Embodied Predictions, Agency, and Psychosis

'Are these my thoughts?': A 20-year prospective study of thought insertion, thought withdrawal, thought broadcasting, and their relationship to auditory verbal hallucinations

The co-occurrence of delusions and other symptoms at the onset of psychosis is a challenge for theories about the aetiology of psychosis. This paper explores the relatedness of delusions about the experience of thinking (thought insertion, thought withdrawal, and thought broadcasting) and auditory verbal hallucinations by describing their trajectories over a 20-year period in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, affective and other psychosis, and unipolar depression nonpsychosis. The sample consisted of 407 participants who were recruited at index hospitalization and evaluated over six follow-ups over 20 years. The symptom structure associated with thought insertion included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusions of control, delusion of self-depreciation, depersonalization and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought withdrawal included somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought dissemination, delusions of control, sexual delusions, depersonalization, negative symptoms, depression, and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought broadcasting included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusion of self-depreciation, fantastic delusions, sexual delusions, and depersonalization. Auditory verbal hallucinations and delusions of self-depreciation were significantly associated with both thought insertion and thought broadcasting. Thought insertion and thought withdrawal were significantly associated with other hallucinations, delusions of control, and anxiety; thought withdrawal and thought broadcasting were significantly related to sexual delusions. We hypothesize that specific symptom constellations over time might be explained as the product of pseudo-coherent realities created to give meaning to the experience of the world and the self of individuals in psychosis based on both prior top-down and ongoing bottom-up elements.

Robotically-induced auditory-verbal hallucinations: combining self-monitoring and strong perceptual priors

BACKGROUND

Inducing hallucinations under controlled experimental conditions in non-hallucinating individuals represents a novel research avenue oriented toward understanding complex hallucinatory phenomena, avoiding confounds observed in patients. Auditory-verbal hallucinations (AVH) are one of the most common and distressing psychotic symptoms, whose etiology remains largely unknown. Two prominent accounts portray AVH either as a deficit in auditory-verbal self-monitoring, or as a result of overly strong perceptual priors.

METHODS

In order to test both theoretical models and evaluate their potential integration, we developed a robotic procedure able to induce self-monitoring perturbations (consisting of sensorimotor conflicts between poking movements and corresponding tactile feedback) and a perceptual prior associated with otherness sensations (i.e. feeling the presence of a non-existing another person).

RESULTS

Here, in two independent studies, we show that this robotic procedure led to AVH-like phenomena in healthy individuals, quantified as an increase in false alarm rate in a voice detection task. Robotically-induced AVH-like sensations were further associated with delusional ideation and to both AVH accounts. Specifically, a condition with stronger sensorimotor conflicts induced more AVH-like sensations (self-monitoring), while, in the otherness-related experimental condition, there were more AVH-like sensations when participants were detecting other-voice stimuli, compared to detecting self-voice stimuli (strong-priors).

CONCLUSIONS

By demonstrating an experimental procedure able to induce AVH-like sensations in non-hallucinating individuals, we shed new light on AVH phenomenology, thereby integrating self-monitoring and strong-priors accounts.

Sensory Attenuation Deficit and Auditory Hallucinations in Schizophrenia: A Causal Mechanism or a Risk Factor? Evidence From Meta-Analyses on the N1 Event-Related Potential Component

BACKGROUND

Sensory attenuation (SA), the dampened perception of self-generated sensory information, is typically associated with reduced event-related potential signals, such as for the N1 component of auditory event-related potentials. SA, together with efficient monitoring of intentions and actions, should facilitate the distinction between self-generated and externally generated sensory events, thereby optimizing interaction with the world. According to many, SA is deficient in schizophrenia. The question arises whether altered SA reflects a sufficient mechanism to explain positive symptoms such as auditory hallucinations. A systematic association of reduced auditory SA in hallucinating patients would support this hypothesis.

METHODS

We conducted a series of meta-analyses on 15 studies on auditory SA in which the N1 component of event-related potential-electroencephalogram signals was measured during talking (self-generated sensory signals condition) or when listening to prerecorded vocalizations (externally generated sensory signals condition).

