The body social: an enactive approach to the self

Indigenous Epistemological Frameworks and Evidence-Informed Approaches to Consciousness and Body Representations in Osteopathic Care: A Call for Academic Engagement

Background/Objectives: Indigenous perspectives, which emphasize non-materialistic dimensions of healing, such as the interconnectedness of the body, mind, and spirit, align with one foundational principle of osteopathic care. Integrating these perspectives into person-centered care may enhance therapeutic effectiveness by accommodating diverse understandings of health and well-being. This perspective paper explores how various epistemological frameworks, including Indigenous non-materialistic approaches, can inform manual therapy techniques and therapeutic alliances to advance person-centered care. Methods: We synthesized the best available evidence with expert insights and interdisciplinary viewpoints to address the gaps in the scientific literature. Our approach integrates conceptual analysis and emerging research to provide a comprehensive discussion for a broad professional audience. Results: We focused on detailing the existing sociocultural and experiential frameworks available to describe patients' bodily perceptions rather than abstract intellectual constructs. Our findings were divided into two sections. The first examines the incorporation of diverse body representations that extend beyond purely biomechanical interpretations, emphasizing the role of non-materialistic components in therapeutic processes. The second explores recent neuroscientific research on self and consciousness, demonstrating how these insights intersect with Indigenous perspectives to enrich the theoretical and practical applications of osteopathic principles in different clinical contexts. Conclusions: Epistemological flexibility has the potential to refine clinical frameworks and ensure that they reflect the full scope of osteopathic practices beyond musculoskeletal care. By integrating diverse sociocultural perspectives without reinforcing stereotypes or rigid cultural constructs, this approach clarifies the diversity of body representations in osteopathic practices, addresses gaps in academic discourse, and promotes the integration of multiple worldviews as a foundation for truly person-centered care.

Process and Dynamics in AI and Language Use

In this volumed, Randall Beer and Joanna Rączaszek-Leonardi have opened an important discussion of what is further needed to enhance the reach of dynamical approaches to cognition. Focusing on issues concerning the nature of language and developments in language technology, we have attempted, in this brief contribution, to place their proposals in a larger philosophical framework that suggests lines of inquiry that we believe will yield fruitful outcomes. In particular, we suggest that the adoption of a process metaphysics suggests that dynamic approaches appropriately conceived within the context of current scientific advances are at basis adequate as a framework; however, the more profound implications of its adoption have not yet been sufficiently explored.

Meditation-Induced Self-Boundary Flexibility and Prosociality: A MEG and Behavioral Measures Study

BACKGROUND

In the last decade, empirical studies on the beneficial effects of meditation on prosocial capacities have accumulated, but the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Buddhist sources state that liberating oneself from a fixed view of the self by gaining access to its transitory and malleable nature leads to increased compassion and other prosocial traits. These, however, have not yet been empirically tested.

METHODS

The current study aims at filling this gap by first examining whether 44 long term meditators differ from 53 controls in prosocial capacities on different levels of the socio-cognitive hierarchy, and second by examining whether these are associated with meditation-induced 'selfless' states, operationalized here as the sense of boundary (SB) flexibility. We capitalize on our previous work on the neurophenomenology of mindfulness-induced SB dissolution, which yielded a neural index of SB-flexibility, solely for the meditators, and examine its correlations with a battery of validated behavioral prosociality tasks.

RESULTS

Our findings reveal enhanced low-level prosocial processes in meditators, including enhanced emotion recognition and reduced outgroup bias. We show the stability of SB flexibility over a year, demonstrating consistent high beta deactivation. The neural index of SB flexibility negatively correlates with recognizing negative emotions, suggesting a link to reduced social threat perception.

CONCLUSIONS

These results connect the neural correlates of SB flexibility to prosociality, supported by stable high beta deactivations. We expect the results to raise awareness regarding the prosocial potential of flexing one's self-boundaries through meditation.

Enactive behaviour settings: situating agency, normativity and transformation

Behaviour settings are sociocultural places defined by three main ecological aspects: the affordances of material structures, typical patterns of skilful action and socially situated norms. These aspects explain the observed regularities of human behaviour associated with the material characteristics of places. However, the focus of ecological theories on how individual agents attune their actions to the pre-established order of behaviour settings neglects the agents' active role in sustaining or motivating transformations in this order. We therefore propose an alternative enactive approach to behaviour settings that accounts for the role of agents as active supporters and transformers of behaviour settings. Based on the enactive concepts of agency, normativity and dialectics, we argue that agents, as participants of behaviour settings, simultaneously respond to multiple normative dimensions (e.g. biological, sensorimotor and interactive). To sustain the order of behaviour settings, agents sometimes need to inhibit other normative responses of their bodies, which sometimes is detrimental to one or many aspects of their lives. Nonetheless, agents can collectively trigger the transformation of behaviour settings. This transformation can occur dialectically as tensions between two or more norms to which human bodies respond are resolved, even if new tensions arise and the process of changing behaviour setting continues. This article is part of the theme issue 'People, places, things and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century'.

