Systematic review: Effects, design choices, and context of pay-for-performance in health care

Influence of financial and reputational incentives on primary care performance: a longitudinal study

BACKGROUND

The Quality and Outcomes Framework has generated reputational as well as financial rewards for general practices because the number of quality points a practice receives is publicly reported. These rewards vary across diseases and practices, and over time.

AIM

To determine the relative effects on performance of the financial and reputational rewards resulting from a pay-for-performance programme.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Observational study of the published performance on 42 indicators of 8929 practices in England between 2004 and 2013.

METHOD

The authors calculated the revenue offered (financial reward, measured in £100s) and the points offered (reputational reward) per additional patient treated for each indicator for each practice in each year. Fixed-effects multivariable regression models were used to estimate whether the percentage of eligible patients treated responded to changes in these financial and reputational rewards.

RESULTS

Both the offered financial rewards and reputational rewards had small but statistically significant associations with practice performance. The effect of the financial reward on performance decreased from 0.797 percentage points per £100 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.614 to 0.979) in 2004, to 0.092 (95% CI = 0.045 to 0.138) in 2013. The effect of the reputational reward increased from -0.121 percentage points per quality point (95% CI = -0.220 to -0.022) in 2004, to 0.209 (95% CI = 0.147 to 0.271) in 2013.

CONCLUSION

In the short term, general practices were more sensitive to revenue than reputational rewards. In the long term, general practices appeared to divert their focus towards the reputational reward, once benchmarks of performance became established.

Effects of Pay-for-Performance for Primary Care Physicians on Preventable Diabetes-Related Hospitalization Costs Among Adults in New Brunswick, Canada: A Quasiexperimental Evaluation

OBJECTIVES

In New Brunswick, Canada, 13.6% of the population 35 years of age and older is living with type 1 or type 2 diabetes mellitus. To address public health and clinical challenges, pay-for-performance (P4P) for family physicians was introduced in 2010 to enable comprehensive diabetes management. This study assesses the impacts of the P4P scheme on excess health-care costs.

METHODS

We used a quasiexperimental study design drawing on linked population-based administrative data sets of physician billings, hospital discharge abstracts and provider and resident registrations. Prospective cohorts of patients with diabetes were identified through a validated algorithm tracing individuals' interactions with the health-care system. We applied propensity-score difference-in-differences estimation for the effects of P4P on preventable diabetes-related hospitalization costs according to patients' exposures to physicians' uptake of the incentive.

RESULTS

Coverage of incentivized care peaked at less than half (44%) of adults with diabetes, who tended to be younger and less often presenting comorbid conditions compared to those whose providers did not claim incentives. The introduction of P4P was attributed to significantly lower diabetes hospitalization costs among newly diagnosed patients (-0.083; p<0.01) and improved compensation for physicians. No cost avoidance was established among medium-term and longer-term patients or for hospitalizations for conditions concordant with diabetes.

CONCLUSIONS

The effects of New Brunswick's P4P for diabetes care are mixed. Results reflect the deficient evidence base on the effects of P4P on patient-oriented and policymaker-important health outcomes. The high risk for multiple morbidities among patients with diabetes and the heterogeneity of physician responses to performance incentives may be hindering the effectiveness of P4P in improving diabetes outcomes.

Integrating evidence, models and maps to enhance Chagas disease vector surveillance

BACKGROUND

Until recently, the Chagas disease vector, Triatoma infestans, was widespread in Arequipa, Perú, but as a result of a decades-long campaign in which over 70,000 houses were treated with insecticides, infestation prevalence is now greatly reduced. To monitor for T. infestans resurgence, the city is currently in a surveillance phase in which a sample of houses is selected for inspection each year. Despite extensive data from the control campaign that could be used to inform surveillance, the selection of houses to inspect is often carried out haphazardly or by convenience. Therefore, we asked, how can we enhance efforts toward preventing T. infestans resurgence by creating the opportunity for vector surveillance to be informed by data?

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

To this end, we developed a mobile app that provides vector infestation risk maps generated with data from the control campaign run in a predictive model. The app is intended to enhance vector surveillance activities by giving inspectors the opportunity to incorporate the infestation risk information into their surveillance activities, but it does not dictate which houses to surveil. Therefore, a critical question becomes, will inspectors use the risk information? To answer this question, we ran a pilot study in which we compared surveillance using the app to the current practice (paper maps). We hypothesized that inspectors would use the risk information provided by the app, as measured by the frequency of higher risk houses visited, and qualitative analyses of inspector movement patterns in the field. We also compared the efficiency of both mediums to identify factors that might discourage risk information use. Over the course of ten days (five with each medium), 1,081 houses were visited using the paper maps, of which 366 (34%) were inspected, while 1,038 houses were visited using the app, with 401 (39%) inspected. Five out of eight inspectors (62.5%) visited more higher risk houses when using the app (Fisher's exact test, p < 0.001). Among all inspectors, there was an upward shift in proportional visits to higher risk houses when using the app (Mantel-Haenszel test, common odds ratio (OR) = 2.42, 95% CI 2.00-2.92), and in a second analysis using generalized linear mixed models, app use increased the odds of visiting a higher risk house 2.73-fold (95% CI 2.24-3.32), suggesting that the risk information provided by the app was used by most inspectors. Qualitative analyses of inspector movement revealed indications of risk information use in seven out of eight (87.5%) inspectors. There was no difference between the app and paper maps in the number of houses visited (paired t-test, p = 0.67) or inspected (p = 0.17), suggesting that app use did not reduce surveillance efficiency.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

Without staying vigilant to remaining and re-emerging vector foci following a vector control campaign, disease transmission eventually returns and progress achieved is reversed. Our results suggest that, when provided the opportunity, most inspectors will use risk information to direct their surveillance activities, at least over the short term. The study is an initial, but key, step toward evidence-based vector surveillance.

Incentives in a public addiction treatment system: Effects on waiting time and selection

Program-level financial incentives are used by some payers as a tool to improve quality of substance use treatment. However, evidence of effectiveness is mixed and performance contracts may have unintended consequences such as creating barriers for more challenging clients who are less likely to meet benchmarks. This study investigates the impact of a performance contract on waiting time for substance use treatment and client selection. Admission and discharge data from publicly funded Maine outpatient (OP) and intensive outpatient (IOP) substance use treatment programs (N = 38,932 clients) were used. In a quasi-experimental pre-post design, pre-period (FY 2005-2007) admission data from incentivized (IC) and non-incentivized (non-IC) programs were compared to post-period (FY 2008-2012) using propensity score matching and multivariate difference-in-difference regression. Dependent variables were waiting time (incentivized) and client selection (severity: history of mental disorders and substance use severity, not incentivized). Despite financial incentives designed to reduce waiting time for substance use treatment among state-funded outpatient programs, average waiting time for treatment increased in the post period for both IC and non-IC groups, as did client severity. There were no significant differences in waiting time between IC and non-IC groups over time. Increases in client severity over time, with no group differences, indicate that programs did not restrict access for more challenging clients. Adequate funding and other approaches to improve quality may be beneficial.

Initiation of new psychotropic prescriptions without a psychiatric diagnosis among US adults: Rates, correlates, and national trends from 2006 to 2015

OBJECTIVES

To estimate rates and national trends of initiation of new psychotropic medications without a psychiatric diagnosis and to identify demographic and clinical correlates independently associated with such use among US adults in outpatient settings.

DATA SOURCE

Data were gathered from the 2006-2015 National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), a nationally representative sample of office-based U.S. outpatient care. The sample was limited to adults aged 18 or older who received a new psychotropic drug prescription (n = 8618 unweighted).

STUDY DESIGN

Using a repeated cross-sectional design with survey sampling techniques, we estimated prescription initiation rates and national trends. Multivariable-adjusted logistic regression analysis was used to identify correlates independently associated with initiation of new psychotropic prescriptions without a psychiatric diagnosis.

DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS

Data were publicly available, and we extracted them from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Altogether, at 60.4% of visits at which a new psychotropic prescription was initiated, no psychiatric diagnosis was recorded for the visit. Overall, the rate increased from 59.1% in 2006-2007 to 67.7% in 2008-2009 and then decreased to 52.0% in 2014-2015. Visits to psychiatrists were associated with very low odds of having no psychiatric diagnosis when compared to primary care visits (OR = 0.02; 95% CI, 0.01-0.04). Visits to non-psychiatric specialists showed 6.90 times greater odds of not having a psychiatric diagnosis when compared to primary care visits (95% CI, 5.38-8.86).

CONCLUSION

New psychotropic medications are commonly initiated without any psychiatric diagnosis, especially by non-psychiatrist physicians. Non-psychiatrists should document relevant diagnoses more vigilantly to prevent potentially inappropriate use or misuse.

