Is Schizophrenia a Disorder of Consciousness? Experimental and Phenomenological Support for Anomalous Unconscious Processing

Self and time in individuals with schizophrenia: A motor component?

Phenomenology suggests a disruption in the experience of time in individuals with schizophrenia, related to disorders of the sense of self. Patients themselves relate a fragmentation of their temporal experience and of their sense of self. Temporal expectations help relate the present moment to the future and we have previously shown that temporal expectations are fragile in patients, and relate to disorders of the self. Here, we investigate whether patients' performance is still impaired when the motor response to the expected event can be prepared in advance. In two different experiments participants (41 patients vs. 43 neurotypicals in total) responded to a visual target occurring at a variable interval (or "foreperiod") after an initial warning signal. Moreover, in Experiment 1 we measured the sense of self with the EASE scale. We observed the usual benefit of the passage of time: the longer the waiting period, the better the preparation, and the faster the responses. However, this effect also comprises sequential (surprise) effects, when a target occurs earlier than on the preceding trial. We evaluated the effect of the passage of time, by isolating trials that followed a trial with the same foreperiod. The benefit of long, versus short, foreperiods was still observed in controls but disappeared in patients. The results suggest that the benefit of the passage of time is diminished in patients and relates to self disorders, even when the task allows for motor preparation. The results suggest that a non-verbal impairment sub-tends disorders of the sense of self.

A QR Code for the Brain: A dynamical systems framework for computing neurophysiological biomarkers

Neural circuits are often considered the bridge connecting genetic causes and behavior. Whereas prenatal neural circuits are believed to be derived from a combination of genetic and intrinsic activity, postnatal circuits are largely influenced by exogenous activity and experience. A dynamical neuroelectric field maintained by neural activity is proposed as the fundamental information processing substrate of cognitive function. Time series measurements of the neuroelectric field can be collected by scalp sensors and used to mathematically quantify the essential dynamical features of the neuroelectric field by constructing a digital twin of the dynamical system phase space. The multiscale nonlinear values that result can be organized into tensor data structures, from which latent features can be extracted using tensor factorization. These latent features can be mapped to behavioral constructs to derive digital biomarkers. This computational framework provides a robust method for incorporating neurodynamical measures into neuropsychiatric biomarker discovery.

Modelling developments in consciousness within a multidimensional framework

A recent advancement in consciousness science has been the introduction of a multidimensional framework of consciousness. This framework has been applied to global states of consciousness, including psychedelic states and disorders of consciousness, and the consciousness of non-human animals. The multidimensional framework enables a finer parsing of both various states of consciousness and forms of animal consciousness, paving the way for new scientific investigations into consciousness. In this paper, the multidimensional model is expanded by constructing temporal profiles. This expansion allows for the modelling of changes in consciousness across the life cycles of organisms and the progression over time of disorders of consciousness. The result of this expansion is 2-fold: (i) it enables new modes of comparison, both across stages of development and across species; (ii) it proposes that more attention be given to the various types of fluctuations that occur in patients who are suffering from disorders of consciousness.

Self-Disorder in Schizophrenia: A Revised View (1. Comprehensive Review-Dualities of Self- and World-Experience)

A growing body of research supports the role of self-disorders as core phenotypic features of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Self-disorders comprise various alterations of conscious experience whose theoretical understanding continues to present a challenge. The following 2 articles aim to provide further clarification of the nature of self-disorders in schizophrenia by offering a comprehensive review (article 1) and theoretical revision (article 2) of the currently most influential model of altered selfhood in schizophrenia: the basic-self-disturbance or ipseity-disorder model (IDM). This article presents a state-of-the-art overview of the current self-disturbance model and critically assesses its descriptive adequacy with respect to the clinical variability and heterogeneity of the alterations in self- and world-awareness characteristic of schizophrenia. Special attention is paid to experiences of exaggerated basic self, increased "grip" or "hold" on the world, and paradoxical combinations. The next article proposes a theoretical revision of the self-disturbance model by considering how hyperreflexivity might form the crucial common thread or generating factor that unifies the phenomenologically heterogeneous, and sometimes even contradictory features of schizophrenic self-disorders. We outline the implications of our revised model for explanatory research, therapeutic practice, and our general understanding of the abnormalities in question.

