In search of animal normativity: a framework for studying social norms in non-human animals

Social norms - rules governing which behaviours are deemed appropriate or inappropriate within a given community - are typically taken to be uniquely human. Recently, this position has been challenged by a number of philosophers, cognitive scientists, and ethologists, who have suggested that social norms may also be found in certain non-human animal communities. Such claims have elicited considerable scepticism from norm cognition researchers, who doubt that any non-human animals possess the psychological capacities necessary for normative cognition. However, there is little agreement among these researchers about what these psychological prerequisites are. This makes empirical study of animal social norms difficult, since it is not clear what we are looking for and thus what should count as behavioural evidence for the presence (or absence) of social norms in animals. To break this impasse, we offer an approach that moves beyond contested psychological criteria for social norms. This approach is inspired by the animal culture research program, which has made a similar shift away from heavily psychological definitions of 'culture' to become organised around a cluster of more empirically tractable concepts of culture. Here, we propose an analogous set of constructs built around the core notion of a normative regularity, which we define as a socially maintained pattern of behavioural conformity within a community. We suggest methods for studying potential normative regularities in wild and captive primates. We also discuss the broader scientific and philosophical implications of this research program with respect to questions of human uniqueness, animal welfare and conservation.

Capuchin monkeys' (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) categorization of photos of unknown male conspecifics suggests attention to fWHR and a dominance bias

The ability to quickly perceive others' rank minimizes costs by helping individuals behave appropriately when interacting with strangers. Indeed, humans and at least some other species can quickly determine strangers' rank or dominance based only on physical features without observing others' interactions or behavior. Nonhuman primates can determine strangers' ranks by observing their interactions, and some evidence suggests that at least some cues to dominance, such as facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR), are also present in other primates. However, it is unknown whether they can determine strangers' rank simply by looking at their faces, rather than observing their interactions. If so, this would suggest selective pressure across the primates on both cues to dominance and the ability to detect those cues accurately. To address this, we examined the ability of male and female tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) to categorize images of the faces of unknown conspecifics (Sapajus from different colonies) and humans (computer-generated and real) as dominant or nondominant based only on still images. Capuchins' categorization of unknown conspecific faces was consistent with fWHR, a cue to dominance, although there was a strong tendency to categorize strangers as dominant, particularly for males. This was true despite the continued correct categorization of known individuals. In addition, capuchins did not categorize human strangers in accordance with external pre-ratings of dominance by independent human raters, despite the availability of the same cue, fWHR. We consider these results in the context of capuchin socio-ecology and what they mean for the evolution of rapid decision-making in social contexts.

Frans de Waal (1948-2024)

Primatologist who brought animals and humans "a little closer".

No evidence of attentional bias toward threatening conspecific and allospecific faces in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) using a dot-probe task

The ability to quickly perceive and interpret threatening facial expressions from others is critical for successfully maintaining group cohesion in social nonhuman primate species. Rapid detection of threatening or negative stimuli in the environment compared to neutral stimuli, referred to as an attentional bias toward threat, is adaptive in that faster threat detection can lead to greater survival outcomes. However, the evolutionary roots of attentional bias formation toward social threat are not well understood. The present study investigated attentional biases toward social threat and the factors associated with them, including underlying hormonal mechanisms, in socially housed capuchin monkeys. Attentional biases were assessed using a dot-probe task that measured capuchins' latency to respond to a target using a joystick after viewing threatening or neutral conspecific or allospecific faces or nonface stimuli. In our first study, we examined how age, dominance status, sex, and cortisol level related to attentional biases. In our second study, we examined how manipulated oxytocin (OT) influenced attentional biases. Capuchin monkeys did not show attentional biases toward threatening faces or objects, but they showed attentional avoidance of scrambled familiar conspecific face stimuli. Cortisol and social rank were associated with attentional bias toward threat in the capuchin monkeys that participated in this study, which suggests that stress and dominance relate to attentional bias toward social threat. Manipulated OT increased attentional avoidance of scrambled familiar and unfamiliar face images, but not unscrambled faces or objects. Overall, we did not find compelling evidence of attentional biases toward social threat in capuchin monkeys. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The Joint Simon task is not joint for capuchin monkeys

Human cooperation can be facilitated by the ability to create a mental representation of one's own actions, as well as the actions of a partner, known as action co-representation. Even though other species also cooperate extensively, it is still unclear whether they have similar capacities. The Joint Simon task is a two-player task developed to investigate this action co-representation. We tested brown capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), a highly cooperative species, on a computerized Joint Simon task and found that, in line with previous research, the capuchins' performance was compatible with co-representation. However, a deeper exploration of the monkeys' responses showed that they, and potentially monkeys in previous studies, did not understand the control conditions, which precludes the interpretation of the results as a social phenomenon. Indeed, further testing to investigate alternative explanations demonstrated that our results were due to low-level cues, rather than action co-representation. This suggests that the Joint Simon task, at least in its current form, cannot determine whether non-human species co-represent their partner's role in joint tasks.

