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Kiefer M, Kammer T. The Relation Between Subjective and Objective Measures of Visual Awareness: Current Evidence, Attempt of a Synthesis and Future Research Directions. J Cogn 2024; 7:59. [PMID: 39035071 PMCID: PMC11259121 DOI: 10.5334/joc.381] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/28/2024] [Accepted: 06/23/2024] [Indexed: 07/23/2024] Open
Abstract
Within the realm of consciousness research, different methods of measuring the content of visual awareness are used: On the one hand, subjective measures require a report of sensory experiences related to a stimulus. On the other hand, objective measures rely on the observer's performance to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus. The most appropriate measure of awareness is currently debated. To contribute to this debate, we review findings on the relation between subjective and objective measures of awareness. Although subjective measures sometimes lag behind objective measures, a substantial number of studies demonstrates a convergence of measures. Based on the reviewed studies, we identify five aspects relevant for achieving a convergence of measures. Future research could then identify and empirically test the boundary conditions, under which a convergence or divergence of subjective and measures of awareness is observed.
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Meyen S, Vadillo MA, von Luxburg U, Franz VH. No evidence for contextual cueing beyond explicit recognition. Psychon Bull Rev 2024; 31:907-930. [PMID: 37845567 PMCID: PMC11192686 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-023-02358-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/31/2023] [Indexed: 10/18/2023]
Abstract
Many studies claim that visual regularities can be learned unconsciously and without explicit awareness. For example in the contextual cueing paradigm, studies often make claims using a standard reasoning based on two results: (1) a reliable response time (RT) difference between repeated vs. new stimulus displays and (2) a close-to-chance sensitivity when participants are asked to explicitly recognize repeated stimulus displays. From this pattern of results, studies routinely conclude that the sensitivity of RT responses is higher than that of explicit responses-an empirical situation we call Indirect Task Advantage (ITA). Many studies further infer from an ITA that RT effects were driven by a form of recognition that exceeds explicit memory: implicit recognition. However, this reasoning is flawed because the sensitivity underlying RT effects is never computed. To properly establish a difference, a sensitivity comparison is required. We apply this sensitivity comparison in a reanalysis of 20 contextual cueing studies showing that not a single study provides consistent evidence for ITAs. Responding to recent correlation-based arguments, we also demonstrate the absence of evidence for ITAs at the level of individual participants. This lack of ITAs has serious consequences for the field: If RT effects can be fully explained by weak but above-chance explicit recognition sensitivity, what is the empirical content of the label "implicit"? Thus, theoretical discussions in this paradigm-and likely in other paradigms using this standard reasoning-require serious reassessment because the current data from contextual cueing studies is insufficient to consider recognition as implicit.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sascha Meyen
- Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 6, 72076, Tübingen, Germany.
| | | | - Ulrike von Luxburg
- Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 6, 72076, Tübingen, Germany
- Tübingen AI Center, Tübingen, Germany
| | - Volker H Franz
- Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 6, 72076, Tübingen, Germany
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3
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Alais D, Coorey J, Blake R, Davidson MJ. A new 'CFS tracking' paradigm reveals uniform suppression depth regardless of target complexity or salience. eLife 2024; 12:RP91019. [PMID: 38682887 PMCID: PMC11057872 DOI: 10.7554/elife.91019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/01/2024] Open
Abstract
When the eyes view separate and incompatible images, the brain suppresses one image and promotes the other into visual awareness. Periods of interocular suppression can be prolonged during continuous flash suppression (CFS) - when one eye views a static 'target' while the other views a complex dynamic stimulus. Measuring the time needed for a suppressed image to break CFS (bCFS) has been widely used to investigate unconscious processing, and the results have generated controversy regarding the scope of visual processing without awareness. Here, we address this controversy with a new 'CFS tracking' paradigm (tCFS) in which the suppressed monocular target steadily increases in contrast until breaking into awareness (as in bCFS) after which it decreases until it again disappears (reCFS), with this cycle continuing for many reversals. Unlike bCFS, tCFS provides a measure of suppression depth by quantifying the difference between breakthrough and suppression thresholds. tCFS confirms that (i) breakthrough thresholds indeed differ across target types (e.g. faces vs gratings, as bCFS has shown) - but (ii) suppression depth does not vary across target types. Once the breakthrough contrast is reached for a given stimulus, all stimuli require a strikingly uniform reduction in contrast to reach the corresponding suppression threshold. This uniform suppression depth points to a single mechanism of CFS suppression, one that likely occurs early in visual processing because suppression depth was not modulated by target salience or complexity. More fundamentally, it shows that variations in bCFS thresholds alone are insufficient for inferring whether the barrier to achieving awareness exerted by interocular suppression is weaker for some categories of visual stimuli compared to others.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Alais
- School of Psychology, The University of SydneySydneyAustralia
| | - Jacob Coorey
- School of Psychology, The University of SydneySydneyAustralia
| | - Randolph Blake
- Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUnited States
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4
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Stein T, van Gaal S, Fahrenfort JJ. How (not) to demonstrate unconscious priming: Overcoming issues with post-hoc data selection, low power, and frequentist statistics. Conscious Cogn 2024; 119:103669. [PMID: 38395013 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103669] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/13/2023] [Revised: 02/16/2024] [Accepted: 02/16/2024] [Indexed: 02/25/2024]
Abstract
One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timo Stein
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Johannes J Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Department of Applied and Experimental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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5
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Yaron I, Zeevi Y, Korisky U, Marshall W, Mudrik L. Progressing, not regressing: A possible solution to the problem of regression to the mean in unconscious processing studies. Psychon Bull Rev 2024; 31:49-64. [PMID: 37528278 PMCID: PMC10867080 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-023-02326-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 06/06/2023] [Indexed: 08/03/2023]
Abstract
How convincing is current evidence for unconscious processing? Recently, a major criticism suggested that some, if not much, of this evidence might be explained by a mere statistical phenomenon: regression to the mean (RttM). Excluding participants based on an awareness assessment is a common practice in studies of unconscious processing, and this post hoc data selection might lead to false effects that are driven by RttM for aware participants wrongfully classified as unaware. Here, we examined this criticism using both simulations and data from 12 studies probing unconscious processing (35 effects overall). In line with the original criticism, we confirmed that the reliability of awareness measures in the field is concerningly low. Yet, using simulations, we showed that reliability measures might be unsuitable for estimating error in awareness measures. Furthermore, we examined other solutions for assessing whether an effect is genuine or reflects RttM; all suffered from substantial limitations, such as a lack of specificity to unconscious processing, lack of power, or unjustified assumptions. Accordingly, we suggest a new nonparametric solution, which enjoys high specificity and relatively high power. Together, this work emphasizes the need to account for measurement error in awareness measures and evaluate its consequences for unconscious processing effects. It further suggests a way to meet the important challenge posed by RttM, in an attempt to establish a reliable and robust corpus of knowledge in studying unconscious processing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Itay Yaron
- The Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 39040, Israel.
