Scene Construction, Visual Foraging, and Active Inference

Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.

Object-Centric Scene Representations Using Active Inference

Representing a scene and its constituent objects from raw sensory data is a core ability for enabling robots to interact with their environment. In this letter, we propose a novel approach for scene understanding, leveraging an object-centric generative model that enables an agent to infer object category and pose in an allocentric reference frame using active inference, a neuro-inspired framework for action and perception. For evaluating the behavior of an active vision agent, we also propose a new benchmark where, given a target viewpoint of a particular object, the agent needs to find the best matching viewpoint given a workspace with randomly positioned objects in 3D. We demonstrate that our active inference agent is able to balance epistemic foraging and goal-driven behavior, and quantitatively outperforms both supervised and reinforcement learning baselines by more than a factor of two in terms of success rate.

Active inference as a theory of sentient behavior

This review paper offers an overview of the history and future of active inference-a unifying perspective on action and perception. Active inference is based upon the idea that sentient behavior depends upon our brains' implicit use of internal models to predict, infer, and direct action. Our focus is upon the conceptual roots and development of this theory of (basic) sentience and does not follow a rigid chronological narrative. We trace the evolution from Helmholtzian ideas on unconscious inference, through to a contemporary understanding of action and perception. In doing so, we touch upon related perspectives, the neural underpinnings of active inference, and the opportunities for future development. Key steps in this development include the formulation of predictive coding models and related theories of neuronal message passing, the use of sequential models for planning and policy optimization, and the importance of hierarchical (temporally) deep internal (i.e., generative or world) models. Active inference has been used to account for aspects of anatomy and neurophysiology, to offer theories of psychopathology in terms of aberrant precision control, and to unify extant psychological theories. We anticipate further development in all these areas and note the exciting early work applying active inference beyond neuroscience. This suggests a future not just in biology, but in robotics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence.

Path integrals, particular kinds, and strange things

This paper describes a path integral formulation of the free energy principle. The ensuing account expresses the paths or trajectories that a particle takes as it evolves over time. The main results are a method or principle of least action that can be used to emulate the behaviour of particles in open exchange with their external milieu. Particles are defined by a particular partition, in which internal states are individuated from external states by active and sensory blanket states. The variational principle at hand allows one to interpret internal dynamics-of certain kinds of particles-as inferring external states that are hidden behind blanket states. We consider different kinds of particles, and to what extent they can be imbued with an elementary form of inference or sentience. Specifically, we consider the distinction between dissipative and conservative particles, inert and active particles and, finally, ordinary and strange particles. Strange particles can be described as inferring their own actions, endowing them with apparent autonomy or agency. In short-of the kinds of particles afforded by a particular partition-strange kinds may be apt for describing sentient behaviour.

An active inference model of hierarchical action understanding, learning and imitation

We advance a novel active inference model of the cognitive processing that underlies the acquisition of a hierarchical action repertoire and its use for observation, understanding and imitation. We illustrate the model in four simulations of a tennis learner who observes a teacher performing tennis shots, forms hierarchical representations of the observed actions, and imitates them. Our simulations show that the agent's oculomotor activity implements an active information sampling strategy that permits inferring the kinematic aspects of the observed movement, which lie at the lowest level of the action hierarchy. In turn, this low-level kinematic inference supports higher-level inferences about deeper aspects of the observed actions: proximal goals and intentions. Finally, the inferred action representations can steer imitative responses, but interfere with the execution of different actions. Our simulations show that hierarchical active inference provides a unified account of action observation, understanding, learning and imitation and helps explain the neurobiological underpinnings of visuomotor cognition, including the multiple routes for action understanding in the dorsal and ventral streams and mirror mechanisms.

Episodic memory formation in unrestricted viewing

The brain systems of episodic memory and oculomotor control are tightly linked, suggesting a crucial role of eye movements in memory. But little is known about the neural mechanisms of memory formation across eye movements in unrestricted viewing behavior. Here, we leverage simultaneous eye tracking and EEG recording to examine episodic memory formation in free viewing. Participants memorized multi-element events while their EEG and eye movements were concurrently recorded. Each event comprised elements from three categories (face, object, place), with two exemplars from each category, in different locations on the screen. A subsequent associative memory test assessed participants' memory for the between-category associations that specified each event. We used a deconvolution approach to overcome the problem of overlapping EEG responses to sequential saccades in free viewing. Brain activity was time-locked to the fixation onsets, and we examined EEG power in the theta and alpha frequency bands, the putative oscillatory correlates of episodic encoding mechanisms. Three modulations of fixation-related EEG predicted high subsequent memory performance: (1) theta increase at fixations after between-category gaze transitions, (2) theta and alpha increase at fixations after within-element gaze transitions, (3) alpha decrease at fixations after between-exemplar gaze transitions. Thus, event encoding with unrestricted viewing behavior was characterized by three neural mechanisms, manifested in fixation-locked theta and alpha EEG activity that rapidly turned on and off during the unfolding eye movement sequences. These three distinct neural mechanisms may be the essential building blocks that subserve the buildup of coherent episodic memories during unrestricted viewing behavior.

Using Gaze for Behavioural Biometrics

A principled approach to the analysis of eye movements for behavioural biometrics is laid down. The approach grounds in foraging theory, which provides a sound basis to capture the uniqueness of individual eye movement behaviour. We propose a composite Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for quantifying the exploration/exploitation signature characterising the foraging eye behaviour. The relevant parameters of the composite model, inferred from eye-tracking data via Bayesian analysis, are shown to yield a suitable feature set for biometric identification; the latter is eventually accomplished via a classical classification technique. A proof of concept of the method is provided by measuring its identification performance on a publicly available dataset. Data and code for reproducing the analyses are made available. Overall, we argue that the approach offers a fresh view on either the analyses of eye-tracking data and prospective applications in this field.