Some dogs can find the payoff-dominant outcome in the Assurance game

Studies on coordination often present animals with the choice of either cooperating or remaining inactive; however, in nature, animals may also choose to act alone. This can be modeled with the Assurance game, an economic game that has recently been used to explore decision-making in primates. We investigated whether dyads of pet dogs coordinate in the Assurance game. Pairs were presented with two alternatives: they could individually solve an apparatus baited with a low-value reward (Hare) or they could coordinate to solve a cooperative apparatus baited with a high-value reward for each dog (Stag). All individuals matched their partner's choices, but after controlling for side bias, only four out of eleven dyads consistently coordinated on the payoff-dominant strategy (Stag-Stag). Thus, some dogs are capable of finding coordinated outcomes, as do primates, at least when their partner's actions are visible and coordination results in the biggest payoff for both individuals.

Humans' (Homo sapiens), capuchin monkeys' (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), and rhesus macaques' (Macaca mulatta) size judgments shift when stimuli change in frequency

When making decisions, humans often strive to uphold objective, absolute standards, such as about what is small versus large, blue versus purple, or unfair versus fair, suggesting that our judgments should not be swayed by extraneous factors such as the sequence or frequency of events to be judged. Yet in previous research, when some items (e.g., threatening faces) became less frequent, humans responded by expanding their concept (of "threatening") to include more ambiguous stimuli. We assessed the origins of this perceptual frequency bias by testing 25 capuchins, seven rhesus monkeys, and 102 humans on a computer task in which they had to classify one circle at a time (pulled from a continuum of 50 circle sizes) as either small or large. Small and large circles initially appeared with equal probability but over time small circles either became less frequent, more frequent, or did not change in frequency. All three species showed changes in judgment, but contrary to predictions, they contracted, rather than expanded, their size judgments of the less frequent category. In other words, when small circles became rare, participants were more likely to judge ambiguous circles sizes as large (and vice versa). This may have been due to the immediate explicit feedback, as has recently been found in humans, and we consider possible mechanisms driving our participants' responses. These results suggest that humans' difficulties in maintaining absolute standards are shared with other animals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Sex differences in white matter tracts of capuchin monkey brains

Nonhuman primates exhibit sexual dimorphism in behavior, suggesting that there could be underlying differences in brain organization and function. Understanding this neuroanatomical variation is critical for enhancing our understanding of the evolution of sex differences in the human brain. Tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) represent a phylogenetically diverse taxa of neotropical primates that converge on several behavioral characteristics with humans relevant to social organization, making them an important point of comparison for studying the evolution of sex differences in primates. While anatomical sex differences in gray matter have previously been found in capuchin monkeys, the current study investigates sex differences in white matter tracts. We carried out tract-based spatial statistical analysis on fractional anisotropy images of tufted capuchin monkeys (15 female, 5 male). We found that females showed significantly higher fractional anisotropy than males in regions of frontal-parietal white matter in the right cerebral hemisphere. Paralleling earlier findings in gray matter, male and female fractional anisotropy values in these regions were nonoverlapping. This complements prior work pointing toward capuchin sex differences in limbic circuitry and higher-order visual regions. We propose that these sex differences are related to the distinct socioecological niches occupied by male and female capuchins. Capuchin neuroanatomical sex differences appear to be more pronounced than in humans, which we suggest may relate to human adaptations for prolonged neurodevelopmental trajectories and increased plasticity.

Comparative economics: how studying other primates helps us better understand the evolution of our own economic decision making

The origins of evolutionary games are rooted in both economics and animal behaviour, but economics has, until recently, focused primarily on humans. Although historically, specific games were used in targeted circumstances with non-human species (i.e. the Prisoner's Dilemma), experimental economics has been increasingly recognized as a valuable method for directly comparing both the outcomes of economic decisions and their underlying mechanisms across species, particularly in comparison with humans, thanks to the structured procedures that allow for them to be instantiated across a variety of animals. So far, results in non-human primates suggest that even when outcomes are shared, underlying proximate mechanisms can vary substantially. Intriguingly, in some contexts non-human primates more easily find a Nash equilibrium than do humans, possibly owing to their greater willingness to explore the parameter space, but humans excel at more complex outcomes, such as alternating between two Nash equilibria, even when deprived of language or instruction, suggesting potential mechanisms that humans have evolved to allow us to solve complex social problems. We consider what these results suggest about the evolution of economic decision-making and suggest future directions, in particular the need to expand taxonomic diversity, to expand this promising approach. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.

Under pressure: the interaction between high-stakes contexts and individual differences in decision-making in humans and non-human species

Observed behavior can be the result of complex cognitive processes that are influenced by environmental factors, physiological process, and situational features. Pressure, a feature of a situation in which an individual's outcome is impacted by his or her own ability to perform, has been traditionally treated as a human-specific phenomenon and only recently have pressure-related deficits been considered in relation to other species. However, there are strong similarities in biological and cognitive systems among mammals (and beyond), and high-pressure situations are at least theoretically common in the wild. We hypothesize that other species are sensitive to pressure and that we can learn about the evolutionary trajectory of pressure responses by manipulating pressure experimentally in these other species. Recent literature indicates that, as in humans, pressure influences responses in non-human primates, with either deficits in ability to perform ("choking") or an ability to thrive when the stakes are high. Here, we synthesize the work to date on performance under pressure in humans and how hormones might be related to individual differences in responses. Then, we discuss why we would expect to see similar effects of pressure in non-humans and highlight the existing evidence for how other species respond. We argue that evidence suggests that other species respond to high-pressure contexts in similar ways as humans, and that responses to pressure are a critical missing piece of our understanding of cognition in human and non-human animals. Understanding pressure's effects could provide insight into individual variation in decision-making in comparative cognition and the evolution of human decision-making.

