Development and plasticity of executive functions: A value-based account

Executive functions are core to multiple aspects of daily cognitive, social and affective functioning. An extensive body of work has charted developmental trajectories and neural substrates of executive functions through the lifespan. Robust associations between executive functions early in life, and later, wellbeing and success has led to considerable efforts to improve executive functions through bespoke interventions. Here, we discuss recent findings on the role of cost-benefit computations in how executive functions are deployed in development. We propose leveraging these insights to design more effective interventions for improving executive functions.

Humans can navigate complex graph structures acquired during latent learning

Humans appear to represent many forms of knowledge in associative networks whose nodes are multiply connected, including sensory, spatial, and semantic. Recent work has shown that explicitly augmenting artificial agents with such graph-structured representations endows them with more human-like capabilities of compositionality and transfer learning. An open question is how humans acquire these representations. Previously, it has been shown that humans can learn to navigate graph-structured conceptual spaces on the basis of direct experience with trajectories that intentionally draw the network contours (Schapiro, Kustner, & Turk-Browne, 2012; Schapiro, Turk-Browne, Botvinick, & Norman, 2016), or through direct experience with rewards that covary with the underlying associative distance (Wu, Schulz, Speekenbrink, Nelson, & Meder, 2018). Here, we provide initial evidence that this capability is more general, extending to learning to reason about shortest-path distances across a graph structure acquired across disjoint experiences with randomized edges of the graph - a form of latent learning. In other words, we show that humans can infer graph structures, assembling them from disordered experiences. We further show that the degree to which individuals learn to reason correctly and with reference to the structure of the graph corresponds to their propensity, in a separate task, to use model-based reinforcement learning to achieve rewards. This connection suggests that the correct acquisition of graph-structured relationships is a central ability underlying forward planning and reasoning, and may be a core computation across the many domains in which graph-based reasoning is advantageous.

Cognitive Control as a Multivariate Optimization Problem

A hallmark of adaptation in humans and other animals is our ability to control how we think and behave across different settings. Research has characterized the various forms cognitive control can take-including enhancement of goal-relevant information, suppression of goal-irrelevant information, and overall inhibition of potential responses-and has identified computations and neural circuits that underpin this multitude of control types. Studies have also identified a wide range of situations that elicit adjustments in control allocation (e.g., those eliciting signals indicating an error or increased processing conflict), but the rules governing when a given situation will give rise to a given control adjustment remain poorly understood. Significant progress has recently been made on this front by casting the allocation of control as a decision-making problem. This approach has developed unifying and normative models that prescribe when and how a change in incentives and task demands will result in changes in a given form of control. Despite their successes, these models, and the experiments that have been developed to test them, have yet to face their greatest challenge: deciding how to select among the multiplicity of configurations that control can take at any given time. Here, we will lay out the complexities of the inverse problem inherent to cognitive control allocation, and their close parallels to inverse problems within motor control (e.g., choosing between redundant limb movements). We discuss existing solutions to motor control's inverse problems drawn from optimal control theory, which have proposed that effort costs act to regularize actions and transform motor planning into a well-posed problem. These same principles may help shed light on how our brains optimize over complex control configuration, while providing a new normative perspective on the origins of mental effort.

Testing the relationship between inhibitory control and soda consumption: An event-related potential (ERP) study

The intake of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB) may detrimentally influence health outcomes. Drinking less soda may help manage SSB consumption, as soft drinks are a top contributor to SSB intake. One cognitive factor that may influence soda consumption is inhibitory control, or the ability to withhold a dominant response in order to correctly respond to one's environment. Increased inhibitory control plays a role in decreasing consumption of high-calorie foods, and strengthening inhibitory control may help individuals manage their food intake. However, neural response to soda beverages versus traditional non-sweetened beverages, such as water, and how it relates to soda consumption is unknown. In a sample of 116 healthy individuals (M = 20.56; SD = 2.08; 47.4% female), we measured soda consumption and tested event-related potential (ERP) measures of inhibitory control, including the N2 and P3 components, during soda-specific and neutral comparison go/no-go tasks. Female participants consumed less soda on average than males, and as participants got older, they consumed less soda. Participants showed faster response times and higher accuracy on the soda-specific compared to neutral go/no-go . ERP results indicated inhibitory control was greater when individuals withheld dominant responses to soda stimuli rather than neutral stimuli. Neither N2 no-go amplitude on the soda-specific go/no-go nor P3 no-go amplitude on the soda-specific predicted measures of soda intake. Results suggest greater inhibitory control resources are required when withholding responses to soda beverages compared to neutral stimuli, but inhibitory control ERPs did not predict day-to-day soda intake.

Filling the gaps: Cognitive control as a critical lens for understanding mechanisms of value-based decision-making

While often seeming to investigate rather different problems, research into value-based decision making and cognitive control have historically offered parallel insights into how people select thoughts and actions. While the former studies how people weigh costs and benefits to make a decision, the latter studies how they adjust information processing to achieve their goals. Recent work has highlighted ways in which decision-making research can inform our understanding of cognitive control. Here, we provide the complementary perspective: how cognitive control research has informed understanding of decision-making. We highlight three particular areas of research where this critical interchange has occurred: (1) how different types of goals shape the evaluation of choice options, (2) how people use control to adjust the ways they make their decisions, and (3) how people monitor decisions to inform adjustments to control at multiple levels and timescales. We show how adopting this alternate viewpoint offers new insight into the determinants of both decisions and control; provides alternative interpretations for common neuroeconomic findings; and generates fruitful directions for future research.

The effect of external store reliance on actual and predicted value-directed remembering

We often rely on external devices to store to-be-remembered information in our everyday lives (e.g., writing grocery lists, setting reminders), yet there is limited research about how certain information (i.e., valuable information) may be differentially encoded when we rely on our internal memory versus an external store. Across three preregistered experiments, we examined the effect of relying on an external store on the recall of high-value and low-value information. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we presented participants with words associated with point values and examined mean recall performance during two critical trials in which the external store was not available: (1) a trial in which participants were told that they would have access to an external memory store at test (told-external-store) and (2) a trial in which participants were told that they would not have access to their external store at test (told-no-external-store). In Experiment 2, we explored participants' metacognitive predictions of performance on the recall test. Critically, across all of the experiments, we found that the value effect (i.e., better recall for valuable information) was significantly reduced when individuals were told that they could rely on an external store. The same pattern was present in participant's metacognitive judgements. Together, these results suggest that when relying on external stores, individuals forgo (to some extent, at least) selective encoding by value and that individuals might be aware of this change in strategy.

