Raqeeb, Haastrup, and Evans: Seeking Consistency through a Distributive Justice-Based Approach to Limitation of Treatment in the Context of Dispute

When is life-sustaining treatment not in the best interests of a minimally conscious child? This is an extremely difficult question that incites seemingly intractable debate. And yet, it is the question courts in England and Wales have set out to answer in disputes about appropriate medical treatment for children.

A Just Standard: The Ethical Management of Incidental Findings in Brain Imaging Research

Neuroimaging research regularly yields "incidental findings": observations of potential clinical significance in healthy volunteers or patients, but which are unrelated to the purpose or variables of the study.

Rethinking the Principle of Justice for Marginalized Populations During COVID-19

In the face of limited resources during the COVID-19 pandemic response, public health experts and ethicists have sought to apply guiding principles in determining how those resources, including vaccines, should be allocated.

Distributive justice, equality and the enhancement of human cognition: A commentary on fairness and 'cognitive doping'

What implications might the use of techniques to enhance human cognition have for the kind of polities or civil societies we inhabit? What might political philosophy, if anything, have to tell us about the desirability of using drugs to increase our intellectual powers? Much of the focus in contemporary debates about human enhancement has been upon the ethical desirability of endeavouring to enhance our capacities: should we be meddling with 'human nature', as it were? Therapeutic uses of drugs are regarded as acceptable but enhancement is frowned upon in much of this literature. This rejection of enhancement is especially prevalent in the area of sport where there is a great deal of opposition to doping. Herein I take a somewhat different approach and explore enhancement as a problem in political philosophy and, more specifically, as a problem of distributive justice. Should the enhancement of human intellectual functioning be rejected on distributive grounds of equality? Alternatively, might it be plausibly be argued that distributive justice requires such enhancement? In this paper I shall outline two contemporary theories of justice-namely, the Egalitarianism and the Rawlsian Prioritarianism-and then consider what these principles might tell us about the political legitimacy (or otherwise) of 'doping for intellect'.

Effort or outcome? Children's meritorious decisions

How individuals determine what is fair and just when allocating resources is a fundamental aspect of moral development. Decisions about fairness involve considerations such as merit, which includes effort (one's own exertion to achieve a goal) and outcome (one's product). Previous research has described merit in terms of both effort and outcome (e.g., a meritorious individual is both hard-working and productive). Crucially, no research has documented whether children give priority to being hard-working (high effort) or to being productive (high outcome or product) when allocating resources. This gap in the literature obfuscates two constructs that reflect how individuals allocate resources. The current study examined this process by which children (3- to 10-year-olds, N = 100; M_age = 7.27 years, SD = 2.39) weighed these two different aspects of merit in their fairness decisions in several situations where levels of effort and outcome were varied. When there was a discrepancy between effort and outcome, children increasingly prioritized effort over outcome with age and allocated more resources to hard-working peers than to productive peers. Effort and outcome were also examined. In situations where only effort varied (i.e., outcome was controlled), with age children were more likely to incorporate effort into their fairness decisions; however, in situations where only outcome varied (i.e., effort was controlled), with age children were less likely to incorporate effort into their fairness decisions. Taken together, the findings suggest that as children get older, they increasingly focus on effort of individuals rather than on their productivity when distributing resources.

Legitimacy in bioethics: challenging the orthodoxy

Several prominent writers including Norman Daniels, James Sabin, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson and Leonard Fleck advance a view of legitimacy according to which, roughly, policies are legitimate if and only if they result from democratic deliberation, which employs only public reasons that are publicised to stakeholders. Yet, the process described by this view contrasts with the actual processes involved in creating the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and in attempting to pass the Health Securities Act (HSA). Since the ACA seems to be legitimate, as the HSA would have been had it passed, there seem to be counterexamples to this view. In this essay, I clarify the concept of legitimacy as employed in bioethics discourse. I then use that clarification to develop these examples into a criticism of the orthodox view-that it implies that legitimacy requires counterintuitively large sacrifices of justice in cases where important advancement of healthcare rights depends on violations of publicity. Finally, I reply to three responses to this challenge: (1) that some revision to the orthodox view salvages its core commitments, (2) that its views of publicity and substantive considerations do not have the implications that I claim and (3) that arguments for it are strong enough to support even counterintuitive results. My arguments suggest a greater role for substantive considerations than the orthodox view allows.

