Understanding individual differences in theory of mind via representation of minds, not mental states

Disruption of dopamine D2/D3 system function impairs the human ability to understand the mental states of other people

Difficulties in reasoning about others' mental states (i.e., mentalising/Theory of Mind) are highly prevalent among disorders featuring dopamine dysfunctions (e.g., Parkinson's disease) and significantly affect individuals' quality of life. However, due to multiple confounding factors inherent to existing patient studies, currently little is known about whether these sociocognitive symptoms originate from aberrant dopamine signalling or from psychosocial changes unrelated to dopamine. The present study, therefore, investigated the role of dopamine in modulating mentalising in a sample of healthy volunteers. We used a double-blind, placebo-controlled procedure to test the effect of the D2/D3 antagonist haloperidol on mental state attribution, using an adaptation of the Heider and Simmel (1944) animations task. On 2 separate days, once after receiving 2.5 mg haloperidol and once after receiving placebo, 33 healthy adult participants viewed and labelled short videos of 2 triangles depicting mental state (involving mentalistic interaction wherein 1 triangle intends to cause or act upon a particular mental state in the other, e.g., surprising) and non-mental state (involving reciprocal interaction without the intention to cause/act upon the other triangle's mental state, e.g., following) interactions. Using Bayesian mixed effects models, we observed that haloperidol decreased accuracy in labelling both mental and non-mental state animations. Our secondary analyses suggest that dopamine modulates inference from mental and non-mental state animations via independent mechanisms, pointing towards 2 putative pathways underlying the dopaminergic modulation of mental state attribution: action representation and a shared mechanism supporting mentalising and emotion recognition. We conclude that dopaminergic pathways impact Theory of Mind, at least indirectly. Our results have implications for the neurochemical basis of sociocognitive difficulties in patients with dopamine dysfunctions and generate new hypotheses about the specific dopamine-mediated mechanisms underlying social cognition.

Distinct genetic and environmental origins of hierarchical cognitive abilities in adult humans

Human cognitive abilities ranging from basic perceptions to complex social behaviors exhibit substantial variation in individual differences. These cognitive functions can be categorized into a two-order hierarchy based on the levels of cognitive processes. Second-order cognition including metacognition and mentalizing monitors and regulates first-order cognitive processes. These two-order hierarchical cognitive functions exhibit distinct abilities. However, it remains unclear whether individual differences in these cognitive abilities have distinct origins. We employ the classical twin paradigm to compare the genetic and environmental contributions to the two-order cognitive abilities in the same tasks from the same population. The results reveal that individual differences in first-order cognitive abilities were primarily influenced by genetic factors. Conversely, the second-order cognitive abilities have a stronger influence from shared environmental factors. These findings suggest that the abilities of metacognition and mentalizing in adults are profoundly shaped by their environmental experiences and less determined by their biological nature.

Electrophysiological correlates of self-related processing in adults with autism

The term "self-bias" refers to the human propensity to prioritize self- over other-related stimuli and is believed to influence various stages of the processing stream. By means of event-related potentials (ERPs), it was recently shown that the self-bias in a shape-label matching task modulates early as well as later phases of information processing in neurotypicals. Recent claims suggest autism-related deficits to specifically impact later stages of self-related processing; however, it is unclear whether these claims hold based on current findings. Using the shape-label matching task while recording ERPs in individuals with autism can clarify which stage of self-related processing is specifically affected in this condition. Therefore, this study sought to investigate the temporal course of self-related processing in adults with and without autism. Thirty-two adults with autism and 27 neurotypicals completed a shape-label matching task while ERPs were concomitantly recorded. At the behavioral level, results furnished evidence for a comparable self-bias across groups, with no differences in task performance between adults with and without autism. At the ERP level, the two groups showed a similar self-bias at early stages of self-related information processing (the N1 component). Conversely, the autism group manifested a lessened differentiation between self- and other-related stimuli at later stages (the parietal P3 component). In line with recent claims of later phases of self-related processing being altered in autism, we found an equivalent self-bias between groups at an early, sensory stage of processing, yet a strongly diminished self-bias at a later, cognitive stage in adults with autism.