The subjective evaluation of task switch cues is related to voluntary task switching

Task switching refers to the effortful mental process of shifting attention between different tasks. While it is well-established that task switching usually comes with an objective performance cost, recent studies have shown that people also subjectively evaluate task switching as negative. An open question is whether this affective evaluation of task switching is also related to actual decision making. In this pre-registered study, we therefore examined whether individual differences in the negative evaluation of task switch cues are related to less voluntary task switching. To this end, participants first performed a cued task switching paradigm where abstract cues signaled task transitions (repetition or alternation). In a second phase, these transition cues were used as prime stimuli in an affective priming procedure to assess participants' affective evaluation of task switching. In a third phase, participants were allowed to freely choose whether to switch or repeat tasks. We found that a more negative evaluation of task switching cues was related to lower switch rates in the voluntary task switching phase. This finding supports neuroeconomic theories of value-based decision making which suggest that people use their subjective value of control to decide whether to engage in (different) tasks.

Cognitive Effort Exertion Enhances Electrophysiological Responses to Rewarding Outcomes

Recent work has highlighted neural mechanisms underlying cognitive effort-related discounting of anticipated rewards. However, findings on whether effort exertion alters the subjective value of obtained rewards are inconsistent. Here, we provide a more nuanced account of how cognitive effort affects subsequent reward processing in a novel task designed to assess effort-induced modulations of the Reward Positivity, an event-related potential indexing reward-related neural activity. We found that neural responses to both gains and losses were significantly elevated in trials requiring more versus less cognitive effort. Moreover, time-frequency analysis revealed that these effects were mirrored in gain-related delta, but not in loss-related theta band activity, suggesting that people ascribed more value to high-effort outcomes. In addition, we also explored whether individual differences in behavioral effort discounting rates and reward sensitivity in the absence of effort may affect the relationship between effort exertion and subsequent reward processing. Together, our findings provide evidence that cognitive effort exertion can increase the subjective value of subsequent outcomes and that this effect may primarily rely on modulations of delta band activity.

Effort Mobilization and Lapses of Sustained Attention

The current study examined whether effort mobilization would enhance sustained attention and reduce lapses of attention. Participants performed a sustained attention task and were randomly assigned to either an effort condition where they were instructed to "Try Hard" on a subset of trials or were assigned to a control condition with no "Try Hard" instructions. Pupillary responses were continuously recorded, and periodically during the task participants were presented with thought probes to determine whether they were on or off task. The results suggested within the effort condition there were no behavioral differences between Try Hard and "Standard" trials. Preparatory pupil responses were increased in Try Hard trials, but there were no differences for phasic pupillary responses to stimulus onset. In contrast, examining differences between the effort and control conditions suggested that participants who received the Try Hard instructions demonstrated faster overall performance, a reduction in very long reaction times, and reported fewer off-task thoughts compared with participants in the control condition. Participants in the effort condition also demonstrated a larger ramp-up in pupillary responses during the preparatory interval and a larger phasic response to stimulus onset compared with participants in the control condition. These results are consistent with attention allocation models suggesting that participants in the effort condition mobilized more attentional effort than participants in the control condition, resulting in enhanced sustained attention and a reduction in lapses of attention. These results also are consistent with recent theories, which suggest that the locus coeruleus norepinephrine system is associated with effort mobilization.

Aversive motivation and cognitive control

Aversive motivation plays a prominent role in driving individuals to exert cognitive control. However, the complexity of behavioral responses attributed to aversive incentives creates significant challenges for developing a clear understanding of the neural mechanisms of this motivation-control interaction. We review the animal learning, systems neuroscience, and computational literatures to highlight the importance of experimental paradigms that incorporate both motivational context manipulations and mixed motivational components (e.g., bundling of appetitive and aversive incentives). Specifically, we postulate that to understand aversive incentive effects on cognitive control allocation, a critical contextual factor is whether such incentives are associated with negative reinforcement or punishment. We further illustrate how the inclusion of mixed motivational components in experimental paradigms enables increased precision in the measurement of aversive influences on cognitive control. A sharpened experimental and theoretical focus regarding the manipulation and assessment of distinct motivational dimensions promises to advance understanding of the neural, monoaminergic, and computational mechanisms that underlie the interaction of motivation and cognitive control.

Rewarding cognitive effort increases the intrinsic value of mental labor

Many extraordinary human skills like reading, mastering an instrument, or programming require thousands of hours of practice and continued exertion of mental effort. However, the importance of mental effort often contrasts with currently dominant theories suggesting that effort is aversive and something people avoid whenever possible. Here, we show that rewarding participants for the exertion of effort in a cognitive task increased their preference for more demanding tasks in a transfer phase. This provides evidence that people can learn to positively value effort and demanding tasks in the absence of extrinsic reward. These findings challenge currently dominant theories of mental effort and point to the role of learning environments for the development of effort-related motivation.

Current models of mental effort in psychology, behavioral economics, and cognitive neuroscience typically suggest that exerting cognitive effort is aversive, and people avoid it whenever possible. The aim of this research was to challenge this view and show that people can learn to value and seek effort intrinsically. Our experiments tested the hypothesis that effort-contingent reward in a working-memory task will induce a preference for more demanding math tasks in a transfer phase, even though participants were aware that they would no longer receive any reward for task performance. In laboratory Experiment 1 (n = 121), we made reward directly contingent on mobilized cognitive effort as assessed via cardiovascular measures (β-adrenergic sympathetic activity) during the training task. Experiments 2a to 2e (n = 1,457) were conducted online to examine whether the effects of effort-contingent reward on subsequent demand seeking replicate and generalize to community samples. Taken together, the studies yielded reliable evidence that effort-contingent reward increased participants’ demand seeking and preference for the exertion of cognitive effort on the transfer task. Our findings provide evidence that people can learn to assign positive value to mental effort. The results challenge currently dominant theories of mental effort and provide evidence and an explanation for the positive effects of environments appreciating effort and individual growth on people’s evaluation of effort and their willingness to mobilize effort and approach challenging tasks.