Body and Time: Virtual Embodiment and its Effect on Time Perception

This article explores the effect of one's body representation on time perception. Time Perception is modulated by a variety of factors including, e.g., the current situation or activity, it can display significant disturbances caused by psychological disorders, and it is influenced by emotional and interoceptive states, i.e., "the sense of the physiological condition of the body". We investigated this relation between one's own body and the perception of time in a novel Virtual Reality (VR) experiment explicitly fostering user activity. Forty-Eight participants randomly experienced different degrees of embodiment: i) without an avatar (low), ii) with hands (medium), and iii) with a high-quality avatar (high). Participants had to repeatedly activate a virtual lamp and estimate the duration of time intervals as well as judge the passage of time. Our results show a significant effect of embodiment on time perception: time passes slower in the low embodiment condition compared to the medium and high conditions. In contrast to prior work, the study provides missing evidence that this effect is independent of the level of activity of participants: In our task, users were prompted to repeatedly perform body actions, thereby ruling-out a potential influence of the level of activity. Importantly, duration judgements in both the millisecond and minute ranges seemed unaffected by variations in embodiment. Taken together, these results lead to a better understanding of the relationship between the body and time.

Thinking about hallucinations: why philosophy matters

Introduction: Hallucinations research is increasingly incorporating philosophy or the work of philosophically trained individuals. We present three different ways in which this is successfully implemented to the enhancement of knowledge and understanding of hallucinations and related phenomena.Method: We review contributions from phenomenology, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of science and psychiatry.Results: We demonstrate that these areas of philosophy make significant contributions to hallucinations research. Phenomenology gives us a sophisticated and critical understanding of the lived experience of hallucinations. Philosophy of cognitive science enables big-picture theorising and synthesis of ideas, as well as a critical engagement with new paradigms. Philosophy of science and psychiatry raises valuable and theoretically informed questions about diagnosis and categorisation.Conclusions: These contributions reflect both the methodological variety within philosophy and its relevance to the hallucinations researcher.

Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness

Cerebral energy supply is insufficient to support continuous neuronal processing of the plethora of time-constant objects that we are aware of. As a result, the brain is forced to limit processing resources to (the most relevant) cases of change. The neuronally generated world is thus temporally discontinuous. This parallels the fact that, in all relevant microscopic fundamental equations of nature, temporal change plays a dominant role. When a scientist calculates a "solution" to such an equation, integration over time is an essential step. The present Hypothesis expresses that the step from neuronal activity to phenomenal content of consciousness is reflective of a (phenomenal) "solution:" the main source of the incomprehensibility of consciousness is proposed to result from the introduction of phenomenal time-constant entities. These are "filled-in" via integration, even though neuronal data only exists for changes to these entities. In this way, a temporally continuous picture of the world phenomenally appears. Qualia are "initial conditions," which are required for integration and cannot be deduced from present data. Phenomenal "identity" (vs. "high similarity") is related to qualia. Inattentive visual perception, which is only rarely investigated, offers insights into these relationships. Introspectively, unattended vision appears rich because percepts are cumulated over long time spans, whereas attentive perception relies purely on present neuronal signals. The present Hypothesis is that a brief neuronal activity can signify long-lasting and constant phenomenal content of consciousness. Experimental support is presented that comes from discrepancies between neuronal activity and perception: transient neuronal responses to sustained stimuli, "filling-in," change blindness, identity vs. close resemblance.