Structure learning enhances concept formation in synthetic Active Inference agents

Humans display astonishing skill in learning about the environment in which they operate. They assimilate a rich set of affordances and interrelations among different elements in particular contexts, and form flexible abstractions (i.e., concepts) that can be generalised and leveraged with ease. To capture these abilities, we present a deep hierarchical Active Inference model of goal-directed behaviour, and the accompanying belief update schemes implied by maximising model evidence. Using simulations, we elucidate the potential mechanisms that underlie and influence concept learning in a spatial foraging task. We show that the representations formed–as a result of foraging–reflect environmental structure in a way that is enhanced and nuanced by Bayesian model reduction, a special case of structure learning that typifies learning in the absence of new evidence. Synthetic agents learn associations and form concepts about environmental context and configuration as a result of inferential, parametric learning, and structure learning processes–three processes that can produce a diversity of beliefs and belief structures. Furthermore, the ensuing representations reflect symmetries for environments with identical configurations.

In the Body’s Eye: The computational anatomy of interoceptive inference

A growing body of evidence highlights the intricate linkage of exteroceptive perception to the rhythmic activity of the visceral body. In parallel, interoceptive inference theories of affective perception and self-consciousness are on the rise in cognitive science. However, thus far no formal theory has emerged to integrate these twin domains; instead, most extant work is conceptual in nature. Here, we introduce a formal model of cardiac active inference, which explains how ascending cardiac signals entrain exteroceptive sensory perception and uncertainty. Through simulated psychophysics, we reproduce the defensive startle reflex and commonly reported effects linking the cardiac cycle to affective behaviour. We further show that simulated ‘interoceptive lesions’ blunt affective expectations, induce psychosomatic hallucinations, and exacerbate biases in perceptual uncertainty. Through synthetic heart-rate variability analyses, we illustrate how the balance of arousal-priors and visceral prediction errors produces idiosyncratic patterns of physiological reactivity. Our model thus offers a roadmap for computationally phenotyping disordered brain-body interaction.

Understanding interactions between the brain and the body has become a topic of increased interest in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. A particular question here concerns how visceral, homeostatic rhythms such as the heart beat influence sensory, affective, and cognitive processing. To better understand these and other oscillatory brain-body interactions, we here introduce a novel computational model of interoceptive inference in which a synthetic agent’s perceptual beliefs are coupled to the rhythm of the heart. Our model both helps to explain emerging empirical data indicating that perceptual inference depends upon beat-to-beat heart rhythms, and can be used to better quantify intra- and inter-individual differences in heart-brain coupling. Using proof-of-principle simulations, we demonstrate how future empirical works could utilize our model to better understand and stratify disorders of interoception and brain-body interaction.

Reclaiming saliency: Rhythmic precision-modulated action and perception

Computational models of visual attention in artificial intelligence and robotics have been inspired by the concept of a saliency map. These models account for the mutual information between the (current) visual information and its estimated causes. However, they fail to consider the circular causality between perception and action. In other words, they do not consider where to sample next, given current beliefs. Here, we reclaim salience as an active inference process that relies on two basic principles: uncertainty minimization and rhythmic scheduling. For this, we make a distinction between attention and salience. Briefly, we associate attention with precision control, i.e., the confidence with which beliefs can be updated given sampled sensory data, and salience with uncertainty minimization that underwrites the selection of future sensory data. Using this, we propose a new account of attention based on rhythmic precision-modulation and discuss its potential in robotics, providing numerical experiments that showcase its advantages for state and noise estimation, system identification and action selection for informative path planning.

Unrestricted eye movements strengthen effective connectivity from hippocampal to oculomotor regions during scene construction

Scene construction is a key component of memory recall, navigation, and future imagining, and relies on the medial temporal lobes (MTL). A parallel body of work suggests that eye movements may enable the imagination and construction of scenes, even in the absence of external visual input. There are vast structural and functional connections between regions of the MTL and those of the oculomotor system. However, the directionality of connections between the MTL and oculomotor control regions, and how it relates to scene construction, has not been studied directly in human neuroimaging. In the current study, we used dynamic causal modeling (DCM) to interrogate effective connectivity between the MTL and oculomotor regions using a scene construction task in which participants' eye movements were either restricted (fixed-viewing) or unrestricted (free-viewing). By omitting external visual input, and by contrasting free- versus fixed- viewing, the directionality of neural connectivity during scene construction could be determined. As opposed to when eye movements were restricted, allowing free-viewing during construction of scenes strengthened top-down connections from the MTL to the frontal eye fields, and to lower-level cortical visual processing regions, suppressed bottom-up connections along the visual stream, and enhanced vividness of the constructed scenes. Taken together, these findings provide novel, non-invasive evidence for the underlying, directional, connectivity between the MTL memory system and oculomotor system associated with constructing vivid mental representations of scenes.

