Antiviral Susceptibility of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses Circulating Globally in 2022-2023

The antiviral susceptibility of currently circulating (2022-2023) highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses was assessed by genotypic and phenotypic approaches. The frequency was low for neuraminidase (NA) and polymerase acidic (PA) substitutions associated with reduced inhibition by NA inhibitors (21/2698, 0.78%) or the PA inhibitor baloxavir (14/2600, 0.54%). Phenotypic testing of 22 clade 2.3.2.1a and 2.3.4.4b viruses revealed broad susceptibility to NA inhibitors and baloxavir for a conclusion that most contemporary HPAI A(H5N1) viruses retain susceptibility to antiviral drugs. Novel NA-K432E and NA-T438I substitutions (N2 numbering) were identified at elevated frequencies (104/2698, 3.85%) and caused reduced zanamivir and peramivir inhibition.

Cross-species spill-over potential of the H9N2 bat influenza A virus

In 2017, a novel influenza A virus (IAV) was isolated from an Egyptian fruit bat. In contrast to other bat influenza viruses, the virus was related to avian A(H9N2) viruses and was probably the result of a bird-to-bat transmission event. To determine the cross-species spill-over potential, we biologically characterize features of A/bat/Egypt/381OP/2017(H9N2). The virus has a pH inactivation profile and neuraminidase activity similar to those of human-adapted IAVs. Despite the virus having an avian virus-like preference for α2,3 sialic acid receptors, it is unable to replicate in male mallard ducks; however, it readily infects ex-vivo human respiratory cell cultures and replicates in the lungs of female mice. A/bat/Egypt/381OP/2017 replicates in the upper respiratory tract of experimentally-infected male ferrets featuring direct-contact and airborne transmission. These data suggest that the bat A(H9N2) virus has features associated with increased risk to humans without a shift to a preference for α2,6 sialic acid receptors.

Emergence of a new genotype of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses in Bangladesh

Influenza virological surveillance was conducted in Bangladesh from January to December 2021 in live poultry markets (LPMs) and in Tanguar Haor, a wetland region where domestic ducks have frequent contact with migratory birds. The predominant viruses circulating in LPMs were low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H9N2 and clade 2.3.2.1a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses. Additional LPAIs were found in both LPM (H4N6) and Tanguar Haor wetlands (H7N7). Genetic analyses of these LPAIs strongly suggested long-distance movement of viruses along the Central Asian migratory bird flyway. We also detected a novel clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus from ducks in free-range farms in Tanguar Haor that was similar to viruses first detected in October 2020 in The Netherlands but with a different PB2. Identification of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N1 viruses in Tanguar Haor provides continued support of the role of migratory birds in transboundary movement of influenza A viruses (IAV), including HPAI viruses. Domestic ducks in free range farm in wetland areas, like Tangua Haor, serve as a conduit for the introduction of LPAI and HPAI viruses into Bangladesh. Clade 2.3.4.4b viruses have dominated in many regions of the world since mid-2021, and it remains to be seen if these viruses will replace the endemic clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses in Bangladesh.

It's the Wrong Virus: Rapid Adaptation of Operations Inside a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Select Agent Laboratory in Response to the 2019 SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic

Background

The Animal Biosafety Level 3 Enhanced (ABSL-3+) laboratory at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital has a long history of influenza pandemic preparedness. The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and subsequent expansion into a pandemic has put new and unanticipated demands on laboratory operations since April 2020. Administrative changes, investigative methods requiring increased demand for inactivation and validation of sample removal, and the adoption of a new animal model into the space required all arms of our Biorisk Management System (BMS) to respond with speed and innovation.

Results

In this report, we describe the outcomes of three major operational changes that were implemented to adapt the ABSL-3+ select agent space into a multipathogen laboratory. First were administrative controls that were revised and developed with new Institutional Biosafety Committee protocols, laboratory space segregation, training of staff, and occupational health changes for potential exposure to SARS-CoV-2 inside the laboratory. Second were extensive inactivation and validation experiments performed for both highly pathogenic avian influenza and SARS-CoV-2 to meet the demands for sample removal to a lower biosafety level. Third was the establishment of a new caging system to house Syrian Golden hamsters for SARS-CoV-2 risk assessment modeling.