Prevalence and assessment of self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum: a systematic review and meta-analysis

Self-disorders have been proposed as the "clinical core" of the schizophrenia spectrum. This has been explored in recent studies using self-disorder assessment tools. However, there are few systematic discussions of their quality and utility. Therefore, a literature search was performed on Medline, Embase, PsychINFO, PubMed and the Web of Science. Studies using these assessment tools to explore self-disorders within schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSDs) were included. A meta-analysis was performed on the outcomes of total self-disorder score and odds ratios of self-disorders, using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis software. Weighted pooled effect sizes in Hedge's g were calculated using a random-effects model. 15 studies were included, giving a sample of 810 participants on the schizophrenia spectrum. Self-disorders showed a greater aggregation within schizophrenia spectrum groups compared to non-schizophrenia spectrum groups, as measured with the Bonn Scale for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms (Hedge's g = 0.774, p < 0.01) and Examination of Anomalous Self-Experiences (Hedge's g = 1.604, p < 0.01). Also, self-disorders had a greater likelihood of occurring within SSDs (odds ratio = 5.435, p < 0.01). These findings help to validate self-disorders as a core clinical feature of the broad schizophrenia spectrum.

The phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia and the challenge from pseudohallucinations

In trying to make sense of the extensive phenomenological variation of first-personal reports on auditory verbal hallucinations, the concept of pseudohallucination is originally introduced to designate any hallucinatory-like phenomena not exhibiting some of the paradigmatic features of "genuine" hallucinations. After its introduction, Karl Jaspers locates the notion of pseudohallucinations into the auditory domain, appealing to a distinction between hallucinatory voices heard within the subjective inner space (pseudohallucination) and voices heard in the outer external space (real hallucinations) with differences in their sensory richness. Jaspers' characterization of the term has been the target of a number of phenomenological, conceptual and empirically-based criticisms. From this latter point of view, it has been claimed that the concept cannot capture distinct phenomena at the neurobiological level. Over the last years, the notion of pseudohallucination seems to be falling into disuse as no major diagnostic system seems to refer to it. In this paper, we propose that even if the concept of pseudohallucination is not helpful to differentiate distinct phenomena at the neurobiological level, the inner/outer distinction highlighted by Jaspers' characterization of the term still remains an open explanatory challenge for dominant theories about the neurocognitive origin of auditory verbal hallucinations. We call this, "the challenge from pseudohallucinations". After exploring this issue in detail, we propose some phenomenological, conceptual, and empirical paths for future research that might help to build up a more contextualized and dynamic view of auditory verbal hallucinatory phenomena.

A Case for Thalamic Mechanisms of Schizophrenia: Perspective From Modeling 22q11.2 Deletion Syndrome

Schizophrenia is a severe, chronic psychiatric disorder that devastates the lives of millions of people worldwide. The disease is characterized by a constellation of symptoms, ranging from cognitive deficits, to social withdrawal, to hallucinations. Despite decades of research, our understanding of the neurobiology of the disease, specifically the neural circuits underlying schizophrenia symptoms, is still in the early stages. Consequently, the development of therapies continues to be stagnant, and overall prognosis is poor. The main obstacle to improving the treatment of schizophrenia is its multicausal, polygenic etiology, which is difficult to model. Clinical observations and the emergence of preclinical models of rare but well-defined genomic lesions that confer substantial risk of schizophrenia (e.g., 22q11.2 microdeletion) have highlighted the role of the thalamus in the disease. Here we review the literature on the molecular, cellular, and circuitry findings in schizophrenia and discuss the leading theories in the field, which point to abnormalities within the thalamus as potential pathogenic mechanisms of schizophrenia. We posit that synaptic dysfunction and oscillatory abnormalities in neural circuits involving projections from and within the thalamus, with a focus on the thalamocortical circuits, may underlie the psychotic (and possibly other) symptoms of schizophrenia.

