Moments in time

The Self-Simulational Theory of temporal extension

Subjective experience is experience in time. Unfolding in a continuous river of moments, our experience, however, consists not only in the changing phenomenological content per se but, further, in additional retrodiction and prospection of the moments that immediately preceded and followed it. It is in this way that William James's 'specious present' presents itself as extending between the past and future. While the phenomenology of temporality always happens, in normal waking states, to someone, and the notions of self-representation and temporal experience have continuously been associated with each other, there has not yet been an explicit account of their relationship. In this paper, the emergence of the subjective experience of temporal extension will be conceived of as arising out of a difference-relation between counterfactual and actual self-representations. After presenting the proposed relationship on both a conceptual level and a formalized and neuronally realistic level of description using information theory, convergent empirical evidence from general findings about temporal experience and inference, altered states of consciousness, and mental illness is examined. The Self-Simulational Theory of temporal extension is able to explain systematic variations in the subjectively experienced length of the temporal Now across numerous domains and holds potentially wide implications for the neuroscience of consciousness, as well as for a deeper understanding of different forms of mental illness.

Can disorders of subjective time inform the differential diagnosis of psychiatric disorders? A transdiagnostic taxonomy of time

AIM

Time is a core aspect of psychopathology with potential for clinical use and early intervention. Temporal experience, perception, judgement and processing are distorted in various psychiatric disorders such as mood (depression and mania), anxiety, autistic, impulse-control, dissociative and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorders. Can these disorders of time be used as early diagnostic or predictive markers? To answer this question, we develop a Transdiagnostic Taxonomy of (disordered) Time (TTT) that maps on to the symptomatological, phenomenal, perceptual and functional descriptions of each underlying disorder in a 2 × 2 × 2 state space. Temporal distortions may precede functional decline, and so assist efforts at early detection and intervention in at-risk groups.

METHOD

Firstly, this article integrates a psychological model of how time is processed with a subjective or phenomenological model of how time is experienced or perceived. Secondly, the integrated combined model of time is then used to heuristically map major psychiatric disorders on to the basic elements of temporal flow and integration.

RESULTS

The TTT systematically describes the basic temporal nature of eight diagnostic categories of psychiatric illness. It differentiates between diagnoses primarily associated with distorted "macro-level" phenomenal temporal experiences (i.e. anxiety, dissociation/PTSD, depression, and mania) from those primarily related to distorted 'micro-level' temporal processing (i.e. psychotic, impulse-control, autistic and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorders).

CONCLUSIONS

The TTT allows differential diagnostic classification of various psychiatric disorders in terms of a possible underlying time disorder, making it useful for future diagnostic and predictive purposes using novel techniques of temporal processing, time perception, passage of time, and time perspective.

Investigating racing thoughts via ocular temporal windows: deficits in the control of automatic perceptual processes

BACKGROUND

Racing thoughts have been found in several states of bipolar disorder (BD), but also in healthy populations with subclinical mood alterations. The evaluation of racing thoughts relies on subjective reports, and objective measures are sparse. The current study aims at finding an objective neuropsychological equivalent of racing thoughts in a mixed group of BD patients and healthy controls by using a bistable perception paradigm.

METHOD

Eighty-three included participants formed three groups based on participants' levels of racing thoughts reported via the Racing and Crowded Thoughts Questionnaire. Participants reported reversals in their perception during viewing of the bistable Necker cube either spontaneously, while asked to focus on one interpretation of the cube, or while asked to accelerate perceptual reversals. The dynamics of perceptual alternations were studied both at a conscious level (with manual temporal windows reflecting perceptual reversals) and at a more automatic level (with ocular temporal windows derived from ocular fixations).

RESULTS

The rate of windows was less modulated by attentional conditions in participants with racing thoughts, and most clearly so for ocular windows. The rate of ocular windows was especially high when participants with racing thoughts were asked to focus on one interpretation of the Necker cube and when they received these instructions for the first time.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results indicate that in subjects with racing thoughts automatic perceptual processes escape cognitive control mechanisms. Racing thoughts may involve not only conscious thought mechanisms but also more automatic processes.

Temporal Order Judgments in Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorders – Explicit and Implicit Measures

Ordering events in time is essential for the understanding of causal relationships between successive events. Incorrect causal links can lead to false beliefs and an altered perception of reality. These symptoms belong to psychosis, which is present in schizophrenia (SZ) spectrum and bipolar (BP) disorder. Experimental results show that patients with SZ have an altered perception of temporal order, while there are no data in patients with BP. We investigated the ability of patients with SZ, BP, and controls to judge the order of stimuli with a 100-ms Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA), and how such large asynchronies facilitate temporal order judgments for small asynchronies. Explicit temporal order effects suggest that patients with SZ perform worse at a long SOA (100 ms) as compared to controls, whereas patients with BP show no difference compared to controls or to patients with SZ. Implicit order effects reveal improved performances in case of identical as compared to different relative order between two successive trials for all groups, with no differences between the groups. We replicated explicit order impairments in patients with SZ compared to controls, while implicit effects appear to be preserved. This difficulty for patients to consciously order stimuli in time might be understood under the light of the loosening-of-associations phenomenon well described in SZ. Further, we showed that patients with BP do not reveal such an explicit order impairment which is consistent with phenomenological descriptions, suggesting a difference in time experience in patients with SZ and BP.

Kinesthesia and Temporal Experience: On the 'Knitting and Unknitting' Process of Bodily Subjectivity in Schizophrenia

This paper proposes a phenomenological hypothesis that psychosis entails a disturbance of the two-fold process of the indication function of kinesthesia and the presentification function of touch that affects the constitution of bodily subjectivity. Recent functional connectivity studies showed that the increased synchrony between the right anterior insula and the default mode network are associated with psychosis. This association is proposed to be correlated with the disrupted dynamics between the pre-reflective and reflective temporal experience in psychotic patients. The paper first examines the dynamic nature of kinesthesia and the influence touch and vision exert on it, and then the reciprocal influence with temporal experience focusing on the body's cyclic sense of temporality and its impact on physiology and phenomenology. Affectivity and self-affection are considered in their basic bodily expressions mainly through the concepts of responsivity and receptivity. The overall constitutive processes referred to throughout the article are proposed as a roadmap to develop body-based therapeutic work.

