Predictive feedback and conscious visual experience

Face detection in contextual scenes

Object and scene perception are intertwined. When objects are expected to appear within a particular scene, they are detected and categorised with greater speed and accuracy. This study examined whether such context effects also moderate the perception of social objects such as faces. Female and male faces were embedded in scenes with a stereotypical female or male context. Semantic congruency of these scene contexts influenced the categorisation of faces (Experiment 1). These effects were bi-directional, such that face sex also affected scene categorisation (Experiment 2), suggesting concurrent automatic processing of both levels. In contrast, the more elementary task of face detection was not affected by semantic scene congruency (Experiment 3), even when scenes were previewed prior to face presentation (Experiment 4). This pattern of results indicates that semantic scene context can affect categorisation of faces. However, the earlier perceptual stage of detection appears to be encapsulated from the cognitive processes that give rise to this contextual interference.

The Gaze of Schizophrenia Patients Captured by Bottom-up Saliency

Schizophrenia (SCHZ) notably impacts various human perceptual modalities, including vision. Prior research has identified marked abnormalities in perceptual organization in SCHZ, predominantly attributed to deficits in bottom-up processing. Our study introduces a novel paradigm to differentiate the roles of top-down and bottom-up processes in visual perception in SCHZ. We analysed eye-tracking fixation ground truth maps from 28 SCHZ patients and 25 healthy controls (HC), comparing these with two mathematical models of visual saliency: one bottom-up, based on the physical attributes of images, and the other top-down, incorporating machine learning. While the bottom-up (GBVS) model revealed no significant overall differences between groups (beta = 0.01, p = 0.281, with a marginal increase in SCHZ patients), it did show enhanced performance by SCHZ patients with highly salient images. Conversely, the top-down (EML-Net) model indicated no general group difference (beta = -0.03, p = 0.206, lower in SCHZ patients) but highlighted significantly reduced performance in SCHZ patients for images depicting social interactions (beta = -0.06, p < 0.001). Over time, the disparity between the groups diminished for both models. The previously reported bottom-up bias in SCHZ patients was apparent only during the initial stages of visual exploration and corresponded with progressively shorter fixation durations in this group. Our research proposes an innovative approach to understanding early visual information processing in SCHZ patients, shedding light on the interplay between bottom-up perception and top-down cognition.

Cortical depth profiles in primary visual cortex for illusory and imaginary experiences

Visual illusions and mental imagery are non-physical sensory experiences that involve cortical feedback processing in the primary visual cortex. Using laminar functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in two studies, we investigate if information about these internal experiences is visible in the activation patterns of different layers of primary visual cortex (V1). We find that imagery content is decodable mainly from deep layers of V1, whereas seemingly 'real' illusory content is decodable mainly from superficial layers. Furthermore, illusory content shares information with perceptual content, whilst imagery content does not generalise to illusory or perceptual information. Together, our results suggest that illusions and imagery, which differ immensely in their subjective experiences, also involve partially distinct early visual microcircuits. However, overlapping microcircuit recruitment might emerge based on the nuanced nature of subjective conscious experience.

A hole in a piece of cardboard and predictive brain: the incomprehension of modern art in the light of the predictive coding paradigm

Incomprehension of and resistance to contemporaneous art have been constant features in the development of modern art. The predictive coding framework can be used to analyse this response by outlining the difference between the misunderstanding of (i) contemporary conceptual/minimalist art and (ii) early modern avant-garde art and by elucidating their underlying cognitive mechanisms. In both of these cases, incomprehension and its behavioural consequences are tied to the failure of the optimal prediction error (PE) minimization that is involved in the perception of such art works. In the case of contemporary conceptual/minimalist art the failure stems from the fact that the encounter results in non-salient visual sensations and generates no PE. In early modern avant-garde art, the occasional inability of viewers to recognize pictorial content using new pictorial conventions reflected the absence of suitable priors to explain away ambiguous sensory data. The capacity to recognize pictorial content in modernist painting, as a prerequisite for a satisfying encounter with such works and ultimately a wider acceptance of new artistic styles, required an updating of a number of expectations in order to optimize the fit between priors and sensations, from low-level perceptual priors to the development of higher-level, culturally determined expectations. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

Instant Effects of Semantic Information on Visual Perception

Does our perception of an object change once we discover what function it serves? We showed human participants (n = 48, 31 females and 17 males) pictures of unfamiliar objects either together with keywords matching their function, leading to semantically informed perception, or together with nonmatching keywords, resulting in uninformed perception. We measured event-related potentials to investigate at which stages in the visual processing hierarchy these two types of object perception differed from one another. We found that semantically informed compared with uninformed perception was associated with larger amplitudes in the N170 component (150-200 ms), reduced amplitudes in the N400 component (400-700 ms), and a late decrease in alpha/beta band power. When the same objects were presented once more without any information, the N400 and event-related power effects persisted, and we also observed enlarged amplitudes in the P1 component (100-150 ms) in response to objects for which semantically informed perception had taken place. Consistent with previous work, this suggests that obtaining semantic information about previously unfamiliar objects alters aspects of their lower-level visual perception (P1 component), higher-level visual perception (N170 component), and semantic processing (N400 component, event-related power). Our study is the first to show that such effects occur instantly after semantic information has been provided for the first time, without requiring extensive learning.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT There has been a long-standing debate about whether or not higher-level cognitive capacities, such as semantic knowledge, can influence lower-level perceptual processing in a top-down fashion. Here we could show, for the first time, that information about the function of previously unfamiliar objects immediately influences cortical processing within less than 200 ms. Of note, this influence does not require training or experience with the objects and related semantic information. Therefore, our study is the first to show effects of cognition on perception while ruling out the possibility that prior knowledge merely acts by preactivating or altering stored visual representations. Instead, this knowledge seems to alter perception online, thus providing a compelling case against the impenetrability of perception by cognition.

Illusory object recognition is either perceptual or cognitive in origin depending on decision confidence

We occasionally misinterpret ambiguous sensory input or report a stimulus when none is presented. It is unknown whether such errors have a sensory origin and reflect true perceptual illusions, or whether they have a more cognitive origin (e.g., are due to guessing), or both. When participants performed an error-prone and challenging face/house discrimination task, multivariate electroencephalography (EEG) analyses revealed that during decision errors (e.g., mistaking a face for a house), sensory stages of visual information processing initially represent the presented stimulus category. Crucially however, when participants were confident in their erroneous decision, so when the illusion was strongest, this neural representation flipped later in time and reflected the incorrectly reported percept. This flip in neural pattern was absent for decisions that were made with low confidence. This work demonstrates that decision confidence arbitrates between perceptual decision errors, which reflect true illusions of perception, and cognitive decision errors, which do not.