Computational models of the "active self" and its disturbances in schizophrenia

The notion that self-disorders are at the root of the emergence of schizophrenia rather than a symptom of the disease, is getting more traction in the cognitive sciences. This is in line with philosophical approaches that consider an enactive self, constituted through action and interaction with the environment. We thereby analyze different definitions of the self and evaluate various computational theories lending to these ideas. Bayesian and predictive processing are promising approaches for computational modeling of the "active self". We evaluate their implementation and challenges in computational psychiatry and cognitive developmental robotics. We describe how and why embodied robotic systems provide a valuable tool in psychiatry to assess, validate, and simulate mechanisms of self-disorders. Specifically, mechanisms involving sensorimotor learning, prediction, and self-other distinction, can be assessed with artificial agents. This link can provide essential insights to the formation of the self and new avenues in the treatment of psychiatric disorders.

The Strasbourg Visual Scale: A Novel Method to Assess Visual Hallucinations

The experience of oneself in the world is based on sensory afferences, enabling us to reach a first-perspective perception of our environment and to differentiate oneself from the world. Visual hallucinations may arise from a difficulty in differentiating one's own mental imagery from externally-induced perceptions. To specify the relationship between hallucinations and the disorders of the self, we need to understand the mechanisms of hallucinations. However, visual hallucinations are often under reported in individuals with psychosis, who sometimes appear to experience difficulties describing them. We developed the "Strasbourg Visual Scale (SVS)," a novel computerized tool that allows us to explore and capture the subjective experience of visual hallucinations by circumventing the difficulties associated with verbal descriptions. This scale reconstructs the hallucinated image of the participants by presenting distinct physical properties of visual information, step-by-step to help them communicate their internal experience. The strategy that underlies the SVS is to present a sequence of images to the participants whose choice at each step provides a feedback toward re-creating the internal image held by them. The SVS displays simple images on a computer screen that provide choices for the participants. Each step focuses on one physical property of an image, and the successive choices made by the participants help them to progressively build an image close to his/her hallucination, similar to the tools commonly used to generate facial composites. The SVS was constructed based on our knowledge of the visual pathways leading to an integrated perception of our environment. We discuss the rationale for the successive steps of the scale, and to which extent it could complement existing scales.

The Sensory and Perceptual Scaffolding of Absorption, Inner Speech, and Self in Psychosis

This study examines the interconnectedness between absorption, inner speech, self, and psychopathology. Absorption involves an intense focus and immersion in mental imagery, sensory/perceptual stimuli, or vivid imagination that involves decreased self-awareness and alterations in consciousness. In psychosis, the dissolution and permeability in the demarcation between self and one's sensory experiences and perceptions, and also between self-other and/or inter-object boundaries alter one's sense of self. Thus, as the individual integrates these changes new "meaning making" or understanding evolves as part of an ongoing inner dialogue and dialogue with others. This study consisted of 117 participants: 81 participants with psychosis and 36 controls. We first conducted a bivariate correlation to elucidate the relationship between absorption and inner speech. We next conducted hierarchical multiple regressions to examine the effect of absorption and inner speech to predict psychopathology. Lastly, we conducted a network analysis and applied extended Bayesian Information Criterion to select the best model. We showed that in both the control and psychosis group dialogic and emotional/motivational types of inner speech were strongly associated with absorption subscales, apart from the aesthetic subscale in the control group which was not significant, while in psychosis, condensed inner speech was uniquely associated with increased imaginative involvement. In psychosis, we also demonstrated that altered consciousness, dialogic, and emotional/motivational inner speech all predicted positive symptoms. In terms of network associations, imaginative involvement was the most central, influential, and most highly predictive node in the model from which all other nodes related to inner speech and psychopathology are connected. This study shows a strong interrelatedness between absorption, inner speech and psychosis thus identifying potentially fertile ground for future research and directions, particularly in the exploration into the underlying construct of imaginative involvement in psychotic symptoms.