Normal blindness: when we Look But Fail To See

Humans routinely miss important information that is 'right in front of our eyes', from overlooking typos in a paper to failing to see a cyclist in an intersection. Recent studies on these 'Looked But Failed To See' (LBFTS) errors point to a common mechanism underlying these failures, whether the missed item was an unexpected gorilla, the clearly defined target of a visual search, or that simple typo. We argue that normal blindness is the by-product of the limited-capacity prediction engine that is our visual system. The processes that evolved to allow us to move through the world with ease are virtually guaranteed to cause us to miss some significant stimuli, especially in important tasks like driving and medical image perception.

The why of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness: Its main functions and the mechanisms underpinning it

What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent’s own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define “the self” (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, and is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems; it maps the agent’s body and cognitive capacities, and its interactions with the environment. The detection of the state of S by attention modulates the energy level of the organ of attention (OA), i.e., the neural substrate that underpins attention. This modulation generates the PAC. The PAC can be qualified according to five dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal and spatial. Each dimension can be traced back to a specific feature of the modulation of the energy level of the OA.

A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness

Most research on the neurobiology of language ignores consciousness and vice versa. Here, language, with an emphasis on inner speech, is hypothesised to generate and sustain self-awareness, i.e., higher-order consciousness. Converging evidence supporting this hypothesis is reviewed. To account for these findings, a 'HOLISTIC' model of neurobiology of language, inner speech, and consciousness is proposed. It involves a 'core' set of inner speech production regions that initiate the experience of feeling and hearing words. These take on affective qualities, deriving from activation of associated sensory, motor, and emotional representations, involving a largely unconscious dynamic 'periphery', distributed throughout the whole brain. Responding to those words forms the basis for sustained network activity, involving 'default mode' activation and prefrontal and thalamic/brainstem selection of contextually relevant responses. Evidence for the model is reviewed, supporting neuroimaging meta-analyses conducted, and comparisons with other theories of consciousness made. The HOLISTIC model constitutes a more parsimonious and complete account of the 'neural correlates of consciousness' that has implications for a mechanistic account of mental health and wellbeing.

Advancing the Study of “Goals of Best Practice”: Toward Achieving Optimal Best – Educational Implications to Developments in Flow Research and Positive Optimal Psychology

The paradigm of positive psychology is significant in introducing positive psychological concepts such as “flourishing,” “optimal best,” and “a state of flow.” In terms of research development of positive psychology, the researchers of this article have made extensive theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions by advancing the study of optimal best. One aspect of this research, notably, consists of advancement of the psychological process of optimization. Optimization, in brief, provides a theoretical account into the “optimization” of a person’s state of functioning. Non-academically, a Buddhist nun’s seeking to successfully achieve an optimal state of enlightenment or, academically, a first-year student’s seeking to achieve an A grade in Psych 101 would require some form of optimization. Recent research development has, interestingly, considered a related concept known as “goals of best practice” (GsBP), which may co-exist with the process of optimization and/or assist to account for the optimization of learning experiences. This conceptual analysis article, by utilizing the paradigm of philosophical psychology, advances the study of optimal best practice by focusing on three major aspects: (i) to consider conceptually and philosophically how and/or the extent to which GsBP could, in fact, relate to the nature of flow, flourishing, and optimal best; (ii) to consider a methodological account, which could help to measure and assess the concept GsBP; and (iii) to consider the potential practicality of GsBP in educational contexts, which may assist to facilitate and motivate the achievement of optimal best. These three aspects, we firmly believe, are of significance as they provide grounding for implementation and continuing research development into the area of best practice.

From Shorter to Longer Timescales: Converging Integrated Information Theory (IIT) with the Temporo-Spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC)

Time is a key element of consciousness as it includes multiple timescales from shorter to longer ones. This is reflected in our experience of various short-term phenomenal contents at discrete points in time as part of an ongoing, more continuous, and long-term ‘stream of consciousness.’ Can Integrated Information Theory (IIT) account for this multitude of timescales of consciousness? According to the theory, the relevant spatiotemporal scale for consciousness is the one in which the system reaches the maximum cause-effect power; IIT currently predicts that experience occurs on the order of short timescales, namely, between 100 and 300 ms (theta and alpha frequency range). This can well account for the integration of single inputs into a particular phenomenal content. However, such short timescales leave open the temporal relation of specific phenomenal contents to others during the course of the ongoing time, that is, the stream of consciousness. For that purpose, we converge the IIT with the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC), which, assuming a multitude of different timescales, can take into view the temporal integration of specific phenomenal contents with other phenomenal contents over time. On the neuronal side, this is detailed by considering those neuronal mechanisms driving the non-additive interaction of pre-stimulus activity with the input resulting in stimulus-related activity. Due to their non-additive interaction, the single input is not only integrated with others in the short-term timescales of 100–300 ms (alpha and theta frequencies) (as predicted by IIT) but, at the same time, also virtually expanded in its temporal (and spatial) features; this is related to the longer timescales (delta and slower frequencies) that are carried over from pre-stimulus to stimulus-related activity. Such a non-additive pre-stimulus-input interaction amounts to temporo-spatial expansion as a key mechanism of TTC for the constitution of phenomenal contents including their embedding or nesting within the ongoing temporal dynamic, i.e., the stream of consciousness. In conclusion, we propose converging the short-term integration of inputs postulated in IIT (100–300 ms as in the alpha and theta frequency range) with the longer timescales (in delta and slower frequencies) of temporo-spatial expansion in TTC.

Perception of Happening: How the Brain Deals with the No-History Problem

In physics, the temporal dimension has units of infinitesimally brief duration. Given this, how is it possible to perceive things, such as motion, music, and vibrotactile stimulation, that involve extension across many units of time? To address this problem, it is proposed that there is what is termed an "information construct of happening" (ICOH), a simultaneous representation of recent, temporally differentiated perceptual information on the millisecond time scale. The main features of the ICOH are (i) time marking, semantic labeling of all information in the ICOH with ordinal temporal information and distance from what is informationally identified as the present moment, (ii) vector informational features that specify kind, direction, and rate of change for every feature in a percept, and (iii) connectives, information relating vector informational features at adjacent temporal locations in the ICOH. The ICOH integrates products of perceptual processing with recent historical information in sensory memory on the subsecond time scale. Perceptual information about happening in informational sensory memory is encoded in semantic form that preserves connected semantic trails of vector and timing information. The basic properties of the ICOH must be supported by a general and widespread timing mechanism that generates ordinal and interval timing information and it is suggested that state-dependent networks may suffice for that purpose. Happening, therefore, is perceived at a moment and is constituted by an information structure of connected recent historical information.

The Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape: Reconciling Neuroscientific Theories With the Phenomenology of Consciousness

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of neuroscientific theories of consciousness. These include theories which explicitly point to EM fields, notably Operational Architectonics and, more recently, the General Resonance Theory. In phenomenological terms, human consciousness is a unified composition of contents. These contents are specific and meaningful, and they exist from a subjective point of view. Human conscious experience is temporally continuous, limited in content, and coherent. Based upon those phenomenal observations, pre-existing theories of consciousness, and a large body of experimental evidence, I derived the Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape (TICL). In brief, the TICL proposes that the neural correlate of consciousness is a structure of temporally integrated causality occurring over a large portion of the thalamocortical system. This structure is composed of a large, integrated set of neuronal elements (the System), which contains some subsystems, defined as having a higher level of temporally-integrated causality than the System as a whole. Each Subsystem exists from the point of view of the System, in the form of meaningful content. In this article, I review the TICL and consider the importance of EM forces as a mechanism of neural causality. I compare the fundamentals of TICL to those of several other neuroscientific theories. Using five major characteristics of phenomenal consciousness as a standard, I compare the basic tenets of Integrated Information Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace, General Resonance Theory, Operational Architectonics, and the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness with the framework of the TICL. While the literature concerned with these theories tends to focus on different lines of evidence, there are fundamental areas of agreement. This means that, in time, it may be possible for many of them to converge upon the truth. In this analysis, I conclude that a primary distinction which divides these theories is the feature of spatial and temporal nesting. Interestingly, this distinction does not separate along the fault line between theories explicitly concerned with EM fields and those which are not. I believe that reconciliation is possible, at least in principle, among those theories that recognize the following: just as the contents of consciousness are distinctions within consciousness, the neural correlates of conscious content should be distinguishable from but fall within the spatial and temporal boundaries of the full neural correlates of consciousness.

The extended present: an informational context for perception

Several previous authors have proposed a kind of specious or subjective present moment that covers a few seconds of recent information. This article proposes a new hypothesis about the subjective present, renamed the extended present, defined not in terms of time covered but as a thematically connected information structure held in working memory and in transiently accessible form in long-term memory. The three key features of the extended present are that information in it is thematically connected, both internally and to current attended perceptual input, it is organised in a hierarchical structure, and all information in it is marked with temporal information, specifically ordinal and duration information. Temporal boundaries to the information structure are determined by hierarchical structure processing and by limits on processing and storage capacity. Supporting evidence for the importance of hierarchical structure analysis is found in the domains of music perception, speech and language processing, perception and production of goal-directed action, and exact arithmetical calculation. Temporal information marking is also discussed and a possible mechanism for representing ordinal and duration information on the time scale of the extended present is proposed. It is hypothesised that the extended present functions primarily as an informational context for making sense of current perceptual input, and as an enabler for perception and generation of complex structures and operations in language, action, music, exact calculation, and other domains.

Endogenous Oscillations Time-Constrain Linguistic Segmentation: Cycling the Garden Path

Speech is transient. To comprehend entire sentences, segments consisting of multiple words need to be memorized for at least a while. However, it has been noted previously that we struggle to memorize segments longer than approximately 2.7 s. We hypothesized that electrophysiological processing cycles within the delta band (<4 Hz) underlie this time constraint. Participants’ EEG was recorded while they listened to temporarily ambiguous sentences. By manipulating the speech rate, we aimed at biasing participants’ interpretation: At a slow rate, segmentation after 2.7 s would trigger a correct interpretation. In contrast, at a fast rate, segmentation after 2.7 s would trigger a wrong interpretation and thus an error later in the sentence. In line with the suggested time constraint, the phase of the delta-band oscillation at the critical point in the sentence mirrored segmentation on the level of single trials, as indicated by the amplitude of the P600 event-related brain potential (ERP) later in the sentence. The correlation between upstream delta-band phase and downstream P600 amplitude implies that segmentation took place when an underlying neural oscillator had reached a specific angle within its cycle, determining comprehension. We conclude that delta-band oscillations set an endogenous time constraint on segmentation.

Special Issue: Consciousness science and its theories Time consciousness: the missing link in theories of consciousness

There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete "functional moments" of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the "experienced moment"). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.

A general procedure to measure the pacing of body movements timed to music and metronome in younger and older adults

Finger-tapping tasks are classically used to investigate sensorimotor synchronization in relation to neutral auditory cues, such as metronomes. However, music is more commonly associated with an entrained bodily response, such as toe tapping, or dancing. Here we report an experimental procedure that was designed to bridge the gap between timing and intervention studies by directly comparing the effects of metronome and musical cue types on motor timing abilities across the three naturalistic voluntary actions of finger tapping, toe tapping, and stepping on the spot as a simplified case of whole body movement. Both pacing cues were presented at slow, medium, and fast tempi. The findings suggested that the task of stepping on the spot enabled better timing performances than tapping both in younger and older adults (75+). Timing performances followed an inverse U shape with best performances observed in the medium tempi that were set close to the spontaneous motor tempo in each movement type. Finally, music provided an entrainment effect in addition to pace setting that enabled better motor timing and greater stability than classically reported using a metronome. By applying time-stamp analyses to kinetic data, we demonstrate that tapping and stepping engage different timing modes. This work details the importance of translational research for a better understanding of motor timing. It offers a simple procedure that strengthens the validity of applying academic work and contributes in knowledge towards a wide range of therapeutic interventions.