Association between a national primary care pay-for-performance scheme and suicide rates in England: spatial cohort study

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance policies aim to improve population health by incentivising improvements in quality of care.AimsTo assess the relationship between general practice performance on severe mental illness (SMI) and depression indicators under a national incentivisation scheme and suicide risk in England for the period 2006-2014.

METHOD

Longitudinal spatial analysis for 32 844 small-area geographical units (lower super output areas, LSOAs), using population-structure adjusted numbers of suicide as the outcome variable. Negative binomial models were fitted to investigate the relationship between spatially estimated recorded quality of care and suicide risk at the LSOA level. Incidence rate ratios (IRRs) were adjusted for deprivation, social fragmentation, prevalence of depression and SMI as well as other 2011 Census variables.

RESULTS

No association was found between practice performance on the mental health indicators and suicide incidence in practice localities (IRR=1.000, 95% CI 0.998-1.002). IRRs indicated elevated suicide risks linked with area-level social fragmentation (1.030; 95% CI 1.027-1.034), deprivation (1.013, 95% CI 1.012-1.014) and rurality (1.059, 95% CI 1.027-1.092).

CONCLUSIONS

Primary care has an important role to play in suicide prevention, but we did not observe a link between practices' higher reported quality of care on incentivised mental health activities and lower suicide rates in the local population. It is likely that effective suicide prevention needs a more concerted, multiagency approach. Better training in suicide prevention for general practitioners is also essential. These findings pertain to the UK but have relevance to other countries considering similar programmes.Declaration of interestNone.

Contractual health services performance agreements for responsive health systems: from conception to implementation in the case of Qatar

Objective

Despite their use worldwide, strategy-based performance management is limited in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. This article explores Qatar's experience, the first from the Region, in implementing contractual agreements between healthcare providers and the regulator-Ministry of Public Health-to align strategy, performance and accountabilities.

Design

mixed-methods including tools development and pilot-testing, guided by performance management cycle with a focus on knowledge translation and key principles: feasibility; mandatory participation; participatory approach through Steering Committee.

Setting

All public, private and semi-governmental hospitals and primary healthcare centers.

Intervention(s)

(i) semi-structured interviews; (ii) review of 4982 indicators; (iii) Delphi technique for selecting indicators with > 80% agreement on importance and > 60% agreement on feasibility; (iv) capacity-building of providers and Ministry staff and 2-month pilot assessed by questionnaire with indicators scoring > 3 considered valid, reliable and feasible; and (v) 1-year grace period assessed by questionnaire.

Main Outcome Measure(s)

Approach strengths and challenges; Data collection and healthcare quality improvements.

Results

Contracts mandate reporting 25 hospital and 15 primary healthcare indicators to the regulator, which delivers confidential benchmarking reports to providers. Scorecards were discussed with the regulator for evidence-informed policymaking. The approach uncovered system-related challenges and learning for public and private sectors: providers commended the participatory approach (82%) and indicated that contracts enabled collecting valid and timely data (64%) and improved healthcare quality (55%).

Conclusion

This experience provides insights for countries implementing performance management, responsive regulation and public-private partnerships. It suggests that contractual agreements can be useful, despite their mandatory nature, if clear principles are applied early on.

A reporting framework for describing and a typology for categorizing and analyzing the designs of health care pay for performance schemes

Background

Pay for Performance (P4P) has increasingly being adopted in different countries as a provider payment mechanism to improve health system performance. Evaluations of pay for performance (P4P) schemes across several countries show significant variation in effectiveness, which may be explained by differences in design. There is however no reliable framework to structure the reporting of the design or a typology to help analyse and interpret results of P4P schemes. This paper reports the development of a reporting framework and a typology of P4P schemes.

Methods

P4P design features were identified from literature and then explored using relevant theories from behavioural and economic science. These design features were then combined with the help of multidimensional tables to produce a reporting framework and a typology which was tested using 74 P4P studies. The inter-rater reliability of the typology was assessed using Fleiss’ Kappa.

Results

A Healthcare Incentive Scheme Reporting Framework (HISReF) was developed consisting of nine design features. This was collapsed into a typology consisting of 4 items/design features. There was good inter-rater reliability on all the four items on the typology (kappa > 0.7).

Conclusion

The HISReF provides an important first step towards establishing a common language in which intervention designers can clearly specify the content of P4P designs. Our typology may be used to aid evidence synthesis and interpretation of results of P4P schemes.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (10.1186/s12913-018-3479-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Improving health systems performance in low- and middle-income countries: a system dynamics model of the pay-for-performance initiative in Afghanistan

System dynamics methods were used to explore effective implementation pathways for improving health systems performance through pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes. A causal loop diagram was developed to delineate primary causal relationships for service delivery within primary health facilities. A quantitative stock-and-flow model was developed next. The stock-and-flow model was then used to simulate the impact of various P4P implementation scenarios on quality and volume of services. Data from the Afghanistan national facility survey in 2012 was used to calibrate the model. The models show that P4P bonuses could increase health workers' motivation leading to higher levels of quality and volume of services. Gaming could reduce or even reverse this desired effect, leading to levels of quality and volume of services that are below baseline levels. Implementation issues, such as delays in the disbursement of P4P bonuses and low levels of P4P bonuses, also reduce the desired effect of P4P on quality and volume, but they do not cause the outputs to fall below baseline levels. Optimal effect of P4P on quality and volume of services is obtained when P4P bonuses are distributed per the health workers' contributions to the services that triggered the payments. Other distribution algorithms such as equal allocation or allocations proportionate to salaries resulted in quality and volume levels that were substantially lower, sometimes below baseline. The system dynamics models served to inform, with quantitative results, the theory of change underlying P4P intervention. Specific implementation strategies, such as prompt disbursement of adequate levels of performance bonus distributed per health workers' contribution to service, increase the likelihood of P4P success. Poorly designed P4P schemes, such as those without an optimal algorithm for distributing performance bonuses and adequate safeguards for gaming, can have a negative overall impact on health service delivery systems.

Pay-for-performance as a cost-effective implementation strategy: results from a cluster randomized trial

BACKGROUND

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been recommended as a promising strategy to improve implementation of high-quality care. This study examined the incremental cost-effectiveness of a P4P strategy found to be highly effective in improving the implementation and effectiveness of the Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach (A-CRA), an evidence-based treatment (EBT) for adolescent substance use disorders (SUDs).

METHODS

Building on a $30 million national initiative to implement A-CRA in SUD treatment settings, urn randomization was used to assign 29 organizations and their 105 therapists and 1173 patients to one of two conditions (implementation-as-usual (IAU) control condition or IAU+P4P experimental condition). It was not possible to blind organizations, therapists, or all research staff to condition assignment. All treatment organizations and their therapists received a multifaceted implementation strategy. In addition to those IAU strategies, therapists in the IAU+P4P condition received US $50 for each month that they demonstrated competence in treatment delivery (A-CRA competence) and US $200 for each patient who received a specified number of treatment procedures and sessions found to be associated with significantly improved patient outcomes (target A-CRA). Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs), which represent the difference between the two conditions in average cost per treatment organization divided by the corresponding average difference in effectiveness per organization, and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) were the primary outcomes.

RESULTS

At trial completion, 15 organizations were randomized to the IAU condition and 14 organizations were randomized to the IAU+P4P condition. Data from all 29 organizations were analyzed. Cluster-level analyses suggested the P4P strategy led to significantly higher average total costs compared to the IAU control condition, yet this average increase of 5% resulted in a 116% increase in the average number of months therapists demonstrated competence in treatment delivery (ICER = $333), a 325% increase in the average number of patients who received the targeted dosage of treatment (ICER = $453), and a 325% increase in the number of days of abstinence per patient in treatment (ICER = $8.134). Further supporting P4P as a cost-effective implementation strategy, the cost per QALY was only $8681 (95% confidence interval $1191-$16,171).

CONCLUSION

This study provides experimental evidence supporting P4P as a cost-effective implementation strategy.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

NCT01016704 .

The impact of financial incentives to improve quality indicators in patients with diabetes in Swiss primary care: a protocol for a cluster randomised controlled trial

INTRODUCTION

There is only limited and conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of Pay-for-Performance (P4P) programmes, although they might have the potential to improve guideline adherence and quality of care. We therefore aim to test a P4P intervention in Swiss primary care practices focusing on quality indicators (QI) achievement in the treatment of patients with diabetes.

METHODS AND ANALYSIS

This is a cluster-randomised, two-armed intervention study with the primary care practice as unit of randomisation. The control group will receive bimonthly feedback reports containing last data of blood pressure and glycated haemoglobin (HbA1c) measurements. The intervention group will additionally be informed about a financial incentive for each percentage point improved in QI achievement. Primary outcomes are differences in process (measurement of HbA1c) and clinical QI (blood pressure control) between the two groups. Furthermore, we investigate the effect on non-incentivised QIs and on sustainability of the financial incentives. Swiss primary care practices participating in the FIRE (Family Medicine ICPC Research using Electronic Medical Record) research network are eligible for participation. The FIRE database consists of anonymised structured medical routine data from Swiss primary care practices. According to power calculations, 70 of the general practitioners contributing to the database will be randomised in either of the groups.

ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION

According to the Local Ethics Committee of the Canton of Zurich, the project does not fall under the scope of the law on human research and therefore no ethical consent is necessary. Results will be published in a peer-reviewed journal.

TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER

ISRCTN13305645; Pre-results.

Universal Health Coverage in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa: Assessment of Global Health Experts' Confidence in Policy Options

Many countries rely on standard recipes for accelerating progress toward universal health coverage (UHC). With limited generalizable empirical evidence, expert confidence and consensus plays a major role in shaping country policy choices. This article presents an exploratory attempt conducted between April and September 2016 to measure confidence and consensus among a panel of global health experts in terms of the effectiveness and feasibility of a number of policy options commonly proposed for achieving UHC in low- and middle-income countries, such as fee exemptions for certain groups of people, ring-fenced domestic health budgets, and public-private partnerships. To ensure a relative homogeneity of contexts, we focused on French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. We initially used the Delphi method to arrive at expert consensus, but since no consensus emerged after 2 rounds, we adjusted our approach to a statistical analysis of the results from our questionnaire by measuring the degree of consensus on each policy option through 100 (signifying total consensus) minus the size of the interquartile range of the individual scores. Seventeen global health experts from various backgrounds, but with at least 20 years' experience in the broad region, participated in the 2 rounds of the study. The results provide an initial "mapping" of the opinions of a group of experts and suggest interesting lessons. For the 18 policy options proposed, consensus emerged only on strengthening the supply of quality primary health care services (judged as being effective with a confidence score of 79 and consensus score of 90), and on fee exemptions for the poorest (judged as being fairly easy to implement with a confidence score of 66 and consensus score of 85). For none of the 18 common policy options was there consensus on both potential effectiveness and feasibility, with very diverging opinions concerning 5 policy options. The lack of confidence and consensus within the panel seems to reflect the lack of consistent evidence on the proposed policy options. This suggests that experts' opinions should be framed within strengthened inclusive and "evidence-informed deliberative processes" where the trade-offs along the 3 dimensions of UHC-extending the population covered against health hazards, expanding the range of services and benefits covered, and reducing out-of-pocket expenditures-can be discussed in a transparent and contextualized setting.

Insights on the effectiveness of reward schemes from 10-year longitudinal case studies in 2 Italian regions

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) programs have been widely analysed in literature, and the results regarding their impact on performance are mixed. Moreover, in the real-life setting, reward schemes are designed combining multiple elements altogether, yet, it is not clear what happens when they are applied using different combinations.

OBJECTIVES

To provide insights on how P4P programs are influenced by 5 key elements: whom, what, how, how many targets, and how much to reward.

METHODS

A qualitative longitudinal analysis of 10 years of P4P reward schemes adopted by the regional administrations of Tuscany and Lombardy (Italy) was conducted. The effects of the P4P features on performance are discussed considering both overall and specific indicators.

RESULTS

Both regions applied financial reward schemes for General Managers by linking the variable pay to performance. While Tuscany maintained a relatively stable financial incentive design and governance tools, Lombardy changed some elements of the design and introduced, in 2012, a P4P program aimed to reward the providers. The main differences between the 2 cases regard the number of targets (how many), the type (what), and the method applied to set targets (how).

CONCLUSION

Considering the overall performance obtained by the 2 regions, it seems that whom, how, and how much to reward are not relevant in the success of P4P programs; instead, the number (how many) and the type (what) of targets set may influence the performance improvement processes driven by financial reward schemes.

Does paying service providers by results improve recovery outcomes for drug misusers in treatment in England?

AIM

To compare drug recovery outcomes in commissioning areas included in a 'payment by results' scheme with all other areas.

DESIGN

Observational and data linkage study of the National Drug Treatment Monitoring System, Office for National Statistics mortality database and Police National Computer criminal records, for 2 years before and after introduction of the scheme. Pre-post controlled comparison compared outcomes in participating versus non-participating areas following adjustment for drug use, functioning and drug treatment status.

SETTING

Drug services in England providing publicly funded, structured treatment.

PARTICIPANTS

Adults in treatment (between 2010 and 2014): 154 175 (10 716 in participating areas, 143 459 non-participating) treatment journeys in the 2 years before and 148 941 (10 012 participating, 138 929 non-participating) after the introduction of the scheme.

INTERVENTION

Scheme participation, with payment to treatment providers based on patient outcomes versus all other areas.

MEASUREMENTS

Rate of treatment initiation; waiting time (> or < 3 weeks); treatment completion; and re-presentation; substance use; injecting; housing status; fatal overdose; and acquisitive crime.

FINDINGS

In participating areas, there were relative decreases in rates of: treatment initiation [difference-in-differences odds ratio (DID OR) = 0.17, 95% confidence interval (CI) = 0.14, 0.21]; treatment completion (DID OR = 0.60, 95% CI = 0.53, 0.67); and treatment completion without re-presentation (DID OR = 0.63, 95% CI = 0.52, 0.77) compared with non-participating areas. Within treatment, relative abstinence (DID OR = 1.50, 95% CI = 1.30, 1.72) and non-injecting (DID OR = 1.32, 95% CI = 1.10, 1.59) rates were improved in participating areas. No significant changes in mortality, recorded crime or housing status were associated with the scheme.

CONCLUSION

Drug addiction recovery services in England that are commissioned on a payment-by-results basis tend to have lower rates of treatment initiation and completion but higher rates of in-treatment abstinence and non-injecting than other services.

Association Between Medicare's Mandatory Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program and Cost Inefficiency

BACKGROUND

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act instituted pay-for-performance programs, including Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP), designed to encourage hospital quality and efficiency.

OBJECTIVE AND METHOD

While these programs have been evaluated with respect to their implications for care quality and financial viability, this is the first study to assess the relationship between hospitals' cost inefficiency and their participation in the programs. We estimate a translog specification of a stochastic cost frontier with controls for participation in the HVBP program and clinical and outcome quality for California hospitals for 2012-2015.

RESULTS

The program-participation indicators' parameters imply that participants were more cost inefficient than their peers. Further, the estimated coefficients for summary process of care quality indexes for three health conditions (acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia, and heart failure) suggest that higher quality scores are associated with increased operating costs.

CONCLUSION

The estimated coefficients for the outcome quality variables suggest that future determination of HVBP payment adjustments, which will depend solely on mortality rates as measures of clinical care quality, may not only be aligned with increasing healthcare quality but also reducing healthcare costs.

Study protocol for Log2Lose: A feasibility randomized controlled trial to evaluate financial incentives for dietary self-monitoring and interim weight loss in adults with obesity

The obesity epidemic has negative physical, psychological, and financial consequences. Despite the existence of effective behavioral weight loss interventions, many individuals do not achieve adequate weight loss, and most regain lost weight in the year following intervention. We report the rationale and design for a 2×2 factorial study that involves financial incentives for dietary self-monitoring (yes vs. no) and/or interim weight loss (yes vs. no). Outpatients with obesity participate in a 24-week, group-based weight loss intervention. All participants are asked to record their daily dietary and liquid intake on a smartphone application (app) and to weigh themselves daily at home on a study-provided cellular scale. An innovative information technology (IT) solution collates dietary data from the app and weight from the scale. Using these data, an algorithm classifies participants weekly according to whether they met their group's criteria to receive a cash reward ranging from $0 to $30 for dietary self-monitoring and/or interim weight loss. Notice of the reward is provided via text message, and credit is uploaded to a gift card. This pilot study will provide information on the feasibility of using this novel IT solution to provide variable-ratio financial incentives in real time via its effects on recruitment, intervention adherence, retention, and cost. This study will provide the foundation for a comprehensive, adequately-powered, randomized controlled trial to promote short-term weight loss and long-term weight maintenance. If efficacious, this approach could reduce the prevalence, adverse outcomes, and costs of obesity for millions of Americans. Clinicaltrials.gov registration: NCT02691260.

Understanding The Role Played By Medicare's Patient Experience Points System In Hospital Reimbursement

In 2015 the Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) program paid hospitals $1.4 billion in performance-based incentives; 30 percent of a hospital's VBP Total Performance Score was based on performance on Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) measures of the patient experience of care. Hospitals receive patient experience points based on three components: achievement, improvement, and consistency. For 2015 we examined how the three components affected reimbursement for 3,152 hospitals, including their impact on low-performing and high-minority hospitals. Achievement accounted for 96 percent of the differences among hospitals in total HCAHPS points. Although achievement had the biggest influence on payments, payments related to improvement and consistency were more beneficial for low-performing hospitals that disproportionately served minority patients. The findings highlight the important inducement that paying for improvement provides to initially low-performing hospitals to improve care and the role this incentive structure plays in minimizing resource redistributions away from hospitals serving minority populations. Additional emphasis on improvement points could benefit hospitals serving disadvantaged patients.