Priority Setting: Right Answer to a Far Too Narrow Question? Comment on "Global Developments in Priority Setting in Health"

In their recent editorial, Baltussen and colleagues provide a concise summary of the prevailing discourse on priority-setting in health policy. Their perspective is entirely consistent with current practice, yet they unintentionally demonstrate the narrowness and moral precariousness of that discourse and practice. I respond with demonstrations of the importance of 'interrogating scarcity' in a variety of contexts.

Personal responsibility within health policy: unethical and ineffective

This paper argues against incorporating assessments of individual responsibility into healthcare policies by expanding an existing argument and offering a rebuttal to an argument in favour of such policies. First, it is argued that what primarily underlies discussions surrounding personal responsibility and healthcare is not causal responsibility, moral responsibility or culpability, as one might expect, but biases towards particular highly stigmatised behaviours. A challenge is posed for proponents of taking personal responsibility into account within health policy to either expand the debate to also include socially accepted behaviours or to provide an alternative explanation of the narrowly focused discussion. Second, a critical response is offered to arguments that claim that policies based on personal responsibility would lead to several positive outcomes including healthy behaviour change, better health outcomes and decreases in healthcare spending. It is argued that using individual responsibility as a basis for resource allocation in healthcare is unlikely to motivate positive behaviour changes, and is likely to increase inequality which may lead to worse health outcomes overall. Finally, the case of West Virginia's Medicaid reform is examined, which raises a worry that policies focused on personal responsibility have the potential to lead to increases in medical spending overall.

Ethical questions identified in a study of local and expatriate responders' perspectives of vulnerability in the 2010 Haiti earthquake

BACKGROUND

Situations of disaster that prompt international humanitarian responses are rife with ethical tensions. The 2010 Haiti earthquake caused great destruction and prompted a massive humanitarian response. The widespread needs experienced by the population and the scale of the response inevitably rendered priority-setting difficult, and gave rise to ethical challenges.

PURPOSE

This paper presents four ethical questions identified in the analysis of a study on vulnerability and equity in the humanitarian response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

METHODS

Using interpretive description methodology, the interdisciplinary research team analysed 24 semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with expatriate and Haitian health workers and decision-makers involved in the response.

RESULTS

Ethical questions identified through the analysis were: (1) How should limited resources be allocated in situations of widespread vulnerability and elevated needs? (2) At what point does it become ethically problematic to expend (considerable) resources to sustain expatriate disaster responders? (3) How ought rapid and reactive interventions be balanced with more deliberated and coordinated approaches? (4) What trade-offs are justified when interventions to address acute needs could contribute to long-term vulnerabilities?

DISCUSSION

The questions arise in light of an immense gap between available resources and widespread and elevated needs. This gap is likely unavoidable in large-scale crises and may be a source of ethical distress for both local and international responders. The analysis of ethical questions associated with crisis response can advance discussions about how relief efforts can best be designed and implemented to minimise ethical distress and improve assistance to local populations.

Eliminating latent tuberculosis in low-burden settings: are the principal beneficiaries to be disadvantaged groups or the broader population?

Tuberculosis (TB) remains a leading cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide, and the burdens of this disease continue to track prior disadvantage. In order to galvanise a coordinated global response, WHO has recently launched the End TB Campaign that aims to eliminate TB by 2050. Key to this is the introduction of population screening programmes in low-burden settings to identify and treat people who have latent TB infection (LTBI). The defining features of LTBI are: that it is not an active disease but confers an increased risk of disease; the socially disadvantaged are those most in danger and uncertainty persists as to who will be harmed or benefitted from screening-led prophylactic interventions. Systematic screening programmes that include surveillance, case-finding and treatment of asymptomatic individuals inevitably redistribute the risk of harms and the potential for benefits within a population. The extent to which those targeted within such programmes should be exposed to higher levels of risk in the pursuit of individual or community benefits requires careful consideration prior to implementation. As currently construed, it remains unclear who stands to benefit most from how LTBI screening in high-income countries is being organised, and whose health is being prioritised: members of disadvantaged groups or the broader community. Unless the aims of LTBI screening programmes in these settings are made transparent and their prioritisation ethically justified, there is a significant danger that such a targeted intervention will further disadvantage those who have the least capacity to bear the burdens of TB elimination.