Evidence for visual temporal order processing below the threshold for conscious perception

Correctly discriminating the order of events arising in our environment is a fundamental temporal process that allows us to better understand and interact with our dynamic world. However, if consecutive events are separated by an interval of less than 20-40 ms, we cannot consciously perceive their relative order. Nevertheless, indirect evidence suggests that the sequential order of events separated by less than 20 ms might still be processed subconsciously. In our study, we aimed to provide evidence that temporal order processing can occur below the threshold for conscious perception. We developed a novel paradigm in which participants were instructed that a visual cue, composed of two coloured stimuli appearing in a particular order, would allow them to predict the shape of a subsequent target. The interval between the two stimuli allowed temporal order to be consciously perceived (66 ms interval) or not (17 ms interval), as verified by performance on a separate temporal order judgment task. Performance was compared to a control condition that provided no predictive information. In both experiments, reaction times were faster in the order-cue conditions compared to the control condition, whether the SOA separating events was longer (66 ms) or shorter (17 ms) than the typical temporal order threshold. Therefore, even when participants could not consciously perceive the temporal order of two consecutive stimuli, the relative sequence of events was nevertheless processed and used to optimise performance. These results suggest that temporal order can be processed subconsciously.

Event timing in human vision: Modulating factors and independent functions

Essential for successful interaction with the environment is the human capacity to resolve events in time. Typical event timing paradigms are judgements of simultaneity (SJ) and of temporal order (TOJ). It remains unclear whether SJ and TOJ are based on the same underlying mechanism and whether there are fixed thresholds for resolution. The current study employed four visual event timing task versions: horizontal and vertical SJ and TOJ. Binary responses were analysed using multilevel binary regression modelling. Modulatory effects of potential explanatory variables on event timing perception were investigated: (1) Individual factors (sex and age), (2) temporal factors (SOA, trial number, order of experiment, order of stimuli orientation, time of day) and (3) spatial factors (left or right stimulus first, top or bottom stimulus first, horizontal vs. vertical orientation). The current study directly compares for the first time, performance on SJ and TOJ tasks using the same paradigm and presents evidence that a variety of factors and their interactions selectively modulate event timing functions in humans, explaining the variance found in previous studies. We conclude that SJ and TOJ are partially independent functions, because they are modulated differently by individual and contextual variables.

Novel method to measure temporal windows based on eye movements during viewing of the Necker cube

Bistable stimuli can give rise to two different interpretations between which our perception will alternate. Recent results showed a strong coupling between eye movements and reports of perceptual alternations with motion stimuli, which provides useful tools to objectively assess perceptual alternations. However, motion might entrain eye movements, and here we check with a static picture, the Necker cube, whether eye movements and perceptual reports (manual responses) reveal similar or different alternation rates, and similar or different sensitivity to attention manipulations. Using a cluster analysis, ocular temporal windows were defined based on the dynamics of ocular fixations during viewing of the Necker cube and compared to temporal windows extracted from manual responses. Ocular temporal windows were measured also with a control condition, where the physical stimulus presented to viewers alternated between two non-ambiguous versions of the Necker cube. Attention was manipulated by asking subjects to either report spontaneous alternations, focus on one percept, or switch as fast as possible between percepts. The validity of the ocular temporal windows was confirmed by the correspondence between ocular fixations when the physical stimulus changed and when the bistable Necker cube was presented. Ocular movements defined smaller time windows than time windows extracted from manual responses. The number of manual and ocular windows both increased between the spontaneous condition and the switch condition. However, only manual, and not ocular windows, increased in duration in the focus condition. Manual responses involve decisional mechanisms, and they may be decoupled from automatic oscillations between the two percepts, as suggested by the fact that both the number and duration of ocular windows remained stable between the spontaneous and focus conditions. In all, the recording of eye movements provides an objective measure of time windows, and reveals faster perceptual alternations with the Necker cube and less sensitivity to attention manipulations than manual responses.

Animals are not cognitively stuck in time

We argue that animals are not cognitively stuck in time. Evidence pertaining to multisensory temporal order perception strongly suggests that animals can represent at least some temporal relations of perceived events.

The "now moment" is believed privileged because "now" is when happening is experienced

Hoerl & McCormack risk misleading people about the cognitive underpinnings of the belief in a privileged "now moment" because they do not explicitly acknowledge that the sense of existing in the now moment is an intrinsically temporally dynamic one. The sense of happening that is exclusive to the now moment is a better candidate for the source of belief in a privileged now.

What happens in the brain of meditators when perception changes but not the stimulus?

During the observation of an ambiguous figure our perception alternates between mutually exclusive interpretations, although the stimulus itself remains unchanged. The rate of these endogenous reversals has been discussed as reflecting basic aspects of endogenous brain dynamics. Recent evidence indicates that extensive meditation practice evokes long-term functional and anatomic changes in the brain, also affecting the endogenous brain dynamics. As one of several consequences the rate of perceptual reversals during ambiguous figure perception decreases. In the present study we compared EEG-correlates of endogenous reversals of ambiguous figures between meditators and non-meditating controls in order to better understand timing and brain locations of this altered endogenous brain dynamics. A well-established EEG paradigm was used to measure the neural processes underlying endogenous perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures with high temporal precision. We compared reversal-related ERPs between experienced meditators and non-meditating controls. For both groups we found highly similar chains of reversal-related ERPs, starting early in visual areas, therewith replicating previous findings from the literature. Meditators, however, showed an additional frontal ERP signature already 160 ms after stimulus onset (Frontal Negativity). We interpret the additional, meditation-specific ERP results as evidence that extensive meditation practice provides control of frontal brain areas over early sensory processing steps. This may allow meditators to overcome phylogenetically evolved perceptual and attentional processing automatisms.

Effects of Handshake Duration on Other Nonverbal Behavior

Although detailed descriptions of proper handshakes partly comprise many etiquette books, how a normal handshake can be described, its proper duration, and the consequences of violating handshake expectations remain empirically unexplored. This study measured the effect of temporal violations of the expected length of a handshake (less than three seconds according to previous studies) administered unobtrusively in a naturalistic experiment. We compared volunteer participants' (N = 34; 25 females; 9 males; M_age = 23.76 years, SD = 6.85) nonverbal behavior before and after (a) a prolonged handshake (>3 seconds), (b) a normal length handshake (average length <3 seconds), and (c) a control encounter with no handshake. Frame-by-frame behavioral analyses revealed that, following a prolonged handshake (vs. a normal length or no handshake), participants showed less interactional enjoyment, as indicated by less laughing. They also showed evidence of anxiety and behavioral freezing, indicated by increased hands-on-hands movements, and they showed fewer hands-on-body movements. Normal length handshakes resulted in less subsequent smiling than did prolonged handshakes, but normal length handshakes were also followed by fewer hands-on-face movements than prolonged handshakes. No behavior changes were associated with the no-handshake control condition. We found no differences in participants' level of empathy or state/trait anxiety related to these conditions. In summary, participants reacted behaviorally to temporal manipulations of handshakes, with relevant implications for interactions in interviews, business, educational, and social settings and for assisting patients with social skills difficulties.