Examination of self patterns: framing an alternative phenomenological interview for use in mental health research and clinical practice

Mental disorders are increasingly understood as involving complex alterations of self that emerge from dynamical interactions of constituent elements, including cognitive, bodily, affective, social, narrative, cultural and normative aspects and processes. An account of self that supports this view is the pattern theory of self (PTS). The PTS is a non-reductive account of the self, consistent with both embodied-enactive cognition and phenomenological psychopathology; it foregrounds the multi-dimensionality of subjects, stressing situated embodiment and intersubjective processes in the formation of the self-pattern. Indications in the literature already demonstrate the viability of the PTS for formulating an alternative methodology to better understand the lived experience of those suffering mental disorders and to guide mental health research more generally. This article develops a flexible methodological framework that front-loads the self-pattern into a minimally structured phenomenological interview. We call this framework 'Examination of Self Patterns' (ESP). The ESP is unconstrained by internalist or externalist assumptions about mind and is flexibly guided by person-specific interpretations rather than pre-determined diagnostic categories. We suggest this approach is advantageous for tackling the inherent complexity of mental health, the clinical protocols and the requirements of research.

The state-trait sense of self inventory: A psychometric study of self-experience and its relation to psychosis-like manifestations

The sense of self is a fundamental construct in the study of the mind, yet its psychological nature remains elusive. We introduce a novel 25-item inventory to investigate selfhood both as an enduring trait and a temporary state. We hypothesized two foundational aspects of the self: identity (related to self-referencing and continuity over time) and agency (the perception of controlling own's actions and thoughts). Results from two population studies highlight a singular self-trait factor combining agency and identity. In contrast, self-state measures revealed a bifactorial structure with a high-order factor and three lower-order subfactors: state-identity, state-agency, and state-technology. These factors were predictive of psychosis-like experiences, schizotypal traits, and hopelessness. Mediation analysis demonstrated that the negative association between the sense of self and hopelessness is mediated by depressive manifestations. Our research provides a tool to shed new light on the complexity of the sense of self and its mental health implications.

Meaning-making and creativity in musical entrainment

In this paper we suggest that basic forms of musical entrainment may be considered as intrinsically creative, enabling further creative behaviors which may flourish at different levels and timescales. Rooted in an agent's capacity to form meaningful couplings with their sonic, social, and cultural environment, musical entrainment favors processes of adaptation and exploration, where innovative and functional aspects are cultivated via active, bodily experience. We explore these insights through a theoretical lens that integrates findings from enactive cognitive science and creative cognition research. We center our examination on the realms of groove experience and the communicative and emotional dimensions of music, aiming to present a novel preliminary perspective on musical entrainment, rooted in the fundamental concepts of meaning-making and creativity. To do so, we draw from a suite of approaches that place particular emphasis on the role of situated experience and review a range of recent empirical work on entrainment (in musical and non-musical settings), emphasizing the latter's biological and cognitive foundations. We conclude that musical entrainment may be regarded as a building block for different musical creativities that shape one's musical development, offering a concrete example for how this theory could be empirically tested in the future.

Seeing and inviting participation in autistic interactions

What does it take to see how autistic people participate in social interactions? And what does it take to support and invite more participation? Western medicine and cognitive science tend to think of autism mainly in terms of social and communicative deficits. But research shows that autistic people can interact with a skill and sophistication that are hard to see when starting from a deficit idea. Research also shows that not only autistic people, but also their non-autistic interaction partners, can have difficulties interacting with each other. To do justice to these findings, we need a different approach to autistic interactions-one that helps everyone see, invite, and support better participation. I introduce such an approach, based on the enactive theory of participatory sense-making and supported by insights from indigenous epistemologies. This approach helps counteract the homogenizing tendencies of the "global mental health" movement, which attempts to erase rather than recognize difference, and often precludes respectful engagements. Based in the lived experiences of people in their socio-cultural-material and interactive contexts, I put forward an engaged-even engaging-epistemology for understanding how we interact across difference. From this perspective, we see participatory sense-making at work across the scientific, diagnostic, therapeutic, and everyday interactions of autistic and non-autistic people, and how everyone can invite and support more of it.

Body social models of disability: Examining enactive and ecological approaches

Autistic philosopher and neurodiversity proponent Robert Chapman (2021) argues that disability may be best understood by utilizing an ecological functional model where the focus is on the intersection and overlaps between relational contributions to collectives and group functioning with individual functionality. This presents an alternative to both social-relational models of disability advocated by other neurodiversity proponents and the orthodox medical model of disability. While enactivists such as Michelle Maiese and Juan Toro, Julian Kiverstein and Erik Rietveld have also offered relational models of disability that challenge the orthodox medical model, I argue that unlike the ecological functional model, these enactivist models remain problematically committed to an individualist methodology. Drawing on what Miriam Kyselo has labeled the body social problem, I show that the enactivist models not only face theoretical issues, but also practical issues in terms of their recommended intervention strategies for disability. I argue that for these reasons, if enactivists want a relational model of disability, then they should adopt both a neurodiversity paradigm approach and Chapman’s ecological functional model.