Income-based equity weights in healthcare planning and policy

Recent research indicates that there is a gap in life expectancy between the rich and the poor. This raises the question: should we on egalitarian grounds use income-based equity weights when we assess benefits of alternative benevolent interventions, so that health benefits to the poor count for more? This article provides three egalitarian arguments for using income-based equity weights under certain circumstances. If income inequality correlates with inequality in health, we have reason to use income-based equity weights on the ground that health inequality is bad. If income inequality correlates with inequality in opportunity for health, we have reason to use such weights on the ground that inequality in opportunity for health is bad. If income inequality correlates with inequality in well-being, income-based equity weights should be used to mitigate inequality in well-being. Three different ways in which to construe income-based equity weights are introduced and discussed. They can be based on relative income inequality, on income rankings and on capped absolute income. The article does not defend any of these types of weighting schemes, but argues that in order to settle which of these types of weighting scheme to choose, more empirical research is needed.

From protection to entitlement: selecting research subjects for early phase clinical trials involving breakthrough therapies

Our goals are to (1) set forth and defend a multiprinciple system for selecting individuals who meet trial eligibility criteria to participate in early phase clinical trials testing chimeric antigen receptor (CAR T-cell) for acute lymphoblastic leukaemia when demand for participation exceeds spaces available in a trial; (2) show the relevance of these selection criteria to other breakthrough experimental therapies; (3) argue that distinct distributive justice criteria apply to breakthrough experimental therapies, standard research and healthcare and (4) argue that as evidence of benefit increases, the emphasis of justice in research shifts from protecting subjects from harm to ensuring fair access to benefits.

Age-related inequalities in health and healthcare: the life stages approach

How should healthcare systems prepare to care for growing numbers and proportions of older people? Older people generally suffer worse health than younger people do. Should societies take steps to reduce age-related health inequalities? Some express concern that doing so would increase age-related inequalities in healthcare. This paper addresses this debate by (1) presenting an argument in support of three principles for distributing scarce resources between age groups; (2) framing these principles of age group justice in terms of life stages; and (3) indicating policy implications that merit further attention in light of rapidly aging societies.

Second thoughts about who is first: the medical triage of violent perpetrators and their victims

Extreme intentional and deliberate violence against innocent people, including acts of terror and school shootings, poses various ethical challenges, some related to the practice of medicine. We discuss a dilemma relating to deliberate violence, in this case the aftermath of a terror attack, in which there are multiple injured individuals, including the terror perpetrator. Normally, the priority of medical treatment is determined based on need. However, in the case of a terror attack, there is reason to question this. Should the perpetrator of extreme violence receive medical treatment on the scene before the victims if he or she is designated as the most seriously injured? Or rather, should victims receive medical care priority if they are also in some life-threatening danger, although not at the same level of severity as the perpetrator? We present two opposing approaches: the conventional 'no-exceptions' approach, which gives priority to the terrorist, and the justice-oriented 'victim first' approach, which gives priority to the victims. Invoking concepts of retributive justice, distributive justice and corrective justice, this latter approach suggests that 'value-neutrality' can lead to injustice. Perpetrators of terror-like violence should be treated as an act of humanism and good ethical medical practice. However, in clear and obvious terror-like situations, to treat the perpetrators of violence before their victims may be unjust. Thus, in some specific situations, the 'victim first' approach may be considered a legitimate alternative triage policy.

Incentives, equity and the Able Chooser Problem

Health incentive schemes aim to produce healthier behaviours in target populations. They may do so both by making incentivised options more salient and by making them less costly. Changes in costs only result in healthier behaviour if the individual rationally assesses the cost change and acts accordingly. Not all people do this well. Those who fail to respond rationally to incentives will typically include those who are least able to make prudent choices more generally. This group will typically include the least advantaged more generally, since disadvantage inhibits one's effective ability to choose well and since poor choices tend to cause or aggravate disadvantage. Therefore, within the target population, health benefits to the better off may come at the cost of aggravated inequity. This is one instance of a problem I name the Able Chooser Problem, previously emphasised by Richard Arneson in relation to coercive paternalism. I describe and discuss this problem by distinguishing between policy options and their effects on the choice situation of individuals. Both positive and negative incentives, as well as mandates that are less than perfectly effective, require some sort of rational deliberation and action and so face the Able Chooser Problem. In contrast, effective restriction of what options are physically available, as well as choice context design that makes some options more salient or appealing, does not demand rational agency. These considerations provide an equity-based argument for preferring smart design of our choice and living environment to incentives and mandates.