Oxytocin increases during fur‐rubbing regardless of level of social contact in tufted capuchin monkeys

Social interactions induce oxytocin release in many social species, suggesting that oxytocin is a critical part of social bonding among individuals. However, oxytocin also increases as a result of physical contact and stimulation, making it unclear which features of affiliative behaviors (for instance, social interaction or physical contact with a conspecific) drive the oxytocin increase observed after engaging in these behaviors. We attempted to tease this apart by studying the differential effect of social interaction, visual coordination with a conspecific, and physical stimulation during the fur-rubbing behavior of tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), which often involves social contact with groupmates but is in some cases performed alone. We induced fur-rubbing by providing onions under three conditions: when capuchins had physical access to their social group and fur-rubbed in contact with groupmates (social condition), when capuchins were separated from their social group but could still see them fur-rub (visual coordination), and when capuchins were physically and visually separated from their groupmates (physical stimulation only). We assessed urinary oxytocin in these three conditions and compared them to a control condition in which apples were provided and no fur-rubbing was observed. Capuchins fur-rubbed for less time when they could not see their groupmates, but fur-rubbing increased urinary oxytocin above the control condition in all three fur-rubbing conditions equally, suggesting that the physical stimulation derived from fur-rubbing was the most important driver of oxytocin increase. These results support a model in which physical stimulation is an important factor in the relationship between oxytocin and at least some behaviors, suggesting that oxytocin increase alone is not necessarily indicative of a social influence on behavior. Future work is needed to determine the contexts in which social factors do impact oxytocin, and whether the downstream behaviors are the same for socially and nonsocially induced oxytocin release.

Dogs take into account the actions of a human partner in a cooperative task

Humans stand out for their capacity to flexibly cooperate, possibly because they understand their partners' role. Researchers have explored if such understanding is unique to humans by assessing whether non-human species wait to manipulate a cooperative apparatus until a delayed partner arrives. If animals do wait, then it is assumed that they recognize the need for a partner. However, success in these tasks may be the result of social facilitation, while failure may be due to poor inhibitory control. Moreover, this approach does not test if animals take their partners' actions into account. Here we trained dogs to press a button simultaneously with their human partner. Afterwards, we tested them in several conditions to disentangle which elements of their partner's behaviour they take into account. Dogs waited to press the button until the delayed partner arrived, the button was available to the partner and the partner acted (pressed the button). We found no relationship between inhibitory control and success. We conclude that dogs are not merely reacting to the presence of their human partners, but are also taking their actions into account when coordinating with them.

Oxytocin and social gaze during a dominance categorization task in tufted capuchin monkeys

Visual attention to facial features is an important way that group-living primate species gain knowledge about others. However, where this attention is focused on the face is influenced by contextual and social features, and emerging evidence in Pan species suggests that oxytocin, a hormone involved in forming and maintaining affiliative bonds among members of the same group, influences social attention as measured by eye gaze. Specifically, bonobos tend to focus on conspecifics’ eyes when viewing two-dimensional images, whereas chimpanzees focus more on the edges of the face. Moreover, exogenous oxytocin, which was hypothesized to increase eye contact in both species, instead enhanced this existing difference. We follow up on this to (1) determine the degree to which this Pan pattern generalizes across highly social, cooperative non-ape primates and (2) explore the impact of exogenously administered vs. endogenously released oxytocin in impacting this behavior. To do so, we tracked gaze direction on a computerized social categorization task using conspecific faces in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) after (1) exogenously administering intranasal oxytocin using a nebulizer or (2) inducing an endogenous increase in oxytocin using fur-rubbing, previously validated to increase oxytocin in capuchins. Overall, we did not find a general tendency in the capuchins to look toward the eyes or mouth, but we found that oxytocin was related to looking behavior toward these regions, albeit not in a straightforward way. Considering frequency of looking per trial, monkeys were more likely to look at the eye region in the fur-rubbing condition as compared to either the saline or exogenous oxytocin conditions. However, in terms of duration of looking during trials in which they did look at the eye region, monkeys spent significantly less time looking at the eyes in both oxytocin conditions as compared to the saline condition. These results suggest that oxytocin did not necessarily enhance eye looking in capuchins, which is consistent with the results from Pan species, and that endogenous and exogenous oxytocin may behave differently in their effect on how social attention is allocated.

Validating Urinary Neopterin as a Biomarker of Immune Response in Captive and Wild Capuchin Monkeys

Non-invasive health monitoring is advantageous for wild and captive primate populations because it reduces the need for traditional invasive techniques (i.e., anesthetization) that can be stressful and potentially harmful for individuals. The biomarker neopterin is an emerging tool in primatology to measure immune activation and immunosenescence, however, most neopterin studies have focused on catarrhine species with little comparative work examining neopterin and health in platyrrhines. To address this gap, we validated a commercially available enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) to measure urinary neopterin in two types of capuchin monkeys, a wild population of white-faced capuchins (Cebus imitator) and a socially housed captive colony of tufted capuchins (Sapajus apella). We analytically validated methods for measuring urinary neopterin in two capuchin populations and demonstrated that two commonly-used methods to control for urine concentration-creatinine and specific gravity (SG)-produced highly concordant results. We also biologically validated these methods by examining variation in neopterin levels based on environment (captive and wild) and age, and changes in levels associated with immune-response. We found that neopterin increased after immune perturbation (rabies vaccine booster), varied by environmental condition, and mirrored expected trends in immune system ontogeny. Our results improve understanding of the innate immune system in platyrrhine species and suggest neopterin may be useful for non-invasive health monitoring in both captive and wild primates.