Embodied Object Representation Learning and Recognition

Scene understanding and decomposition is a crucial challenge for intelligent systems, whether it is for object manipulation, navigation, or any other task. Although current machine and deep learning approaches for object detection and classification obtain high accuracy, they typically do not leverage interaction with the world and are limited to a set of objects seen during training. Humans on the other hand learn to recognize and classify different objects by actively engaging with them on first encounter. Moreover, recent theories in neuroscience suggest that cortical columns in the neocortex play an important role in this process, by building predictive models about objects in their reference frame. In this article, we present an enactive embodied agent that implements such a generative model for object interaction. For each object category, our system instantiates a deep neural network, called Cortical Column Network (CCN), that represents the object in its own reference frame by learning a generative model that predicts the expected transform in pixel space, given an action. The model parameters are optimized through the active inference paradigm, i.e., the minimization of variational free energy. When provided with a visual observation, an ensemble of CCNs each vote on their belief of observing that specific object category, yielding a potential object classification. In case the likelihood on the selected category is too low, the object is detected as an unknown category, and the agent has the ability to instantiate a novel CCN for this category. We validate our system in an simulated environment, where it needs to learn to discern multiple objects from the YCB dataset. We show that classification accuracy improves as an embodied agent can gather more evidence, and that it is able to learn about novel, previously unseen objects. Finally, we show that an agent driven through active inference can choose their actions to reach a preferred observation.

The Free Energy Principle for Perception and Action: A Deep Learning Perspective

The free energy principle, and its corollary active inference, constitute a bio-inspired theory that assumes biological agents act to remain in a restricted set of preferred states of the world, i.e., they minimize their free energy. Under this principle, biological agents learn a generative model of the world and plan actions in the future that will maintain the agent in an homeostatic state that satisfies its preferences. This framework lends itself to being realized in silico, as it comprehends important aspects that make it computationally affordable, such as variational inference and amortized planning. In this work, we investigate the tool of deep learning to design and realize artificial agents based on active inference, presenting a deep-learning oriented presentation of the free energy principle, surveying works that are relevant in both machine learning and active inference areas, and discussing the design choices that are involved in the implementation process. This manuscript probes newer perspectives for the active inference framework, grounding its theoretical aspects into more pragmatic affairs, offering a practical guide to active inference newcomers and a starting point for deep learning practitioners that would like to investigate implementations of the free energy principle.

Looking for the neural basis of memory

Memory neuroscientists often measure neural activity during task trials designed to recruit specific memory processes. Behavior is championed as crucial for deciphering brain-memory linkages but is impoverished in typical experiments that rely on summary judgments. We criticize this approach as being blind to the multiple cognitive, neural, and behavioral processes that occur rapidly within a trial to support memory. Instead, time-resolved behaviors such as eye movements occur at the speed of cognition and neural activity. We highlight successes using eye-movement tracking with in vivo electrophysiology to link rapid hippocampal oscillations to encoding and retrieval processes that interact over hundreds of milliseconds. This approach will improve research on the neural basis of memory because it pinpoints discrete moments of brain-behavior-cognition correspondence.

Active inference, selective attention, and the cocktail party problem

In this paper, we introduce a new generative model for an active inference account of preparatory and selective attention, in the context of a classic 'cocktail party' paradigm. In this setup, pairs of words are presented simultaneously to the left and right ears and an instructive spatial cue directs attention to the left or right. We use this generative model to test competing hypotheses about the way that human listeners direct preparatory and selective attention. We show that assigning low precision to words at attended-relative to unattended-locations can explain why a listener reports words from a competing sentence. Under this model, temporal changes in sensory precision were not needed to account for faster reaction times with longer cue-target intervals, but were necessary to explain ramping effects on event-related potentials (ERPs)-resembling the contingent negative variation (CNV)-during the preparatory interval. These simulations reveal that different processes are likely to underlie the improvement in reaction times and the ramping of ERPs that are associated with spatial cueing.

World model learning and inference

Understanding information processing in the brain-and creating general-purpose artificial intelligence-are long-standing aspirations of scientists and engineers worldwide. The distinctive features of human intelligence are high-level cognition and control in various interactions with the world including the self, which are not defined in advance and are vary over time. The challenge of building human-like intelligent machines, as well as progress in brain science and behavioural analyses, robotics, and their associated theoretical formalisations, speaks to the importance of the world-model learning and inference. In this article, after briefly surveying the history and challenges of internal model learning and probabilistic learning, we introduce the free energy principle, which provides a useful framework within which to consider neuronal computation and probabilistic world models. Next, we showcase examples of human behaviour and cognition explained under that principle. We then describe symbol emergence in the context of probabilistic modelling, as a topic at the frontiers of cognitive robotics. Lastly, we review recent progress in creating human-like intelligence by using novel probabilistic programming languages. The striking consensus that emerges from these studies is that probabilistic descriptions of learning and inference are powerful and effective ways to create human-like artificial intelligent machines and to understand intelligence in the context of how humans interact with their world.

The Acquisition of Culturally Patterned Attention Styles Under Active Inference

This paper presents an active inference based simulation study of visual foraging. The goal of the simulation is to show the effect of the acquisition of culturally patterned attention styles on cognitive task performance, under active inference. We show how cultural artefacts like antique vase decorations drive cognitive functions such as perception, action and learning, as well as task performance in a simple visual discrimination task. We thus describe a new active inference based research pipeline that future work may employ to inquire on deep guiding principles determining the manner in which material culture drives human thought, by building and rebuilding our patterns of attention.

An empirical evaluation of active inference in multi-armed bandits

A key feature of sequential decision making under uncertainty is a need to balance between exploiting-choosing the best action according to the current knowledge, and exploring-obtaining information about values of other actions. The multi-armed bandit problem, a classical task that captures this trade-off, served as a vehicle in machine learning for developing bandit algorithms that proved to be useful in numerous industrial applications. The active inference framework, an approach to sequential decision making recently developed in neuroscience for understanding human and animal behaviour, is distinguished by its sophisticated strategy for resolving the exploration-exploitation trade-off. This makes active inference an exciting alternative to already established bandit algorithms. Here we derive an efficient and scalable approximate active inference algorithm and compare it to two state-of-the-art bandit algorithms: Bayesian upper confidence bound and optimistic Thompson sampling. This comparison is done on two types of bandit problems: a stationary and a dynamic switching bandit. Our empirical evaluation shows that the active inference algorithm does not produce efficient long-term behaviour in stationary bandits. However, in the more challenging switching bandit problem active inference performs substantially better than the two state-of-the-art bandit algorithms. The results open exciting venues for further research in theoretical and applied machine learning, as well as lend additional credibility to active inference as a general framework for studying human and animal behaviour.

