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Rudometova NB, Fando AA, Kisakova LA, Kisakov DN, Borgoyakova MB, Litvinova VR, Yakovlev VA, Tigeeva EV, Vahitov DI, Sharabrin SV, Shcherbakov DN, Evseenko VI, Ivanova KI, Gudymo AS, Ilyicheva TN, Marchenko VY, Ilyichev AA, Rudometov AP, Karpenko LI. Immunogenic and Protective Properties of Recombinant Hemagglutinin of Influenza A (H5N8) Virus. Vaccines (Basel) 2024; 12:143. [PMID: 38400127 PMCID: PMC10893068 DOI: 10.3390/vaccines12020143] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/30/2023] [Revised: 01/23/2024] [Accepted: 01/27/2024] [Indexed: 02/25/2024] Open
Abstract
In this study, we characterized recombinant hemagglutinin (HA) of influenza A (H5N8) virus produced in Chinese hamster ovary cells (CHO-K1s). Immunochemical analysis showed that the recombinant hemagglutinin was recognized by the serum of ferrets infected with influenza A (H5N8) virus, indicating that its antigenic properties were retained. Two groups of Balb/c mice were immunized with intramuscular injection of recombinant hemagglutinin or propiolactone inactivated A/Astrakhan/3212/2020 (H5N8) influenza virus. The results demonstrated that both immunogens induced a specific antibody response as determined by ELISA. Virus neutralization assay revealed that sera of immunized animals were able to neutralize A/turkey/Stavropol/320-01/2020 (H5N8) influenza virus-the average neutralizing titer was 2560. Immunization with both recombinant HA/H5 hemagglutinin and inactivated virus gave 100% protection against lethal H5N8 virus challenge. This study shows that recombinant HA (H5N8) protein may be a useful antigen candidate for developing subunit vaccines against influenza A (H5N8) virus with suitable immunogenicity and protective efficacy.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nadezhda B. Rudometova
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Anastasia A. Fando
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Lyubov A. Kisakova
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Denis N. Kisakov
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Mariya B. Borgoyakova
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Victoria R. Litvinova
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Vladimir A. Yakovlev
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Elena V. Tigeeva
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Danil I. Vahitov
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Sergey V. Sharabrin
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Dmitriy N. Shcherbakov
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Veronika I. Evseenko
- Institute of Solid State Chemistry and Mechanochemistry, Siberian Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk 630090, Novosibirsk Region, Russia;
| | - Ksenia I. Ivanova
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Andrei S. Gudymo
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Tatiana N. Ilyicheva
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Vasiliy Yu. Marchenko
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Alexander A. Ilyichev
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Andrey P. Rudometov
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
| | - Larisa I. Karpenko
- Federal Budgetary Research Institution State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology «Vector», Rospotrebnadzor, Koltsovo 630559, Novosibirsk Region, Russia (L.A.K.); (D.N.K.); (M.B.B.); (V.R.L.); (E.V.T.); (D.I.V.); (S.V.S.); (D.N.S.); (K.I.I.); (A.S.G.); (T.N.I.); (V.Y.M.); (A.A.I.); (A.P.R.); (L.I.K.)