The relevance of familiarity in the context of self-related information processing

Humans are inclined to preferentially process self-related content, referred to as the "self-bias." Different paradigms have been used to study this effect. However, not all paradigms included a familiar other condition (but rather an unfamiliar other condition), needed to differentiate self-specific effects from the impact of familiarity. The primary goal of our study was to test the suitability for studying the self-bias of two paradigms that provide robust measures of salience effects-that is, the Repetition Blindness (RB) effect and the Emotional Stroop (ES) interference-while addressing the familiarity confound. We further explored whether self-bias effects were related to autism symptomatology, as a reduced self-bias in autism has been reported in previous research. In an online procedure, 82 adults performed an RB task and an ES task in a counterbalanced order, while being presented with both self- and familiar other-related stimuli. Results of both frequentist and Bayesian analyses did not provide evidence in favour of a specific self-bias on either task: we found no significant modulation of the RB effect, nor of the ES interference, for the own versus a close other's name. Moreover, no link with autism symptomatology was found. Tackling a crucial shortcoming from earlier studies, our investigation raises awareness on the importance of accounting for familiarity when investigating self-related processing.

To see or not to see: the parallel processing of self-relevance and facial expressions

The self, like the concept of central "gravity", facilitates the processing of information that is directly relevant to the self. This phenomenon is known as the self-prioritization effect. However, it remains unclear whether the self-prioritization effect extends to the processing of emotional facial expressions. To fill this gap, we used a self-association paradigm to investigate the impact of self-relevance on the recognition of emotional facial expressions while controlling for confounding factors such as familiarity and overlearning. Using a large and diverse sample, we replicated the effect of self-relevance on face processing but found no evidence for a modulation of self-relevance on facial emotion recognition. We propose two potential theoretical explanations to account for these findings and emphasize that further research with different experimental designs and a multitasks measurement approach is needed to understand this mechanism fully. Overall, our study contributes to the literature on the parallel cognitive processing of self-relevance and facial emotion recognition, with implications for both social and cognitive psychology.

Introducing tomsup: Theory of mind simulations using Python

Theory of mind (ToM) is considered crucial for understanding social-cognitive abilities and impairments. However, verbal theories of the mechanisms underlying ToM are often criticized as under-specified and mutually incompatible. This leads to measures of ToM being unreliable, to the extent that even canonical experimental tasks do not require representation of others' mental states. There have been attempts at making computational models of ToM, but these are not easily available for broad research application. In order to help meet these challenges, we here introduce the Python package tomsup: Theory of mind simulations using Python. The package provides a computational eco-system for investigating and comparing computational models of hypothesized ToM mechanisms and for using them as experimental stimuli. The package notably includes an easy-to-use implementation of the variational recursive Bayesian k-ToM model developed by (Devaine, Hollard, & Daunizeau, 2014b) and of simpler non-recursive decision models, for comparison. We provide a series of tutorials on how to: (i) simulate agents relying on the k-ToM model and on a range of simpler types of mechanisms; (ii) employ those agents to generate online experimental stimuli; (iii) analyze the data generated in such experimental setup, and (iv) specify new custom ToM and heuristic cognitive models.

Novel theory of mind task demonstrates representation of minds in mental state inference

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to represent the mental states of oneself and others, is argued to be central to human social experience, and impairments in this ability are thought to underlie several psychiatric and developmental conditions. To examine the accuracy of mental state inferences, a novel ToM task was developed, requiring inferences to be made about the mental states of 'Targets', prior participants who took part in a videoed mock interview. Participants also made estimates of the Targets' personality traits. These inferences were compared to ground-truth data, provided by the Targets, of their true traits and mental states. Results from 55 adult participants demonstrated that trait inferences were used to derive mental state inferences, and that the accuracy of trait estimates predicted the accuracy of mental state inferences. Moreover, the size and direction of the association between trait accuracy and mental state accuracy varied according to the trait-mental state combination. The accuracy of trait inferences was predicted by the accuracy of participants' understanding of trait covariation at the population level. Findings are in accordance with the Mind-space theory, that representation of the Target mind is used in the inference of their mental states.