RESULTS

We found that individuals with schizophrenia did show some auditory SA because their N1 signal was significantly attenuated in talking conditions compared with listening conditions. However, the magnitude of such attenuation was reduced in individuals with schizophrenia compared to healthy control participants. This phenomenon generalizes independently from the stage of the disease, the severity of positive symptoms, and whether patients have auditory hallucinations or not.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings suggest that reduced SA cannot be a sufficient mechanism for explaining positive symptoms such as auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. Because reduced SA was also present in participants at risk of schizophrenia, reduced SA may represent a risk factor for the disorder. We discuss the implications of these results for clinical-cognitive models of schizophrenia.

The bodily self from psychosis to psychedelics

The sense of self is a foundational element of neurotypical human consciousness. We normally experience the world as embodied agents, with the unified sensation of our selfhood being nested in our body. Critically, the sense of self can be altered in psychiatric conditions such as psychosis and altered states of consciousness induced by psychedelic compounds. The similarity of phenomenological effects across psychosis and psychedelic experiences has given rise to the "psychotomimetic" theory suggesting that psychedelics simulate psychosis-like states. Moreover, psychedelic-induced changes in the sense of self have been related to reported improvements in mental health. Here we investigated the bodily self in psychedelic, psychiatric, and control populations. Using the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion, we tested (N = 75) patients with psychosis, participants with a history of substantial psychedelic experiences, and control participants to see how psychedelic and psychiatric experience impacts the bodily self. Results revealed that psychosis patients had reduced Body Ownership and Sense of Agency during volitional action. The psychedelic group reported subjective long-lasting changes to the sense of self, but no differences between control and psychedelic participants were found. Our results suggest that while psychedelics induce both acute and enduring subjective changes in the sense of self, these are not manifested at the level of the bodily self. Furthermore, our data show that bodily self-processing, related to volitional action, is disrupted in psychosis patients. We discuss these findings in relation to anomalous self-processing across psychedelic and psychotic experiences.

Aberrant sense of agency induced by delayed prediction signals in schizophrenia: a computational modeling study

Aberrant sense of agency (SoA, a feeling of control over one's own actions and their subsequent events) has been considered key to understanding the pathology of schizophrenia. Behavioral studies have demonstrated that a bidirectional (i.e., excessive and diminished) SoA is observed in schizophrenia. Several neurophysiological and theoretical studies have suggested that aberrancy may be due to temporal delays (TDs) in sensory-motor prediction signals. Here, we examined this hypothesis via computational modeling using a recurrent neural network (RNN) expressing the sensory-motor prediction process. The proposed model successfully reproduced the behavioral features of SoA in healthy controls. In addition, simulation of delayed prediction signals reproduced the bidirectional schizophrenia-pattern SoA, whereas three control experiments (random noise addition, TDs in outputs, and TDs in inputs) demonstrated no schizophrenia-pattern SoA. These results support the TD hypothesis and provide a mechanistic understanding of the pathology underlying aberrant SoA in schizophrenia.

Excessive teleological thinking is driven by aberrant associations and not by failure of reasoning

Teleological thought - the tendency to ascribe purpose to objects and events - is useful in some cases (encouraging explanation-seeking), but harmful in others (fueling delusions and conspiracy theories). What drives excessive and maladaptive teleological thinking? In causal learning, there is a fundamental distinction between associative learning versus learning via propositional mechanisms. Here, we propose that directly contrasting the contributions of these two pathways can elucidate the roots of excess teleology. We modified a causal learning task such that we could encourage associative versus propositional mechanisms in different instances. Across three experiments (total N = 600), teleological tendencies were correlated with delusion-like ideas and uniquely explained by aberrant associative learning, but not by learning via propositional rules. Computational modeling suggested that the relationship between associative learning and teleological thinking can be explained by excessive prediction errors that imbue random events with more significance - providing a new understanding for how humans make meaning of lived events.