Nudges for Judges: An Experiment on the Effect of Making Sentencing Costs Explicit

Judges are typically tasked to consider sentencing benefits but not costs. Previous research finds that both laypeople and prosecutors discount the costs of incarceration when forming sentencing attitudes, raising important questions about whether professional judges show the same bias during sentencing. To test this, we used a vignette-based experiment in which Minnesota state judges (N = 87) reviewed a case summary about an aggravated robbery and imposed a hypothetical sentence. Using random assignment, half the participants received additional information about plausible negative consequences of incarceration. As predicted, our results revealed a mitigating effect of cost exposure on prison sentence term lengths. Critically, these findings support the conclusion that policies that increase transparency in sentencing costs could reduce sentence lengths, which has important economic and social ramifications.

Correctional "Free Lunch"? Cost Neglect Increases Punishment in Prosecutors

Prosecutors can influence judges’ sentencing decisions by the sentencing recommendations they make—but prosecutors are insulated from the costs of those sentences, which critics have described as a correctional “free lunch.” In a nationally distributed survey experiment, we show that when a sample of (n=178) professional prosecutors were insulated from sentencing cost information, their prison sentence recommendations were nearly one-third lengthier than sentences rendered following exposure to direct cost information. Exposure to a fiscally equivalent benefit of incarceration did not impact sentencing recommendations, as predicted. This pattern suggests that prosecutors implicitly value incorporating sentencing costs but selectively neglect them unless they are made explicit. These findings highlight a likely but previously unrecognized contributor to mass incarceration and identify a potential way to remediate it.

Modelling collective decision-making: Insights into collective anti-predator behaviors from an agent-based approach

Collective decision-making is a widespread phenomenon across organisms. Studying how animal societies make group decisions to the mutual benefit of group members, while avoiding exploitation by cheaters, can provide unique insights into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. As a step toward dissecting the proximate mechanisms that underpin collective decision-making across animals, we developed an agent-based model of antipredatory alarm signaling and mobbing during predator-prey encounters. Such collective behaviors occur in response to physical threats in many distantly related species with vastly different cognitive abilities, making it a broadly important model behavior. We systematically assessed under which quantitative contexts potential prey benefit from three basic strategies: predator detection, signaling about the predator (e.g., alarm calling), and retreating from vs. approaching the predator. Collective signaling increased survival rates over individual predator detection in several scenarios. Signaling sometimes led to fewer prey detecting the predator but this effect disappeared when prey animals that had seen the predator both signaled and approached it, as in mobbing. Critically, our results highlight that collective decision-making in response to a threat can emerge from simple rules without needing a central leader or needing to be under conscious control.

Leveling the playing field in studying cumulative cultural evolution: Conceptual and methodological advances in nonhuman animal research

Cumulative cultural evolution (CCE), the improvement of cultural traits over generations via social transmission, is widely believed to be unique to humans. The capacity to build upon others' knowledge, technologies, and skills has produced the most diverse and sophisticated technological repertoire in the animal kingdom. Yet, inconsistency in both the definitions and criteria used to determine CCE and the methodology used to examine it across studies may be hindering our ability to determine which aspects are unique to humans. Issues regarding how improvement is defined and measured and whether some criteria are empirically testable are of increasing concern to the field. In this article, we critically assess the progress made in the field and current points of debate from conceptual and methodological perspectives. We discuss how inconsistency in definitions is detrimental to our ability to document potential evidence of CCE to nonhuman animals. We build on Mesoudi and Thornton's (2018) recently described core and extended CCE criteria to make specific recommendations about, from a comparative lens, which criteria should be used as evidence of CCE. We evaluate existing data from both wild and captive studies of nonhuman animals using these suggestions. We finish by discussing issues currently faced by researchers studying CCE in nonhuman animals, particularly nonhuman primates, and provide suggestions that may overcome these concerns and move the field forward. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) do not show an aversion to inequity in a token exchange task

Although individuals in some species refuse foods they normally accept if their partner receives a more preferred one, this is not true across all species. The cooperation hypothesis proposes that this species-level variability evolved because inequity aversion is a mechanism to identify situations in which cooperation is not paying off, and that species regularly observed cooperating should be more likely to be averse to inequity. To rule out other potential explanations of inequity aversion, we need to test the converse as well: species rarely observed cooperating, especially those phylogenetically close to more cooperative species, should be less likely to be inequity averse. To this end, we tested eight zoo-housed Western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) on a token exchange task in which subjects received either the same food reward or a less-preferred reward for the same or more effort than their partner, recording both refusals to participate in the exchange and refusals to accept the reward. Supporting the cooperation hypothesis, even with procedural differences across sessions, gorillas were significantly more likely to refuse in all conditions in which they received a low-value food reward after completing an exchange, regardless of what their partner received, suggesting that gorillas were not inequity averse, but instead would not work for a low-value reward. Additionally, gorillas were more likely to refuse later in the session; while the pattern of refusals remained unchanged after accounting for this, this suggests that species should be tested on as many trials as is practical.