The Bidirectional Social-Cognitive Mechanisms of the Social-Attention Symptoms of Autism

Differences in social attention development begin to be apparent in the 6th to 12th month of development in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and theoretically reflect important elements of its neurodevelopmental endophenotype. This paper examines alternative conceptual views of these early social attention symptoms and hypotheses about the mechanisms involved in their development. One model emphasizes mechanism involved in the spontaneous allocation of attention to faces, or social orienting. Alternatively, another model emphasizes mechanisms involved in the coordination of attention with other people, or joint attention, and the socially bi-directional nature of its development. This model raises the possibility that atypical responses of children to the attention or the gaze of a social partner directed toward themselves may be as important in the development of social attention symptoms as differences in the development of social orienting. Another model holds that symptoms of social attention may be important to early development, but may not impact older individuals with ASD. The alterative model is that the social attention symptoms in infancy (social orienting and joint attention), and social cognitive symptoms in childhood and adulthood share common neurodevelopmental substrates. Therefore, differences in early social attention and later social cognition constitute a developmentally continuous axis of symptom presentation in ASD. However, symptoms in older individuals may be best measured with in vivo measures of efficiency of social attention and social cognition in social interactions rather than the accuracy of response on analog tests used in measures with younger children. Finally, a third model suggests that the social attention symptoms may not truly be a symptom of ASD. Rather, they may be best conceptualized as stemming from differences domain general attention and motivation mechanisms. The alternative argued for here that infant social attention symptoms meet all the criteria of a unique dimension of the phenotype of ASD and the bi-directional phenomena involved in social attention cannot be fully explained in terms of domain general aspects of attention development.

Chronic Fatigue in Cancer, Brain Connectivity and Reluctance to Engage in Physical Activity: A Mini-Review

A large amount of evidence shows that after a cancer diagnosis, patients significantly reduce their level of physical activity. Usually, this reduction is attributed to cancer-related fatigue. However, to our knowledge, no study has clearly demonstrated that fatigue alters effort-based decision-making in cancer. This mini-review aimed to provide evidence that chronic fatigue in cancer patients causes changes in brain connectivity that impact effort-based decision-making. Indeed, three patterns of activation to compensate for dysfunctional networks have been reported: greater variability in the executive network and hyperactivation in the executive network, which account for less efficient and costly processes in the frontal cortex, and reduced deactivation in the default mode network. Nevertheless, these activation patterns are also observed with other factors, such as anticipatory stressors (worry, rumination or sleep loss), that might also cause reluctance to engage in physical activity. Effort-based decision-making involving weighing costs against benefits and physical activity interventions should increase immediate benefits to facilitate engagement in effortful activities.

Representational exchange in social learning: Blurring the lines between the ritual and instrumental

We propose that human social learning is subject to a trade-off between the cost of performing a computation and the flexibility of its outputs. Viewing social learning through this lens sheds light on cases that seem to violate bifocal stance theory (BST) – such as high-fidelity imitation in instrumental action – and provides a mechanism by which causal insight can be bootstrapped from imitation of cultural practices.

Advances in modeling learning and decision-making in neuroscience

An organism's survival depends on its ability to learn about its environment and to make adaptive decisions in the service of achieving the best possible outcomes in that environment. To study the neural circuits that support these functions, researchers have increasingly relied on models that formalize the computations required to carry them out. Here, we review the recent history of computational modeling of learning and decision-making, and how these models have been used to advance understanding of prefrontal cortex function. We discuss how such models have advanced from their origins in basic algorithms of updating and action selection to increasingly account for complexities in the cognitive processes required for learning and decision-making, and the representations over which they operate. We further discuss how a deeper understanding of the real-world complexities in these computations has shed light on the fundamental constraints on optimal behavior, and on the complex interactions between corticostriatal pathways to determine such behavior. The continuing and rapid development of these models holds great promise for understanding the mechanisms by which animals adapt to their environments, and what leads to maladaptive forms of learning and decision-making within clinical populations.

Brain stimulation over dorsomedial prefrontal cortex modulates effort-based decision making

Deciding whether to engage in strenuous mental activities requires trading-off the potential benefits against the costs of mental effort, but it is unknown which brain rhythms are causally involved in such cost-benefit calculations. We show that brain stimulation targeting midfrontal theta oscillations increases the engagement in goal-directed mental effort. Participants received transcranial alternating current stimulation over dorsomedial prefrontal cortex while deciding whether they are willing to perform a demanding working memory task for monetary rewards. Midfrontal theta tACS increased the willingness to exert mental effort for rewards while leaving working memory performance unchanged. Computational modelling using a hierarchical Bayesian drift diffusion model suggests that theta tACS shifts the starting bias before evidence accumulation towards high reward-high effort options without affecting the velocity of the evidence accumulation process. Our findings suggest that the motivation to engage in goal-directed mental effort can be increased via midfrontal tACS.

Beyond Description and Deficits: How Computational Psychiatry Can Enhance an Understanding of Decision-Making in Anorexia Nervosa

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Despite decades of research, knowledge of the mechanisms maintaining anorexia nervosa (AN) remains incomplete and clearly effective treatments elusive. Novel theoretical frameworks are needed to advance mechanistic and treatment research for this disorder. Here, we argue the utility of engaging a novel lens that differs from existing perspectives in psychiatry. Specifically, we argue the necessity of expanding beyond two historically common perspectives: (1) the descriptive perspective: the tendency to define mechanisms on the basis of surface characteristics and (2) the deficit perspective: the tendency to search for mechanisms associated with under-functioning of decision-making abilities and related circuity, rather than problems of over-functioning, in psychiatric disorders.

