Behavioural and functional anatomical correlates of deception in humans

Lying in neuropsychology

The issue of lying occurs in neuropsychology especially when examinations are conducted in a forensic context. When a subject intentionally either presents non-existent deficits or exaggerates their severity to obtain financial or material compensation, this behaviour is termed malingering. Malingering is discussed in the general framework of lying in psychology, and the different procedures used by neuropsychologists to evidence a lack of collaboration at examination are briefly presented and discussed. When a lack of collaboration is observed, specific emphasis is placed on the difficulty in unambiguously establishing that this results from the patient's voluntary decision.

Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest

The current study tested the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making by increasing cognitive load. This manipulation is believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue, reduces the cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias to occur. As telling a lie is believed to be more cognitively taxing than telling the truth, we hypothesized that participants would be more honest under high cognitive load than low cognitive load. 173 participants anonymously rolled a die three times and reported their outcomes — of which one of the rolls would be paid out — while either under high or low cognitive load. For the roll that determined pay, participants under low cognitive load, but not under high cognitive load, reported die rolls that were significantly different from a uniform (honest) distribution. The reported outcome of this roll was also significantly higher in the low load condition than in the high load condition, suggesting that participants in the low load condition lied to get higher pay. This pattern was not observed for the second and third roll where participants knew the rolls were not going to be paid out and where therefore lying would not serve self-interest. Results thus indicate that having limited cognitive capacity will unveil a tendency to be honest in a situation where having more cognitive capacity would have enabled one to serve self-interest by lying.

Contextualizing neuro-collaborations: reflections on a transdisciplinary fMRI lie detection experiment

Recent neuroscience initiatives (including the E.U.'s Human Brain Project and the U.S.'s BRAIN Initiative) have reinvigorated discussions about the possibilities for transdisciplinary collaboration between the neurosciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. As STS scholars have argued for decades, however, such inter- and transdisciplinary collaborations are potentially fraught with tensions between researchers. This essay build on such claims by arguing that the tensions of transdisciplinary research also exist within researchers' own experiences of working between disciplines - a phenomenon that we call "disciplinary double consciousness" (DDC). Building on previous work that has characterized similar spaces (and especially on the Critical Neuroscience literature), we argue that "neuro-collaborations" inevitably engage researchers in DDC - a phenomenon that allows us to explore the useful dissonance that researchers can experience when working between a "home" discipline and a secondary discipline. Our case study is a five-year research project in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) lie detection involving a transdisciplinary research team made up of social scientists, a neuroscientist, and a humanist. In addition to theorizing neuro-collaborations from the inside-out, this essay presents practical suggestions for developing transdisciplinary infrastructures that could support future neuro-collaborations.

Functional MRI-based lie detection: scientific and societal challenges

Functional MRI (fMRI)-based lie detection has been marketed as a tool for enhancing personnel selection, strengthening national security and protecting personal reputations, and at least three US courts have been asked to admit the results of lie detection scans as evidence during trials. How well does fMRI-based lie detection perform, and how should the courts, and society more generally, respond? Here, we address various questions — some of which are based on a meta-analysis of published studies — concerning the scientific state of the art in fMRI-based lie detection and its legal status, and discuss broader ethical and societal implications. We close with three general policy recommendations.

Interviewing to Detect Deception

DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis of verbal and nonverbal cues to deception showed that cues to deception are faint and unreliable. If liars do not spontaneously display diagnostic cues to deceit, a logical step is to make sure that investigators elicit or enhance such cues in interviews through specific interview technique. Such interview techniques were scarce in the nonverbal and verbal cues to deception domain, but recently researchers have developed alternative protocols that have their roots in cognition and are based on the assumption that questions can be asked that are more difficult for liars to answer than for truth tellers. They will be discussed in the first part of this article. Traditionally, lie detection in a forensic context concentrated on police-suspect interview settings. However, in the wake of high-profile international terrorist attacks, the importance of identifying terrorist networks and gathering intelligence about the activities of such groups has become paramount. Deception detection in intelligence interviews differs in several ways from deception detection in traditional police-suspect interviews and requires innovative deception research. In the second part of this article we discuss the emerging literature in this domain.