Towards a computational phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep parametric active inference

Meta-awareness refers to the capacity to explicitly notice the current content of consciousness and has been identified as a key component for the successful control of cognitive states, such as the deliberate direction of attention. This paper proposes a formal model of meta-awareness and attentional control using hierarchical active inference. To do so, we cast mental action as policy selection over higher-level cognitive states and add a further hierarchical level to model meta-awareness states that modulate the expected confidence (precision) in the mapping between observations and hidden cognitive states. We simulate the example of mind-wandering and its regulation during a task involving sustained selective attention on a perceptual object. This provides a computational case study for an inferential architecture that is apt to enable the emergence of these central components of human phenomenology, namely, the ability to access and control cognitive states. We propose that this approach can be generalized to other cognitive states, and hence, this paper provides the first steps towards the development of a computational phenomenology of mental action and more broadly of our ability to monitor and control our own cognitive states. Future steps of this work will focus on fitting the model with qualitative, behavioural, and neural data.

Contextual perception under active inference

Human social interactions depend on the ability to resolve uncertainty about the mental states of others. The context in which social interactions take place is crucial for mental state attribution as sensory inputs may be perceived differently depending on the context. In this paper, we introduce a mental state attribution task where a target-face with either an ambiguous or an unambiguous emotion is embedded in different social contexts. The social context is determined by the emotions conveyed by other faces in the scene. This task involves mental state attribution to a target-face (either happy or sad) depending on the social context. Using active inference models, we provide a proof of concept that an agent's perception of sensory stimuli may be altered by social context. We show with simulations that context congruency and facial expression coherency improve behavioural performance in terms of decision times. Furthermore, we show through simulations that the abnormal viewing strategies employed by patients with schizophrenia may be due to (i) an imbalance between the precisions of local and global features in the scene and (ii) a failure to modulate the sensory precision to contextualise emotions.

Binocular rivalry reveals an out-of-equilibrium neural dynamics suited for decision-making

In ambiguous or conflicting sensory situations, perception is often ‘multistable’ in that it perpetually changes at irregular intervals, shifting abruptly between distinct alternatives. The interval statistics of these alternations exhibits quasi-universal characteristics, suggesting a general mechanism. Using binocular rivalry, we show that many aspects of this perceptual dynamics are reproduced by a hierarchical model operating out of equilibrium. The constitutive elements of this model idealize the metastability of cortical networks. Independent elements accumulate visual evidence at one level, while groups of coupled elements compete for dominance at another level. As soon as one group dominates perception, feedback inhibition suppresses supporting evidence. Previously unreported features in the serial dependencies of perceptual alternations compellingly corroborate this mechanism. Moreover, the proposed out-of-equilibrium dynamics satisfies normative constraints of continuous decision-making. Thus, multistable perception may reflect decision-making in a volatile world: integrating evidence over space and time, choosing categorically between hypotheses, while concurrently evaluating alternatives.

Realizing Active Inference in Variational Message Passing: The Outcome-Blind Certainty Seeker

Active inference is a state-of-the-art framework in neuroscience that offers a unified theory of brain function. It is also proposed as a framework for planning in AI. Unfortunately, the complex mathematics required to create new models can impede application of active inference in neuroscience and AI research. This letter addresses this problem by providing a complete mathematical treatment of the active inference framework in discrete time and state spaces and the derivation of the update equations for any new model. We leverage the theoretical connection between active inference and variational message passing as described by John Winn and Christopher M. Bishop in 2005. Since variational message passing is a well-defined methodology for deriving Bayesian belief update equations, this letter opens the door to advanced generative models for active inference. We show that using a fully factorized variational distribution simplifies the expected free energy, which furnishes priors over policies so that agents seek unambiguous states. Finally, we consider future extensions that support deep tree searches for sequential policy optimization based on structure learning and belief propagation.

The extrafoveal preview paradigm as a measure of predictive, active sampling in visual perception

A key feature of visual processing in humans is the use of saccadic eye movements to look around the environment. Saccades are typically used to bring relevant information, which is glimpsed with extrafoveal vision, into the high-resolution fovea for further processing. With the exception of some unusual circumstances, such as the first fixation when walking into a room, our saccades are mainly guided based on this extrafoveal preview. In contrast, the majority of experimental studies in vision science have investigated "passive" behavioral and neural responses to suddenly appearing and often temporally or spatially unpredictable stimuli. As reviewed here, a growing number of studies have investigated visual processing of objects under more natural viewing conditions in which observers move their eyes to a stationary stimulus, visible previously in extrafoveal vision, during each trial. These studies demonstrate that the extrafoveal preview has a profound influence on visual processing of objects, both for behavior and neural activity. Starting from the preview effect in reading research we follow subsequent developments in vision research more generally and finally argue that taking such evidence seriously leads to a reconceptualization of the nature of human visual perception that incorporates the strong influence of prediction and action on sensory processing. We review theoretical perspectives on visual perception under naturalistic viewing conditions, including theories of active vision, active sensing, and sampling. Although the extrafoveal preview paradigm has already provided useful information about the timing of, and potential mechanisms for, the close interaction of the oculomotor and visual systems while reading and in natural scenes, the findings thus far also raise many new questions for future research.