Mindfulness in the focus of the neurosciences - The contribution of neuroimaging to the understanding of mindfulness

BACKGROUND

Mindfulness affects human levels of experience by facilitating the immediate and impartial perception of phenomena, including sensory stimulation, emotions, and thoughts. Mindfulness is now a focus of neuroimaging, since technical and methodological developments in magnetic resonance imaging have made it possible to observe subjects performing mindfulness tasks.

OBJECTIVE

We set out to describe the association between mental processes and characteristics of mindfulness, including their specific cerebral patterns, as shown in structural and functional neuroimaging studies.

METHODS

We searched the MEDLINE databank of references and abstracts on life sciences and biomedical topics via PubMed using the keywords: "mindfulness," "focused attention (FA)," "open monitoring (OM)," "mind wandering," "emotional regulation," "magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)" and "default mode network (DMN)." This review extracted phenomenological experiences across populations with varying degrees of mindfulness training and correlated these experiences with structural and functional neuroimaging patterns. Our goal was to describe how mindful behavior was processed by the constituents of the default mode network during specific tasks.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Depending on the research paradigm employed to explore mindfulness, investigations of function that used fMRI exhibited distinct activation patterns and functional connectivities. Basic to mindfulness is a long-term process of learning to use meditation techniques. Meditators progress from voluntary control of emotions and subjective preferences to emotional regulation and impartial awareness of phenomena. As their ability to monitor perception and behavior, a metacognitive skill, improves, mindfulness increases self-specifying thoughts governed by the experiential phenomenological self and reduces self-relational thoughts of the narrative self. The degree of mindfulness (ratio of self-specifying to self-relational thoughts) may affect other mental processes, e.g., awareness, working memory, mind wandering and belief formation. Mindfulness prevents habituation and the constant assumptions associated with mindlessness. Self-specifying thinking during mindfulness and self-relational thinking in the narrative self relies on the default mode network. The main constituents of this network are the dorsal and medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex. These midline structures are antagonistic to self-specifying and self-relational processes, since the predominant process determines their differential involvement. Functional and brain volume changes indicate brain plasticity, mediated by mental training over the long-term.

Depressive traits are associated with a reduced effect of choice on intentional binding

A sense of agency (SoA) over wilful actions is thought to be dependent on the level of choice and the nature of the outcome. In a preregistered study, we manipulated choice and valence of outcome to assess the relationship between SoA across the depression and psychosis continuum. Participants (N = 151) completed a Libet Clock task, in which they had either a free or forced choice to press one of two buttons and received either a rewarding or punishing outcome. Participants also completed questionnaires on depressive and psychosis-like traits. Rewarding outcomes increased intentional binding. The evidence favoured no effect of choice on average, but this was influenced by inter-individual differences. Individuals reporting more depressive traits had less of a difference in intentional binding between free and forced choice conditions. We show that implicit SoA is sensitive to outcome valence and the effect of choice differs across the depression continuum.

Enactive and simondonian reflections on mental disorders

As an alternative to linear and unidimensional perspectives focused mainly on either organic or psychological processes, the enactive approach to life and mind-a branch of 4-E (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) cognitive theories-offers an integrative framework to study mental disorders that encompasses and articulates organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective dimensions of embodiment. These three domains are deeply entangled in a non-trivial manner. A question remains on how this systemic and multi-dimensional approach may be applied to our understanding of mental disorders and symptomatic behavior. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of individuation (focusing particularly on the concepts of tension, metastability, and preindividual), we provide some enactive conceptual tools to better understand the dynamic, interactive, and multi-dimensional nature of human bodies in mental disorders and psychopathological symptoms. One of such tools cursiva is sense-making, a key notion that captures the relational process of generating meaning by interacting with the sociomaterial environment. The article analyzes five aspects related to sense-making: temporality, adaptivity, the multiplicity of normativities it involves, the fundamental role of tension, and its participatory character. On this basis, we draw certain implications for our understanding of mental disorders and diverse symptoms, and suggest their interpretation in terms of difficulties to transform tensions and perform individuation processes, which result in a reduction of the field of potentialities for self-individuation and sense-making.