Which strings attached: ethical considerations for selecting appropriate conditionalities in conditional cash transfer programmes

Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) present a promising approach to simultaneously tackle chronic poverty and poor health. While these programmes clearly embody beneficent aims, questions remain regarding the ethical design of CCTs. Limited guidance exists for the ethical evaluation of the defining feature of these programmes: the conditionalities. Drawing upon prominent public health ethics frameworks and social justice theories, this paper outlines five categories of morally relevant considerations that CCT programme designers should consider when assessing which behaviours or outcomes they select as conditionalities for payment: (1) likelihood of yielding desired health outcomes, (2) risks and burdens, (3) receptivity, (4) attainability and (5) indirect impacts and externalities. When evaluating potential conditionalities across these five categories of considerations, it is important to recognise that not all beneficiaries or subgroups of beneficiaries will fare equally on each. Given that most CCTs aim to reduce inequities and promote long-term health and prosperity for the most disadvantaged, it is critical to apply these considerations with due attention to how different segments of the beneficiary population will be differentially affected. Taken on balance, with due reflection on distributional effects, these five categories represent a comprehensive set of considerations for the moral analysis of specific conditionalities and will help ensure that CCT designers structure programmes in a way that is both morally sound and effective in achieving their goals.

Solidarity, justice and unconditional access to healthcare

Luck egalitarianism provides a reason to object to conditionality in health incentive programmes in some cases when conditionality undermines political values such as solidarity or inclusiveness. This is the case with incentive programmes that aim to restrict access to essential healthcare services. Such programmes undermine solidarity. Yet, most people's lives are objectively worse, in one respect, in non-solidary societies, because solidarity contributes both instrumentally and directly to individuals' well-being. Because solidarity is non-excludable, undermining it will deprive both the prudent and the imprudent citizens of its goods. Thereby, undermining solidarity can make prudent citizens worse off than they would have otherwise been, out of no fault or choice of their own, but rather as a result of somebody else's imprudent choice. This goes against the spirit of luck egalitarianism. Therefore (luck egalitarian) justice can require us to save the imprudent and avoid conditionality in access to essential healthcare services.

Health incentive research and social justice: does the risk of long term harms to systematically disadvantaged groups bear consideration?

The ethics of health incentive research-a form of public health research-are not well developed, and concerns of justice have been least examined. In this paper, we explore what potential long term harms in relation to justice may occur as a result of such research and whether they should be considered as part of its ethical evaluation. 'Long term harms' are defined as harms that contribute to existing systematic patterns of disadvantage for groups. Their effects are experienced on a long term basis, persisting even once an incentive research project ends. We will first establish that three categories of such harms potentially arise as a result of health incentive interventions. We then argue that the risk of these harms also constitutes a morally relevant consideration for health incentive research and suggest who may be responsible for assessing and mitigating these risks. We propose that responsibility should be assigned on the basis of who initiates health incentive research projects. Finally, we briefly describe possible strategies to prevent or mitigate the risk of long term harms to members of disadvantaged groups, which can be employed during the design, conduct and dissemination of research projects.

Too poor to say no? Health incentives for disadvantaged populations

Incentive schemes, which offer recipients benefits if they meet particular requirements, are being used across the world to encourage healthier behaviours. From the perspective of equality, an important concern about such schemes is that since people often do not have equal opportunity to fulfil the stipulated conditions, incentives create opportunity for further unfair advantage. Are incentive schemes that are available only to disadvantaged groups less susceptible to such egalitarian concerns? While targeted schemes may at first glance seem well placed to help improve outcomes among disadvantaged groups and thus reduce inequalities, I argue in this paper that they are susceptible to significant problems. At the same time, incentive schemes may be less problematic when they operate in ways that differ from the 'standard' incentive mechanism; I discuss three such mechanisms.