RECENT FINDINGS

Computational psychiatry can provide a novel framework for understanding AN because this approach emphasizes the role of computational misalignments (rather than absolute deficits or excesses) between decision-making strategies and environmental demands as the key factors promoting psychiatric illnesses. Informed by this approach, we argue that AN can be understood as a disorder of excess goal pursuit, maintained by over-engagement, rather than disengagement, of executive functioning strategies and circuits. Emerging evidence suggests that this same computational imbalance may constitute an under-investigated phenotype presenting transdiagnostically across psychiatric disorders. A variety of computational models can be used to further elucidate excess goal pursuit in AN. Most traditional psychiatric treatments do not target excess goal pursuit or associated neurocognitive mechanisms. Thus, targeting at the level of computational dysfunction may provide a new avenue for enhancing treatment for AN and related disorders.

Neurobiological mechanisms of control in alcohol use disorder - moving towards mechanism-based non-invasive brain stimulation treatments

Alcohol use disorder (AUD) is characterized by excessive habitual drinking and loss of control over alcohol intake despite negative consequences. Both of these aspects foster uncontrolled drinking and high relapse rates in AUD patients. Yet, common interventions mostly focus on the phenomenological level, and prioritize the reduction of craving and withdrawal symptoms. Our review provides a mechanistic understanding of AUD and suggests alternative therapeutic approaches targeting the mechanisms underlying dysfunctional alcohol-related behaviours. Specifically, we explain how repeated drinking fosters the development of rigid drinking habits and is associated with diminished cognitive control. These behavioural and cognitive effects are then functionally related to the neurobiochemical effects of alcohol abuse. We further explain how alterations in fronto-striatal network activity may constitute the neurobiological correlates of these alcohol-related dysfunctions. Finally, we discuss limitations in current pharmacological AUD therapies and suggest non-invasive brain stimulation (like TMS and tDCS interventions) as a potential addition/alternative for modulating the activation of both cortical and subcortical areas to help re-establish the functional balance between controlled and automatic behaviour.

The sequence of manipulation matters: Abstract thinking offsets ego-depletion when induced before, but not after a depleting task

Based on theoretical and empirical studies dealing with the facilitation and inhibiting effects of different psychic distances (low vs. high construal-level), we tested if the exhibition of self-control under a high construal-level is a more efficient and less resource exhausting mode, compared to the exhibition of self-control under a low construal level. Prior studies already showed that the execution of self-control results in a lower construal-level and a high construal-level has facilitating effects on self-control. We expand upon these studies by: 1. operationalizing the whole process of ego-depletion through two sequential self-control tasks, 2. combining one ego-depletion and one construal-level manipulation in a 2 by 2 design and 3. varying the sequence of manipulations. In Experiment 1, we examined how the manipulation of the participants before and after being depleted, affects the self-control performance in a final task. In Experiment 2, we re-tested the offset of ego-depletion on another self-control measurement, with the condition of a high construal-level manipulated first. In Experiment 1 the ego-depletion effect remained existent when the construal-level was manipulated after the execution of self-control in a stroop test, but it was offset, when the construal-level was manipulated before the stoop test. Drawing on measurements of the perceived available self-control resources in Experiment 2, we were able to rule out an alternative approach, explaining similar results by an attentional shift towards reduced resources under low construal-level.

Locus coeruleus neurons encode the subjective difficulty of triggering and executing actions

The brain stem noradrenergic nucleus locus coeruleus (LC) is involved in various costly processes: arousal, stress, and attention. Recent work has pointed toward an implication in physical effort, and indirect evidence suggests that the LC could be also involved in cognitive effort. To assess the dynamic relation between LC activity, effort production, and difficulty, we recorded the activity of 193 LC single units in 5 monkeys performing 2 discounting tasks (a delay discounting task and a force discounting task), as well as a simpler target detection task where conditions were matched for difficulty and only differed in terms of sensory-motor processes. First, LC neurons displayed a transient activation both when monkeys initiated an action and when exerting force. Second, the magnitude of the activation scaled with the associated difficulty, and, potentially, the corresponding amount of effort produced, both for decision and force production. Indeed, at action initiation in both discounting tasks, LC activation increased in conditions associated with lower average engagement rate, i.e., those requiring more cognitive control to trigger the response. Decision-related activation also scaled with response time (RT), over and above task parameters, in line with the idea that it reflects the amount of resources (here time) spent on the decision process. During force production, LC activation only scaled with the amount of force produced in the force discounting task, but not in the control target detection task, where subjective difficulty was equivalent across conditions. Our data show that LC neurons dynamically track the amount of effort produced to face both cognitive and physical challenges with a subsecond precision. This works provides key insight into effort processing and the contribution of the noradrenergic system, which is affected in several pathologies where effort is impaired, including Parkinson disease and depression.

Dissociable influences of reward and punishment on adaptive cognitive control

To invest effort into any cognitive task, people must be sufficiently motivated. Whereas prior research has focused primarily on how the cognitive control required to complete these tasks is motivated by the potential rewards for success, it is also known that control investment can be equally motivated by the potential negative consequence for failure. Previous theoretical and experimental work has yet to examine how positive and negative incentives differentially influence the manner and intensity with which people allocate control. Here, we develop and test a normative model of control allocation under conditions of varying positive and negative performance incentives. Our model predicts, and our empirical findings confirm, that rewards for success and punishment for failure should differentially influence adjustments to the evidence accumulation rate versus response threshold, respectively. This dissociation further enabled us to infer how motivated a given person was by the consequences of success versus failure.

The ascending arousal system promotes optimal performance through mesoscale network integration in a visuospatial attentional task

Previous research has shown that the autonomic nervous system provides essential constraints over ongoing cognitive function. However, there is currently a relative lack of direct empirical evidence for how this interaction manifests in the brain at the macroscale level. Here, we examine the role of ascending arousal and attentional load on large-scale network dynamics by combining pupillometry, functional MRI, and graph theoretical analysis to analyze data from a visual motion-tracking task with a parametric load manipulation. We found that attentional load effects were observable in measures of pupil diameter and in a set of brain regions that parametrically modulated their BOLD activity and mesoscale network-level integration. In addition, the regional patterns of network reconfiguration were correlated with the spatial distribution of the α2a adrenergic receptor. Our results further solidify the relationship between ascending noradrenergic activity, large-scale network integration, and cognitive task performance.