Biology, Buddhism, and AI: Care as the Driver of Intelligence

Intelligence is a central feature of human beings' primary and interpersonal experience. Understanding how intelligence originated and scaled during evolution is a key challenge for modern biology. Some of the most important approaches to understanding intelligence are the ongoing efforts to build new intelligences in computer science (AI) and bioengineering. However, progress has been stymied by a lack of multidisciplinary consensus on what is central about intelligence regardless of the details of its material composition or origin (evolved vs. engineered). We show that Buddhist concepts offer a unique perspective and facilitate a consilience of biology, cognitive science, and computer science toward understanding intelligence in truly diverse embodiments. In coming decades, chimeric and bioengineering technologies will produce a wide variety of novel beings that look nothing like familiar natural life forms; how shall we gauge their moral responsibility and our own moral obligations toward them, without the familiar touchstones of standard evolved forms as comparison? Such decisions cannot be based on what the agent is made of or how much design vs. natural evolution was involved in their origin. We propose that the scope of our potential relationship with, and so also our moral duty toward, any being can be considered in the light of Care-a robust, practical, and dynamic lynchpin that formalizes the concepts of goal-directedness, stress, and the scaling of intelligence; it provides a rubric that, unlike other current concepts, is likely to not only survive but thrive in the coming advances of AI and bioengineering. We review relevant concepts in basal cognition and Buddhist thought, focusing on the size of an agent's goal space (its cognitive light cone) as an invariant that tightly links intelligence and compassion. Implications range across interpersonal psychology, regenerative medicine, and machine learning. The Bodhisattva's vow ("for the sake of all sentient life, I shall achieve awakening") is a practical design principle for advancing intelligence in our novel creations and in ourselves.

Person-Centered Psychiatry as Dialogical Psychiatry: The Significance of the Therapeutic Stance

In this article, we present holistic and person-centered perspectives in psychiatry, with the aim of better understanding what a focus on personhood might really mean and what clinical implications it might have. We first introduce classical and philosophical concepts of personhood, in order to then outline person-centered approaches in psychiatry, which mainly focus on the person of the patient. We then argue that, for it to really be person-centered, psychiatry must necessarily also focus on the person of professionals. We thus explore the notion of stance, as the expression of the therapist's personhood. By unpacking the effects that a professional's stance can have on patients, we finally turn to a consideration of the interpersonal sphere. More specifically, we propose clinical considerations on a therapeutic stance that strives to support and to help the person of the patient unfold. Such a stance must - we argue - necessarily be a dialogical one. Drawing on these considerations, we thus claim that a truly person-centered approach in psychiatry must necessarily and automatically be interperson-centered and dialogical. In the concluding remarks, we finally discuss broader societal implications and outline future research perspectives.

Reopening Selves: Phenomenological Considerations on Psychiatric Spaces and the Therapeutic Stance

Classical and contemporary phenomenological approaches in psychiatry describe schizophrenia as a disorder of common sense and self-affection. Although taking into account intersubjectivity, this conceptualization still puts forward an individualistic view of the disorder, that is, the intersubjective deficit resides within the person. To overcome such individualism, in this article, we first propose that schizophrenic experience might be understood as arising from a dialectic relation between the self's loss of openness to the world and the world's loss of openness to the self. To show the relevance of social factors at the onset of schizophrenic experience, we propose a phenomenological analysis of trigger situations. In the second and main part of this article, we then focus on the implications of these phenomenological insights for the clinical practice: we argue that if schizophrenia is understood as a loss of openness between self and social world, psychiatric institutions should be transformed into spaces that enable a reopening of selves. We first describe enclosing phenomena such as coercive treatment to then, in contrast, present particular forms of open psychiatric spaces such as open door approaches and open dialogue. Besides the institutional-structural level, we also highlight aspects of openness at the intersubjective level of the individual agents, thus particularly emphasizing the role of an open therapeutic stance. We thus speak of (re)opening selves as we believe that the reopening of the patients' self cannot but be related to and fostered by a reopening of the professionals' self and stance. We thus argue that openness in the therapeutic stance is key to initiating the further process of recovery, which we describe as a reattunement of selves both at the bodily and narrative level. Last but not least, we sketch out possibilities for future phenomenological research on the question of psychiatric space and draw some broader societal implications.

Integration and Causality in Enactive Approaches to Psychiatry

In this paper I address what has been called the integration problem in psychiatry. This problem is tied to conceptions of causality and explanatory levels in our understanding of mind. I take an interdisciplinary enactive perspective to develop a 3-fold method for exploring the dynamics of integration, based on a concept of dynamical causation and a non-hierarchical (level-free) notion of gestalt. I also consider Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) as a test case.

[Re]moving Bodies - A Shared Diminished Reality Installation for Exploring Relational Movement