The neural correlates of the visual consciousness in schizophrenia: an fMRI study

In the current literature, two distinct and opposite models are suggested to explain the consciousness disorders in schizophrenia. The first one suggests that consciousness disorders rely on a low-level processing deficit, when the second model suggests that consciousness disorders rely on disruption in the ability to consciously access information, with preserved unconscious processing. The current study aims to understand the mechanisms associated with visual consciousness disorder in order to pave the road that will settle the debate regarding these hypotheses. During a functional magnetic resonance imaging session, 19 healthy participants (HC) and 15 patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) performed a visual detection task to compare the neural substrates associated with the conscious access to the visual inputs. The visual detection threshold was significantly higher in SCZ than in HC [t(32) = 3.37, p = 0.002]. Whole-brain ANOVA demonstrated that around the visual detection threshold patients with SCZ failed to activate a large network of brain areas compared to HC. (1) During conscious vision, HC engaged more the left cuneus and the right occipital cortex than patients with SCZ, (2) during unconscious vision, HC engaged a large network that patients with SCZ failed to activate, and finally, (3) during the access to consciousness process, patients with SCZ failed to activate the anterior cingulate cortex. These results suggest that the consciousness disorders in schizophrenia rely on specific dysfunctions depending on the consciousness stage. The disorders of the conscious vision are associated with dysfunction of occipital areas while the ones associated with unconscious vision rely on a large widespread network. Finally, the conscious access to the visual inputs is impaired by a dysfunction of the anterior cingulate cortex. The current study suggests that none of the two suggested models can explain consciousness disorders in schizophrenia. We suggest that there is an alternative model supporting that the conscious access to visual inputs is due to a disengagement of the supragenual anterior cingulate during the unconscious processing of the visual inputs associated with a sensory deficit.

Consciousness and the rabbit holes of delirium

Delirium is a common disorder in hospitalized older adults and the defining characteristic is a disturbance of consciousness. Unfortunately, there are currently no testable measures of consciousness as pertains to its disruption in delirium. Not surprisingly rates of recognition of delirium suffer. Arguably, a greater understanding of the quantum of consciousness may improve delirium diagnosis through better diagnostic tools. Candidate dimensions of consciousness derived from fields of psychology, psychiatry, and philosophy are discussed and relevance to delirium explored. Based upon existing literature in the field of consciousness we identify the pre-reflective state, experiential awareness, and functional networks as candidate sites that may be affected in delirium. Opportunities for clinical instrument development and how these tools can be tested are discussed. We conclude that consciousness content may not hold to a unitary measurement, but facets of its integrity that are impacted in delirium are open to further exploration. Disorders in pre-reflective status, experiential awareness, and functional networks may represent the measurable "rabbit holes" of consciousness disturbance.

Reintroducing Consciousness in Psychopathology: Review of the Literature and Conceptual Framework

Alterations in consciousness are among the most common transdiagnostic psychopathological symptoms. Therefore clinical practice would benefit from a clear conceptual framework that guides the recognition, comprehension, and treatment of consciousness disorders. However, contemporary psychopathology lacks such a framework. We describe how pathology of consciousness is currently being addressed in clinical psychology and psychiatry so far, and how the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) and International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition (ICD-10) refer to this subject. A brief review of the literature on consciousness is then given. After describing psychological perspectives on consciousness and discussing theoretical issues involved in exploring consciousness, we offer a practical clinical working definition of consciousness and we illustrate its connections with a variety of diagnoses. Making use of Jean-Paul Sartre’s distinctions among: states, functions, qualities, and structure, provide a conceptual framework to understand consciousness, to refine diagnostics and to guide the development of therapeutic possibilities in clinical practice.

Behind the opaque curtain: A 20-year longitudinal study of dissociative and first-rank symptoms in schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses, other psychoses and non-psychotic disorders

BACKGROUND

Depersonalization and derealization are currently considered diagnostically distinct from first-rank symptoms (FRS) seen in schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses. Nevertheless, the lived experiences of these symptoms can be very similar phenomenologically.

AIMS

To investigate the interrelationships between depersonalization, derealization and FRS in individuals with different types of psychotic and non-psychotic diagnoses.

