Guidance on the environmental risk assessment of genetically modified animals

Challenges for the Post-Market Environmental Monitoring in the European Union Imposed by Novel Applications of Genetically Modified and Genome-Edited Organisms

Information on the state of the environment is important to achieve the objectives of the European Green Deal, including the EU's Biodiversity Strategy for 2030. The existing regulatory provisions for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) foresee an obligatory post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of potential adverse effects upon release into the environment. So far, GMO monitoring activities have focused on genetically modified crops. With the advent of new genomic techniques (NGT), novel GMO applications are being developed and may be released into a range of different, non-agricultural environments with potential implications for ecosystems and biodiversity. This challenges the current monitoring concepts and requires adaptation of existing monitoring programs to meet monitoring requirements. While the incorporation of existing biodiversity monitoring programs into GMO monitoring at the national level is important, additional monitoring activities will also be required. Using case examples, we highlight that monitoring requirements for novel GMO applications differ from those of GM crop plants previously authorized for commercial use in the European Union.

Conceptual risk assessment of mosquito population modification gene-drive systems to control malaria transmission: preliminary hazards list workshops

The field-testing and eventual adoption of genetically-engineered mosquitoes (GEMs) to control vector-borne pathogen transmission will require them meeting safety criteria specified by regulatory authorities in regions where the technology is being considered for use and other locales that might be impacted. Preliminary risk considerations by researchers and developers may be useful for planning the baseline data collection and field research used to address the anticipated safety concerns. Part of this process is to identify potential hazards (defined as the inherent ability of an entity to cause harm) and their harms, and then chart the pathways to harm and evaluate their probability as part of a risk assessment. The University of California Malaria Initiative (UCMI) participated in a series of workshops held to identify potential hazards specific to mosquito population modification strains carrying gene-drive systems coupled to anti-parasite effector genes and their use in a hypothetical island field trial. The hazards identified were placed within the broader context of previous efforts discussed in the scientific literature. Five risk areas were considered i) pathogens, infections and diseases, and the impacts of GEMs on human and animal health, ii) invasiveness and persistence of GEMs, and interactions of GEMs with target organisms, iii) interactions of GEMs with non-target organisms including horizontal gene transfer, iv) impacts of techniques used for the management of GEMs and v) evolutionary and stability considerations. A preliminary hazards list (PHL) was developed and is made available here. This PHL is useful for internal project risk evaluation and is available to regulators at prospective field sites. UCMI project scientists affirm that the subsequent processes associated with the comprehensive risk assessment for the application of this technology should be driven by the stakeholders at the proposed field site and areas that could be affected by this intervention strategy.

Requirements for market entry of gene drive-modified mosquitoes for control of vector-borne diseases: analogies to other biologic and biotechnology products

Gene drive-modified mosquitoes (GDMMs) are proposed as new tools for control and elimination of malaria and other mosquito-borne diseases, and promising results have been observed from testing conducted in containment. Although still at an early stage of development, it is important to begin now to consider approval procedures and market entry strategies for the eventual implementation of GDMMs in the context of disease control programs, as these could impact future research plans. It is expected that, as for other types of new products, those seeking to bring GDMMs to market will be required to provide sufficient information to allow the regulator(s) to determine whether the product is safe and effective for its proposed use. There already has been much emphasis on developing requirements for the biosafety components of the "safe and effective" benchmark, largely concerned with their regulation as genetically modified organisms. Other potential approval requirements have received little attention, however. Although GDMMs are expected to be implemented primarily in the context of public health programs, any regulatory analogies to other public health products, such as pharmaceuticals, vaccines, or chemical pesticides, must take into account the characteristics of live mosquito products. Typical manufacturing standards related to product identity, potency or quality will need to be adapted to GDMMs. Valuable lessons can be drawn from the regulatory approval processes for other whole organism and genetically modified (GM) organism products. Supply chain requirements, such as scale of production, location and design of production facilities, and methods of distribution and delivery, will be dependent upon the characteristics of the particular GDMM product, the conditions of use, and the region to be served. Plans for fulfilling supply chain needs can build upon experience in the development of other live insect products for use in public health and agriculture. Implementation of GDMMs would benefit from additional research on enabling technologies for long-term storage of mosquito life stages, efficient mass production, and area-wide delivery of GDMMs. Early consideration of these practical requirements for market entry will help to mitigate downstream delays in the development of these promising new technologies.