In this article we explore an epistemic approach we name dis/embodiment and introduce "Articulations," an interdisciplinary project bringing together Virtual Reality (VR) designers, cognitive scientists, dancers, anthropologists, and human-machine interaction specialists. According to Erin Manning, our sense of self and other emerges from processes of bodying and relational movement (becoming oneself by moving in relation with the world). The aim of the project is to exploit the potential of multi-person VR in order to explore the intersubjective dynamics of relational movement and bodying, and to do so with scientific, artistic and therapeutic purposes in mind. To achieve this bridge, we bring up a novel paradigm we name "Shared Diminished Reality". It consists in using minimalist representation to instantiate users' bodies in the virtual space. Instead of using humanoid avatars or full body skeletons, we reduce the representation of the moving bodies to three spheres whose trajectories reflect the tracking of the head and the two wrists. This "diminished"virtual rendition of the body-in-movement, we call dis/embodiment. It provides a simple but clear experience of one's own responsive movement in relation to the world and other bodies. It also allows for subtle manipulations of bodies' perceptual and cross-perceptual feedback and simplifies the tracking and the analysis of movements. After having introduced the epistemic framework, the basic architecture, and the empirical method informing the installation, we present and discuss, as a proof-of-concept, some data collected in a situated experiment at a science-art event. We investigate motion patterns observed in different experimental conditions (in which participants either could or could not see the representation of their own hands in the virtual space) and their relation with subjective reports collected. We conclude with reflection on further possibilities of our installation in exploring bodying and relational movement.

Self-Boundary Dissolution in Meditation: A Phenomenological Investigation

A fundamental aspect of the sense of self is its pre-reflective dimension specifying the self as a bounded and embodied knower and agent. Being a constant and tacit feature structuring consciousness, it eludes robust empirical exploration. Recently, deep meditative states involving global dissolution of the sense of self have been suggested as a promising path for advancing such an investigation. To that end, we conducted a comprehensive phenomenological inquiry into meditative self-boundary alteration. The induced states were systematically characterized by changes in six experiential features including the sense of location, agency, first-person perspective, attention, body sensations, and affective valence, as well as their interaction with meditative technique and overall degree of dissolution. Quantitative analyses of the relationships between these phenomenological categories highlighted a unitary dimension of boundary dissolution. Notably, passive meditative gestures of "letting go", which reduce attentional engagement and sense of agency, emerged as driving the depth of dissolution. These findings are aligned with an enactive approach to the pre-reflective sense of self, linking its generation to sensorimotor activity and attention-demanding processes. Moreover, they set the stage for future phenomenologically informed analyses of neurophysiological data and highlight the utility of combining phenomenology and intense contemplative training for a scientific characterization of processes giving rise to the basic sense of being a bounded self.

Algorithmic injustice: a relational ethics approach

It has become trivial to point out that algorithmic systems increasingly pervade the social sphere. Improved efficiency-the hallmark of these systems-drives their mass integration into day-to-day life. However, as a robust body of research in the area of algorithmic injustice shows, algorithmic systems, especially when used to sort and predict social outcomes, are not only inadequate but also perpetuate harm. In particular, a persistent and recurrent trend within the literature indicates that society's most vulnerable are disproportionally impacted. When algorithmic injustice and harm are brought to the fore, most of the solutions on offer (1) revolve around technical solutions and (2) do not center disproportionally impacted communities. This paper proposes a fundamental shift-from rational to relational-in thinking about personhood, data, justice, and everything in between, and places ethics as something that goes above and beyond technical solutions. Outlining the idea of ethics built on the foundations of relationality, this paper calls for a rethinking of justice and ethics as a set of broad, contingent, and fluid concepts and down-to-earth practices that are best viewed as a habit and not a mere methodology for data science. As such, this paper mainly offers critical examinations and reflection and not "solutions."

Mentalization and embodied selfhood in Borderline Personality Disorder

Aberrations of self-experience are considered a core feature of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). While prominent etiologic accounts of BPD, such as the mentalization based approach, appeal to the developmental constitution of self in early infant-caregiver environments, they often rely on a conception of self that is not explicitly articulated. Moreover, self-experience in BPD is often theorized at the level of narrative identity, thus minimizing the role of embodied experience. In this article, we present the hypothesis that disordered self and interpersonal functioning in BPD result, in part, from impairments in "embodied mentalization," that manifest foundationally as alterations in minimal embodied selfhood, i.e. the first-person experience of being an individuated embodied subject. This account of BPD, which engages early intersubjective experiences has the potential to integrate phenomenological, developmental, and symptomatic findings in BPD, and is consistent with contemporary theories of brain function.

An Algorithmic Metaphysics of Self-Patterns

The paper draws on an algorithmic criterion to demonstrate that the self (as initially described in Shaun Gallagher’s a pattern theory of self) is a composite, scattered, and patterned object. It also addresses the question of extendedness of the self-pattern. Based on the criteria drawn from algorithmic complexity, I argue that although the self-pattern possesses a genuinely extended aspect (and in this sense, the self-pattern is minimally extended) the self-pattern and its environment do not constitute a genuine composite object.