The Role of Foveal Cortex in Discriminating Peripheral Stimuli: The Sketchpad Hypothesis

Foveal (central) and peripheral vision are strongly interconnected to provide an integrated experience of the world around us. Recently, it has been suggested that there is a feedback mechanism that links foveal and peripheral vision. This peripheral-to-foveal feedback differs from other feedback mechanisms in that during visual processing a novel representation of a stimulus is formed in a different cortical region than that of the feedforward representation. The functional role of foveal feedback is not yet completely understood, but some evidence from neuroimaging studies suggests a link with peripheral shape processing. Behavioural and transcranial magnetic stimulation studies show impairment in peripheral shape discrimination when the foveal retinotopic cortex is disrupted post stimulus presentation. This review aims to link these findings to the visual sketchpad hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, foveal retinotopic cortex stores task-relevant information to aid identification of peripherally presented objects. We discuss how the characteristics of foveal feedback support this hypothesis and rule out other possible explanations. We also discuss the possibility that the foveal feedback may be independent of the sensory modality of the stimulation.

Investigating the role of the foveal cortex in peripheral object discrimination

Peripheral object discrimination is hindered by a central dynamic mask presented between 150 and 300 ms after stimulus onset. The mask is thought to interfere with task-relevant feedback coming from higher visual areas to the foveal cortex in V1. Fan et al. (2016) supported this hypothesis by showing that the effect of mask can be further delayed if the task requires mental manipulation of the peripheral target. The main purpose of this study was to better characterize the temporal dynamics of foveal feedback. Specifically, in two experiments we have shown that (1) the effect of foveal noise mask is sufficiently robust to be replicated in an online data collection (2) in addition to a change in sensitivity the mask affects also the criterion, which becomes more conservative; (3) the expected dipper function for sensitivity approximates a quartic with a global minimum at 94 ms, while the best fit for criterion is a quintic with a global maximum at 174 ms; (4) the power spectrum analysis of perceptual oscillations in sensitivity data shows a cyclic effect of mask at 3 and 12 Hz. Overall, our results show that foveal noise affects sensitivity in a cyclic manner, with a global dip emerging earlier than previously found. The noise also affects the response bias, even though with a different temporal profile. We, therefore, suggest that foveal noise acts on two distinct feedback mechanisms, a faster perceptual feedback followed by a slower cognitive feedback.

Spatial frequency processing and its modulation by emotional content in severe alcohol use disorder

RATIONALE

Visuo-perceptive deficits in severe alcohol use disorder (SAUD) remain little understood, notably regarding the respective involvement of the two main human visual streams, i.e., magnocellular (MC) and parvocellular (PC) pathways, in these deficits. Besides, in healthy populations, low-level visual perception can adapt depending on the nature of visual cues, among which emotional features, but this MC and PC pathway adaptation to emotional content is unexplored in SAUD.

OBJECTIVES

To assess MC and PC functioning as well as their emotional modulations in SAUD.

METHODS

We used sensitivity indices (d') and repeated-measures analyses of variance to compare orientation judgments of Gabor patches sampled at various MC- and PC-related spatial frequencies in 35 individuals with SAUD and 38 matched healthy controls. We then explored how emotional content modulated performances by introducing neutral or fearful face cues immediately before the Gabor patches and added the type of cue in the analyses.

RESULTS

SAUD patients showed a general reduction in sensitivity across all spatial frequencies, indicating impoverished processing of both coarse and fine-scale visual content. However, we observed selective impairments depending on facial cues: individuals with SAUD processed intermediate spatial frequencies less efficiently than healthy controls following neutral faces, whereas group differences emerged for the highest spatial frequencies following fearful faces. Altogether, SAUD was associated with mixed MC and PC deficits that may vary according to emotional content, in line with a flexible but suboptimal use of low-level visual content. Such subtle alterations could have implications for everyday life's complex visual judgments.

Surprising Threats Accelerate Conscious Perception

The folk psychological notion that "we see what we expect to see" is supported by evidence that we become consciously aware of visual stimuli that match our prior expectations more quickly than stimuli that violate our expectations. Similarly, "we see what we want to see," such that more biologically-relevant stimuli are also prioritised for conscious perception. How, then, is perception shaped by biologically-relevant stimuli that we did not expect? Here, we conducted two experiments using breaking continuous flash suppression (bCFS) to investigate how prior expectations modulated response times to neutral and fearful faces. In both experiments, we found that prior expectations for neutral faces hastened responses, whereas the opposite was true for fearful faces. This interaction between emotional expression and prior expectations was driven predominantly by participants with higher trait anxiety. Electroencephalography (EEG) data collected in Experiment 2 revealed an interaction evident in the earliest stages of sensory encoding, suggesting prediction errors expedite sensory encoding of fearful faces. These findings support a survival hypothesis, where biologically-relevant fearful stimuli are prioritised for conscious access even more so when unexpected, especially for people with high trait anxiety.

Early-stage visual perception impairment in schizophrenia, bottom-up and back again

Visual perception is one of the basic tools for exploring the world. However, in schizophrenia, this modality is disrupted. So far, there has been no clear answer as to whether the disruption occurs primarily within the brain or in the precortical areas of visual perception (the retina, visual pathways, and lateral geniculate nucleus [LGN]). A web-based comprehensive search of peer-reviewed journals was conducted based on various keyword combinations including schizophrenia, saliency, visual cognition, visual pathways, retina, and LGN. Articles were chosen with respect to topic relevance. Searched databases included Google Scholar, PubMed, and Web of Science. This review describes the precortical circuit and the key changes in biochemistry and pathophysiology that affect the creation and characteristics of the retinal signal as well as its subsequent modulation and processing in other parts of this circuit. Changes in the characteristics of the signal and the misinterpretation of visual stimuli associated with them may, as a result, contribute to the development of schizophrenic disease.