Meditation-Induced States, Vagal Tone, and Breathing Activity Are Related to Changes in Auditory Temporal Integration

This study is based on the relationship between meditation, the present moment, and psychophysiology. We employed the metronome task to operationalize the extension of the present moment. A pre-post longitudinal study was conducted. The performance in the metronome task was compared before and after the interventions (meditation, story). The aim was to assess whether physiological changes (heart, breathing) during meditation influence the temporal-integration (TI) of metronome beats. Mindfulness meditators either meditated (n = 41) or listened to a story (n = 43). The heart and breathing activity were recorded during the intervention and compared to a resting-state condition. By applying path analyses we found that meditation led to an increase of the duration of integration intervals at the slowest metronome frequency (inter-stimulus interval, ISI = 3 s). After meditation, the higher the heart-rate variability (i.e., the root mean square of successive differences, RMSSD), the longer the duration of integration intervals at the fastest frequency (ISI = 0.33 s). Moreover, the higher the breathing rate during meditation, the greater the integration of intervals at ISI = 1 s. These findings add evidence to meditation-induced changes on the TI of metronome beats and the concept of the embodiment of mental functioning.

Duration Perception Versus Perception Duration: A Proposed Model for the Consciously Experienced Moment

Duration perception is not the same as perception duration. Time is an object of perception in its own right and is qualitatively different to exteroceptive or interoceptive perception of concrete objects or sensations originating within the self. In reviewing evidence for and against the experienced moment, White (2017, Psychol. Bull., 143, 735–756) proposed a model of global integration of information dense envelopes of integration. This is a valuable addition to the literature because it supposes that, like Tononi’s (2004, BMC Neurosci., 5, 42) Integrated Information Theory, consciousness is an integral step above perception of objects or the self. Consciousness includes the perception of abstract contents such as time, space, and magnitude, as well as post-perceptual contents drawn from memory. The present review takes this logic a step further and sketches a potential neurobiological pathway through the salience, default mode, and central executive networks that culminates in a candidate model of how duration perception and consciousness arises. Global integration is viewed as a process of Bayesian Prediction Error Minimisation according to a model put forward by Hohwy, Paton and Palmer (2016, Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci., 15, 315–335) called ‘distrusting the present’. The proposed model also expresses global integration as an intermediate stage between perception and memory that spans an approximate one second duration, an analogue of Wittmann’s (2011, Front. Integr. Neurosci., 5, 66) experienced moment.

Spatial and Spectral Auditory Temporal-Order Judgment (TOJ) Tasks in Elderly People Are Performed Using Different Perceptual Strategies

The Temporal-Order Judgment (TOJ) paradigm has been widely investigated in previous studies as an accurate measure of temporal resolution and sequencing abilities in the millisecond time range. Two auditory TOJ tasks are often used: (1) a spatial TOJ task, in which two identical stimuli are presented in rapid succession monaurally and the task is to indicate which ear received the first stimulus and which ear received the second one (left-right or right-left), and (2) a spectral TOJ task, in which two tones of different frequencies are presented asynchronously to both ears binaurally and the task is to report the sequence of these tones (low-high or high-low). The previous literature studies conducted on young volunteers indicated that the measured temporal acuity on these two tasks depended on the procedure used. As considerable data are now available about age-related decline in temporal resolution ability, the aim of the present study was to compare in elderly subjects the pattern of performance on these two tasks. A total of 40 normal healthy volunteers aged from 62 to 78 years performed two TOJ tasks. The measurement was repeated in two consecutive sessions. Temporal resolution was indexed by the Auditory Temporal-Order Threshold (ATOT), i.e., the minimum time gap between successive stimuli necessary for a participant to report a before-after relation with 75% correctness. The main finding of the present study was the indication of differences in the elderly in performance on two tasks. In the spatial task, the distribution of obtained ATOT values did not deviate from the Gaussian distribution. In contrast, the distribution of data in the spectral task deviated significantly from the Gaussian and was spread more to the right. Although lower ATOT values were usually observed in Session 2 than in Session 1, such difference was significant only in the spectral task. We conclude that although temporal acuity and sequencing abilities in the millisecond time range are probably based in neuronal oscillatory activity, the measured ATOTs in the elderly seem to be stimulus-dependent, procedure-related, and influenced by the perceptual strategies used by participants.

Synchronization, Attention and Transformation: Multidimensional Exploration of the Aesthetic Experience of Contemporary Dance Spectators

The co-presence of bodies in intersubjective situations can give rise to processes of kinesthetic empathy and physiological synchronization, especially in the context of dance: the body and attention of the spectators are oriented towards the dancers. In this study, we investigate the processes of "body-mind" resonance between a choreography and its spectators, and more specifically the lasting impact of this resonance post-performance. We then explore the relation between the observed effects and subjective measures of attention. The study focuses on the work of the French choreographer Myriam Gourfink, who develops a unique movement, based on the slower breathing of dancers: the breathing generates an extremely slow movement without rhythmic ruptures. Phenomenological studies of her work report changes in temporal perception and changes in bodily attentional states. We made use of two cognitive tasks in order to quantify this change in temporal perception: Spontaneous Motor Tempo (SMT) and Apparent Motion effect (AM) before and after a 40-min live performance. Subjective reports were collected at the end of the performance. Physiological data were recorded before and after the performance. We performed a control experiment with a choreography of a distinctly different quality of movement. Post-Gourfink performance, we observed a significant deceleration of SMT and a decrease in its variability, while AM was reported with longer temporal intervals. Neither of these effects was observed in the control condition. Furthermore, an increase in perception of AM was correlated with a slower breathing rate after the performance. Correlations with subjective reports suggest a link between changes in cognitive and physiological dynamics and the degree of absorption of the spectators in the performance. In addition, these changes were related to specific reported attentional dispositions that we interpret as a form of attentional resonance. The ensemble of the results suggests an expansion of the "specious present" that is related to the slowing of physiological rhythms, and an attentional resonance between spectators and the choreography. The intricate relation we observed between inter-personal resonance and temporal cognition, foregrounds the notion of shared present as a neurophenomenological construct.

