Does the brain consume additional glucose during self-control tasks?

The Nature of Self-Regulatory Fatigue and "Ego Depletion": Lessons From Physical Fatigue

Self-regulation requires overriding a dominant response and leads to temporary self-regulatory fatigue. Existing theories of the nature and causes of self-regulatory fatigue highlight physiological substrates such as glucose, or psychological processes such as motivation, but these explanations are incomplete on their own. Historically, theories of physical fatigue demonstrate a similar pattern of useful but incomplete explanations, as recent views of physical fatigue emphasize the roles of both physiological and psychological factors. In addition to accounting for multiple inputs, these newer views also explain how fatigue can occur even in the presence of sufficient resources. Examining these newer theories of physical fatigue can serve as a foundation on which to build a more comprehensive understanding of self-regulatory fatigue that integrates possible neurobiological underpinnings of physical and self-regulatory fatigue, and suggests the possible function of self-regulatory fatigue.

Sharing More Than the Sofa

Following an initial act of self-control, human performance on subsequent tasks that also require self-control exertion is impaired. This phenomenon, termed ego depletion, is constrained by beliefs and perceptions in humans. Interestingly, this effect has also been observed in dogs, which arguably do not share similar belief systems. This observation suggests that a common biological mechanism might underlie the phenomenon for both species. It also suggests that we can learn something about human self-control by conducting research with dogs. In this article, we relate findings on the depletion effect in dogs to the different mechanisms that are proposed to explain the effect in humans. Finally, we elaborate on practical implications for working dogs.

Testing the Glucose Hypothesis among Capuchin Monkeys: Does Glucose Boost Self-Control?

The ego-depletion hypothesis states that self-control diminishes over time and with exertion. Accordingly, the glucose hypothesis attributes this depletion of self-control resources to decreases in blood glucose levels. Research has led to mixed findings among humans and nonhuman animals, with limited evidence for such a link between glucose and self-control among closely-related nonhuman primate species, but some evidence from more distantly related species (e.g., honeybees and dogs). We tested this hypothesis in capuchin monkeys by manipulating the sugar content of a calorie-matched breakfast meal following a nocturnal fast, and then presenting each monkey with the accumulation self-control task. Monkeys were presented with food items one-by-one until the subject retrieved and ate the accumulating items, which required continual inhibition of food retrieval in the face of an increasingly desirable reward. Results indicated no relationship between self-control performance on the accumulation task and glucose ingestion levels following a fast. These results do not provide support for the glucose hypothesis of self-control among capuchin monkeys within the presented paradigm. Further research assessing self-control and its physiological correlates among closely- and distantly-related species is warranted to shed light on the mechanisms underlying self-control behavior.

Neural mechanisms underlying the impact of daylong cognitive work on economic decisions

The ability to exert self-control is key to social insertion and professional success. An influential literature in psychology has developed the theory that self-control relies on a limited common resource, so that fatigue effects might carry over from one task to the next. However, the biological nature of the putative limited resource and the existence of carry-over effects have been matters of considerable controversy. Here, we targeted the activity of the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) as a common substrate for cognitive control, and we prolonged the time scale of fatigue induction by an order of magnitude. Participants performed executive control tasks known to recruit the LPFC (working memory and task-switching) over more than 6 h (an approximate workday). Fatigue effects were probed regularly by measuring impulsivity in intertemporal choices, i.e., the propensity to favor immediate rewards, which has been found to increase under LPFC inhibition. Behavioral data showed that choice impulsivity increased in a group of participants who performed hard versions of executive tasks but not in control groups who performed easy versions or enjoyed some leisure time. Functional MRI data acquired at the start, middle, and end of the day confirmed that enhancement of choice impulsivity was related to a specific decrease in the activity of an LPFC region (in the left middle frontal gyrus) that was recruited by both executive and choice tasks. Our findings demonstrate a concept of focused neural fatigue that might be naturally induced in real-life situations and have important repercussions on economic decisions.