| | - Yoav Zeevi
- The Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 39040, Israel
- Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 39040, Israel
| | - Uri Korisky
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 39040, Israel
| | - William Marshall
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, 53719, USA
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, L2S 3A1, Canada
| | - Liad Mudrik
- The Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 39040, Israel
- School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 39040, Israel
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6
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Schmidt T, Biafora M. A theory of visibility measures in the dissociation paradigm. Psychon Bull Rev 2024; 31:65-88. [PMID: 37528279 PMCID: PMC10977871 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-023-02332-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 06/26/2023] [Indexed: 08/03/2023]
Abstract
Research on perception without awareness primarily relies on the dissociation paradigm, which compares a measure of awareness of a critical stimulus (direct measure) with a measure indicating that the stimulus has been processed at all (indirect measure). We argue that dissociations between direct and indirect measures can only be demonstrated with respect to the critical stimulus feature that generates the indirect effect, and the observer's awareness of that feature, the critical cue. We expand Kahneman's (Psychological Bulletin, 70, 404-425, 1968) concept of criterion content to comprise the set of all cues that an observer actually uses to perform the direct task. Different direct measures can then be compared by studying the overlap of their criterion contents and their containment of the critical cue. Because objective and subjective measures may integrate different sets of cues, one measure generally cannot replace the other without sacrificing important information. Using a simple mathematical formalization, we redefine and clarify the concepts of validity, exclusiveness, and exhaustiveness in the dissociation paradigm, show how dissociations among different awareness measures falsify both single-valued measures and monocausal theories of "consciousness," and formulate the demand that theories of visual awareness should be sufficiently specific to explain dissociations among different facets of awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Schmidt
- Faculty of Social Sciences, Visual Attention and Awareness Laboratory, University of Kaiserslautern-Landau (RPTU), Erwin-Schrödinger-Str. Geb. 57, D-67663, Kaiserslautern, Germany.
| | - Melanie Biafora
- Faculty of Social Sciences, Visual Attention and Awareness Laboratory, University of Kaiserslautern-Landau (RPTU), Erwin-Schrödinger-Str. Geb. 57, D-67663, Kaiserslautern, Germany
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Sánchez-Fuenzalida N, van Gaal S, Fleming SM, Haaf JM, Fahrenfort JJ. Predictions and rewards affect decision-making but not subjective experience. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2220749120. [PMID: 37878723 PMCID: PMC10622870 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2220749120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/07/2022] [Accepted: 09/12/2023] [Indexed: 10/27/2023] Open
Abstract
To survive, organisms constantly make decisions to avoid danger and maximize rewards in information-rich environments. As a result, decisions about sensory input are not only driven by sensory information but also by other factors, such as the expected rewards of a decision (known as the payoff matrix) or by information about temporal regularities in the environment (known as cognitive priors or predictions). However, it is unknown to what extent these different types of information affect subjective experience or whether they merely result in nonperceptual response criterion shifts. To investigate this question, we used three carefully matched manipulations that typically result in behavioral shifts in decision criteria: a visual illusion (Müller-Lyer condition), a punishment scheme (payoff condition), and a change in the ratio of relevant stimuli (base rate condition). To gauge shifts in subjective experience, we introduce a task in which participants not only make decisions about what they have just seen but are also asked to reproduce their experience of a target stimulus. Using Bayesian ordinal modeling, we show that each of these three manipulations affects the decision criterion as intended but that the visual illusion uniquely affects sensory experience as measured by reproduction. In a series of follow-up experiments, we use computational modeling to show that although the visual illusion results in a distinct drift-diffusion (DDM) parameter profile relative to nonsensory manipulations, reliance on DDM parameter estimates alone is not sufficient to ascertain whether a given manipulation is perceptual or nonperceptual.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nicolás Sánchez-Fuenzalida
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
| | - Stephen M. Fleming
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, LondonWC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, LondonWC1H 0AP, United Kingdom
- Max Planck Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, LondonWC1B 5EH, United Kingdom
| | - Julia M. Haaf
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
| | - Johannes J. Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain & Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam1001NK, The Netherlands
- Department of Applied and Experimental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam1081HV, The Netherlands
- Institute for Brain and Behavior Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam1081HV, The Netherlands
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Kiefer M, Frühauf V, Kammer T. Subjective and objective measures of visual awareness converge. PLoS One 2023; 18:e0292438. [PMID: 37788260 PMCID: PMC10547206 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0292438] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2023] [Accepted: 09/20/2023] [Indexed: 10/05/2023] Open
Abstract