Consciousness: a unique way of processing information

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the "single voice" of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention.

Is Schizophrenia a Disorder of Consciousness? Experimental and Phenomenological Support for Anomalous Unconscious Processing

Decades ago, several authors have proposed that disorders in automatic processing lead to intrusive symptoms or abnormal contents in the consciousness of people with schizophrenia. However, since then, studies have mainly highlighted difficulties in patients' conscious experiencing and processing but rarely explored how unconscious and conscious mechanisms may interact in producing this experience. We report three lines of research, focusing on the processing of spatial frequencies, unpleasant information, and time-event structure that suggest that impairments occur at both the unconscious and conscious level. We argue that focusing on unconscious, physiological and automatic processing of information in patients, while contrasting that processing with conscious processing, is a first required step before understanding how distortions or other impairments emerge at the conscious level. We then indicate that the phenomenological tradition of psychiatry supports a similar claim and provides a theoretical framework helping to understand the relationship between the impairments and clinical symptoms. We base our argument on the presence of disorders in the minimal self in patients with schizophrenia. The minimal self is tacit and non-verbal and refers to the sense of bodily presence. We argue this sense is shaped by unconscious processes, whose alteration may thus affect the feeling of being a unique individual. This justifies a focus on unconscious mechanisms and a distinction from those associated with consciousness.

As time passes by: Observed motion-speed and psychological time during video playback

Research shows that psychological time (i.e., the subjective experience and assessment of the passage of time) is malleable and that the central nervous system re-calibrates temporal information in accordance with situational factors so that psychological time flows slower or faster. Observed motion-speed (e.g., the visual perception of a rolling ball) is an important situational factor which influences the production of time estimates. The present study examines previous findings showing that observed slow and fast motion-speed during video playback respectively results in over- and underproductions of intervals of time. Here, we investigated through three separate experiments: a) the main effect of observed motion-speed during video playback on a time production task and b) the interactive effect of the frame rate (frames per second; fps) and motion-speed during video playback on a time production task. No main effect of video playback-speed or interactive effect between video playback-speed and frame rate was found on time production.

Binding time: Evidence for integration of temporal stimulus features

Several lines of evidence suggest that during processing of events, the features of these events become connected via episodic bindings. Such bindings have been demonstrated for a large number of visual and auditory stimulus features, like color and orientation, or pitch and loudness. Importantly, most visual and auditory events typically also involve temporal features, like onset time or duration. So far, however, whether temporal stimulus features are also bound into event representations has never been tested directly. The aim of the present study was to investigate possible binding between stimulus duration and other features of auditory events. In Experiment 1, participants had to respond with two keys to a low or high pitch sinus tone. Critically, the tones were presented with two different presentation durations. Sequential analysis of RT data indicated binding of stimulus duration into the event representation: at pitch repetitions, performance was better when both pitch and duration repeated, relative to when only pitch repeated and duration switched. This finding was replicated with loudness as relevant stimulus feature in Experiment 2. In sum, the results demonstrate that temporal features are bound into auditory event representations. This finding is an important advancement for binding theory in general, and raises several new questions for future research.

The brain and the subjective experience of time. A voxel based symptom-lesion mapping study

The aim of the study was to identify the anatomical bases involved in the subjective experience of time, by means of a voxel based symptom-lesion mapping (VLSM) study on patients with focal brain damage. Thirty-three patients (nineteen with right-hemisphere lesions -RBD, and fourteen with left lesion- LBD) and twenty-eight non-neurological controls (NNC) underwent the semi-structured QUEstionnaire for the Subjective experience of Time (QUEST) requiring retrospective and prospective judgements on self-relevant time intervals. All participants also completed tests to assess general cognitive functioning and two questionnaires to evaluate their emotional state. Both groups of brain-damaged patients achieved significantly different scores from NNC on the time performance, without differences between RBD and LBD. VLSM showed a cluster of voxels located in the right inferior parietal lobule significantly related to errors in the prospective items. The lesion subtraction analysis revealed two different patterns possibly associated with errors in the prospective items (the right inferior parietal cortex, rolandic operculum and posterior middle temporal gyrus) and in the retrospective items (superior middle temporal gyrus, white matter posterior to the insula).

Temporal Processing in Bistable Perception of the Necker Cube

Perception of ambiguous figures is unstable and alternates repeatedly between possible interpretations. Some approaches to explaining this phenomenon have, so far, assumed low-level bottom-up mechanisms like adaptation and mutual inhibition of underlying neural assemblies. In contrast, less precise top-down approaches assume high-level attentional control mechanisms generalised across sensory modalities. In the current work we focused on specific aspects of the top-down approach. In a first study we used dwell times (periods of transiently stable percepts) and the parameters of dwell time distribution functions to compare the dynamics of perceptual alternations between visual (Necker cube) and auditory ambiguity (verbal transformation effect). In a second study we compared the endogenous alternation dynamics of the Necker cube with parameters from two attention tasks with different regimes of temporal dynamics. The first attention task (d2) is characterised by endogenous self-paced dynamics, similar to the dynamics underlying perceptual alternations of ambiguous figures, and we found clear correlations between dwell time parameters (Necker cube) and processing speed (d2 task). The temporal dynamics of the second (go/no-go) attention task, in contrast, are exogenously governed by the stimulus protocol, and we found no statistically significant correlation with the Necker cube data. Our results indicate that both perceptual instability and higher-level attentional tasks are linked to endogenous brain dynamics on a global coordinating level beyond sensory modalities.

Sharing the Now in the Social Present: Duration of Nonverbal Synchrony Is Linked With Personality

OBJECTIVE

The social present is a novel descriptor of dyadic nowness and social sharing, extending research on individual nowness (James's [1890] specious present) to the interpersonal and intersubjective domain. We wished to connect this descriptor to personality attributes.

METHOD

We define the social present by the duration of significant nonverbal synchrony, based on the phenomenon of movement synchrony that generally emerges in social interactions. It is thus an implicit and objective measure that can be implemented by automated video analyses. In this study, 168 healthy participants were invited to verbal conversations in same-sex dyads. We analyzed the associations of the social present with personality attributes and interaction types (competition, cooperation, fun task).

