The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle

Stress sharing as cognitive glue for collective intelligences: A computational model of stress as a coordinator for morphogenesis

Individual cells have numerous competencies in physiological and metabolic spaces. However, multicellular collectives can reliably navigate anatomical morphospace towards much larger, reliable endpoints. Understanding the robustness and control properties of this process is critical for evolutionary developmental biology, bioengineering, and regenerative medicine. One mechanism that has been proposed for enabling individual cells to coordinate toward specific morphological outcomes is the sharing of stress (where stress is a physiological parameter that reflects the current amount of error in the context of a homeostatic loop). Here, we construct and analyze a multiscale agent-based model of morphogenesis in which we quantitatively examine the impact of stress sharing on the ability to reach target morphology. We found that stress sharing improves the morphogenetic efficiency of multicellular collectives; populations with stress sharing reached anatomical targets faster. Moreover, stress sharing influenced the future fate of distant cells in the multi-cellular collective, enhancing cells' movement and their radius of influence, consistent with the hypothesis that stress sharing works to increase cohesiveness of collectives. During development, anatomical goal states could not be inferred from observation of stress states, revealing the limitations of knowledge of goals by an extern observer outside the system itself. Taken together, our analyses support an important role for stress sharing in natural and engineered systems that seek robust large-scale behaviors to emerge from the activity of their competent components.

Defining Death: Toward a Biological and Ethical Synthesis

Much of the debate over the definition and criteria for determining our death has focused on disagreement over the correct biological account of death, i.e., what it means for any organism to die. In this paper, we argue that this exclusive focus on the biology of death is misguided, because it ignores ethical and social factors that bear on the acceptability of criteria for determining our death. We propose that attention shift from strictly biological considerations to ethical and social considerations that bear on the determination of what we call "civil death." We argue for acceptance of a neurological criterion for determining death on grounds that it is the most reasonable way to synthesize biological, ethical, and social considerations about our death..

Self-Improvising Memory: A Perspective on Memories as Agential, Dynamically Reinterpreting Cognitive Glue

Many studies on memory emphasize the material substrate and mechanisms by which data can be stored and reliably read out. Here, I focus on complementary aspects: the need for agents to dynamically reinterpret and modify memories to suit their ever-changing selves and environment. Using examples from developmental biology, evolution, and synthetic bioengineering, in addition to neuroscience, I propose that a perspective on memory as preserving salience, not fidelity, is applicable to many phenomena on scales from cells to societies. Continuous commitment to creative, adaptive confabulation, from the molecular to the behavioral levels, is the answer to the persistence paradox as it applies to individuals and whole lineages. I also speculate that a substrate-independent, processual view of life and mind suggests that memories, as patterns in the excitable medium of cognitive systems, could be seen as active agents in the sense-making process. I explore a view of life as a diverse set of embodied perspectives-nested agents who interpret each other's and their own past messages and actions as best as they can (polycomputation). This synthesis suggests unifying symmetries across scales and disciplines, which is of relevance to research programs in Diverse Intelligence and the engineering of novel embodied minds.

Arousal coherence, uncertainty, and well-being: an active inference account

Here we build on recent findings which show that greater alignment between our subjective experiences (how we feel) and physiological states (measurable changes in our body) plays a pivotal role in the overall psychological well-being. Specifically, we propose that the alignment or 'coherence' between affective arousal (e.g. how excited we 'feel') and autonomic arousal (e.g. heart rate or pupil dilation) may be key for maintaining up-to-date uncertainty representations in dynamic environments. Drawing on recent advances in interoceptive and affective inference, we also propose that arousal coherence reflects interoceptive integration, facilitates adaptive belief updating, and impacts our capacity to adapt to changes in uncertainty, with downstream consequences to well-being. We also highlight the role of meta-awareness of arousal, a third level of inference, which may permit conscious awareness, learning about, and intentional regulation of lower-order sources of arousal. Practices emphasizing meta-awareness of arousal (like meditation) may therefore elicit some of their known benefits via improved arousal coherence. We suggest that arousal coherence is also likely to be associated with markers of adaptive functioning (like emotional awareness and self-regulatory capacities) and discuss mind-body practices that may increase coherence.

Order and change in art: towards an active inference account of aesthetic experience

How to account for the power that art holds over us? Why do artworks touch us deeply, consoling, transforming or invigorating us in the process? In this paper, we argue that an answer to this question might emerge from a fecund framework in cognitive science known as predictive processing (a.k.a. active inference). We unpack how this approach connects sense-making and aesthetic experiences through the idea of an 'epistemic arc', consisting of three parts (curiosity, epistemic action and aha experiences), which we cast as aspects of active inference. We then show how epistemic arcs are built and sustained by artworks to provide us with those satisfying experiences that we tend to call 'aesthetic'. Next, we defuse two key objections to this approach; namely, that it places undue emphasis on the cognitive component of our aesthetic encounters-at the expense of affective aspects-and on closure and uncertainty minimization (order)-at the expense of openness and lingering uncertainty (change). We show that the approach offers crucial resources to account for the open-ended, free and playful behaviour inherent in aesthetic experiences. The upshot is a promising but deflationary approach, both philosophically informed and psychologically sound, that opens new empirical avenues for understanding our aesthetic encounters. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

The self and conscious experience

The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation-engendered by attentional activity-of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent's own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S.

Intensive whole-brain 7T MRI case study of volitional control of brain activity in deep absorptive meditation states

Jhanas are profound states of mind achieved through advanced meditation, offering valuable insights into the nature of consciousness and tools to enhance well-being. Yet, its neurophenomenology remains limited due to methodological difficulties and the rarity of advanced meditation practitioners. We conducted a highly exploratory study to investigate the neurophenomenology of jhanas in an intensively sampled adept meditator case study (4 hr 7T fMRI collected in 27 sessions) who performed jhana meditation and rated specific aspects of experience immediately thereafter. Linear mixed models and correlations were used to examine relations among brain activity and jhana phenomenology. We identified distinctive patterns of brain activity in specific cortical, subcortical, brainstem, and cerebellar regions associated with jhana. Furthermore, we observed correlations between brain activity and phenomenological qualities of attention, jhanic qualities, and narrative processing, highlighting the distinct nature of jhanas compared to non-meditative states. Our study presents the most rigorous evidence yet that jhana practice deconstructs consciousness, offering unique insights into consciousness and significant implications for mental health and well-being.