The Ties that Bind: Agnosia, Neglect and Selective Attention to Visual Scale

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Historical and contemporary treatments of visual agnosia and neglect regard these disorders as largely unrelated. It is thought that damage to different neural processes leads directly to one or the other condition, yet apperceptive variants of agnosia and object-centered variants of neglect share remarkably similar deficits in the quality of conscious experience. Here we argue for a closer association between "apperceptive" variants of visual agnosia and "object-centered" variants of visual neglect. We introduce a theoretical framework for understanding these conditions based on "scale attention", which refers to selecting boundary and surface information at different levels of the structural hierarchy in the visual array.

RECENT FINDINGS

We review work on visual agnosia, the cortical structures and cortico-cortical pathways that underlie visual perception, visuospatial neglect and object-centered neglect, and attention to scale. We highlight direct and indirect pathways involved in these disorders and in attention to scale. The direct pathway involves the posterior vertical segments of the superior longitudinal fasciculus that are positioned to link the established dorsal and ventral attentional centers in the parietal cortex with structures in the inferior occipitotemporal cortex associated with visual apperceptive agnosia. The connections in the right hemisphere appear to be more important for visual conscious experience, whereas those in the left hemisphere appear to be more strongly associated with the planning and execution of visually guided grasps directed at multi-part objects such as tools. In the latter case, semantic and functional information must drive the selection of the appropriate hand posture and grasp points on the object. This view is supported by studies of grasping in patients with agnosia and in patients with neglect that show that the selection of grasp points when picking up a tool involves both scale attention and semantic contributions from inferotemporal cortex. The indirect pathways, which include the inferior fronto-occipital and horizontal components of the superior longitudinal fasciculi, involve the frontal lobe, working memory and the "multiple demands" network, which can shape the content of visual awareness through the maintenance of goal- and task-based abstractions and their influence on scale attention. Recent studies of human cortico-cortical pathways necessitate revisions to long-standing theoretical views on visual perception, visually guided action and their integrations. We highlight findings from a broad sample of seemingly disparate areas of research to support the proposal that attention to scale is necessary for typical conscious visual experience and for goal-directed actions that depend on functional and semantic information. Furthermore, we suggest that vertical pathways between the parietal and occipitotemporal cortex, along with indirect pathways that involve the premotor and prefrontal cortex, facilitate the operations of scale attention.

What modulates the Mirror Neuron System during action observation?: Multiple factors involving the action, the actor, the observer, the relationship between actor and observer, and the context

Seeing an agent perform an action typically triggers a motor simulation of that action in the observer's Mirror Neuron System (MNS). Over the past few years, it has become increasingly clear that during action observation the patterns and strengths of responses in the MNS are modulated by multiple factors. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide the most comprehensive survey to date of these factors. To that end, 22 distinct factors are described, broken down into the following sets: six involving the action; two involving the actor; nine involving the observer; four involving the relationship between actor and observer; and one involving the context. The second aim is to consider the implications of these findings for four prominent theoretical models of the MNS: the Direct Matching Model; the Predictive Coding Model; the Value-Driven Model; and the Associative Model. These assessments suggest that although each model is supported by a wide range of findings, each one is also challenged by other findings and relatively unaffected by still others. Hence, there is now a pressing need for a richer, more inclusive model that is better able to account for all of the modulatory factors that have been identified so far.

Robust Lexically Mediated Compensation for Coarticulation: Christmash Time Is Here Again

A long-standing question in cognitive science is how high-level knowledge is integrated with sensory input. For example, listeners can leverage lexical knowledge to interpret an ambiguous speech sound, but do such effects reflect direct top-down influences on perception or merely postperceptual biases? A critical test case in the domain of spoken word recognition is lexically mediated compensation for coarticulation (LCfC). Previous LCfC studies have shown that a lexically restored context phoneme (e.g., /s/ in Christma#) can alter the perceived place of articulation of a subsequent target phoneme (e.g., the initial phoneme of a stimulus from a tapes-capes continuum), consistent with the influence of an unambiguous context phoneme in the same position. Because this phoneme-to-phoneme compensation for coarticulation is considered sublexical, scientists agree that evidence for LCfC would constitute strong support for top-down interaction. However, results from previous LCfC studies have been inconsistent, and positive effects have often been small. Here, we conducted extensive piloting of stimuli prior to testing for LCfC. Specifically, we ensured that context items elicited robust phoneme restoration (e.g., that the final phoneme of Christma# was reliably identified as /s/) and that unambiguous context-final segments (e.g., a clear /s/ at the end of Christmas) drove reliable compensation for coarticulation for a subsequent target phoneme. We observed robust LCfC in a well-powered, preregistered experiment with these pretested items (N = 40) as well as in a direct replication study (N = 40). These results provide strong evidence in favor of computational models of spoken word recognition that include top-down feedback.

Conscious perception and perceptual echoes: a binocular rivalry study

Alpha rhythms (∼10Hz) in the human brain are classically associated with idling activities, being predominantly observed during quiet restfulness with closed eyes. However, recent studies demonstrated that alpha (∼10Hz) rhythms can directly relate to visual stimulation, resulting in oscillations, which can last for as long as one second. This alpha reverberation, dubbed perceptual echoes (PE), suggests that the visual system actively samples and processes visual information within the alpha-band frequency. Although PE have been linked to various visual functions, their underlying mechanisms and functional role are not completely understood. In this study, we investigated the relationship between conscious perception and the generation and the amplitude of PE. Specifically, we displayed two coloured Gabor patches with different orientations on opposite sides of the screen, and using a set of dichoptic mirrors, we induced a binocular rivalry between the two stimuli. We asked participants to continuously report which one of two Gabor patches they consciously perceived, while recording their EEG signals. Importantly, the luminance of each patch fluctuated randomly over time, generating random sequences from which we estimated two impulse-response functions (IRFs) reflecting the PE generated by the perceived (dominant) and non-perceived (suppressed) stimulus, respectively. We found that the alpha power of the PE generated by the consciously perceived stimulus was comparable with that of the PE generated during monocular vision (control condition) and higher than the PE induced by the suppressed stimulus. Moreover, confirming previous findings, we found that all PEs propagated as a travelling wave from posterior to frontal brain regions, irrespective of conscious perception. All in all our results demonstrate a correlation between conscious perception and PE, suggesting that the synchronization of neural activity plays an important role in visual sampling and conscious perception.

