The Circularity of the Embodied Mind

An Active-Inference Approach to Second-Person Neuroscience

Social neuroscience has often been criticized for approaching the investigation of the neural processes that enable social interaction and cognition from a passive, detached, third-person perspective, without involving any real-time social interaction. With the emergence of second-person neuroscience, investigators have uncovered the unique complexity of neural-activation patterns in actual, real-time interaction. Social cognition that occurs during social interaction is fundamentally different from that unfolding during social observation. However, it remains unclear how the neural correlates of social interaction are to be interpreted. Here, we leverage the active-inference framework to shed light on the mechanisms at play during social interaction in second-person neuroscience studies. Specifically, we show how counterfactually rich mutual predictions, real-time bodily adaptation, and policy selection explain activation in components of the default mode, salience, and frontoparietal networks of the brain, as well as in the basal ganglia. We further argue that these processes constitute the crucial neural processes that underwrite bona fide social interaction. By placing the experimental approach of second-person neuroscience on the theoretical foundation of the active-inference framework, we inform the field of social neuroscience about the mechanisms of real-life interactions. We thereby contribute to the theoretical foundations of empirical second-person neuroscience.

Nature heals: An informational entropy account of self-organization and change in field psychotherapy

This paper reviews biophysical models of psychotherapeutic change based on synergetics and the free energy principle. These models suggest that introducing sensory surprise into the patient-therapist system can lead to self-organization and the formation of new attractor states, disrupting entrenched patterns of thoughts, emotions, and behaviours. We propose that the therapist can facilitate this process by cultivating epistemic trust and modulating embodied attention to allow surprising affective states to enter shared awareness. Transient increases in free energy enable the update of generative models, expanding the range of experiences available within the patient-therapist phenomenal field. We hypothesize that patterns of disorganization at behavioural and physiological levels, indexed by increased entropy, complexity, and lower determinism, are key markers and predictors of psychotherapeutic gains. Future research should investigate how the therapist's openness to novelty shapes therapeutic outcomes.

Pain and temporality: a merleau-pontyian approach

Chronic pain is a common disorder with enormous sociomedical importance. A major part of primary and secondary costs of illness is caused by the various pain syndromes. Nociception - the sensory perception of a painful stimulus - is a complex process relying on an intricate system of anatomical, neurophysiological and biochemical networks. This applies even more so to pain - the state of experiencing a nociceptive event, of interpreting it in terms of meaning for the affected individual and of suffering a range of emotions it elicits. This intricacy renders it obvious, that the empirical medical sciences alone cannot explain all aspects of pain. Hence, it has also become a focus of phenomenological research. One aspect of these investigations is the interaction of pain and the perception of the lived body's spatiality. The focus of this article will build on these concepts to develop a construct of the alteration of temporality caused by chronic pain and the effects this spells out for the affected subject. To this end, I will primarily draw on Merleau-Ponty's ideas of the lived body as well as on theories of enactivism and embodiment. I will also point out parallels to neuroscientific data, thereby demonstrating the proximity of phenomenology and neuroscience. A possible partial solution to the pain dilemma may be derived from psychology: techniques relying on cognitive behavioural intervention, awareness training, and existential analysis may provide alleviation to patients suffering from chronic pain.

The Nested States Model: A Phenomenologically-Grounded Model of the Mind

BACKGROUND

Subjective experience is central to the nature of mental illness, yet it has not played a central role in most empirical approaches to psychopathology. While phenomenological perspectives in psychiatry have seen a recent resurgence, there remains a need for more detailed models of psychopathological processes based on explicit phenomenological and enactive foundations.

SUMMARY

We present a framework derived from the Nested States Model (NSM) through which such phenomenologically-grounded models might be constructed. The NSM describes the dynamic structure of subjective experience as a system of nested states that reciprocally influence one another across hierarchical layers. Here, we show how the NSM provides a scheme for characterizing patterns of experience that comprise various psychopathological processes. We demonstrate the utility of this scheme both for clinical practice and for building our knowledge of psychopathological processes more broadly.

KEY MESSAGES

The NSM can advance three aims that we see as critical for the lasting integration of phenomenological approaches to psychopathology within psychiatry. First, we show that the NSM provides a means for constructing clinical formulations and treatment considerations that center squarely on an individual's subjective experiences. Second, the NSM supplies a framework for organizing findings from clinical-phenomenological research that can guide the construction of broader phenomenologically-grounded models of psychopathological processes. Lastly, the NSM aligns our perspective on subjective experience with emerging perspectives on brain dynamics, helping to bridge phenomenological work with ongoing neurophysiological research.