Explanatory power by vagueness. Challenges to the strong prior hypothesis on hallucinations exemplified by the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome

Predictive processing models are often ascribed a certain generality in conceptually unifying the relationships between perception, action, and cognition or the potential to posit a 'grand unified theory' of the mind. The limitations of this unification can be seen when these models are applied to specific cognitive phenomena or phenomenal consciousness. Our article discusses these shortcomings for predictive processing models of hallucinations by the example of the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. This case study shows that the current predictive processing account omits essential characteristics of stimulus-independent perception in general, which has critical phenomenological implications. We argue that the most popular predictive processing model of hallucinatory conditions - the strong prior hypothesis - fails to fully account for the characteristics of nonveridical perceptual experiences associated with Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. To fill this explanatory gap, we propose that the strong prior hypothesis needs to include reality monitoring to apply to more than just veridical percepts.

From Black Holes Entropy to Consciousness: The Dimensions of the Brain Connectome

It has been shown that the theory of relativity can be applied physically to the functioning brain, so that the brain connectome should be considered as a four-dimensional spacetime entity curved by brain activity, just as gravity curves the four-dimensional spacetime of the physical world. Following the most recent developments in modern theoretical physics (black hole entropy, holographic principle, AdS/CFT duality), we conjecture that consciousness can naturally emerge from this four-dimensional brain connectome when a fifth dimension is considered, in the same way that gravity emerges from a 'flat' four-dimensional quantum world, without gravitation, present at the boundaries of a five-dimensional spacetime. This vision makes it possible to envisage quantitative signatures of consciousness based on the entropy of the connectome and the curvature of spacetime estimated from data obtained by fMRI in the resting state (nodal activity and functional connectivity) and constrained by the anatomical connectivity derived from diffusion tensor imaging.

Playing Brains: The Ethical Challenges Posed by Silicon Sentience and Hybrid Intelligence in DishBrain

The convergence of human and artificial intelligence is currently receiving considerable scholarly attention. Much debate about the resulting Hybrid Minds focuses on the integration of artificial intelligence into the human brain through intelligent brain-computer interfaces as they enter clinical use. In this contribution we discuss a complementary development: the integration of a functional in vitro network of human neurons into an in silico computing environment.To do so, we draw on a recent experiment reporting the creation of silico-biological intelligence as a case study (Kagan et al., 2022b). In this experiment, multielectrode arrays were plated with stem cell-derived human neurons, creating a system which the authors call DishBrain. By embedding the system into a virtual game-world, neural clusters were able to receive electrical input signals from the game-world and to respond appropriately with output signals from pre-assigned motor regions. Using this design, the authors demonstrate how the DishBrain self-organises and successfully learns to play the computer game 'Pong', exhibiting 'sentient' and intelligent behaviour in its virtual environment.The creation of such hybrid, silico-biological intelligence raises numerous ethical challenges. Following the neuroscientific framework embraced by the authors themselves, we discuss the arising ethical challenges in the context of Karl Friston's Free Energy Principle, focusing on the risk of creating synthetic phenomenology. Following the DishBrain's creator's neuroscientific assumptions, we highlight how DishBrain's design may risk bringing about artificial suffering and argue for a congruently cautious approach to such synthetic biological intelligence.

Myth of objectivity and the origin of symbols

An age-old challenge in epistemology and moral philosophy is whether objectivity exists independent of subjective perspective. Alfred North Whitehead labeled it a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"; after all, knowledge is represented elusively in symbols. I employ the free energy principle (FEP) to argue that the belief in moral objectivity, although perhaps fallacious, amounts to an ancient and universal human myth that is essential for our symbolic capacity. To perceive any object in a world of non-diminishing (perhaps irreducible) uncertainty, according to the FEP, its constituent parts must display common probabilistic tendencies, known as statistical beliefs, prior to its interpretation, or active inference, as a stable entity. Behavioral bias, subjective emotions, and social norms scale the scope of identity by coalescing agents with otherwise disparate goals and aligning their perspectives into a coherent structure. I argue that by declaring belief in norms as objective, e.g., expressing that a particular theft or infidelity was generally wrong, our ancestors psychologically constructed a type of identity bound only by shared faith in a perspective that technically transcended individual subjectivity. Signaling explicit belief in what were previously non-symbolic norms, as seen in many non-human animals, simulates a top-down point of view of our social interactions and thereby constructs our cultural niche and symbolic capacity. I demonstrate that, largely by contrasting with overly reductive analytical models that assume individual rational pursuit of extrinsic rewards, shared belief in moral conceptions, i.e., what amounts to a religious faith, remains a motivational cornerstone of our language, economic and civic institutions, stories, and psychology. Finally, I hypothesize that our bias for familiar accents (shibboleth), plausibly represents the phylogenetic and ontogenetic contextual origins of our impulse to minimize social surprise by declaring belief in the myth of objectivity.

Relative fluency (unfelt vs felt) in active inference

For a growing number of researchers, it is now accepted that the brain is a predictive organ that predicts the content of the sensorium and crucially the precision of-or confidence in-its own predictions. In order to predict the precision of its predictions, the brain has to infer the reliability of its own beliefs. This means that our brains have to recognise the precision of their predictions or, at least, their accuracy. In this paper, we argue that fluency is product of this recognition process. In short, to recognise fluency is to infer that we have a precise 'grip' on the unfolding processes that generate our sensations. More specifically, we propose that it is changes in fluency - from unfelt to felt - that are both recognised and realised when updating predictions about precision. Unfelt fluency orients attention to unpredicted sensations, while felt fluency supervenes on-and contextualises-unfelt fluency; thereby rendering certain attentional processes, phenomenologically opaque. As such, fluency underwrites the precision we place in our predictions and therefore acts upon our perceptual inferences. Hence, the causes of conscious subjective inference have unconscious perceptual precursors.