Summary

The demands placed on biocontainment laboratories for response to SARS-CoV-2 has highlighted the importance of a robust BMS. In a relatively short time, the ABSL-3+ was able to adapt from a single select agent space to a multipathogen laboratory and expand our pandemic response capacity.

Distinct but connected avian influenza virus activities in wetlands and live poultry markets in Bangladesh, 2018-2019

From April 2018 to October 2019, we continued active surveillance for influenza viruses in Bangladeshi live poultry markets (LPMs) and in Tanguar Haor, a wetland region of Bangladesh where domestic ducks have frequent contact with migratory birds. The predominant virus subtypes circulating in the LPMs were low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H9N2 and clade 2.3.2.1a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses of the H5N1-R1 genotype, like those found in previous years. Viruses of the H5N1-R2 genotype, which were previously reported as co-circulating with H5N1-R1 genotype viruses in LPM, were not detected. In addition to H9N2 viruses, which were primarily found in chicken and quail, H2N2, H3N8 and H11N3 LPAI viruses were detected in LPMs, exclusively in ducks. Viruses in domestic ducks and/or wild birds in Tanguar Haor were more diverse, with H1N1, H4N6, H7N1, H7N3, H7N4, H7N6, H8N4, H10N3, H10N4 and H11N3 detected. Phylogenetic analyses of these LPAI viruses suggested that some were new to Bangladesh (H2N2, H7N6, H8N4, H10N3 and H10N4), likely introduced by migratory birds of the Central Asian flyway. Our results show a complex dynamic of viral evolution and diversity in Bangladesh based on factors such as host populations and geography. The LPM environment was characterised by maintenance of viruses with demonstrated zoonotic potential and H5N1 genotype turnover. The wetland environment was characterised by greater viral gene pool diversity but a lower overall influenza virus detection rate. The genetic similarity of H11N3 viruses in both environments demonstrates that LPM and wetlands are connected despite their having distinct influenza ecologies.

The SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 Omicron virus causes attenuated infection and disease in mice and hamsters

Despite the development and deployment of antibody and vaccine countermeasures, rapidly-spreading SARS-CoV-2 variants with mutations at key antigenic sites in the spike protein jeopardize their efficacy. The recent emergence of B.1.1.529, the Omicron variant1,2, which has more than 30 mutations in the spike protein, has raised concerns for escape from protection by vaccines and therapeutic antibodies. A key test for potential countermeasures against B.1.1.529 is their activity in pre-clinical rodent models of respiratory tract disease. Here, using the collaborative network of the SARS-CoV-2 Assessment of Viral Evolution (SAVE) program of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), we evaluated the ability of multiple B.1.1.529 Omicron isolates to cause infection and disease in immunocompetent and human ACE2 (hACE2) expressing mice and hamsters. Despite modeling and binding data suggesting that B.1.1.529 spike can bind more avidly to murine ACE2, we observed attenuation of infection in 129, C57BL/6, and BALB/c mice as compared with previous SARS-CoV-2 variants, with limited weight loss and lower viral burden in the upper and lower respiratory tracts. Although K18-hACE2 transgenic mice sustained infection in the lungs, these animals did not lose weight. In wild-type and hACE2 transgenic hamsters, lung infection, clinical disease, and pathology with B.1.1.529 also were milder compared to historical isolates or other SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern. Overall, experiments from multiple independent laboratories of the SAVE/NIAID network with several different B.1.1.529 isolates demonstrate attenuated lung disease in rodents, which parallels preliminary human clinical data.

Detection of a Novel Reassortant H9N9 Avian Influenza Virus in Free-Range Ducks in Bangladesh

Wild aquatic birds are the primary natural reservoir for influenza A viruses (IAVs). In this study, an A(H9N9) influenza A virus (A/duck/Bangladesh/44493/2020) was identified via routine surveillance in free-range domestic ducks in Bangladesh. Phylogenetic analysis of hemagglutinin showed that the H9N9 virus belonged to the Y439-like lineage. The HA gene had the highest nucleotide identity to A/Bean Goose (Anser fabalis)/South Korea/KNU 2019-16/2019 (H9N2). The other seven gene segments clustered within the Eurasian lineage.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N6) Virus Clade 2.3.4.4h in Wild Birds and Live Poultry Markets, Bangladesh

Migratory birds play a major role in spreading influenza viruses over long distances. We report highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N6) viruses in migratory and resident ducks in Bangladesh. The viruses were genetically similar to viruses detected in wild birds in China and Mongolia, suggesting migration-associated dissemination of these zoonotic pathogens.