Modification of the chemically induced inflammation assay reveals the Janus face of a phenol rich fulvic acid

Inflammation is an essential process as a reaction towards infections or wounding. Exposure to hazardous environmental pollutants can lead to chronic inflammations, where the resolving phase is delayed or blocked. Very contradictory studies have been reported on the pro- and anti-inflammatory effects of humic substances (HSs) leading to significant disagreements between researchers. To a certain extent, this can be attributed to the chemical heterogeneity of this group of xenobiotics. Here we show for the first time that pro- and anti-inflammatory effects can occur by one HSs. We adapted an assay that uses green fluorescence-labeled zebrafish larvae and CuSO₄ to indue an inflammation. In wild-type larvae, exposure to 50 µM CuSO₄ for 2 h activated the production of reactive oxygen species, which can be monitored with a fluorescence dye (H2DCFDA) and a microplate reader. This allows not only the use of wild-type fish but also a temporal separation of copper exposure and inflammatory substance while retaining the high throughput. This modified assay was then used to evaluate the inflammatory properties of a fulvic acid (FA). We found, that the aromatic structure of the FA protects from inflammation at 5 and 50 mg C/L, while the persistent free radicals enhance the copper-induced inflammation at ≥ 300 mg C/L.

Sustainable use of CRISPR/Cas in fish aquaculture: the biosafety perspective

Aquaculture is becoming the primary source of seafood for human diets, and farmed fish aquaculture is one of its fastest growing sectors. The industry currently faces several challenges including infectious and parasitic diseases, reduced viability, fertility reduction, slow growth, escapee fish and environmental pollution. The commercialization of the growth-enhanced AquAdvantage salmon and the CRISPR/Cas9-developed tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) proffers genetic engineering and genome editing tools, e.g. CRISPR/Cas, as potential solutions to these challenges. Future traits being developed in different fish species include disease resistance, sterility, and enhanced growth. Despite these notable advances, off-target effect and non-clarification of trait-related genes among other technical challenges hinder full realization of CRISPR/Cas potentials in fish breeding. In addition, current regulatory and risk assessment frameworks are not fit-for purpose regarding the challenges of CRISPR/Cas notwithstanding that public and regulatory acceptance are key to commercialization of products of the new technology. In this study, we discuss how CRISPR/Cas can be used to overcome some of these limitations focusing on diseases and environmental release in farmed fish aquaculture. We further present technical limitations, regulatory and risk assessment challenges of the use of CRISPR/Cas, and proffer research strategies that will provide much-needed data for regulatory decisions, risk assessments, increased public awareness and sustainable applications of CRISPR/Cas in fish aquaculture with emphasis on Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) breeding.

Platforms for Production of Protein-Based Vaccines: From Classical to Next-Generation Strategies

To date, vaccination has become one of the most effective strategies to control and reduce infectious diseases, preventing millions of deaths worldwide. The earliest vaccines were developed as live-attenuated or inactivated pathogens, and, although they still represent the most extended human vaccine types, they also face some issues, such as the potential to revert to a pathogenic form of live-attenuated formulations or the weaker immune response associated with inactivated vaccines. Advances in genetic engineering have enabled improvements in vaccine design and strategies, such as recombinant subunit vaccines, have emerged, expanding the number of diseases that can be prevented. Moreover, antigen display systems such as VLPs or those designed by nanotechnology have improved the efficacy of subunit vaccines. Platforms for the production of recombinant vaccines have also evolved from the first hosts, Escherichia coli and Saccharomyces cerevisiae, to insect or mammalian cells. Traditional bacterial and yeast systems have been improved by engineering and new systems based on plants or insect larvae have emerged as alternative, low-cost platforms. Vaccine development is still time-consuming and costly, and alternative systems that can offer cost-effective and faster processes are demanding to address infectious diseases that still do not have a treatment and to face possible future pandemics.