Anything for a cheerio: Brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) consistently coordinate in an Assurance Game for unequal payoffs

Unequal outcomes disrupt cooperation in some situations, but this has not been tested in the context of coordination in economic games. To explore this, we tested brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) on a manual version of the Stag Hunt (or Assurance) Game, in which individuals sequentially chose between two options, Stag or Hare, and were rewarded according to their choices and that of their partner. Typically, coordination on Stag results in an equal highest payout, whereas coordinating on Hare results in a guaranteed equal but lower payoff and uncoordinated play results in the lowest payoff when playing Stag. We varied this structure such that one capuchin received double the rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome; thus, it was still both animals' best option, but no longer equally rewarding. Despite the inequality, capuchins coordinated on Stag in 78% of trials, and neither payoff structure nor their partner's choice impacted their decision. Additionally, there was no relationship between self-scratching, a measure of stress in capuchins, and choices. After completing the study, we discovered our reward, cheerios, was sufficiently valuable that in another study, capuchins never refused it, so post hoc we repeated the study using a lower value reward, banana flavored pellets. Capuchins completed only 26% of the pellet trials (compared to 98% with cheerios), constraining our ability to interpret the results, but nonetheless the monkeys showed a decrease in preference for Stag, particularly when they received fewer rewards for the coordinated Stag outcome. These results reinforce capuchins' ability to find coordinated outcomes in the Stag Hunt game, but more work is needed to determine whether the monkeys did not mind the inequality or were unwilling to sacrifice a highly preferred food to rectify it. In either case, researchers should carefully consider the impact of their chosen rewards on subjects' choices.

The effects of positive and negative experiences on subsequent behavior and cognitive performance in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella)

Our understanding of animals' affective processing is notably limited compared to the wealth of research on humans, largely due to difficulties in measurement. Moreover, despite a recent increase in the understanding of the interaction between affect and cognition in animals, most research has focused on negative affect, with the result that we continue to know little about the effects of positive affect. In this study, we tested 15 adult capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) using a novel methodology that took advantage of capuchins' species-typical behavior to engineer both a positive and negative experience, using the same apparatus to minimize extraneous impacts. Following a positive or negative experience (that presumably induced positive and negative affect, respectively), or a control with no manipulation, we assessed subjects' performance on a cognitive task, a computerized delayed match-to-sample. As predicted, behavior following the negative condition suggested a negative affective state, with increased rates of scratching (commonly used as an indicator of stress in nonhuman primates) compared to both the positive and control conditions. Cognitive performance was also impaired in the negative condition compared to the other two. Contrary to predictions, however, the positive condition did not have a facilitative effect on cognitive performance, but behavioral results indicate that we may not have induced a truly positive affective state. Although we add to evidence that a negative experience can influence subsequent behavior and cognitive performance in nonhuman primates, our work highlights our lack of knowledge about the impact of positive affect, if any, on behavior and cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Introduction to pioneers in primatology

As a relatively young discipline, primatology is lucky to still have many of its pioneering researchers active in the field. At the 2019 American Society of Primatology meeting, I convened the inaugural Pioneers in Primatology symposium to bring together a selection of these researchers to reflect on their careers, with a focus on the stories that defined their work and their thoughts on the important future directions for the field. After the symposium, Karen Strier and I decided that these pioneers' contributions merited preservation, and this special issue is our effort to do so.

Studying animal innovation at the individual level: A ratings-based assessment in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] sp.)

Large-scale studies of individual differences in innovative behavior among nonhuman animals are rare because of logistical difficulties associated with obtaining observational data on a large number of innovative individuals across multiple locations. Here, we take a different approach, using observer ratings to study individual differences in innovative behavior in 127 brown capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] sp.) from 15 social groups and 7 facilities. Capuchins were reliably rated by 1 to 7 raters (mean 3.2 ± 1.6 raters/monkey) on a 7-point Likert scale for levels of innovative behavior, task motivation, sociality, and dominance. In a subsample, we demonstrate these ratings are valid: Rated innovation predicted performance on a learning task, rated motivation predicted participation in the task, rated dominance predicted social rank based on win/loss aggressive outcomes, and rated sociality predicted the time that monkeys spent in proximity to others. Across all 127 capuchins, individuals that were rated as being more innovative were significantly younger, more social, and more motivated to engage in tasks. Age, sociality, and task motivation all had independent effects on innovativeness, whereas sex, dominance, and group size were nonsignificant. Our findings are consistent with long-term behavioral observations of innovation in wild white-faced capuchins. Observer ratings may, therefore, be a valid tool for studies of animal innovation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

What behaviour in economic games tells us about the evolution of non-human species' economic decision-making behaviour

In the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in using games derived from experimental economics to test decision-making behaviour across species. In most cases, researchers are using the games as a tool, for instance, to understand what factors influence decision-making, how decision-making differs across species or contexts, or to ask broader questions about species' propensities to cooperate or compete. These games have been quite successful in this regard. To what degree, however, do these games tap into species' economic decision-making? For the purpose of understanding the evolution of economic systems in humans, this is the key question. To study this, we can break economic decision-making down into smaller components, each of which is a potential step in the evolution of human economic behaviour. We can then use data from economic games, which are simplified, highly structured models of decision-making and therefore ideal for the comparative approach, to directly compare these components across species and contexts, as well as in relation to more naturalistic behaviours, to better understand the evolution of economic behaviour and the social and ecological contexts that influenced it. The comparative approach has successfully informed us about the evolution of other complex traits, such as language and morality, and should help us more deeply understand why and how human economic systems evolved. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Comparative performance of orangutans (Pongo spp.), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and drills (Mandrillus leucophaeus), in an ephemeral foraging task