Putting revenge and forgiveness in an evolutionary context

In this response, we address eight issues concerning our proposal that human minds contain adaptations for revenge and forgiveness. Specifically, we discuss (a) the inferences that are and are not licensed by patterns of contemporary behavioral data in the context of the adaptationist approach; (b) the theoretical pitfalls of conflating proximate and ultimate causation; (c) the role of development in the production of adaptations; (d) the implications of proposing that the brain’s cognitive systems are fundamentally computational in nature; (e) our preferred method for considering the role of individual differences in computational systems; (f) applications of our proposal to understanding conflicts between groups; (g) the possible implications of our views for understanding the operation of contemporary criminal justice systems; and (h) the question of whether people ever “genuinely” forgive.

The Central Governor Model of Exercise Regulation Teaches Us Precious Little about the Nature of Mental Fatigue and Self-Control Failure

Self-control is considered broadly important for many domains of life. One of its unfortunate features, however, is that it tends to wane over time, with little agreement about why this is the case. Recently, there has been a push to address this problem by looking to the literature in exercise physiology, specifically the work on the central governor model of physical fatigue. Trying to explain how and why mental performance wanes over time, the central governor model suggests that exertion is throttled by some central nervous system mechanism that receives information about energetic bodily needs and motivational drives to regulate exertion and, ultimately, to prevent homeostatic breakdown, chiefly energy depletion. While we admire the spirit of integration and the attempt to shed light on an important topic in psychology, our concern is that the central governor model is very controversial in exercise physiology, with increasing calls to abandon it altogether, making it a poor fit for psychology. Our concerns are threefold. First, while we agree that preservation of bodily homeostasis makes for an elegant ultimate account, the fact that such important homeostatic concerns can be regularly overturned with even slight incentives (e.g., a smile) renders the ultimate account impotent and points to other ultimate functions for fatigue. Second, despite the central governor being thought to take as input information about the metabolic needs of the body, there is no credible evidence that mental effort actually consumes inordinate amounts of energy that are not already circulating in the brain. Third, recent modifications of the model make the central governor appear like an all-knowing homunculus and unfalsifiable in principle, thus contributing very little to our understanding of why people tend to disengage from effortful tasks over time. We note that the latest models in exercise physiology have actually borrowed concepts and models from psychology to understand physical performance.

Carbohydrate ingestion but not mouth rinse maintains sustained attention when fasted

Carbohydrate (CHO) receptors in the mouth signal brain areas involved in cognitive tasks relying upon motivation and task persistence; however, the minimal CHO dose that improves mental activity is unclear.

PURPOSE

To determine if CHO (via ingestion or oral rinse) influences sustained attention without eliciting glycemic responses when in a fasted state.

METHODS

Study A: Six healthy adults completed five treatment trials, ingesting 0-6% CHO solutions to evaluate glycemic response. Peak blood glucose for 6% and 1.5% CHO was greater (p<0.05) than 0% and 0.4% CHO; thus, the low 0.4% CHO was evaluated further. Study B: Following an overnight fast, ten healthy adults completed three trials in a crossover design: 1) 400 ml 0.4% CHO ingested serially via 25 ml boluses, 2) 375 ml 0% CHO control (CON) ingested followed by one 25 ml 6% CHO isocaloric (1.5 g CHO) mouth rinse, and 3) CON ingest followed by CON rinse. Following treatments, a 20 min Continuous Performance Task (CPT) was performed to assess accuracy and precision.

RESULTS

Accuracy and precision were not different during the first 5 min of CPT. However, accuracy was maintained with CHO ingest (p=1.0) but decreased over 20 min (p<0.05) with both CHO and CON rinse treatments. Precision tended to decline over 20 min CPT with CON (p=0.06) and CHO rinse (p=0.05) but were maintained with CHO ingest (p=1.0). No differences in glycemic responses were observed between treatments.

CONCLUSIONS

Compared to mouth rinsing CON or CHO (1.5 g in 6% CHO), ingestion of an isocaloric low-CHO drink maintained sustained attention over a mentally fatiguing task and appears effective after fasting without eliciting a glycemic response.

Six Questions for the Resource Model of Control (and Some Answers)

The resource model of self-control casts self-control as a capacity that relies on some limited resource that exhausts with use. The model captured our imagination and brought much-needed attention on an important yet neglected psychological construct. Despite its success, basic issues with the model remain. Here, we ask six questions: (i) Does self-control really wane over time? (ii) Is ego depletion a form of mental fatigue? (iii) What is the resource that is depleted by ego depletion? (iv) How can changes in motivation, perception, and expectations replenish an exhausted resource? (v) Has the revised resource model unwittingly become a model about motivation? (vi) Do self-control exercises increase self-control? By providing some answers to these questions - including conducting a meta-analysis of the self-control training literature - we highlight how the resource model needs to be revised if not supplanted altogether.

