Replication of Experiments Evaluating Impact of Psychological Distance on Moral Judgment

Eyal, Liberman, and Trope (2008) established that people judged moral transgressions more harshly and virtuous acts more positively when the acts were psychologically distant than close. In a series of conceptual and direct replications, Gong and Medin (2012) came to the opposite conclusion. Attempting to resolve these inconsistencies, we conducted four high-powered replication studies in which we varied temporal distance (Studies 1 and 3), social distance (Study 2) or construal level (Study 4), and registered their impact on moral judgment. We found no systematic effect of temporal distance, the effect of social distance consistent with Eyal et al., and the reversed effect of direct construal level manipulation, consistent with Gong and Medin. Possible explanations for the incompatible results are discussed.

Commentaries and Rejoinder on

In the hope to resolve the two sets of opposing results concerning the effects of psychological distance and construal levels on moral judgment, Žeželj and Jokić (2014) conducted a series of four direct replications, which yielded divergent patterns of results. In our commentary, we first revisit the consistent findings that lower-level construals induced by How/Why manipulation lead to harsher moral condemnation than higher-level construals. We then speculate on the puzzling patterns of results regarding the role of temporal distance in shaping moral judgment. And we conclude by discussing the complexity of morality and propose that it may be important to incorporate cultural systems into the study of moral cognition.

When are support and opposition not opposites? Depth of processing as a moderator of the valence-framing effect

Prior research has demonstrated the valence-framing effect, in which leading people to frame a preference negatively (e.g., 'I oppose Romney') yields stronger attitudes than does leading people to frame that same preference positively (e.g., 'I support Obama'). Three studies tested whether or not depth of processing (as operationalized by manipulations of motivation and ability to cognitively process) moderate the effect. The valence-framing effect was replicated, such that opposers manifested stronger attitudes than did supporters, but only when attitudes were relevant to the participants (Experiments 1 and 3), and when participants were not under cognitive load (Experiment 2). Our results thus identify depth of processing as an important moderator of the valence-framing effect and provide potential insight into the effect's mechanism.