Transmission experiments support clade-level differences in the transmission and pathogenicity of Cambodian influenza A/H5N1 viruses

Influenza A/H5N1 has circulated in Asia since 2003 and is now enzootic in many countries in that region. In Cambodia, the virus has circulated since 2004 and has intermittently infected humans. During this period, we have noted differences in the rate of infections in humans, potentially associated with the circulation of different viral clades. In particular, a reassortant clade 1.1.2 virus emerged in early 2013 and was associated with a dramatic increase in infections of humans (34 cases) until it was replaced by a clade 2.3.2.1c virus in early 2014. In contrast, only one infection of a human has been reported in the 6 years since the clade 2.3.2.1c virus became the dominant circulating virus. We selected three viruses to represent the main viral clades that have circulated in Cambodia (clade 1.1.2, clade 1.1.2 reassortant, and clade 2.3.2.1c), and we conducted experiments to assess the virulence and transmissibility of these viruses in avian (chicken, duck) and mammalian (ferret) models. Our results suggest that the clade 2.3.2.1c virus is more "avian-like," with high virulence in both ducks and chickens, but there is no evidence of aerosol transmission of the virus from ducks to ferrets. In contrast, the two clade 1 viruses were less virulent in experimentally infected and contact ducks. However, evidence of chicken-to-ferret aerosol transmission was observed for both clade 1 viruses. The transmission experiments provide insights into clade-level differences that might explain the variation in A/H5N1 infections of humans observed in Cambodia and other settings.

Antibody Responses to SARS-CoV-2 Antigens in Humans and Animals

To optimize the public health response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), we must first understand the antibody response to individual proteins on the severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and the antibody's cross reactivity to other coronaviruses. Using a panel of 37 convalescent COVID-19 human serum samples, we showed that the magnitude and specificity of responses varied across individuals, independent of their reactivity to seasonal human coronaviruses (HCoVs). These data suggest that COVID-19 vaccines will elicit primary humoral immune responses in naïve individuals and variable responses in those previously exposed to SARS-CoV-2. Unlike the limited cross-coronavirus reactivities in humans, serum samples from 96 dogs and 10 cats showed SARS-CoV-2 protein-specific responses focused on non-S1 proteins. The correlation of this response with those to other coronaviruses suggests that the antibodies are cross-reactive and generated to endemic viruses within these hosts, which must be considered in seroepidemiologic studies. We conclude that substantial variation in antibody generation against coronavirus proteins will influence interpretations of serologic data in the clinical and veterinary settings.

Continuing evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses in Bangladeshi live poultry markets

Since November 2008, we have conducted active avian influenza surveillance in Bangladesh. Clades 2.2.2, 2.3.4.2, and 2.3.2.1a of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses have all been identified in Bangladeshi live poultry markets (LPMs), although, since the end of 2014, H5N1 viruses have been exclusively from clade 2.3.2.1a. In June 2015, a new reassortant H5N1 virus (H5N1-R1) from clade 2.3.2.1a was identified, containing haemagglutinin, neuraminidase, and matrix genes of H5N1 viruses circulating in Bangladesh since 2011, plus five other genes of Eurasian-lineage low pathogenic avian influenza A (LPAI) viruses. Here we report the status of circulating avian influenza A viruses in Bangladeshi LPMs from March 2016 to January 2018. Until April 2017, H5N1 viruses exclusively belonged to H5N1-R1 clade 2.3.2.1a. However, in May 2017, we identified another reassortant H5N1 (H5N1-R2), also of clade 2.3.2.1a, wherein the PA gene segment of H5N1-R1 was replaced by that of another Eurasian-lineage LPAI virus related to A/duck/Bangladesh/30828/2016 (H3N8), detected in Bangladeshi LPM in September 2016. Currently, both reassortant H5N1-R1 and H5N1-R2 co-circulate in Bangladeshi LPMs. Furthermore, some LPAI viruses isolated from LPMs during 2016–2017 were closely related to those from ducks in free-range farms and wild birds in Tanguar haor, a wetland region of Bangladesh where ducks have frequent contact with migratory birds. These data support a hypothesis where Tanguar haor-like ecosystems provide a mechanism for movement of LPAI viruses to LPMs where reassortment with poultry viruses occurs adding to the diversity of viruses at this human-animal interface.