Mind Reading Using Neuroimaging

Traditional lie detection tools, such as the polygraph, voice stress analysis, or special interrogation techniques, rely on behavioral or psychophysiological manifestations of deception. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, the question emerged whether it would be possible to directly identify deceit in the part of the body where it is generated: the brain. After a few promising studies, these techniques became soon commercially available and there have been attempts to use such results in the court in recent years. The current article reviews the development of neuroimaging techniques in the field of deception detection and critically discusses the potential but also the shortcomings of such methods. Unfortunately, the majority of research in this field was rather unsystematic and neglected the accumulated knowledge regarding methodological pitfalls that were extensively discussed in the scientific community in conjunction with the polygraph. Therefore, neuroimaging studies on deception largely differ with respect to the experimental paradigm (the interrogation technique), the methods for analyzing the data, and the procedures to obtain individual diagnoses. Moreover, most studies used artificial laboratory settings that differ considerably from real-life applications. As a consequence, neuroimaging techniques are not applicable for detecting deception in individual field cases at the moment. However, recent advantages such as multivariate pattern analysis might yield novel neuroimaging applications in the near future that are capable of improving established techniques for detecting deception or concealed knowledge.

Preventing Future Crimes

This review paper examines the growing body of research on the psycho-legal study of true and false intentions – a typically neglected area within the field of deception detection. The extant studies are thematically grouped into four main topics: (i) physiological measures; (ii) implicit measures; (iii) strategic interviewing; and (iv) studies examining episodic future thought (EFT) and mental images. The benefits and limitations, and underlying theory of the respective approaches are discussed. The paper also provides a note on relevant theory, specific for intention research, and recommendations for future research directions. Findings from experimental research are related to the applied context.

Unfolding the spatial and temporal neural processing of lying about face familiarity

To understand the neural processing underpinnings of deception, this study employed both neuroimaging (functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) and neurophysiological (event-related potential, ERP) methodologies to examine the temporal and spatial coupling of the neural correlates and processes that occur when one lies about face familiarity. This was performed using simple directed lying tasks. According to cues provided by the researchers, the 17 participants were required to respond truthfully or with lies to a series of faces. The findings confirmed that lie and truth conditions are associated with different fMRI activations in the ventrolateral, dorsolateral, and dorsal medial-frontal cortices; premotor cortex, and inferior parietal gyrus. They are also associated with different amplitudes within the time interval between 300 and 1000 ms post face stimulus, after the initiation (270 ms) of face familiarity processing. These results support the cognitive model that suggests representations of truthful information are first aroused and then manipulated during deception. Stronger fMRI activations at the left inferior frontal gyrus and more positive-going ERP amplitudes within [1765, 1800] ms were observed in the contrast between lie and truth for familiar than for unfamiliar faces. The fMRI and ERP findings, together with ERP source reconstruction, clearly delineate the neural processing of face familiarity deception.

Possible role of an error detection mechanism in brain processing of deception: PET-fMRI study

To investigate brain maintenance of deliberate deception the positron emission tomography and the event related functional MRI studies were performed. We used an experimental paradigm that presupposed free choices between equally beneficial deceptive or honest actions. Experimental task simulated the "Cheat" card game which aims to defeat an opponent by sequential deceptive and honest claims. Results of both the PET and the fMRI studies revealed that execution of both deliberately deceptive and honest claims is associated with fronto-parietal brain network comprised of inferior and middle frontal gyri, precentral gyrus (BA 6), caudate nucleus, and inferior parietal lobule. Direct comparison between those claims, balanced in terms of decision making and action outcome (gain and losses), revealed activation of areas specifically associated with deception execution: precentral gyrus (BA 6), caudate nuclei, thalamus and inferior parietal lobule (BA 39/40). The obtained experimental data were discussed in relation to a possible role of an error detection system in processing deliberate deception.