Modeling intentionality in the human brain

This paper is focusing on a rather neglected issue that concerns both aspects of philosophy and neurobiology in relation to the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is concerned with the 'directedness' or 'aboutness' of mental phenomena towards an object. Despite the fact that in philosophy both concepts of aboutness and directedness are conceptually identical with intentionality, a careful neuroscientific approach can demonstrate that these two phenomena represent two distinct conceptual and neurobiological aspects of intentionality with complementary functions. We described the interaction between a series of intentionality and pathogenetic psychobiological factors, the corresponding brain topography, and the resulting clinical manifestation and psychopathology. A permanent failure of intentionality dominates in psychosis, which includes an inappropriateness of the intentional object or connection, from the outset, or even from the prodromal phase of the disorder. Affective disorders may result from imprecise interoceptive prediction error signals, due to a confused identification of the intentional object. In suicidal patients there is an emotional intentionality failure, characterized by an absence of intentional object or a loss of conscious access to normal intentional objects. We may model an 'intentional system' as a higher order system, with a monitoring and regulatory role attributed to the brain and behavior. Also, we may consider mental disorders as the result of a radical disruption of intentionality, due to an inappropriateness or lack of the intentional object or due to an inappropriate connection in some points of the suggested brain pathways of intentionality.

Disentangling the Neural Correlates of Agency, Ownership and Multisensory Processing

The experience of the self as an embodied agent in the world is an essential aspect of human consciousness. This experience arises from the feeling of control over one's bodily actions, termed the Sense of Agency, and the feeling that the body belongs to the self, Body Ownership. Despite long-standing philosophical and scientific interest in the relationship between the body and brain, the neural systems involved in Body Ownership and Sense of Agency, and especially their interactions, are not yet understood. In this preregistered study using the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion inside an MR-scanner, we aimed to uncover the relationship between Body Ownership and Sense of Agency in the human brain. Importantly, by using both visuomotor and visuotactile stimulations and measuring online trial-by-trial fluctuations in the illusion magnitude, we were able to disentangle brain systems related to objective sensory stimulation and subjective judgments of the bodily-self. Our results indicate that at both the behavioral and neural levels, Body Ownership and Sense of Agency are strongly interrelated. Multisensory regions in the occipital and fronto-parietal regions encoded convergence of sensory stimulation conditions. The subjective judgments of the bodily-self were related to BOLD fluctuations in the Somatosensory cortex and in regions not activated by the sensory conditions, such as the insular cortex and precuneus. Our results highlight the convergence of multisensory processing in specific neural systems for both Body Ownership and Sense of Agency with partially dissociable regions for subjective judgments in regions of the Default Mode Network.

Impaired sense of agency and associated confidence in psychosis

The Sense of Agency (SoA), our sensation of control over our actions, is a fundamental mechanism for delineating the Self from the environment and others. SoA arises from implicit processing of sensorimotor signals as well as explicit higher-level judgments. Psychosis patients suffer from difficulties in the sense of control over their actions and accurate demarcation of the Self. Moreover, it is unclear if they have metacognitive insight into their aberrant abilities. In this pre-registered study, we examined SoA and its associated confidence judgments using an embodied virtual reality paradigm in psychosis patients and controls. Our results show that psychosis patients not only have a severely reduced ability for discriminating their actions but they also do not show proper metacognitive insight into this deficit. Furthermore, an exploratory analysis revealed that the SoA capacities allow for high levels of accuracy in clinical classification of psychosis. These results indicate that SoA and its metacognition are core aspects of the psychotic state and provide possible venues for understanding the underlying mechanisms of psychosis, that may be leveraged for novel clinical purposes.

Sense of body ownership and body agency in schizophrenia

Recent research suggests that embodiment sensations (sense of body ownership and sense of body agency) are altered in schizophrenia. Using a mirror box illusion setup, we tested if the anomalous embodiment experience depends on deficient processing of visuomotor synchrony, disrupted processing of movement mode, or both. The task required participants to press a lever with their index while looking at the image of the experimenter's hand moving on a similar lever. The illusion of embodiment could arise because looking toward the direction of their own hand the participant saw the reflection of the experimenter's hand visually superimposed to his own one through a mirror. During the illusion induction, we systematically varied visuomotor asynchrony (4 delays were imposed on the movement of the experimenter's hand) and the mode of movement (the participant could perform active vs. passive movements). The strength of the illusion of embodiment of the external hand was assessed with explicit judgments of ownership and agency. Patients' data showed an anomalous modulation of ownership with respect to visuomotor synchrony manipulation and an altered modulation of agency with respect to both visuomotor synchrony and movement mode manipulations. Results from the present study suggest that impairments affecting both the processing of temporal aspects of visuomotor signals and the processing of type of movement underlie anomalous embodiment sensations in schizophrenia. Hypotheses about potential deficits accounting for our results are proposed.