A goal of the comparative approach is to test a variety of species on the same task. Here, we examined whether the factors that helped capuchin monkeys improve their performance in a dichotomous choice task would generalize to three other primate species: orangutans, gorillas, and drill monkeys. In this task, subjects have access to two options, each resulting in an identical food, but one (the ephemeral option) is only available if it is chosen first, whereas the other one (the permanent option) is always available. Therefore, the food-maximizing solution is to choose the ephemeral option first, followed by the permanent option for an additional reward. On the original version (plate task), the options were discriminated by the color and pattern of the plates holding the food, while on two subsequent versions we used altered cues that we predicted would improve performance: (1) the color of the foods themselves (color task), which we hypothesized was relevant to primates, who choose foods rather than substrates on which foods are found when foraging, and (2) patterned cups covering the foods (cup task), which we hypothesized would help primates avoid the prepotent response associated with visible food. Like capuchins, all three species initially failed to solve the plate task. However, while orangutans improved their performance from the plate to the color task, they did not for the cup task, and only a few gorillas and no drills succeeded in either task. Unfortunately, our ability to interpret these data was obscured by differences in the subjects' level of experience with cognitive testing and practical constraints that precluded the use of completely identical procedures across species. Nonetheless, we consider what these results can tell us, and discuss the value of conducting studies across multiple sites despite unavoidable differences.

Slippery scales: Cost prompts, but not benefit prompts, modulate sentencing recommendations in laypeople

Do people punish more than they would if the decision costs were more transparent? In two Internet-based vignette experiments, we tested whether juvenile sentencing recommendations among U.S. adults are responsive to variation in the salience of the taxpayer costs and public safety benefits of incarceration. Using a 2 Cost (present vs. absent) x 2 Benefit (present vs. absent) factorial design, Experiment 1 (N = 234) found that exposure to information about the direct costs of incarcerating the juvenile offender reduced sentencing recommendations by about 28%, but exposure to the public safety benefits had no effect on sentences. Experiment 2 (N = 301) manipulated cost-benefit salience by asking participants to generate their own list of costs of incarceration, benefits of incarceration, or an affectively neutral, unrelated word list. Results revealed a similar selective effect whereby sentencing recommendations were reduced in the cost condition relative to the benefits and control conditions, but sentences in the benefit condition did not differ from the control. This combined pattern suggests that laypeople selectively neglect to factor cost considerations into these judgments, thereby inflating their support for punishment, unless those costs are made salient. These findings contribute to the debate on transparency in sentencing.

Sex differences in the brains of capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella)

This study reports an analysis of 20 T1-weighted magnetic resonance imaging scans from tufted capuchin monkeys (5 male, 15 female). We carried out a data-driven, whole-brain volumetric analysis on regional gray matter anatomy using voxel-based morphometry. This revealed that males showed statistically significant expansion of a region of the hypothalamus, while females showed significant expansion in a distributed set of regions, including the cerebellum, early visual cortex, and higher-order visual regions spanning occipital and temporal cortex. In order to elucidate the network connectivity of these regions, we employed probabilistic tractography on diffusion tensor imaging data. This showed that the female-enlarged regions connect with distributed association networks across the brain. Notably, this contrasts with rodent studies, where sex differences are focused in deep, ancestral limbic regions involved in the control of reproductive behavior. Additionally, in our data set, for several regions, male and female volumetric measures were completely nonoverlapping. This contrasts with human studies, where sex differences in cortical regions have been reported but are characterized by overlapping rather than divergent male and female values. We suggest that these results can be understood in the context of the different lifetime experiences of males and females, which may produce increased experience-dependent cortical plasticity in capuchins compared to rodents, and in humans compared to capuchins.

Anthropomorphism in comparative affective science: Advocating a mindful approach

Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human-like capacities and traits to non-human entities. Anthropomorphism is ubiquitous in everyday life and in scientific domains, operating both implicitly and explicitly as a function of the human lens through which we view the world. A rich history of work in psychology, animal behavior, cognitive science, and philosophy has highlighted the negative and, to a lesser degree, the positive implications of anthropomorphism. In this article, we aim to provide a nuanced perspective of how anthropomorphism impacts the work of comparative affective science. Specifically, we discuss three domains of empirical inquiry in which lessons can be drawn about the benefits and pitfalls of anthropomorphism: responses to death, inequity aversion, and prosocial behavior. On balance, we advocate a mindful approach to anthropomorphizing in comparative affective science, and comparative science more generally.