The cultural learning account of first impressions

Humans spontaneously attribute character traits to strangers based on their facial appearance. Although these 'first impressions' typically have no basis in reality, some authors have assumed that they have an innate origin. By contrast, the Trait Inference Mapping (TIM) account proposes that first impressions are products of culturally acquired associative mappings that allow activation to spread from representations of facial appearance to representations of trait profiles. According to TIM, cultural instruments, including propaganda, illustrated storybooks, art and iconography, ritual, film, and TV, expose many individuals within a community to common sources of correlated face-trait experience, yielding first impressions that are shared by many, but typically inaccurate. Here, we review emerging empirical findings, many of which accord with TIM, and argue that future work must distinguish first impressions based on invariant facial features (e.g., shape) from those based on facial behaviours (e.g., expressions).

Equivalent own name bias in autism: An EEG study of the Attentional Blink

The “Attentional Blink” refers to difficulty in detecting the second of two target stimuli presented in rapid temporal succession. Studies have shown that salient target stimuli, such as one’s own name, reduce the magnitude of this effect. Given indications that self-related processing is altered in autism, it is an open question whether this attentional self-bias is reduced in autism. To investigate this, in the current study we utilised an Attentional Blink paradigm involving one’s own and others’ names, in a group of 24 autistic adults, and 22 neurotypical adults, while measuring EEG. In line with previous studies, the Attentional Blink was reduced when the participant’s own name was the second target, with no differences between autistic and neurotypical participants. ERP results show that the effect on the Attentional Blink of one’s own name was reflected in increased N2 and P3 amplitudes, for both autistic and nonautistic individuals. This is the first event-related potential study of own-name processing in the context of the Attentional Blink. The results provide evidence of an intact attentional self-bias in autism, both at the behavioural and neural level.

Time perception of individuals with subthreshold autistic traits: the regulation of interpersonal information associations

BACKGROUND

People with high subthreshold autistic traits usually share behavioral patterns similar to those of individuals on the autism spectrum, but with fewer social and cognitive changes. The effect of autistic traits on time perception and the role of interpersonal information in this effect remain unexplored.

METHODS

This study used a temporal bisection task between 400 and 1600 ms to compare the time perception of individuals with higher and lower autistic traits, and to explore the regulation of interpersonal information on their time perception by establishing associations between identities and geometric shapes. Thirty-two participants with high autistic traits and thirty-one participants with low autistic traits participated in this study.

RESULTS

In the absence of identity information, people with high autistic traits tended to judge short durations as longer. Their subjective bisection point was lower, and the Weber ratio was higher than for those with low autistic traits, suggesting that their overestimation of short duration was due to decreased temporal sensitivity. With the involvement of interpersonal information, the proportion of long responses for no identity was significantly lower than for self, friends, and strangers, which seemed more obvious in individuals with low autistic traits although there was no significant interaction between identity and group. The Weber ratio of no identity was lower than that for other identities.

CONCLUSION

The results suggest that individuals with high autistic traits have more conservative responses that are relatively shorter in duration, and this change is related to a decline in perceptual sensitivity. Compared to individuals with high autistic traits, the time perception of individuals with low autistic traits seemed more susceptible to interpersonal information.

