Cognitive Correlates of Risky Decision-Making in Individuals with and without ADHD: A Meta-analysis

This meta-analytic study aims to investigate the cognitive correlates of risky decision-making in individuals with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and typically developing (TD) individuals. A systematic analysis of existing literature was conducted, encompassing 38 studies (496 ADHD and 1493 TD). Findings revealed a consistent propensity for riskier decision-making in individuals with ADHD, supported by significant correlations with attention, cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, time perception, and working memory. The study underscores the relevance of these cognitive functions in shaping decision-making tendencies, with nuanced patterns observed within the ADHD and TD subgroups. Individuals with ADHD often demonstrate altered patterns of correlation, reflecting the specific cognitive challenges characteristic of the disorder.

"It doesn't matter if you are in charge of the trees, you always miss the trees for the forest": Power and the illusion of explanatory depth

Power can increase overconfidence and illusory thinking. We investigated whether power is also related to the illusion of explanatory depth (IOED), people's tendency to think they understand the world in more detail, coherence, and depth than they actually do. Abstract thinking was reported as a reason for the IOED, and according to the social distance theory of power, power increases abstract thinking. We linked these literatures and tested construal style as a mediator. Further, predispositions can moderate effects of power and we considered narcissism as a candidate because narcissism leads to overconfidence and may thus increase the IOED especially in combination with high power. In three preregistered studies (total N = 607), we manipulated power or measured feelings of power. We found evidence for the IOED (regarding explanatory knowledge about devices). Power led to general overconfidence but had only a small impact on the IOED. Power and narcissism had a small interactive effect on the IOED. Meta-analytical techniques suggest that previous findings on the construal-style-IOED link show only weak evidential value. Implications refer to research on management, power, and overconfidence.

Suboptimal decision making and interpersonal problems in ADHD: longitudinal evidence from a laboratory task

Over half of children with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) display interpersonal and social problems. Several lines of research suggest that suboptimal decision making, the ability to adjust choices to different risk-varying options, influences poorer choices made in social interactions. We thus measured decision making and its prediction of social problems longitudinally with the Cambridge Gambling Task in children with ADHD over four years. Children with ADHD had shown suboptimal decision making driven mainly by delay aversion at baseline and we expected this to be a stabile trait which would predict greater parent-reported social problems. From the baseline assessment (n = 70), 67% participated at the follow-up assessment, 21 from the ADHD group and 26 from the typically developing group. The mean age at the follow-up was 14.5 years old. The results confirmed our expectations that suboptimal decision making was a stabile trait in children and adolescents with ADHD. Although delay aversion did not differ from controls at follow-up it still proved to be the main longitudinal predictor for greater social problems. Our findings indicate that impulsivity in social interactions may be due to a motivational deficit in youth with ADHD.

I think, therefore I act, Revisited: Building a stronger foundation for risk analysis

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is a thinking style in which people engaged in judgment and decision-making actively seek out and then evaluate information in a manner that is intentionally disconnected from their prior beliefs and motivations and in line with self-perceptions of autonomy. Actively open-minded thinkers have been observed to make both more accurate judgments about the magnitude of risks and more evidence-based decisions under uncertainty in a wide range of situations such as climate change and politics. In addition, actively open-minded thinkers functioning in domains where they lack a desired level of knowledge are open to "outsourcing" the job of critical reasoning thinking to credible experts; in other words, they are better able to gauge who is trustworthy and then rely on the insights of these trustworthy others to help them reach a conclusion. We report results from a follow-up to research previously published in Risk Analysis that confirms these tenets in the context of COVID-19. We then extend these results to offer a series of recommendations for strengthening the process and outcomes of risk analysis: leveraging the latent norm of autonomy and personal agency that underpins AOT, activating or engaging with approaches to reasoning-such as decision structuring-that are in line with AOT, and working upstream and downstream of risk analysis to establish AOT as a norm of its own.

A reassessment of the Resistance to Framing scale

Risky-choice and attribute framing effects are well-known cognitive biases, where choices are influenced by the way information is presented. To assess susceptibility to these framing types, the Resistance to Framing scale is often used, although its performance has rarely been extensively tested. In an online survey among university students from Bulgaria (N = 245) and North America (N = 261), we planned to examine the scale's psychometric properties, structural validity, and measurement invariance. However, some of these examinations were not possible because the scale displayed low and mostly non-significant inter-item correlations as well as low item-total correlations. Followingly, exploratory item response theory analyses indicated that the scale's reliability was low, especially for high levels of resistance to framing. This suggests problems with the scale at a basic level of conceptualization, namely that the items may not represent the same content domain. Overall, the scale in its current version is of limited use, at least in university student samples, due to the identified problems. We discuss potential remedies to these problems, as well as provide open code and data ( https://osf.io/j5n6f ) which facilitates testing the scale in other samples (e.g., general population, different languages and countries) to obtain a comprehensive picture of its performance.

The problem with confidence: too much and too little results in poorer achievement, inner conflict, and social inhibition

Introduction

Confidence is defined as the feelings and thoughts people have during a task that result in judgments about their performance. Evidence suggests that confidence is trait-like, but thus far research on the relative match between confidence and accuracy has been primarily restricted to over-confidence effects, and subject to the methodological flaws involved with using difference scores. We sought to answer an exploratory question in this research, whether discrepancies in ability and confidence in either direction reliably predicted individual differences on a broad-spectrum and commercially available personality test, the California Psychological Inventory (CPI260).