More Effort, Less Fatigue: The Role of Interest in Increasing Effort and Reducing Mental Fatigue

People generally prefer easier over more difficult mental tasks. Using two different adaptations of a demand selection task, we show that interest can influence this effect, such that participants choose options with a higher cognitive workload. Interest was also associated with lower feelings of fatigue. In two studies, participants (N = 63 and N = 158) repeatedly made a choice between completing a difficult or easy math problem. Results show that liking math predicts choosing more difficult (vs. easy) math problems (even after controlling for perceived math skill). Two additional studies used the Academic Diligence Task (Galla et al., 2014), where high school students (N = 447 and N = 884) could toggle between a math task and playing a video game/watching videos. In these studies, we again find that math interest relates to greater proportion of time spent on the math problems. Three of these four studies also examined perceived fatigue, finding that interest relates to lower fatigue. An internal meta-analysis of the four studies finds a small but robust effect of interest on both the willingness to exert greater effort and the experience of less fatigue (despite engaging in more effort).

Facing successfully high mental workload and stressors: An fMRI study

The present fMRI study aimed at highlighting patterns of brain activations and autonomic activity when confronted with high mental workload and the threat of auditory stressors. Twenty participants performed a complex cognitive task in either safe or aversive conditions. Our results showed that increased mental workload induced recruitment of the lateral frontoparietal executive control network (ECN), along with disengagement of medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate regions of the default mode network (DMN). Mental workload also elicited an increase in heart rate and pupil diameter. Task performance did not decrease under the threat of stressors, most likely due to efficient inhibition of auditory regions, as reflected by a large decrement of activity in the superior temporal gyri. The threat of stressors was also accompanied with deactivations of limbic regions of the salience network (SN), possibly reflecting emotional regulation mechanisms through control from dorsal medial prefrontal and parietal regions, as indicated by functional connectivity analyses. Meanwhile, the threat of stressors induced enhanced ECN activity, likely for improved attentional and cognitive processes toward the task, as suggested by increased lateral prefrontal and parietal activations. These fMRI results suggest that measuring the balance between ECN, SN, and DMN recruitment could be used for objective mental state assessment. In this sense, an extra recruitment of task‐related regions and a high ratio of lateral versus medial prefrontal activity may represent a relevant marker of increased but efficient mental effort, while the opposite may indicate a disengagement from the task due to mental overload and/or stressors.

Investigating anticipatory processes during sequentially changing reward prospect: An ERP study

Performance-contingent reward prospect modulates the stability-flexibility balance in voluntary task switching. High reward prospect typically increases stability, indicated by a low voluntary switch rate (VSR). But this effect depends on the immediate reward history: Only when a high reward repeats (reward remains high), stability is increased. In contrast, when reward increases (high reward following low reward) cognitive flexibility is promoted, indicated by a relatively high VSR. To investigate the underlying mechanisms of changing reward expectations during voluntary task choice, we conducted two experiments and measured reward cue-locked event-related potentials (P2, P3b, CNV). The experiments yielded consistent findings: The P2 was stronger in response to high vs. low reward reflecting an early attentional boost by high reward anticipation. The P3b was highest in increase, intermediate in remain-high, and lowest in low reward trials suggesting responsiveness to working memory updating and motivational arousal. Finally, the CNV increased over time and was sensitive to both reward magnitude and sequence with the lowest amplitude in reward remain-low trials suggesting that preparatory control only increases when worth the effort. Taken together, early attentional processes (P2) were boosted by mere reward magnitude, while later processes (P3b, CNV) were sensitive to both reward magnitude and its sequence.

Individual differences in working memory capacity predict benefits to memory from intention offloading

Research suggests that individuals with lower working memory have difficulty remembering to fulfil delayed intentions. The current study examined whether the ability to offload intentions onto the environment mitigated these deficits. Participants (N = 268) completed three versions of a delayed intention task with and without the use of reminders, along with three measures of working memory capacity. Results showed that individuals with higher working memory fulfilled more intentions when having to rely on their own memory, but this difference was eliminated when offloading was permitted. Individuals with lower working memory chose to offload more often, suggesting that they were less willing to engage in effortful maintenance of internal representations when given the option. Working memory was not associated with metacognitive confidence or optimal offloading choices based on point value. These findings suggest offloading may help circumvent capacity limitations associated with maintaining and remembering delayed intentions.

Valence bias in metacontrol of decision making in adolescents and young adults

The development of metacontrol of decision making and its susceptibility to framing effects were investigated in a sample of 201 adolescents and adults in Germany (12-25 years, 111 female, ethnicity not recorded). In a task that dissociates model-free and model-based decision making, outcome magnitude and outcome valence were manipulated. Both adolescents and adults showed metacontrol and metacontrol tended to increase across adolescence. Furthermore, model-based decision making was more pronounced for loss compared to gain frames but there was no evidence that this framing effect differed with age. Thus, the strategic adaptation of decision making continues to develop into young adulthood and for both adolescents and adults, losses increase the motivation to invest cognitive resources into an effortful decision-making strategy.

Setting the space for deliberation in decision-making

Decision-making models in the behavioral, cognitive, and neural sciences typically consist of forced-choice paradigms with two alternatives. While theoretically it is feasible to translate any decision situation to a sequence of binary choices, real-life decision-making is typically more complex and nonlinear, involving choices among multiple items, graded judgments, and deferments of decision-making. Here, we discuss how the complexity of real-life decision-making can be addressed using conventional decision-making models by focusing on the interactive dynamics between criteria settings and the collection of evidence. Decision-makers can engage in multi-stage, parallel decision-making by exploiting the space for deliberation, with non-binary readings of evidence available at any point in time. The interactive dynamics principally adhere to the speed-accuracy tradeoff, such that increasing the space for deliberation enables extended data collection. The setting of space for deliberation reflects a form of meta-decision-making that can, and should be, studied empirically as a value-based exercise that weighs the prior propensities, the economics of information seeking, and the potential outcomes. Importantly, the control of the space for deliberation raises a question of agency. Decision-makers may actively and explicitly set their own decision parameters, but these parameters may also be set by environmental pressures. Thus, decision-makers may be influenced-or nudged in a particular direction-by how decision problems are framed, with a sense of urgency or a binary definition of choice options. We argue that a proper understanding of these mechanisms has important practical implications toward the optimal usage of space for deliberation.