Prefrontal Computation as Active Inference

The prefrontal cortex is vital for a range of cognitive processes, including working memory, attention, and decision-making. Notably, its absence impairs the performance of tasks requiring the maintenance of information through a delay period. In this paper, we formulate a rodent task—which requires maintenance of delay-period activity—as a Markov decision process and treat optimal task performance as an (active) inference problem. We simulate the behavior of a Bayes optimal mouse presented with 1 of 2 cues that instructs the selection of concurrent visual and auditory targets on a trial-by-trial basis. Formulating inference as message passing, we reproduce features of neuronal coupling within and between prefrontal regions engaged by this task. We focus on the micro-circuitry that underwrites delay-period activity and relate it to functional specialization within the prefrontal cortex in primates. Finally, we simulate the electrophysiological correlates of inference and demonstrate the consequences of lesions to each part of our in silico prefrontal cortex. In brief, this formulation suggests that recurrent excitatory connections—which support persistent neuronal activity—encode beliefs about transition probabilities over time. We argue that attentional modulation can be understood as the contextualization of sensory input by these persistent beliefs.

Robot navigation as hierarchical active inference

Localization and mapping has been a long standing area of research, both in neuroscience, to understand how mammals navigate their environment, as well as in robotics, to enable autonomous mobile robots. In this paper, we treat navigation as inferring actions that minimize (expected) variational free energy under a hierarchical generative model. We find that familiar concepts like perception, path integration, localization and mapping naturally emerge from this active inference formulation. Moreover, we show that this model is consistent with models of hippocampal functions, and can be implemented in silico on a real-world robot. Our experiments illustrate that a robot equipped with our hierarchical model is able to generate topologically consistent maps, and correct navigation behaviour is inferred when a goal location is provided to the system.

Generative Models for Active Vision

The active visual system comprises the visual cortices, cerebral attention networks, and oculomotor system. While fascinating in its own right, it is also an important model for sensorimotor networks in general. A prominent approach to studying this system is active inference-which assumes the brain makes use of an internal (generative) model to predict proprioceptive and visual input. This approach treats action as ensuring sensations conform to predictions (i.e., by moving the eyes) and posits that visual percepts are the consequence of updating predictions to conform to sensations. Under active inference, the challenge is to identify the form of the generative model that makes these predictions-and thus directs behavior. In this paper, we provide an overview of the generative models that the brain must employ to engage in active vision. This means specifying the processes that explain retinal cell activity and proprioceptive information from oculomotor muscle fibers. In addition to the mechanics of the eyes and retina, these processes include our choices about where to move our eyes. These decisions rest upon beliefs about salient locations, or the potential for information gain and belief-updating. A key theme of this paper is the relationship between "looking" and "seeing" under the brain's implicit generative model of the visual world.

Neural Dynamics under Active Inference: Plausibility and Efficiency of Information Processing

Active inference is a normative framework for explaining behaviour under the free energy principle-a theory of self-organisation originating in neuroscience. It specifies neuronal dynamics for state-estimation in terms of a descent on (variational) free energy-a measure of the fit between an internal (generative) model and sensory observations. The free energy gradient is a prediction error-plausibly encoded in the average membrane potentials of neuronal populations. Conversely, the expected probability of a state can be expressed in terms of neuronal firing rates. We show that this is consistent with current models of neuronal dynamics and establish face validity by synthesising plausible electrophysiological responses. We then show that these neuronal dynamics approximate natural gradient descent, a well-known optimisation algorithm from information geometry that follows the steepest descent of the objective in information space. We compare the information length of belief updating in both schemes, a measure of the distance travelled in information space that has a direct interpretation in terms of metabolic cost. We show that neural dynamics under active inference are metabolically efficient and suggest that neural representations in biological agents may evolve by approximating steepest descent in information space towards the point of optimal inference.

Gazing at Social Interactions Between Foraging and Decision Theory

Finding the underlying principles of social attention in humans seems to be essential for the design of the interaction between natural and artificial agents. Here, we focus on the computational modeling of gaze dynamics as exhibited by humans when perceiving socially relevant multimodal information. The audio-visual landscape of social interactions is distilled into a number of multimodal patches that convey different social value, and we work under the general frame of foraging as a tradeoff between local patch exploitation and landscape exploration. We show that the spatio-temporal dynamics of gaze shifts can be parsimoniously described by Langevin-type stochastic differential equations triggering a decision equation over time. In particular, value-based patch choice and handling is reduced to a simple multi-alternative perceptual decision making that relies on a race-to-threshold between independent continuous-time perceptual evidence integrators, each integrator being associated with a patch.

Representation of Contralateral Visual Space in the Human Hippocampus

The initial encoding of visual information primarily from the contralateral visual field is a fundamental organizing principle of the primate visual system. Recently, the presence of such retinotopic sensitivity has been shown to extend well beyond early visual cortex to regions not historically considered retinotopically sensitive. In particular, human scene-selective regions in parahippocampal and medial parietal cortex exhibit prominent biases for the contralateral visual field. Here, we used fMRI to test the hypothesis that the human hippocampus, which is thought to be anatomically connected with these scene-selective regions, would also exhibit a biased representation of contralateral visual space. First, population receptive field (pRF) mapping with scene stimuli revealed strong biases for the contralateral visual field in bilateral hippocampus. Second, the distribution of retinotopic sensitivity suggested a more prominent representation in anterior medial portions of the hippocampus. Finally, the contralateral bias was confirmed in independent data taken from the Human Connectome Project (HCP) initiative. The presence of contralateral biases in the hippocampus, a structure considered by many as the apex of the visual hierarchy, highlights the truly pervasive influence of retinotopy. Moreover, this finding has important implications for understanding how visual information relates to the allocentric global spatial representations known to be encoded therein.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Retinotopic encoding of visual information is an organizing principle of visual cortex. Recent work demonstrates this sensitivity in structures far beyond early visual cortex, including those anatomically connected to the hippocampus. Here, using population receptive field (pRF) modeling in two independent sets of data we demonstrate a consistent bias for the contralateral visual field in bilateral hippocampus. Such a bias highlights the truly pervasive influence of retinotopy, with important implications for understanding how the presence of retinotopy relates to more allocentric spatial representations.