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Hervé S, Schmitz A, Briand FX, Gorin S, Quéguiner S, Niqueux É, Paboeuf F, Scoizec A, Le Bouquin-Leneveu S, Eterradossi N, Simon G. Serological Evidence of Backyard Pig Exposure to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N8 Virus during 2016-2017 Epizootic in France. Pathogens 2021; 10:pathogens10050621. [PMID: 34070190 PMCID: PMC8158469 DOI: 10.3390/pathogens10050621] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/26/2021] [Revised: 04/21/2021] [Accepted: 05/14/2021] [Indexed: 12/20/2022] Open
Abstract
In autumn/winter 2016-2017, HPAI-H5N8 viruses belonging to the A/goose/Guandong/1/1996 (Gs/Gd) lineage, clade 2.3.4.4b, were responsible for outbreaks in domestic poultry in Europe, and veterinarians were requested to reinforce surveillance of pigs bred in HPAI-H5Nx confirmed mixed herds. In this context, ten pig herds were visited in southwestern France from December 2016 to May 2017 and serological analyses for influenza A virus (IAV) infections were carried out by ELISA and hemagglutination inhibition assays. In one herd, one backyard pig was shown to have produced antibodies directed against a virus bearing a H5 from clade 2.3.4.4b, suggesting it would have been infected naturally after close contact with HPAI-H5N8 contaminated domestic ducks. Whereas pigs and other mammals, including humans, may have limited sensitivity to HPAI-H5 clade 2.3.4.4b, this information recalls the importance of implementing appropriate biosecurity measures in pig and poultry farms to avoid IAV interspecies transmission, a prerequisite for co-infections and subsequent emergence of new viral genotypes whose impact on both animal and human health cannot be predicted.
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Affiliation(s)
- Séverine Hervé
- Swine Virology Immunology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Swine Influenza, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (S.G.); (S.Q.); (G.S.)
- Correspondence:
| | - Audrey Schmitz
- Avian and Rabbit Virology Immunology and Parasitology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (A.S.); (F.-X.B.); (É.N.); (N.E.)
| | - François-Xavier Briand
- Avian and Rabbit Virology Immunology and Parasitology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (A.S.); (F.-X.B.); (É.N.); (N.E.)
| | - Stéphane Gorin
- Swine Virology Immunology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Swine Influenza, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (S.G.); (S.Q.); (G.S.)
| | - Stéphane Quéguiner
- Swine Virology Immunology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Swine Influenza, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (S.G.); (S.Q.); (G.S.)
| | - Éric Niqueux
- Avian and Rabbit Virology Immunology and Parasitology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (A.S.); (F.-X.B.); (É.N.); (N.E.)
| | - Frédéric Paboeuf
- SPF Pig Production and Experimentation, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France;
| | - Axelle Scoizec
- Epidemiology, Health and Welfare Unit, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (A.S.); (S.L.B.-L.)
| | - Sophie Le Bouquin-Leneveu
- Epidemiology, Health and Welfare Unit, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (A.S.); (S.L.B.-L.)
| | - Nicolas Eterradossi
- Avian and Rabbit Virology Immunology and Parasitology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (A.S.); (F.-X.B.); (É.N.); (N.E.)
| | - Gaëlle Simon
- Swine Virology Immunology Unit, National Reference Laboratory for Swine Influenza, Ploufragan-Plouzané-Niort Laboratory, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), 22440 Ploufragan, France; (S.G.); (S.Q.); (G.S.)
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Kuiken T, Smietanka K, Staubach C, Guajardo M, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview August - November2019. EFSA J 2020; 17:e05988. [PMID: 32626216 PMCID: PMC7008850 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5988] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/03/2022] Open
Abstract
Between 16 August and 15 November 2019, one low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5) outbreak in poultry in France was reported in Europe. Genetic characterisation reveals that the virusclusterswith Eurasian LPAI viruses. No highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in birds were notified in Europe in the relevant period for this report. HPAI A(H5N6) viruswas identified in chickens in Nigeria, this isthe first report of HPAI A(H5N6) from the African continent.FewerHPAI outbreaks in Asia and Africa were reported during the time period for this report compared with the previous reporting period. Apart from the long‐term epidemic of HPAI A(H5N2)in Taiwan, only six HPAI outbreakswere reported in domestic birds from Nepal, South Africa and Taiwan. Furthermore, no HPAI detections fromwild birds were reported worldwide in the relevant time period forthis report.Even if the risk of incursion of HPAI from wild birds into poultryestablishments in Europe is currently assessed as low, it is important to maintain passive surveillance activities. The focus should be on wild bird species that are in the revised list of target species in order to detect any incursion of HPAI virus early and initiate a warning.Despite the decrease in the number of avian influenza outbreaks over recent months, it is important to maintain a high alert level andhigh standard of biosecurity onpoultry establishments.In Europe, no human infections due toHPAI viruses detected in wild bird or poultry outbreaks, have been reported. The risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered to be very low.