Qualitative multi-centered study: Trustworthiness of the three-level model (3-LM) Part 1

The 3-Level Model (3-LM) is proposed as a guide or heuristic for observing and describing patient change. Used since 2011 in the context of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA), its trustworthiness as a model still needs to be studied. OBJECTIVES AND METHODS: This study aimed to assess the trustworthiness of the 3-LM by comparing the output of three groups of IPA-certified analysts (Europe, North America and South America). The comparison was made using process and outcome measures as analytical tools. This objective was divided into specific objectives presented in two articles. Each group belonged to a different geographical region of the IPA. They all worked on the same clinical case and their output was analysed using the same structured qualitative methodology. To analyse levels 1 and 3 of the model, the Consensual Qualitative Research (CQR) method was used. For level 2, the Operationalised Psychodynamic Diagnosis (OPD-2) was used. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: There was a predominance of convergence between each of the groups for each of the levels analysed, with some points of divergence. The implications of these results for the trustworthiness of the model, clinical practice, training and research in psychoanalysis are discussed.

Converging theories on dreaming: Between Freud, predictive processing, and psychedelic research

Dreams are still an enigma of human cognition, studied extensively in psychoanalysis and neuroscience. According to the Freudian dream theory and Solms' modifications of the unconscious derived from it, the fundamental task of meeting our emotional needs is guided by the principle of homeostasis. Our innate value system generates conscious feelings of pleasure and unpleasure, resulting in the behavior of approaching or withdrawing from the world of objects. Based on these experiences, a hierarchical generative model of predictions (priors) about the world is constantly created and modified, with the aim to optimize the meeting of our needs by reducing prediction error, as described in the predictive processing model of cognition. Growing evidence from neuroimaging supports this theory. The same hierarchical functioning of the brain is in place during sleep and dreaming, with some important modifications like a lack of sensual and motor perception and action. Another characteristic of dreaming is the predominance of primary process thinking, an associative, non-rational cognitive style, which can be found in similar altered states of consciousness like the effect of psychedelics. Mental events that do not successfully fulfill an emotional need will cause a prediction error, leading to conscious attention and adaptation of the priors that incorrectly predicted the event. However, this is not the case for repressed priors (RPs), which are defined by the inability to become reconsolidated or removed, despite ongoing error signal production. We hypothesize that Solms' RPs correspond with the conflictual complexes, as described by Moser in his dream formation theory. Thus, in dreams and dream-like states, these unconscious RPs might become accessible in symbolic and non-declarative forms that the subject is able to feel and make sense of. Finally, we present the similarities between dreaming and the psychedelic state. Insights from psychedelic research could be used to inform dream research and related therapeutic interventions, and vice versa. We propose further empirical research questions and methods and finally present our ongoing trial "Biological Functions of Dreaming" to test the hypothesis that dreaming predicts intact sleep architecture and memory consolidation, via a lesion model with stroke patients who lost the ability to dream.

Hyperactivity of the default mode network in schizophrenia and free energy: A dialogue between Freudian theory of psychosis and neuroscience

The economic conceptualization of Freudian metapsychology, based on an energetics model of the psyche's workings, offers remarkable commonalities with some recent discoveries in neuroscience, notably in the field of neuroenergetics. The pattern of cerebral activity at resting state and the identification of a default mode network (DMN), a network of areas whose activity is detectable at baseline conditions by neuroimaging techniques, offers a promising field of research in the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. In this article we study one significant clinical application of this interdisciplinary dialogue by looking at the role of the DMN in the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Anomalies in the functioning of the DMN have been observed in schizophrenia. Studies have evidenced the existence of hyperactivity in this network in schizophrenia patients, particularly among those for whom a positive symptomatology is dominant. These data are particularly interesting when considered from the perspective of the psychoanalytic understanding of the positive symptoms of psychosis, most notably the Freudian hypothesis of delusions as an "attempt at recovery." Combining the data from research in neuroimaging of schizophrenia patients with the Freudian hypothesis, we propose considering the hyperactivity of the DMN as a consequence of a process of massive reassociation of traces occurring in schizophrenia. This is a process that may constitute an attempt at minimizing the excess of free energy present in psychosis. Modern models of active inference and the free energy principle (FEP) may shed some light on these processes.

What Is Expressed in "Free-Association"? Theoretical Notes on the Erotic Poetics of freier Einfalle

Despite the historical importance of free-association to psychoanalysis, there are theoretical tensions within the discipline as to how we think about what is expressed in free association and why it might be important to listen and become aware of ourselves free associatively. This method has usually been conceived of as a mode of speaking with the purpose of listening in order to hear and to arrive at the formulations of interpretation and insight. Rather than solely having this epistemological purpose, it can also be considered as an ontological freeing of subtle energies leading to greater aliveness. Pivotal to this way of approaching psychoanalytic processes are the "helpful notions" of psychic energy and of repression, with the latter being understood not as an eviction of representational forms from the domain of consciousness, but rather as the deformation of representations into traces of psychic energy that remain actively disruptive within us. The author suggests that, through free-associative processes, the patient and the psychoanalyst can become aware of movements of psychic energy that cannot be formulated in the representationality of self-consciousness. This unorthodox reading of Freud's discoveries leads to an interesting "ontoethical" appreciation of psychoanalytic processes as somatically grounded and erotically poetic.

The hard problem of consciousness—A perspective from holistic philosophy

Based on a material view and reductionism, science has achieved great success. These cognitive paradigms treat the external as an objective existence and ignore internal consciousness. However, this cognitive paradigm, which we take for granted, has also led to some dilemmas related to consciousness in biology and physics. Together, these phenomena reveal the interaction and inseparable side of matter and consciousness (or body and mind) rather than the absolute opposition. However, a material view that describes matter and consciousness in opposition cannot explain the underlying principle, which causes a gap in interpretation. For example, consciousness is believed to be the key to influencing wave function collapse (reality), but there is a lack of a scientific model to study how this happens. In this study, we reveal that the theory of scientific cognition exhibits a paradigm shift in terms of perception. This tendency implies that reconciling the relationship between matter and consciousness requires an abstract theoretical model that is not based on physical forms. We propose that the holistic cognitive paradigm offers a potential solution to reconcile the dilemmas and can be scientifically proven. In contrast to the material view, the holistic cognitive paradigm is based on the objective contradictory nature of perception rather than the external physical characteristics. This cognitive paradigm relies on perception and experience (not observation) and summarizes all existence into two abstract contradictory perceptual states (Yin-Yang). Matter and consciousness can be seen as two different states of perception, unified in perception rather than in opposition. This abstract perspective offers a distinction from the material view, which is also the key to falsification, and the occurrence of an event is inseparable from the irrational state of the observer’s conscious perception. Alternatively, from the material view, the event is random and has nothing to do with perception. We hope that this study can provide some new enlightenment for the scientific coordination of the opposing relationship between matter and consciousness.