Active Vision for Robot Manipulators Using the Free Energy Principle

Occlusions, restricted field of view and limited resolution all constrain a robot's ability to sense its environment from a single observation. In these cases, the robot first needs to actively query multiple observations and accumulate information before it can complete a task. In this paper, we cast this problem of active vision as active inference, which states that an intelligent agent maintains a generative model of its environment and acts in order to minimize its surprise, or expected free energy according to this model. We apply this to an object-reaching task for a 7-DOF robotic manipulator with an in-hand camera to scan the workspace. A novel generative model using deep neural networks is proposed that is able to fuse multiple views into an abstract representation and is trained from data by minimizing variational free energy. We validate our approach experimentally for a reaching task in simulation in which a robotic agent starts without any knowledge about its workspace. Each step, the next view pose is chosen by evaluating the expected free energy. We find that by minimizing the expected free energy, exploratory behavior emerges when the target object to reach is not in view, and the end effector is moved to the correct reach position once the target is located. Similar to an owl scavenging for prey, the robot naturally prefers higher ground for exploring, approaching its target once located.

The Thalamus as a Blackboard for Perception and Planning

It has been suggested that the thalamus acts as a blackboard, on which the computations of different cortical modules are composed, coordinated, and integrated. This article asks what blackboard role the thalamus might play, and whether that role is consistent with the neuroanatomy of the thalamus. It does so in a context of Bayesian belief updating, expressed as a Free Energy Principle. We suggest that the thalamus-as-a-blackboard offers important questions for research in spatial cognition. Several prominent features of the thalamus-including its lack of olfactory relay function, its lack of internal excitatory connections, its regular and conserved shape, its inhibitory interneurons, triadic synapses, and diffuse cortical connectivity-are consistent with a blackboard role.Different thalamic nuclei may play different blackboard roles: (1) the Pulvinar, through its reciprocal connections to posterior cortical regions, coordinates perceptual inference about "what is where" from multi-sense-data. (2) The Mediodorsal (MD) nucleus, through its connections to the prefrontal cortex, and the other thalamic nuclei linked to the motor cortex, uses the same generative model for planning and learning novel spatial movements. (3) The paraventricular nucleus may compute risk-reward trade-offs. We also propose that as any new movement is practiced a few times, cortico-thalamocortical (CTC) links entrain the corresponding cortico-cortical links, through a process akin to supervised learning. Subsequently, the movement becomes a fast unconscious habit, not requiring the MD nucleus or other thalamic nuclei, and bypassing the thalamic bottleneck.

Deeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference

The positive-negative axis of emotional valence has long been recognized as fundamental to adaptive behavior, but its origin and underlying function have largely eluded formal theorizing and computational modeling. Using deep active inference, a hierarchical inference scheme that rests on inverting a model of how sensory data are generated, we develop a principled Bayesian model of emotional valence. This formulation asserts that agents infer their valence state based on the expected precision of their action model-an internal estimate of overall model fitness ("subjective fitness"). This index of subjective fitness can be estimated within any environment and exploits the domain generality of second-order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). We show how maintaining internal valence representations allows the ensuing affective agent to optimize confidence in action selection preemptively. Valence representations can in turn be optimized by leveraging the (Bayes-optimal) updating term for subjective fitness, which we label affective charge (AC). AC tracks changes in fitness estimates and lends a sign to otherwise unsigned divergences between predictions and outcomes. We simulate the resulting affective inference by subjecting an in silico affective agent to a T-maze paradigm requiring context learning, followed by context reversal. This formulation of affective inference offers a principled account of the link between affect, (mental) action, and implicit metacognition. It characterizes how a deep biological system can infer its affective state and reduce uncertainty about such inferences through internal action (i.e., top-down modulation of priors that underwrite confidence). Thus, we demonstrate the potential of active inference to provide a formal and computationally tractable account of affect. Our demonstration of the face validity and potential utility of this formulation represents the first step within a larger research program. Next, this model can be leveraged to test the hypothesized role of valence by fitting the model to behavioral and neuronal responses.

Representation Wars: Enacting an Armistice Through Active Inference

Over the last 30 years, representationalist and dynamicist positions in the philosophy of cognitive science have argued over whether neurocognitive processes should be viewed as representational or not. Major scientific and technological developments over the years have furnished both parties with ever more sophisticated conceptual weaponry. In recent years, an enactive generalization of predictive processing – known as active inference – has been proposed as a unifying theory of brain functions. Since then, active inference has fueled both representationalist and dynamicist campaigns. However, we believe that when diving into the formal details of active inference, one should be able to find a solution to the war; if not a peace treaty, surely an armistice of a sort. Based on an analysis of these formal details, this paper shows how both representationalist and dynamicist sensibilities can peacefully coexist within the new territory of active inference.

Whence the Expected Free Energy?