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Kuiken T, Niqueux E, Staubach C, Terregino C, Guajardo IM, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview November 2019- February2020. EFSA J 2020; 18:e06096. [PMID: 32874270 PMCID: PMC7448010 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6096] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Between 16 November 2019 and 15 February 2020, 36 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) virus outbreakswere reported in Europe in poultry (n=34), captive birds (n=1) and wild birds (n=2), in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Germany, Czechiaand Ukraine,one HPAI outbreakcaused by a simultaneous infection with A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) was reported in poultry in Bulgaria, andtwo low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5) virus outbreaks were reported in poultryin the United Kingdom and in Denmark. Genomic characterisation of the HPAI A(H5N8) viruses suggests that they are reassortants of HPAI A(H5N8) viruses from Africa and LPAI viruses from Eurasia. It is likely that this reassortment occurred in wild migratory birds in Asia during the summer and then spread to eastern Europe with the autumnmigration. This is the first time that wild bird migration from Africa to Eurasia has been implicated in the long-distance spread of HPAI viruses to the EU. Given the late incursion of HPAI A(H5N8) virus into the EU in this winter season (first outbreak reported on 30 December 2019), its overall restriction to eastern Europe, and the approaching spring migration, the risk of the virus spreadingfurther in the west via wild birds is decreasing for the coming months. Genetic analysis of the HPAI A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) viruses detected in the Bulgarian outbreak reveals that these virusesare both related to the 2018-19 Bulgarian HPAI A(H5N8) viruses and not to the HPAI A(H5N8) viruses currently circulating in Europe.An increasing number of HPAI A(H5N1), A(H5N2), A(H5N5) and A(H5N6) virus outbreaks in poultry in Asia were reported during the time period for this report compared with the previous reporting period. Single outbreaks of HPAI A(H5N8) virus were notified by Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Furthermore, in contrast to the last report, HPAI virus-positive wild birds were reported from Israel and one of the key migration areas in northern China.Two human cases due to A(H9N2) virus infection were reported during the reporting period.
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Thornton AC, Parry-Ford F, Tessier E, Oppilamany N, Zhao H, Dunning J, Pebody R, Dabrera G. Human Exposures to H5N6 Avian Influenza, England, 2018. J Infect Dis 2020; 220:20-22. [PMID: 30788504 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jiz080] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2018] [Accepted: 02/14/2019] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
The human risk following exposure to the European reassortant avian influenza A(H5N6) is unknown. We used routine data collected as part of public health follow-up to assess outcomes of individuals exposed to H5N6-infected wild birds in England. There were 19 separate incidents of confirmed H5N6 among wild birds in the first quarter of 2018 in England and 69 individuals exposed to infected birds during these incidents. Five exposed individuals developed respiratory symptoms. However, no H5N6 infection was detected among those individuals with respiratory symptoms who underwent diagnostic testing, indicating that the human risk from this strain remains low.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Nisha Oppilamany
- Respiratory Diseases Department, Immunisations and Countermeasures Division
| | | | - Jake Dunning
- Virus Reference Department, National Infection Service
| | - Richard Pebody
- National Infection Service, Public Health England, London, United Kingdom
| | - Gavin Dabrera
- National Infection Service, Public Health England, London, United Kingdom
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Valley-Omar Z, Cloete A, Pieterse R, Walaza S, Salie-Bassier Y, Smith M, Govender N, Seleka M, Hellferscee O, Mtshali PS, Allam M, Ismail A, Anthony T, Seutloali M, McCarthy K, van Helden L, Cohen C, Treurnicht FK. Human surveillance and phylogeny of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) during an outbreak in poultry in South Africa, 2017. Influenza Other Respir Viruses 2020; 14:266-273. [PMID: 32058677 PMCID: PMC7182598 DOI: 10.1111/irv.12724] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/02/2019] [Revised: 11/19/2019] [Accepted: 01/15/2020] [Indexed: 12/14/2022] Open
Abstract