The role of a mindful movement-based program (Movimento Biologico) in health promotion: results of a pre-post intervention study

Introduction

Mindful movement is a comprehensive approach that integrates various bodily, emotional and cognitive aspects into physical activity, promoting overall well-being. This study assessed the impact of a mindful movement program, known as Movimento Biologico (MB), on participants psychological well-being (PWB), positive mental health (PMH), sense of coherence (SOC), and interoceptive awareness.

Methods

MB program was conducted for students attending the bachelor's degree in Kinesiology and Sport Sciences of University of Perugia over 8 weeks (from October 16 to November 27, 2022). Participants were requested to fill in four questionnaires before and after the MB program: (1) 18-item PWB scale; (2) 9-item PMH scale; (3) 13-item SOC scale; (4) 32-item scale for Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA). Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to assess changes, with significance set at p < 0.05.

Results

Thirty-eight students (mean age 21.2, 60.5% male) participated. Several MAIA subscales, including noticing (p = 0.003), attention management (p = 0.002), emotional awareness (p = 0.007), self-regulation (p < 0.001), body listening (p = 0.001), and trusting (p = 0.001), showed significant improvements. PMH increased significantly (p = 0.015), and there was a significant enhancement in the autonomy subscale of PWB (p = 0.036). SOC and overall PWB also improved, though not significantly.

Conclusion

The MB program significantly improved participants' positive mental health and interoceptive awareness. This likely resulted from better recognition and management of positive physiological sensations, a stronger link between physical sensations and emotions, enhanced confidence in one's body, and increased autonomy.

Integrated care model for patients with functional somatic symptom disorder - a co-produced stakeholder exploration with recommendations for best practice

BACKGROUND

Functional somatic symptoms (FFS) and bodily distress disorders are highly prevalent across all medical settings. Services for these patients are dispersed across the health care system with minimal conceptual and operational integration, and patients do not currently access therapeutic offers in significant numbers due to a mismatch between their and professionals' understanding of the nature of the symptoms. New service models are urgently needed to address patients' needs and to align with advances in aetiological evidence and diagnostic classification systems to overcome the body-mind dichotomy.

METHOD

A panel of clinical experts from different clinical services involved in providing aspects of health care for patients with functional symptoms reviewed the current care provision. This review and the results from a focus group exploration of patients with lived experience of functional symptoms were explored by the multidisciplinary expert group, and the conclusions are summarised as recommendations for best practice.

RESULTS

The mapping exercise and multidisciplinary expert consultation revealed five themes for service improvement and pathway development: time/access, communication, barrier-free care, choice and governance. Service users identified four meta-themes for best practice recommendations: focus on healthcare professional communication and listening skills as well as professional attributes and knowledge base to help patients being both believed and understood in order to accept their condition; systemic and care pathway issues such as stronger emphasis on primary care as the first point of contact for patients, resources to reduce the length of the patient journey from initial assessment to diagnosis and treatment.

CONCLUSION

We propose a novel, integrated care pathway for patients with 'functional somatic disorder', which delivers care according to and working with patients' explanatory beliefs. The therapeutic model should operate based upon an understanding of the embodied nature of patient's complaints and provide flexible access points to the care pathway.

[Embodiment - Connecting Body and Mind]

Body and mind are often considered as separate entities, also in medicine. However, new neuroscientific research indicates that body and mind are much more connected than previously thought. This scientific contribution will look at the importance of "embodiment" for medicine.

Music performance as knowledge acquisition: a review and preliminary conceptual framework

To what extent does playing a musical instrument contribute to an individual's construction of knowledge? This paper aims to address this question by examining music performance from an embodied perspective and offering a narrative-style review of the main literature on the topic. Drawing from both older theoretical frameworks on motor learning and more recent theories on sensorimotor coupling and integration, this paper seeks to challenge and juxtapose established ideas with contemporary views inspired by recent work on embodied cognitive science. By doing so we advocate a centripetal approach to music performance, contrasting the prevalent centrifugal perspective: the sounds produced during performance not only originate from bodily action (centrifugal), but also cyclically return to it (centripetal). This perspective suggests that playing music involves a dynamic integration of both external and internal factors, transcending mere output-oriented actions and revealing music performance as a form of knowledge acquisition based on real-time sensorimotor experience.