Self-control depletion in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.): does delay of gratification rely on a limited resource?

Self-control failure has enormous personal and societal consequences. One of the most debated models explaining why self-control breaks down is the Strength Model, according to which self-control depends on a limited resource. Either previous acts of self-control or taking part in highly demanding cognitive tasks have been shown to reduce self-control, possibly due to a reduction in blood glucose levels. However, several studies yielded negative findings, and recent meta-analyses questioned the robustness of the depletion effect in humans. We investigated, for the first time, whether the Strength Model applies to a non-human primate species, the tufted capuchin monkey. We tested five capuchins in a self-control task (the Accumulation task) in which food items were accumulated within individual’s reach for as long as the subject refrained from taking them. We evaluated whether capuchins’ performance decreases: (i) when tested before receiving their daily meal rather than after consuming it (Energy Depletion Experiment), and (ii) after being tested in two tasks with different levels of cognitive complexity (Cognitive Depletion Experiment). We also tested, in both experiments, how implementing self-control in each trial of the Accumulation task affected this capacity within each session and/or across consecutive sessions. Repeated acts of self-control in each trial of the Accumulation task progressively reduced this capacity within each session, as predicted by the Strength Model. However, neither experiencing a reduction in energy level nor taking part in a highly demanding cognitive task decreased performance in the subsequent Accumulation task. Thus, whereas capuchins seem to be vulnerable to within-session depletion effects, to other extents our findings are in line with the growing body of studies that failed to find a depletion effect in humans. Methodological issues potentially affecting the lack of depletion effects in capuchins are discussed.

The Impact of an Ego Depletion Manipulation on Performance-Based and Self-Report Assessment Measures

We investigated the impact of ego depletion on selected Rorschach cognitive processing variables and self-reported affect states. Research indicates acts of effortful self-regulation transiently deplete a finite pool of cognitive resources, impairing performance on subsequent tasks requiring self-regulation. We predicted that relative to controls, ego-depleted participants' Rorschach protocols would have more spontaneous reactivity to color, less cognitive sophistication, and more frequent logical lapses in visualization, whereas self-reports would reflect greater fatigue and less attentiveness. The hypotheses were partially supported; despite a surprising absence of self-reported differences, ego-depleted participants had Rorschach protocols with lower scores on two variables indicative of sophisticated combinatory thinking, as well as higher levels of color receptivity; they also had lower scores on a composite variable computed across all hypothesized markers of complexity. In addition, self-reported achievement striving moderated the effect of the experimental manipulation on color receptivity, and in the Depletion condition it was associated with greater attentiveness to the tasks, more color reactivity, and less global synthetic processing. Results are discussed with an emphasis on the response process, methodological limitations and strengths, implications for calculating refined Rorschach scores, and the value of using multiple methods in research and experimental paradigms to validate assessment measures.

The role of motivation, glucose and self-control in the antisaccade task

Research shows that self-control is resource limited and there is a gradual weakening in consecutive self-control task performance akin to muscle fatigue. A body of evidence suggests that the resource is glucose and consuming glucose reduces this effect. This study examined the effect of glucose on performance in the antisaccade task - which requires self-control through generating a voluntary eye movement away from a target - following self-control exertion in the Stroop task. The effects of motivation and individual differences in self-control were also explored. In a double-blind design, 67 young healthy adults received a 25g glucose or inert placebo drink. Glucose did not enhance antisaccade performance following self-control exertion in the Stroop task. Motivation however, predicted performance on the antisaccade task; more specifically high motivation ameliorated performance decrements observed after initial self-control exertion. In addition, individuals with high levels of self-control performed better on certain aspects of the antisaccade task after administration of a glucose drink. The results of this study suggest that the antisaccade task might be a powerful paradigm, which could be used as a more objective measure of self-control. Moreover, the results indicate that level of motivation and individual differences in self-control should be taken into account when investigating deficiencies in self-control following prior exertion.