Who benefits from increased service utilisation? Examining the distributional effects of payment for performance in Tanzania

BACKGROUND

Payment for performance (P4P) strategies, which provide financial incentives to health workers and/or facilities for reaching pre-defined performance targets, can improve healthcare utilisation and quality. P4P may also reduce inequalities in healthcare use and access by enhancing universal access to care, for example, through reducing the financial barriers to accessing care. However, P4P may also enhance inequalities in healthcare if providers cherry-pick the easier-to-reach patients to meet their performance targets. In this study, we examine the heterogeneity of P4P effects on service utilisation across population subgroups and its implications for inequalities in Tanzania.

METHODS

We used household data from an evaluation of a P4P programme in Tanzania. We surveyed about 3000 households with women who delivered in the last 12 months prior to the interview from seven intervention and four comparison districts in January 2012 and a similar number of households in 13 months later. The household data were used to generate the population subgroups and to measure the incentivised service utilisation outcomes. We focused on two outcomes that improved significantly under the P4P, i.e. institutional delivery rate and the uptake of antimalarials for pregnant women. We used a difference-in-differences linear regression model to estimate the effect of P4P on utilisation outcomes across the different population subgroups.

RESULTS

P4P led to a significant increase in the rate of institutional deliveries among women in poorest and in middle wealth status households, but not among women in least poor households. However, the differential effect was marginally greater among women in the middle wealth households compared to women in the least poor households (p = 0.094). The effect of P4P on institutional deliveries was also significantly higher among women in rural districts compared to women in urban districts (p = 0.028 for differential effect), and among uninsured women than insured women (p = 0.001 for differential effect). The effect of P4P on the uptake of antimalarials was equally distributed across population subgroups.

CONCLUSION

P4P can enhance equitable healthcare access and use especially when the demand-side barriers to access care such as user fees associated with drug purchase due to stock-outs have been reduced.

Incentive Design and Quality Improvements: Evidence from State Medicaid Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance Programs

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. We find larger weights on clinical outcomes often lead to larger improvements, but small weights can lead to no improvement or worsening of some clinical outcomes. We find a qualifier for P4P eligibility based on having few or no severe inspection deficiencies is more effective at decreasing inspection deficiencies than using weights, suggesting simple rules for participation may incent larger improvement.

Performance-based financing in low-income and middle-income countries: isn't it time for a rethink?

This paper questions the view that performance-based financing (PBF) in the health sector is an effective, efficient and equitable approach to improving the performance of health systems in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). PBF was conceived as an open approach adapted to specific country needs, having the potential to foster system-wide reforms. However, as with many strategies and tools, there is a gap between what was planned and what is actually implemented. This paper argues that PBF as it is currently implemented in many contexts does not satisfy the promises. First, since the start of PBF implementation in LMICs, concerns have been raised on the basis of empirical evidence from different settings and disciplines that indicated the risks, cost and perverse effects. However, PBF implementation was rushed despite insufficient evidence of its effectiveness. Second, there is a lack of domestic ownership of PBF. Considering the amounts of time and money it now absorbs, and the lack of evidence of effectiveness and efficiency, PBF can be characterised as a donor fad. Third, by presenting itself as a comprehensive approach that makes it possible to address all aspects of the health system in any context, PBF monopolises attention and focuses policy dialogue on the short-term results of PBF programmes while diverting attention and resources from broader processes of change and necessary reforms. Too little care is given to system-wide and long-term effects, so that PBF can actually damage health services and systems. This paper ends by proposing entry points for alternative approaches.

Can pay-for-performance to primary care providers stimulate appropriate use of antibiotics?

Antibiotic resistance is a major threat to public health worldwide. As the healthcare sector's use of antibiotics is an important contributor to the development of resistance, it is crucial that physicians only prescribe antibiotics when needed and that they choose narrow-spectrum antibiotics, which act on fewer bacteria types, when possible. Inappropriate use of antibiotics is nonetheless widespread, not least for respiratory tract infections (RTI), a common reason for antibiotics prescriptions. We examine if pay-for-performance (P4P) presents a way to influence primary care physicians' choice of antibiotics. During 2006-2013, 8 Swedish healthcare authorities adopted P4P to make physicians select narrow-spectrum antibiotics more often in the treatment of children with RTI. Exploiting register data on all purchases of RTI antibiotics in a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that P4P significantly increased the share of narrow-spectrum antibiotics. There are no signs that physicians gamed the system by issuing more prescriptions overall.

Payment incentives for community-based psychiatric care in Ontario, Canada

BACKGROUND

In September 2011, the government of Ontario implemented payment incentives to encourage the delivery of community-based psychiatric care to patients after discharge from a psychiatric hospital admission and to those with a recent suicide attempt. We evaluated whether these incentives affected supply of psychiatric services and access to care.

METHODS

We used administrative data to capture monthly observations for all psychiatrists who practised in Ontario between September 2009 and August 2014. We conducted interrupted time-series analyses of psychiatrist-level and patient-level data to evaluate whether the incentives affected the quantity of eligible outpatient services delivered and the likelihood of receiving follow-up care.

RESULTS

Among 1921 psychiatrists evaluated, implementation of the incentive payments was not associated with increased provision of follow-up visits after discharge from a psychiatric hospital admission (mean change in visits per month per psychiatrist 0.0099, 95% confidence interval [CI] -0.0989 to 0.1206; change in trend 0.0032, 95% CI -0.0035 to 0.0095) or after a suicide attempt (mean change -0.0910, 95% CI -0.1885 to 0.0026; change in trend 0.0102, 95% CI 0.0045 to 0.0159). There was also no change in the probability that patients received follow-up care after discharge (change in level -0.0079, 95% CI -0.0223 to 0.0061; change in trend 0.0007, 95% CI -0.0003 to 0.0016) or after a suicide attempt (change in level 0.0074, 95% CI -0.0094 to 0.0366; change in trend 0.0006, 95% CI -0.0007 to 0.0022).

INTERPRETATION

Our results suggest that implementation of the incentives did not increase access to follow-up care for patients after discharge from a psychiatric hospital admission or after a suicide attempt, and the incentives had no effect on supply of psychiatric services. Further research to guide design and implementation of more effective incentives is warranted.

Comparing Care for Dual-Eligibles Across Coverage Models: Empirical Evidence From Oregon

Dual-eligible beneficiaries or "duals" are individuals enrolled in both the Medicare and Medicaid programs. For both Medicare and Medicaid, they may be enrolled in fee-for-service or managed care, creating a mix of possible coverage models. Understanding these different models is essential to improving care for duals. Using All-Payer All-Claims data, we empirically described health service use and quality of care for Oregon duals across five coverage models with different combinations of fee-for-service, managed care, and plan alignment status across Medicare and Medicaid. We found substantial heterogeneity in care across these five coverage models. We also found that duals in plans with aligned financial incentives for Medicare and Medicaid experienced more improvement in their care relative to those with nonaligned Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care plans. These results highlight the importance of developing policies that account for the heterogeneity of the dual population and their coverage options.

Effect of incentive payments on chronic disease management and health services use in British Columbia, Canada: Interrupted time series analysis

We studied the effects of incentive payments to primary care physicians for the care of patients with diabetes, hypertension, and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) in British Columbia, Canada. We used linked administrative health data to examine monthly primary care visits, continuity of care, laboratory testing, pharmaceutical dispensing, hospitalizations, and total h ealth care spending. We examined periods two years before and two years after each incentive was introduced, and used segmented regression to assess whether there were changes in level or trend of outcome measures across all eligible patients following incentive introduction, relative to pre-intervention periods. We observed no increases in primary care visits or continuity of care after incentives were introduced. Rates of ACR testing and antihypertensive dispensing increased among patients with hypertension, but none of the other modest increases in laboratory testing or prescriptions dispensed reached statistical significance. Rates of hospitalizations for stroke and heart failure among patients with hypertension fell relative to pre-intervention patterns, while hospitalizations for COPD increased. Total hospitalizations and hospitalizations via the emergency department did not change. Health care spending increased for patients with hypertension. This large-scale incentive scheme for primary care physicians showed some positive effects for patients with hypertension, but we observe no similar changes in patient management, reductions in hospitalizations, or changes in spending for patients with diabetes and COPD.

Implementing Quality Indicators for Diabetes and Hypertension in Family Medicine in Slovenia

INTRODUCTION

A new form of family practices was introduced in 2011 through a pilot project introducing nurse practitioners as members of team and determining a set of quality indicators. The aim of this article was to assess the quality of diabetes and hypertension management.