Neuropsychological assessment methodology revisited: metatheoretical reflections

Theory building in neuropsychology, similar to other disciplines, rests on metatheoretical assumptions of philosophical origin. Such assumptions regarding the relation of psychological and physiological variables influence research methodologies as well as assessment strategies in fields of application. Here, we revisit the classic procedure of Double Dissociation (DD) to illustrate the connection of metatheory and methodology. In a seemingly unbridgeable opposition, the classical neuropsychological procedure of DD can be understood as either presupposing localizationism and a modular view of the brain, or as a special case of the generalized neuro-lens model for neuropsychological assessment. In the latter case, it is more easily compatible with a perspective that emphasizes the systemic-network, rather than the modular, nature of the brain, which as part of the organism, proportionately mediates the situatedness of the human being in the world. This perspective not only makes it possible to structure ecological validation processes and give them a metatheoretical foundation, but also to interlace it with the phenomenological insight that the laboratory as one context of empirical research may be analyzed in terms of situated experience. We conclude with showing that both the localizationist and the system science approach can agree on a view of the brain as a dynamical network, and that metatheory may thus offer important new perspectives of reconciliation.

The biopsychosocial model is lost in translation: from misrepresentation to an enactive modernization

INTRODUCTION

There are increasing recommendations to use the biopsychosocial model (BPSM) as a guide for musculoskeletal research and practice. However, there is a wide range of interpretations and applications of the model, many of which deviate from George Engel's original BPSM. These deviations have led to confusion and suboptimal patient care.

OBJECTIVES

1) To review Engel's original work; 2) outline prominent BPSM interpretations and misapplications in research and practice; and 3) present an "enactive" modernization of the BPSM.

METHODS

Critical narrative review in the context of musculoskeletal pain.

RESULTS

The BPSM has been biomedicalized, fragmented, and used in reductionist ways. Two useful versions of the BPSM have been running mostly in parallel, rarely converging. The first version is a "humanistic" interpretation based on person- and relationship-centredness. The second version is a "causation" interpretation focused on multifactorial contributors to illness and health. Recently, authors have argued that a modern enactive approach to the BPSM can accommodate both interpretations.

CONCLUSION

The BPSM is often conceptualized in narrow ways and only partially implemented in clinical care. We outline how an "enactive-BPS approach" to musculoskeletal care aligns with Engel's vision yet addresses theoretical limitations and may mitigate misapplications.

Motor control and skill acquisition in pediatric physical therapy: an enactive proposal

Theories of motor control and skill acquisition strongly influence and guide various fields of clinical practice. In last decades, changes in theoretical frameworks related to the conceptualization of brain plasticity, functional structures within the child, and environment have led to a revision of therapy approaches progressing from therapist-driven to child-initiated approaches. Even though theoretical frameworks and clinical practice are closely linked to the child's body, the profession has paid less attention to theories concerning the body's role and status in interpersonal relationships when fostering motor control and skill acquisition in children. In this theoretical paper we discuss the theoretical frameworks of motor control and skill acquisition that currently guide clinical practice. Through highlighting valuable contributions of these theories, we explore theoretical and practical benefits pediatric physical therapy can acquire by taking an enactive approach as a means to bring the child as a subject into focus. We rely on enactive concepts of embodiment, autonomy, and participatory sense-making in our exploration to provide an extended understanding of motor control and skill acquisition shaping our beliefs about what counts in therapeutic encounters in pediatric physical therapy.

The embodied mind in motion: a neuroscientific and philosophical perspective on prevention and therapy of dementia

The embodied mind in motion is a concept in which health and well-being, prevention and therapy, as well as lifestyle and habits meet. The mind changes profoundly in the course of dementias, affecting daily living and resulting in reduced quality of life. Interdisciplinary approaches are required for a holistic understanding of how the mind is affected by dementia. We here explore what such a holistic theory of dementia might look like and propose the idea of "embodied mind in motion". The paradigm is biopsychosocial or biocultural, the theoretical anchor point is the lifeworld, and the guiding concept is "embodiment," as body and mind are constantly in motion. Physical activity is, hence, central for the experience of health and well-being, beyond being "exercise" and "health behavior". We discuss the embodied mind in motion referring to phenomenology, enactivism and (philosophical) anthropology. In our view, habits are embodied long-term memories and a philosophical equivalent to lifestyle. They unfold the meaningfulness of moving the body, complementing the objectifiable benefits of physical exercise. Empirical studies on "holistic activities" like hiking, yoga, music and dance illustrate improved integration into everyday life. Their meaningfulness enhances compliance and increases the preventive and even therapeutic potential. A crucial factor for this is the emotional dimension of lifestyle, exemplified by the virally popularized performance of "Swan Lake" by wheel-chair bound ex-ballerina Marta Cinta González Saldaña, suffering from Alzheimer's disease. A number of epistemological and ontological consequences anchor "embodied movement" as a valuable principle for dementia research.