The role of implicit affective responses and trait self-control in ego resource management

Exertion of self-control requires reliance on ego resources. Impaired performance typically results once those resources have been depleted by previous use. Yet the mechanism behind the depletion processes is little understood. Beliefs, motivation, and physiological changes have been implicated, yet the source behind these remains unknown. We propose that implicit may form the fundamental building blocks that these processes rely upon to operate. Implicit affective responses to energy may trigger management of ego resources after depletion. Findings suggest that inhibitory trait self-control may interact with the depletion effect, indicating the importance of taking individual differences in chronic availability of ego-resources into account. After depletion, individuals high in trait self-control may be less motivated to conserve remaining resources than those low in self-control. This mechanism may also help explain the conservation of resources observed when expecting multiple tasks requiring self-control.

Adaptation: A Two-Perception Probabilistic Conceptual Framework

We introduce a two-perception probabilistic concept of adaptation (TPPCA), which accounts for fast and slow adaptation processes. The outcome of both processes depends on the perceptual difference (termed herein aquantum) of how an individual perceives his or her abilities, skills, and capacities (βv) to interact, cope, and perform a given task (δi). Thus, the adaptation process is determined by (βv– δi). Fast adaptation processes target aspects that require immediate responses while slow adaptation processes involve ongoing adaptation to long-term demands. We introduce the TPPCA in several domains of inquiry, which rely on fast adaptation processes (perceptual–cognitive–action coupling, performance routines, psychological crisis, reversal states), slow adaptation processes (i.e., career aspirations, burnout), and processes that can be either fast or slow (i.e., flow, affect and mood changes, emotion regulation).

Implicit associations have a circadian rhythm

The current study shows that people's ability to inhibit implicit associations that run counter to their explicit views varies in a circadian pattern. The presence of this rhythmic variation suggests the involvement of a biological process in regulating automatic associations—specifically, with the current data, associations that form undesirable social biases. In 1998, Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz introduced the Implicit Association Test as a means of measuring individual differences in implicit cognition. The IAT is a powerful tool that has become widely used. Perhaps most visibly, studies employing the IAT demonstrate that people generally hold implicit biases against social groups, which often conflict with their explicitly held views. The IAT engages inhibitory processes similar to those inherent in self-control tasks. Because the latter processes are known to be resource-limited, we considered whether IAT scores might likewise be resource dependent. Analyzing IAT performance from over a million participants across all times of day, we found a clear circadian pattern in scores. This finding suggests that the IAT measures not only the strength of implicit associations, but also the effect of variations in the physiological resources available to inhibit their undesirable influences on explicit behavior.

Illusionary delusions. Willingness to exercise self-control can mask effects of glucose on self-control performance in experimental paradigms that use identical self-control tasks

The purpose of the present article is to highlight limitations of Lange and Eggert's methodology of using identical self-control tasks in testing effects of glucose on depletion of self-control resources and self-control performance. We suggest that when participants engage in two identical self-control tasks, cognitions developed during initial act of self-control may mask the effects of glucose on self-control performance by undermining willingness to exert effort during the second act of self-control. As a consequence, glucose may increase ability to exercise self-control but participants may not want to capitalize on this "ability advantage" because they are unwilling to exercise self-control. The present article concludes that researchers who test the glucose hypothesis in the context of a depletion paradigm should employ dissimilar acts of self-control and ensure that depleted participants are sufficiently motivated to exercise self-control.

The opportunity cost model: automaticity, individual differences, and self-control resources

I contend that Kurzban et al.'s model is silent on three issues. First, the extent to which opportunity-cost computations are automatic or deliberative is unclear. Second, the role of individual differences in biasing opportunity-cost computations needs elucidating. Third, in the absence of "next-best" tasks, task persistence will be indefinite, which seems unfeasible, so perhaps integration with a limited-resource account is necessary.

Beyond dopamine: the noradrenergic system and mental effort

An opportunity cost model of effort requires flexible integration of valuation and self-control systems. Reciprocal connections between these networks and brainstem neuromodulatory systems are likely to provide the signals that affect subsequent persistence or failure when faced with effort challenges. The interaction of these systems should be taken into account to strengthen a normative neural model of effort.