RESULTS

The average duration of the social present was 6.0 seconds, highest in competitive interactions and in male-male dyads. People with higher Openness to Experience, higher avoidant attachment, and lower narcissistic interpersonal styles showed extended social present in their interactions.

CONCLUSIONS

The concept of the social present extends personality attributes to the interpersonal domain and to intersubjectivity. The social present may be computed based on movement synchrony but also prosodic or physiological synchronies. We foresee implications for health-related interactions such as psychotherapy, where therapeutic presence is an essential property of alliance.

Implicit Timing as the Missing Link between Neurobiological and Self Disorders in Schizophrenia?

Disorders of consciousness and the self are at the forefront of schizophrenia symptomatology. Patients are impaired in feeling themselves as the authors of their thoughts and actions. In addition, their flow of consciousness is disrupted, and thought fragmentation has been suggested to be involved in the patients' difficulties in feeling as being one unique, unchanging self across time. Both impairments are related to self disorders, and both have been investigated at the experimental level. Here we review evidence that both mechanisms of motor control and the temporal structure of signal processing are impaired in schizophrenia patients. Based on this review, we propose that the sequencing of action and perception plays a key role in the patients' impairments. Furthermore, the millisecond time scale of the disorders, as well as the impaired sequencing, highlights the cooperation between brain networks including the cerebellum, as proposed by Andreasen (1999). We examine this possibility in the light of recent knowledge on the anatomical and physiological properties of the cerebellum, its role in timing, and its involvement in known physiological impairments in patients with schizophrenia, e.g., resting states and brain dynamics. A disruption in communication between networks involving the cerebellum, related to known impairments in dopamine, glutamate and GABA transmission, may help to better explain why patients experience reduced attunement with the external world and possibly with themselves.

Aging and the subjective experience of time

BACKGROUND

The subjective experience of time involves several, not yet identified, mechanisms. Many cognitive and emotional factors, such as attention, memory and subjective mental states can influence time estimation.

AIMS

We aimed to assess the subjective experience of time and its relationships with cognitive and emotional characteristics in the elderly.

METHOD

Forty-nine non-demented patients hospitalized for orthopedic rehabilitation underwent an 'ecological' evaluation tool, the semi-structured QUEstionnaire for the Subjective experience of Time (QUEST) requiring retrospective and prospective judgements on self-relevant time intervals. All patients completed tests to assess general cognitive functioning and two questionnaires to evaluate emotional state.

RESULTS

Results showed that accuracy in time estimation did not differ in young-old vs. old-old individuals: both groups performed better on prospective than on retrospective items and on highly than on poorly self-relevant items. Multiple regression analysis showed that performance on QUEST was significantly related to depression and hospitalization duration, but not to age, education, or neuropsychological scores.

CONCLUSIONS

The influence of the emotional state is consistent with theories postulating that the "sense of time" is emergent from emotional and visceral states.

Can Lionel Messi's brain slow down time passing?

It seems that seeing others in slow-motion by heroes does not belong only to movies. When Lionel Messi plays football, you can hardly see anything from him that other players cannot do. Then why he is not stoppable really? It seems the answer may be that opponents do not have enough time to do what they want; because in Messi's neural system, time passes slower. In differential equations that model a single neuron, this speed can be generated by multiplying an equal term in all equations. Or maybe interactions between neurons and the structure of neural networks play this role.

Ecstatic Epileptic Seizures: A Glimpse into the Multiple Roles of the Insula

Ecstatic epileptic seizures are a rare but compelling epileptic entity. During the first seconds of these seizures, ecstatic auras provoke feelings of well-being, intense serenity, bliss, and "enhanced self-awareness." They are associated with the impression of time dilation, and can be described as a mystic experience by some patients. The functional neuroanatomy of ecstatic seizures is still debated. During recent years several patients presenting with ecstatic auras have been reported by others and us (in total n = 52); a few of them in the setting of presurgical evaluation including electrical brain stimulation. According to the recently recognized functions of the insula, and the results of nuclear brain imaging and electrical stimulation, the ecstatic symptoms in these patients seem to localize to a functional network centered around the anterior insular cortex, where we thus propose to locate this rare ictal phenomenon. Here we summarize the role of the multiple sensory, autonomic, affective, and cognitive functions of the insular cortex, which are integrated into the creation of self-awareness, and we suggest how this system may become dysfunctional on several levels during ecstatic aura.

What Happens in a Moment

There has been evidence for the very brief, temporal quantization of perceptual experience at regular intervals below 100 ms for several decades. We briefly describe how earlier studies led to the concept of "psychological moment" of between 50 and 60 ms duration. According to historical theories, within the psychological moment all events would be processed as co-temporal. More recently, a link with physiological mechanisms has been proposed, according to which the 50-60 ms psychological moment would be defined by the upper limit required by neural mechanisms to synchronize and thereby represent a snapshot of current perceptual event structure. However, our own experimental developments also identify a more fine-scaled, serialized process structure within the psychological moment. Our data suggests that not all events are processed as co-temporal within the psychological moment and instead, some are processed successively. This evidence questions the analog relationship between synchronized process and simultaneous experience and opens debate on the ontology and function of "moments" in psychological experience.

Tracking Visual Events in Time in the Absence of Time Perception: Implicit Processing at the ms Level

Previous studies have suggested that even if subjects deem two visual stimuli less than 20 ms apart to be simultaneous, implicitly they are nonetheless distinguished in time. It is unclear, however, how information is encoded within this short timescale. We used a priming paradigm to demonstrate how successive visual stimuli are processed over time intervals of less than 20 ms. The primers were two empty square frames displayed either simultaneously or with a 17ms asynchrony. The primers were followed by the target information after a delay of 25 ms to 100 ms. The two square frames were filled in one after another with a delay of 100 ms between them, and subjects had to decide on the location of the first of the frames to be filled in. In a second version of the paradigm, only one square frame was filled in, and subjects had to decide where it was positioned. The influence of the primers is revealed through faster response times depending on the location of the first and second primers. Experiment 1 replicates earlier results, with a bias towards the side of the second primer, but only when there is a delay of 75 to 100 ms between primers and targets. The following experiments suggest this effect to be relatively independent of the task context, except for a slight effect on the time course of the biases. For the temporal order judgment task, identical results were observed when subjects have to answer to the side of the second rather than the first target, showing the effect to be independent of the hand response, and suggesting it might be related to a displacement of attention. All in all the results suggest the flow of events is followed more efficiently than suggested by explicit asynchrony judgment studies. We discuss the possible impact of these results on our understanding of the sense of time continuity.