Individual Differences in Indirect Speech Act Processing Found Outside the Language Network

Face-to-face communication requires skills that go beyond core language abilities. In dialogue, we routinely make inferences beyond the literal meaning of utterances and distinguish between different speech acts based on, e.g., contextual cues. It is, however, not known whether such communicative skills potentially overlap with core language skills or other capacities, such as theory of mind (ToM). In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study we investigate these questions by capitalizing on individual variation in pragmatic skills in the general population. Based on behavioral data from 199 participants, we selected participants with higher vs. lower pragmatic skills for the fMRI study (N = 57). In the scanner, participants listened to dialogues including a direct or an indirect target utterance. The paradigm allowed participants at the whole group level to (passively) distinguish indirect from direct speech acts, as evidenced by a robust activity difference between these speech acts in an extended language network including ToM areas. Individual differences in pragmatic skills modulated activation in two additional regions outside the core language regions (one cluster in the left lateral parietal cortex and intraparietal sulcus and one in the precuneus). The behavioral results indicate segregation of pragmatic skill from core language and ToM. In conclusion, contextualized and multimodal communication requires a set of interrelated pragmatic processes that are neurocognitively segregated: (1) from core language and (2) partly from ToM.

The relationship between alexithymia and theory of mind: A systematic review

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to represent the mental states of oneself and others, is an essential social skill disrupted across many psychiatric conditions. The transdiagnostic nature of ToM impairment means it is plausible that ToM impairment is related to alexithymia (difficulties identifying and describing one's own emotions), as alexithymia is seen across psychiatric conditions. Whilst many studies have examined links between alexithymia and ToM, results are mixed. Therefore, the purpose of this systematic review is to provide a taxonomy of ToM tests and assess their relationship with alexithymia. Tests are grouped according to whether they assess propensity to engage spontaneously in ToM or accuracy of ToM inferences, with tests further subdivided into those that do, and do not, require emotion recognition. A review of 63 suitable studies suggests that alexithymia is often associated with reduced ToM, and inaccurate ToM when tasks require emotion recognition. This latter finding appears due to impaired emotion recognition, rather than ToM impairment per se. Further directions and considerations for future research are discussed.

A comparison of self-bias measures across cognitive domains

BACKGROUND

The 'self-bias'-i.e., the human proneness to preferentially process self-relevant stimuli-is thought to be important for both self-related and social processing. Previous research operationalized the self-bias using different paradigms, assessing the size of the self-bias within a single cognitive domain. Recent studies suggested a reduced self-bias in autism, yet findings are inconsistent. The lack of consensus across existing studies may result from variation in paradigms and cognitive domains tested. Therefore, the primary goal of the current study was to investigate whether self-biases found across cognitive domains (i.e., perception, memory, attention) are related or independent. The secondary goal was to explore the relationship between these self-biases and the extent of autistic traits in a neurotypical sample.

METHODS

In an online procedure, 99 Dutch-speaking adults performed three self-processing tasks in counterbalanced order-i.e., the shape-label matching task (perception), the trait adjectives task (memory) and the visual search task (attention)-and completed two self-report measures of ASD symptomatology, i.e., AQ-10 and SRS-A. To control for level of familiarity, self-, close other- and famous other-relevant stimuli were included in each task. Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each task, and both frequentist as well as Bayesian analyses were applied to investigate the correlational patterns between self-bias measures.

RESULTS

We observed significant correlations of the self-bias magnitude between memory and attention, as well as attention and perception. However, Bayesian analysis provided only weak support for the latter association. Further, the size of the self-bias was not significantly related across memory and perception. No significant correlation between autistic traits and the self-bias magnitude was found for any of the three tasks, with Bayesian analyses strongly favoring the null hypothesis.

CONCLUSIONS

In contrast with the view of a 'unidimensional' self-bias, our findings provide evidence for a heterogeneous and multifaceted self consisting of a variety of related and unrelated aspects. None of the self-bias indices were found to relate to autistic traits in our neurotypical sample.