Reaction time measures in deception research: comparing the effects of irrelevant and relevant stimulus-response compatibility

Evidence regarding the validity of reaction time (RT) measures in deception research is mixed. One possible reason for this inconsistency is that structurally different RT paradigms have been used. The aim of this study was to experimentally investigate whether structural differences between RT tasks are related to how effective those tasks are for capturing deception. We achieved this aim by comparing the effectiveness of relevant and irrelevant stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) tasks. We also investigated whether an intended but not yet completed mock crime could be assessed with both tasks. Results showed (1) a larger compatibility effect in the relevant SRC task compared to the irrelevant SRC task, (2) for both the completed and the intended crime. These results were replicated in a second experiment in which a semantic feature (instead of color) was used as critical response feature in the irrelevant SRC task. The findings support the idea that a structural analysis of deception tasks helps to identify RT measures that produce robust group effects, and that strong compatibility effects for both enacted crimes as well as merely intended crimes can be found with RT measures that are based on the manipulation of relevant SRC.

The neural mechanism of encountering misjudgment by the justice system

Although misjudgment is an issue of primary concern to the justice system and public safety, the response to misjudgment by the human brain remains unclear. We used fMRI to record neural activity in participants that encountered four possible judgments by the justice system with two basic components: whether the judgment was right or wrong [accuracy: right vs. wrong (misjudgment)] and whether the judgment was positive or negative [valence: positive vs. negative]. As hypothesized, the rostral ACC specifically processes the accuracy of judgment, being more active for misjudgment than for right judgment, while the striatum was uniquely responsible for the valence of judgment, being recruited to a larger extent by positive judgment compared to negative judgment. Furthermore, the activity in the rACC for positive misjudgments was positively correlated with that for negative misjudgments, which confirmed the misjudgment-specificity of the rACC. These results demonstrate that the brain can distinguish a misjudgment from a right judgment and regard a misjudgment as an emotionally arousing stimulus, independent of whether it is positive or negative, while positive judgment is considered as hedonic information, regardless of whether it is right or wrong. Our study is the first to reveal the neural mechanism that underlies judgment processing. This mechanism may constitute the basis of future studies to develop a novel marker for the detection of lies.

Detection of deception based on fMRI activation patterns underlying the production of a deceptive response and receiving feedback about the success of the deception after a mock murder crime

The ability of a deceiver to track a victim's ongoing judgments about the truthfulness of the deceit can be critical for successful deception. However, no study has yet investigated the neural circuits underlying receiving a judgment about one's lie. To explore this issue, we used a modified Guilty Knowledge Test in a mock murder situation to simultaneously record the neural responses involved in producing deception and later when judgments of that deception were made. Producing deception recruited the bilateral inferior parietal lobules (IPLs), right ventral lateral prefrontal (VLPF) areas and right striatum, among which the activation of the right VLPF contributed mostly to diagnosing the identities of the participants, correctly diagnosing 81.25% of 'murderers' and 81.25% of 'innocents'. Moreover, the participant's response when their deception was successful uniquely recruited the right middle frontal gyrus, bilateral IPLs, bilateral orbitofrontal cortices, bilateral middle temporal gyrus and left cerebellum, among which the right IPL contributed mostly to diagnosing participants' identities, correctly diagnosing 93.75% of murderers and 87.5% of innocents. This study shows that neural activity associated with being a successful liar (or not) is a feasible indicator for detecting lies and may be more valid than neural activity associated with producing deception.

Understanding advanced theory of mind and empathy in high-functioning adults with autism spectrum disorder

It has been argued that higher functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) have specific deficits in advanced but not simple theory of mind (ToM), yet the questionable ecological validity of some tasks reduces the strength of this assumption. The present study employed The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT), which uses video vignettes to assess comprehension of subtle conversational inferences (sarcasm, lies/deception). Given the proposed relationships between advanced ToM and cognitive and affective empathy, these associations were also investigated. As expected, the high-functioning adults with ASDs demonstrated specific deficits in comprehending the beliefs, intentions, and meaning of nonliteral expressions. They also had significantly lower cognitive and affective empathy. Cognitive empathy was related to ToM and group membership whereas affective empathy was only related to group membership.