Background In June 2017, an outbreak of the highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) was detected in commercial poultry farms in South Africa, which rapidly spread to all nine South African provinces. Objectives We conducted active surveillance for the transmission of influenza A(H5N8) to humans working with infected birds during the South African outbreak. Methods Influenza A(H5N8)‐positive veterinary specimens were used to evaluate the ability of real‐time PCR‐based assays to detect contemporary avian influenza A(H5N8) strains. Whole genome sequences were generated from these specimens by next‐generation sequencing for phylogenetic characterization and screening for mammalian‐adaptive mutations. Results Human respiratory samples from 74 individuals meeting our case definition, all tested negative for avian influenza A(H5) by real‐time PCR, but 2 (3%) were positive for human influenza A(H3N2). 54% (40/74) reported wearing personal protective equipment including overalls, boots, gloves, masks, and goggles. 94% (59/63) of veterinary specimens positive for H5N8 were detected on an influenza A(H5) assay for human diagnostics. A commercial H5N8 assay detected H5 in only 6% (3/48) and N8 in 92% (44/48). Thirteen (13/25; 52%) A(H5N8) genomes generated from veterinary specimens clustered in a single monophyletic clade. These sequences contained the NS (P42S) and PB2 (L89V) mutations noted as markers of mammalian adaptation. Conclusions Diagnostic assays were able to detect and characterize influenza A(H5N8) viruses, but poor performance is reported for a commercial assay. Absence of influenza A(H5N8) in humans with occupational exposure and no clear impression of molecular adaptation for mammalian infection suggest that this avian pathogen continues to be low‐risk human pathogen.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ziyaad Valley-Omar
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa.,Department of Pathology, Division of Medical Virology, University of Cape Town, South Africa
| | - Alicia Cloete
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Reneé Pieterse
- Department of Agriculture, Western Cape Provincial Veterinary Laboratory, Stellenbosch, South Africa
| | - Sibongile Walaza
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Yusrah Salie-Bassier
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Mikhail Smith
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Nevashan Govender
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Mpho Seleka
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Orienka Hellferscee
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Phillip Senzo Mtshali
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Mushal Allam
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Arshad Ismail
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Tasneem Anthony
- Department of Agriculture, Western Cape Provincial Veterinary Laboratory, Stellenbosch, South Africa
| | - Michelle Seutloali
- Department of Agriculture, Western Cape Provincial Veterinary Laboratory, Stellenbosch, South Africa
| | - Kerrigan McCarthy
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Lesley van Helden
- Veterinary Services, Western Cape Department of Agriculture, South Africa
| | - Cheryl Cohen
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa.,School of Public Health, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
| | - Florette Kathleen Treurnicht
- National Institute for Communicable Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa.,School of Pathology, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
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Clean Poultry Energy System Design Based on Biomass Gasification Technology: Thermodynamic and Economic Analysis. ENERGIES 2019. [DOI: 10.3390/en12224235] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
Despite growing attention has been paid to waste material gasification for high-efficiency energy conversion, the application of gasification technology in meat waste management is still limited. To fill this gap, this study designed two systems which evaluated the potential of using gasification technology to manage the poultry waste that has been exposed to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). Two systems are simulated by using Aspen plus combined with a one-dimensional kinetics control gasification model, and wood or dried poultry is selected as the feedstock for the gasifier. The results show that the energy efficiency of the poultry drying system (wood gasification) is 14.5%, which is 12% lower than that of the poultry gasification system when the poultry energy is accounted as energy input. Even though the economic analysis indicates the poultry elimination cost of the poultry gasification system is only 30 $/tonne lower than the poultry drying system, taking the absence of dried poultry burial into consideration, the poultry gasification system has development potentials. The sensitivity analysis shows that labor fee and variable factor has larger effects on the poultry elimination cost, while the uncertainty analysis determines the uncertainty level of the economic analysis results.