A large-scale structural and functional connectome of social mentalizing

Humans have a remarkable ability to infer the mind of others. This mentalizing skill relies on a distributed network of brain regions but how these regions connect and interact is not well understood. Here we leveraged large-scale multimodal neuroimaging data to elucidate the brain-wide organization and mechanisms of mentalizing processing. Key connectomic features of the mentalizing network (MTN) have been delineated in exquisite detail. We found the structural architecture of MTN is organized by two parallel subsystems and constructed redundantly by local and long-range white matter fibers. We uncovered an intrinsic functional architecture that is synchronized according to the degree of mentalizing, and its hierarchy reflects the inherent information integration order. We also examined the correspondence between the structural and functional connectivity in the network and revealed their differences in network topology, individual variance, spatial specificity, and functional specificity. Finally, we scrutinized the connectome resemblance between the default mode network and MTN and elaborated their inherent differences in dynamic patterns, laterality, and homogeneity. Overall, our study demonstrates that mentalizing processing unfolds across functionally heterogeneous regions with highly structured fiber tracts and unique hierarchical functional architecture, which make it distinguishable from the default mode network and other vicinity brain networks supporting autobiographical memory, semantic memory, self-referential, moral reasoning, and mental time travel.

Socio-cognitive processing in people with eating disorders: Computerized tests of mentalizing, empathy and imitation skills

OBJECTIVE

Eating disorders are psychiatric illnesses characterized by extreme eating behaviors, such as sustained food restriction or loss of control over eating. Symptoms are thought to be maintained by a variety of mechanisms, one of which may be the socio-cognitive impairments associated with eating disorders. While some previous work has addressed socio-cognitive impairments in eating disorders, this work has relied mostly on self-report data.

METHOD

Here we employed computerized tests of (a) mentalizing (ability to infer the mental states of others); (b) empathy (the degree to which the emotional states of others can be identified and the degree to which the states of others impact one's own emotional state); and (c) imitation (the degree to which observation of another's actions prompts the performance of those actions); in a group of 78 women with an eating disorder and a matched control group of 66 healthy women.

RESULTS

People with eating disorders showed both hyper- and hypo-mentalizing and reduced accuracy of emotional and cognitive mental state inference. They displayed less imitation of observed actions, but no differences in empathy compared to healthy controls. Although anxiety and depressive symptoms had significant effects on mentalizing, most of the observed inter-group differences persisted.

DISCUSSION

Women with eating disorders have difficulties mentalizing and imitating observed actions despite intact non-social automatic imitation, compared to healthy controls. These findings provide an indication that intervention modules to strengthen specific areas of social cognition might be helpful to improve patients' social skills.

Exploring the relationship between anthropomorphism and theory-of-mind in brain and behaviour

The process of understanding the minds of other people, such as their emotions and intentions, is mimicked when individuals try to understand an artificial mind. The assumption is that anthropomorphism, attributing human‐like characteristics to non‐human agents and objects, is an analogue to theory‐of‐mind, the ability to infer mental states of other people. Here, we test to what extent these two constructs formally overlap. Specifically, using a multi‐method approach, we test if and how anthropomorphism is related to theory‐of‐mind using brain (Experiment 1) and behavioural (Experiment 2) measures. In a first exploratory experiment, we examine the relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity within the theory‐of‐mind brain network (n = 108). Results from a Bayesian regression analysis showed no consistent relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity in regions of the theory‐of‐mind network. In a follow‐up, pre‐registered experiment, we explored the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and situational and dispositional anthropomorphism in more depth. Participants (n = 311) watched a short movie while simultaneously completing situational anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind ratings, as well as measures of dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind. Only situational anthropomorphism predicted the ability to understand and predict the behaviour of the film's characters. No relationship between situational or dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind was observed. Together, these results suggest that while the constructs of anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind might overlap in certain situations, they remain separate and possibly unrelated at the personality level. These findings point to a possible dissociation between brain and behavioural measures when considering the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and anthropomorphism.