Exploring the Interplay of Trait Self–Control and Ego Depletion: Empirical Evidence for Ironic Effects

Trait self–control (TSC) has been conceptualized as a general and abstract ability to exert self–regulation across multiple domains that has mostly beneficial effects. However, its relationship to situational depletion of self–regulatory resources has received little attention. We systematically explore the interplay of trait and situational self–control in two studies (total N = 264). In contrast with a positive view of TSC, the results show greater ego depletion effects for high (vs. low) self–control abilities across such diverse domains as candy consumption (Study 1), risk–taking behaviour (Study 2) and achievement motivation (Study 2). It is proposed that these ironic effects are attributable to high–TSC individuals’ less frequent active inhibition of impulses in everyday life and their resulting lack of experience in resisting acute temptations. A third study (N> = 358) corroborated this general reasoning by showing that TSC is indeed associated with less frequent impulse inhibition in daily routines. Our data point to a downside of dispositional self–control in ego depletion paradigms. Other explanations and potential future avenues for resolving inconsistent findings across the literature are discussed. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology

Sweetened blood sweetens behavior. Ego depletion, glucose, guilt, and prosocial behavior

Although guilt feels bad to the individual, it is good for society because guilty feelings can prompt people to perform good deeds. Previous research shows that fatigue decreases guilty feelings and helpful behavior. This present research tests whether glucose restores guilty feelings and increases helpful behavior. Depleted participants watched a movie about butchering animals for their meat or skin and were told to express no emotions, whereas non-depleted participants watched the same movie, but could express their emotions. Afterwards they drank a glucose or placebo beverage. Having participants play a game in which another person was punished for their errors induced guilt. Finally, participants played a dictator game in which they could leave lottery tickets for the next participant. Depleted participants felt less guilty and helped less than non-depleted participants, and those who consumed a placebo beverage felt less guilt and helped less than those who consumed a glucose beverage.

The Addict in Us all

In this paper, we contend that the psychology of addiction is similar to the psychology of ordinary, non-addictive temptation in important respects, and explore the ways in which these parallels can illuminate both addiction and ordinary action. The incentive salience account of addiction proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1-3) entails that addictive desires are not in their nature different from many of the desires had by non-addicts; what is different is rather the way that addictive desires are acquired, which in turn affects their strength. We examine these "incentive salience" desires, both in addicts and non-addicts, contrasting them with more cognitive desires. On this account, the self-control challenge faced by addicted agents is not different in kind from that faced by non-addicted agents - though the two may, of course, differ greatly in degree of difficulty. We explore a general model of self-control for both the addict and the non-addict, stressing that self-control may be employed at three different stages, and examining the ways in which it might be strengthened. This helps elucidate a general model of intentional action.

Beyond simple utility in predicting self-control fatigue: A proximate alternative to the opportunity cost model

The opportunity cost model offers an ultimate explanation of ego depletion that helps to move the field beyond biologically improbable resource accounts. The model's more proximate explanation, however, falls short of accounting for much data and is based on an outdated view of human rationality. We suggest that our own process model offers a better proximate account of self-control fatigue.

Cost-benefit models as the next, best option for understanding subjective effort

The commentaries on our target article are surprisingly sympathetic to our overall approach to explaining subjective effort, though disagreement with particulars inevitably emerged. Here, in our response, we first review the few disagreements concerning the basic structure of our proposal, highlighting areas in which little or no resistance was voiced. Opposition to the assumptions that underlie our opportunity cost model is noticeably limited. Areas of genuine disagreement, however, include: (1) the inputs to and outputs of the relevant decision-making systems; (2) how to interpret data regarding individual differences in performance; (3) how to explain persistence on tasks that give rise to the sensation of subjective effort; and (4) the details of the relevant neuropsychological systems. Throughout we point to empirical issues raised by the commentaries and suggest research that will be useful in arbitrating points of disagreement.

An opportunity cost model of subjective effort and task performance

Why does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over time. We propose an alternative explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and benefits associated with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms, especially those associated with executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Consequently, the deployment of these computational mechanisms carries an opportunity cost--that is, the next-best use to which these systems might be put. We argue that the phenomenology of effort can be understood as the felt output of these cost/benefit computations. In turn, the subjective experience of effort motivates reduced deployment of these computational mechanisms in the service of the present task. These opportunity cost representations, then, together with other cost/benefit calculations, determine effort expended and, everything else equal, result in performance reductions. In making our case for this position, we review alternative explanations for both the phenomenology of effort associated with these tasks and for performance reductions over time. Likewise, we review the broad range of relevant empirical results from across sub-disciplines, especially psychology and neuroscience. We hope that our proposal will help to build links among the diverse fields that have been addressing similar questions from different perspectives, and we emphasize ways in which alternative models might be empirically distinguished.