An economic model of the drives from Friston's free energy perspective

This paper is focused on the theory of drives, particularly on its economic model, which was an integral part of Freud's original formulation. Freud was aiming to make a link between the psychic energy of drives and the biophysical rules of nature. However, he was not able to develop this model into a comprehensive system linking the body and the mind. The further development of psychoanalytic theory, in various attempts to comprehend the theory of drives, can be described as taking different approaches. Some of them equate drives with bodily impulses, others abandon the economic model, a few stay with Freud's original model. I believe that the Friston notion of free energy and the hierarchical model of the brain allows us to develop this model and to integrate the economic model into some contemporary theories of drives. I argue against those theories equating drives with biological impulses. My arguments are supported by Freud's project itself but also by recent developments within neuro-psychoanalysis describing the process of mentalizing homeostasis, interoceptive signals and relations with caregivers. I argue for those theories which see the drives as psychic forces, which through developmental processes and cathexes acquire aims and objects, and become intertwined with impulses originating internally and externally, such as affect, interoceptive impulses, perception of the external world, and impulses from erotogenic zones in particular. Here, I present my analysis of the compatibility and consistency of free energy and the hierarchical model perspective, and two psychoanalytical traditions of thoughts: French psychoanalysis and the post-Kleinian school of British psychoanalysis. In particular, my analysis focuses on the contemporary Kleinian notion of unconscious phantasies, especially Bronstein's description of their semiotic aspects. Secondly, I look at Segal's view of drives as dialectic forces of adaptation vs. conservatism. Analyzing the French tradition, I focus on Green's perspective on the drives, Lacan's distinction between drives and desire, and Penot's description of the process of subjectivation. I conclude that free energy, as described by Friston, can be seen as a source of the drives' energy and the process of minimizing it is an equivalent of what Freud described as binding the free energy, in which psychic unbound energy acquires distinctive features and becomes bound.

Dual-Brain Psychology: A novel theory and treatment based on cerebral laterality and psychopathology

Dual-Brain Psychology is a theory and its clinical applications that come out of the author's clinical observations and from the Split-brain Studies. The theory posits, based on decades of rigorous, peer-reviewed experiments and clinical reports, that, in most patients, one brain's cerebral hemisphere (either left or right) when stimulated by simple lateral visual field stimulation, or unilateral transcranial photobiomodulation, reveals a dramatic change in personality such that stimulating one hemisphere evokes, as a trait, a personality that is more childlike and more presently affected by childhood maltreatments that are usually not presently appreciated but are the proximal cause of the patient's symptoms. The personality associated with the other hemisphere is much more mature, less affected by the traumas, and less symptomatic. The theory can be applied to in-depth psychotherapy in which the focus is on helping the troubled side to bear and process the traumas with the help of the therapist and the healthier personality. A person's symptoms can be evoked to aid the psychotherapy with hemispheric stimulation and the relationship between the dual personalities can be transformed from conflicted and sabotaging to cooperating toward overall health. Stimulating the positive hemisphere in most therapy patients rapidly relieves symptoms such as anxiety, depression, or substance cravings. Two randomized controlled trials used unilateral transcranial photobiomodulation to the positive hemisphere as a stand-alone treatment for opioid cravings and both revealed high effect sizes. The theory is supported by brain imaging and rTMS studies. It is the first psychological theory and application that comes out of and is supported by rigorous peer-reviewed experimentation.

Drive, instinct, reflex—Applications to treatment of anxiety, depressive and addictive disorders

The neuropsychoanalytic approach solves important aspects of how to use our understanding of the brain to treat patients. We describe the neurobiology underlying motivation for healthy behaviors and psychopathology. We have updated Freud’s original concepts of drive and instinct using neuropsychoanalysis in a way that conserves his insights while adding information that is of use in clinical treatment. Drive (Trieb) is a pressure to act on an internal stimulus. It has a motivational energic source, an aim, an object, and is terminated by the satisfaction of a surge of serotonin. An instinct (Instinkt) is an inherited pattern of behavior that varies little from species to species. Drives are created by internal/ventral brain factors. Instincts require input from the outside that arrive through dorsal brain structures. In our model unpleasure is the experience of unsatisfied drives while pleasure if fueled by a propitious human environment. Motivational concepts can be used guide clinical work. Sometimes what had previously described psychoanalytically as, “Internal conflict,” can be characterized neurobiologically as conflicts between different motivational systems. These motivational systems inform treatment of anxiety and depression, addiction in general and specific problems of opioid use disorder. Our description of motivation in addictive illness shows that the term, “reward system,” is incorrect, eliminating a source of stigmatizing addiction by suggesting that it is hedonistic. Understanding that motivational systems that have both psychological and brain correlates can be a basis for treating various disorders. Over many papers the authors have described the biology of drives, instincts, unpleasure and pleasure. We will start with a summary of our work, then show its clinical application.

On the origins and evolution of qualia: An experience-space perspective

This paper elaborates on a proposal for mapping a configuration space for selector circuits (SCs), defined as the subset of neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) responsible for evoking particular qualia, to its experiential counterpart, experience-space (E-space), as part of an investigation into the nature of conscious experience as it first emerged in evolution. The dimensionality of E-space, meaning the degrees of freedom required to specify the properties of related sets of qualia, is at least two, but the utility of E-space as a hypothetical construct is much enhanced by assuming it is a large dimensional space, with at least several times as many dimensions as there are categories of qualia to occupy them. Phenomenal consciousness can then be represented as having originated as one or more multidimensional ur-experiences that combined multiple forms of experience together. Taking this as a starting point, questions concerning evolutionary sequence can be addressed, including how the quale best suited to a given sensory modality would have been extracted by evolution from a larger set of possibilities, a process referred to here as dimensional sorting, and how phenomenal consciousness would have been experienced in its earliest manifestations. There is a further question as to whether the E-space formulation is meaningful in analytical terms or simply a descriptive device in graphical form, but in either case it provides a more systematic way of thinking about early stages in the evolution of consciousness than relying on narrative and conjecture alone.