The Oxford Face Matching Test: A non-biased test of the full range of individual differences in face perception

Tests of face processing are typically designed to identify individuals performing outside of the typical range; either prosopagnosic individuals who exhibit poor face processing ability, or super recognisers, who have superior face processing abilities. Here we describe the development of the Oxford Face Matching Test (OFMT), designed to identify individual differences in face processing across the full range of performance, from prosopagnosia, through the range of typical performance, to super recognisers. Such a test requires items of varying difficulty, but establishing difficulty is problematic when particular populations (e.g., prosopagnosics, individuals with autism spectrum disorder) may use atypical strategies to process faces. If item difficulty is calibrated on neurotypical individuals, then the test may be poorly calibrated for atypical groups, and vice versa. To obtain items of varying difficulty, we used facial recognition algorithms to obtain face pair similarity ratings that are not biased towards specific populations. These face pairs were used as stimuli in the OFMT, and participants were required to judge whether the face images depicted the same individual or different individuals. Across five studies the OFMT was shown to be sensitive to individual differences in the typical population, and in groups of both prosopagnosic individuals and super recognisers. The test-retest reliability of the task was at least equivalent to the Cambridge Face Memory Test and the Glasgow Face Matching Test. Furthermore, results reveal, at least at the group level, that both face perception and face memory are poor in those with prosopagnosia, and are good in super recognisers.

Neural correlates of recursive thinking during interpersonal strategic interactions

To navigate the complex social world, individuals need to represent others' mental states to think strategically and predict their next move. Strategic mentalizing can be classified into different levels of theory of mind according to its order of mental state attribution of other people's beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth. For example, reasoning people's beliefs about simple world facts is the first-order attribution while going further to reason people's beliefs about the minds of others is the second-order attribution. The neural substrates that support such high-order recursive reasoning in strategic interpersonal interactions are still unclear. Here, using a sequential-move interactional game together with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we showed that recursive reasoning engaged the frontal-subcortical regions. At the stimulus stage, the ventral striatum was more activated in high-order reasoning as compared with low-order reasoning. At the decision stage, high-order reasoning activated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and other mentalizing regions. Moreover, functional connectivity between the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the insula/hippocampus was positively correlated with individual differences in high-order social reasoning. This work delineates the neural correlates of high-order recursive thinking in strategic games and highlights the key role of the interplay between mPFC and subcortical regions in advanced social decision-making.

Face perception predicts affective theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder but not schizophrenia or typical development

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and schizophrenia spectrum disorder (SCZ) have overlapping symptomatology related to difficulties with social cognition. Yet, few studies have directly compared social cognition in ASD, SCZ, and typical development (TD). The current study examined individual differences in face recognition and its relation to affective theory of mind (ToM) in each diagnostic group. Adults with ASD (n = 31), SCZ (n = 43), and TD (n = 47) between the ages of 18 and 48 years-old with full scale IQ above 80 participated in this study. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) measured affective ToM, and the Benton Facial Recognition Test (BFRT) measured face perception. Adults with ASD and SCZ did not differ in their affective ToM abilities, and both groups showed affective ToM difficulties compared with TD. However, better face recognition ability uniquely predicted better affective ToM ability in ASD. Results suggest that affective ToM difficulties may relate to face processing in ASD but not SCZ. By clarifying the complex nature of individual differences in affective ToM and face recognition difficulties in these disorders, the present study suggests there may be divergent mechanisms underlying pathways to social dysfunction in ASD compared with SCZ. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Mutual (Mis)understanding: Reframing Autistic Pragmatic "Impairments" Using Relevance Theory