Sensorimotor predictions shape reported conscious visual experience in a breaking continuous flash suppression task

Accounts of predictive processing propose that conscious experience is influenced not only by passive predictions about the world, but also by predictions encompassing how the world changes in relation to our actions-that is, on predictions about sensorimotor contingencies. We tested whether valid sensorimotor predictions, in particular learned associations between stimuli and actions, shape reports about conscious visual experience. Two experiments used instrumental conditioning to build sensorimotor predictions linking different stimuli with distinct actions. Conditioning was followed by a breaking continuous flash suppression task, measuring the speed of reported breakthrough for different pairings between the stimuli and prepared actions, comparing those congruent and incongruent with the trained sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 1, counterbalancing of the response actions within the breaking continuous flash suppression task was achieved by repeating the same action within each block but having them differ across the two blocks. Experiment 2 sought to increase the predictive salience of the actions by avoiding the repetition within blocks. In Experiment 1, breakthrough times were numerically shorter for congruent than incongruent pairings, but Bayesian analysis supported the null hypothesis of no influence from the sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 2, reported conscious perception was significantly faster for congruent than for incongruent pairings. A meta-analytic Bayes factor combining the two experiments confirmed this effect. Altogether, we provide evidence for a key implication of the action-oriented predictive processing approach to conscious perception, namely that sensorimotor predictions shape our conscious experience of the world.

Posttraumatic cognitions predict distorted body perceptions in women with dissociative identity disorder

BACKGROUND

Dissociative identity disorder (DID) is a psychobiological syndrome associated with a history of exposure to childhood abuse and neglect. The consequences of these traumatic events often include a profound impact on the way individuals inhabit and experience their bodies. Despite this, there is a paucity of empirical research on the subject. The aim of this study was to systematically document the occurrence of distorted body perceptions in DID and examine childhood maltreatment, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptom severity, and posttraumatic cognitions as predictors of distorted body perceptions in DID.

METHODS

Participants were adult women with histories of childhood abuse and neglect and a current DID diagnosis receiving treatment at a psychiatric care facility. Data were obtained through a battery of self-report measures, including the Body Uneasiness Test, Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, PTSD Checklist for DMS-5, and Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory.

RESULTS

A series of unpaired t-tests documented elevated levels of weight phobia, body image concerns, body avoidance, compulsive self-monitoring, and depersonalization in DID compared to published non-clinical data on the Body Uneasiness Test. A series of multiple regression models including measures of childhood trauma, PTSD symptoms, and posttraumatic cognitions demonstrated that over and above childhood trauma and PTSD symptom severity, posttraumatic cognitions significantly predicted distorted body perceptions.

CONCLUSIONS

In a treatment-seeking sample of women with DID, distorted body perceptions were elevated. Furthermore, posttraumatic cognitive distortions significantly predicted distorted body perceptions when controlling for childhood maltreatment and PTSD symptom severity. This suggests that distorted cognitions are a key target for therapeutic intervention.

Magnocellular and Parvocellular Mediated Luminance Contrast Discrimination in Severe Alcohol Use Disorder

BACKGROUND

Severe alcohol use disorder (SAUD) is associated with widespread cognitive impairments, including low-level visual processing deficits that persist after prolonged abstinence. However, the extent and characteristics of these visual deficits remain largely undetermined, impeding the identification of their underlying mechanisms and influence on higher-order processing. In particular, little work has been conducted to assess the integrity of the magnocellular (MC) and parvocellular (PC) visual pathways, namely the 2 main visual streams that convey information from the retina up to striate, extrastriate, and dorsal/ventral cerebral regions.

METHODS

We investigated achromatic luminance contrast processing mediated by inferred MC and PC pathways in 33 patients with SAUD and 32 matched healthy controls using 2 psychophysical pedestal contrast discrimination tasks that promote responses of inferred MC or PC pathways. We relied on a staircase procedure to assess participants' ability to detect small changes in luminance within an array of 4 gray squares that were either continuously presented (steady pedestal, MC-biased) or briefly flashed (pulsed pedestal, PC-biased).

RESULTS

We replicated the expected pattern of MC and PC contrast responses in healthy controls. We found preserved dissociation of MC and PC contrast signatures in SAUD but higher MC-mediated mean contrast discrimination thresholds combined with a steeper PC-mediated contrast discrimination slope compared with healthy controls.

CONCLUSION

These findings indicate altered MC-mediated contrast sensitivity and PC-mediated contrast gain, confirming the presence of early sensory disturbances in individuals with SAUD. Such low-level deficits, while usually overlooked, might influence higher-order abilities (e.g., memory, executive functions) in SAUD by disturbing the "coarse-to-fine" tuning of the visual system, which relies on the distinct functional properties of MC and PC pathways and ensures proper and efficient monitoring of the environment.

Perceptual decisions are biased toward relevant prior choices

Perceptual decisions are biased by recent perceptual history-a phenomenon termed 'serial dependence.' Here, we investigated what aspects of perceptual decisions lead to serial dependence, and disambiguated the influences of low-level sensory information, prior choices and motor actions. Participants discriminated whether a brief visual stimulus lay to left/right of the screen center. Following a series of biased 'prior' location discriminations, subsequent 'test' location discriminations were biased toward the prior choices, even when these were reported via different motor actions (using different keys), and when the prior and test stimuli differed in color. By contrast, prior discriminations about an irrelevant stimulus feature (color) did not substantially influence subsequent location discriminations, even though these were reported via the same motor actions. Additionally, when color (not location) was discriminated, a bias in prior stimulus locations no longer influenced subsequent location discriminations. Although low-level stimuli and motor actions did not trigger serial-dependence on their own, similarity of these features across discriminations boosted the effect. These findings suggest that relevance across perceptual decisions is a key factor for serial dependence. Accordingly, serial dependence likely reflects a high-level mechanism by which the brain predicts and interprets new incoming sensory information in accordance with relevant prior choices.

The Brain’s Asymmetric Frequency Tuning: Asymmetric Behavior Originates from Asymmetric Perception

To construct a coherent multi-modal percept, vertebrate brains extract low-level features (such as spatial and temporal frequencies) from incoming sensory signals. However, because frequency processing is lateralized with the right hemisphere favouring low frequencies while the left favours higher frequencies, this introduces asymmetries between the hemispheres. Here, we describe how this lateralization shapes the development of several cognitive domains, ranging from visuo-spatial and numerical cognition to language, social cognition, and even aesthetic appreciation, and leads to the emergence of asymmetries in behaviour. We discuss the neuropsychological and educational implications of these emergent asymmetries and suggest future research approaches.