Within consciousness research, the most appropriate assessment of visual awareness is matter of a controversial debate: Subjective measures rely on introspections of the observer related to perceptual experiences, whereas objective measures are based on performance of the observer to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus in question across a series of trials. In the present study, we compared subjective and objective awareness measurements across different stimulus feature and contrast levels using a temporal two-alternative forced choice task. This task has the advantage to provide an objective psychophysical performance measurement, while minimizing biases from unconscious processing. Thresholds based on subjective ratings with the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) and on performance accuracy were determined for detection (stimulus presence) and discrimination (letter case) tasks at high and low stimulus contrast. We found a comparable pattern of thresholds across tasks and contrasts for objective and subjective measurements of awareness. These findings suggest that objective performance measures based on accuracy and subjective ratings of the visual experience can provide similar information on the feature-content of a percept. The observed similarity of thresholds validates psychophysical and subjective approaches to awareness as providing converging and thus most likely veridical measures of awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Markus Kiefer
- Department of Psychiatry, Ulm University, Ulm, Germany
| | | | - Thomas Kammer
- Department of Psychiatry, Ulm University, Ulm, Germany
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9
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Michel M. Confidence in consciousness research. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2023; 14:e1628. [PMID: 36205300 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1628] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2022] [Revised: 09/14/2022] [Accepted: 09/21/2022] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
To study (un)conscious perception and test hypotheses about consciousness, researchers need procedures for determining whether subjects consciously perceive stimuli or not. This article is an introduction to a family of procedures called "confidence-based procedures," which consist in interpreting metacognitive indicators as indicators of consciousness. I assess the validity and accuracy of these procedures, and answer a series of common objections to their use in consciousness research. I conclude that confidence-based procedures are valid for assessing consciousness, and, in most cases, accurate enough for our practical and scientific purposes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Perception and Psychophysics Philosophy > Consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthias Michel
- Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, New York University, New York, New York, USA
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10
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Sensitivity vs. awareness curve: A novel model-based analysis to uncover the processes underlying nonconscious perception. Psychon Bull Rev 2022; 30:553-563. [PMID: 36163609 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-022-02180-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 09/04/2022] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
In this study, we present a novel model-based analysis of the association between awareness and perceptual processing based on a multidimensional version of signal detection theory (general recognition theory, or GRT). The analysis fits a GRT model to behavioral data and uses the estimated model to construct a sensitivity versus awareness (SvA) curve, representing sensitivity in the discrimination task at each value of relative likelihood of awareness. This approach treats awareness as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, but also provides an objective benchmark for low likelihood of awareness. In two experiments, we assessed nonconscious facial expression recognition using SvA curves in a condition in which faces (fearful vs. neutral) were rendered invisible using continuous flash suppression (CFS) for 500 and 700 milliseconds. We predicted and found nonconscious processing of face emotion, in the form of higher than chance-level sensitivity in the area of low likelihood of awareness.
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11
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Baumann L, Valuch C. Priming of natural scene categorization during continuous flash suppression. Conscious Cogn 2022; 104:103387. [PMID: 36007344 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103387] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/10/2022] [Revised: 07/15/2022] [Accepted: 08/02/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) reduces conscious awareness of stimuli. Whether stimuli suppressed by CFS are processed at categorical or semantic levels is still debated. Here, we approached this question using a large set of indoor and outdoor scene photographs in a priming paradigm. Perceptually suppressed primes were followed by visible targets. Participants rapidly reported whether the targets showed an indoor or an outdoor scene. Responses were faster (and fast responses more accurate) when primes and targets came from a congruent superordinate category (e.g., both were outdoor scenes). During CFS, priming effects were relatively small (up to 10 ms) and modulated by prime visibility and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of prime and target. Without CFS, the stimuli elicited consistent and more robust priming effects (about 24 ms). Our results imply that scene category is processed during CFS, although some residual prime visibility is likely necessary for significant priming effects to occur.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leonie Baumann
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Goettingen, Germany
| | - Christian Valuch
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Goettingen, Germany; Department of Cognition, Emotion, and Methods in Psychology, University of Vienna, Austria.