METHODS

The Chicago Follow-up Study was a prospective longitudinal research program designed to study psychopathology and recovery in psychiatric disorders consisting of 555 participants, who were recruited at index hospitalization and studied over six follow-up timepoints at approximately 2, 4.5, 7.5, 10, 15, and 20 years later. The primary clinical indices were depersonalization, derealization and Schneiderian FRS that were measured at index hospitalization and at each subsequent follow-up.

RESULTS

62.8% of participants had at least four follow-ups. There were significant differences in the course and chronicity of depersonalization, derealization and first-rank symptoms across the three diagnostic groups. For the whole sample, derealization was significantly associated with FRS at 2-, 4.5- and 7.5-year follow-up timepoints whereas depersonalization was related to FRS from 10-year follow-up to 20-year follow-up. In participants with schizophrenia, overall depersonalization was more often associated with passivity phenomena whereas derealization was more often associated with overall delusions. There was also a significant effect of time on the associations between depersonalization, derealization and FRS across follow-ups.

CONCLUSIONS

Depersonalization and derealization should be viewed as transdiagnostic phenomena that are associated with FRS psychopathology along a continuum, although they are more closely associated with schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses.

Thinking, believing, and hallucinating self in schizophrenia

In this Personal View, we discuss the history and concept of self-disturbance in relation to the pathophysiology and subjective experience of schizophrenia in terms of three approaches: the perceptual anomalies approach of the early Heidelberg School of Psychiatry, the ipseity model, and the predictive coding framework. Despite the importance of these approaches, there has been a notable absence of efforts to compare them and consider how they might be integrated. This Personal View compares the three approaches and offers suggestions as to how they might work together, which represents a novel position. We view self-disturbances as transformations of self that form the inseparable background against which psychotic symptoms emerge. Integrating computational psychiatric approaches with those used by phenomenologists in the first two listed approaches, we argue that delusions and hallucinations are inferences produced under extraordinary conditions and are both statistically and experientially as real for patients as other mental events. Such inferences still approximate Bayes-optimality, given the personal, neurobiological, and environmental circumstances, and might be the only ones available to minimise prediction error. The added contribution we hope to make focuses on how the dialogue between neuroscience and phenomenology might improve clinical practice. We hope this Personal View will act as a timely primer and bridging point for the different approaches of computational psychiatry and phenomenological psychopathology for interested clinicians.

Novel method to measure temporal windows based on eye movements during viewing of the Necker cube

Bistable stimuli can give rise to two different interpretations between which our perception will alternate. Recent results showed a strong coupling between eye movements and reports of perceptual alternations with motion stimuli, which provides useful tools to objectively assess perceptual alternations. However, motion might entrain eye movements, and here we check with a static picture, the Necker cube, whether eye movements and perceptual reports (manual responses) reveal similar or different alternation rates, and similar or different sensitivity to attention manipulations. Using a cluster analysis, ocular temporal windows were defined based on the dynamics of ocular fixations during viewing of the Necker cube and compared to temporal windows extracted from manual responses. Ocular temporal windows were measured also with a control condition, where the physical stimulus presented to viewers alternated between two non-ambiguous versions of the Necker cube. Attention was manipulated by asking subjects to either report spontaneous alternations, focus on one percept, or switch as fast as possible between percepts. The validity of the ocular temporal windows was confirmed by the correspondence between ocular fixations when the physical stimulus changed and when the bistable Necker cube was presented. Ocular movements defined smaller time windows than time windows extracted from manual responses. The number of manual and ocular windows both increased between the spontaneous condition and the switch condition. However, only manual, and not ocular windows, increased in duration in the focus condition. Manual responses involve decisional mechanisms, and they may be decoupled from automatic oscillations between the two percepts, as suggested by the fact that both the number and duration of ocular windows remained stable between the spontaneous and focus conditions. In all, the recording of eye movements provides an objective measure of time windows, and reveals faster perceptual alternations with the Necker cube and less sensitivity to attention manipulations than manual responses.