Psychoanalytic psychotherapies and the free energy principle

In this paper I propose a model of the fundamental components of psychoanalytic psychotherapies that I try to explicate with contemporary theories of the Bayesian brain and the Free Energy Principle (FEP). I first show that psychoanalytic therapies require a setting (made up of several envelopes), a particular psychic state and specific processes (transference, free association, dreaming, play, reflexivity and narrativity) in order to induce psychic transformations. I then analyze how these processes of transformations operate and how they can be enlightened by the FEP. I first underline the fact that psychoanalytic therapies imply non-linear processes taking time to unfold and require a setting containing high entropy processes. More precisely, these processes are characterized by an interplay between extension and reduction of free energy. This interplay also favors the emergence of new orders of subjective experience, which occur following states of disorder, according to a certain energetic threshold allowing the modification and improvement of mental functioning. These high entropy states are also characterized by random functioning and psychic malleability which favors the exploration of subjective experience in an original manner. Overall, the approach proposed in this paper support the dialogue between psychoanalysis and other fields of research while underlining how psychoanalytical theoretical and conceptual constructs can also be useful to other disciplines, in particular the neurosciences of subjectivity.

The why of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness: Its main functions and the mechanisms underpinning it

What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent’s own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define “the self” (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, and is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems; it maps the agent’s body and cognitive capacities, and its interactions with the environment. The detection of the state of S by attention modulates the energy level of the organ of attention (OA), i.e., the neural substrate that underpins attention. This modulation generates the PAC. The PAC can be qualified according to five dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal and spatial. Each dimension can be traced back to a specific feature of the modulation of the energy level of the OA.

A voice without a mouth no more: The neurobiology of language and consciousness

Most research on the neurobiology of language ignores consciousness and vice versa. Here, language, with an emphasis on inner speech, is hypothesised to generate and sustain self-awareness, i.e., higher-order consciousness. Converging evidence supporting this hypothesis is reviewed. To account for these findings, a 'HOLISTIC' model of neurobiology of language, inner speech, and consciousness is proposed. It involves a 'core' set of inner speech production regions that initiate the experience of feeling and hearing words. These take on affective qualities, deriving from activation of associated sensory, motor, and emotional representations, involving a largely unconscious dynamic 'periphery', distributed throughout the whole brain. Responding to those words forms the basis for sustained network activity, involving 'default mode' activation and prefrontal and thalamic/brainstem selection of contextually relevant responses. Evidence for the model is reviewed, supporting neuroimaging meta-analyses conducted, and comparisons with other theories of consciousness made. The HOLISTIC model constitutes a more parsimonious and complete account of the 'neural correlates of consciousness' that has implications for a mechanistic account of mental health and wellbeing.

Theories of consciousness

Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.

Consciousness as the Temporal Propagation of Information

Our ability to understand the mind and its relation to the body is highly dependent on the way we define consciousness and the lens through which we study it. We argue that looking at conscious experience from an information-theory perspective can help obtain a unified and parsimonious account of the mind. Today's dominant models consider consciousness to be a specialized function of the brain characterized by a discrete neural event. Against this background, we consider subjective experience through information theory, presenting consciousness as the propagation of information from the past to the future. We examine through this perspective major characteristics of consciousness. We demonstrate that without any additional assumptions, temporal continuity in perception can explain the emergence of volition, subjectivity, higher order thoughts, and body boundaries. Finally, we discuss the broader implications for the mind-body question and the appeal of embodied cognition.

Methodological aspects of studying the mechanisms of consciousness

There are at least two approaches to the definition of consciousness. In the first case, certain aspects of consciousness, called qualia, are considered inaccessible for research from a third person and can only be described through subjective experience. This approach is inextricably linked with the so-called "hard problem of consciousness", that is, the question of why consciousness has qualia or how any physical changes in the environment can generate subjective experience. With this approach, some aspects of consciousness, by definition, cannot be explained on the basis of external observations and, therefore, are outside the scope of scientific research. In the second case, a priori constraints do not constrain the field of scientific investigation, and the best explanation of the experience in the first person is included as a possible subject of empirical research. Historically, in the study of cause-and-effect relationships in biology, it was customary to distinguish between proximate causation and ultimate causation existing in biological systems. Immediate causes are based on the immediate influencing factors [1]. Proximate causation has evolutionary explanations. When studying biological systems themselves, such an approach is undoubtedly justified, but it often seems insufficient when studying the interaction of consciousness and the brain [2,3]. Current scientific communities proceed from the assumption that the physical substrate for the generation of consciousness is a neural network that unites various types of neurons located in various brain structures. Many neuroscientists attach a key role in this process to the cortical and thalamocortical neural networks. This question is directly related to experimental and clinical research in the field of disorder of consciousness. Progress in this area of medicine depends on advances in neuroscience in this area and is also a powerful source of empirical information. In this area of consciousness research, a large amount of experimental data has been accumulated, and in this review an attempt was made to generalize and systematize.

Affective Neuroscience Contributions to the Treatment of Addiction: The Role of Social Instincts, Pleasure and SEEKING

Addiction is an illness prevalent in the worldwide population that entails multiple health risks. Because of the nature of addictive disorders, users of drugs seldom look for treatment and when they do, availability can be difficult to access. Permanence in treatment and its outcomes vary from case to case. Most models work from a multidisciplinary approach that tackles several dimensions of addictive disorders. However, the different etiological factors claim for a personalized treatment to enhance opportunities for better results. Problems in relationships with others play an important role in the etiology and the recovery process of addiction. This paper focuses on the social-environmental causes of addiction based on an affective neuroscience approach that attempts to integrate the interplay between social instincts, pleasure, and the SEEKING system in addiction. To advance toward better treatment strategies, it is pertinent to understand the limitations of the current multidisciplinary models. Acknowledging the social nature of the human brain may help to identify the quality of different types of traumatic early life experiences in drug users and how to address them in what may become a neuropsychoanalytic treatment of addiction.