A central diagnostic and anecdotal feature of autism is difficulty with social communication. We take the position that communication is a two-way, intersubjective phenomenon-as described by the double empathy problem-and offer up relevance theory (a cognitive account of utterance interpretation) as a means of explaining such communication difficulties. Based on a set of proposed heuristics for successful and rapid interpretation of intended meaning, relevance theory positions communication as contingent on shared-and, importantly, mutually recognized-"relevance." Given that autistic and non-autistic people may have sometimes markedly different embodied experiences of the world, we argue that what is most salient to each interlocutor may be mismatched. Relevance theory would predict that where this salient information is not (mutually) recognized or adjusted for, mutual understanding may be more effortful to achieve. This paper presents the findings from a small-scale, linguistic ethnographic study of autistic communication featuring eight core autistic participants. Each core autistic participant engaged in three naturalistic conversations around the topic of loneliness with: (1) a familiar, chosen conversation partner; (2) a non-autistic stranger and (3) an autistic stranger. Relevance theory is utilized as a frame for the linguistic analysis of the interactions. Mutual understanding was unexpectedly high across all types of conversation pairings. In conversations involving two autistic participants, flow, rapport and intersubjective attunement were significantly increased and in three instances, autistic interlocutors appeared to experience improvements in their individual communicative competence contrasted with their other conversations. The findings have the potential to guide future thinking about how, in practical terms, communication between autistic and non-autistic people in both personal and public settings might be improved.

The Effect of Abusive Supervision on Employees' Work Procrastination Behavior

Work procrastination is a retreat behavior associated with negative cognitive experience and it results in great losses to individual as well as organizational development. Understanding the antecedents of employees’ work procrastination behavior contributes to lower frequency of its occurrence. This research builds a dual-moderated mediation model from the perspective of cognitive appraisal theory and explored work procrastination behavior of employees subjected to abusive supervision. With 378 valid returned questionnaires, data collected from 32 companies in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing supports our hypotheses. This result has enriched the understanding of work procrastination behavior and provided practical implications to avoide its negative effects.

Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires, and knowledge than oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agent’s perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly to inhibitory control. This study assessed whether there are individual differences in self–other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in executive function. A total of 142 participants completed two ToM (the director task and a Level 1 visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self–other interference, and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined using path analysis. Results showed that the self–other interference effects of the two ToM tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest that self–other differences are part of the nature of ToM tasks, but self–other interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self–other differences result in interference effects in various ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be a major limiting step for adults’ performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to assess other factors that may limit adults’ ToM performance and hence explain individual differences in social ability.

Effort shapes social cognition and behaviour: A neuro-cognitive framework

Theoretical accounts typically posit that variability in social behaviour is a function of capacity limits. We argue that many social behaviours are goal-directed and effortful, and thus variability is not just a function of capacity, but also motivation. Leveraging recent work examining the cognitive, computational and neural basis of effort processing, we put forward a framework for motivated social cognition. We argue that social cognition is demanding, people avoid its effort costs, and a core-circuit of brain areas that guides effort-based decisions in non-social situations may similarly evaluate whether social behaviours are worth the effort. Thus, effort sensitivity dissociates capacity limits from social motivation, and may be a driver of individual differences and pathological impairments in social cognition.

Ritual and the origins of first impressions

When encountering a stranger for the first time, adults spontaneously attribute to them a wide variety of character traits based solely on their physical appearance, most notably from their face. While these trait inferences exert a pervasive influence over our behaviour, their origins remain unclear. Whereas nativist accounts hold that first impressions are a product of gene-based natural selection, the Trait Inference Mapping framework (TIM) posits that we learn face-trait mappings ontogenetically as a result of correlated face-trait experience. Here, we examine the available anthropological evidence on ritual in order to better understand the mechanism by which first impressions from faces are acquired. Consistent with the TIM framework, we argue that examination of ritual body modification performed by communities around the world demonstrates far greater cross-cultural variability in face-trait mappings than currently appreciated. Furthermore, rituals of this type may be a powerful mechanism through which face-trait associations are transmitted from one generation to the next. This article is part of the theme issue 'Ritual renaissance: new insights into the most human of behaviours'.