Subjective visibility report is facilitated by conscious predictions only

Predictions in the visual domain have been shown to modulate conscious access. Yet, little is known about how predictions may do so and to what extent they need to be consciously implemented to be effective. To address this, we administered an attentional blink (AB) task in which target 1 (T1) identity predicted target 2 (T2) identity, while participants rated their perceptual awareness of validly versus invalidly predicted T2s (Experiment 1 & 2) or reported T2 identity (Experiment 3). Critically, we tested the effects of conscious and non-conscious predictions, after seen and unseen T1s, on T2 visibility. We found that valid predictions increased subjective visibility reports and discrimination of T2s, but only when predictions were generated by a consciously accessed T1, irrespective of the timing at which the effects were measured (short vs. longs lags). These results further our understanding of the intricate relationship between predictive processing and consciousness.

Expectations affect the perception of material properties

Many objects that we encounter have typical material qualities: spoons are hard, pillows are soft, and Jell-O dessert is wobbly. Over a lifetime of experiences, strong associations between an object and its typical material properties may be formed, and these associations not only include how glossy, rough, or pink an object is, but also how it behaves under force: we expect knocked over vases to shatter, popped bike tires to deflate, and gooey grilled cheese to hang between two slices of bread when pulled apart. Here we ask how such rich visual priors affect the visual perception of material qualities and present a particularly striking example of expectation violation. In a cue conflict design, we pair computer-rendered familiar objects with surprising material behaviors (a linen curtain shattering, a porcelain teacup wrinkling, etc.) and find that material qualities are not solely estimated from the object's kinematics (i.e., its physical [atypical] motion while shattering, wrinkling, wobbling etc.); rather, material appearance is sometimes “pulled” toward the “native” motion, shape, and optical properties that are associated with this object. Our results, in addition to patterns we find in response time data, suggest that visual priors about materials can set up high-level expectations about complex future states of an object and show how these priors modulate material appearance.

Continual Learning of Recurrent Neural Networks by Locally Aligning Distributed Representations

Temporal models based on recurrent neural networks have proven to be quite powerful in a wide variety of applications, including language modeling and speech processing. However, training these models often relies on backpropagation through time (BPTT), which entails unfolding the network over many time steps, making the process of conducting credit assignment considerably more challenging. Furthermore, the nature of backpropagation itself does not permit the use of nondifferentiable activation functions and is inherently sequential, making parallelization of the underlying training process difficult. Here, we propose the parallel temporal neural coding network (P-TNCN), a biologically inspired model trained by the learning algorithm we call local representation alignment. It aims to resolve the difficulties and problems that plague recurrent networks trained by BPTT. The architecture requires neither unrolling in time nor the derivatives of its internal activation functions. We compare our model and learning procedure with other BPTT alternatives (which also tend to be computationally expensive), including real-time recurrent learning, echo state networks, and unbiased online recurrent optimization. We show that it outperforms these on-sequence modeling benchmarks such as Bouncing MNIST, a new benchmark we denote as Bouncing NotMNIST, and Penn Treebank. Notably, our approach can, in some instances, outperform full BPTT as well as variants such as sparse attentive backtracking. Significantly, the hidden unit correction phase of P-TNCN allows it to adapt to new data sets even if its synaptic weights are held fixed (zero-shot adaptation) and facilitates retention of prior generative knowledge when faced with a task sequence. We present results that show the P-TNCN's ability to conduct zero-shot adaptation and online continual sequence modeling.

Using the perceptual past to predict the perceptual future influences the perceived present - A novel ERP paradigm

The information available through our senses is noisy, incomplete, and to varying degrees ambiguous. The perceptual system must create stable and reliable percepts out of this restricted information. It solves this perceptual inference problem by integrating memories of previous percepts and making predictions about the perceptual future.

Using ambiguous figures and a new experimental approach, we studied whether generating predictions based on regularities in the past affects processing of the present and how this is done. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were measured to investigate whether a highly regular temporal context of either ambiguous or unambiguous stimulus variants differently affects processing of a current stimulus and/or task execution. Further, we tested whether symbolic announcements about the immediate perceptual future can replace the past experience of regularities as a source for making predictions. Both ERP and reaction time varied as a function of stimulus ambiguity in the temporal context of a present stimulus. No such effects were found with symbolic announcements.

Our results indicate that predictions about the future automatically alter processing of the present, even if the predictions are irrelevant for the present percept and task. However, direct experiences of past regularities are necessary for predicting the future whereas symbolic information about the future is not sufficient.

A biological foundation for spatial-numerical associations: the brain's asymmetric frequency tuning

"Left" and "right" coordinates control our spatial behavior and even influence abstract thoughts. For number concepts, horizontal spatial-numerical associations (SNAs) have been widely documented: we associate few with left and many with right. Importantly, increments are universally coded on the right side even in preverbal humans and nonhuman animals, thus questioning the fundamental role of directional cultural habits, such as reading or finger counting. Here, we propose a biological, nonnumerical mechanism for the origin of SNAs on the basis of asymmetric tuning of animal brains for different spatial frequencies (SFs). The resulting selective visual processing predicts both universal SNAs and their context-dependence. We support our proposal by analyzing the stimuli used to document SNAs in newborns for their SF content. As predicted, the SFs contained in visual patterns with few versus many elements preferentially engage right versus left brain hemispheres, respectively, thus predicting left-versus rightward behavioral biases. Our "brain's asymmetric frequency tuning" hypothesis explains the perceptual origin of horizontal SNAs for nonsymbolic visual numerosities and might be extensible to the auditory domain.

How Do We Segment Text? Two-Stage Chunking Operation in Reading

Chunking in language comprehension is a process that segments continuous linguistic input into smaller chunks that are in the reader's mental lexicon. Effective chunking during reading facilitates disambiguation and enhances efficiency for comprehension. However, the chunking mechanisms remain elusive, especially in reading, given that information arrives simultaneously yet the written systems may not have explicit cues for labeling boundaries such as Chinese. What are the mechanisms of chunking that mediates the reading of the text that contains hierarchical information? We investigated this question by manipulating the lexical status of the chunks at distinct levels in four-character Chinese strings, including the two-character local chunk and four-character global chunk. Male and female human participants were asked to make lexical decisions on these strings in a behavioral experiment, followed by a passive reading task when their electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. The behavioral results showed that the lexical decision time of lexicalized two-character local chunks was influenced by the lexical status of the four-character global chunk, but not vice versa, which indicated the processing of global chunks possessed priority over the local chunks. The EEG results revealed that familiar lexical chunks were detected simultaneously at both levels and further processed in a different temporal order, the onset of lexical access for the global chunks was earlier than that of local chunks. These consistent results suggest a two-stage operation for chunking in reading, the simultaneous detection of familiar lexical chunks at multiple levels around 100 ms followed by recognition of chunks with global precedence.