METHODS

We included all family medicine practices that were participating in the project in December 2015 (N=584). The following data were extracted from automatic electronic reports on quality indicators: gender and specialisation of the family physician, status (public servant/self-contracted), duration of participation in the project, region of Slovenia, the number of inhabitants covered by a family medicine practice, the name of IT provider, and levels of selected quality indicators.

RESULTS

Out of 584 family medicine practices that were included in this project at the end of 2015, 568 (97.3%) had complete data and could be included in this analysis. The highest values were observed for structure quality indicator (list of diabetics) and the lowest for process and outcome quality indicators. The values of the selected quality indicators were independently associated with the duration of participation in the project, some regions of Slovenia where practices were located, and some IT providers of the practices.

CONCLUSION

First, the analysis of data on quality indicators for diabetes and hypertension in this primary care project pointed out the problems which are currently preventing higher quality of chronic patient management at the primary health care level.

Are characteristics of team members important for quality management of chronic patients at primary care level?

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

To determine the possible associations between higher levels of selected quality indicators and the characteristics of providers.

BACKGROUND

In 2011, an ongoing project on a new model of family medicine practice was launched in Slovenia; the family physicians' working team (a family physician and a practice nurse) was extended by a nurse practitioner working 0.5 full-time equivalents. This was an example of a personalised team approach to managing chronic patients.

METHODS

We included all family medicine practices in the six units of the Community Health Centre Ljubljana which were participating in the project in December 2015 (N = 66). Data were gathered from automatic electronic reports on quality indicators provided monthly by each practice. We also collected demographic data.

RESULTS

There were 66 family medicine teams in the sample, with 165 members of their teams (66 family physicians, 33 nurse practitioners and 66 practice nurses). Fifty-six (84.4%) of the family physicians were women, as were 32 (97.0%) of the nurse practitioners, and 86 (95.5%) of the practice nurses. Multivariate analysis showed that a higher level of the quality indicator "Examination of diabetic foot once per year" was independently associated with nurse practitioners having attended additional education on diabetes, duration of participation in the project, age and years worked since graduation of nurse practitioners, working in the Center unit and not working in the Bezigrad unit.

CONCLUSIONS

Characteristics of team members are important in fostering quality management of chronic patients. Nurse practitioners working in new model family practices need obligatory, continuous professional education in the management of chronic patients.

RELEVANCE TO CLINICAL PRACTICE

The quality of care of chronic patients depends on the specific characteristics of the members of the team, which should be taken into account when planning quality improvements.

Healthcare financing systems for increasing the use of tobacco dependence treatment

BACKGROUND

Tobacco smoking is the leading preventable cause of death worldwide, which makes it essential to stimulate smoking cessation. The financial cost of smoking cessation treatment can act as a barrier to those seeking support. We hypothesised that provision of financial assistance for people trying to quit smoking, or reimbursement of their care providers, could lead to an increased rate of successful quit attempts. This is an update of the original 2005 review.

OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of this review was to assess the impact of reducing the costs for tobacco smokers or healthcare providers for using or providing smoking cessation treatment through healthcare financing interventions on abstinence from smoking. The secondary objectives were to examine the effects of different levels of financial support on the use or prescription of smoking cessation treatment, or both, and on the number of smokers making a quit attempt (quitting smoking for at least 24 hours). We also assessed the cost effectiveness of different financial interventions, and analysed the costs per additional quitter, or per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained.

SEARCH METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Tobacco Addiction Group Specialised Register in September 2016.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We considered randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled trials and interrupted time series studies involving financial benefit interventions to smokers or their healthcare providers, or both.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two reviewers independently extracted data and assessed the quality of the included studies. We calculated risk ratios (RR) for individual studies on an intention-to-treat basis and performed meta-analysis using a random-effects model.

MAIN RESULTS

In the current update, we have added six new relevant studies, resulting in a total of 17 studies included in this review involving financial interventions directed at smokers or healthcare providers, or both.Full financial interventions directed at smokers had a favourable effect on abstinence at six months or longer when compared to no intervention (RR 1.77, 95% CI 1.37 to 2.28, I² = 33%, 9333 participants). There was no evidence that full coverage interventions increased smoking abstinence compared to partial coverage interventions (RR 1.02, 95% CI 0.71 to 1.48, I² = 64%, 5914 participants), but partial coverage interventions were more effective in increasing abstinence than no intervention (RR 1.27 95% CI 1.02 to 1.59, I² = 21%, 7108 participants). The economic evaluation showed costs per additional quitter ranging from USD 97 to USD 7646 for the comparison of full coverage with partial or no coverage.There was no clear evidence of an effect on smoking cessation when we pooled two trials of financial incentives directed at healthcare providers (RR 1.16, CI 0.98 to 1.37, I² = 0%, 2311 participants).Full financial interventions increased the number of participants making a quit attempt when compared to no interventions (RR 1.11, 95% CI 1.04 to 1.17, I² = 15%, 9065 participants). There was insufficient evidence to show whether partial financial interventions increased quit attempts compared to no interventions (RR 1.13, 95% CI 0.98 to 1.31, I² = 88%, 6944 participants).Full financial interventions increased the use of smoking cessation treatment compared to no interventions with regard to various pharmacological and behavioural treatments: nicotine replacement therapy (NRT): RR 1.79, 95% CI 1.54 to 2.09, I² = 35%, 9455 participants; bupropion: RR 3.22, 95% CI 1.41 to 7.34, I² = 71%, 6321 participants; behavioural therapy: RR 1.77, 95% CI 1.19 to 2.65, I² = 75%, 9215 participants.There was evidence that partial coverage compared to no coverage reported a small positive effect on the use of bupropion (RR 1.15, 95% CI 1.03 to 1.29, I² = 0%, 6765 participants). Interventions directed at healthcare providers increased the use of behavioural therapy (RR 1.69, 95% CI 1.01 to 2.86, I² = 85%, 25820 participants), but not the use of NRT and/or bupropion (RR 0.94, 95% CI 0.76 to 1.18, I² = 6%, 2311 participants).We assessed the quality of the evidence for the main outcome, abstinence from smoking, as moderate. In most studies participants were not blinded to the different study arms and researchers were not blinded to the allocated interventions. Furthermore, there was not always sufficient information on attrition rates. We detected some imprecision but we judged this to be of minor consequence on the outcomes of this study.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Full financial interventions directed at smokers when compared to no financial interventions increase the proportion of smokers who attempt to quit, use smoking cessation treatments, and succeed in quitting. There was no clear and consistent evidence of an effect on smoking cessation from financial incentives directed at healthcare providers. We are only moderately confident in the effect estimate because there was some risk of bias due to a lack of blinding in participants and researchers, and insufficient information on attrition rates.

Financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries: an overview of systematic reviews

BACKGROUND

One target of the Sustainable Development Goals is to achieve "universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all". A fundamental concern of governments in striving for this goal is how to finance such a health system. This concern is very relevant for low-income countries.

OBJECTIVES

To provide an overview of the evidence from up-to-date systematic reviews about the effects of financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries. Secondary objectives include identifying needs and priorities for future evaluations and systematic reviews on financial arrangements, and informing refinements in the framework for financial arrangements presented in the overview.

METHODS

We searched Health Systems Evidence in November 2010 and PDQ-Evidence up to 17 December 2016 for systematic reviews. We did not apply any date, language, or publication status limitations in the searches. We included well-conducted systematic reviews of studies that assessed the effects of financial arrangements on patient outcomes (health and health behaviours), the quality or utilisation of healthcare services, resource use, healthcare provider outcomes (such as sick leave), or social outcomes (such as poverty, employment, or financial burden of patients, e.g. out-of-pocket payment, catastrophic disease expenditure) and that were published after April 2005. We excluded reviews with limitations important enough to compromise the reliability of the findings. Two overview authors independently screened reviews, extracted data, and assessed the certainty of evidence using GRADE. We prepared SUPPORT Summaries for eligible reviews, including key messages, 'Summary of findings' tables (using GRADE to assess the certainty of the evidence), and assessments of the relevance of findings to low-income countries.