Potential use of gene drive modified insects against disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species poses new challenges for risk assessment

Potential future application of engineered gene drives (GDs), which bias their own inheritance and can spread genetic modifications in wild target populations, has sparked both enthusiasm and concern. Engineered GDs in insects could potentially be used to address long-standing challenges in control of disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, or help to rescue endangered species, and thus provide important public benefits. However, there are concerns that the deliberate environmental release of GD modified insects may pose different or new harms to animal and human health and the wider environment, and raise novel challenges for risk assessment. Risk assessors, risk managers, developers, potential applicants and other stakeholders at many levels are currently discussing whether there is a need to develop new or additional risk assessment guidance for the environmental release of GD modified organisms, including insects. Developing new or additional guidance that is useful and practical is a challenge, especially at an international level, as risk assessors, risk managers and many other stakeholders have different, often contrasting, opinions and perspectives toward the environmental release of GD modified organisms, and on the adequacy of current risk assessment frameworks for such organisms. Here, we offer recommendations to overcome some of the challenges associated with the potential future development of new or additional risk assessment guidance for GD modified insects and provide considerations on areas where further risk assessment guidance may be required.

Adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives

Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC,ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.

Spatiotemporal Controllability and Environmental Risk Assessment of Genetically Engineered Gene Drive Organisms from the Perspective of European Union Genetically Modified Organism Regulation

Gene drive organisms are a recent development created by using methods of genetic engineering; they inherit genetic constructs that are passed on to future generations with a higher probability than with Mendelian inheritance. There are some specific challenges inherent to the environmental risk assessment (ERA) of genetically engineered (GE) gene drive organisms because subsequent generations of these GE organisms might show effects that were not observed or intended in the former generations. Unintended effects can emerge from interaction of the gene drive construct with the heterogeneous genetic background of natural populations and/or be triggered by changing environmental conditions. This is especially relevant in the case of gene drives with invasive characteristics and typically takes dozens of generations to render the desired effect. Under these circumstances, "next generation effects" can substantially increase the spatial and temporal complexity associated with a high level of uncertainty in ERA. To deal with these problems, we suggest the introduction of a new additional step in the ERA of GE gene drive organisms that takes 3 criteria into account: the biology of the target organisms, their naturally occurring interactions with the environment (biotic and abiotic), and their intended biological characteristics introduced by genetic engineering. These 3 criteria are merged to form an additional step in ERA, combining specific "knowns" and integrating areas of "known unknowns" and uncertainties, with the aim of assessing the spatiotemporal controllability of GE gene drive organisms. The establishment of assessing spatiotemporal controllability can be used to define so-called "cut-off criteria" in the risk analysis of GE gene drive organisms: If it is likely that GE gene drive organisms escape spatiotemporal controllability, the risk assessment cannot be sufficiently reliable because it is not conclusive. Under such circumstances, the environmental release of the GE gene drive organisms would not be compatible with the precautionary principle (PP). Integr Environ Assess Manag 2020;16:555-568. © 2020 The Authors. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Society of Environmental Toxicology & Chemistry (SETAC).

Beyond limits – the pitfalls of global gene drives for environmental risk assessment in the European Union

Gene drive organisms (GDOs) have been suggested as approaches to combat some of the most pressing environmental and public health issues. No such organisms have so far been released into the environment, but it remains unclear whether the relevant regulatory provisions will be fit for purpose to cover their potential environmental, human and animal health risks if environmental releases of GDOs are envisaged. We evaluate the novel features of GDOs and outline the resulting challenges for the environmental risk assessment. These are related to the definition of the receiving environment, the use of the comparative approach, the definition of potential harm, the stepwise testing approach, the assessment of long-term and large-scale risks at population and ecosystem level and the post-release monitoring of adverse effects. Fundamental adaptations as well as the development of adequate risk assessment methodologies are needed in order to enable an operational risk assessment for globally spreading GDOs before these organisms are released into environments in the EU.