Neural correlates of deception in social contexts in normally developing children

Deception is related to the ability to inhibit prepotent responses and to engage in mental tasks such as anticipating responses and inferring what another person knows, especially in social contexts. However, the neural correlates of deception processing, which requires mentalizing, remain unclear. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we examined the neural correlates of deception, including mentalization, in social contexts in normally developing children. Healthy right-handed children (aged 8–9 years) were scanned while performing interactive games involving deception. The games varied along two dimensions: the type of reply (deception and truth) and the type of context (social and less social). Participants were instructed to deceive a witch and to tell the truth to a girl. Under the social-context conditions, participants were asked to consider what they inferred about protagonists' preferences from their facial expressions when responding to questions. Under the less-social-context conditions, participants did not need to consider others' preferences. We found a significantly greater response in the right precuneus under the social-context than under less-social-context conditions. Additionally, we found marginally greater activation in the right inferior parietal lobule (IPL) under the deception than under the truth condition. These results suggest that deception in a social context requires not only inhibition of prepotent responses but also engagement in mentalizing processes. This study provides the first evidence of the neural correlates of the mentalizing processes involved in deception in normally developing children.

Telling lies: the irrepressible truth?

Telling a lie takes longer than telling the truth but precisely why remains uncertain. We investigated two processes suggested to increase response times, namely the decision to lie and the construction of a lie response. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were directed or chose whether to lie or tell the truth. A colored square was presented and participants had to name either the true color of the square or lie about it by claiming it was a different color. In both experiments we found that there was a greater difference between lying and telling the truth when participants were directed to lie compared to when they chose to lie. In Experiments 3 and 4, we compared response times when participants had only one possible lie option to a choice of two or three possible options. There was a greater lying latency effect when questions involved more than one possible lie response. Experiment 5 examined response choice mechanisms through the manipulation of lie plausibility. Overall, results demonstrate several distinct mechanisms that contribute to additional processing requirements when individuals tell a lie.

[Non-contact measurement of eye movements in the detection of deception]

The effectiveness of detecting deception by measuring eye movements without making contact was investigated. A deception-detection protocol was used with two conditions based on the stimulus similarity to the critical image. Volunteer participants (N = 63) were randomly assigned to either the high or the low-similarity condition. They were randomly presented with critical and non-critical images and their eye movements were measured without contact. High-similarity images were presented in the high-similarity condition and low-similarity images were presented in the low-similarity condition. The results showed no significant differences in eye movements between the critical and non-critical images in the high-similarity condition. In contrast, in the low-similarity condition, the frequency and total length of time for glancing at critical images were significantly lower than for glancing at non-critical images. These results are suggestive of the effectiveness of the non-contact measurement of eye movements for the detection of deception.

When interference helps: increasing executive load to facilitate deception detection in the concealed information test

The possibility to enhance the detection efficiency of the Concealed Information Test (CIT) by increasing executive load was investigated, using an interference design. After learning and executing a mock crime scenario, subjects underwent three deception detection tests: an RT-based CIT, an RT-based CIT plus a concurrent memory task (CITMem), and an RT-based CIT plus a concurrent set-shifting task (CITShift). The concealed information effect, consisting in increased RT and lower response accuracy for probe items compared to irrelevant items, was evidenced across all three conditions. The group analyses indicated a larger difference between RTs to probe and irrelevant items in the dual-task conditions, but this difference was not translated in a significantly increased detection efficiency at an individual level. Signal detection parameters based on the comparison with a simulated innocent group showed accurate discrimination for all conditions. Overall response accuracy on the CITMem was highest and the difference between response accuracy to probes and irrelevants was smallest in this condition. Accuracy on the concurrent tasks (Mem and Shift) was high, and responses on these tasks were significantly influenced by CIT stimulus type (probes vs. irrelevants). The findings are interpreted in relation to the cognitive load/dual-task interference literature, generating important insights for research on the involvement of executive functions in deceptive behavior.

When Pinocchio's nose does not grow: belief regarding lie-detectability modulates production of deception

Does the brain activity underlying the production of deception differ depending on whether or not one believes their deception can be detected? To address this question, we had participants commit a mock theft in a laboratory setting, and then interrogated them while they underwent functional MRI (fMRI) scanning. Crucially, during some parts of the interrogation participants believed a lie-detector was activated, whereas in other parts they were told it was switched-off. We were thus able to examine the neural activity associated with the contrast between producing true vs. false claims, as well as the independent contrast between believing that deception could and could not be detected. We found increased activation in the right amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), during the production of false (compared to true) claims. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the effects of deception and belief in the left temporal pole and right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off. As these regions are associated with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory retrieval, we conclude that producing deceptive behavior in a context in which one believes this deception can be detected is associated with a cognitively taxing effort to reconcile contradictions between one's actions and recollections.