Serotonin Receptor 1A Variation Is Associated with Anxiety and Agonistic Behavior in Chimpanzees

Serotonin is a neurotransmitter that plays an important role in regulating behavior and personality in humans and other mammals. Polymorphisms in genes coding for the serotonin receptor subtype 1A (HTR1A), the serotonin transporter (SLC6A4), and the serotonin degrading enzyme monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) are associated with anxiety, impulsivity, and neurotic personality in humans. In primates, previous research has largely focused on SLC6A4 and MAOA, with few studies investigating the role of HTR1A polymorphic variation on behavior. Here, we examined variation in the coding region of HTR1A across apes, and genotyped polymorphic coding variation in a sample of 214 chimpanzees with matched measures of personality and behavior. We found evidence for positive selection at three amino acid substitution sites, one in chimpanzees-bonobos (Thr26Ser), one in humans (Phe33Val), and one in orangutans (Ala274Gly). Investigation of the HTR1A coding region in chimpanzees revealed a polymorphic site, where a C/A single nucleotide polymorphism changes a proline to a glutamine in the amino acid sequence (Pro248Gln). The substitution is located in the third intracellular loop of the receptor, a region important for serotonin signal transduction. The derived variant is the major allele in this population (frequency 0.67), and is associated with a reduction in anxiety, decreased rates of male agonistic behavior, and an increase in socio-positive behavior. These results are the first evidence that the HTR1A gene may be involved in regulating social behavior in chimpanzees and encourage further systematic investigation of polymorphic variation in other primate populations with corresponding data on behavior.

Are the roots of human economic systems shared with non-human primates?

We review and analyze evidence for an evolutionary rooting of human economic behaviors and organization in non-human primates. Rather than focusing on the direct application of economic models that a priori account for animal decision behavior, we adopt an inductive definition of economic behavior in terms of the contribution of individual cognitive capacities to the provision of resources within an exchange structure. We spell out to what extent non-human primates' individual and strategic decision behaviors are shared with humans. We focus on the ability to trade, through barter or token-mediated exchanges, as a landmark of an economic system among members of the same species. It is an open question why only humans have reached a high level of economic sophistication. While primates have many of the necessary cognitive abilities (symbolic and computational) in isolation, one plausible issue we identify is the limits in exerting cognitive control to combine several sources of information. The difference between human and non-human primates' economies might well then be in degree rather than kind.

Capuchin and rhesus monkeys but not humans show cognitive flexibility in an optional-switch task

Learned rules help us accurately solve many problems, but by blindly following a strategy, we sometimes fail to find more efficient alternatives. Previous research found that humans are more susceptible to this "cognitive set" bias than other primates in a nonverbal computer task. We modified the task to test one hypothesis for this difference, that working memory influences the advantage of taking a shortcut. During training, 60 humans, 7 rhesus macaques, and 22 capuchin monkeys learned to select three icons in sequence. They then completed 96 baseline trials, in which only this learned rule could be used, and 96 probe trials, in which they could also immediately select the final icon. Rhesus and capuchin monkeys took this shortcut significantly more often than humans. Humans used the shortcut more in this new, easier task than in previous work, but started using it significantly later than the monkeys. Some participants of each species also used an intermediate strategy; they began the learned rule but switched to the shortcut after selecting the first item in the sequence. We suggest that these species differences arise from differences in rule encoding and in the relative efficiency of exploiting a familiar strategy versus exploring alternatives.

Chimpanzees Rarely Settle on Consistent Patterns of Play in the Hawk Dove, Assurance, and Prisoner's Dilemma Games, in a Token Exchange Task

Games derived from experimental economics can be used to directly compare decision-making behavior across primate species, including humans. For example, the use of coordination games, such as the Assurance game, has shown that a variety of primate species can coordinate; however, the mechanism by which they do so appears to differ across species. Recently, these games have been extended to explore anti-coordination and cooperation in monkeys, with evidence that they play the Nash equilibria in sequential games in these other contexts. In the current paper, we use the same methods to explore chimpanzees' behavior in the Assurance Game; an anti-coordination game, the Hawk Dove game; and a cooperation game with a temptation to defect, the Prisoner's Dilemma game. We predicted that they would consistently play the Nash equilibria, as do the monkeys, and that, as in previous work, the subjects' level of experience with cognitive experiments would impact performance. Surprisingly, few of our pairs consistently played the same outcome (i.e., no statistically significant preferences), although those who did showed evidence consistent with Nash equilibria play, the same pattern seen more consistently in the monkeys. We consider reasons for their inconsistent performance; for instance, perhaps it was due to lack of interest in a task that rewarded them almost every trial no matter what option they chose, although this does not explain why they were inconsistent when the monkeys were not. A second goal of our study was to ascertain the effects of exogenous oxytocin in their decision making in one population. In line with recent work showing complex effects of oxytocin on social behavior, we found no effect on subjects' outcomes. We consider possible explanations for this as well.

Responses to Economic Games of Cooperation and Conflict in Squirrel Monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis)

Games from experimental economics have provided insights into the evolutionary roots of social decision making in primates and other species. Multiple primate species' abilities to cooperate, coordinate and anti-coordinate have been tested utilizing variants of these simple games. Past research, however, has focused on species known to cooperate and coordinate in the wild. To begin to address the degree to which cooperation and coordination may be a general ability that manifests in specific contexts, the present study assessed the decisions of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis; N = 10), a species not known for their cooperative behavior in these games. Pairs of monkeys were presented with the Assurance Game (a coordination game), the Hawk-Dove Game (an anti-coordination game) and the Prisoner's Dilemma (a cooperation game with a temptation to defect). We then compared squirrel monkeys' performance to existing data on capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), a closely related species that routinely cooperates, to determine what, if any, differences in decision making emerged. Some pairs of both species found the payoff-dominant Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the coordination game, but failed to find the NE in subsequent games. Our results suggest that, like capuchins, squirrel monkeys coordinate their behavior with others, suggesting that such mutual outcomes occur in at least some contexts, even in species that do not routinely cooperate.