Regulation of GM Organisms for Invasive Species Control

Invasive species can cause significant harm to the environment, agriculture, and human health, but there are often very limited tools available to control their populations. Gene drives (GD) have been proposed as a new tool which could be used to control or eliminate such species. Here, GD describes a variety of molecular biology applications which all enable the introduction of genetic elements at a higher than expected frequency. These elements can change the genotypes in target populations rapidly with consequences either for (intrinsic) fitness or host-parasite interaction, or both. Beneficial applications are foreseen for human and animal health, agriculture, or nature conservation. This rapidly developing technology is likely to have major impacts in the fight against various diseases, pests, and invasive species. The majority of GD applications involve genetic engineering and novel traits. Therefore, applicants and GMO regulators need to interact to achieve the benefits in innovation while cautiously avoiding unacceptable risks. The release into the environment may include transboundary movement and replacement of target populations, with potential impact on human/animal health and the environment. This article summarizes knowledge-based discussions to identify information gaps and analyzes scenarios for responsible introduction of GD organisms into the environment. It aims to connect the latest scientific developments with regulatory approaches and decision-making.

Using problem formulation for fit-for-purpose pre-market environmental risk assessments of regulated stressors

Pre‐market/prospective environmental risk assessments (ERAs) contribute to risk analyses performed to facilitate decisions about the market introduction of regulated stressors. Robust ERAs begin with an explicit problem formulation, which involves among other steps: (1) formally devising plausible pathways to harm that describe how the deployment of a regulated stressor could be harmful; (2) formulating risk hypotheses about the likelihood and severity of such events; (3) identifying the information that will be useful to test the risk hypotheses; and (4) developing a plan to acquire new data for hypothesis testing should tests with existing information be insufficient for decision‐making. Here, we apply problem formulation to the assessment of possible adverse effects of RNA interference‐based insecticidal genetically modified (GM) plants, GM growth hormone coho salmon, gene drive‐modified mosquitoes and classical biological weed control agents on non‐target organisms in a prospective manner, and of neonicotinoid insecticides on bees in a retrospective manner. In addition, specific considerations for the problem formulation for the ERA of nanomaterials and for landscape‐scale population‐level ERAs are given. We argue that applying problem formulation to ERA maximises the usefulness of ERA studies for decision‐making, through an iterative process, because: (1) harm is defined explicitly from the start; (2) the construction of risk hypotheses is guided by policy rather than an exhaustive attempt to address any possible differences; (3) existing information is used effectively; (4) new data are collected with a clear purpose; (5) risk is characterised against well‐defined criteria of hypothesis corroboration or falsification; and (6) risk assessment conclusions can be communicated clearly. However, problem formulation is still often hindered by the absence of clear policy goals and decision‐making criteria (e.g. definition of protection goals and what constitutes harm) that are needed to guide the interpretation of scientific information. We therefore advocate further dialogue between risk assessors and risk managers to clarify how ERAs can address policy goals and decision‐making criteria. Ideally, this dialogue should take place for all classes of regulated stressors, as this can promote alignment and consistency on the desired level of protection and maximum tolerable impacts across regulated stressors.

Effects of the removal or reduction in density of the malaria mosquito, Anopheles gambiae s.l., on interacting predators and competitors in local ecosystems

New genetic control methods for mosquitoes may reduce vector species without direct effects on other species or the physical environment common with insecticides or drainage. Effects on predators and competitors could, however, be a concern as Anopheles gambiae s.l. is preyed upon in all life stages. We overview the literature and assess the strength of the ecological interactions identified. Most predators identified consume many other insect species and there is no evidence that any species preys exclusively on any anopheline mosquito. There is one predatory species with a specialisation on blood-fed mosquitoes including An. gambiae s.l.. Evarcha culicivora is a jumping spider, known as the vampire spider, found around Lake Victoria. There is no evidence that these salticids require Anopheles mosquitoes and will readily consume blood-fed Culex. Interspecific competition studies focus on other mosquitoes of larval habitats. Many of these take place in artificial cosms and give contrasting results to semi-field studies. This may limit their extrapolation regarding the potential impact of reduced An. gambiae numbers. Previous mosquito control interventions are informative and identify competitive release and niche opportunism; so while the identity and relative abundance of the species present may change, the biomass available to predators may not.