Neural correlates of spontaneous deception: A functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)study

Deception is commonly seen in everyday social interactions. However, most of the knowledge about the underlying neural mechanism of deception comes from studies where participants were instructed when and how to lie. To study spontaneous deception, we designed a guessing game modeled after Greene and Paxton (2009) "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(30), 12506-12511", in which lying is the only way to achieve the performance level needed to end the game. We recorded neural responses during the game using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). We found that when compared to truth-telling, spontaneous deception, like instructed deception, engenders greater involvement of such prefrontal regions as the left superior frontal gyrus. We also found that the correct-truth trials produced greater neural activities in the left middle frontal gyrus and right superior frontal gyrus than the incorrect-truth trials, suggesting the involvement of the reward system. Furthermore, the present study confirmed the feasibility of using NIRS to study spontaneous deception.

Using Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law and Research Policy Collide

Progress in the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain to evaluate deception and differentiate lying from truth-telling has created anticipation of a breakthrough in the search for technology-based methods of lie detection. In the last few years, litigants have attempted to introduce fMRI lie detection evidence in courts. This article weighs in on the interdisciplinary debate about the admissibility of such evidence, identifying the missing pieces of the scientific puzzle that need to be completed if fMRI-based lie detection is to meet the standards of either legal reliability or general acceptance. We believe that the Daubert's "known error rate" is the key concept linking the legal and scientific standards. We posit that properly-controlled clinical trials are the most convincing means to determine the error rates of fMRI-based lie detection and confirm or disprove the relevance of the promising laboratory research on this topic. This article explains the current state of the science and provides an analysis of the case law in which litigants have sought to introduce fMRI lie detection. Analyzing the myriad issues related to fMRI lie detection, the article identifies the key limitations of the current neuroimaging of deception science as expert evidence and explores the problems that arise from using scientific evidence before it is proven scientifically valid and reliable. We suggest that courts continue excluding fMRI lie detection evidence until this potentially useful form of forensic science meets the scientific standards currently required for adoption of a medical test or device. Given a multitude of stakeholders and, the charged and controversial nature and the potential societal impact of this technology, goodwill and collaboration of several government agencies may be required to sponsor impartial and comprehensive clinical trials that will guide the development of forensic fMRI technology.

Learning to lie: effects of practice on the cognitive cost of lying

Cognitive theories on deception posit that lying requires more cognitive resources than telling the truth. In line with this idea, it has been demonstrated that deceptive responses are typically associated with increased response times and higher error rates compared to truthful responses. Although the cognitive cost of lying has been assumed to be resistant to practice, it has recently been shown that people who are trained to lie can reduce this cost. In the present study (n = 42), we further explored the effects of practice on one’s ability to lie by manipulating the proportions of lie and truth-trials in a Sheffield lie test across three phases: Baseline (50% lie, 50% truth), Training (frequent-lie group: 75% lie, 25% truth; control group: 50% lie, 50% truth; and frequent-truth group: 25% lie, 75% truth), and Test (50% lie, 50% truth). The results showed that lying became easier while participants were trained to lie more often and that lying became more difficult while participants were trained to tell the truth more often. Furthermore, these effects did carry over to the test phase, but only for the specific items that were used for the training manipulation. Hence, our study confirms that relatively little practice is enough to alter the cognitive cost of lying, although this effect does not persist over time for non-practiced items.

A repeated lie becomes a truth? The effect of intentional control and training on deception

Deception has been demonstrated as a task that involves executive control such as conflict monitoring and response inhibition. In the present study, we investigated whether or not the controlled processes associated with deception could be trained to be more efficient. Forty-eight participants finished a reaction time-based differentiation of deception paradigm (DDP) task using self- and other-referential information on two occasions. After the first baseline DDP task, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group in which participants finished the same task for a second time; an instruction group in which participants were instructed to speed up their deceptive responses in the second DDP; a training group in which participants received training in speeding up their deceptive responses, and then proceeded to the second DDP. Results showed that instruction alone significantly reduced the RTs associated with participants’ deceptive responses. However, the differences between deceptive and truthful responses were erased only in the training group. The result suggests that the performance associated with deception is malleable and could be voluntarily controlled with intention or training.