H9N2 influenza viruses from Bangladesh: Transmission in chicken and New World quail

The H9N2 influenza viruses that have become established in Bangladeshi live poultry markets possess five gene segments of the highly pathogenic H7N3 avian influenza virus. We assessed the replication, transmission, and disease potential of three H9N2 viruses in chickens and New World quail. Each virus replicated to high titers and transmitted by the airborne route to contacts in both species. Infected chickens showed no disease signs, and the viruses differed in their disease potential in New World quail. New World quail were more susceptible than chickens to H9N2 viruses and shed virus after airborne transmission for 10 days. Consequently, New World quail are a potential threat in the maintenance and spread of influenza virus in live poultry markets.

Genesis of Influenza A(H5N8) Viruses

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) clade 2.3.4.4 virus emerged in 2016 and spread to Russia, Europe, and Africa. Our analysis of viruses from domestic ducks at Tanguar haor, Bangladesh, showed genetic similarities with other viruses from wild birds in central Asia, suggesting their potential role in the genesis of A(H5N8).

The Continuing Evolution of H5N1 and H9N2 Influenza Viruses in Bangladesh Between 2013 and 2014

In 2011, avian influenza surveillance at the Bangladesh live bird markets (LBMs) showed complete replacement of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus of clade 2.2.2 (Qinghai-like H5N1 lineage) by the HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1. This clade, which continues to circulate in Bangladesh and neighboring countries, is an intra-and interclade reassortant; its HA, polymerase basic 1 (PB1), polymerase (PA), and nonstructural (NS) genes come from subclade 2.3.2.1a; the polymerase basic 2 (PB2) comes from subclade 2.3.2.1c; and the NA, nucleocapsid protein (NP), and matrix (M) gene from clade 2.3.4.2. The H9N2 influenza viruses cocirculating in the Bangladesh LBMs are also reassortants, possessing five genes (NS, M, NP, PA, and PB1) from an HPAI H7N3 virus previously isolated in Pakistan. Despite frequent coinfection of chickens and ducks, reassortment between these H5N1 and H9N2 viruses has been rare. However, all such reassortants detected in 2011 through 2013 have carried seven genes from the local HPAI H5N1 lineage and the PB1 gene from the Bangladeshi H9N2 clade G1 Mideast, itself derived from HPAI H7N3 virus. Although the live birds we sampled in Bangladesh showed no clinical signs of morbidity, the emergence of this reassortant HPAI H5N1 lineage further complicates endemic circulation of H5N1 viruses in Bangladesh, posing a threat to both poultry and humans.

Insight into live bird markets of Bangladesh: an overview of the dynamics of transmission of H5N1 and H9N2 avian influenza viruses

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 and low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H9N2 viruses have been recognized as threats to public health in Bangladesh since 2007. Although live bird markets (LBMs) have been implicated in the transmission, dissemination, and circulation of these viruses, an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of avian transmission of H5N1 and H9N2 viruses at the human-animal interface has been lacking. Here we present and evaluate epidemiological findings from active surveillance conducted among poultry in various production sectors in Bangladesh from 2008 to 2016. Overall, the prevalence of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in collected samples was 24%. Our data show that AIVs are more prevalent in domestic birds within LBMs (30.4%) than in farms (9.6%). Quail, chickens and ducks showed a high prevalence of AIVs (>20%). The vast majority of AIVs detected (99.7%) have come from apparently healthy birds and poultry drinking water served as a reservoir of AIVs with a prevalence of 32.5% in collected samples. HPAI H5N1 was more frequently detected in ducks while H9N2 was more common in chickens and quail. LBMs, particularly wholesale markets, have become a potential reservoir for various types of AIVs, including HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H9N2. The persistence of AIVs in LBMs is of great concern to public health, and this study highlights the importance of regularly reviewing and implementing infection control procedures as a means of reducing the exposure of the general public to AIVs.Emerging Microbes & Infections (2017) 6, e12; doi:10.1038/emi.2016.142; published online 8 March 2017.