Moving beyond the lab: investigating empathy through the Empirical 5E approach

Empathy is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that plays a crucial role in human social interactions. Recent developments in social neuroscience have provided valuable insights into the neural underpinnings and bodily mechanisms underlying empathy. This methodology often prioritizes precision, replicability, internal validity, and confound control. However, fully understanding the complexity of empathy seems unattainable by solely relying on artificial and controlled laboratory settings, while overlooking a comprehensive view of empathy through an ecological experimental approach. In this article, we propose articulating an integrative theoretical and methodological framework based on the 5E approach (the "E"s stand for embodied, embedded, enacted, emotional, and extended perspectives of empathy), highlighting the relevance of studying empathy as an active interaction between embodied agents, embedded in a shared real-world environment. In addition, we illustrate how a novel multimodal approach including mobile brain and body imaging (MoBi) combined with phenomenological methods, and the implementation of interactive paradigms in a natural context, are adequate procedures to study empathy from the 5E approach. In doing so, we present the Empirical 5E approach (E5E) as an integrative scientific framework to bridge brain/body and phenomenological attributes in an interbody interactive setting. Progressing toward an E5E approach can be crucial to understanding empathy in accordance with the complexity of how it is experienced in the real world.

Revisiting uncertainty as a felt sense of unsafety: The somatic error theory of intolerance of uncertainty

Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) has gained widespread interest as a construct of broad interest from both transdiagnostic and trans-situational perspectives. We have approached this article inspired by the curiosity, clinical observation, consideration of different theoretical perspectives, speculation, optimism and indeed fun that can be seen in S. J. Rachman's work. We address some of what we know about IU before considering one way of conceptualizing IU from the standpoint of a felt sense or embodied experience. In the first part, we start with Woody and Rachman's (1994) observations of people with GAD. Second, we consider some key findings from the literature. Third, we consider two important perspectives on uncertainty, namely, Brosschot et al.'s (2016, 2018) influential Generalized Unsafety Theory of Stress and uncertainty as an emotion. In the second part, backing our clinical hunch about the importance of the felt sense of uncertainty, we consider IU from the perspective of interoception and the somatic error theory of anxiety (Khalsa & Feinstein, 2018). We propose the somatic error theory of intolerance of uncertainty, which places the experience of uncertainty at the heart of our understanding of intolerance of uncertainty. This is followed by predictions, unresolved questions, and potential clinical implications. Finally, we revisit Woody and Rachman's (1994) suggestions for treatment as internalizing "a sense of safety in a range of circumstances (p. 750)" and update this from the perspective of the felt sense of uncertainty. We finish by suggesting that uncertainty can be tolerated, perhaps accepted, and even embraced.

A cultural-ecosocial systems view for psychiatry

While contemporary psychiatry seeks the mechanisms of mental disorders in neurobiology, mental health problems clearly depend on developmental processes of learning and adaptation through ongoing interactions with the social environment. Symptoms or disorders emerge in specific social contexts and involve predicaments that cannot be fully characterized in terms of brain function but require a larger social-ecological view. Causal processes that result in mental health problems can begin anywhere within the extended system of body-person-environment. In particular, individuals' narrative self-construal, culturally mediated interpretations of symptoms and coping strategies as well as the responses of others in the social world contribute to the mechanisms of mental disorders, illness experience, and recovery. In this paper, we outline the conceptual basis and practical implications of a hierarchical ecosocial systems view for an integrative approach to psychiatric theory and practice. The cultural-ecosocial systems view we propose understands mind, brain and person as situated in the social world and as constituted by cultural and self-reflexive processes. This view can be incorporated into a pragmatic approach to clinical assessment and case formulation that characterizes mechanisms of pathology and identifies targets for intervention.