Disorders of human consciousness in the Tri-partite synapses

Conscious Action Theory extends quantum theory to macroscopic phenomena and suggests physical correlates of consciousness occur at the intersection of external measurement signals and internally generated signals from memories that model the outside world. This physical theory predicts conscious phenomena happen at all scales and differ only by the size and complexity of material organizations involved. At the scale of the human "Brain" consciousness is predicted to happen where the processing loop of activity in the Glial network interfaces with the real world input-output processing loop of the Nuronal network. This happens at the Tripartite synapses creating an intersection plenum in biological systems that produces the experience of empty space and the objects it contains. Analysis of the transmitter-receptor strengths implementing the control and feedback between the Glial and Neuronal networks indicate imbalances can be directly related to schizophrenia, mania, epilepsy, and depression. This paper addresses three topics supporting the above mechanisms for normal consciousness functioning and its medical deviations. First we preset the architecture of a pan-psychic physical theory, which supports the hypothesis that tri-partite synapses are the location of human conscious experience. Second we discuss the inner workings of the Glial network to support long term memory and control functions corresponding to the inner feeling of the "I" self. Third, we consider the relation between psychiatric conditions and the balance states between the number of neuronal transmitters and astrocytic receptors.

"Seeing Rain": Integrating phenomenological and Bayesian predictive coding approaches to visual hallucinations and self-disturbances (Ichstörungen) in schizophrenia

We present a schizophrenia patient who reports "seeing rain" with attendant somatosensory features which separate him from his surroundings. Because visual/multimodal hallucinations are understudied in schizophrenia, we examine a case history to determine the role of these hallucinations in self-disturbances (Ichstörungen). Developed by the early Heidelberg School, self-disturbances comprise two components: 1. The self experiences its own automatic processing as alien to self in a split-off, "doubled-I." 2. In "I-paralysis," the disruption to automatic processing is now outside the self in omnipotent agents. Self-disturbances (as indicated by visual/multimodal hallucinations) involve impairment in the ability to predict moment-to-moment experiences in the ongoing perception-action cycle. The phenomenological approach to subjective experience of self-disturbances complements efforts to model psychosis using the computational framework of hierarchical predictive coding. We conclude that self-disturbances play an adaptive, compensatory role following the uncoupling of perception and action, and possibly, other low-level perceptual anomalies.

A reflection upon methods to explore timing in patients with schizophrenia

Phenomenologists have provided a detailed description of the disorders of the subjective experience associated with minimal-self disorders in patients with schizophrenia. Those patients report a range of distortions of their conscious experiences, including a sense of inner void, confusion between self and others, and, sometimes, a disruption of the sense of time. These reports have been interpreted as distortion of the first-person perspective and a lack of immersion in the world, associated with a breakdown of the temporal structure of consciousness, and especially a disruption of the sense of time continuity. Further, it has been proposed that these disruptions are based on a difficulty to retain past information and to predict future information, that is, the mechanisms that help to relate events with one another and to reach a sense of time continuity. Experimental psychology results seem to converge to similar conclusions, inasmuch as some results in patients with schizophrenia suggest a deficient ability to predict sequences of events at the millisecond level. Several studies have underlined this convergence. Here we reflect on the limits of both the phenomenological and experimental psychology approaches, and of the convergence of their hypotheses. We think that this reflection is necessary to avoid premature conclusions on the mechanisms underlying the impairments in patients, but also to enrich our understanding of schizophrenia.

Hallucinations Beyond Voices: A Conceptual Review of the Phenomenology of Altered Perception in Psychosis