Influenza surveillance on 'foie gras' duck farms in Bulgaria, 2008-2012

Objectives

Ducks can shed and spread influenza A viruses (IAVs) while showing no disease signs. Our objective was to clarify the role of ‘foie gras’ ducks in the circulation of IAVs in Bulgaria.

Methods

Monthly avian influenza surveillance was conducted on 63 ‘foie gras’ duck farms, 52 of which were surveyed throughout the study between November 2008 and April 2012. Virologic and serologic samples were collected and tested. During this time, wild bird samples were collected at major wild bird‐resting areas near the Black Sea coast and Danube River.

Results

The study showed high isolation frequency of low‐pathogenicity avian influenza viruses. In the raising population (<75 days old), subtypes H3, H4, and H6 were detected monthly and H5 LPAIV, sporadically. Different subtypes (H1, H10, H11) were isolated from the fattening premises (75‐ to 100‐day‐old ducks), suggesting different routes of introduction. Only 6 of the 52 farms that were surveyed both virologically and serologically were influenza‐free throughout the study, possibly due to higher biosecurity measures implemented. No evidence of direct transmission of IAV from wild birds was found. Wild bird surveillance showed low isolation frequency of IAV. IAV prevalence of 0·55% for migratory ducks and 0·53% for migratory geese was estimated in November–December 2011 and January–February 2012, respectively, at two ornithologically important locations near the Black Sea coast.

Conclusions

The ‘foie gras’ duck farms in Bulgaria are an optimal niche where Eurasian‐like IAVs are maintained and reassorted unapparent to farmers and veterinarians.

The replication of Bangladeshi H9N2 avian influenza viruses carrying genes from H7N3 in mammals

H9N2 avian influenza viruses are continuously monitored by the World Health Organization because they are endemic; they continually reassort with H5N1, H7N9 and H10N8 viruses; and they periodically cause human infections. We characterized H9N2 influenza viruses carrying internal genes from highly pathogenic H7N3 viruses, which were isolated from chickens or quail from live-bird markets in Bangladesh between 2010 and 2013. All of the H9N2 viruses used in this study carried mammalian host-specific mutations. We studied their replication kinetics in normal human bronchoepithelial cells and swine tracheal and lung explants, which exhibit many features of the mammalian airway epithelium and serve as a mammalian host model. All H9N2 viruses replicated to moderate-to-high titers in the normal human bronchoepithelial cells and swine lung explants, but replication was limited in the swine tracheal explants. In Balb/c mice, the H9N2 viruses were nonlethal, replicated to moderately high titers and the infection was confined to the lungs. In the ferret model of human influenza infection and transmission, H9N2 viruses possessing the Q226L substitution in hemagglutinin replicated well without clinical signs and spread via direct contact but not by aerosol. None of the H9N2 viruses tested were resistant to the neuraminidase inhibitors. Our study shows that the Bangladeshi H9N2 viruses have the potential to infect humans and highlights the importance of monitoring and characterizing this influenza subtype to better understand the potential risk these viruses pose to humans.

Impact of Adjuvants on the Immunogenicity and Efficacy of Split-Virion H7N9 Vaccine in Ferrets

BACKGROUND

An effective vaccine is urgently needed against the H7N9 avian influenza virus. We evaluated the immunogenicity and protective efficacy of a split-virion H7N9 vaccine with or without the oil-in-water adjuvants in ferrets.

METHODS

Ferrets were vaccinated with 2 doses of unadjuvanted, MF59 or AS03-adjuvanted A/Shanghai/2/2013 (H7N9) vaccine, and the induction of antibodies to hemagglutinin (HA) or neuraminidase proteins was evaluated. Ferrets were then challenged with wild-type H7N9 virus to assess the vaccine's protective efficacy. The vaccine composition and integrity was also evaluated in vitro.

RESULTS

Adjuvanted vaccines stimulated robust serum antibody titers against HA and neuraminidase compared with the unadjuvanted vaccines. Although there was a difference in adjuvanticity between AS03 and MF59 at a lower dose (3.75 µg of HA), both adjuvants induced comparable antibody responses after 2 doses of 15 µg. On challenge, ferrets that received adjuvanted vaccines showed lower viral burden than the control or unadjuvanted vaccine group. In vitro examinations revealed that the vaccine contained visible split-virus particles and retained the native conformation of HA recognizable by polyclonal and monoclonal antibodies.

