encroachment of wildlife habitats by invasive agricultural land use contribute to shape the complexity of influenza epidemiology. The OneHealth approach integrates these and further elements into considerations to improve disease control and prevention. Food of animal origin for human consumption is another integral aspect; if produced from infected livestock such items may act as vehicles of spread of animal pathogens, and, in case of zoonotic agents, as a potential human health hazard. Notifiable zoonotic avian influenza viruses (AIV) have become entrenched in poultry populations in several Asian and northern African countries since 2003. Highly pathogenic (HP) AIV (e.g. H5N1) cause extensive poultry mortality and severe economic losses. HPAIV and low pathogenic AIV (e.g. H7N9) with zoonotic propensities pose risks for human health. More than 1500 human cases of AIV infection have been reported, mainly from regions with endemically infected poultry. Intense human exposure to AIV-infected poultry, e.g. during rearing, slaughtering or processing of poultry, is a major risk factor for acquiring AIV infection. In contrast, human infections through consumption of AIV-contaminated food have not been substantiated. Heating poultry products according to kitchen standards (core temperatures ≥70°C, ≥10 s) rapidly inactivates AIV infectivity and renders fully cooked products safe. Nevertheless, concerted efforts must ensure that poultry products potentially contaminated with zoonotic AIV do not reach the food chain. Stringent and sustained OneHealth measures are required to better control and eventually eradicate, HPAIV from endemic regions.

Ultra-deep pyrosequencing of partial surface protein genes from infectious Salmon Anaemia virus (ISAV) suggest novel mechanisms involved in transition to virulence

Uncultivable HPR0 strains of infectious salmon anaemia viruses (ISAVs) infecting gills are non-virulent putative precursors of virulent ISAVs (vISAVs) causing systemic disease in farmed Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar). The transition to virulence involves two molecular events, a deletion in the highly polymorphic region (HPR) of the hemagglutinin-esterase (HE) gene and a Q₂₆₆→L₂₆₆ substitution or insertion next to the putative cleavage site (R₂₆₇) in the fusion protein (F). We have performed ultra-deep pyrosequencing (UDPS) of these gene regions from healthy fish positive for HPR0 virus carrying full-length HPR sampled in a screening program, and a vISAV strain from an ISA outbreak at the same farming site three weeks later, and compared the mutant spectra. As the UDPS data shows the presence of both HE genotypes at both sampling times, and the outbreak strain was unlikely to be directly related to the HPR0 strain, this is the first report of a double infection with HPR0s and vISAVs. For F amplicon reads, mutation frequencies generating L₂₆₆ codons in screening samples and Q₂₆₆ codons in outbreak samples were not higher than at any random site. We suggest quasispecies heterogeneity as well as RNA structural properties are linked to transition to virulence. More specifically, a mechanism where selected single point mutations in the full-length HPR alter the RNA structure facilitating single- or sequential deletions in this region is proposed. The data provides stronger support for the deletion hypothesis, as opposed to recombination, as the responsible mechanism for generating the sequence deletions in HE.

Connecting the study of wild influenza with the potential for pandemic disease

Continuing outbreaks of pathogenic (H5N1) and pandemic (SOIVH1N1) influenza have underscored the need to understand the origin, characteristics, and evolution of novel influenza A virus (IAV) variants that pose a threat to human health. In the last 4-5years, focus has been placed on the organization of large-scale surveillance programs to examine the phylogenetics of avian influenza virus (AIV) and host-virus relationships in domestic and wild animals. Here we review the current gaps in wild animal and environmental surveillance and the current understanding of genetic signatures in potentially pandemic strains.

Receptor-binding profiles of H7 subtype influenza viruses in different host species

Influenza viruses of gallinaceous poultry and wild aquatic birds usually have distinguishable receptor-binding properties. Here we used a panel of synthetic sialylglycopolymers and solid-phase receptor-binding assays to characterize receptor-binding profiles of about 70 H7 influenza viruses isolated from aquatic birds, land-based poultry, and horses in Eurasia and America. Unlike typical duck influenza viruses with non-H7 hemagglutinin (HA), all avian H7 influenza viruses, irrespective of the host species, displayed a poultry-virus-like binding specificity, i.e., preferential binding to sulfated oligosaccharides Neu5Acα2-3Galβ1-4(6-O-HSO(3))GlcNAc and Neu5Acα2-3Galβ1-4(Fucα1-3)(6-O-HSO(3))GlcNAc. This phenotype correlated with the unique amino acid sequence of the amino acid 185 to 189 loop of H7 HA and seemed to be dependent on ionic interactions between the sulfate group of the receptor and Lys193 and on the lack of sterical clashes between the fucose residue and Gln222. Many North American and Eurasian H7 influenza viruses displayed weak but detectable binding to the human-type receptor moiety Neu5Acα2-6Galβ1-4GlcNAc, highlighting the potential of H7 influenza viruses for avian-to-human transmission. Equine H7 influenza viruses differed from other viruses by preferential binding to the N-glycolyl form of sialic acid. Our data suggest that the receptor-binding site of contemporary H7 influenza viruses in aquatic and terrestrial birds was formed after the introduction of their common precursor from ducks to a new host, presumably, gallinaceous poultry. The uniformity of the receptor-binding profile of H7 influenza viruses in various wild and domestic birds indicates that there is no strong receptor-mediated host range restriction in birds on viruses with this HA subtype. This notion agrees with repeated interspecies transmission of H7 influenza viruses from aquatic birds to poultry.

Length variations in the NA stalk of an H7N1 influenza virus have opposite effects on viral excretion in chickens and ducks

A deletion of ∼20 amino acids in the stalk of neuraminidase is frequently observed upon transmission of influenza A viruses from waterfowl to domestic poultry. A pair of recombinant H7N1 viruses bearing either a short- or long-stalk neuraminidase was genetically engineered. Inoculation of the long-stalk-neuraminidase virus resulted in a higher cloacal excretion in ducks and led conversely to lower-level oropharyngeal excretion in chickens, associated with a higher-level local immune response and better survival. Therefore, a short-stalk neuraminidase is a determinant of viral adaptation and virulence in chickens but is detrimental to virus replication and shedding in ducks.