The expected free energy (EFE) is a central quantity in the theory of active inference. It is the quantity that all active inference agents are mandated to minimize through action, and its decomposition into extrinsic and intrinsic value terms is key to the balance of exploration and exploitation that active inference agents evince. Despite its importance, the mathematical origins of this quantity and its relation to the variational free energy (VFE) remain unclear. In this letter, we investigate the origins of the EFE in detail and show that it is not simply "the free energy in the future." We present a functional that we argue is the natural extension of the VFE but actively discourages exploratory behavior, thus demonstrating that exploration does not directly follow from free energy minimization into the future. We then develop a novel objective, the free energy of the expected future (FEEF), which possesses both the epistemic component of the EFE and an intuitive mathematical grounding as the divergence between predicted and desired futures.

Active Inference: Demystified and Compared

Active inference is a first principle account of how autonomous agents operate in dynamic, nonstationary environments. This problem is also considered in reinforcement learning, but limited work exists on comparing the two approaches on the same discrete-state environments. In this letter, we provide (1) an accessible overview of the discrete-state formulation of active inference, highlighting natural behaviors in active inference that are generally engineered in reinforcement learning, and (2) an explicit discrete-state comparison between active inference and reinforcement learning on an OpenAI gym baseline. We begin by providing a condensed overview of the active inference literature, in particular viewing the various natural behaviors of active inference agents through the lens of reinforcement learning. We show that by operating in a pure belief-based setting, active inference agents can carry out epistemic exploration-and account for uncertainty about their environment-in a Bayes-optimal fashion. Furthermore, we show that the reliance on an explicit reward signal in reinforcement learning is removed in active inference, where reward can simply be treated as another observation we have a preference over; even in the total absence of rewards, agent behaviors are learned through preference learning. We make these properties explicit by showing two scenarios in which active inference agents can infer behaviors in reward-free environments compared to both Q-learning and Bayesian model-based reinforcement learning agents and by placing zero prior preferences over rewards and learning the prior preferences over the observations corresponding to reward. We conclude by noting that this formalism can be applied to more complex settings (e.g., robotic arm movement, Atari games) if appropriate generative models can be formulated. In short, we aim to demystify the behavior of active inference agents by presenting an accessible discrete state-space and time formulation and demonstrate these behaviors in a OpenAI gym environment, alongside reinforcement learning agents.

Active listening

This paper introduces active listening, as a unified framework for synthesising and recognising speech. The notion of active listening inherits from active inference, which considers perception and action under one universal imperative: to maximise the evidence for our (generative) models of the world. First, we describe a generative model of spoken words that simulates (i) how discrete lexical, prosodic, and speaker attributes give rise to continuous acoustic signals; and conversely (ii) how continuous acoustic signals are recognised as words. The 'active' aspect involves (covertly) segmenting spoken sentences and borrows ideas from active vision. It casts speech segmentation as the selection of internal actions, corresponding to the placement of word boundaries. Practically, word boundaries are selected that maximise the evidence for an internal model of how individual words are generated. We establish face validity by simulating speech recognition and showing how the inferred content of a sentence depends on prior beliefs and background noise. Finally, we consider predictive validity by associating neuronal or physiological responses, such as the mismatch negativity and P300, with belief updating under active listening, which is greatest in the absence of accurate prior beliefs about what will be heard next.

Active inference on discrete state-spaces: A synthesis

Active inference is a normative principle underwriting perception, action, planning, decision-making and learning in biological or artificial agents. From its inception, its associated process theory has grown to incorporate complex generative models, enabling simulation of a wide range of complex behaviours. Due to successive developments in active inference, it is often difficult to see how its underlying principle relates to process theories and practical implementation. In this paper, we try to bridge this gap by providing a complete mathematical synthesis of active inference on discrete state-space models. This technical summary provides an overview of the theory, derives neuronal dynamics from first principles and relates this dynamics to biological processes. Furthermore, this paper provides a fundamental building block needed to understand active inference for mixed generative models; allowing continuous sensations to inform discrete representations. This paper may be used as follows: to guide research towards outstanding challenges, a practical guide on how to implement active inference to simulate experimental behaviour, or a pointer towards various in-silico neurophysiological responses that may be used to make empirical predictions.

Learning Generative State Space Models for Active Inference

In this paper we investigate the active inference framework as a means to enable autonomous behavior in artificial agents. Active inference is a theoretical framework underpinning the way organisms act and observe in the real world. In active inference, agents act in order to minimize their so called free energy, or prediction error. Besides being biologically plausible, active inference has been shown to solve hard exploration problems in various simulated environments. However, these simulations typically require handcrafting a generative model for the agent. Therefore we propose to use recent advances in deep artificial neural networks to learn generative state space models from scratch, using only observation-action sequences. This way we are able to scale active inference to new and challenging problem domains, whilst still building on the theoretical backing of the free energy principle. We validate our approach on the mountain car problem to illustrate that our learnt models can indeed trade-off instrumental value and ambiguity. Furthermore, we show that generative models can also be learnt using high-dimensional pixel observations, both in the OpenAI Gym car racing environment and a real-world robotic navigation task. Finally we show that active inference based policies are an order of magnitude more sample efficient than Deep Q Networks on RL tasks.

Generative models, linguistic communication and active inference

This paper presents a biologically plausible generative model and inference scheme that is capable of simulating communication between synthetic subjects who talk to each other. Building on active inference formulations of dyadic interactions, we simulate linguistic exchange to explore generative models that support dialogues. These models employ high-order interactions among abstract (discrete) states in deep (hierarchical) models. The sequential nature of language processing mandates generative models with a particular factorial structure-necessary to accommodate the rich combinatorics of language. We illustrate linguistic communication by simulating a synthetic subject who can play the 'Twenty Questions' game. In this game, synthetic subjects take the role of the questioner or answerer, using the same generative model. This simulation setup is used to illustrate some key architectural points and demonstrate that many behavioural and neurophysiological correlates of linguistic communication emerge under variational (marginal) message passing, given the right kind of generative model. For example, we show that theta-gamma coupling is an emergent property of belief updating, when listening to another.

Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation

Disruptions in the ordinary sense of selfhood underpin both pathological and "enlightened" states of consciousness. People suffering from depersonalization can experience the loss of a sense of self as devastating, often accompanied by intense feelings of alienation, fear, and hopelessness. However, for meditative contemplatives from various traditions, "selfless" experiences are highly sought after, being associated with enduring peace and joy. Little is understood about how these contrasting dysphoric and euphoric experiences should be conceptualized. In this paper, we propose a unified account of these selfless experiences within the active inference framework. Building on our recent active inference research, we propose an account of the experiences of selfhood as emerging from a temporally deep generative model. We go on to develop a view of the self as playing a central role in structuring ordinary experience by "tuning" agents to the counterfactually rich possibilities for action. Finally, we explore how depersonalization may result from an inferred loss of allostatic control and contrast this phenomenology with selfless experiences reported by meditation practitioners. We will show how, by beginning with a conception of self-modeling within an active inference framework, we have available to us a new way of conceptualizing the striking experiential similarities and important differences between these selfless experiences within a unifying theoretical framework. We will explore the implications for understanding and treating dissociative disorders, as well as elucidate both the therapeutic potential, and possible dangers, of meditation.

Deep Active Inference and Scene Construction

Adaptive agents must act in intrinsically uncertain environments with complex latent structure. Here, we elaborate a model of visual foraging-in a hierarchical context-wherein agents infer a higher-order visual pattern (a "scene") by sequentially sampling ambiguous cues. Inspired by previous models of scene construction-that cast perception and action as consequences of approximate Bayesian inference-we use active inference to simulate decisions of agents categorizing a scene in a hierarchically-structured setting. Under active inference, agents develop probabilistic beliefs about their environment, while actively sampling it to maximize the evidence for their internal generative model. This approximate evidence maximization (i.e., self-evidencing) comprises drives to both maximize rewards and resolve uncertainty about hidden states. This is realized via minimization of a free energy functional of posterior beliefs about both the world as well as the actions used to sample or perturb it, corresponding to perception and action, respectively. We show that active inference, in the context of hierarchical scene construction, gives rise to many empirical evidence accumulation phenomena, such as noise-sensitive reaction times and epistemic saccades. We explain these behaviors in terms of the principled drives that constitute the expected free energy, the key quantity for evaluating policies under active inference. In addition, we report novel behaviors exhibited by these active inference agents that furnish new predictions for research on evidence accumulation and perceptual decision-making. We discuss the implications of this hierarchical active inference scheme for tasks that require planned sequences of information-gathering actions to infer compositional latent structure (such as visual scene construction and sentence comprehension). This work sets the stage for future experiments to investigate active inference in relation to other formulations of evidence accumulation (e.g., drift-diffusion models) in tasks that require planning in uncertain environments with higher-order structure.

A Bayesian Account of Generalist and Specialist Formation Under the Active Inference Framework

This paper offers a formal account of policy learning, or habitual behavioral optimization, under the framework of Active Inference. In this setting, habit formation becomes an autodidactic, experience-dependent process, based upon what the agent sees itself doing. We focus on the effect of environmental volatility on habit formation by simulating artificial agents operating in a partially observable Markov decision process. Specifically, we used a "two-step" maze paradigm, in which the agent has to decide whether to go left or right to secure a reward. We observe that in volatile environments with numerous reward locations, the agents learn to adopt a generalist strategy, never forming a strong habitual behavior for any preferred maze direction. Conversely, in conservative or static environments, agents adopt a specialist strategy; forming strong preferences for policies that result in approach to a small number of previously-observed reward locations. The pros and cons of the two strategies are tested and discussed. In general, specialization offers greater benefits, but only when contingencies are conserved over time. We consider the implications of this formal (Active Inference) account of policy learning for understanding the relationship between specialization and habit formation.

Choosing a Markov blanket

This commentary focuses upon the relationship between two themes in the target article: the ways in which a Markov blanket may be defined and the role of precision and salience in mediating the interactions between what is internal and external to a system. These each rest upon the different perspectives we might take while "choosing" a Markov blanket.

TTOM in action: Refining the variational approach to cognition and culture

The target article "Thinking Through Other Minds" (TTOM) offered an account of the distinctively human capacity to acquire cultural knowledge, norms, and practices. To this end, we leveraged recent ideas from theoretical neurobiology to understand the human mind in social and cultural contexts. Our aim was both synthetic - building an integrative model adequate to account for key features of cultural learning and adaptation; and prescriptive - showing how the tools developed to explain brain dynamics can be applied to the emergence of social and cultural ecologies of mind. In this reply to commentators, we address key issues, including: (1) refining the concept of culture to show how TTOM and the free-energy principle (FEP) can capture essential elements of human adaptation and functioning; (2) addressing cognition as an embodied, enactive, affective process involving cultural affordances; (3) clarifying the significance of the FEP formalism related to entropy minimization, Bayesian inference, Markov blankets, and enactivist views; (4) developing empirical tests and applications of the TTOM model; (5) incorporating cultural diversity and context at the level of intra-cultural variation, individual differences, and the transition to digital niches; and (6) considering some implications for psychiatry. The commentators' critiques and suggestions point to useful refinements and applications of the model. In ongoing collaborations, we are exploring how to augment the theory with affective valence, take into account individual differences and historicity, and apply the model to specific domains including epistemic bias.