Integrating neuroscience in psychiatry: a cultural-ecosocial systemic approach

Psychiatry has increasingly adopted explanations for psychopathology that are based on neurobiological reductionism. With the recognition of health disparities and the realisation that someone's postcode can be a better predictor of health outcomes than their genetic code, there are increasing efforts to ensure cultural and social-structural competence in psychiatric practice. Although neuroscientific and social-cultural approaches in psychiatry remain largely separate, they can be brought together in a multilevel explanatory framework to advance psychiatric theory, research, and practice. In this Personal View, we outline how a cultural-ecosocial systems approach to integrating neuroscience in psychiatry can promote social-contextual and systemic thinking for more clinically useful formulations and person-centred care.

Fading boundaries between the physical and the social world: Insights and novel techniques from the intersection of these two fields

This review focuses on the subtle interactions between sensory input and social cognition in visual perception. We suggest that body indices, such as gait and posture, can mediate such interactions. Recent trends in cognitive research are trying to overcome approaches that define perception as stimulus-centered and are pointing toward a more embodied agent-dependent perspective. According to this view, perception is a constructive process in which sensory inputs and motivational systems contribute to building an image of the external world. A key notion emerging from new theories on perception is that the body plays a critical role in shaping our perception. Depending on our arm's length, height and capacity of movement, we create our own image of the world based on a continuous compromise between sensory inputs and expected behavior. We use our bodies as natural "rulers" to measure both the physical and the social world around us. We point out the necessity of an integrative approach in cognitive research that takes into account the interplay between social and perceptual dimensions. To this end, we review long-established and novel techniques aimed at measuring bodily states and movements, and their perception, with the assumption that only by combining the study of visual perception and social cognition can we deepen our understanding of both fields.

Restoring the missing person to personalized medicine and precision psychiatry

Precision psychiatry has emerged as part of the shift to personalized medicine and builds on frameworks such as the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), multilevel biological "omics" data and, most recently, computational psychiatry. The shift is prompted by the realization that a one-size-fits all approach is inadequate to guide clinical care because people differ in ways that are not captured by broad diagnostic categories. One of the first steps in developing this personalized approach to treatment was the use of genetic markers to guide pharmacotherapeutics based on predictions of pharmacological response or non-response, and the potential risk of adverse drug reactions. Advances in technology have made a greater degree of specificity or precision potentially more attainable. To date, however, the search for precision has largely focused on biological parameters. Psychiatric disorders involve multi-level dynamics that require measures of phenomenological, psychological, behavioral, social structural, and cultural dimensions. This points to the need to develop more fine-grained analyses of experience, self-construal, illness narratives, interpersonal interactional dynamics, and social contexts and determinants of health. In this paper, we review the limitations of precision psychiatry arguing that it cannot reach its goal if it does not include core elements of the processes that give rise to psychopathological states, which include the agency and experience of the person. Drawing from contemporary systems biology, social epidemiology, developmental psychology, and cognitive science, we propose a cultural-ecosocial approach to integrating precision psychiatry with person-centered care.

An enactivist-inspired mathematical model of cognition

In this paper we start from the philosophical position in cognitive science known as enactivism. We formulate five basic enactivist tenets that we have carefully identified in the relevant literature as the main underlying principles of that philosophy. We then develop a mathematical framework to talk about cognitive systems (both artificial and natural) which complies with these enactivist tenets. In particular we pay attention that our mathematical modeling does not attribute contentful symbolic representations to the agents, and that the agent's nervous system or brain, body and environment are modeled in a way that makes them an inseparable part of a greater totality. The long-term purpose for which this article sets the stage is to create a mathematical foundation for cognition which is in line with enactivism. We see two main benefits of doing so: (1) It enables enactivist ideas to be more accessible for computer scientists, AI researchers, roboticists, cognitive scientists, and psychologists, and (2) it gives the philosophers a mathematical tool which can be used to clarify their notions and help with their debates. Our main notion is that of a sensorimotor system which is a special case of a well studied notion of a transition system. We also consider related notions such as labeled transition systems and deterministic automata. We analyze a notion called sufficiency and show that it is a very good candidate for a foundational notion in the “mathematics of cognition from an enactivist perspective.” We demonstrate its importance by proving a uniqueness theorem about the minimal sufficient refinements (which correspond in some sense to an optimal attunement of an organism to its environment) and by showing that sufficiency corresponds to known notions such as sufficient history information spaces. In the end, we tie it all back to the enactivist tenets.