Dimensions of Musical Creativity

Current literature on creative cognition has developed rich conceptual landscapes dedicated to the analysis of both individual and collective forms of creativity. This work has favored the emergence of unifying theories on domain-general creative abilities in which the main experiential, behavioral, computational, and neural aspects involved in everyday creativity are examined and discussed. But while such accounts have gained important analytical leverage for describing the overall conditions and mechanisms through which creativity emerges and operates, they necessarily leave contextual forms of creativity less explored. Among the latter, musical practices have recently drawn the attention of scholars interested in its creative properties as well as in the creative potential of those who engage with them. In the present article, we compare previously posed theories of creativity in musical and non-musical domains to lay the basis of a conceptual framework that mitigates the tension between (i) individual and collective and (ii) domain-general and domain-specific perspectives on creativity. In doing so, we draw from a range of scholarship in music and enactive cognitive science, and propose that creative cognition may be best understood as a process of skillful organism-environment adaptation that one cultivates endlessly. With its focus on embodiment, plurality, and adaptiveness, our account points to a structured unity between living systems and their world, disclosing a variety of novel analytical resources for research and theory across different dimensions of (musical) creativity.

Convergently Emergent: Ecological and Enactive Approaches to the Texture of Agency

Enactive and ecological approaches to cognitive science both claim a “mutuality” between agents and their environments – that they have a complementary nature and should be addressed as a single whole system. Despite this apparent agreement, each offers criticisms of the other on precisely this point – enactivists claiming that ecological psychologists over-emphasize the environment, while the complementary criticism, of agent-centered constructivism, is leveled by ecological psychologists at enactivists. In this paper I suggest that underlying the confusion between the two approaches is the complexity of agency, which comes in different forms, at different scales or levels of analysis. Cognitive science has not theorized the relationship between these different forms in a sufficiently disciplined manner, and a task therefore remains of finding a way to map the complex territory of agency.

Being Perceived and Being "Seen": Interpersonal Affordances, Agency, and Selfhood

Are interpersonal affordances a distinct type of affordance, and if so, what is it that differentiates them from other kinds of affordances? In this paper, I show that a hard distinction between interpersonal affordances and other affordances is warranted and ethically important. The enactivist theory of participatory sense-making demonstrates that there is a difference in coupling between agent-environment and agent-agent interactions, and these differences in coupling provide a basis for distinguishing between the perception of environmental and interpersonal affordances. Building further on this foundation for understanding interpersonal affordances, I argue that in line with some enactivist work on social cognition, interpersonal affordances ought to be considered as those that are afforded by agents and are recognized as such. Given this distinction, I also make the point that because our social conventions establish persons as more than mere agents, the direct perception of interpersonal affordances may also involve seeing others as embodied selves. Distinguishing between types of affordances thus also matters ethically: there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as an agent, and there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as a self.

A Radical Reassessment of the Body in Social Cognition

The main issue addressed in this paper is to provide a reassessment of the role and relevance of the body in social cognition from a radical embodied cognitive science perspective. Initially, I provide a historical introduction of the traditional account of the body in cognitive science, which I here call the cognitivist view. I then present several lines of criticism raised against the cognitivist view advanced by more embodied, enacted and situated approaches in cognitive science, and related disciplines. Next, I analyze several approaches under the umbrella of embodied social cognition. My line of argument is that some of these approaches, although pointing toward the right direction of conceiving that the social mind is not merely contained inside the head, still fail to fully acknowledge the radically embodied social mind. I argue that the failure of these accounts of embodied social cognition could be associated with so-called 'simple embodiment.' The third part of this paper focuses on elaborating an alternative characterization of the radically embodied social mind that also tries to reduce the remaining problems with 'simple embodiment.' I draw upon two turns in radically embodied cognitive science, the enactive turn, and the intersubjective turn. On the one hand, there is the risk of focusing too much on the individual level in social cognition that may result in new kinds of methodological individualism that partly neglect the social dimension. On the other hand, socially distributed and socially extended approaches that pay more attention to the dynamics within social interaction may encounter the risk of ignoring the individual during social interaction dynamics and simultaneously not emphasizing the role of embodiment. The approach taken is to consider several ways of describing and incorporating the (individual) social mind at the social level that includes language. I outline some ideas and motivations for how to study and expand the field of radical embodied social cognition in the future, as well as pose the ubiquitous hazard of falling back into a cognitivism view in several ways.

Coenhabiting Interpersonal Inter-Identities in Recurrent Social Interaction

We propose a view of identity beyond the individual in what we call interpersonal inter-identities (IIIs). Within this approach, IIIs comprise collections of entangled stabilities that emerge in recurrent social interaction and manifest for those who instantiate them as relatively invariant though ever-evolving patterns of being (or more accurately, becoming) together. Herein, we consider the processes responsible for the emergence of these IIIs from the perspective of an enactive cognitive science. Our proposal hinges primarily on the development of two related notions: enhabiting and coenhabiting. First, we introduce the notion of enhabiting, a set of processes at the individual level whereby structural interdependencies stabilize and thereafter undergird the habits, networks of habits, and personal identities through which we make sense of our experience. Articulating this position we lean on the notion of a tendency toward an optimal grip, though offering it a developmental framing, whereby iterative states of selective openness help realize relatively stable autonomous personal identities with their own norms of self-regulation. We then extend many of the notions found applicable here to an account of social coenhabiting, in particular, we introduce the notion of tending toward a co-optimal grip as central to the development of social habits, networks of habits, and ultimately IIIs. Such structures, we propose, also emerge as autonomous structures with their own norms of self-regulation. We wind down our account with some reflections on the implications of these structures outside of the interactions wherein they come into being and offer some thoughts about the complex animations of the individual embodied subjects that instantiate them.