B or 13? Unconscious Top-Down Contextual Effects at the Categorical but Not the Lexical Level

Contextual effects require integration of top-down predictions and bottom-up visual information. Given the widely assumed link between integration and consciousness, we asked whether contextual effects require consciousness. In two experiments (total N = 60), an ambiguous stimulus (which could be read as either B or 13) was presented alongside masked numbers (12 and 14) or letters (A and C). Context biased stimulus classification when it was consciously and unconsciously perceived. However, unconsciously perceived contexts evoked smaller effects. This finding was replicated and generalized into another language in a further experiment (N = 46) using a different set of stimuli, strengthening the claim that symbolic contextual effects can occur without awareness. Moreover, four experiments (total N = 160) suggested that these unconscious effects might be limited to the categorical level (numbers context vs. letters context) and do not extend to the lexical level (words context vs. nonwords context). Taken together, our results suggest that although consciousness may not be necessary for effects that require simple integration or none at all, it is nevertheless required for integration over larger semantic windows.

Predictive context biases binocular rivalry in children and adults with no positive relation to two measures of social cognition

Integration of prior experience and contextual information can help to resolve perceptually ambiguous situations and might support the ability to understand other peoples' thoughts and intentions, called Theory of Mind. We studied whether the readiness to incorporate contextual information for resolving binocular rivalry is positively associated with Theory-of-Mind-related social cognitive abilities. In children (12 to 13 years) and adults (18 to 25 years), a predictive temporal context reliably modulated the onset of binocular rivalry to a similar degree. In contrast, adult participants scored better on measures of Theory of Mind compared to children. We observed considerable interindividual differences regarding the influence of a predictive context on binocular rivalry, which were associated with differences in sensory eye dominance. The absence of a positive association between predictive effects on perception and Theory of Mind performance suggests that predictive effects on binocular rivalry and higher-level Theory-of-Mind-related abilities stem from different neurocognitive mechanisms. We conclude that the influence of predictive contextual information on basic visual processes is fully developed at an earlier age, whereas social cognitive skills continue to evolve from adolescence to adulthood.

Towards a Dynamic Exploration of Vision, Cognition and Emotion in Alcohol-Use Disorders

Abstract: Visuoperceptive impairments are among the most frequently reported deficits in alcohol-use disorders, but only very few studies have investigated their origin and interactions with other categories of dysfunctions. Besides, these deficits have generally been interpreted in a linear bottom-up perspective, which appears very restrictive with respect to the new models of vision developed in healthy populations. Indeed, new theories highlight the predictive nature of the visual system and demonstrate that it interacts with higher-level cognitive functions to generate top-down predictions. These models nota-bly posit that a fast but coarse visual analysis involving magnocellular pathways helps to compute heuristic guesses regard-ing the identity and affective value of inputs, which are used to facilitate conscious visual recognition. Building on these new proposals, the present review stresses the need to reconsider visual deficits in alcohol-use disorders as they might have cru-cial significance for core features of the pathology, such as attentional bias, loss of inhibitory control and emotion decoding impairments. Centrally, we suggest that individuals with severe alcohol-use disorders could present with magnocellular dam-age and we defend a dynamic explanation of the deficits. Rather than being restricted to high-level processes, deficits could start at early visual stages and then extend and potentially intensify during following steps due to reduced cerebral connec-tivity and dysfunctional cognitive/emotional regions. A new research agenda is specifically provided to test these hypotheses.

Exploring the role of expectations and stimulus relevance on stimulus-specific neural representations and conscious report

Subjective experience can be influenced by top-down factors, such as expectations and stimulus relevance. Recently, it has been shown that expectations can enhance the likelihood that a stimulus is consciously reported, but the neural mechanisms supporting this enhancement are still unclear. We manipulated stimulus expectations within the attentional blink (AB) paradigm using letters and combined visual psychophysics with magnetoencephalographic (MEG) recordings to investigate whether prior expectations may enhance conscious access by sharpening stimulus-specific neural representations. We further explored how stimulus-specific neural activity patterns are affected by the factors expectation, stimulus relevance and conscious report. First, we show that valid expectations about the identity of an upcoming stimulus increase the likelihood that it is consciously reported. Second, using a series of multivariate decoding analyses, we show that the identity of letters presented in and out of the AB can be reliably decoded from MEG data. Third, we show that early sensory stimulus-specific neural representations are similar for reported and missed target letters in the AB task (active report required) and an oddball task in which the letter was clearly presented but its identity was task-irrelevant. However, later sustained and stable stimulus-specific representations were uniquely observed when target letters were consciously reported (decision-dependent signal). Fourth, we show that global pre-stimulus neural activity biased perceptual decisions for a ‘seen’ response. Fifth and last, no evidence was obtained for the sharpening of sensory representations by top-down expectations. We discuss these findings in light of emerging models of perception and conscious report highlighting the role of expectations and stimulus relevance.

Changes in structural network topology correlate with severity of hallucinatory behavior in Parkinson's disease

Inefficient integration between bottom-up visual input and higher order visual processing regions is implicated in visual hallucinations in Parkinson's disease (PD). Here, we investigated white matter contributions to this perceptual imbalance hypothesis. Twenty-nine PD patients were assessed for hallucinatory behavior. Hallucination severity was correlated to connectivity strength of the network using the network-based statistic approach. The results showed that hallucination severity was associated with reduced connectivity within a subnetwork that included the majority of the diverse club. This network showed overall greater between-module scores compared with nodes not associated with hallucination severity. Reduced between-module connectivity in the lateral occipital cortex, insula, and pars orbitalis and decreased within-module connectivity in the prefrontal, somatosensory, and primary visual cortices were associated with hallucination severity. Conversely, hallucination severity was associated with increased between- and within-module connectivity in the orbitofrontal and temporal cortex, as well as regions comprising the dorsal attentional and default mode network. These results suggest that hallucination severity is associated with marked alterations in structural network topology with changes in participation along the perceptual hierarchy. This may result in the inefficient transfer of information that gives rise to hallucinations in PD.