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Adlhoch C, Miteva A, Zdravkova A, Miškić T, Kneževic D, Perdikaris S, Śmietanka K, Świętoń E, Kopriva V, Chudý M, Romero González LJ, Moreno Gil I, Wallén Norell A, Verdonck F. Estimation of the number of exposed people during highly pathogenic avian influenza virus outbreaks in EU/EEA countries, October 2016-September 2018. Zoonoses Public Health 2019; 66:874-878. [PMID: 31493311 PMCID: PMC6852165 DOI: 10.1111/zph.12629] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/08/2019] [Revised: 04/26/2019] [Accepted: 06/11/2019] [Indexed: 12/04/2022]
Abstract
We estimated that more than 11,000 people were exposed to highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in EU/EEA countries over the outbreak period October 2016-September 2018 by cross-linking data submitted by Member States to European Food Safety Authority and EMPRES-i. A stronger framework for collecting human exposure data is required.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Tihana Miškić
- Ministry of AgricultureVeterinary and Food Safety DirectorateZagrebCroatia
| | | | - Sokratis Perdikaris
- Ministry of Rural Development and Food, General Directorate of Veterinary ServicesDirectorate of Animal HealthAthensGreece
| | | | | | - Vilem Kopriva
- State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak RepublicBratislavaSlovakia
| | - Martin Chudý
- State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak RepublicBratislavaSlovakia
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Adlhoch C, Fusaro A, Kuiken T, Monne I, Smietanka K, Staubach C, Muñoz Guajardo I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview February- August 2019. EFSA J 2019; 17:e05843. [PMID: 32626437 PMCID: PMC7009306 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5843] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 16 February and 15 August 2019, five HPAI A(H5N8) outbreaks at poultry establishments in Bulgaria, two low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5N1) outbreaks in poultry in Denmark and one in captive birds in Germany, one LPAI A(H7N3) outbreak in poultry in Italy and one LPAI A(H7N7) outbreak in poultry in Denmark were reported in Europe. Genetic characterisation reveals that viruses from Denmark cluster with viruses previously identified in wild birds and poultry in Europe; while the Italian isolate clusters with LPAI viruses circulating in wild birds in Central Asia. No avian influenza outbreaks in wild birds were notified in Europe in the relevant period for this report. A decreased number of outbreaks in poultry and wild birds in Asia, Africa and the Middle East was reported during the time period for this report, particularly during the last three months. Furthermore, only six affected wild birds were reported in the relevant time period of this report. Currently there is no evidence of a new HPAI virus incursion from Asia into Europe. However, passive surveillance systems may not be sensitive for early detection if the prevalence or case fatality in wild birds is very low. Therefore, it is important to encourage and maintain passive surveillance in Europe encouraging a search for carcasses of wild bird species that are in the revised list of target species in order to detect any incursion of HPAI virus early and initiate warning. No human infections due to HPAI viruses - detected in wild birds and poultry outbreaks in Europe - have been reported during the last years and the risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered very low.
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Olsen SJ, Rooney JA, Blanton L, Rolfes MA, Nelson DI, Gomez TM, Karli SA, Trock SC, Fry AM. Estimating Risk to Responders Exposed to Avian Influenza A H5 and H7 Viruses in Poultry, United States, 2014-2017. Emerg Infect Dis 2019; 25:1011-1014. [PMID: 30741630 PMCID: PMC6478193 DOI: 10.3201/eid2505.181253] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
In the United States, outbreaks of avian influenza H5 and H7 virus infections in poultry have raised concern about the risk for infections in humans. We reviewed the data collected during 2014-2017 and found no human infections among 4,555 exposed responders who were wearing protection.