Recent psychiatric research and treatment initiatives have tended to move away from traditional diagnostic categories and have focused instead on transdiagnostic phenomena, such as hallucinations. However, this emphasis on isolated experiences may artificially limit the definition of such phenomena and ignore the rich, complex, and dynamic changes occurring simultaneously in other domains of experience. This article reviews the literature on a range of experiential features associated with psychosis, with a focus on their relevance for hallucinations. Phenomenological research on changes in cognition, perception, selfhood and reality, temporality, interpersonal experience, and embodiment are discussed, along with their implications for traditional conceptualizations of hallucinations. We then discuss several phenomenological and neurocognitive theories, as well as the potential impact of trauma on these phenomena. Hallucinations are suggested to be an equifinal outcome of multiple genetic, neurocognitive, subjective, and social processes; by grouping them together under a single, operationalizable definition, meaningful differences in etiology and phenomenology may be ignored. It is suggested that future research efforts strive to incorporate a broader range of experiential alterations, potentially expanding on traditional definitions of hallucinations. Relevance for clinical practice, including emphasizing phenomenologically responsive techniques and developing targeted new therapies, is discussed.

Motor Synchronization in Patients With Schizophrenia: Preserved Time Representation With Abnormalities in Predictive Timing

Objective: Basic temporal dysfunctions have been described in patients with schizophrenia, which may impact their ability to connect and synchronize with the outer world. The present study was conducted with the aim to distinguish between interval timing and synchronization difficulties and more generally the spatial-temporal organization disturbances for voluntary actions. A new sensorimotor synchronization task was developed to test these abilities. Method: Twenty-four chronic schizophrenia patients matched with 27 controls performed a spatial-tapping task in which finger taps were to be produced in synchrony with a regular metronome to six visual targets presented around a virtual circle on a tactile screen. Isochronous (time intervals of 500 ms) and non-isochronous auditory sequences (alternated time intervals of 300/600 ms) were presented. The capacity to produce time intervals accurately versus the ability to synchronize own actions (tap) with external events (tone) were measured. Results: Patients with schizophrenia were able to produce the tapping patterns of both isochronous and non-isochronous auditory sequences as accurately as controls producing inter-response intervals close to the expected interval of 500 and 900 ms, respectively. However, the synchronization performances revealed significantly more positive asynchrony means (but similar variances) in the patient group than in the control group for both types of auditory sequences. Conclusion: The patterns of results suggest that patients with schizophrenia are able to perceive and produce both simple and complex sequences of time intervals but are impaired in the ability to synchronize their actions with external events. These findings suggest a specific deficit in predictive timing, which may be at the core of early symptoms previously described in schizophrenia.

Minimal Self and Timing Disorders in Schizophrenia: A Case Report

For years, phenomenological psychiatry has proposed that distortions of the temporal structure of consciousness contribute to the abnormal experiences described before schizophrenia emerges, and may relate to basic disturbances in consciousness of the self. However, considering that temporality refers mainly to an implicit aspect of our relationship with the world, disturbances in the temporal structure of consciousness remain difficult to access. Nonetheless, previous studies have shown a correlation between self disorders and the automatic ability to expect an event in time, suggesting timing is a key issue for the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Timing disorders may represent a target for cognitive remediation, but this requires that disorders can be demonstrated at an individual level. Since cognitive impairments in patients with schizophrenia are discrete, and there is no standardized timing exploration, we focused on timing impairments suggested to be related to self disorders. We present the case report of AF, a 22 year old man suffering from schizophrenia, with no antipsychotic intake. Although AF shows few positive and negative symptoms and has a normal neurocognitive assessment, he shows a high level of disturbance of Minimal Self Disorders (SDs) (assessed with the EASE scale). Moreover, AF has a rare ability to describe his self and time difficulties. An objective assessment of timing ability (variable foreperiod task) confirmed that AF had temporal impairments similar to those previously described in patients, i.e., a preserved ability to distinguish time intervals, but a difficulty to benefit from the passage of time to expect a visual stimulus. He presents additional difficulties in benefitting from temporal cues and adapting to changes in time delays. The impairments were ample enough to yield significant effects with analyses at the individual level. Although causal relationships between subjective and objective impairments cannot be established, the results show that exploring timing deficits at the individual level is possible in patients with schizophrenia. Besides, the results are consistent with hypotheses relating minimal self disorders (SDs) to timing difficulties. They suggest that both subjective and objective timing investigations should be developed further so that their use at an individual level can be generalized in clinical practice.