Means and ends of effective global risk assessments for genetic pest management

The development and use of genetic technologies is regulated by countries according to their national laws and governance structures. Legal frameworks require comprehensive technical evidence to be submitted by an applicant on the biology of the organism, its safety to human, animal health and the environment in which it will be released. Some countries also require information on socio-economic and trade impacts. One of the key elements that assists decision-making under those legal frameworks is the use of risk assessments. The risk assessment paradigm of problem formulation based on risk hypothesis, and the assessment of plausible scientific pathways leading to potential environmental and human harms being realised, has been used widely to assess potential risks of genetic technologies to human health and the environment, from crops to mosquitoes. This paper uses the case study of a genetically modified self-limiting olive fly (Bactrocera oleae) for a first deliberate release in Spain to examine the regulatory processes and stakeholders involved in the assessment of risk. It is anticipated that existing risk assessment frameworks are equally applicable to gene drive technologies that may spread and persist in the environment and cross-national borders, but it is the governance structures surrounding the involvement of civil society in regulatory processes that must be administered in a more transparent and defined manner.

Maintaining Quality of Candidate Strains of Transgenic Mosquitoes for Studies in Containment Facilities in Disease Endemic Countries

Transgenic mosquitoes are being developed as novel components of area-wide approaches to vector-borne disease control. Best practice is to develop these in phases, beginning with laboratory studies, before moving to field testing and inclusion in control programs, to ensure safety and prevent costly field testing of unsuitable strains. The process of identifying and developing good candidate strains requires maintenance of transgenic colonies over many generations in containment facilities. By working in disease endemic countries with target vector populations, laboratory strains may be developed and selected for properties that will enhance intended control efficacy in the next phase, while avoiding traits that introduce unnecessary risks. Candidate strains aiming toward field use must consistently achieve established performance criteria, throughout the process of scaling up from small study colonies to production of sufficient numbers for field testing and possible open release. Maintenance of a consistent quality can be demonstrated by a set of insect quality and insectary operating indicators, measured over time at predetermined intervals. These indicators: inform comparability of studies using various candidate strains at different times and locations; provide evidence of conformity relevant to compliance with terms of approval for regulated use; and can be used to validate some assumptions related to risk assessments covering the contained phase and for release into the environment.

Comparison of Model Predictions and Laboratory Observations of Transgene Frequencies in Continuously-Breeding Mosquito Populations

The persistence of transgenes in the environment is a consideration in risk assessments of transgenic organisms. Combining mathematical models that predict the frequency of transgenes and experimental demonstrations can validate the model predictions, or can detect significant biological deviations that were neither apparent nor included as model parameters. In order to assess the correlation between predictions and observations, models were constructed to estimate the frequency of a transgene causing male sexual sterility in simulated populations of a malaria mosquito Anopheles gambiae that were seeded with transgenic females at various proportions. Concurrently, overlapping-generation laboratory populations similar to those being modeled were initialized with various starting transgene proportions, and the subsequent proportions of transgenic individuals in populations were determined weekly until the transgene disappeared. The specific transgene being tested contained a homing endonuclease gene expressed in testes, I-PpoI, that cleaves the ribosomal DNA and results in complete male sexual sterility with no effect on female fertility. The transgene was observed to disappear more rapidly than the model predicted in all cases. The period before ovipositions that contained no transgenic progeny ranged from as little as three weeks after cage initiation to as long as 11 weeks.