MAIN RESULTS

We identified 7272 reviews and included 15 in this overview, on: collection of funds (2 reviews), insurance schemes (1 review), purchasing of services (1 review), recipient incentives (6 reviews), and provider incentives (5 reviews). The reviews were published between 2008 and 2015; focused on 13 subcategories; and reported results from 276 studies: 115 (42%) randomised trials, 11 (4%) non-randomised trials, 23 (8%) controlled before-after studies, 51 (19%) interrupted time series, 9 (3%) repeated measures, and 67 (24%) other non-randomised studies. Forty-three per cent (119/276) of the studies included in the reviews took place in low- and middle-income countries. Collection of funds: the effects of changes in user fees on utilisation and equity are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is also uncertain whether aid delivered under the Paris Principles (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability) improves health outcomes compared to aid delivered without conforming to those principles (very low-certainty evidence). Insurance schemes: community-based health insurance may increase service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is uncertain whether social health insurance improves utilisation of health services or health outcomes (very low-certainty evidence). Purchasing of services: it is uncertain whether increasing salaries of public sector healthcare workers improves the quantity or quality of their work (very low-certainty evidence). Recipient incentives: recipient incentives may improve adherence to long-term treatments (low-certainty evidence), but it is uncertain whether they improve patient outcomes. One-time recipient incentives probably improve patient return for start or continuation of treatment (moderate-certainty evidence) and may improve return for tuberculosis test readings (low-certainty evidence). However, incentives may not improve completion of tuberculosis prophylaxis, and it is uncertain whether they improve completion of treatment for active tuberculosis. Conditional cash transfer programmes probably lead to an increase in service utilisation (moderate-certainty evidence), but their effects on health outcomes are uncertain. Vouchers may improve health service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). Introducing a restrictive cap may decrease use of medicines for symptomatic conditions and overall use of medicines, may decrease insurers' expenditures on medicines (low-certainty evidence), and has uncertain effects on emergency department use, hospitalisations, and use of outpatient care (very low-certainty evidence). Reference pricing, maximum pricing, and index pricing for drugs have mixed effects on drug expenditures by patients and insurers as well as the use of brand and generic drugs. Provider incentives: the effects of provider incentives are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence), including: the effects of provider incentives on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians or outpatient referrals from primary to secondary care, incentives for recruiting and retaining health professionals to serve in remote areas, and the effects of pay-for-performance on provider performance, the utilisation of services, patient outcomes, or resource use in low-income countries.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Research based on sound systematic review methods has evaluated numerous financial arrangements relevant to low-income countries, targeting different levels of the health systems and assessing diverse outcomes. However, included reviews rarely reported social outcomes, resource use, equity impacts, or undesirable effects. We also identified gaps in primary research because of uncertainty about applicability of the evidence to low-income countries. Financial arrangements for which the effects are uncertain include external funding (aid), caps and co-payments, pay-for-performance, and provider incentives. Further studies evaluating the effects of these arrangements are needed in low-income countries. Systematic reviews should include all outcomes that are relevant to decision-makers and to people affected by changes in financial arrangements.

Effectiveness of pay-for-performance for chronic kidney disease patients on hemodialysis: a systematic review protocol

REVIEW QUESTION/OBJECTIVE

The objective of this review is to assess the evidence on the effectiveness of implementation of a pay-for-performance program on clinical outcomes in the adult chronic kidney disease (CKD) patient receiving hemodialysis.The review question is: What is the effectiveness of implementation of a pay-for-performance program on clinical outcomes in the adult CKD patient receiving hemodialysis, as compared to the period immediately before implementation of the program?More specifically, the objectives are to identify.

Levers for addressing medical underuse and overuse: achieving high-value health care

The preceding papers in this Series have outlined how underuse and overuse of health-care services occur within a complex system of health-care production, with a multiplicity of causes. Because poor care is ubiquitous and has considerable consequences for the health and wellbeing of billions of people around the world, remedying this problem is a morally and politically urgent task. Universal health coverage is a key step towards achieving the right care. Therefore, full consideration of potential levers of change must include an upstream perspective-ie, an understanding of the system-level factors that drive overuse and underuse, as well as the various incentives at work during a clinical encounter. One example of a system-level factor is the allocation of resources (eg, hospital beds and clinicians) to meet the needs of a local population to minimise underuse or overuse. Another example is priority setting using tools such as health technology assessment to guide the optimum diffusion of safe, effective, and cost-effective health-care services. In this Series paper we investigate a range of levers for eliminating medical underuse and overuse. Some levers could operate effectively (and be politically viable) across many different health and political systems (eg, increase patient activation with decision support) whereas other levers must be tailored to local contexts (eg, basing coverage decisions on a particular cost-effectiveness ratio). Ideally, policies must move beyond the purely incremental; that is, policies that merely tinker at the policy edges after underuse or overuse arises. In this regard, efforts to increase public awareness, mobilisation, and empowerment hold promise as universal methods to reset all other contexts and thereby enhance all other efforts to promote the right care.

Population-based Cancer Screening: Measurement of Coordination and Continuity of Care

BACKGROUND

European guidelines for the quality of screening programs for breast and colorectal cancer describe process, structure, and outcome indicators. However, none of them specifically evaluate coordination and continuity of care during the cancer screening process.

OBJECTIVES

The aim of this study was to identify and adapt care quality indicators related to the coordination and continuity of the cancer screening process to assess nursing care in cancer screening programs.

METHODS

The indicators proposed in this study were selected in 2 phases. The first consisted of a literature review, and the second was made by consensus of an expert group. An electronic literature search was conducted, through June 2016. From a total of 225 articles retrieved, 14 studies met inclusion criteria, and these 14 documents were delivered to the group of experts for evaluation and to propose a final list of agreed-upon indicators.

RESULTS

The group of experts selected 7 indicators: adequacy and waiting time derivation of participants, delivery and availability of the report of the process, understanding professionals involved in the process, and satisfaction and understanding of participants.

CONCLUSIONS

These indicators should help identify areas for improvement and measure the outcome of coordination and continuity of care.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

The results provided a common set of indicators to evaluate the coordination and continuity of care for cancer screening and to consequently assess the contribution of nursing care in cancer screening programs. The identification and adaptation of these quality indicators will help to identify areas for improvement and measure the effect of coordination and continuity of care.

Characterization and effectiveness of pay-for-performance in ophthalmology: a systematic review

Background

To identify, characterize and compare existing pay-for-performance approaches and their impact on the quality of care and efficiency in ophthalmology.

Methods

A systematic evidence-based review was conducted. English, French and German written literature published between 2000 and 2015 were searched in the following databases: Medline (via PubMed), NCBI web site, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, Econlit and the Cochrane Library. Empirical as well as descriptive articles were included. Controlled clinical trials, meta-analyses, randomized controlled studies as well as observational studies were included as empirical articles. Systematic characterization of identified pay-for-performance approaches (P4P approaches) was conducted according to the “Model for Implementing and Monitoring Incentives for Quality” (MIMIQ). Methodological quality of empirical articles was assessed according to the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) checklists.

Results

Overall, 13 relevant articles were included. Eleven articles were descriptive and two articles included empirical analyses. Based on these articles, four different pay-for-performance approaches implemented in the United States were identified. With regard to quality and incentive elements, systematic comparison showed numerous differences between P4P approaches. Empirical studies showed isolated cost or quality effects, while a simultaneous examination of these effects was missing.

Conclusion

Research results show that experiences with pay-for-performance approaches in ophthalmology are limited. Identified approaches differ with regard to quality and incentive elements restricting comparability. Two empirical studies are insufficient to draw strong conclusions about the effectiveness and efficiency of these approaches.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12913-017-2333-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Program on Care for Black Patients with Hypertension: Important Answers in the Era of the Affordable Care Act

OBJECTIVE

Evaluate the effect of a pay-for-performance intervention on the quality of hypertension care provided to black patients and determine whether it produced risk selection.

DATA SOURCE/STUDY SETTING

Primary data collected between 2007 and 2009 from Veterans Affairs physicians and their primary care panels.

STUDY DESIGN

Nested study within a cluster randomized controlled trial of three types of financial incentives and no incentives (control). We compared the proportion of physicians' black patients meeting hypertension performance measures for baseline and final performance periods. We measured risk selection by comparing the proportion of patients who switched providers, patient visit frequency, and panel turnover. Due to limited power, we prespecified in the analysis plan combining the three incentive groups and oversampling black patients.

DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHOD

Data collected electronically and by chart review.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The proportion of black patients who achieved blood pressure control or received an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in the final period was 6.3 percent (95 percent confidence interval, 0.8-11.7 percent) greater for physicians who received an incentive than for controls. There was no difference between intervention and controls in the proportion of patients who switched providers, visit frequency, or panel turnover.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

A pay-for-performance intervention improved blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in black patients and did not produce risk selection.

Using Publicly Reported Nursing-Sensitive Screening Indicators to Measure Hospital Performance: The Netherlands Experience in 2011

BACKGROUND

Deliberate screening allows detection of health risks that are otherwise not noticeable and allows expedient intervention to minimize complications and optimize outcomes, especially during critical events like hospitalization. Little research has evaluated the usefulness of screening performance and outcome indicators as measures to differentiate nursing quality, although policymakers are using them to benchmark hospitals.

OBJECTIVES

The aims of this study were to examine hospital performance based on nursing-sensitive screening indicators and to assess associations with hospital characteristics and nursing-sensitive outcomes for patients.