After a pair of self-control-intensive tasks, sucrose swishing improves subsequent working memory performance

BACKGROUND

The limited strength model of self-control predicts that acts of self-control impair subsequent performance on tasks that require self-control (i.e., "ego depletion"), and the majority of the published research on this topic is supportive of this prediction. Additional research suggests that this effect can be alleviated by manipulating participants' motivation to perform-for instance, by having participants swish a drink containing carbohydrates, which is thought to function as a reward-or by requiring participants to complete two initial acts of self-control rather than only one.

METHODS

Here, we explore both the effect of having participants perform two initial tasks thought to require self-control (versus two less self-control-intensive tasks) and the effect of swishing a drink containing sucrose (compared to control drinks) on subsequent self-control. Outcomes were analyzed using standard null hypothesis significance testing techniques (e.g., analysis of variance, t-tests). In some cases, test statistics were transformed into Bayes factors to aid in interpretation (i.e., to allow for acceptance of the null hypothesis).

RESULTS

We found that performing two self-control-intensive tasks actually improved subsequent self-control when participants swished a drink containing sucrose between tasks. For participants who swished control drinks, we found no evidence of ego depletion.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that claims that self-control failure is caused by the depletion of a resource (or that it functions as if it relies on a limited resource) merit greater circumspection. Our results-all of which were either null or contrary to predictions from the limited strength model-are important for researchers interested in patterns of self-control failure.

Hunger Games

Social-welfare policies are a modern instantiation of a phenomenon that has pervaded human evolutionary history: resource sharing. Ancestrally, food was a key shared resource in situations of temporary hunger. If evolved human psychology continues to shape how individuals think about current, evolutionarily novel conditions, this invites the prediction that attitudes regarding welfare politics are influenced by short-term fluctuations in hunger. Using blood glucose levels as a physiological indicator of hunger, we tested this prediction in a study in which participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which they consumed soft drinks containing either carbohydrates or an artificial sweetener. Analyses showed that participants with experimentally induced low blood glucose levels expressed stronger support for social welfare. Using an incentivized measure of actual sharing behavior (the dictator game), we further demonstrated that this increased support for social welfare does not translate into genuinely increased sharing motivations. Rather, we suggest that it is “cheap talk” aimed at increasing the sharing efforts of other individuals.

Self-regulatory depletion enhances neural responses to rewards and impairs top-down control

To be successful at self-regulation, individuals must be able to resist impulses and desires. The strength model of self-regulation suggests that when self-regulatory capacity is depleted, self-control deficits result from a failure to engage top-down control mechanisms. Using functional neuroimaging, we examined changes in brain activity in response to viewing desirable foods among 31 chronic dieters, half of whom completed a task known to result in self-regulatory depletion. Compared with nondepleted dieters, depleted dieters exhibited greater food-cue-related activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, a brain area associated with coding the reward value and liking aspects of desirable foods; they also showed decreased functional connectivity between this area and the inferior frontal gyrus, a region commonly implicated in self-control. These findings suggest that self-regulatory depletion provokes self-control failure by reducing connectivity between brain regions that are involved in cognitive control and those that represent rewards, thereby decreasing the capacity to resist temptations.

Neural and behavioral evidence for an intrinsic cost of self-control

The capacity for self-control is critical to adaptive functioning, yet our knowledge of the underlying processes and mechanisms is presently only inchoate. Theoretical work in economics has suggested a model of self-control centering on two key assumptions: (1) a division within the decision-maker between two 'selves' with differing preferences; (2) the idea that self-control is intrinsically costly. Neuroscience has recently generated findings supporting the 'dual-self' assumption. The idea of self-control costs, in contrast, has remained speculative. We report the first independent evidence for self-control costs. Through a neuroimaging meta-analysis, we establish an anatomical link between self-control and the registration of cognitive effort costs. This link predicts that individuals who strongly avoid cognitive demand should also display poor self-control. To test this, we conducted a behavioral experiment leveraging a measure of demand avoidance along with two measures of self-control. The results obtained provide clear support for the idea of self-control costs.