CONCLUSIONS

The adjuvanted H7N9 vaccines demonstrated superior immunogenicity and protective efficacy against H7N9 infection in ferrets and hold potential as a vaccination regimen.

Epistatic interactions between neuraminidase mutations facilitated the emergence of the oseltamivir-resistant H1N1 influenza viruses

Oseltamivir-resistant H1N1 influenza viruses carrying the H275Y neuraminidase mutation predominated worldwide during the 2007–2009 seasons. While several neuraminidase substitutions were found to be necessary to counteract the adverse effects of H275Y, the order and impact of evolutionary events involved remain elusive. Here, we reconstruct H1N1 neuraminidase phylogeny during 1999–2009, estimate the timing and order of crucial amino acid changes, and evaluate their impact on the biological outcome of the H275Y mutation. Of the twelve neuraminidase substitutions that occurred during 1999–2009, five (chronologically, V234M, R222Q, K329E, D344N, H275Y, and D354G) are necessary for maintaining full neuraminidase function in the presence of the H275Y mutation by altering protein accumulation or enzyme affinity/activity. The sequential emergence and cumulative effects of these mutations clearly illustrate a role for epistasis in shaping the emergence and subsequent evolution of a drug-resistant virus population, which can be useful in understanding emergence of novel viral phenotypes of influenza.

Characterization of an H4N2 influenza virus from Quails with a multibasic motif in the hemagglutinin cleavage site

The cleavage motif in the hemagglutinin (HA) protein of highly pathogenic H5 and H7 subtypes of avian influenza viruses is characterized by a peptide insertion or a multibasic cleavage site (MBCS). Here, we isolated an H4N2 virus from quails (Quail/CA12) with two additional arginines in the HA cleavage site, PEKRRTR/G, forming an MBCS-like motif. Quail/CA12 is a reassortant virus with the HA and neuraminidase (NA) gene most similar to a duck-isolated H4N2 virus, PD/CA06 with a monobasic HA cleavage site. Quail/CA12 required exogenous trypsin for efficient growth in culture and caused no clinical illness in infected chickens. Quail/CA12 had high binding preference for α2,6-linked sialic acids and showed higher replication and transmission ability in chickens and quails than PD/CA06. Although the H4N2 virus remained low pathogenic, these data suggests that the acquisition of MBCS in the field is not restricted to H5 or H7 subtypes.

A single dose of whole inactivated H7N9 influenza vaccine confers protection from severe disease but not infection in ferrets

The H7N9 influenza virus caused significant mortality and morbidity in infected humans during an outbreak in China in 2013 stimulating vaccine development efforts. As previous H7-based vaccines have been poorly immunogenic in humans we sought to determine the immunogenic and protective properties of an inactivated whole virus vaccine derived from a 2013 H7N9 virus in ferrets. As whole virus vaccine preparations have been shown to be more immunogenic in humans, but less likely to be used, than split or surface antigen formulations, we vaccinated ferrets with a single dose of 15, 30, or 50 μg of the vaccine and subsequently challenged with wild-type A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9) either by direct instillation or by contact with infected animals. Although ferrets vaccinated with higher doses of vaccine had higher serum hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) titers, the titers were still low. During subsequent instillation challenge, however, ferrets vaccinated with 50 μg of vaccine showed no illness and shed significantly less virus than mock vaccinated controls. All vaccinated ferrets had lower virus loads in their lungs as compared to controls. In a separate study where unvaccinated-infected ferrets were placed in the same cage with vaccinated-uninfected ferrets, vaccination did not prevent infection in the contact ferrets, although they showed a trend of lower viral load. Overall, we conclude that inactivated whole-virus H7N9 vaccine was able to reduce the severity of infection and viral load, despite the lack of hemagglutinin-inhibiting antibodies.