Consider the pons: bridging the gap on sensory prediction abnormalities in schizophrenia

A shared mechanism across species heralds the arrival of self-generated sensations, helping the brain to anticipate, and therefore distinguish, self-generated from externally generated sensations. In mammals, this sensory prediction mechanism is supported by communication within a cortico-ponto-cerebellar-thalamo-cortical loop. Schizophrenia is associated with impaired sensory prediction as well as abnormal structural and functional connections between nodes in this circuit. Despite the pons' principal role in relaying and processing sensory information passed from the cortex to cerebellum, few studies have examined pons connectivity in schizophrenia. Here, we first briefly describe how the pons contributes to sensory prediction. We then summarize schizophrenia-related abnormalities in the cortico-ponto-cerebellar-thalamo-cortical loop, emphasizing the dearth of research on the pons relative to thalamic and cerebellar connections. We conclude with recommendations for advancing our understanding of how the pons relates to sensory prediction failures in schizophrenia.

Co-occurring psychotic and eating disorders in England: findings from the 2014 Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey

BACKGROUND

Psychotic disorders and eating disorders are complex mental illnesses associated with increased mortality and functional impairment. This study aimed to investigate the co-occurrence and relationships between eating disorders and psychotic disorders and assess the mediation effect of mood instability.

METHODS

This study used data from the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (APMS) 2014, a general population-based survey in England. Participants (total N = 7546, female N = 4488, male N = 3058, mean age = 52.3 years) were categorised based on psychotic disorder status into the groups of probable psychosis, diagnosed psychosis, and healthy controls without psychosis. The dependent variable of this study was the presence or absence of an eating disorder, with mood instability as the mediator. Logistic regression and mediation analyses were conducted to assess the relationships between these variables.

RESULTS

Both probable and diagnosed psychoses were significantly related to the presence of an eating disorder, and mood instability was found to be a mediating variable with moderate effect.

CONCLUSION

The present study demonstrates a significant relationship between eating disorders and psychotic disorders in the English general population, indicating higher levels of co-occurrence between these two groups of disorders than when compared with healthy controls. The findings also suggest the relationship between eating and psychotic disorders is mediated, to an extent, by the presence of mood instability traits. Future research could extend the present study's findings through assessing whether specific eating disorders are more significantly related to psychotic disorders than others.

Hypersensitivity to passive voice hearing in hallucination proneness

Voices are a complex and rich acoustic signal processed in an extensive cortical brain network. Specialized regions within this network support voice perception and production and may be differentially affected in pathological voice processing. For example, the experience of hallucinating voices has been linked to hyperactivity in temporal and extra-temporal voice areas, possibly extending into regions associated with vocalization. Predominant self-monitoring hypotheses ascribe a primary role of voice production regions to auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH). Alternative postulations view a generalized perceptual salience bias as causal to AVH. These theories are not mutually exclusive as both ascribe the emergence and phenomenology of AVH to unbalanced top-down and bottom-up signal processing. The focus of the current study was to investigate the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying predisposition brain states for emergent hallucinations, detached from the effects of inner speech. Using the temporal voice area (TVA) localizer task, we explored putative hypersalient responses to passively presented sounds in relation to hallucination proneness (HP). Furthermore, to avoid confounds commonly found in in clinical samples, we employed the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS) for the quantification of HP levels in healthy people across an experiential continuum spanning the general population. We report increased activation in the right posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG) during the perception of voice features that positively correlates with increased HP scores. In line with prior results, we propose that this right-lateralized pSTG activation might indicate early hypersensitivity to acoustic features coding speaker identity that extends beyond own voice production to perception in healthy participants prone to experience AVH.

