Policy influence and the legalized cannabis industry: learnings from other addictive consumption industries

BACKGROUND AND AIM

New Zealand has recently legalized medicinal cannabis and has explored the possibility of legalizing large-scale recreational cannabis supply. In the process, concerns have emerged regarding whether corporations involved in the large-scale production and sale of legalized cannabis will invest in tactics of influence with policymakers and the public. This paper aimed to examine the various ways a legalized cannabis industry could seek to influence governments and the public in the New Zealand reform context.

METHOD

Based on the study of industry tactics with alcohol, tobacco and gambling, we applied a three-chain model of industry influence that breaks tactics into the 'public good', 'knowledge' and 'political' chains.

RESULTS

Exploratory analysis of the nascent cannabis industry's activity in New Zealand provided signs of industry influence strategies related to all three chains. The medicinal cannabis industry has associated the establishment of a legal cannabis sector with regional economic development and employment, supported lobbying for recreational law reform, funded NGOs involved in lobbying for law reform, established research partnerships with universities, invited ex-politicians on advisory boards, and participated in government public sector partnerships.

CONCLUSION

There is emerging evidence that the legal cannabis industry is using strategies to influence the regulatory environment in New Zealand.

Scientific journals and conflict of interest disclosure: what progress has been made?

The article addresses the failure of the scientific community to create an effective mechanism to protect the integrity of the scientific literature from improper influence by vested interests. The seriousness of this threat is increasingly recognized. Scientists willing to distort scientific research to serve vested interests receive millions of dollars for their services. Organizations such as the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, the World Association of Medical Editors and the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) have launched initiatives to establish international standards for Conflict of Interest (COI) disclosure. COPE requires its 7,000 member journals to comply with its Code of Conduct for Journal Editors. While these initiatives are encouraging, they are internal educational endeavours only. Five examples are given showing failure of COPE member journals to comply with COPE's Code of Conduct. While COPE offers a complaint process, it involves only discussion and voluntary compliance. COPE neither polices nor enforces its Code. Instead of the current feeble, un-resourced process, which delivers neither transparency nor accountability, the article proposes the creation of a mechanism that will employ specific, effective measures to address contraventions of COI disclosure requirements.