Capuchin (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) Change Detection

Change blindness is a phenomenon in which individuals fail to detect seemingly obvious changes in their visual fields. Like humans, several animal species have also been shown to exhibit change blindness; however, no species of New World monkey has been tested to date. Nine capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) were trained to select whether or not a stimulus changed on a computerized task. In four phases of testing, consisting of full image changes, subtle occlusion changes, and two levels of feature location changes, the search display and mask durations were systematically varied to determine whether capuchins experienced change blindness and in what contexts. Only the full image change test yielded significant results, with subjects detecting changes most accurately with longer search displays and, perplexingly, least accurately when there was no mask. No interactions between search display and mask durations were found in any test phase, suggesting that the relationship between the two parameters may not be important to how capuchins perceive changes. While it is possible that capuchins do not experience change blindness, we suspect that a mix of experimental design, the difficulty of the task, and the inability to verify how closely the subjects attended to each trial contributed to the lack of significant results

Justice at any cost? The impact of cost-benefit salience on criminal punishment judgments

This study investigated the effect of cost-benefit salience on simulated criminal punishment judgments. In two vignette-based survey experiments, we sought to identify how the salience of decision costs influences laypeople's punishment judgments. In both experiments (N₁  = 109; N₂  = 398), undergraduate participants made sentencing judgments with and without explicit information about the direct, material costs of incarceration. Using a within-subjects design, Experiment 1 revealed that increasing the salience of incarceration costs mitigated punishments. However, when costs were not made salient, punishments were no lower than those made when the costs were externalized (i.e., paid by a third party). Experiment 2 showed the same pattern using a between-subjects design. We conclude that, when laypeople formulate sentencing attitudes without exposure to the costs of the punishment, they are prone to discount those costs, behaving as if punishment is societally cost-free. However, when cost information is salient, they utilize it, suggesting the operation of a genuine, albeit labile, punishment preference. We discuss the implications of these findings for psychological theories of decision making and for sentencing policy, including the degree of transparency about the relevant costs of incarceration during the decision process.

Responses to Modified Monty Hall Dilemmas in Capuchin Monkeys, Rhesus Macaques, and Humans

The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) is a simple probability puzzle famous for its counterintuitive solution. Participants initially choose among three doors, one of which conceals a prize. A different door is opened and shown not to contain the prize. Participants are then asked whether they would like to stay with their original choice or switch to the other remaining door. Although switching doubles the chances of winning, people overwhelmingly choose to stay with their original choice. To assess how experience and the chance of winning affect decisions in the MHD, we used a comparative approach to test 264 college students, 24 capuchin monkeys, and 7 rhesus macaques on a nonverbal, computerized version of the game. Participants repeatedly experienced the outcome of their choices and we varied the chance of winning by changing the number of doors (three or eight). All species quickly and consistently switched doors, especially in the eight-door condition. After the computer task, we presented humans with the classic text version of the MHD to test whether they would generalize the successful switch strategy from the computer task. Instead, participants showed their characteristic tendency to stick with their pick, regardless of the number of doors. This disconnect between strategies in the classic version and a repeated nonverbal task with the same underlying probabilities may arise because they evoke different decision-making processes, such as explicit reasoning versus implicit learning.

The Importance of a Truly Comparative Methodology for Comparative Psychology

Comparative research has taught us much about the evolution and development of human and animal behavior. Humans share not just physical and biological similarities with other species, but also many behavioral traits and, in some of these cases, the psychological mechanisms behind them. Comparing behavior and cognition across multiple species can help scientists to pinpoint why and when in phylogenetic history a behavior may have evolved, how it evolved, and what the mechanisms behind it are (Tinbergen, 1963). While the comparative approach has proven quite effective in addressing these questions, comparing behavior across multiple species is not as easy and straightforward as it may initially seem. Rigorous methodology and careful interpretation of results is crucial to answering any of these questions definitively. The focus of the current article is on the comparative methodology and the important factors that need to be addressed in order for comparative research to be effective. We first discuss the benefits and importance of comparative research, followed by the challenges that need to be overcome in good comparative work. We then discuss experimental economics as one “model system” for comparative work that has proven particularly good at addressing such issues, and comment on other approaches. We conclude with future directions for comparative research with an eye on important methodological and theoretical considerations.

Humans as a model for understanding biological fundamentals

How special are humans? This question drives scholarly output across both the sciences and the humanities. Whereas some disciplines, and the humanities in particular, aim at gaining a better understanding of humans per se, most biologists ultimately aim to understand life in general. This raises the question of whether and when humans are acceptable, or even desirable, models of biological fundamentals. Especially for basic biological processes, non-human species are generally accepted as a relevant model to study topics for which studying humans is impractical, impossible, or ethically inadvisable, but the reverse is controversial: are humans 'too unique' to be informative with respect to biological fundamentals relevant to other species? Or are there areas where we share key components, or for which our very uniqueness serves to allow novel explorations? In this special feature, authors from disciplines including biology, psychology, anthropology, neuroscience and philosophy tackle this question. Their overall conclusion is a qualified yes: humans do tell us about biological fundamentals, in some contexts. We hope this special feature will spur a discussion that will lead to a more careful delineation of the similarities and the differences between humans and other species, and how these impact the study of biological fundamentals.