The positive dimension of schizotypy is associated with a reduced attenuation and precision of self-generated touch

The brain predicts the sensory consequences of our movements and uses these predictions to attenuate the perception of self-generated sensations. Accordingly, self-generated touch feels weaker than an externally generated touch of identical intensity. In schizophrenia, this somatosensory attenuation is substantially reduced, suggesting that patients with positive symptoms fail to accurately predict and process self-generated touch. If an impaired prediction underlies the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, then a similar impairment should exist in healthy nonclinical individuals with high positive schizotypal traits. One hundred healthy participants (53 female), assessed for schizotypal traits, underwent a well-established psychophysics force discrimination task to quantify how they perceived self-generated and externally generated touch. The perceived intensity of tactile stimuli delivered to their left index finger (magnitude) and the ability to discriminate the stimuli (precision) was measured. We observed that higher positive schizotypal traits were associated with reduced somatosensory attenuation and poorer somatosensory precision of self-generated touch, both when treating schizotypy as a continuous or categorical variable. These effects were specific to positive schizotypy and were not observed for the negative or disorganized dimensions of schizotypy. The results suggest that positive schizotypal traits are associated with a reduced ability to predict and process self-generated touch. Given that the positive dimension of schizotypy represents the analogue of positive psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia, deficits in processing self-generated tactile information could indicate increased liability to schizophrenia.

I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder

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This paper examines potential mechanisms behind atypical sense of self and agency in Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD).

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Using Active Inference, we argue that aberrant somatosensory attenuation and precision weighting underlies DPD.

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Failures of somatosensory attenuation may disrupt the sense of agency and control over one’s perceptions and actions.

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In DPD, individuals may believe ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions.

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Unlike psychosis however, in DPD the individual maintains the full insight that the ‘other agent’ is ‘me’ (the self).

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of ‘predicting precision’ and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that “I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception”. We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the ‘other agent’ is ‘me’ (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.

From hallucinations to synaesthesia: A circular inference account of unimodal and multimodal erroneous percepts in clinical and drug-induced psychosis

Psychedelics distort perception and induce visual and multimodal hallucinations as well as synaesthesia. This is in contradiction with the high prevalence of distressing voices in schizophrenia. Here we introduce a unifying account of unimodal and multimodal erroneous percepts based on circular inference. We show that amplification of top-down predictions (descending loops) leads to an excessive reliance on priors and aberrant levels of integration of the sensory representations, resulting in crossmodal percepts and stronger illusions. By contrast, amplification of bottom-up information (ascending loops) results in overinterpretation of unreliable sensory inputs and high levels of segregation between sensory modalities, bringing about unimodal hallucinations and reduced vulnerability to illusions. We delineate a canonical microcircuit in which layer-specific inhibition controls the propagation of information across hierarchical levels: inhibitory interneurons in the deep layers exert control over priors, removing descending loops. Conversely, inhibition in the supragranular layers counterbalances the effects of the ascending loops. Overall, we put forward a multiscale and transnosographic account of erroneous percepts with important theoretical, conceptual and clinical implications.

Association Between Failures in Perceptual Updating and the Severity of Psychosis in Schizophrenia

IMPORTANCE

Recent accounts suggest that delusions and hallucinations may result from alterations in how prior knowledge is integrated with new information, but experimental evidence supporting this idea has been complex and inconsistent. Evidence from a simpler perceptual task would make clear whether psychotic symptoms are associated with overreliance on prior information and impaired updating.

OBJECTIVE

To investigate whether individuals with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (PSZ) and healthy control individuals (HCs) differ in the ability to update their beliefs based on evidence in a relatively simple perceptual paradigm.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS

This case-control study included individuals who met DSM-IV criteria for PSZ and matched HC participants in 2 independent samples. The PSZ group was recruited from the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, Yale University, and community clinics, and the HC group was recruited from the community. To test perceptual updating, a random dot kinematogram paradigm was implemented in which dots moving coherently in a single direction were mixed with randomly moving dots. On 50% of trials, the direction of coherent motion changed by 90° midway through the trial. Participants were asked to report the direction perceived at the end of the trial. The Peters Delusions Inventory and Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) were used to quantify the severity of positive symptoms. Data were collected from September 2018 to March 2020 and were analyzed from approximately March 2020 to March 2021.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Critical measures included the proportion of responses centered around the initial direction vs the subsequent changed direction and the overall precision of motion perception and reaction times.