Preliminary Evidence of a Missing Self Bias in Face Perception for Individuals with Dissociative Identity Disorder

Failing to recognize one's mirror image can signal an abnormality in one's sense of self. In dissociative identity disorder (DID), individuals often report that their mirror image can feel unfamiliar or distorted. They also experience some of their own thoughts, emotions, and bodily sensations as if they are nonautobiographical and sometimes as if instead, they belong to someone else. To assess these experiences, we designed a novel backwards masking paradigm in which participants were covertly shown their own face, masked by a stranger's face. Participants rated feelings of familiarity associated with the strangers' faces. 21 control participants without trauma-generated dissociation rated masks, which were covertly preceded by their own face, as more familiar compared to masks preceded by a stranger's face. In contrast, across two samples, 28 individuals with DID and similar clinical presentations (DSM-IV Dissociative Disorder Not Otherwise Specified type 1) did not show increased familiarity ratings to their own masked face. However, their familiarity ratings interacted with self-reported identity state integration. Individuals with higher levels of identity state integration had response patterns similar to control participants. These data provide empirical evidence of aberrant self-referential processing in DID/DDNOS and suggest this is restored with identity state integration.

Cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception

Cognitive and affective penetration of perception refers to the influence that higher mental states such as beliefs and emotions have on perceptual systems. Psychological and neuroscientific studies appear to show that these states modulate the visual system at the visuomotor, attentional, and late levels of processing. However, empirical evidence showing that similar consequences occur in early stages of visual processing seems to be scarce. In this paper, I argue that psychological evidence does not seem to be either sufficient or necessary to argue in favour of or against the cognitive penetration of perception in either late or early vision. In order to do that we need to have recourse to brain imaging techniques. Thus, I introduce a neuroscientific study and argue that it seems to provide well-grounded evidence for the cognitive penetration of early vision in face perception. I also examine and reject alternative explanations to my conclusion.

Neural responses to emotional involuntary memories in posttraumatic stress disorder: Differences in timing and activity

Background

Involuntary memories are a hallmark symptom of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but studies of the neural basis of involuntary memory retrieval in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are sparse. The study of the neural correlates of involuntary memories of stressful events in PTSD focuses on the voluntary retrieval of memories that are sometimes recalled as intrusive involuntary memories, not on involuntary retrieval while being scanned. Involuntary memory retrieval in controls has been shown to elicit activity in the parahippocampal gyrus, precuneus, inferior parietal cortex, and posterior midline regions. However, it is unknown whether involuntary memories are supported by the same mechanisms in PTSD. Because previous work has shown that both behavioral and neural responsivity is slowed in PTSD, we examined the spatiotemporal dynamics of the neural activity underlying negative and neutral involuntary memory retrieval.

Methods

Twenty-one individuals with PTSD and 21 non-PTSD, trauma-exposed controls performed an involuntary memory task, while undergoing a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan. Environmental sounds served as cues for well-associated pictures of negative and neutral scenes. We used a finite impulse response model to analyze temporal differences between groups in neural responses.

Results

Compared with controls, participants with PTSD reported more involuntary memories, which were more emotional and more vivid, but which activated a similar network of regions. However, compared to controls, individuals with PTSD showed delayed neural responsivity in this network and increased vmPFC/ACC activity for negative > neutral stimuli.

Conclusions

The similarity between PTSD and controls in neural substrates underlying involuntary memories suggests that, unlike voluntary memories, involuntary memories elicit similar activity in regions critical for memory retrieval. Further, the delayed neural responsivity for involuntary memories in PTSD suggests that factors affecting cognition in PTSD, like increased fatigue, or avoidance behaviors could do so by delaying activity in regions necessary for cognitive processing. Finally, compared to neutral memories, negative involuntary memories elicit hyperactivity in the vmPFC, whereas the vmPFC is typically shown to be hypoactive in PTSD during voluntary memory retrieval. These patterns suggest that considering both the temporal dynamics of cognitive processes as well as involuntary cognitive processes would improve existing neurobiological models of PTSD.

Frontotemporal stimulation modulates semantically-guided visual search during confrontation naming: A combined tDCS and eye tracking investigation

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) was paired with eye tracking to elucidate contributions of frontal, temporoparietal and anterior temporal cortex to early visual search patterns during picture naming (e.g., rapid visual scanning to diagnostic semantic features). Neurotypical adults named line drawings of objects prior to and following tDCS in three separate sessions, each employing a unique electrode montage. The gaze data revealed montage by stimulation (pre/post) interaction effects characterized by longer initial visual fixations (mean difference = 89 ms; Cohen's d = .8) and cumulative fixation durations (mean difference = 98 ms; Cohen's d = .9) on key semantic features (e.g., the head of an animal) after cathodal frontotemporal stimulation relative to the pre-stimulation baseline. We interpret these findings as reflecting a tDCS-induced modulation of semantic contributions of the anterior temporal lobe(s) to top-down influences on object recognition. Further, we discuss implications for the optimization of tDCS for the treatment of anomia in aphasia.

The Use of Picture Cards to Elicit Postgraduate Dental Student Feedback

The aim of this study was to elicit information about the use of picture cards to stimulate student feedback following a postgraduate dental course. Twenty-nine general dental practitioners (GDPs) volunteered for the study. Following an explanation of how this style of feedback worked, students were asked to choose a picture card from those available and use that image to stimulate their feedback. An independent interviewer introduced the topic and gathered comments in the form of qualitative data, generated by pre-formed questions. 93% (n = 26) questionnaires were completed and returned. 77% (n = 20) GDPs reported enjoying giving their feedback by 'picture card' technique; 83% (n = 20) reported this form of feedback stimulated their thoughts. Qualitative data were analysed thematically. Some GDPs felt the picture cards helped them formulate their feedback, others felt being able to give feedback to a third party they did not know was beneficial and giving feedback as a group was helpful. This novel approach of using picture cards to stimulate feedback was well received by these GDPs. A mixed result as to the value of this style of feedback was evident. A group feedback session facilitated by a stranger was considered to be a valuable approach to take.