Appealing to the cognitive miser: Using demand avoidance to modulate cognitive flexibility in cued and voluntary task switching

Current cognitive control accounts view goal-directed behavior as striking a balance between two antagonistic control demands: Stability, on the one hand, reflects a rigid, focused state of control and flexibility, while on the other, reflects a relaxed, distractible state, whereby goals can be rapidly updated to meet unexpected changes in demands. In the current study, we sought to test whether the avoidance of cognitive demand could motivate people to dynamically regulate control along the stability-flexibility continuum. In both cued (Experiment 1) and voluntary (Experiment 2) task-switching paradigms, we selectively associated either task-switches or task-repetitions with high cognitive demand (independent of task identity), and measured changes in performance in a following phase after the demand manipulation was removed. Contrasting performance with a control group, across both experiments, we found that selectively associating cognitive demand with task repetitions increased flexibility, but selectively associating cognitive demand with task switches failed to increase stability. The results of the current study provide novel evidence for avoidance-driven modulations of control regulation along the stability-flexibility continuum, while also highlighting some limitations in using task-switching paradigms to examine motivational influences on control adaptation. Data, analysis code, experiment code, and preprint available at osf.io/7rct9/. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Frontopolar Cortex Response to Positive Feedback Relates to Nonincentivized Task Persistence

When individuals make decisions whether to persist at a task, their decision-making is informed by whether success is pending or accomplished. If pending, the brain facilitates behavioral persistence; if the goal is accomplished or no longer desired, the brain enables switching away from the current task. Feedback, which is known to differentially engage reward neurocircuitry, may modulate goal-directed behavior such as task persistence. However, prior studies are confounded by offering external incentives for persistence. This study tested whether neural response to feedback differed as a function of nonincentivized task persistence in 99 human participants ages 13-30 (60 females). Individuals who persisted engaged the frontopolar cortex (FPC) to a greater extent during receipt of task-relevant positive feedback compared with negative feedback. For individuals who quit, task-irrelevant monetary reward engaged the FPC to a greater extent compared with positive feedback. FPC activation in response to positive feedback is identified as a key contributor to task persistence.

How does caffeine influence memory? Drug, experimental, and demographic factors

Caffeine is a widely used nootropic drug, but its effects on memory in healthy participants have not been sufficiently evaluated. Here we review evidence of the effects of caffeine on different types of memory, and the associated drug, experimental, and demographical factors. There is limited evidence that caffeine affects performance in memory tasks beyond improved reaction times. For drug factors, a dose-response relationship may exist but findings are inconsistent. Moreover, there is evidence that the source of caffeine can modulate its effects on memory. For experimental factors, past studies often lacked a baseline control for diet and sleep and none discussed the possible reversal of withdrawal effect due to pre-experimental fasting. For demographic factors, caffeine may interact with sex and age, and the direction of the effect may depend on the dose, individual tolerance, and metabolism at baseline. Future studies should incorporate these considerations, as well as providing continued evidence on the effect of caffeine in visuospatial, prospective, and implicit memory measures.

Costly habitual avoidance is reduced by concurrent goal-directed approach in a modified devaluation paradigm

Avoidance habits potentially contribute to maintaining maladaptive, costly avoidance behaviors that persist in the absence of threat. However, experimental evidence about costly habitual avoidance is scarce. In two experiments, we tested whether extensively trained avoidance impairs the subsequent goal-directed approach of rewards. Healthy participants were extensively trained to avoid an aversive outcome by performing simple responses to distinct full-screen color stimuli. After the subsequent devaluation of the aversive outcome, participants received monetary rewards for correct responses to neutral object pictures, which were presented on top of the same full-screen colors. These approach responses were either compatible or incompatible with habitual avoidance responses. Notably, the full-screen colors were not relevant to inform approach responses. In Experiment 1, participants were not instructed about post-devaluation stimulus-response-reward contingencies. Accuracy was lower in habit-incompatible than in habit-compatible trials, indicating costly avoidance, whereas reaction times did not differ. In Experiment 2, contingencies were explicitly instructed. Accuracy differences disappeared, but reaction times were slower in habit-incompatible than in habit-compatible trials, indicating low-cost habitual avoidance tendencies. These findings suggest a small but consistent impact of habitual avoidance tendencies on subsequent goal-directed approach. Costly habitual responding could, however, be inhibited when competing goal-directed approach was easily realizable.

A rational reinterpretation of dual-process theories

Highly influential "dual-process" accounts of human cognition postulate the coexistence of a slow accurate system with a fast error-prone system. But why would there be just two systems rather than, say, one or 93? Here, we argue that a dual-process architecture might reflect a rational tradeoff between the cognitive flexibility afforded by multiple systems and the time and effort required to choose between them. We investigate what the optimal set and number of cognitive systems would be depending on the structure of the environment. We find that the optimal number of systems depends on the variability of the environment and the difficulty of deciding when which system should be used. Furthermore, we find that there is a plausible range of conditions under which it is optimal to be equipped with a fast system that performs no deliberation ("System 1") and a slow system that achieves a higher expected accuracy through deliberation ("System 2"). Our findings thereby suggest a rational reinterpretation of dual-process theories.