Thinking about Others' Minds: Mental State Inference in Boys with Conduct Problems and Callous-Unemotional Traits

Children with conduct problems (CP) and high levels of callous-unemotional traits (CP/HCU) have been found to have an intact ability to represent other minds, however, they behave in ways that indicate a reduced propensity to consider other people’s thoughts and feelings. Here we report findings from three tasks assessing different aspects of mentalising in 81 boys aged 11–16 [Typically developing (TD) n = 27; CP/HCU n = 28; CP and low levels of callous-unemotional traits (CP/LCU) n = 26]. Participants completed the Movie Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC), a task assessing ability/propensity to incorporate judgements concerning an individual’s mind into mental state inference; provided a written description of a good friend to assess mind-mindedness; and completed the Social Judgement Task (SJT), a new measure assessing mentalising about antisocial actions. Boys with CP/HCU had more difficulty in accurately inferring others’ mental states in the MASC than TD and CP/LCU boys. There were no group differences in the number of mind-related comments as assessed by the mind-mindedness protocol or in responses to the SJT task. These findings suggest that although the ability to represent mental states is intact, CP/HCU boys are less likely to update mental state inferences as a function of different minds.

Mentalizing during social InterAction: A four component model

Mentalizing, conventionally defined as the process in which we infer the inner thoughts and intentions of others, is a fundamental component of human social cognition. Yet its role, and the nuanced layers involved, in real world social interaction are rarely discussed. To account for this lack of theory, we propose the interactive mentalizing theory (IMT) -to emphasize the role of metacognition in different mentalizing components. We discuss the connection between mentalizing, metacognition, and social interaction in the context of four elements of mentalizing: (i) Metacognition-inference of our own thought processes and social cognitions and which is central to all other components of mentalizing including: (ii) first-order mentalizing-inferring the thoughts and intentions of an agent's mind; (iii) personal second-order mentalizing-inference of other's mentalizing of one's own mind; (iv) Collective mentalizing: which takes at least two forms (a) vicarious mentalizing: adopting another's mentalizing of an agent (i.e., what we think others think of an agent) and (b) co-mentalizing: mentalizing about an agent in conjunction with others' mentalizing of that agent (i.e., conforming to others beliefs about another agent's internal states). The weights of these four elements is determined by metacognitive insight and confidence in one's own or another's mentalizing ability, yielding a dynamic interaction between these circuits. To advance our knowledge on mentalizing during live social interaction, we identify how these subprocesses can be organized by different target agents and facilitated by combining computational modeling and interactive brain approaches.

We Need to Talk About Development and Victims

The article by Lilienfeld and colleagues (this issue) proposes that the study of personality disorders could be substantially advanced by viewing at least some of them as emergent interpersonal syndromes. This commentary considers the need for a developmental approach in understanding how the emergent interpersonal syndromes arise. It also highlights the importance of systematically studying individual differences in victimization. We need to understand why some are more likely than others to be exploited, victimized, or remain in a dysfunctional relationship with an individual with a personality disorder.

Self-processing in individuals with autism spectrum disorder

Research attempting to explain the social difficulties observed in autism spectrum disorder has focused predominantly on difficulties understanding others, but there are indications that self-referential processing is also atypical in autism. For example, infants who later get an autism diagnosis show a reduced response when hearing their own name. In addition, research suggests that the self-bias (the tendency to preferentially process information when self-relevant) is smaller or absent in autism. However, findings are mixed: researchers are yet to clarify exactly those aspects of self-processing which are atypical in autism and in what way they are atypical. To gain further insight into these issues, future studies should focus on whether and how different aspects of self-processing are related in both neurotypical and autistic individuals. Furthermore, the (a)typical development of different aspects of the self, as well as the impact of the self on different domains of cognitive processing, deserves further attention, requiring studies with participants in a wide age range. Finally, the use of neural measures of self-processing will be invaluable, given the recent hypothesis that autistic individuals may learn to compensate for difficulties by relying on neural pathways which differ from those utilised by neurotypical individuals. Autism Res 2019, 1-5. © 2019 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: Research has indicated that individuals with autism spectrum disorder show differences in the processing of self-relevant information. However, as yet, exactly how self-processing differs in autism remains unknown. To further our understanding of the self in autism, future studies should focus on the relationship between different aspects of self-processing, investigating brain activity as well as behaviour, across a wide range of ages.