Novel Treatment Approaches for Substance Use Disorders: Therapeutic Use of Psychedelics and the Role of Psychotherapy

Purpose of Review

The use of psychedelics in a therapeutical setting has been reported for the treatment of various diagnoses in recent years. However, as psychedelic substances are still commonly known for their (illicit) recreational use, it may seem counterintuitive to use psychedelic therapy to treat substance use disorders. This review aims to discuss how psychedelics can promote and intensify psychotherapeutic key processes, in different approaches like psychodynamic and cognitive behavioral therapy, with a spotlight on the treatment of substance use disorders (SUD).

Recent Findings

There is promising evidence of feasibility, safety, and efficacy of psychedelic therapy in SUD. In the whole process of former and current psychedelic therapy regimes that have shown to be safe and efficacious, various psychotherapeutic elements, both psychodynamic and behavioral as well as other approaches, can be identified, while a substantial part of the assumed mechanism of action, the individual psychedelic experience, cannot be distinctly classified to just one approach.

Summary

Psychedelic therapy consists of a complex interaction of pharmacological and psychological processes. When administered in well-defined conditions, psychedelics can serve as augmentation of different psychotherapy interventions in the treatment of SUD and other mental disorders, regardless of their theoretical origin.

The Fourier-Laplace Transform-A Conjugate Link Between the Material Brain and the Conscious Mind

Recent attempts to establish the quantum boundaries of life is pursued. A pre-existing view of quantum biology is supplemented by the formulation of modern advances in theoretical chemical physics and quantum chemistry. The extension to open system dynamics entails a self-referential amplification supporting the signature of life as well as consciousness via long-range correlative information, ODLCI. The associated negentropic coherence permeates hierarchical and functional organization at multiple levels. In this communication we will derive and review one of the most important mathematical tools, i.e., the combined use of the Fourier- and the Laplace transform. It is shown that an underlying operator algebra facilitates the formulation of the conjugate relationship between energy-time and momentum-space. Implications from augmented general dilation analytic operator families provide novel information-based representations and yield, inter alia, a thermo-qubit syntax for communication, which are required to support the quantum Darwinian view of life.

Bayesian theories of consciousness: a review in search for a minimal unifying model

The goal of the paper is to review existing work on consciousness within the frameworks of Predictive Processing, Active Inference, and Free Energy Principle. The emphasis is put on the role played by the precision and complexity of the internal generative model. In the light of those proposals, these two properties appear to be the minimal necessary components for the emergence of conscious experience-a Minimal Unifying Model of consciousness.

Multiple Routes to Animal Consciousness: Constrained Multiple Realizability Rather Than Modest Identity Theory

The multiple realizability thesis (MRT) is an important philosophical and psychological concept. It says any mental state can be constructed by multiple realizability (MR), meaning in many distinct ways from different physical parts. The goal of our study is to find if the MRT applies to the mental state of consciousness among animals. Many things have been written about MRT but the ones most applicable to animal consciousness are by Shapiro in a 2004 book called The Mind Incarnate and by Polger and Shapiro in their 2016 work, The Multiple Realization Book. Standard, classical MRT has been around since 1967 and it says that a mental state can have very many different physical realizations, in a nearly unlimited manner. To the contrary, Shapiro's book reasoned that physical, physiological, and historical constraints force mental traits to evolve in just a few, limited directions, which is seen as convergent evolution of the associated neural traits in different animal lineages. This is his mental constraint thesis (MCT). We examined the evolution of consciousness in animals and found that it arose independently in just three animal clades-vertebrates, arthropods, and cephalopod mollusks-all of which share many consciousness-associated traits: elaborate sensory organs and brains, high capacity for memory, directed mobility, etc. These three constrained, convergently evolved routes to consciousness fit Shapiro's original MCT. More recently, Polger and Shapiro's book presented much the same thesis but changed its name from MCT to a "modest identity thesis." Furthermore, they argued against almost all the classically offered instances of MR in animal evolution, especially against the evidence of neural plasticity and the differently expanded cerebrums of mammals and birds. In contrast, we argue that some of these classical examples of MR are indeed valid and that Shapiro's original MCT correction of MRT is the better account of the evolution of consciousness in animal clades. And we still agree that constraints and convergence refute the standard, nearly unconstrained, MRT.

Clinical Applications of Neuropsychoanalysis: Hypotheses Toward an Integrative Model

Neuropsychoanalysis has been established as a field based on the dialog between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences. Freud was a neurologist for 20 years and used the neuroscientific knowledge of his time as the foundation of his metapsychology. Psychoanalysis has predominantly relied on its own method to develop techniques for the different psychoanalytic treatments. It rarely uses contributions from fields outside psychoanalysis that could enrich its understanding of the mind. Neuropsychoanalysis has informed and revised several topics in psychoanalysis, for example consciousness and the unconscious, dreams, and affect amongst many others. Clear clinical applications of neuropsychoanalysis can be appreciated in the work with neurological patients. However, a constant question from clinicians is whether neuropsychoanalytic findings can contribute to psychoanalytic treatments with non-neurological patients. This paper explores clinical applications of neuropsychoanalysis mainly based on affective neuroscience to propose an analysis of emotions that may contribute to the gradual development of a neuropsychoanalytically informed psychotherapy. The task of integrating neuroscientific knowledge into psychoanalytic technique is still considered a challenge of accentuated complexity, but it is at the same time a necessary and promising endeavor that aims at improving the quality of the treatments available for human suffering and psychopathology.

Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution

Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by 'subjective valuation'-a deep inference about the precision or 'predictability' of the self-evidencing ('fitness-promoting') outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of 'selflessness'; in particular the 'totally selfless' states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelic drugs. Drawing on existing work that accounts for psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution in the active inference framework, I argue that these states do not threaten to undermine an active inference theory of consciousness. Instead, these accounts corroborate the view that subjective valuation is the constitutive facet of experience, and they highlight the potential of psychedelic research to inform consciousness science, computational psychiatry and computational phenomenology.