Beliefs about willpower determine the impact of glucose on self-control

Past research found that the ingestion of glucose can enhance self-control. It has been widely assumed that basic physiological processes underlie this effect. We hypothesized that the effect of glucose also depends on people's theories about willpower. Three experiments, both measuring (experiment 1) and manipulating (experiments 2 and 3) theories about willpower, showed that, following a demanding task, only people who view willpower as limited and easily depleted (a limited resource theory) exhibited improved self-control after sugar consumption. In contrast, people who view willpower as plentiful (a nonlimited resource theory) showed no benefits from glucose--they exhibited high levels of self-control performance with or without sugar boosts. Additionally, creating beliefs about glucose ingestion (experiment 3) did not have the same effect as ingesting glucose for those with a limited resource theory. We suggest that the belief that willpower is limited sensitizes people to cues about their available resources including physiological cues, making them dependent on glucose boosts for high self-control performance.

Suppressing emotions impairs subsequent stroop performance and reduces prefrontal brain activation

Abundant behavioral evidence suggests that the ability to self-control is limited, and that any exertion of self-control will increase the likelihood of subsequent self-control failures. Here we investigated the neural correlates underlying the aftereffects of self-control on future control processes using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). An initial act of self-control (suppressing emotions) impaired subsequent performance in a second task requiring control (Stroop task). On the neural level, increased activity during emotion suppression was followed by a relative decrease in activity during the Stroop task in a cluster in the right lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), an area engaged in the effortful implementation of control. There was no reliable evidence for reduced activity in the medial frontal cortex (MFC) including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is involved in conflict detection processes and has previously also been implicated in self-control. Follow-up analyses showed that the detected cluster in the right lateral PFC and an area in the MFC were involved in both the emotion suppression task and the Stroop task, but only the cluster in the right lateral PFC showed reduced activation after emotion suppression during the Stroop task. Reduced activity in lateral prefrontal areas relevant for the implementation of control may be a critical consequence of prior self-control exertion if the respective areas are involved in both self-control tasks.

Training Self-Control: A Domain-General Translational Neuroscience Approach

Self-control plays an important role in healthy development and has been shown to be amenable to intervention. This article presents a theoretical framework for the emerging area of "brain-training" interventions that includes both laboratory-based direct training methods and ecologically valid school-, family-, and community-based interventions. Although these approaches have proliferated in recent years, evidence supporting them is just beginning to emerge, and conceptual models underlying many of the techniques they employ tend to be underspecified and imprecise. Identifying the neural systems responsible for improvements in self-control may be of tremendous benefit not only for overall intervention efficacy but also for basic science issues related to underlying shared biological mechanisms of psychopathology. This article reviews the neurodevelopment of self-control and explores its implications for theory, intervention, and prevention. It then presents a neurally informed framework for understanding self-control development and change and discusses how this framework may inform future intervention strategies for individuals suffering with psychopathology or drug abuse/dependence, or for young children with delays in cognitive or emotional functioning.

Imaging fatigue of interference control reveals the neural basis of executive resource depletion

Executive control coordinates, prioritizes, and selects task-relevant representations under conditions of conflict. Behavioral evidence has documented that executive resources are separable, finite, and can be temporarily depleted; however, the neural basis for such resource limits are largely unknown. Here, we investigate the neural correlates underlying the fatigue or depletion of interference control, an executive process hypothesized to mediate competition among candidate memory representations. Using a pre/post continuous acquisition fMRI design, we demonstrate that, compared with a nondepletion control group, the depletion group showed a fatigue-induced performance deficit that was specific to interference control and accompanied by a left-to-right shift in the network of active regions. Specifically, we observed decreased BOLD signal in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), striatum, and the cerebellum, along with a corresponding increase in right hemisphere regions including the IFG, insular, and temporal cortex. Depletion-related changes in activation magnitude correlated with behavioral changes, suggesting that decreased recruitment of task-relevant regions, including left IFG, contributes to impaired interference control. These results provide new evidence about the brain dynamics of "process-specific" fatigue and suggest that depletion may pose a significant limitation on the cognitive and neural resources available for executive control.