Interpersonal synchrony feels good but impedes self-regulation of affect

The social benefits of interpersonal synchrony are widely recognized. Yet, little is known about its impact on the self. According to enactive cognitive science, the human self for its stability and regulation needs to balance social attunement with disengagement from others. Too much interpersonal synchrony is considered detrimental for a person’s ability to self-regulate. In this study, 66 adults took part in the Body-Conversation Task (BCT), a dyadic movement task promoting spontaneous social interaction. Using whole-body behavioural imaging, we investigated the simultaneous impact of interpersonal synchrony (between persons) and intrapersonal synchrony (within a person) on positive affect and self-regulation of affect. We hypothesized that interpersonal synchrony’s known tendency to increase positive affect would have a trade-off, decreasing a person’s ability to self-regulate affect. Interpersonal synchrony predicted an increase in positive affect. Consistent with our hypothesis, it simultaneously predicted a weakening in self-regulation of affect. Intrapersonal synchrony, however, tended to oppose these effects. Our findings challenge the widespread belief that harmony with others has only beneficial effects, pointing to the need to better understand the impact of interaction dynamics on the stability and regulation of the human self.

The 'Self' Aspects: the Sense of the Existence, Identification, and Location

The present article is limited to research studies focused on understanding the phenomenon and construction of the concept of 'Self.' When we look at one's experience of the Self, as a whole, it involves various components associated with different aspects like self-identification, self-location and the sense of the existence of oneself or the sense of Self. While exploring the Self phenomenon, many scientific studies consider only partial aspects of the experience, and hence any understanding resulting from such an evaluation makes it difficult to comment on the nature of the Self. We emphasize that while studying the Self, to understand it totally, one would need to include all the components of the Self. In this connection, we raise the following two theses: a) Ontologically, the Self is conceived as a sentient entity, the bearer of the "what it is like to be" type of feeling, and b) Phenomenologically, we do not have a direct apprehension of the Self, but experience various aspects of the Self through the Senses of Existence, Identification, and Location.

Dynamical Relations in the Self-Pattern

The notion of a self-pattern, as developed in the pattern theory of self (Gallagher, 2013), which holds that the self is best explained in terms of the kind of reality that pertains to a dynamical pattern, acknowledges the importance of neural dynamics, but also expands the account of self to extra-neural (embodied and enactive) dynamics. The pattern theory of self, however, has been criticized for failing to explicate the dynamical relations among elements of the self-pattern (e.g., Kyselo, 2014; Beni, 2016; de Haan et al., 2017); as such, it seems to be nothing more than a mere list of elements. We'll argue that the dynamics of a self-pattern are reflected in three significant and interrelated ways that allow for investigation. First, a self-pattern is reflectively reiterated in its narrative component. Second, studies of psychiatric or neurological disorders can help us understand the precise nature of the dynamical relations in a self-pattern, and how they can fail. Third, referencing predictive processing accounts, neuroscience can also help to explicate the dynamical relations that constitute the self-pattern.

Evolutionary Musicology Meets Embodied Cognition: Biocultural Coevolution and the Enactive Origins of Human Musicality

Despite evolutionary musicology's interdisciplinary nature, and the diverse methods it employs, the field has nevertheless tended to divide into two main positions. Some argue that music should be understood as a naturally selected adaptation, while others claim that music is a product of culture with little or no relevance for the survival of the species. We review these arguments, suggesting that while interesting and well-reasoned positions have been offered on both sides of the debate, the nature-or-culture (or adaptation vs. non-adaptation) assumptions that have traditionally driven the discussion have resulted in a problematic either/or dichotomy. We then consider an alternative "biocultural" proposal that appears to offer a way forward. As we discuss, this approach draws on a range of research in theoretical biology, archeology, neuroscience, embodied and ecological cognition, and dynamical systems theory (DST), positing a more integrated model that sees biological and cultural dimensions as aspects of the same evolving system. Following this, we outline the enactive approach to cognition, discussing the ways it aligns with the biocultural perspective. Put simply, the enactive approach posits a deep continuity between mind and life, where cognitive processes are explored in terms of how self-organizing living systems enact relationships with the environment that are relevant to their survival and well-being. It highlights the embodied and ecologically situated nature of living agents, as well as the active role they play in their own developmental processes. Importantly, the enactive approach sees cognitive and evolutionary processes as driven by a range of interacting factors, including the socio-cultural forms of activity that characterize the lives of more complex creatures such as ourselves. We offer some suggestions for how this approach might enhance and extend the biocultural model. To conclude we briefly consider the implications of this approach for practical areas such as music education.