What Is Consciousness? Integrated Information vs. Inference

Any successful naturalistic account of consciousness must state what consciousness is, in terms that are compatible with the rest of our naturalistic descriptions of the world. Integrated Information Theory represents a pioneering attempt to do just this. This theory accounts for the core features of consciousness by holding that there is an equivalence between the phenomenal experience associated with a system and its intrinsic causal power. The proposal, however, fails to provide insight into the qualitative character of consciousness and, as a result of its proposed equivalence between consciousness and purely internal dynamics, into the intentional character of conscious perception. In recent years, an alternate group of theories has been proposed that claims consciousness to be equivalent to certain forms of inference. One such theory is the Living Mirror theory, which holds consciousness to be a form of inference performed by all living systems. The proposal of consciousness as inference overcomes the shortcomings of Integrated Information Theory, particularly in the case of conscious perception. A synthesis of these two perspectives can be reached by appreciating that conscious living systems are self-organising in nature. This mode of organization requires them to have a high level of integration. From this perspective, we can understand consciousness as being dependent on a system possessing non-trivial amounts of integrated information while holding that the process of inference performed by the system is the fact of consciousness itself.

Sex and Prediction Error, Part 2: Jouissance and The Free Energy Principle in Neuropsychoanalysis

Jouissance refers to an excess enjoyment beyond (yet tied to) speech and representation. From the perspective of some Lacanian analysts, jouissance is precisely what testifies against any relationship to the brain-jouissance "slips" out of cognition. On the contrary, it is argued here that jouissance has a central place in contemporary neuropsychoanalysis. In part 1 of this series the metapsychology of jouissance was presented in relation to the real and symbolic registers. Here, in part 2, Mark Solms's neuropsychoanalytic model of Karl Friston's free energy principle is summarized. In this model, "predictions" aim to resolve prediction errors-most notably, those signaled by affective consciousness. "Surplus prediction error"-prediction error that arises at the point where the predictive model fails-is proposed to be a neural correlate of jouissance. This limit within prediction is analogous to the real as a structural negativity within the symbolic.

Sex and Prediction Error, Part 3: Provoking Prediction Error

In parts 1 and 2 of this Lacanian neuropsychoanalytic series, surplus prediction error was presented as a neural correlate of the Lacanian concept of jouissance. Affective consciousness (a key source of prediction error in the brain) impels the work of cognition, the predictive work of explaining what is foreign and surprising. Yet this arousal is the necessary bedrock of all consciousness. Although the brain's predictive model strives for homeostatic explanation of prediction error, jouissance "drives a hole" in the work of homeostasis. Some residual prediction error always remains. Lacanian clinical technique attends to this surplus and the failed predictions to which this jouissance "sticks." Rather than striving to eliminate prediction error, clinical practice seeks its metabolization. Analysis targets one's mode of jouissance to create a space for the subject to enjoy in some other way. This entails working with prediction error, not removing or tolerating it. Analysis aims to shake the very core of the subject by provoking prediction error-this drives clinical change. Brief clinical examples illustrate this view.

Alzheimer's and Consciousness: How Much Subjectivity Is Objective?

Does Alzheimer Disease show a decline in cognitive functions that relate to the awareness of external reality? In this paper, we will propose a perspective that patients with increasing symptoms of AD show a change in the awareness of subjective versus objective representative axis of reality thus consequently move to a more internal like perception of reality. This paradigm shift suggests that new insights into the dynamicity of the conscious representation of reality in the AD brain may give us new clues to the very early signs of memory and self-awareness impairment that originates from, in our view the microtubules. Dialog between Adso and William, in Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose, Third Day: Vespers. "But how does it happen," I said with admiration, "that you were able to solve the mystery of the library looking at it from the outside, and you were unable to solve it when you were inside?" "Thus, God knows the world, because He conceived it in His mind, as if it was from the outside, before it was created, and we do not know its rule, because we live inside it, having found it already made."

Psychomotor Predictive Processing

Psychomotor experience can be based on what people predict they will experience, rather than on sensory inputs. It has been argued that disconnects between human experience and sensory inputs can be addressed better through further development of predictive processing theory. In this paper, the scope of predictive processing theory is extended through three developments. First, by going beyond previous studies that have encompassed embodied cognition but have not addressed some fundamental aspects of psychomotor functioning. Second, by proposing a scientific basis for explaining predictive processing that spans objective neuroscience and subjective experience. Third, by providing an explanation of predictive processing that can be incorporated into the planning and operation of systems involving robots and other new technologies. This is necessary because such systems are becoming increasingly common and move us farther away from the hunter-gatherer lifestyles within which our psychomotor functioning evolved. For example, beliefs that workplace robots are threatening can generate anxiety, while wearing hardware, such as augmented reality headsets and exoskeletons, can impede the natural functioning of psychomotor systems. The primary contribution of the paper is the introduction of a new formulation of hierarchical predictive processing that is focused on psychomotor functioning.

A preliminary sketch of a Jungian socioanalysis - an emerging theory combining analytical psychology, complexity theories, sociological theories, socio- and psycho-analysis, group analysis and affect theories1

This paper presents a preliminary sketch of what we have termed a Jungian socioanalysis - an emerging theory combining analytical psychology, complexity theories, sociological theories, socio- and psycho-analysis, group analysis and affect theories. Our assumption is that Jungian theory and practice need to attend to and focus more on social contexts, sociality and the influence of societal developments. But also, on the other hand, that analytical psychology, primarily Jung's theory of individuation and the transcendent function as well as the broad complexity perspective of his theory of psyche, can be extended to a 'socio' and not just a 'psycho' perspective. The paper presents five foundational assumptions for a Jungian socioanalysis, with the following headings: 1) A Jungian socioanalysis calls for a complex psychology; 2) (Un)consciousness is social and sociality has a dimension of (un)consciousness; 3) A Jungian socioanalysis explores social fields 'from within' by smaller groups; 4) A Jungian socioanalysis enables and is enabled by emerging metaphors and affect-imagery; 5) Socio-cultural fields have an impulse toward individuation. This is the first of two papers in the present edition of the journal - the second paper gives socio-clinical illustrations of our thesis in this paper.