Experiences in Engaging the Public on Biotechnology Advances and Regulation

Public input is often sought as part of the biosafety decision-making process. Information and communication about the advances in biotechnology are part of the first step to engagement. This step often relies on the developers and introducers of the particular innovation, for example, an industry-funded website has hosted various authorities to respond to questions from the public. Alternative approaches to providing information have evolved, as demonstrated in sub-Saharan Africa where non-governmental organizations and associations play this role in some countries and subregions. Often times, those in the public who choose to participate in engagement opportunities have opinions about the overall biosafety decision process. Case-by-case decisions are made within defined regulatory frameworks, however, and in general, regulatory consultation does not provide the opportunity for input to the overall decision-making process. The various objectives on both sides of engagement can make the experience challenging; there are no clear metrics for success. The situation is challenging because public input occurs within the context of the local legislative framework, regulatory requirements, and the peculiarities of the fairly recent biosafety frameworks, as well as of public opinion and individual values. Public engagement may be conducted voluntarily, or may be driven by legislation. What can be taken into account by the decision makers, and therefore what will be gathered and the timing of consultation, also may be legally defined. Several practical experiences suggest practices for effective engagement within the confines of regulatory mandates: (1) utilizing a range of resources to facilitate public education and opportunities for understanding complex technologies; (2) defining in advance the goal of seeking input; (3) identifying and communicating with the critical public groups from which input is needed; (4) using a clearly defined approach to gathering and assessing what will be used in making the biosafety decision; and (5) communicating using clear and simple language. These practices create a foundation for systematic methods to gather, acknowledge, respond to, and even incorporate public input. Applying such best practices will increase transparency and optimize the value of input from the public.

Ecological risk analysis and genetically modified salmon: management in the face of uncertainty

The commercialization of growth hormone transgenic Atlantic salmon for aquaculture has become a controversial public policy issue. Concerns exist over the potential ecological effects of this biotechnology should animals escape captivity. From within an ecological risk-analysis framework, science has been sought to provide decision makers with evidence upon which to base regulatory decisions pertaining to genetically modified salmon. Here I review the available empirical information on the potential ecological and genetic effects of transgenic salmon and discuss the underlying eco-evolutionary science behind the topic. I conclude that data gaps and irreducible epistemic uncertainties limit the role of scientific inference in support of ecological risk management for transgenic salmon. I argue that predictive uncertainties are pervasive in complex eco-evolutionary systems and that it behooves those involved in the risk-analysis process to accept and communicate these limitations in the interest of timely, clear, and cautious risk-management options.

Expert opinion vs. empirical evidence: the precautionary principle applied to GM crops

Expert opinion is often sought by government regulatory agencies when there is insufficient empirical evidence to judge the safety implications of a course of action. However, it can be reckless to continue following expert opinion when a preponderance of evidence is amassed that conflicts with this opinion. Factual evidence should always trump opinion in prioritizing the information that is used to guide regulatory policy. Evidence-based medicine has seen a dramatic upturn in recent years spurred by examples where evidence indicated that certain treatments recommended by expert opinions increased death rates. We suggest that scientific evidence should also take priority over expert opinion in the regulation of genetically modified crops (GM). Examples of regulatory data requirements that are not justified based on the mass of evidence are described, and it is suggested that expertise in risk assessment should guide evidence-based regulation of GM crops.

EFSA's scientific activities and achievements on the risk assessment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) during its first decade of existence: looking back and ahead

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and derived food and feed products are subject to a risk analysis and regulatory approval before they can enter the market in the European Union (EU). In this risk analysis process, the role of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which was created in 2002 in response to multiple food crises, is to independently assess and provide scientific advice to risk managers on any possible risks that the use of GMOs may pose to human and animal health and the environment. EFSA's scientific advice is elaborated by its GMO Panel with the scientific support of several working groups and EFSA's GMO Unit. This review presents EFSA's scientific activities and highlights its achievements on the risk assessment of GMOs for the first 10 years of its existence. Since 2002, EFSA has issued 69 scientific opinions on genetically modified (GM) plant market registration applications, of which 62 for import and processing for food and feed uses, six for cultivation and one for the use of pollen (as or in food), and 19 scientific opinions on applications for marketing products made with GM microorganisms. Several guidelines for the risk assessment of GM plants, GM microorganisms and GM animals, as well as on specific issues such as post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) were elaborated. EFSA also provided scientific advice upon request of the European Commission on safeguard clause and emergency measures invoked by EU Member States, annual PMEM reports, the potential risks of new biotechnology-based plant breeding techniques, evaluations of previously assessed GMOs in the light of new scientific publications, and the use of antibiotic resistance marker genes in GM plants. Future challenges relevant to the risk assessment of GMOs are discussed. EFSA's risk assessments of GMO applications ensure that data are analysed and presented in a way that facilitates scientifically sound decisions that protect human and animal health and the environment.