METHODS

A secondary use of nursing-sensitive data from the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate was performed, including the mandatory screening and outcome indicators related to delirium, malnutrition, pain and pressure ulcers. The sample consisted of all 93 hospitals in the Netherlands in 2011. High- and low-performing hospitals were determined based on the overall proportion of screened patients. Descriptive statistics and analysis of variance were used to examine screening performances in relation to hospital characteristics and nursing-sensitive outcomes.

RESULTS

Over all hospitals, the average screening rates ranged from 59% (delirium) to 94% (pain). Organizational characteristics were not different in high- and low-performing hospitals. The hospitals with the best overall screening performances had significantly better results regarding protein intake within malnourished patients (p < .01). For mortality, marginal significant effects did not remain after controlling for organizational structures. No associations were found with prevalence of pressure ulcers and patient self-reported pain scores.

DISCUSSION

The screening for patient risks is an important nursing task. Our findings suggest that nursing-sensitive screening indicators may be relevant measures for benchmarking nursing quality in hospitals. Time-trend studies are required to support our findings and to further investigate relations with nursing-sensitive outcomes.

Impact of a Sequential Intervention on Albumin Utilization in Critical Care

OBJECTIVES

Literature generally finds no advantages in mortality risk for albumin over cheaper alternatives in many settings. Few studies have combined financial and nonfinancial strategies to reduce albumin overuse. We evaluated the effect of a sequential multifaceted intervention on decreasing albumin use in ICU and explore the effects of different strategies.

DESIGN

Prospective prepost cohort study.

SETTING

Eight ICUs at two hospitals in an academic healthcare system.

PATIENTS

Adult patients admitted to study ICUs from September 2011 to August 2014 (n = 22,004).

INTERVENTIONS

Over 2 years, providers in study ICUs participated in an intervention to reduce albumin use involving monthly feedback and explicit financial incentives in the first year and internal guidelines and order process changes in the second year.

MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS

Outcomes measured were albumin orders per ICU admission, direct albumin costs, and mortality. Mean (SD) utilization decreased 37% from 2.7 orders (6.8) per admission during the baseline to 1.7 orders (4.6) during the intervention (p < 0.001). Regression analysis revealed that the intervention was independently associated with 0.9 fewer orders per admission, a 42% relative decrease. This adjusted effect consisted of an 18% reduction in the probability of using any albumin (p < 0.001) and a 29% reduction in the number of orders per admission among patients receiving any (p < 0.001). Secondary analysis revealed that probability reductions were concurrent with internal guidelines and order process modification while reductions in quantity occurred largely during the financial incentives and feedback period. Estimated cost savings totaled $2.5M during the 2-year intervention. There was no significant difference in ICU or hospital mortality between baseline and intervention.

CONCLUSIONS

A sequential intervention achieved significant reductions in ICU albumin use and cost savings without changes in patient outcomes, supporting the combination of financial and nonfinancial strategies to align providers with evidence-based practices.

Is the Road to Mental Health Paved With Good Incentives? Estimating the Population Impact of Physician Incentives on Mental Health Care Using Linked Administrative Data

OBJECTIVES

The use of physician incentives to improve health care, in general, has been extensively studied but its value in mental health care has rarely been demonstrated. In this study the population-level impact of physician incentives on mental health care was estimated using indicators for receipt of counseling/psychotherapy (CP); antidepressant therapy (AT); minimally adequate counseling/psychotherapy; and minimally adequate antidepressant therapy. The incentives' impacts on overall continuity of care and of mental health care were also examined.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Monthly cohorts of individuals diagnosed with major depression were identified between January 2005 and December 2012 and their use of mental health services tracked for 12 months following initial diagnosis. Linked health administrative data were used to ascertain cases and measure health service use. Pre-post changes associated with the introduction of physician incentives were estimated using segmented regression analyses, after adjusting for seasonal variation.

RESULTS

Physician incentives reversed the downward and upward trends in CP and AT. Five years postintervention, the estimated impacts in percentage points for CP, AT, minimally adequate counseling/psychotherapy, and minimally adequate antidepressant therapy were +3.28 [95% confidence interval (CI), 2.05-4.52], -4.47 (95% CI, -6.06 to -2.87), +1.77 (95% CI, 0.94-2.59), and -2.24 (95% CI, -4.04 to -0.45). Postintervention, the downward trends in continuity of care failed to reverse, but were disrupted, netting estimated impacts of +7.53 (95% CI, 4.54-10.53) and +4.37 (95% CI, 2.64-6.09) for continuity of care and of mental health care.

CONCLUSIONS

The impact of physician incentives on mental health care was modest at best. Other policy interventions are needed to close existing gaps in mental health care.

Effectiveness of Pay-for-Performance Incentive Designs on Diabetes Care

BACKGROUND

Taiwan's National Health Insurance program implemented a pay-for-performance (P4P) program based on process measures in 2001. In late 2006, the P4P was revised to also include achievement of outcome measures.

OBJECTIVES

This study examined whether a change in P4P incentive design structure affected diabetes outcomes.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

We used a longitudinal cohort study design using 2 population-based databases. Newly enrolled P4P patients with diabetes in 2002-2003 (phase 1) and 2007-2008 (phase 2) made up the study cohorts. Propensity score matching was used to match comparable cohorts in each phase. In total, 46,286 matched cohorts in phase 1 and 2 were analyzed. Process measures were defined as the provision of tests of glycosylated hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c), low-density lipoprotein cholesterol, and blood pressure, and outcome measures as changes in those values between baseline and last follow-up within 3 years. Patient-level generalized linear regression models were used and patient characteristics, physician characteristics, and health care facility characteristics were adjusted for.

RESULTS

Our results indicated that the process measures of HbA1c and low-density lipoprotein cholesterol tests did not differ significantly between the 2 phases. In addition, better improvements were noted in outcome measures for the phase 2 patients (ie, HbA1c level and lipid profiles), whereas nonincentivized intermediate measures (eg, blood pressure) showed no negative unintended consequences.

CONCLUSIONS

Quality of care tended to be better when both process and targeted outcome measures were combined as quality metrics in the P4P program in Taiwan.

Disease-specific Pay-for-Performance Programs: Do the P4P Effects Differ Between Diabetic Patients With and Without Multiple Chronic Conditions?

BACKGROUND

Several studies have investigated the effects of pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives. However, little is known about whether patients with multiple chronic conditions (MCC) would benefit from P4P initiatives similarly to patients without MCC.

OBJECTIVES

The objective of this study was to compare the effects of the diabetes mellitus pay-for-performance (DM-P4P) program on the quality of diabetic care between type 2 diabetic patients with and without MCC.

METHODS

This study used data from Taiwan's Longitudinal Health Insurance Database 2005. Of this cohort, 52,276 diabetic patients were identified. To address potential selection bias between the intervention and comparison groups, the propensity score matching method was used. Generalized estimating equations were applied to analyze the difference-in-difference model to examine the effect of the intervention, the DM-P4P program.

RESULTS

The disease-specific DM-P4P program had positive impacts on process and outcome indicators of health care quality regardless of patients' MCC status. Diabetic patients with MCC experienced a significantly larger decrease in the admission rate of diabetes-related ambulatory care sensitive conditions after the P4P enrollment over time compared with patients without MCC.

CONCLUSIONS

The positive impacts on use of diabetes-related services were comparable between diabetic patients with and without MCC. Most importantly, for MCC patients, the disease-specific DM-P4P program had a stronger positive impact on health outcomes. Hence, the commonly observed phenomenon of "cherry picking" in implementing P4P strategies may lead to disparities in the quality of diabetic care between diabetic patients with and without MCC.

Factors Related to Implementation and Reach of a Pragmatic Multisite Trial: The My Own Health Report (MOHR) Study

BACKGROUND

Contextual factors relevant to translating healthcare improvement interventions to different settings are rarely collected systematically. This study articulates a prospective method for assessing and describing contextual factors related to implementation and patient reach of a pragmatic trial in primary care.

METHODS

In a qualitative case-series, contextual factors were assessed from the My Own Health Report (MOHR) study, focused on systematic health risk assessments and goal setting for unhealthy behaviors and behavioral health in nine primary care practices. Practice staff interviews and observations, guided by a context template were conducted prospectively at three time points. Patient reach was calculated as percentage of patients completing MOHR of those who were offered MOHR and themes describing contextual factors were summarized through an iterative, data immersion process.These included practice members' motivations towards MOHR, practice staff capacity for implementation, practice information system capacity, external resources to support quality improvement, community linkages, and implementation strategy fit with patient populations.

CONCLUSIONS

Systematically assessing contextual factors prospectively throughout implementation of quality improvement initiatives helps translation to other health care settings. Knowledge of contextual factors is essential for scaling up of effective interventions.