Jungian socioanalysis, social dreaming and the emerging complexity of Europe1

This paper presents central elements of what we have termed Jungian socioanalysis - an emerging theory combining analytical psychology, complexity theories, sociological theories, socio- and psychoanalysis, social dreaming, group analysis and affect theories consisting of five assumptions (see also Odde & Vestergaard 2021). Jungian socioanalysis develops a process approach, as opposed to a systems approach, to sociality. In this paper we focus mostly on one of the five assumptions, namely that Jungian socioanalysis explores social fields 'from within' through smaller groups, treating group processes as a vehicle to gain a psychosocial and cultural understanding of larger social entities. We give an example of this approach with a presentation of two local social dreaming experiences in Denmark, focusing on Europe in transition. We show that the most significant outcome doesn't rely on the specific content of the dreams, but rather on the engagement in the social dreaming process itself, resulting in transformative image-affects. The paper ends with reflections on how these social dreaming experiences inform a Jungian socioanalysis, pointing to enabling intersubjective meetings, or present moments, opening for a deeper understanding from within the group as opposed to a systems approach. The paper is a revised version of a presentation at the 2018 European Congress in Avignon.

Brain Entropy During Aging Through a Free Energy Principle Approach

Neural complexity and brain entropy (BEN) have gained greater interest in recent years. The dynamics of neural signals and their relations with information processing continue to be investigated through different measures in a variety of noteworthy studies. The BEN of spontaneous neural activity decreases during states of reduced consciousness. This evidence has been showed in primary consciousness states, such as psychedelic states, under the name of "the entropic brain hypothesis." In this manuscript we propose an extension of this hypothesis to physiological and pathological aging. We review this particular facet of the complexity of the brain, mentioning studies that have investigated BEN in primary consciousness states, and extending this view to the field of neuroaging with a focus on resting-state functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. We first introduce historic and conceptual ideas about entropy and neural complexity, treating the mindbrain as a complex nonlinear dynamic adaptive system, in light of the free energy principle. Then, we review the studies in this field, analyzing the idea that the aim of the neurocognitive system is to maintain a dynamic state of balance between order and chaos, both in terms of dynamics of neural signals and functional connectivity. In our exploration we will review studies both on acute psychedelic states and more chronic psychotic states and traits, such as those in schizophrenia, in order to show the increase of entropy in those states. Then we extend our exploration to physiological and pathological aging, where BEN is reduced. Finally, we propose an interpretation of these results, defining a general trend of BEN in primary states and cognitive aging.

Is the Influence of Freud Declining in Psychology and Psychiatry? A Bibliometric Analysis

Sigmund Freud is occasionally perceived as outdated and his work no longer relevant to academia. The citing papers (CPs) that cited Freud works were collected from Web of Science and analyzed. The 10 most common research areas of the CPs were noted, and the overall volume of the respective bodies of literature were retrieved. I computed the annual percentage of the respective bodies of literature that cited Freud. On a separate note, I computed the annual percentage of citations coming from psychology and psychiatry. Results based on 42,571 CPs found that psychology accounted for over half of the citations to Freud. The percentage of psychology papers citing Freud declined gradually from around 3% in the late 1950s to around 1% in the 2010s, in an extent of −0.02% per year over the entire survey period spanning across 65 years from 1956 till 2020 (P < 0.001). In psychiatry, a similar decline was observed, from around 4–4.5% in the late 1950s to just below 0.5% in the 2010s, in an extent of −0.1% per year (P < 0.001). However, a reverse trend was observed for psychoanalysis literature, which generally increased from 10–20% before the 1980s to 25–30% since the 2000s, in an extent of +0.2% per year (P < 0.001). Meanwhile, the annual percentage of CPs coming from psychology and psychiatry was decreasing by 0.4% per year (P < 0.001). Bibliometric data supported the notion that Freud's influence was on a decline in psychology and psychiatry fields.

A critical analysis of Markovian monism

Free Energy Principle underlies a unifying framework that integrates theories of origins of life, cognition, and action. Recently, FEP has been developed into a Markovian monist perspective (Friston et al. in BC 102: 227-260, 2020). The paper expresses scepticism about the validity of arguments for Markovian monism. The critique is based on the assumption that Markovian models are scientific models, and while we may defend ontological theories about the nature of scientific models, we could not read off metaphysical theses about the nature of target systems (self-organising conscious systems, in the present context) from our theories of nature of scientific models (Markov blankets). The paper draws attention to different ways of understanding Markovian models, as material entities, fictional entities, and mathematical structures. I argue that none of these interpretations contributes to the defence of a metaphysical stance (either in terms of neutral monism or reductive physicalism). This is because scientific representation is a sophisticated process, and properties of Markovian models-such as the property of being neither physical nor mental-could not be projected onto their targets to determine the ontological properties of targets easily.

The Brain Emotional Systems in Addictions: From Attachment to Dominance/Submission Systems

Human development has become particularly complex during the evolution. In this complexity, adolescence is an extremely important developmental stage. Adolescence is characterized by biological and social changes that create the prerequisites to psychopathological problems, including both substance and non-substance addictive behaviors. Central to the dynamics of the biological changes during adolescence are the synergy between sexual and neurophysiological development, which activates the motivational/emotional systems of Dominance/Submission. The latter are characterized by the interaction between the sexual hormones, the dopaminergic system and the stress axis (HPA). The maturation of these motivational/emotional systems requires the integration with the phylogenetically more recent Attachment/CARE Systems, which primarily have governed the subject's relationships until puberty. The integration of these systems is particularly complex in the human species, due to the evolution of the process of competition related to sexual selection: from a simple fight between two individuals (of the same genus and species) to a struggle for the acquisition of a position in rank and the competition between groups. The latter is an important evolutionary acquisition and believed to be the variable that has most contributed to enhancing the capacity for cooperation in the human species. The interaction between competition and cooperation, and between competition and attachment, characterizes the entire human relational and emotional structure and the unending work of integration to which the BrainMind is involved. The beginning of the integration of the aforementioned motivational/emotional systems is currently identified in the prepubertal period, during the juvenile stage, with the development of the Adrenarche-the so-called Adrenal Puberty. This latter stage is characterized by a low rate of release of androgens, the hormones released by the adrenal cortex, which activate the same behaviors as those observed in the PLAY system. The Adrenarche and the PLAY system are biological and functional prerequisites of adolescence, a period devoted to learning the difficult task of integrating the phylogenetically ancient Dominance/Submission Systems with the newer Attachment/CARE Systems. These systems accompany very different adaptive goals which can easily give rise to mutual conflict and can in turn make the balance of the BrainMind precarious and vulnerable to mental suffering.