RESULTS

A total of 48 participants were included in the PSZ group (31 [65%] male; mean [SD] age, 36.56 [9.76] years) and 36 in the HC group (22 [61%] male; mean [SD] age, 35.67 [10.74] years) in the original sample. An independent replication sample included 42 participants in the PSZ group (29 [69%] male; mean [SD] age, 33.98 [11.03] years) and 34 in the HC group (20 [59%] male; mean [SD] age, 34.29 [10.44] years). In line with previous research, patients with PSZ were less precise and had slower reaction times overall. The key finding was that patients with PSZ were significantly more likely (original sample: mean, 27.88 [95% CI, 24.19-31.57]; replication sample: mean, 26.70 [95% CI, 23.53-29.87]) than HC participants (original sample: mean, 18.86 [95% CI, 16.56-21.16]; replication sample: mean, 15.67 [95% CI, 12.61-18.73]) to report the initial motion direction rather than the final one. Moreover, the tendency to report the direction of initial motion correlated with the degree of conviction on the Peters Delusions Inventory (original sample: r = 0.32 [P = .05]; replication sample: r = 0.30 [P = .05]) and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale Reality Distortion score (original sample: r = 0.55 [P = .001]; replication sample: r = 0.35 [P = .03]) and severity of hallucinations (original sample: r = 0.39 [P = .02]; replication sample: r = 0.30 [P = .05]).

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

The findings of this case-control study suggest that the severity of psychotic symptoms is associated with a tendency to overweight initial information over incoming sensory evidence. These results are consistent with predictive coding accounts of the origins of positive symptoms and suggest that deficits in very elementary perceptual updating may be a critical mechanism in psychosis.

The recovery of homicidal people diagnosed with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder-An interpretative phenomenological analysis

OBJECTIVE

Identity recovery in people diagnosed with schizophrenia who have committed homicide poses several difficulties. Premorbid mental illnesses, the experience of psychosis, and the absence of cohesive ego functions may result in the inability to integrate the homicidal act into self-identity. Problems with integration increase the risk of recidivism and further mental problems. The aim of the present research was to explore how homicidal people diagnosed with schizophrenia make sense of their actions, and how they identify with the homicide.

METHOD

Six semi-structured interviews were conducted at a long-term psychiatric home with people who had committed homicide and who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), an idiographic method rooted in phenomenologist traditions that focuses on how participants experience and make sense of events in their lives, and how those events affect their identity and sense of self.

RESULTS

Three personal experiential themes were established as a result of the analysis: (1) homicide and responsibility; (2) homicide and self; and (3) control over threats to self and self-evaluation. (1) Homicide was often reported to have been committed in a non-conscious, delusional state that may have led to the loss of self-determination. (2) Our interviewees struggled to integrate their acts into their identities. They distanced themselves from the crime or held multiple, parallel interpretations of the act. (3) Recovering patients experienced the constant threat of entering into a delusional reality and losing control. The importance of control was central to their self-evaluation. The patients appeared to distance themselves from the homicidal act and to regard their delusional selves as a threat to their lives.

CONCLUSION

Therapy aimed at bolstering self-control, supporting the integration of the fragmented self, and raising awareness of the connections between delusional reality and standard, intersubjective reality may be helpful in reducing the instability of the self. Therapy aimed at processing complex grief and loss of family is also needed.