From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry

Introduction

Reliance on sole reductionism, whether explanatory, methodological or ontological, is difficult to support in clinical psychiatry. Rather, psychiatry is challenged by a plurality of approaches. There exist multiple legitimate ways of understanding human functionality and disorder, i.e., different systems of representation, different tools, different methodologies and objectives. Pluralistic frameworks have been presented through which the multiplicity of approaches in psychiatry can be understood. In parallel of these frameworks, an enactive approach for psychiatry has been proposed. In this paper, we consider the relationships between the different kinds of pluralistic frameworks and this enactive approach for psychiatry.

Methods

We compare the enactive approach in psychiatry with wider analytical forms of pluralism.

Results

On one side, the enactive framework anchored both in cognitive sciences, theory of dynamic systems, systems biology, and phenomenology, has recently been proposed as an answer to the challenge of an integrative psychiatry. On the other side, two forms of explanatory pluralisms can be described: a non-integrative pluralism and an integrative pluralism. The first is tolerant, it examines the coexistence of different potentially incompatible or untranslatable systems in the scientific or clinical landscape. The second is integrative and proposes to bring together the different levels of understanding and systems of representations. We propose that enactivism is inherently a form of integrative pluralism, but it is at the same time a component of the general framework of explanatory pluralism, composed of a set of so-called analytical approaches.

Conclusions

A significant number of mental health professionals are already accepting the variety of clinical and scientific approaches. In this way, a rigorous understanding of the theoretical positioning of psychiatric actors seems necessary to promote quality clinical practice. The study of entanglements between an analytical pluralism and a synthetic-organizational enactivist pluralism could prove fruitful.

Enactive and simondonian reflections on mental disorders

As an alternative to linear and unidimensional perspectives focused mainly on either organic or psychological processes, the enactive approach to life and mind-a branch of 4-E (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) cognitive theories-offers an integrative framework to study mental disorders that encompasses and articulates organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective dimensions of embodiment. These three domains are deeply entangled in a non-trivial manner. A question remains on how this systemic and multi-dimensional approach may be applied to our understanding of mental disorders and symptomatic behavior. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of individuation (focusing particularly on the concepts of tension, metastability, and preindividual), we provide some enactive conceptual tools to better understand the dynamic, interactive, and multi-dimensional nature of human bodies in mental disorders and psychopathological symptoms. One of such tools cursiva is sense-making, a key notion that captures the relational process of generating meaning by interacting with the sociomaterial environment. The article analyzes five aspects related to sense-making: temporality, adaptivity, the multiplicity of normativities it involves, the fundamental role of tension, and its participatory character. On this basis, we draw certain implications for our understanding of mental disorders and diverse symptoms, and suggest their interpretation in terms of difficulties to transform tensions and perform individuation processes, which result in a reduction of the field of potentialities for self-individuation and sense-making.

Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness

Cerebral energy supply is insufficient to support continuous neuronal processing of the plethora of time-constant objects that we are aware of. As a result, the brain is forced to limit processing resources to (the most relevant) cases of change. The neuronally generated world is thus temporally discontinuous. This parallels the fact that, in all relevant microscopic fundamental equations of nature, temporal change plays a dominant role. When a scientist calculates a "solution" to such an equation, integration over time is an essential step. The present Hypothesis expresses that the step from neuronal activity to phenomenal content of consciousness is reflective of a (phenomenal) "solution:" the main source of the incomprehensibility of consciousness is proposed to result from the introduction of phenomenal time-constant entities. These are "filled-in" via integration, even though neuronal data only exists for changes to these entities. In this way, a temporally continuous picture of the world phenomenally appears. Qualia are "initial conditions," which are required for integration and cannot be deduced from present data. Phenomenal "identity" (vs. "high similarity") is related to qualia. Inattentive visual perception, which is only rarely investigated, offers insights into these relationships. Introspectively, unattended vision appears rich because percepts are cumulated over long time spans, whereas attentive perception relies purely on present neuronal signals. The present Hypothesis is that a brief neuronal activity can signify long-lasting and constant phenomenal content of consciousness. Experimental support is presented that comes from discrepancies between neuronal activity and perception: transient neuronal responses to sustained stimuli, "filling-in," change blindness, identity vs. close resemblance.

Integration and Causality in Enactive Approaches to Psychiatry

In this paper I address what has been called the integration problem in psychiatry. This problem is tied to conceptions of causality and explanatory levels in our understanding of mind. I take an interdisciplinary enactive perspective to develop a 3-fold method for exploring the dynamics of integration, based on a concept of dynamical causation and a non-hierarchical (level-free) notion of gestalt. I also consider Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) as a test case.