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12
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Francken JC, Beerendonk L, Molenaar D, Fahrenfort JJ, Kiverstein JD, Seth AK, van Gaal S. An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious 2022; 2022:niac011. [PMID: 35975240 PMCID: PMC9374479 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/17/2021] [Revised: 05/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/27/2022] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jolien C Francken
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Sciences, Radboud University, Erasmusplein 1, 6525 HT, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
| | - Lola Beerendonk
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Dylan Molenaar
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Johannes J Fahrenfort
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit, Van der Boechorststraat 7, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Julian D Kiverstein
- Academic Medical Centre, University of Amsterdam, Meibergdreef 9, 1105 AZ, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Anil K Seth
- Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) Program on Brain, Mind, and Consciousness, MaRS Centre, West Tower, 661 University Avenue, Toronto, ON M5G 1M1, Canada
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129-B, 1018 WS, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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Hutchinson BT, Bandara KH, McGovern HT, Talipski LA. Insights on overflow from failure to report tasks. Behav Brain Res 2022; 417:113610. [PMID: 34600961 DOI: 10.1016/j.bbr.2021.113610] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2021] [Revised: 09/18/2021] [Accepted: 09/20/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Theories of consciousness diverge on the functional requirement that a conscious state need be reportable. Some maintain that the perceptual system's capacity for consciousness exceeds that of its capacity for access. Others contend that what is accessed is all there is to consciousness. Here, we suggest a compelling case for access-free consciousness cannot be made reliant on experimental evidence where access is necessarily invoked. However, a bona fide empirical separation of consciousness and report could counter the claim that reportability, and hence access, is all there is to consciousness. We first overview recent neurophysiological findings from no-report tasks, before examining a series of studies in which participants were unable to report features of clearly visible items. These new data present a challenge for a hard "access-only" view of consciousness, as they appear to demonstrate that properties of our visual experience can remain unreportable. In so doing, we highlight the utility and underappreciated value of so-called failure to report tasks.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Kavindu H Bandara
- Research School of Psychology, Australian National University, Australia
| | | | - Louisa A Talipski
- Research School of Psychology, Australian National University, Australia
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14
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Sklar AY, Goldstein A, Hassin RR. Regression to the Mean Does Not Explain Away Nonconscious Processing. Exp Psychol 2021; 68:130-136. [PMID: 34711077 DOI: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000518] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
In studies that use subliminal presentations, participants may become aware of stimuli that are intended to remain subliminal. A common solution to this problem is to analyze the results of the group of participants for whom the stimuli remained subliminal. A recent article (Shanks, 2017) argued that this method leads to a regression to the mean artifact, which may account for many of the observed effects. However, conceptual and statistical characteristics of the original publication lead to overestimation of the influence of the artifact. Using simulations, we demonstrate that this overestimation leads to the mistaken conclusion that regression to the mean accounts for nonconscious effects. We conclude by briefly outlining a new description of the influence of the artifact and how it should be statistically addressed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Asael Y Sklar
- Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
| | | | - Ran R Hassin
- Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
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15
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Morgan RM, Abrams RL. Recruitment of newly acquired category exemplars into unconscious processing systems is rapid and durable. Conscious Cogn 2021; 95:103205. [PMID: 34487994 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103205] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/05/2021] [Revised: 07/21/2021] [Accepted: 08/26/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
In a series of 3 unconscious priming experiments, we investigated if newly acquired English language words can become integrated into unconscious processing systems, and what preconditions are required to enable this process. In each experiment participants learned English language names of extremely rare fish and flowers in a single learning session. After a varying interval of time and in some cases a brief session of repeated conscious exposure (relearning), the newly learned words were presented as briefly flashed, visually masked primes in a standard unconscious category priming procedure. Results show that newly acquired words are recruited quickly into unconscious processing systems. Furthermore, this acquisition persists for at least 48 h and is dependent on prime duration. Since priming was only obtained after an interval that included overnight sleep, consolidation during sleep may play a role in the integration of novel words into unconscious processing systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Reed M Morgan
- Loyola Marymount University, LMU Psychology, 1 LMU Drive, Suite 4700, Los Angeles, CA 90045-2659, United States
| | - Richard L Abrams
- Loyola Marymount University, LMU Psychology, 1 LMU Drive, Suite 4700, Los Angeles, CA 90045-2659, United States.
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16
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Abstract
Studies of unconscious mental processes often compare a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with a measure of awareness (e.g., a verbal report or forced-choice response) of the critical cue or contingency taken either concurrently or separately. The resulting patterns of bivariate data across participants lend themselves to several analytic approaches for inferring the existence of unconscious mental processes, but it is rare for researchers to consider the underlying generative processes that might cause these patterns. We show that bivariate data are generally insufficient to discriminate single-process models, with a unitary latent process determining both performance and awareness, from dual-process models, comprising distinct latent processes for performance and awareness. Future research attempting to isolate and investigate unconscious processes will need to employ richer types of data and analyses.
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Affiliation(s)
- David R Shanks
- Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, UK
| | - Simone Malejka
- Department of Psychology, University of Cologne, Germany
| | - Miguel A Vadillo
- Departamento de Psicología Básica, Facultad de Psicología, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain
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17