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Adlhoch C, Kuiken T, Monne I, Mulatti P, Smietanka K, Staubach C, Guajardo IM, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview November 2018 - February 2019. EFSA J 2019; 17:e05664. [PMID: 32626274 PMCID: PMC7009136 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5664] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/07/2023] Open
Abstract
No human infections due to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) or A(H5N6) viruses ‐ detected in wild birds and poultry outbreaks in Europe ‐ have been reported so far and the risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered very low. Between 16 November 2018 and 15 February 2019, two HPAI A(H5N8) outbreaks in poultry establishments in Bulgaria, two HPAI A(H5N6) outbreaks in wild birds in Denmark and one low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H5N3) in captive birds in the Netherlands were reported in the European Union (EU). Genetic characterisation of the HPAI A(H5N6) viruses reveals that they cluster with the A(H5N6) viruses that have been circulating in Europe since December 2017. The wild bird species involved were birds of prey and were likely infected due to hunting or scavenging infected wild waterfowl. However, HPAI virus was not detected in other wild birds during this period. Outside the EU, two HPAI outbreaks were reported in poultry during the reporting period from western Russia. Sequence information on an HPAI A(H5N6) virus found in a common gull in western Russia in October 2018 suggests that the virus clusters within clade 2.3.4.4c and is closely related to viruses that transmitted zoonotically in China. An increasing number of outbreaks in poultry and wild birds in Asia, Africa and the Middle East was observed during the time period for this report. Currently there is no evidence of a new HPAI virus incursion from Asia into Europe. However, passive surveillance systems may not be sensitive enough if the prevalence or case fatality in wild birds is very low. Nevertheless, it is important to encourage and maintain a certain level of passive surveillance in Europe testing single sick or dead wild birds and birds of prey as they may be sensitive sentinel species for the presence of HPAI virus in the environment. A well‐targeted active surveillance might complement passive surveillance to collect information on HPAI infectious status of apparently healthy wild bird populations.
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Poen MJ, Venkatesh D, Bestebroer TM, Vuong O, Scheuer RD, Oude Munnink BB, de Meulder D, Richard M, Kuiken T, Koopmans MPG, Kelder L, Kim YJ, Lee YJ, Steensels M, Lambrecht B, Dan A, Pohlmann A, Beer M, Savic V, Brown IH, Fouchier RAM, Lewis NS. Co-circulation of genetically distinct highly pathogenic avian influenza A clade 2.3.4.4 (H5N6) viruses in wild waterfowl and poultry in Europe and East Asia, 2017-18. Virus Evol 2019; 5:vez004. [PMID: 31024736 PMCID: PMC6476160 DOI: 10.1093/ve/vez004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 54] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses were first introduced into Europe in late 2014 and re-introduced in late 2016, following detections in Asia and Russia. In contrast to the 2014-15 H5N8 wave, there was substantial local virus amplification in wild birds in Europe in 2016-17 and associated wild bird mortality, with evidence for occasional gene exchange with low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. Since December 2017, several European countries have again reported events or outbreaks with HPAI H5N6 reassortant viruses in both wild birds and poultry, respectively. Previous phylogenetic studies have shown that the two earliest incursions of HPAI H5N8 viruses originated in Southeast Asia and subsequently spread to Europe. In contrast, this study indicates that recent HPAI H5N6 viruses evolved from the H5N8 2016-17 viruses during 2017 by reassortment of a European HPAI H5N8 virus and wild host reservoir LPAI viruses. The genetic and phenotypic differences between these outbreaks and the continuing detections of HPAI viruses in Europe are a cause of concern for both animal and human health. The current co-circulation of potentially zoonotic HPAI and LPAI virus strains in Asia warrants the determination of drivers responsible for the global spread of Asian lineage viruses and the potential threat they pose to public health.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marjolein J Poen
- Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Divya Venkatesh
- Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, UK
| | | | - Oanh Vuong
- Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Rachel D Scheuer
- Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
| | | | | | - Mathilde Richard
- Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Thijs Kuiken
- Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
| | | | - Leon Kelder
- Staatsbosbeheer, Amersfoort, the Netherlands
| | - Yong-Joo Kim
- Avian Influenza Research and Diagnostic Division, Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency, Republic of Korea
| | - Youn-Jeong Lee
- Avian Influenza Research and Diagnostic Division, Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency, Republic of Korea