Fair subject selection in clinical research: formal equality of opportunity

In this paper, I explore the ethics of subject selection in the context of biomedical research. I reject a key principle of what I shall refer to as the standard view According to this principle, investigators should select participants so as to minimise aggregate risk to participants and maximise aggregate benefits to participants and society. On this view, investigators should exclude prospective participants who are more susceptible to risk than other prospective participants. I argue instead that investigators should select subjects in accordance with an alternative principle: formal equality of opportunity. According to this principle, investigators must treat all prospective participants the same unless differential treatment is warranted by the scientific goals of the study or the need to promote participants' medically related interests. All prospective participants (1) who meet the scientifically defined eligibility criteria and (2) for whom participation is consistent with their medically related interests should have an equal, formal opportunity to participate in the study. Prospective participants should not be excluded simply because they are more susceptible to risk than others.

Should uterus transplants be publicly funded?

Since 2000, 11 human uterine transplantation procedures (UTx) have been performed across Europe and Asia. Five of these have, to date, resulted in pregnancy and four live births have now been recorded. The most significant obstacles to the availability of UTx are presently scientific and technical, relating to the safety and efficacy of the procedure itself. However, if and when such obstacles are overcome, the most likely barriers to its availability will be social and financial in nature, relating in particular to the ability and willingness of patients, insurers or the state to pay. Thus, publicly funded healthcare systems such as the UK's National Health Service (NHS) will eventually have to decide whether UTx should be funded. With this in mind, we seek to provide an answer to the question of whether there exist any compelling reasons for the state not to fund UTx. The paper proceeds as follows. It assumes, at least for the sake of argument, that UTx will become sufficiently safe and cost-effective to be a candidate for funding and then asks, given that, what objections to funding there might be. Three main arguments are considered and ultimately rejected as providing insufficient reason to withhold funding for UTx. The first two are broad in their scope and offer an opportunity to reflect on wider issues about funding for infertility treatment in general. The third is narrower in scope and could, in certain forms, apply to UTx but not other assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). The first argument suggests that UTx should not be publicly funded because doing so would be inconsistent with governments' obligations to prevent climate change and environmental pollution. The second claims that UTx does not treat a disorder and is not medically necessary. Finally, the third asserts that funding for UTx should be denied because of the availability of alternatives such as adoption and surrogacy.

Appropriateness of no-fault compensation for research-related injuries from an African perspective: an appeal for action by African countries

Compensation for research-related injuries (RRIs) remains a challenge in the current environment of global collaborative biomedical research as exemplified by the continued reluctance of the US government, a major player in international biomedical research, to enact regulation for mandatory compensation for RRIs. This stance is in stark contrast to the mandatory compensation policies adopted by other democracies like the European Union (EU) countries. These positions taken by the USA and the EU create a nexus of confusion when research is exported to low-income and middle-income countries which have no laws guiding compensation for RRIs. In this paper, we begin by exploring the background to policies concerning RRIs, how they reflect on the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in African societies, and how this compares with the no-fault compensation model. We then explore the underlying African ethical framework of Ubuntu in the sub-Saharan region, guiding traditional practices of dispute resolution and compensation, and how this framework can help to form the moral justification for no-fault compensation as the preferred compensation model for RRIs for African countries. Finally, we call upon countries in the African Union (AU), to adopt a no-fault policy for compensation of RRIs, and enact it into a regulatory requirement for insurance-based no-fault compensation for biomedical research, which will then be enforced by member states of the AU.

The Ebola outbreak in Western Africa: ethical obligations for care

The recent wave of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Western Africa and efforts to control the disease where the health system requires strengthening raises a number of ethical challenges for healthcare workers practicing in these countries. We discuss the implications of weak health systems for controlling EVD and limitations of the ethical obligation to provide care for patients with EVD using Nigeria as a case study. We highlight the right of healthcare workers to protection that should be obligatorily provided by the government. Where the national government cannot meet this obligation, healthcare workers only have a moral and not a professional obligation to provide care to patients with EVD. The national government also has an obligation to adequately compensate healthcare workers that become infected in the course of duty. Institutionalisation of policies that protect healthcare workers are required for effective control of the spread of highly contagious diseases like EVD in a timely manner.