Does the inferior frontal sulcus play a functional role in deception? A neuronavigated theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation study

By definition, lying involves withholding the truth. Response inhibition may therefore be the cognitive function at the heart of deception. Neuroimaging research has shown that the same brain region that is activated during response inhibition tasks, namely the inferior frontal region, is also activated during deception paradigms. This led to the hypothesis that the inferior frontal region is the neural substrate critically involved in withholding the truth. In the present study, we critically examine the functional necessity of the inferior frontal region in withholding the truth during deception. We experimentally manipulated the neural activity level in right inferior frontal sulcus (IFS) by means of neuronavigated continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS). Individual structural magnetic resonance brain images (MRI) were used to allow precise stimulation in each participant. Twenty-six participants answered autobiographical questions truthfully or deceptively before and after sham and real cTBS. Deception was reliably associated with more errors, longer and more variable response times than truth telling. Despite the potential role of IFS in deception as suggested by neuroimaging data, the cTBS-induced disruption of right IFS did not affect response times or error rates, when compared to sham stimulation. The present findings do not support the hypothesis that the right IFS is critically involved in deception.

Sex, lies and fMRI--gender differences in neural basis of deception

Deception has always been a part of human communication as it helps to promote self-presentation. Although both men and women are equally prone to try to manage their appearance, their strategies, motivation and eagerness may be different. Here, we asked if lying could be influenced by gender on both the behavioral and neural levels. To test whether the hypothesized gender differences in brain activity related to deceptive responses were caused by differential socialization in men and women, we administered the Gender Identity Inventory probing the participants’ subjective social sex role. In an fMRI session, participants were instructed either to lie or to tell the truth while answering a questionnaire focusing on general and personal information. Only for personal information, we found differences in neural responses during instructed deception in men and women. The women vs. men direct contrast revealed no significant differences in areas of activation, but men showed higher BOLD signal compared to women in the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG). Moreover, this effect remained unchanged when self-reported psychological gender was controlled for. Thus, our study showed that gender differences in the neural processes engaged during falsifying personal information might be independent from socialization.

Inter-identity autobiographical amnesia in patients with dissociative identity disorder

Background

A major symptom of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID; formerly Multiple Personality Disorder) is dissociative amnesia, the inability to recall important personal information. Only two case studies have directly addressed autobiographical memory in DID. Both provided evidence suggestive of dissociative amnesia. The aim of the current study was to objectively assess transfer of autobiographical information between identities in a larger sample of DID patients.

Methods

Using a concealed information task, we assessed recognition of autobiographical details in an amnesic identity. Eleven DID patients, 27 normal controls, and 23 controls simulating DID participated. Controls and simulators were matched to patients on age, education level, and type of autobiographical memory tested.

Findings

Although patients subjectively reported amnesia for the autobiographical details included in the task, the results indicated transfer of information between identities.

Conclusion

The results call for a revision of the DID definition. The amnesia criterion should be modified to emphasize its subjective nature.

Lying and executive control: an experimental investigation using ego depletion and goal neglect

This study investigated whether lying requires executive control using a reaction-time based lie test. We hypothesized that (1) goal neglect induced by a long response-stimulus interval (RSI; 5-8s) would make lying harder relative to a short RSI (.2 s) that promoted attentional focus, and (2) participants whose executive control resources were depleted by an initial executive control task would experience more difficulty to lie than control participants who performed a task that required little executive control. Across two experiments, the ego depletion manipulation did not reliably affect lying. Both experiments revealed that the cognitive cost associated with lying was larger for the long compared to the short RSI. This finding supports the idea that lying requires more executive control than truth telling. The manipulation of RSI may provide a simple, yet effective means to improve lie detection accuracy.