Agency Deficits in a Human Genetic Model of Schizophrenia: Insights From 22q11DS Patients

Schizophrenia is a chronic and disabling mental illness characterized by a disordered sense of self. Current theories suggest that deficiencies in the sense of control over one's actions (Sense of Agency, SoA) may underlie some of the symptoms of schizophrenia. However, it is not clear if agency deficits are a precursor or a result of psychosis. Here, we investigated full body agency using virtual reality in a cohort of 22q11 deletion syndrome participants with a genetic propensity for schizophrenia. In two experiments employing virtual reality, full body motion tracking, and online feedback, we investigated SoA in two separate domains. Our results show that participants with 22q11DS had a considerable deficit in monitoring their actions, compared to age-matched controls in both the temporal and spatial domain. This was coupled with a bias toward erroneous attribution of actions to the self. These results indicate that nonpsychotic 22q11DS participants have a domain general deficit in the conscious sensorimotor mechanisms underlying the bodily self. Our data reveal an abnormality in the SoA in a cohort with a genetic predisposition for schizophrenia, but without psychosis, providing evidence that deficits in delineation of the self may be a precursor rather than a result of the psychotic state.

Interoception abnormalities in schizophrenia: A review of preliminary evidence and an integration with Bayesian accounts of psychosis

Schizophrenia research has traditionally focused almost exclusively on how the brain interprets the outside world. However, our internal bodily milieu is also central to how we interpret the world and construct our reality: signals from within the body are critical for not only basic survival, but also a wide range of brain functions from basic perception, emotion, and motivation, to sense of self. In this article, we propose that interoception-the processing of bodily signals-may have implications for a wide range of clinical symptoms in schizophrenia and may thus provide key insights into illness mechanisms. We start with an overview of interoception pathways. Then we provide a review of direct and indirect findings in various interoceptive systems in schizophrenia and interpret these findings in the context of computational frameworks that model interoception as hierarchical Bayesian inference. Finally, we propose a conceptual model of how altered interoceptive inference may contribute to specific schizophrenia symptoms-negative symptoms in particular-and suggest directions for future research, including potential new avenues of treatment.

Sensorimotor conflicts induce somatic passivity and louden quiet voices in healthy listeners

Sensorimotor conflicts are known to alter the perception of accompanying sensory signals, and deficits in sensory attenuation have been observed in schizophrenia. In the auditory domain, self-generated tones or voices (compared to tones or voices presented passively or with temporal delays) have been associated with changes in loudness perception and attenuated neural responses. It has been argued that for sensory signals to be attenuated, predicted and sensory consequences must have a consistent spatiotemporal relationship, between button presses and reafferent signals, via predictive sensory signaling, a process altered in schizophrenia. Here, we investigated auditory sensory attenuation for a series of morphed voices while healthy participants applied sensorimotor stimulations that had no spatiotemporal relationship to the voice stimuli and that have been shown to induce mild psychosis-like phenomena. In two independent groups of participants, we report a loudening of silent voices and found this effect only during maximal sensorimotor conflicts (versus several control conditions). Importantly, conflicting sensorimotor stimulation also induced a mild psychosis-like state in the form of somatic passivity and participants who experienced stronger passivity lacked the sensorimotor loudening effect. We argue that this conflict-related sensorimotor loudness amplification may represent a reduction of auditory self-attenuation that is lacking in participants experiencing a concomitant mild psychosis-like state. We interpret our results within the framework of the comparator model of sensorimotor control, and discuss the implications of our findings regarding passivity experiences and hallucinations in schizophrenia.

Reconciling competing mechanisms posited to underlie auditory verbal hallucinations

Perception is not the passive registration of incoming sensory data. Rather, it involves some analysis by synthesis, based on past experiences and context. One adaptive consequence of this arrangement is imagination-the ability to richly simulate sensory experiences, interrogate and manipulate those simulations, in service of action and decision making. In this paper, we will discuss one possible cost of this adaptation, namely hallucinations-perceptions without sensory stimulation, which characterize serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia, but which also occur in neurological illnesses, and-crucially for the present piece-are common also in the non-treatment-seeking population. We will draw upon a framework for imagination that distinguishes voluntary from non-voluntary experiences and explore the extent to which the varieties and features of hallucinations map onto this distinction, with a focus on auditory-verbal hallucinations (AVHs)-colloquially, hearing voices. We will propose that sense of agency for the act of imagining is key to meaningfully dissecting different forms and features of AVHs, and we will outline the neural, cognitive and phenomenological sequelae of this sense. We will conclude that a compelling unifying framework for action, perception and belief-predictive processing-can incorporate observations regarding sense of agency, imagination and hallucination. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.