The co-creation of meaningful action: bridging enaction and interactional sociology

What makes possible the co-creation of meaningful action? In this paper, we go in search of an answer to this question by combining insights from interactional sociology and enaction. Both research schools investigate social interactions as such, and conceptualize their organization in terms of autonomy. We ask what it could mean for an interaction to be autonomous, and discuss the structures and processes that contribute to and are maintained in the so-called interaction order. We also discuss the role played by individual vulnerability as well as the vulnerability of social interaction processes in the co-creation of meaningful action. Finally, we outline some implications of this interdisciplinary fraternization for the empirical study of social understanding, in particular in social neuroscience and psychology, pointing out the need for studies based on dynamic systems approaches on origins and references of coordination, and experimental designs to help understand human co-presence.

Exploring Music-Based Rehabilitation for Parkinsonism through Embodied Cognitive Science

Recent embodied approaches in cognitive sciences emphasize the constitutive roles of bodies and environment in driving cognitive processes. Cognition is thus seen as a distributed system based on the continuous interaction of bodies, brains, and environment. These categories, moreover, do not relate only causally, through a sequential input-output network of computations; rather, they are dynamically enfolded in each other, being mutually implemented by the concrete patterns of actions adopted by the cognitive system. However, while this claim has been widely discussed across various disciplines, its relevance and potential beneficial applications for music therapy remain largely unexplored. With this in mind, we provide here an overview of the embodied approaches to cognition, discussing their main tenets through the lenses of music therapy. In doing so, we question established methodological and theoretical paradigms and identify possible novel strategies for intervention. In particular, we refer to the music-based rehabilitative protocols adopted for Parkinson's disease patients. Indeed, in this context, it has recently been observed that music therapy not only affects movement-related skills but that it also contributes to stabilizing physiological functions and improving socio-affective behaviors. We argue that these phenomena involve previously unconsidered aspects of cognition and (motor) behavior, which are rooted in the action-perception cycle characterizing the whole living system.

Alliance: a common factor of psychotherapy modeled by structural theory

There is broad consensus that the therapeutic alliance constitutes a core common factor for all modalities of psychotherapy. Meta-analyses corroborated that alliance, as it emerges from therapeutic process, is a significant predictor of therapy outcome. Psychotherapy process is traditionally described and explored using two categorically different approaches, the experiential (first-person) perspective and the behavioral (third-person) perspective. We propose to add to this duality a third, structural approach. Dynamical systems theory and synergetics on the one hand and enactivist theory on the other together can provide this structural approach, which contributes in specific ways to a clarification of the alliance factor. Systems theory offers concepts and tools for the modeling of the individual self and, building on this, of alliance processes. In the enactive perspective, the self is conceived as a socially enacted autonomous system that strives to maintain identity by observing a two-fold goal: to exist as an individual self in its own right (distinction) while also being open to others (participation). Using this conceptualization, we formalized the therapeutic alliance as a phase space whose potential minima (attractors) can be shifted by the therapist to approximate therapy goals. This mathematical formalization is derived from probability theory and synergetics. We draw the conclusion that structural theory provides powerful tools for the modeling of how therapeutic change is staged by the formation, utilization, and dissolution of the therapeutic alliance. In addition, we point out novel testable hypotheses and future applications.

Towards multiple interactions of inner and outer sensations in corporeal awareness

Under normal circumstances, different inner- and outer-body sources are integrated to form coherent and accurate mental experiences of the state of the body, leading to the phenomenon of corporeal awareness. How these processes are affected by changes in inner and outer inputs to the body remains unclear. Here, we aim to present empirical evidence in which people with a massive sensory and motor disconnection may continue to experience feelings of general body state awareness without complete control of their inner and outer states. In these clinical populations, the activity of the neural structures subserving inner and outer body processing can be manipulated and tuned by means of body illusions that are usually based on multisensory stimulation. We suggest that a multisensory therapeutic approach could be adopted in the context of therapies for patients suffering from deafferentation and deefferentation. In this way, these individuals could regain a more complete feeling and control of the sensations they experience, which vary widely depending on their neurological condition.

Keep meaning in conversational coordination

Coordination is a widely employed term across recent quantitative and qualitative approaches to intersubjectivity, particularly approaches that give embodiment and enaction central explanatory roles. With a focus on linguistic and bodily coordination in conversational contexts, I review the operational meaning of coordination in recent empirical research and related theorizing of embodied intersubjectivity. This discussion articulates what must be involved in treating linguistic meaning as dynamic processes of coordination. The coordination approach presents languaging as a set of dynamic self-organizing processes and actions on multiple timescales and across multiple modalities that come about and work in certain domains (those jointly constructed in social, interactive, high-order sense-making). These processes go beyond meaning at the level that is available to first-person experience. I take one crucial consequence of this to be the ubiquitously moral nature of languaging with others. Languaging coordinates experience, among other levels of behavior and event. Ethical effort is called for by the automatic autonomy-influencing forces of languaging as coordination.