| | | | | | - Adam Dan
- Veterinary Diagnostics Directorate, Budapest, Hungary
| | - Anne Pohlmann
- Institute of Diagnostic Virology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Insel Riems, Germany
| | - Martin Beer
- Institute of Diagnostic Virology, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Insel Riems, Germany
| | | | - Ian H Brown
- OIE/FAO/EURL International Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Swine Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)—Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey, UK
| | - Ron A M Fouchier
- Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Nicola S Lewis
- OIE/FAO/EURL International Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Swine Influenza and Newcastle Disease, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)—Weybridge, Addlestone, Surrey, UK
- Department of Pathobiology and Population Sciences, Royal Veterinary College, Hawkshead Lane, North Mymms, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, AL9 7TA, UK
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Adlhoch C, Brouwer A, Kuiken T, Miteva A, Mulatti P, Smietanka K, Staubach C, Gogin A, Muñoz Guajardo I, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview August - November 2018. EFSA J 2018; 16:e05573. [PMID: 32625795 PMCID: PMC7009621 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5573] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/27/2023] Open
Abstract
Between 16 August and 15 November 2018, 14 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) outbreaks in poultry establishments in Bulgaria and seven HPAI A(H5N6) outbreaks, one in captive birds in Germany and six in wild birds in Denmark and the Netherlands were reported in the European Union (EU). No human infection due to HPAI A(H5N8) and A(H5N6) viruses have been reported in Europe so far. Seroconversion of people exposed during outbreaks in Russia has been reported in one study. Although the risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered to be very low, appropriate personal protection measures of people exposed will reduce any potential risk. Genetic clustering of the viruses isolated from poultry in Bulgaria suggests three separate introductions in 2016 and a continuing circulation and transmission of these viruses within domestic ducks. Recent data from Bulgaria provides further indication that the sensitivity of passive surveillance of HPAI A(H5N8) in domestic ducks may be significantly compromised. Increased vigilance is needed especially during the periods of cold spells in winter when aggregations of wild birds and their movements towards areas with more favourable weather conditions may be encouraged. Two HPAI outbreaks in poultry were reported during this period from western Russia. Low numbers of HPAI outbreaks were observed in Africa and Asia, no HPAI cases were detected in wild birds in the time period relevant for this report. Although a few HPAI outbreaks were reported in Africa and Asia during the reporting period, the probability of HPAI virus introductions from non‐EU countries via wild birds particularly via the north‐eastern route from Russia is increasing, as the fall migration of wild birds from breeding and moulting sites to the wintering sites continues. Furthermore, the lower temperatures and ultraviolet radiation in winter can facilitate the environmental survival of any potential AI viruses introduced to Europe.
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Adlhoch C, Kuiken T, Mulatti P, Smietanka K, Staubach C, Muñoz Guajardo I, Amato L, Baldinelli F. Avian influenza overview May - August 2018. EFSA J 2018; 16:e05430. [PMID: 32626052 PMCID: PMC7009402 DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5430] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Between 16 May and 15 August 2018, three highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) outbreaks in poultry establishments and three HPAI A(H5N6) outbreaks in wild birds were reported in Europe. Three low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) outbreaks were reported in three Member States. Few HPAI and LPAI bird cases have been detected in this period of the year, in accordance with the seasonal expected pattern of LPAI and HPAI. There is no evidence to date that HPAI A(H5N8) and A(H5N6) viruses circulating in Europe have caused any human infections. The risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered to be very low. Several HPAI outbreaks in poultry were reported during this period from Russia. The presence of the A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) viruses in parts of Russia connected with fall migration routes of wild birds is of concern for possible introduction and spread with wild birds migrating to the EU. Although few AI outbreaks were observed in Africa, Asia and the Middle East during the reporting period, the probability of AI virus introductions from non‐EU countries via wild birds particularly via the north‐eastern route from Russia is increasing, as the fall migration of wild birds will start in the coming weeks. Further, the lower temperatures in autumn and winter may facilitate the environmental survival of avian influenza viruses potentially introduced to Europe.
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