Antigenic and molecular characterization of avian influenza A(H9N2) viruses, Bangladesh

Human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus was identified in Bangladesh in 2011. Surveillance for influenza viruses in apparently healthy poultry in live-bird markets in Bangladesh during 2008-2011 showed that subtype H9N2 viruses are isolated year-round, whereas highly pathogenic subtype H5N1 viruses are co-isolated with subtype H9N2 primarily during the winter months. Phylogenetic analysis of the subtype H9N2 viruses showed that they are reassortants possessing 3 gene segments related to subtype H7N3; the remaining gene segments were from the subtype H9N2 G1 clade. We detected no reassortment with subtype H5N1 viruses. Serologic analyses of subtype H9N2 viruses from chickens revealed antigenic conservation, whereas analyses of viruses from quail showed antigenic drift. Molecular analysis showed that multiple mammalian-specific mutations have become fixed in the subtype H9N2 viruses, including changes in the hemagglutinin, matrix, and polymerase proteins. Our results indicate that these viruses could mutate to be transmissible from birds to mammals, including humans.

Possible role of songbirds and parakeets in transmission of influenza A(H7N9) virus to humans

Avian-origin influenza A(H7N9) recently emerged in China, causing severe human disease. Several subtype H7N9 isolates contain influenza genes previously identified in viruses from finch-like birds. Because wild and domestic songbirds interact with humans and poultry, we investigated the susceptibility and transmissibility of subtype H7N9 in these species. Finches, sparrows, and parakeets supported replication of a human subtype H7N9 isolate, shed high titers through the oropharyngeal route, and showed few disease signs. Virus was shed into water troughs, and several contact animals seroconverted, although they shed little virus. Our study demonstrates that a human isolate can replicate in and be shed by such songbirds and parakeets into their environment. This finding has implications for these birds' potential as intermediate hosts with the ability to facilitate transmission and dissemination of A(H7N9) virus.

Antiviral resistance among highly pathogenic influenza A (H5N1) viruses isolated worldwide in 2002-2012 shows need for continued monitoring

Highly pathogenic (HP) H5N1 influenza viruses are evolving pathogens with the potential to cause sustained human-to-human transmission and pandemic virus spread. Specific antiviral drugs can play an important role in the early stages of a pandemic, but the emergence of drug-resistant variants can limit control options. The available data on the susceptibility of HP H5N1 influenza viruses to neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors and adamantanes is scarce, and there is no extensive analysis. Here, we systematically examined the prevalence of NA inhibitor and adamantane resistance among HP H5N1 influenza viruses that circulated worldwide during 2002-2012. The phenotypic fluorescence-based assay showed that both human and avian HP H5N1 viruses are susceptible to NA inhibitors oseltamivir and zanamivir with little variability over time and ∼5.5-fold less susceptibility to oseltamivir of viruses of hemagglutinin (HA) clade 2 than of clade 1. Analysis of available sequence data revealed a low incidence of NA inhibitor-resistant variants. The established markers of NA inhibitor resistance (E119A, H274Y, and N294S, N2 numbering) were found in 2.4% of human and 0.8% of avian isolates, and the markers of reduced susceptibility (I117V, K150N, I222V/T/K, and S246N) were found in 0.8% of human and 2.9% of avian isolates. The frequency of amantadine-resistant variants was higher among human (62.2%) than avian (31.6%) viruses with disproportionate distribution among different HA clades. As in human isolates, avian H5N1 viruses carry double L26I and S31N M2 mutations more often than a single S31N mutation. Overall, both human and avian HP H5N1 influenza viruses are susceptible to NA inhibitors; some proportion is still susceptible to amantadine in contrast to ∼100% amantadine resistance among currently circulating seasonal human H1N1 and H3N2 viruses. Continued antiviral susceptibility monitoring of H5N1 viruses is needed to maintain therapeutic approaches for control of disease.

Spread of influenza virus A (H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 to Bulgaria in common buzzards

On March 15, 2010, a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus was isolated from the carcass of a common buzzard (Buteo buteo) in Bulgaria. Phylogenetic analyses of the virus showed a close genetic relationship with influenza virus A (H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 viruses isolated from wild birds in the Tyva Republic and Mongolia during 2009-2010. Designated A/common buzzard/Bulgaria/38WB/2010, this strain was highly pathogenic in chickens but had low pathogenicity in mice and ferrets and no molecular markers of increased pathogenicity in mammals. The establishment of clade 2.3.2.1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 subtype in wild birds in Europe would increase the likelihood of health threats to humans and poultry in the region.