Executive Functions in Social Context: Implications for Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Supporting Developmental Trajectories

Success in life is linked to executive functions, a collection of cognitive processes that support goal-directed behaviors. Executive functions is an umbrella term related to cognitive control, self-control, and more. Variations in executive functioning predict concurrent success in schooling, relationships, and behavior, as well as important life outcomes years later. Such findings may suggest that certain individuals are destined for good executive functioning and success. However, environmental influences on executive function and development have long been recognized. Recent research in this tradition demonstrates the power of social contextual influences on children's engagement of executive functions. Such findings suggest new interpretations of why individuals differ in executive functioning and associated life outcomes, including across cultures and socioeconomic statuses. These findings raise fundamental questions about how best to conceptualize, measure, and support executive functioning across diverse contexts. Future research addressing real-world dynamics and computational mechanisms will elucidate how executive functioning emerges in the world.

Language Tasks and the Network Control Role of the Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus

Recent work has combined cognitive neuroscience and control theory to make predictions about cognitive control functions. Here, we test a link between whole-brain theories of semantics and the role of the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) in controlled language performance using network control theory (NCT), a branch of systems engineering. Specifically, we examined whether two properties of node controllability, boundary and modal controllability, were linked to semantic selection and retrieval on sentence completion and verb generation tasks. We tested whether the controllability of the left IFG moderated language selection and retrieval costs and the effects of continuous θ burst stimulation (cTBS), an inhibitory form of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) on behavior in 41 human subjects (25 active, 16 sham). We predicted that boundary controllability, a measure of the theoretical ability of a node to integrate and segregate brain networks, would be linked to word selection in the contextually-rich sentence completion task. In contrast, we expected that modal controllability, a measure of the theoretical ability of a node to drive the brain into specifically hard-to-reach states, would be linked to retrieval on the low-context verb generation task. Boundary controllability was linked to selection and to the ability of TMS to reduce response latencies on the sentence completion task. In contrast, modal controllability was not linked to performance on the tasks or TMS effects. Overall, our results suggest a link between the network integrating role of the LIFG and selection and the overall semantic demands of sentence completion.

Deriving Mental Energy From Task Completion

Many tasks in everyday life (e.g., making an accurate decision, completing job tasks, and searching for product information) are extrinsically motivated (i.e., the task is performed to gain a benefit) and require mental effort. Prior research shows that the cognitive resources needed to perform an extrinsically motivated task are allocated pre-task. The pre-task allocation of mental resources tends to be conservative, because mental effort is costly. Consequently, there are mental energy deficits when the use of mental resources exceeds the allocated amount. This research provides evidence for post-task mental energy replenishment. The amount of resource replenishment is a function of the size of the mental energy deficit and the favorability of the cost-benefit trade-off experienced at the completion of the task (i.e., the value of the reward given the energy investment). The findings have implications for how cognitive resources management influences the availability of mental energy on a moment-to-moment basis.

To organise or not to organise? Understanding search strategy preferences using Lego building blocks

Humans routinely organise or reconfigure the environment as part of their everyday activities, such as placing a set of keys in a designated location to reduce the need to remember its location. This type of spatial organisation is widely thought to reduce both the physical and cognitive demands of a task to allow individuals to perform tasks more easily. Although spatial organisation can be a useful strategy when searching for items in the environment, individuals do not always choose to utilise these organisational strategies when carrying out everyday tasks. Across three experiments, we examined individuals' preference for spatial organisation in the context of a real-world search task, and the degree to which individuals engaged in time- and effort-based cost-benefit analysis to inform whether to choose between an organisation-based or non-organisation-based search strategy. We found that individuals' strategy preferences could be explained by the perceived task time associated with each strategy, but not perceived task effort. However, even statistically controlling for relative perceived task time or reported effort, participants showed a strong systematic preference against organisation prior to engaging in the task, and, post-task, a strong preference towards organisation. Implications for understanding individuals' use of spatial organisation are discussed.

Acute Psychosocial Stress Increases Cognitive-Effort Avoidance

Adverse effects following acute stress are traditionally thought to reflect functional impairments of central executive-dependent cognitive-control processes. However, recent evidence demonstrates that cognitive-control application is perceived as effortful and aversive, indicating that stress-related decrements in cognitive performance could denote decreased motivation to expend effort instead. To investigate this hypothesis, we tested 40 young, healthy individuals (20 female, 20 male) under both stress and control conditions in a 2-day study that had a within-subjects design. Cognitive-effort avoidance was assessed using the demand-selection task, in which participants chose between performing low-demand and high-demand variants of a task-switching paradigm. We found that acute stress indeed increased participants' preference for less demanding behavior, whereas task-switching performance remained intact. Additional Bayesian and multiverse analyses confirmed the robustness of this effect. Our findings provide novel insights into how stressful experiences shape behavior by modulating our motivation to employ cognitive control.

Linear reinforcement learning in planning, grid fields, and cognitive control

It is thought that the brain’s judicious reuse of previous computation underlies our ability to plan flexibly, but also that inappropriate reuse gives rise to inflexibilities like habits and compulsion. Yet we lack a complete, realistic account of either. Building on control engineering, here we introduce a model for decision making in the brain that reuses a temporally abstracted map of future events to enable biologically-realistic, flexible choice at the expense of specific, quantifiable biases. It replaces the classic nonlinear, model-based optimization with a linear approximation that softly maximizes around (and is weakly biased toward) a default policy. This solution demonstrates connections between seemingly disparate phenomena across behavioral neuroscience, notably flexible replanning with biases and cognitive control. It also provides insight into how the brain can represent maps of long-distance contingencies stably and componentially, as in entorhinal response fields, and exploit them to guide choice even under changing goals.