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Rohr M, Wentura D. Degree and Complexity of Non-conscious Emotional Information Processing - A Review of Masked Priming Studies. Front Hum Neurosci 2021; 15:689369. [PMID: 34239432 PMCID: PMC8258119 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2021.689369] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/31/2021] [Accepted: 05/24/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Whether and to what degree information can be processed non-consciously has been a matter of debate since the emergence of psychology as a science. Emotional information, in particular, has often been assumed to have a privileged status because of its relevance for well-being and survival (e.g., to detect a threat). Indeed, many studies have explored non-conscious processing of evaluative (i.e., "emotional" in a broad sense) or emotional (e.g., facial expressions) features using the "silver bullet" of non-consciousness research - the masked sequential priming paradigm. In its prototypical form, this paradigm involves the categorization of target stimuli according to valence (e.g., is the target positive or negative?). Each target is preceded by a briefly presented prime that is followed by a mask to constrain awareness. Non-conscious processing is inferred from subtle influences of the prime on target processing, that is, whether responses are faster if prime and target are valence-congruent or not. We will review this research with a focus on three questions: first, which methods are used in this area to establish non-conscious processing? Second, is there evidence for non-conscious extraction of evaluative information? Third, is there evidence for non-conscious processing beyond a simple valence (positive/negative) discrimination, for example, processing of emotion-specific information? We will highlight important current debates and potential directions in which the field will move in the future.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michaela Rohr
- Department of Cognitive Psychology, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
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18
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Stein T, Kaiser D, Fahrenfort JJ, van Gaal S. The human visual system differentially represents subjectively and objectively invisible stimuli. PLoS Biol 2021; 19:e3001241. [PMID: 33951043 PMCID: PMC8128378 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.3001241] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/22/2020] [Revised: 05/17/2021] [Accepted: 04/20/2021] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
The study of unconscious processing requires a measure of conscious awareness. Awareness measures can be either subjective (based on participant's report) or objective (based on perceptual performance). The preferred awareness measure depends on the theoretical position about consciousness and may influence conclusions about the extent of unconscious processing and about the neural correlates of consciousness. We obtained functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measurements from 43 subjects while they viewed masked faces and houses that were either subjectively or objectively invisible. Even for objectively invisible (perceptually indiscriminable) stimuli, we found significant category information in both early, lower-level visual areas and in higher-level visual cortex, although representations in anterior, category-selective ventrotemporal areas were less robust. For subjectively invisible stimuli, similar to visible stimuli, there was a clear posterior-to-anterior gradient in visual cortex, with stronger category information in ventrotemporal cortex than in early visual cortex. For objectively invisible stimuli, however, category information remained virtually unchanged from early visual cortex to object- and category-selective visual areas. These results demonstrate that although both objectively and subjectively invisible stimuli are represented in visual cortex, the extent of unconscious information processing is influenced by the measurement approach. Furthermore, our data show that subjective and objective approaches are associated with different neural correlates of consciousness and thus have implications for neural theories of consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timo Stein
- Brain and Cognition, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Daniel Kaiser
- Department of Psychology, University of York, United Kingdom
| | - Johannes J. Fahrenfort
- Brain and Cognition, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Cognitive Psychology, Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands
| | - Simon van Gaal
- Brain and Cognition, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
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19
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Stein T, Peelen MV. Dissociating conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects. Nat Hum Behav 2021; 5:612-624. [PMID: 33398144 DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-01004-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/30/2020] [Accepted: 10/21/2020] [Indexed: 01/28/2023]
Abstract
The scope of unconscious processing is highly debated, with recent studies showing that even high-level functions such as perceptual integration and category-based attention occur unconsciously. For example, upright faces that are suppressed from awareness through interocular suppression break into awareness more quickly than inverted faces. Similarly, verbal object cues boost otherwise invisible objects into awareness. Here, we replicate these findings, but find that they reflect a general difference in detectability not specific to interocular suppression. To dissociate conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects, we use an additional discrimination task to rule out conscious processes as a cause for these differences. Results from this detection-discrimination dissociation paradigm reveal that, while face orientation is processed unconsciously, category-based attention requires awareness. These findings provide insights into the function of conscious perception and offer an experimental approach for mapping out the scope and limits of unconscious processing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timo Stein
- Brain and Cognition, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
| | - Marius V Peelen
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
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20
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Abstract
Studies utilizing continuous flash suppression (CFS) provide valuable information regarding conscious and nonconscious perception. There are, however, crucial unanswered questions regarding the mechanisms of suppression and the level of visual processing in the absence of consciousness with CFS. Research suggests that the answers to these questions depend on the experimental configuration and how we assess consciousness in these studies. The aim of this review is to evaluate the impact of different experimental configurations and the assessment of consciousness on the results of the previous CFS studies. We review studies that evaluated the influence of different experimental configuration on the depth of suppression with CFS and discuss how different assessments of consciousness may impact the results of CFS studies. Finally, we review behavioral and brain recording studies of CFS. In conclusion, previous studies provide evidence for survival of low-level visual information and complete impairment of high-level visual information under the influence of CFS. That is, studies suggest that nonconscious perception of lower-level visual information happens with CFS, but there is no evidence for nonconscious high-level recognition with CFS.
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21
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Homan P, Lau HL, Levy I, Raio CM, Bach DR, Carmel D, Schiller D. Evidence for a minimal role of stimulus awareness in reversal of threat learning. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2021; 28:95-103. [PMID: 33593928 PMCID: PMC7888237 DOI: 10.1101/lm.050997.119] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2019] [Accepted: 12/02/2020] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
In an ever-changing environment, survival depends on learning which stimuli represent threat, and also on updating such associations when circumstances shift. It has been claimed that humans can acquire physiological responses to threat-associated stimuli even when they are unaware of them, but the role of awareness in updating threat contingencies remains unknown. This complex process-generating novel responses while suppressing learned ones-relies on distinct neural mechanisms from initial learning, and has only been shown with awareness. Can it occur unconsciously? Here, we present evidence that threat reversal may not require awareness. Participants underwent classical threat conditioning to visual stimuli that were suppressed from awareness. One of two images was paired with an electric shock; halfway through the experiment, contingencies were reversed and the shock was paired with the other image. Despite variations in suppression across participants, we found that physiological responses reflected changes in stimulus-threat pairings independently of stimulus awareness. These findings suggest that unconscious affective processing may be sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing circumstances.