Phase-dependent justification: the role of personal responsibility in fair healthcare

The main aim of this paper is to examine the fairness of different ways of holding people responsible for healthcare-related choices. Our focus is on conceptualisations of responsibility that involve blame and sanctions, and our analytical approach is to provide a systematic discussion based on interrelated and successive health-related, lifestyle choices of an individual. We assess the already established risk-sharing, backward-looking and forward-looking views on responsibility according to a variety of standard objections. In conclusion, all of the proposed views on holding people responsible for their lifestyle choices are subjected to reasonable critiques, although the risk-sharing view fare considerably better than the others overall considered. With our analytical approach, we are able to identify how basic conditions for responsibility ascription alter along a time axis. Repeated relapses with respect to healthcare associated with persistent, unhealthy lifestyle choices, call for distinct attention. In such situations, contextualised reasoning and transparent policy-making, rather than opaque clinical judgements, are required as steps towards fair allocation of healthcare resources.

Relevance and Effectiveness of the WHO Global Code Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel--Ethical and Systems Perspectives

The relevance and effectiveness of the World Health Organization's (WHO's) Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel is being reviewed in 2015. The Code, which is a set of ethical norms and principles adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 2010, urges members states to train and retain the health personnel they need, thereby limiting demand for international migration, especially from the under-staffed health systems in low- and middle-income countries. Most countries failed to submit a first report in 2012 on implementation of the Code, including those source countries whose health systems are most under threat from the recruitment of their doctors and nurses, often to work in 4 major destination countries: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Political commitment by source country Ministers of Health needs to have been achieved at the May 2015 WHA to ensure better reporting by these countries on Code implementation for it to be effective. This paper uses ethics and health systems perspectives to analyse some of the drivers of international recruitment. The balance of competing ethics principles, which are contained in the Code's articles, reflects a tension that was evident during the drafting of the Code between 2007 and 2010. In 2007-2008, the right of health personnel to migrate was seen as a preeminent principle by US representatives on the Global Council which co-drafted the Code. Consensus on how to balance competing ethical principles--giving due recognition on the one hand to the obligations of health workers to the countries that trained them and the need for distributive justice given the global inequities of health workforce distribution in relation to need, and the right to migrate on the other hand--was only possible after President Obama took office in January 2009. It is in the interests of all countries to implement the Global Code and not just those that are losing their health personnel through international recruitment, given that it calls on all member states "to educate, retain and sustain a health workforce that is appropriate for their (need) ..." (Article 5.4), to ensure health systems' sustainability. However, in some wealthy destination countries, this means tackling national inequities and poorly designed health workforce strategies that result in foreign-trained doctors being recruited to work among disadvantaged populations and in primary care settings, allowing domestically trained doctors work in more attractive hospital settings.

On the random distribution of scarce doses of vaccine in response to the threat of an influenza pandemic: a response to Wardrope

Wardrope argues against my proposed non-consequentialist policy for the distribution of scarce influenza vaccine in the face of a pandemic. According to him, even if one accepts what he calls my deontological ethical theory, it does not follow that we are required to agree with my proposed randomised allocation of doses of vaccine by means of a lottery. He argues in particular that I fail to consider fully the prophylactic role of vaccination whereby it serves to protect from infection more people than are vaccinated. He concludes that: 'The benefits and burdens of vaccination are provided impartially and far more effectively by targeted vaccination than impartial lotteries.' He has shown convincingly that this conclusion can be established in the case of his particular envisaged scenario. However, Wardrope gives no reason to suppose that, in the circumstances that we actually face, targeted vaccination would constitute impartial treatment of citizens in the UK. I readily agree with Wardrope that if it should treat its citizens justly and impartially, it does not necessarily follow that the state should distribute vaccinations of the basis of a lottery. That will be a reasonable thing to do only if certain assumptions are made. These assumptions will not always be reasonable. However, they are reasonable ones to make in the actual circumstances that currently apply.

Feiring's concept of forward-looking responsibility: a dead end for responsibility in healthcare

Eli Feiring has developed a concept of forward-looking responsibility in healthcare. On this account, what matters morally in the allocation of scarce healthcare resources is not people's past behaviours but rather their commitment to take on lifestyles that will increase the benefit acquired from received treatment. According to Feiring, this is to be preferred over the backward-looking concept of responsibility often associated with luck egalitarianism. The article critically scrutinises Feiring's position. It begins by spelling out the wider implications of Feiring's view. Against this background, it shows that (i) Feiring's distinction between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility is incompatible with the Scanlonian notion of responsibility she apparently endorses; (ii) her favoured forward-looking notion of responsibility is subject to the objections levelled against the luck egalitarian view (whatever the strength of such objections).