Neural correlates of feigned memory impairment are distinguishable from answering randomly and answering incorrectly: an fMRI and behavioral study

Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have identified activation in the prefrontal-parietal-sub-cortical circuit during feigned memory impairment when comparing with truthful telling. Here, we used fMRI to determine whether neural activity can differentiate between answering correctly, answering randomly, answering incorrectly, and feigned memory impairment. In this study, 12 healthy subjects underwent block-design fMRI while they performed digit task of forced-choice format under four conditions: answering correctly, answering randomly, answering incorrectly, and simulated feigned memory impairment. There were three main results. First, six areas, including the left prefrontal cortex, the left superior temporal lobe, the right postcentral gyrus, the right superior parietal cortex, the right superior occipital cortex, and the right putamen, were significantly modulated by condition type. Second, for some areas, including the right superior parietal cortex, the right postcentral gyrus, the right superior occipital cortex, and the right putamen, brain activity was significantly greater in feigned memory impairment than answering randomly. Third, for the areas including the left prefrontal cortex and the right putamen, brain activity was significantly greater in feigned memory impairment than answering incorrectly. In contrast, for the left superior temporal lobe, brain activity was significantly greater in answering incorrectly than feigned memory impairment. The results suggest that neural correlates of feigned memory impairment are distinguishable from answering randomly and answering incorrectly in healthy subjects.

The contribution of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to the preparation for deception and truth-telling

Recent neuroimaging evidence suggests that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with creating deceptive responses. However, the neural basis of the preparatory processes that create deception has yet to be explored. Previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the preparation for a certain task activates brain areas relevant to the execution of that task, leading to the question of whether dorsolateral prefrontal activity is observed during the preparation for deception. In the present study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine whether dorsolateral prefrontal activity, which increases during the execution of deception compared with the execution of truth-telling, also increases during the preparation for deception compared with the preparation for truth-telling. Our data show that the execution of deception was associated with increased activity in several brain regions, including the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, compared with truth-telling, confirming the contribution of this region to the production of deceptive responses. The results also reveal that the preparations for both deception and truth-telling were associated with increased activity in certain brain regions, including the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest that the preparations for truth-telling and deception make similar demands on the brain and that the dorsolateral prefrontal activity identified in the preparation phase is associated with general preparatory processes, regardless of whether one is telling a lie or the truth.

The origin of children's implanted false memories: memory traces or compliance?

A longstanding question in false memory research is whether children's implanted false memories represent actual memory traces or merely result from compliance. The current study examined this question using a response latency based deception task. Forty-five 8-year-old children received narratives about a true (first day at school) and false event (hot air balloon ride). Across two interviews, 58/32% of the participants developed a partial/full false memory. Interestingly, these children also showed higher false recall on an unrelated DRM paradigm compared to children without a false memory. The crucial finding, however, was that the results of the deception task revealed that children with partial and full false memories were faster to confirm than to deny statements relating to the false event. This indicates that children's implanted false memories reflect actual memory traces, and are unlikely to be explained by mere compliance.

fNIRS-based online deception decoding

Deception involves complex neural processes in the brain. Different techniques have been used to study and understand brain mechanisms during deception. Moreover, efforts have been made to develop schemes that can detect and differentiate deception and truth-telling. In this paper, a functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)-based online brain deception decoding framework is developed. Deploying dual-wavelength fNIRS, we interrogate 16 locations in the forehead when eight able-bodied adults perform deception and truth-telling scenarios separately. By combining preprocessed oxy-hemoglobin and deoxy-hemoglobin signals, we develop subject-specific classifiers using the support vector machine. Deception and truth-telling states are classified correctly in seven out of eight subjects. A control experiment is also conducted to verify the deception-related hemodynamic response. The average classification accuracy is over 83.44% from these seven subjects. The obtained result suggests that the applicability of fNIRS as a brain imaging technique for online deception detection is very promising.