Disruption of information processing in schizophrenia: The time perspective

We review studies suggesting time disorders on both automatic and subjective levels in patients with schizophrenia. Patients have difficulty explicitly discriminating between simultaneous and asynchronous events, and ordering events in time. We discuss the relationship between these difficulties and impairments on a more elementary level. We showed that for undetectable stimulus onset asynchronies below 20 ms, neither patients nor controls merge events in time, as previously believed. On the contrary, subjects implicitly distinguish between events even when evaluating them to be simultaneous. Furthermore, controls privilege the last stimulus, whereas patients seem to stay stuck on the first stimulus when asynchronies are sub-threshold. Combining previous results shows this to be true for patients even for asynchronies as short as 8 ms. Moreover, this peculiarity predicts difficulties with detecting asynchronies longer than 50 ms, suggesting an impact on the conscious ability to time events. Difficulties on the subjective level are also correlated with clinical disorganization. The results are interpreted within the framework of predictive coding which can account for an implicit ability to update events. These results complement a range of other results, by suggesting a difficulty with binding information in time as well as space, and by showing that information processing lacks continuity and stability in patients. The time perspective may help bridge the gap between cognitive impairments and clinical symptoms, by showing how the innermost structure of thought and experience is disrupted.

Temporal structure of consciousness and minimal self in schizophrenia

The concept of the minimal self refers to the consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience. According to recent studies, disturbances of the minimal self may be a core feature of schizophrenia. They are emphasized in classical psychiatry literature and in phenomenological work. Impaired minimal self-experience may be defined as a distortion of one’s first-person experiential perspective as, for example, an “altered presence” during which the sense of the experienced self (“mineness”) is subtly affected, or “altered sense of demarcation,” i.e., a difficulty discriminating the self from the non-self. Little is known, however, about the cognitive basis of these disturbances. In fact, recent work indicates that disorders of the self are not correlated with cognitive impairments commonly found in schizophrenia such as working-memory and attention disorders. In addition, a major difficulty with exploring the minimal self experimentally lies in its definition as being non-self-reflexive, and distinct from the verbalized, explicit awareness of an “I.” In this paper, we shall discuss the possibility that disturbances of the minimal self observed in patients with schizophrenia are related to alterations in time processing. We shall review the literature on schizophrenia and time processing that lends support to this possibility. In particular we shall discuss the involvement of temporal integration windows on different time scales (implicit time processing) as well as duration perception disturbances (explicit time processing) in disorders of the minimal self. We argue that a better understanding of the relationship between time and the minimal self as well of issues of embodiment require research that looks more specifically at implicit time processing. Some methodological issues will be discussed.

Attention and working memory: two basic mechanisms for constructing temporal experiences

Various kinds of observations show that the ability of human beings to both consciously relive past events – episodic memory – and conceive future events, entails an active process of construction. This construction process also underpins many other important aspects of conscious human life, such as perceptions, language, and conscious thinking. This article provides an explanation of what makes the constructive process possible and how it works. The process mainly relies on attentional activity, which has a discrete and periodic nature, and working memory, which allows for the combination of discrete attentional operations. An explanation is also provided of how past and future events are constructed.

Patients with schizophrenia selectively impaired in temporal order judgments

The ability to order events in time plays a pervasive role in cognitive functions, but has only rarely been explored in patients with schizophrenia. Results we obtained recently suggested that patients have difficulties following events over time. However, this impairment concerned implicit responses at very short asynchronies, and it is not known whether it generalizes to subjective temporal order judgments. Here, we make a direct comparison between temporal order judgments and simultaneity/asynchrony discrimination in the same patients. Two squares were displayed on the screen either simultaneously or with an asynchrony of 24 to 96ms. In one session 20 patients and 20 controls made a temporal order judgment and in the other they discriminated between simultaneous and asynchronous stimuli. Controls recorded similar performances in the two tasks at asynchronies above 50ms, whereas patients displayed a sizeable impairment in temporal order judgment selectively. This impairment occurred in the easiest conditions, with the largest SOAs (Stimulus Onset Asynchronies) and only in the temporal order judgment. The results are the first evidence that patients with schizophrenia have a selective difficulty determining temporal order, even for asynchronies producing a clear perception of asynchrony. This impairment may mediate difficulties engaging oneself in everyday life events.

Perception of acoustically presented time series with varied intervals

Data from three experiments on serial perception of temporal intervals in the supra-second domain are reported. Sequences of short acoustic signals ("pips") separated by periods of silence were presented to the observers. Two types of time series, geometric or alternating, were used, where the modulus 1+δ of the inter-pip series and the base duration Tb (range from 1.1 to 6s) were varied as independent parameters. The observers had to judge whether the series were accelerating, decelerating, or uniform (3 paradigm), or to distinguish regular from irregular sequences (2 paradigm). "Intervals of subjective uniformity" (isus) were obtained by fitting Gaussian psychometric functions to individual subjects' responses. Progression towards longer base durations (Tb=4.4 or 6s) shifts the isus towards negative δs, i.e., accelerating series. This finding is compatible with the phenomenon of "subjective shortening" of past temporal intervals, which is naturally accounted for by the lossy integration model of internal time representation. The opposite effect observed for short durations (Tb=1.1 or 1.5s) remains unexplained by the lossy integration model, and presents a challenge for further research.

Changes in the representation of space and time while listening to music

Music is known to alter people's ordinary experience of space and time. Not only does this challenge the concept of invariant space and time tacitly assumed in psychology but it may also help us understand how music works and how music can be understood as an embodied experience. Yet research about these alterations is in its infancy. This review is intended to delineate a future research agenda. We review experimental evidence and subjective reports of the influence of music on the representation of space and time and present prominent approaches to explaining these effects. We discuss the role of absorption and altered states of consciousness and their associated changes in attention and neurophysiological processes, as well as prominent models of human time processing and time experience. After integrating the reviewed research, we conclude that research on the influence of music on the representation of space and time is still quite inconclusive but that integrating the different approaches could lead to a better understanding of the observed effects. We also provide a working model that integrates a large part of the evidence and theories. Several suggestions for further research in both music psychology and cognitive psychology are outlined.