Good medical ethics, justice and provincial globalism

The summer 2014 Ebola virus outbreak in Western Africa illustrates global health's striking inequalities. Globalisation has also increased pandemics, and disparate health system conditions mean that where one falls ill or is injured in the world can mean the difference between quality care, substandard care or no care at all, between full recovery, permanent ill effects and death. Yet attention to the normative underpinnings of global health justice and distribution remains, despite some important exceptions, inadequate in medical ethics, bioethics and political philosophy. We need a theoretical foundation on which to build a more just world. Provincial globalism (PG), grounded in capability theory, offers a foundation; it provides the components of a global health justice framework that can guide implementation. Under PG, all persons possess certain health entitlements. Global health justice requires progressively securing this health capabilities threshold for every person.

Justice and the NICE approach

When thinking about population level healthcare priority setting decisions, such as those made by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, good medical ethics requires attention to three main principles of health justice: (1) cost-effectiveness, an aspect of beneficence, (2) non-discrimination, and (3) priority to the worse off in terms of both current severity of illness and lifetime health. Applying these principles requires consideration of the identified patients who benefit from decisions and the unidentified patients who bear the opportunity costs.

Should we perform kidney transplants on foreign nationals?

In Canada, there are currently no guidelines at either the federal or provincial level regarding the provision of kidney transplantation services to foreign nationals (FN). Renal transplant centres have, in the past, agreed to put refugee claimants and other FNs on the renal transplant waiting list, in part, because these patients (refugee claimants) had health insurance through the Interim Federal Health Programme to cover the costs of medication and hospital care. However, severe cuts recently made to this programme have forced clinicians to question whether they should continue with transplants for FNs, for financial and ethical reasons. This paper first examines different national policies (eg, in Canada, USA, France and the UK) to map the diversity of approaches regarding transplantation for FNs, and then works through different considerations commonly used to support or oppose the provision of organs to these patients: (1) the organ shortage; (2) the free-rider problem; (3) the risk of becoming a transplant destination; (4) the impact on organ donation rates; (5) physicians' duties; (6) economic concerns; (7) vulnerability. Using a Canadian case as a focus, and generalising through a review of various national policies, we analyse the arguments for and against transplantation for FNs with a view to bringing clarity to what is a sensitive political and clinical management issue. Our aim is to help transplant centres, clinicians and ethicists reflect on the merits of possible options, and the rationales behind them.

Wait times and national health policy

Many arguments against US healthcare reform appeal to facts about wait times, and wait times are also discussed in debates about national health policy in other industrialised countries. This paper points out that there are several different ways to measure wait times. We currently measure them in one way, and this paper describes an alternative. The most reasonable assessments of US and international health reforms need to rely on the alternative method, and so when critics of health reform rely on the standard method, their arguments are unsound.

Climate change matters

One manifestation of climate change is the increasingly severe extreme weather that causes injury, illness and death through heat stress, air pollution, infectious disease and other means. Leading health organisations around the world are responding to the related water and food shortages and volatility of energy and agriculture prices that threaten health and health economics. Environmental and climate ethics highlight the associated challenges to human rights and distributive justice but rarely address health or encompass bioethical methods or analyses. Public health ethics and its broader umbrella, bioethics, remain relatively silent on climate change. Meanwhile global population growth creates more people who aspire to Western lifestyles and unrestrained socioeconomic growth. Fulfilling these aspirations generates more emissions; worsens climate change; and undermines virtues and values that engender appreciation of, and protections for, natural resources. Greater understanding of how virtues and values are evolving in different contexts, and the associated consequences, might nudge the individual and collective priorities that inform public policy toward embracing stewardship and responsibility for environmental resources necessary to health. Instead of neglecting climate change and related policy, public health ethics and bioethics should explore these issues; bring transparency to the tradeoffs that permit emissions to continue at current rates; and offer deeper understanding about what is at stake and what it means to live a good life in today's world.