Modulation of untruthful responses with non-invasive brain stimulation

Deceptive abilities have long been studied in relation to personality traits. More recently, studies explored the neural substrates associated with deceptive skills suggesting a critical role of the prefrontal cortex. Here we investigated whether non-invasive brain stimulation over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) could modulate generation of untruthful responses about subject's personal life across contexts (i.e., deceiving on guilt-free questions on daily activities; generating previously memorized lies about past experience; and producing spontaneous lies about past experience), as well as across modality responses (verbal and motor responses). Results reveal that real, but not sham, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the DLPFC can reduce response latency for untruthful over truthful answers across contexts and modality responses. Also, contexts of lies seem to incur a different hemispheric laterality. These findings add up to previous studies demonstrating that it is possible to modulate some processes involved in generation of untruthful answers by applying non-invasive brain stimulation over the DLPFC and extend these findings by showing a differential hemispheric contribution of DLPFCs according to contexts.

Verbal deception from late childhood to middle adolescence and its relation to executive functioning skills

The present investigation examined 8- to 16-year-olds' tendency to lie, the sophistication of their lies, and related cognitive factors. Participants were left alone and asked not to look at the answers to a test, but the majority peeked. The researcher then asked a series of questions to examine whether the participants would lie about their cheating and, if they did lie, evaluate the sophistication of their lies. Additionally, participants completed measures of working memory, inhibitory control, and planning skills. Results revealed that the sophistication of 8- to 16-year-olds' lies, but not their decision to lie, was significantly related to executive functioning skills.

Effect of prefrontal transcranial magnetic stimulation on spontaneous truth-telling

Brain-process foundations of deceptive behaviour have become a subject of intensive study both in fundamental and applied neuroscience. Recently, utilization of transcranial magnetic stimulation has enhanced methodological rigour in this research because in addition to correlational studies causal effects of the distinct cortical systems involved can be studied. In these studies, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been implied as the brain area involved in deceptive behaviour. However, combined brain imaging and stimulation research has been concerned mostly with deceptive behaviour in the contexts of mock thefts and/or denial of recognition of critical objects. Spontaneous, "criminally decontextuated" propensity to lying and its dependence on the activity of selected brain structures has remained unexplored. The purpose of this work is to test whether spontaneous propensity to lying can be changed by brain stimulation. Here, we show that when subjects can name the colour of presented objects correctly or incorrectly at their free will, the tendency to stick to truthful answers can be manipulated by stimulation targeted at dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Right hemisphere stimulation decreases lying, left hemisphere stimulation increases lying. Spontaneous choice to lie more or less can be influenced by brain stimulation.

The von Economo neurons in the frontoinsular and anterior cingulate cortex

The von Economo neurons (VENs) are large bipolar neurons located in the frontoinsular cortex (FI) and limbic anterior (LA) area in great apes and humans but not in other primates. Our stereological counts of VENs in FI and LA show them to be more numerous in humans than in apes. In humans, small numbers of VENs appear the 36th week postconception, with numbers increasing during the first 8 months after birth. There are significantly more VENs in the right hemisphere in postnatal brains; this may be related to asymmetries in the autonomic nervous system. VENs are also present in elephants and whales and may be a specialization related to very large brain size. The large size and simple dendritic structure of these projection neurons suggest that they rapidly send basic information from FI and LA to other parts of the brain, while slower neighboring pyramids send more detailed information. Selective destruction of VENs in early stages of frontotemporal dementia (FTD) implies that they are involved in empathy, social awareness, and self-control, consistent with evidence from functional imaging.

How the brain shapes deception: an integrated review of the literature

How do people tell a lie? One useful approach to addressing this question is to elucidate the neural substrates for deception. Recent conceptual and technical advances in functional neuroimaging have enabled exploration of the psychology of deception more precisely in terms of the specific neuroanatomical mechanisms involved. A growing body of evidence suggests that the prefrontal cortex plays a key role in deception, and some researchers have recently emphasized the importance of other brain regions, such as those responsible for emotion and reward. However, it is still unclear how these regions play a role in making effective decisions to tell a lie. To provide a framework for considering this issue, the present article reviews current accomplishments in the study of the neural basis of deception. First, evolutionary and developmental perspectives are provided to better understand how and when people can make use of deception. The ensuing section introduces several findings on pathological lying and its neural correlate. Next, recent findings in the cognitive neuroscience of deception based on functional neuroimaging and loss-of-function studies are summarized, and possible neural mechanisms underlying deception are proposed. Finally, the priority areas of future neuroscience research-human honesty and dishonesty-are discussed.