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Affiliation(s)
- Philipp Homan
- Psychiatric University Hospital Zurich, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland
| | - H Lee Lau
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland.,Department of Neuroscience, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland.,Friedman Brain Institute, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York 10029, USA
| | - Ifat Levy
- Department of Comparative Medicine, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York 10029, USA.,Department of Neuroscience, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York 10029, USA.,Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520, USA
| | - Candace M Raio
- New York University Grossman School of Medicine, New York, New York 10016, USA
| | - Dominik R Bach
- Computational Psychiatry Research, Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy, and Psychosomatics, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland.,Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, London WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom
| | - David Carmel
- School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Kelburn Parade, Wellington 6012, New Zealand
| | - Daniela Schiller
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland.,Department of Neuroscience, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland.,Friedman Brain Institute, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, New York 10029, USA
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22
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Baier D, Goller F, Ansorge U. Awareness and Stimulus-Driven Spatial Attention as Independent Processes. Front Hum Neurosci 2020; 14:352. [PMID: 32982706 PMCID: PMC7493193 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2020.00352] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/16/2020] [Accepted: 08/04/2020] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
To investigate the relation between attention and awareness, we manipulated visibility/awareness and stimulus-driven attention capture among metacontrast-masked visual stimuli. By varying the time interval between target and mask, we manipulated target visibility measured as target discrimination accuracies (ACCs; Experiments 1 and 2) and as subjective awareness ratings (Experiment 3). To modulate stimulus-driven attention capture, we presented the masked target either as a color-singleton (the target stands out by its unique color among homogeneously colored non-singletons), as a non-singleton together with a distractor singleton elsewhere (an irrelevant distractor has a unique color, whereas the target is colored like the other stimuli) or without a singleton (no stimulus stands out; only in Experiment 1). As color singletons capture attention in a stimulus-driven way, we expected target visibility/discrimination performance to be best for target singletons and worst with distractor singletons. In Experiments 1 and 2, we confirmed that the masking interval and the singleton manipulation influenced ACCs in an independent way and that attention capture by the singletons, with facilitated performance in target-singleton compared to distractor-singleton conditions, was found regardless of the interval-induced (in-)visibility of the targets. In Experiment 1, we also confirmed that attention capture was the same among participants with worse and better visibility/discrimination performance. In Experiment 2, we confirmed attention capture by color singletons with better discrimination performance for probes presented at singleton position, compared to other positions. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that attention capture by target singletons also increased target awareness and that this capture effect on subjective awareness was independent of the effect of the masking interval, too. Together, results provide new evidence that stimulus-driven attention and awareness operate independently from one another and that stimulus-driven attention capture can precede awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Diane Baier
- Department of Cognition, Emotion, and Methods in Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
| | - Florian Goller
- Department of Consumer Service, University of Applied Sciences Wiener Neustadt, Wiener Neustadt, Austria
| | - Ulrich Ansorge
- Department of Cognition, Emotion, and Methods in Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.,Cognitive Research Hub, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
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23
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Stein T, Utz V, van Opstal F. Unconscious semantic priming from pictures under backward masking and continuous flash suppression. Conscious Cogn 2019; 78:102864. [PMID: 31896031 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102864] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/21/2018] [Revised: 11/20/2019] [Accepted: 12/19/2019] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
It is debated whether the meaning of invisible pictures can be processed unconsciously. We tested whether pictures of animals or objects presented under backward masking or continuous flash suppression could prime the subsequent categorization of target words into animal or non-animal. In Experiment 1, the backward masking part failed to replicate the priming effect reported in two previous studies, despite sufficient statistical power (N = 59). Similarly, the continuous flash suppression part provided no evidence for a priming effect. In Experiment 2 (N = 65) we shortened the prime-target SOA from 290 ms to 90 ms, but again failed to obtain unconscious semantic priming under backward masking. Thus, our study did not provide evidence for unconscious semantic processing of pictures. These findings support the emerging view that unconscious processing is rather limited in scope.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timo Stein
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.
| | - Vanessa Utz
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
| | - Filip van Opstal
- Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
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24
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Induced dissociations: Opposite time courses of priming and masking induced by custom-made mask-contrast functions. Atten Percept Psychophys 2019; 82:1333-1354. [PMID: 31338826 DOI: 10.3758/s13414-019-01822-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
We present a new experimental technique to induce dissociations between the visibility of a masked prime and its ability to induce a priming effect in response times. In three experiments, we systematically couple an independent variable known to influence the priming effect (prime-mask SOA) with a variable expected to influence prime visibility but not priming (mask contrast). This way, we create mask-contrast functions where mask contrast either increases with SOA, decreases, or remains constant at maximum or minimum levels. We show that different mask-contrast functions can lead to qualitatively different time courses of masking without affecting the time course of priming, allowing for double dissociations (e.g., increasing priming effects under decreasing prime visibility). For the first time, we demonstrate such double dissociations for response priming by color as well as shape stimuli. We also show that the technique requires stimuli that decouple the mask's ability to mask the prime from its ability to activate the response. We conclude that mask-contrast functions can accentuate or even induce dissociations between priming and masking, opening new possibilities for studying perception without awareness.
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25
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Oxner M, Corballis PM, Hayward WG. The relation of discrete stimuli can be integrated despite the failure of conscious identification. VISUAL COGNITION 2018. [DOI: 10.1080/13506285.2018.1541035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Matt Oxner
- School of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
| | | | - William G. Hayward
- School of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
- Department of Psychology and ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and Its Disorders, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
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26
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Persuh M, LaRock E, Berger J. Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play. Front Hum Neurosci 2018; 12:78. [PMID: 29551967 PMCID: PMC5840147 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2018.00078] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/29/2017] [Accepted: 02/12/2018] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Working memory (WM), an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. WM has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system-that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious WM. In this article, we focus on visual working memory (VWM) and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious WM. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious WM store, though we offer independent reasons to think that WM may operate on unconsciously perceived information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marjan Persuh
- Department of Social Sciences, Human Services and Criminal Justice, Borough of Manhattan Community College, City University of New York, New York, NY, United States
| | - Eric LaRock
- Department of Philosophy, 751 Mathematics and Science Center, Oakland University, Rochester, MI, United States
| | - Jacob Berger
- Department of English and Philosophy, Idaho State University, Pocatello, ID, United States
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27
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Avneon M, Lamy D. Reexamining unconscious response priming: A liminal-prime paradigm. Conscious Cogn 2018; 59:87-103. [PMID: 29329968 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.12.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/11/2017] [Revised: 11/29/2017] [Accepted: 12/28/2017] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Abstract
Research on the limits of unconscious processing typically relies on the subliminal-prime paradigm. However, this paradigm is limited in the issues it can address. Here, we examined the implications of using the liminal-prime paradigm, which allows comparing unconscious and conscious priming with constant stimulation. We adapted an iconic demonstration of unconscious response priming to the liminal-prime paradigm. On the one hand, temporal attention allocated to the prime and its relevance to the task increased the magnitude of response priming. On the other hand, the longer RTs associated with the dual task inherent to the paradigm resulted in response priming being underestimated, because unconscious priming effects were shorter-lived than conscious-priming effects. Nevertheless, when the impact of long RTs was alleviated by considering the fastest trials or by imposing a response deadline, conscious response priming remained considerably larger than unconscious response priming. These findings suggest that conscious perception strongly modulates response priming.