How US institutional review boards decide when researchers need to translate studies

Informed consent is crucial in research, but potential participants may not all speak the same language, posing questions that have not been examined concerning decisions by institutional review boards (IRBs) and research ethics committees' (RECs) about the need for researchers to translate consent forms and other study materials. Sixty US IRBs (every fourth one in the list of the top 240 institutions by The National Institutes of Health funding) were contacted, and leaders (eg, chairs) from 34 (response rate=57%) and an additional 12 members and administrators were interviewed. IRBs face a range of problems about translation of informed consent documents, questionnaires and manuals-what, when and how to translate (eg, for how many or what proportion of potential subjects), why to do so and how to decide. Difficulties can arise about translation of specific words and of broader cultural concepts regarding processes of informed consent and research, especially in the developing world. In these decisions, IRBs weigh the need for autonomy (through informed consent) and justice (to ensure fair distribution of benefits and burdens of research) against practical concerns about costs to researchers. At times IRBs may have to compromise between these competing goals. These data, the first to examine when and how IRBs/RECs require researchers to translate materials, thus highlight a range of problems with which these committees struggle, suggesting a need for further normative and empirical investigation of these domains, and consideration of guidelines to help IRBs deal with these tensions.

You cannot have your normal functioning cake and eat it too

Does biomedical enhancement challenge justice in health care? This paper argues that health care justice based on the concept of normal functioning is inadequate if enhancements are widespread. Two different interpretations of normal functioning are distinguished: the "species typical" vs. the "normal cooperator" account, showing that each version of the theory fails to account for certain egalitarian intuitions about help and assistance owed to people with health needs, where enhancements are widespread.

Is it ethical to invite compatible pairs to participate in exchange programmes?

Living kidney transplantation offers the best results for patients with end-stage renal disease (ESRD). This form of transplantation is no longer restricted to genetically or emotionally related donors, as shown by the acceptance of non-directed living anonymous donors, and the development of exchange programmes (EPs). EPs make it possible to perform living kidney transplantation among incompatible pairs, but while such programmes can help increase living organ donation, they can also create a degree of unfairness. Kidney transplant recipients in the O blood group are at a disadvantage when it comes to EPs because they can only receive organs from O donors, whereas O donors are universal donors. This poses a major challenge in terms of distributive justice and equity. A way to remedy this situation is through altruistic unbalanced paired kidney exchange (AUPKE), in which a compatible pair consisting of an O blood group donor and a non-O recipient is invited to participate in an EP. Although the AUPKE approach appears fairer for O recipients, it still raises ethical questions. How does this type of exchange affect the donor/recipient gift relationship? Should recipients in compatible pairs receive a 'better organ' than the one they would otherwise have received from their intended donor? Finally, what is the role of transplant teams in AUPKE? This article will examine the organisational and ethical challenges associated with EPs and AUPKE, and compare different EP policies in countries where such programmes exist.

Infanticide, moral status and moral reasons: the importance of context

Giubilini and Minerva ask why birth should be a critical dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for terminating existence. Their argument is that birth does not change moral status in the sense that is relevant: the ability to be harmed by interruption of one's aims. Rather than question the plausibility of their position or the argument they give, we ask instead about the importance to scholarship or policy of publishing the article: does it to any extent make a novel or needed addition to the literature? Giubilini and Minerva's argument is remarkably similar to one advanced by Michael Tooley in 'Abortion and Infanticide,' almost 40 years ago. There have been immense changes in the intervening 40 years: in the ability to diagnose conditions early in pregnancy, in genetics and in the availability of in vitro fertilization; in understanding of the capabilities of persons with disabilities; in law; in economic support and access to healthcare for pregnant women and their children; in social customs and arrangements; and even in philosophy, with developments in feminist thought, bioethics and cognitive science. Some of these changes have been for the better, but others, such as the unravelling of social safety nets, have arguably been for the worse. Any or all of these changes might give rise to moral reasons for the relevance of birth that were not available 40 years ago. These changes might also be relevant to the identification of cases, if any, in which 'after-birth abortion' might be considered. If context is relevant to the applicability of moral reasons-as for theorists of justice in the non-idealised world it surely should be-it is questionable whether a view of the birth-line that ignores contextualising change can be adequate.