Models of decision making have so far been unable to account for how humans’ choices can be flexible yet efficient. Here the authors present a linear reinforcement learning model which explains both flexibility, and rare limitations such as habits, as arising from efficient approximate computation

If-then planning, self-control, and boredom as predictors of adherence to social distancing guidelines: Evidence from a two-wave longitudinal study with a behavioral intervention

In the wake of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), social distancing is instrumental for containing the pandemic. To maximize its effectiveness, it is paramount to investigate psychological factors that predict adherence to social distancing guidelines and examine corresponding interventions. We focused on individual differences in if-then planning, self-control, and boredom, and tested an intervention based on if-then planning. We conducted a two-wave longitudinal study combining observational and experimental methods. Participants (N = 574, 35.7% female, age: M = 37.5 years, SD = 10.8) reported their adherence to social distancing guidelines and the perceived difficulty of adherence at T1, along with trait measures of if-then planning, self-control, and boredom. Afterwards, they were randomly assigned to an if-then planning intervention to increase adherence, or to a control intervention. One week later at T2, participants again reported their adherence and the perceived difficulty of adhering. Multiple regression and structural equation modeling were used to establish whether trait if-then planning, self-control, and boredom predicted adherence, and to examine the effects of the if-then planning intervention. Trait if-then planning, self-control, and boredom were associated with T1 adherence, while only if-then planning and boredom predicted T2 adherence. No overall treatment effect of the if-then planning intervention emerged; however, participants who complied with the intervention (75.6%) maintained higher levels of adherence over time than control participants. In sum, individual differences in if-then planning, self-control, and boredom predicted adherence to social distancing guidelines. If-then planning interventions are promising but require further steps to ascertain compliance.

Differences in cognitive processing? The role of verbal processes and mental effort in bilingual and monolingual children's planning performance

Past research documents a bilingual advantage in the domain of executive functions (EFs). However, controversial debates have questioned the robustness of those behavioral differences. The current study aimed to better understand the underlying cognitive prerequisites in bilingual students as compared with monolingual students and focused on two processes: the role of verbal processes, on the one hand, and mental effort during task execution, on the other. The use of self-regulatory speech has been found to be related to performance in tasks requiring EFs. For bilinguals who have grown up with two language systems from an early age, those relations are not fully understood. Furthermore, results from neuroimaging studies have shown that bilinguals might exhibit less mental effort in EF tasks. We investigated both processes in German-speaking monolingual elementary school students (n = 33; M_age = 8.78 years) and German-Russian bilingual elementary school students (n = 34; M_age = 8.88 years) solving a planning task. Results showed that monolinguals were impaired by a verbal secondary task in comparison with a motor control condition, whereas bilinguals performed in both tasks at an equal level, indicating a differential role of self-regulatory speech in both language groups. Analyses of changes in pupil diameter revealed less mental effort during task execution for bilingual children as compared with monolingual children. The current study adds to the existing literature by supplying further evidence for cognitive differences between monolingual and bilingual children.

Listening Effort Is Not the Same as Speech Intelligibility Score

Listening effort is a valuable and important notion to measure because it is among the primary complaints of people with hearing loss. It is tempting and intuitive to accept speech intelligibility scores as a proxy for listening effort, but this link is likely oversimplified and lacks actionable explanatory power. This study was conducted to explain the mechanisms of listening effort that are not captured by intelligibility scores, using sentence-repetition tasks where specific kinds of mistakes were prospectively planned or analyzed retrospectively. Effort measured as changes in pupil size among 20 listeners with normal hearing and 19 listeners with cochlear implants. Experiment 1 demonstrates that mental correction of misperceived words increases effort even when responses are correct. Experiment 2 shows that for incorrect responses, listening effort is not a function of the proportion of words correct but is rather driven by the types of errors, position of errors within a sentence, and the need to resolve ambiguity, reflecting how easily the listener can make sense of a perception. A simple taxonomy of error types is provided that is both intuitive and consistent with data from these two experiments. The diversity of errors in these experiments implies that speech perception tasks can be designed prospectively to elicit the mistakes that are more closely linked with effort. Although mental corrective action and number of mistakes can scale together in many experiments, it is possible to dissociate them to advance toward a more explanatory (rather than correlational) account of listening effort.

Micropursuit and the control of attention and eye movements in dynamic environments

It is more challenging to plan eye movements during perceptual tasks performed in dynamic displays than in static displays. Decisions about the timing of saccades become more critical, and decisions must also involve smooth eye movements, as well as saccades. The present study examined eye movements when judging which of two moving discs would arrive first, or collide, at a common meeting point. Perceptual discrimination after training was precise (Weber fractions < 6%). Strategies reflected a combined contribution of saccades and smooth eye movements. The preferred strategy was to look near the meeting point when strategies were freely chosen. When strategies were assigned, looking near the meeting point produced better performance than switching between the discs. Smooth eye movements were engaged in two ways: (a) low-velocity smooth eye movements correlated with the motion of each disc (micropursuit) were found while the line of sight remained between the discs; and (b) spontaneous smooth pursuit of the pair of discs occurred after the perceptual report, when the discs moved as a pair along a common path. The results show clear preferences and advantages for those eye movement strategies during dynamic perceptual tasks that require minimal management or effort. In addition, smooth eye movements, whose involvement during perceptual tasks within dynamic displays may have previously escaped notice, provide useful indictors of the strategies used to select information and distribute attention during the performance of dynamic perceptual tasks.

Auditory spatial attention gradients and cognitive control as a function of vigilance

Selection and effort are central to attention, yet it is unclear whether they draw on a common pool of cognitive resources, and if so, whether there are differences for early versus later stages of cognitive processing. This study assessed effort by quantifying the vigilance decrement, and spatial processing at early and later stages as a function of time-on-task. Participants performed an auditory spatial attention task, with occasional "catch" trials requiring no response. Psychophysiological measures included bilateral cerebral blood flow (transcranial Doppler), pupil dilation, and blink rate. The shape of attention gradients using reaction time indexed early processing, and did not significantly vary over time. Later stimulus-response conflict was comparable over time, except for a reduction to left hemispace stimuli. Target and catch trial accuracy decreased with time, with a more abrupt decrease for catch versus target trials. Diffusion decision modeling found progressive decreases in information accumulation rate and non-decision time, and the adoption of more liberal response criteria. Cerebral blood flow increased from baseline and then decreased over time, particularly in the left hemisphere. Blink rate steadily increased over time, while pupil dilation increased only at the beginning and then returned towards baseline. The findings suggest dissociations between resources for selectivity and effort. Measures of high subjective effort and temporal declines in catch trial accuracy and cerebral blood flow velocity suggest a standard vigilance decrement was evident in parallel with preserved selection. Different attentional systems and classes of computations that may account for dissociations between selectivity versus effort are discussed.