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28
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Affiliation(s)
- Marjan Persuh
- Department of Social Sciences, Human Services and Criminal Justice, Borough of Manhattan Community College, City University of New York, New York, NY, United States
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29
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Velichkovsky BB. Consciousness and working memory: Current trends and research perspectives. Conscious Cogn 2017; 55:35-45. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.07.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/11/2017] [Revised: 07/12/2017] [Accepted: 07/17/2017] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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30
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Shanks DR. Regressive research: The pitfalls of post hoc data selection in the study of unconscious mental processes. Psychon Bull Rev 2017; 24:752-775. [PMID: 27753047 PMCID: PMC5486877 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-016-1170-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 82] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
Abstract
Many studies of unconscious processing involve comparing a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with an awareness measure (such as a verbal report or a forced-choice response) taken either concurrently or separately. Unconscious processing is inferred when above-chance performance is combined with null awareness. Often, however, aggregate awareness is better than chance, and data analysis therefore employs a form of extreme group analysis focusing post hoc on participants, trials, or items where awareness is absent or at chance. The pitfalls of this analytic approach are described with particular reference to recent research on implicit learning and subliminal perception. Because of regression to the mean, the approach can mislead researchers into erroneous conclusions concerning unconscious influences on behavior. Recommendations are made about future use of post hoc selection in research on unconscious cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- David R Shanks
- Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London, WC1H 0AP, England.
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31
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Rothkirch M, Hesselmann G. What We Talk about When We Talk about Unconscious Processing - A Plea for Best Practices. Front Psychol 2017; 8:835. [PMID: 28588539 PMCID: PMC5440724 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00835] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2017] [Accepted: 05/08/2017] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
In this perspective article, we first outline the large diversity of methods, measures, statistical analyses, and concepts in the field of the experimental study of unconscious processing. We then suggest that this diversity implies that comparisons between different studies on unconscious processing are fairly limited, especially when stimulus awareness has been assessed in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that flexible choices of methods and measures will inevitably lead to an overestimation of unconscious processes. In the concluding paragraph, we briefly present solutions and strategies for future research. We make a plea for the introduction of "best practices," similar to previous attempts to constitute practicing standards for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG).
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Affiliation(s)
- Marcus Rothkirch
- Visual Perception Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Campus Charité Mitte, Charité – Universitätsmedizin BerlinBerlin, Germany
| | - Guido Hesselmann
- Visual Perception Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Campus Charité Mitte, Charité – Universitätsmedizin BerlinBerlin, Germany
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32
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Kiefer M, Kammer T. The Emergence of Visual Awareness: Temporal Dynamics in Relation to Task and Mask Type. Front Psychol 2017; 8:315. [PMID: 28316583 PMCID: PMC5334328 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00315] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2016] [Accepted: 02/20/2017] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
One aspect of consciousness phenomena, the temporal emergence of visual awareness, has been subject of a controversial debate. How can visual awareness, that is the experiential quality of visual stimuli, be characterized best? Is there a sharp discontinuous or dichotomous transition between unaware and fully aware states, or does awareness emerge gradually encompassing intermediate states? Previous studies yielded conflicting results and supported both dichotomous and gradual views. It is well conceivable that these conflicting results are more than noise, but reflect the dynamic nature of the temporal emergence of visual awareness. Using a psychophysical approach, the present research tested whether the emergence of visual awareness is context-dependent with a temporal two-alternative forced choice task. During backward masking of word targets, it was assessed whether the relative temporal sequence of stimulus thresholds is modulated by the task (stimulus presence, letter case, lexical decision, and semantic category) and by mask type. Four masks with different similarity to the target features were created. Psychophysical functions were then fitted to the accuracy data in the different task conditions as a function of the stimulus mask SOA in order to determine the inflection point (conscious threshold of each feature) and slope of the psychophysical function (transition from unaware to aware within each feature). Depending on feature-mask similarity, thresholds in the different tasks were highly dispersed suggesting a graded transition from unawareness to awareness or had less differentiated thresholds indicating that clusters of features probed by the tasks quite simultaneously contribute to the percept. The latter observation, although not compatible with the notion of a sharp all-or-none transition between unaware and aware states, suggests a less gradual or more discontinuous emergence of awareness. Analyses of slopes of the fitted psychophysical functions also indicated that the emergence of awareness of single features is variable and might be influenced by the continuity of the feature dimensions. The present work thus suggests that the emergence of awareness is neither purely gradual nor dichotomous, but highly dynamic depending on the task and mask type.