Improved Risk Prediction Following Surgery Using Machine Learning Algorithms

Background:

Machine learning is used to analyze big data, often for the purposes of prediction. Analyzing a patient’s healthcare utilization pattern may provide more precise estimates of risk for adverse events (AE) or death. We sought to characterize healthcare utilization prior to surgery using machine learning for the purposes of risk prediction.

Methods:

Patients from MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters Database undergoing elective surgery from 2007–2012 with ≥1 comorbidity were included. All available healthcare claims occurring within six months prior to surgery were assessed. More than 300 predictors were defined by considering all combinations of conditions, encounter types, and timing along with sociodemographic factors. We used a supervised Naive Bayes algorithm to predict risk of AE or death within 90 days of surgery. We compared the model’s performance to the Charlson’s comorbidity index, a commonly used risk prediction tool.

Results:

Among 410,521 patients (mean age 52, 52 ± 9.4, 56% female), 4.7% had an AE and 0.01% died. The Charlson’s comorbidity index predicted 57% of AE’s and 59% of deaths. The Naive Bayes algorithm predicted 79% of AE’s and 78% of deaths. Claims for cancer, kidney disease, and peripheral vascular disease were the primary drivers of AE or death following surgery.

Conclusions:

The use of machine learning algorithms improves upon one commonly used risk estimator. Precisely quantifying the risk of an AE following surgery may better inform patient-centered decision-making and direct targeted quality improvement interventions while supporting activities of accountable care organizations that rely on accurate estimates of population risk.

Incentivised chronic disease management and the inverse equity hypothesis: findings from a longitudinal analysis of Scottish primary care practice-level data

BACKGROUND

The inverse equity hypothesis asserts that new health policies initially widen inequality, then attenuate inequalities over time. Since 2004, the UK's pay-for-performance scheme for chronic disease management (CDM) in primary care general practices (the Quality and Outcomes Framework) has permitted practices to except (exclude) patients from attending annual CDM reviews, without financial penalty. Informed dissent (ID) is one component of exception rates, applied to patients who have not attended due to refusal or non-response to invitations. 'Population achievement' describes the proportion receiving care, in relation to those eligible to receive it, including excepted patients. Examination of exception reporting (including ID) and population achievement enables the equity impact of the UK pay-for-performance contract to be assessed. We conducted a longitudinal analysis of practice-level rates and of predictors of ID, overall exceptions and population achievement for CDM to examine whether the inverse equity hypothesis holds true.

METHODS

We carried out a retrospective, longitudinal study using routine primary care data, analysed by multilevel logistic regression. Data were extracted from 793 practices (83% of Scottish general practices) serving 4.4 million patients across Scotland from 2010/2011 to 2012/2013, for 29 CDM indicators covering 11 incentivised diseases. This provided 68,991 observations, representing a total of 15 million opportunities for exception reporting.

RESULTS

Across all observations, the median overall exception reporting rate was 7.0% (7.04% in 2010-2011; 7.02% in 2011-2012 and 6.92% in 2012-2013). The median non-attendance rate due to ID was 0.9% (0.76% in 2010-2011; 0.88% in 2011-2012 and 0.96% in 2012-2013). Median population achievement was 83.5% (83.51% in 2010-2011; 83.41% in 2011-2012 and 83.63% in 2012-2013). The odds of ID reporting in 2012/2013 were 16.0% greater than in 2010/2011 (p < 0.001). Practices in Scotland's most deprived communities were twice as likely to report non-attendance due to ID (odds ratio 2.10, 95% confidence interval 1.83-2.40, p < 0.001) compared with those in the least deprived; rural practices reported lower levels of non-attendance due to ID. These predictors were also independently associated with overall exceptions. Rates of population achievement did not change over time, with higher levels (higher remuneration) associated with increased rates of overall and ID exception and more affluent practices.

CONCLUSIONS

Non-attendance for CDM due to ID has risen over time, and higher rates are seen in patients from practices located in disadvantaged areas. This suggests that CDM incentivisation does not conform to the inverse equity hypothesis, because inequalities are widening over time with lower uptake of anticipatory care health checks and CDM reviews noted among those most in need. Incentivised CDM needs to include incentives for engaging with the 'hard to reach' if inequalities in healthcare delivery are to be tackled.

Pay-for-performance reduces healthcare spending and improves quality of care: Analysis of target and non-target obstetrics and gynecology surgeries

Objective

In Korea, the Value Incentive Program (VIP) was first applied to selected clinical conditions in 2007 to evaluate the performance of medical institutes. We examined whether the condition-specific performance of the VIP resulted in measurable improvement in quality of care and in reduced medical costs.

Design

Population-based retrospective observational study.

Setting

We used two data set including the results of quality assessment and hospitalization data from National Health Claim data from 2011 to 2014.

Participants

Participants who were admitted to the hospital for obstetrics and gynecology were included. A total of 535 289 hospitalizations were included in our analysis.

Methods

We used a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model to identify associations between the quality assessment and length of stay (LOS). A GEE model based on a gamma distribution was used to evaluate medical cost. The Poisson regression analysis was used to evaluate readmission.

Main Outcome Measures

The outcome variables included LOS, medical costs and readmission within 30 days.

Results

Higher condition-specific performance by VIP participants was associated with shorter LOSs, decreases in medical cost, and lower within 30-day readmission rates for target and non-target surgeries. LOS and readmission within 30 days were different by change in quality assessment at each medical institute.

Conclusions

Our findings contribute to the body of evidence used by policy-makers for expansion and development of the VIP. The study revealed the positive effects of quality assessment on quality of care. To reduce the between-institute quality gap, alternative strategies are needed for medical institutes that had low performance.

The Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Program on Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infections in Pennsylvania

Healthcare associated infections have significantly contributed to the rising cost of hospital care in the United States. The implementation of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs has been one approach to improve quality at a reduced cost. We quantify the impact of Highmark's Quality Blue (QB) hospital P4P program on central line-associated blood stream infections (CLABSI) in Pennsylvania. The impact of years of participation in QB on CLABSI is also evaluated. Data from 149 Pennsylvania hospitals on CLABSI from 2008-2013 are used. Negative binomial regression and fixed effects panel regression are performed. Hospitals participating in QB have 0.727 times the CLABSI as those hospitals that do not participate. Hospitals participating for four or more years have on average 3.13 fewer CLABSI per year compared to those participating for less than four years. Highmark's P4P program has shown improved outcomes with regards to CLABSI, but further research is needed to determine if QB is cost effective.

Patients' appropriateness, acceptability, usability and preferences for pharmaceutical preparations: Results from a literature review on clinical evidence

Patients play an important role in achieving the desired therapeutic outcomes, as they are frequently responsible for their own medication management. To facilitate drug administration and overcome medication issues, the patients' needs and preferences should be considered in the pharmaceutical drug product design. With the aim to evaluate the current state of evidence for patient appropriateness, acceptability, usability and preference for aspects of this design, a literature search was performed. Comparative clinical studies that assessed such endpoints for different patient populations were included and summarized descriptively. The search identified 45 publications that met the inclusion criteria. A detailed analysis of the studies identified two main areas investigating either packaging design (n=10) or dosage form design (n=35). Studies on packaging design showed preferences for wing top and screw cap openings, push-through blisters and suppositories with slide system. Additionally, child-resistant containers should be avoided concerning specific patient populations. Regarding dosage form design, sprinkles and minitablets were the most preferred in studies involving young patients, while preferences varied considerably depending on route of administration and geographical region in studies with adult patients. Review of the methodology used in the studies revealed that ten studies had used well-defined protocols and observational endpoints to investigate patient appropriateness. Studies focusing on methodology for testing the appropriateness and usability of drug products by patients were not found. In conclusion, more interdisciplinary scientific efforts are required to develop and increase research in understanding patient needs and preferences.

Implementing hospital pay-for-performance: Lessons learned from the French pilot program

Despite a wide implementation of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs, evidence on their impact in hospitals is still limited. Our objective was to assess the implementation of the French P4P pilot program (IFAQ1) across 222 hospitals. The study consisted of a questionnaire among four leaders in each enrolled hospital, combined with a qualitative analysis based on 33 semi-structured interviews conducted with staff in four participating hospitals. For the questionnaire results, descriptive statistics were performed and responses were analyzed by job title. For the interviews, transcripts were analysed using coding techniques. Survey results showed that leaders were mostly positive about the program and reported a good level of awareness, in contrast to the frontline staff, who remained mostly unaware of the program's existence. The main barriers were attributed to lack of clarity in program rules, and to time constraints. Different strategies were then suggested by leaders. The qualitative results added further explanations for low program adoption among hospital staff, so far. Ultimately, although paying for quality is still an intuitive approach; gaps in program awareness within enrolled hospitals may pose an important challenge to P4P efficacy. Implementation evaluations are therefore necessary for policymakers to better understand P4P adoption processes among hospitals.