Recent cross-modal statistical learning influences visual perceptual selection

Incoming sensory signals are often ambiguous and consistent with multiple perceptual interpretations. Information from one sensory modality can help to resolve ambiguity in another modality, but the mechanisms by which multisensory associations come to influence the contents of conscious perception are unclear. We asked whether and how novel statistical information about the coupling between sounds and images influences the early stages of awareness of visual stimuli. We exposed subjects to consistent, arbitrary pairings of sounds and images and then measured the impact of this recent passive statistical learning on subjects' initial conscious perception of a stimulus by employing binocular rivalry, a phenomenon in which incompatible images presented separately to the two eyes result in a perceptual alternation between the two images. On each trial of the rivalry test, subjects were presented with a pair of rivalrous images (one of which had been consistently paired with a specific sound during exposure while the other had not) and an accompanying sound. We found that, at the onset of binocular rivalry, an image was significantly more likely to be perceived, and was perceived for a longer duration, when it was presented with its paired sound than when presented with other sounds. Our results indicate that recently acquired multisensory information helps resolve sensory ambiguity, and they demonstrate that statistical learning is a fast, flexible mechanism that facilitates this process.

Dynamic Interactions between Top-Down Expectations and Conscious Awareness

It is well known that top-down expectations affect perceptual processes. Yet, remarkably little is known about the relationship between expectations and conscious awareness. We address three crucial outstanding questions: (1) how do expectations affect the likelihood of conscious stimulus perception?; (2) does the brain register violations of expectations nonconsciously?; and (3) do expectations need to be conscious to influence perceptual decisions? Using human participants, we performed three experiments in which we manipulated stimulus predictability within the attentional blink paradigm, while combining visual psychophysics with electrophysiological recordings. We found that valid stimulus expectations increase the likelihood of conscious access of stimuli. Furthermore, our findings suggest a clear dissociation in the interaction between expectations and consciousness: conscious awareness seems crucial for the implementation of top-down expectations, but not for the generation of bottom-up stimulus-evoked prediction errors. These results constrain and update influential theories about the role of consciousness in the predictive brain.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT While the relationship between expectations and conscious awareness plays a major role in many prediction-based theories of brain functioning, thus far few empirical studies have examined this relationship. Here, we address this gap in knowledge in a set of three experiments. Our results suggest that the effect of expectations on conscious awareness varies between different steps of the hierarchy of predictive processing. While the active use of top-down expectations for perceptual decisions requires conscious awareness, prediction errors can be triggered outside of conscious awareness. These results constrain and update influential theories about the role of consciousness in the predictive brain.

Facial expression predictions as drivers of social perception

Emerging perspectives in neuroscience indicate that the brain functions predictively, constantly anticipating sensory input based on past experience. According to these perspectives, prediction signals impact perception, guiding and constraining experience. In a series of six behavioral experiments, we show that predictions about facial expressions drive social perception, deeply influencing how others are evaluated: individuals are judged as more likable and trustworthy when their facial expressions are anticipated, even in the absence of any conscious changes in felt affect. Moreover, the effect of predictions on social judgments extends to both real-world situations where such judgments have particularly high consequence (i.e., evaluating presidential candidates for an upcoming election), as well as to more basic perceptual processes that may underlie judgment (i.e., facilitated visual processing of expected expressions). The implications of these findings, including relevance for cross-cultural interactions, social stereotypes and mental illness, are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

What Is Memory-Guided Attention? How Past Experiences Shape Selective Visuospatial Attention in the Present

What controls our attention? It is historically thought that there are two primary factors that determine selective attention: the perceptual salience of the stimuli and the goals based on the task at hand. However, this distinction doesn't neatly capture the varied ways our past experience can influence our ongoing mental processing. In this chapter, we aim to describe how past experience can be systematically characterized by different types of memory, and we outline experimental evidence suggesting how attention can then be guided by each of these different memory types. We highlight findings from human behavioral, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological work from the perspective of two related frameworks of human memory: the multiple memory systems (MMS) framework and the neural processing (NP) framework. The MMS framework underscores how memory can be separated based on consciousness (declarative and non-declarative memory), while the NP framework emphasizes different forms of memory as reflective of different brain processing modes (rapid encoding of flexible associations, slow encoding of rigid associations, and rapid encoding of single or unitized items). We describe how memory defined by these frameworks can guide our attention, even when they do not directly relate to perceptual salience or the goals concerning the current task. We close by briefly discussing theoretical implications as well as some interesting avenues for future research.

The role of language in the experience and perception of emotion: a neuroimaging meta-analysis

Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies demonstrate that labeling one's emotional experiences and perceptions alters those states. Here, we used a comprehensive meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature to systematically explore whether the presence of emotion words in experimental tasks has an impact on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions across studies. Using a database of 386 studies, we assessed brain activity when emotion words (e.g. 'anger', 'disgust') and more general affect words (e.g. 'pleasant', 'unpleasant') were present in experimental tasks vs not present. As predicted, when emotion words were present, we observed more frequent activations in regions related to semantic processing. When emotion words were not present, we observed more frequent activations in the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus, bilaterally. The presence of affect words did not have the same effect on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions, suggesting that our observed effects are specific to emotion words. These findings are consistent with the psychological constructionist prediction that in the absence of accessible emotion concepts, the meaning of affective experiences and perceptions are ambiguous. Findings are also consistent with the regulatory role of 'affect labeling'. Implications of the role of language in emotion construction and regulation are discussed.

Unitary and dual models of phenomenal consciousness

There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal quality is formed from the process that makes this quality conscious. We put forward a conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological and neural argument for the dual model. These arguments are independent but provide mutual support to each other. Together, they strongly support the dual model of phenomenal consciousness and the concomitant idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is thus, we submit, a hypothesis worthy of further probing and development.

Why and How. The Future of the Central Questions of Consciousness

In this review, we deal with two central questions of consciousness how and why, and we outline their possible future development. The question how refers to the empirical endeavor to reveal the neural correlates and mechanisms that form consciousness. On the other hand, the question why generally refers to the “hard problem” of consciousness, which claims that empirical science will always fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why is there conscious experience at all. Unfortunately, the hard problem of consciousness will probably never completely disappear because it will always have its most committed supporters. However, there is a good chance that its weight and importance will be highly reduced by empirically tackling consciousness in the near future. We expect that future empirical endeavor of consciousness will be based on a unifying brain theory and will answer the question as to what is the function of conscious experience, which will in turn replace the implications of the hard problem. The candidate of such a unifying brain theory is predictive coding, which will have to explain both perceptual consciousness and conscious mind-wandering in order to become the truly unifying theory of brain functioning.