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Affiliation(s)
- Markus Kiefer
- Section for Cognitive Electrophysiology, Department of Psychiatry, Ulm University Ulm, Germany
| | - Thomas Kammer
- Section for Neurostimulation, Department of Psychiatry, Ulm University Ulm, Germany
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33
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Masked emotional priming: A double dissociation between direct and indirect effects reveals non-conscious processing of emotional information beyond valence. Conscious Cogn 2017; 49:203-214. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.01.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/27/2016] [Revised: 01/10/2017] [Accepted: 01/11/2017] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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34
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Abstract
Is semantic priming driven by the objective or perceived meaning of the priming stimulus? This question is relevant given that many studies suggest that the objective meaning of invisible stimuli can influence cognitive processes and behavior. In an experiment involving 66 participants, we tested how the perceived meaning of misperceived stimuli influenced response times. Stroop priming (i.e., longer response times for incongruent than for congruent prime-target pairs) was observed in trials in which the prime was correctly identified. However, reversed Stroop priming was observed when the prime stimulus was incorrectly identified. Even in trials in which participants reported no perception of the prime and identified the primes at close to chance level (i.e., trials that meet both subjective and objective definitions of being subliminal), Stroop priming corresponded to perceived congruency, not objective congruency. This result suggests that occasional weak percepts and mispercepts are intermixed with no percepts in conditions traditionally claimed to be subliminal, casting doubt on claims of subliminal priming made in previous reports.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anders Sand
- Gösta Ekman Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Stockholm University
| | - Mats E Nilsson
- Gösta Ekman Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Stockholm University
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35
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Sand A. Reversed Priming Effects May Be Driven by Misperception Rather than Subliminal Processing. Front Psychol 2016; 7:198. [PMID: 26925016 PMCID: PMC4760073 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00198] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/16/2015] [Accepted: 02/02/2016] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
A new paradigm for investigating whether a cognitive process is independent of perception was recently suggested. In the paradigm, primes are shown at an intermediate signal strength that leads to trial-to-trial and inter-individual variability in prime perception. Here, I used this paradigm and an objective measure of perception to assess the influence of prime identification responses on Stroop priming. I found that sensory states producing correct and incorrect prime identification responses were also associated with qualitatively different priming effects. Incorrect prime identification responses were associated with reversed priming effects but in contrast to previous studies, I interpret this to result from the (mis-)perception of primes rather than from a subliminal process. Furthermore, the intermediate signal strength also produced inter-individual variability in prime perception that strongly influenced priming effects: only participants who on average perceived the primes were Stroop primed. I discuss how this new paradigm, with a wide range of d′ values, is more appropriate when regression analysis on inter-individual identification performance is used to investigate perception-dependent processing. The results of this study, in line with previous results, suggest that drawing conclusions about subliminal processes based on data averaged over individuals may be unwarranted.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anders Sand
- Gösta Ekmans Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Stockholm University Stockholm, Sweden
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36
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Stein T, Kaiser D, Hesselmann G. Can working memory be non-conscious? Neurosci Conscious 2016; 2016:niv011. [PMID: 30774983 PMCID: PMC6368269 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niv011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/28/2015] [Revised: 12/04/2015] [Accepted: 12/08/2015] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Working memory (WM) is closely linked to conscious awareness: In most conceptions of WM, the inputs to WM need to be conscious. The findings of some recent studies, however, have been taken to suggest that WM can indeed operate on non-conscious inputs. Here, we argue that these findings can easily be accommodated by conventional conceptions of non-conscious perception and conscious WM. We conclude that these studies do not provide conclusive evidence for non-conscious WM. It is thus too early to dismiss the traditional view of a tight link between WM and conscious awareness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Timo Stein
- Center for Mind/Brain Sciences (CIMeC), University of Trento, 38068 Rovereto, Italy and
| | - Daniel Kaiser
- Center for Mind/Brain Sciences (CIMeC), University of Trento, 38068 Rovereto, Italy and
| | - Guido Hesselmann
- Visual Perception Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Charité-Universitätsmedizin, 10117 Berlin, Germany
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Bhide A, Schlaggar BL, Barnes KA. Developmental differences in masked form priming are not driven by vocabulary growth. Front Psychol 2014; 5:667. [PMID: 25071641 PMCID: PMC4093752 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00667] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/19/2014] [Accepted: 06/10/2014] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
As children develop into skilled readers, they are able to more quickly and accurately distinguish between words with similar visual forms (i.e., they develop precise lexical representations). The masked form priming lexical decision task is used to test the precision of lexical representations. In this paradigm, a prime (which differs by one letter from the target) is briefly flashed before the target is presented. Participants make a lexical decision to the target. Primes can facilitate reaction time by partially activating the lexical entry for the target. If a prime is unable to facilitate reaction time, it is assumed that participants have a precise orthographic representation of the target and thus the prime is not a close enough match to activate its lexical entry. Previous developmental work has shown that children and adults' lexical decision times are facilitated by form primes preceding words from small neighborhoods (i.e., very few words can be formed by changing one letter in the original word; low N words), but only children are facilitated by form primes preceding words from large neighborhoods (high N words). It has been hypothesized that written vocabulary growth drives the increase in the precision of the orthographic representations; children may not know all of the neighbors of the high N words, making the words effectively low N for them. We tested this hypothesis by (1) equating the effective orthographic neighborhood size of the targets for children and adults and (2) testing whether age or vocabulary size was a better predictor of the extent of form priming. We found priming differences even when controlling for effective neighborhood size. Furthermore, age was a better predictor of form priming effects than was vocabulary size. Our findings provide no support for the hypothesis that growth in written vocabulary size gives rise to more precise lexical representations. We propose that the development of spelling ability may be a more important factor.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adeetee Bhide
- Department of Neurology, Washington University School of Medicine St. Louis, MO, USA
| | - Bradley L Schlaggar
- Department of Neurology, Washington University School of Medicine St. Louis, MO, USA ; Department of Radiology, Washington University School of Medicine St. Louis, MO, USA ; Department of Pediatrics, Washington University School of Medicine St. Louis, MO, USA ; Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology, Washington University School of Medicine St. Louis, MO, USA
| | - Kelly Anne Barnes
- Department of Neurology, Washington University School of Medicine St. Louis, MO, USA
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