Methods

Participants were 220 employed adults who had previously taken the CPI260 for career development purposes. They were invited to complete a measure of cognitive ability and confidence in return for feedback on the same. Data were modeled using polynomial regression and response surface analysis, to determine whether and how CPI260 personality traits were associated with matches or mismatches between accuracy and confidence in the same test.

Results

We identified negative curvilinear effects along the line of disagreement for four CPI260 scales, suggesting that both under- and over-confidence were associated with personality.

Discussion

In contrast to our expectations, individuals who were under-confident and those who were over-confident had lower achievement potential, less social confidence, and more inner conflict than other individuals in this sample. Although preliminary, these findings suggest that both over-confident and under-confident individuals are aware of potential weaknesses that impede their functioning.

"10,000 Available" or "10% Remaining": The Impact of Scarcity Framing on Ticket Availability Perceptions in the Secondary Ticket Market

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of numeracy framing and demand on participants' perceived ticket availability and likelihood of finding a lower-priced deal in the secondary ticket market for National Football League (NFL) games. A total of 640 participants were recruited via Qualtrics where participants were solicited electronically via 10 date-specific email blasts prior to a New York Giants Sunday Night Football home game. Participants were randomly assigned to one of five treatment conditions (control, percentage frame × low demand, percentage frame × high demand, frequency frame × low demand, frequency frame × high demand) to complete an online survey. Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to discern overall differences in the mean likelihood scores of the dependent variable between groups. The results showed that participants presented with the "percentage" frame perceived tickets as less available than those presented with the "frequency scarcity" frame, and the effect was greater for high-demand games. Additionally, game demand moderated the effect of scarcity framing on participants' perceived ticket availability and expected lower rate. Several manipulation checks were applied to ensure the study's validity. The findings of this study have practical implications for ticket marketers in the sport industry to effectively frame scarcity information and facilitate transactions for online buyers and sellers.

The heuristics-and-biases inventory: An open-source tool to explore individual differences in rationality

Over the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in the study of individual differences in how people's judgments and decisions deviate from normative standards. We conducted a systematic review of heuristics-and-biases tasks for which individual differences and their reliability were measured, which resulted in 41 biases measured over 108 studies, and suggested that reliable measures are still needed for some biases described in the literature. To encourage and facilitate future studies on heuristics and biases, we centralized the task materials in an online resource: The Heuristics-and-Biases Inventory (HBI; https://sites.google.com/view/hbiproject). We discuss how this inventory might help research progress on major issues such as the structure of rationality (single vs. multiple factors) and how biases relate to cognitive ability, personality, and real-world outcomes. We also consider how future research should improve and expand the HBI.

Many phish in the C $\mathcal{C}$ : A coexisting-choice-criteria model of security behavior

Normative decision theory proves inadequate for modeling human responses to the social-engineering campaigns of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks. Behavioral decision theory fares better, but still falls short of capturing social-engineering attack vectors which operate through emotions and peripheral-route persuasion. We introduce a generalized decision theory, under which any decision will be made according to one of multiple coexisting choice criteria. We denote the set of possible choice criteria by C $\mathcal {C}$ . Thus, the proposed model reduces to conventional Expected Utility theory when| C EU | = 1 $|\mathcal {C}_{\text{EU}}|=1$ , while Dual-Process (thinking fast vs. thinking slow) decision making corresponds to a model with| C DP | = 2 $|\mathcal {C}_{\text{DP}}|=2$ . We consider a more general case with| C | ≥ 2 $|\mathcal {C}|\ge 2$ , which necessitates careful consideration of how, for a particular choice-task instance, one criterion comes to prevail over others. We operationalize this with a probability distribution that is conditional upon traits of the decisionmaker as well as upon the context and the framing of choice options. Whereas existing signal detection theory (SDT) models of phishing detection commingle the different peripheral-route persuasion pathways, in the present descriptive generalization the different pathways are explicitly identified and represented. A number of implications follow immediately from this formulation, ranging from the conditional nature of security-breach risk to delineation of the prerequisites for valid tests of security training. Moreover, the model explains the "stepping-stone" penetration pattern of APT attacks, which has confounded modeling approaches based on normative rationality.

Poorer decision making among college students during the COVID-19 pandemic: Evidence for "pandemic-brain"

OBJECTIVE

Did living through the COVID-19 pandemic cause healthy college students to experience "pandemic-brain," a phenomenon characterized by difficulties with various cognitive abilities? Did students shift from deliberative to more impulsive decision making?

PARTICIPANTS

We compared a pre-pandemic sample of 722 undergraduate students to 161 undergraduate students recruited in Fall 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

METHOD

We compared scores on the Adult Decision Making Competence scale among participants who completed the task pre-pandemic or across two time points in Fall 2020, during the pandemic.

RESULTS

Decision making was less consistent and more reliant on gain/loss framing during the pandemic compared to pre-pandemic, but college students were no less confident in their decisions. No significant changes in decision making occurred during the pandemic.

CONCLUSIONS

These decision making changes could increase the risk of making an impulsive choice with negative health consequences affecting demands on student health centers and imperiling learning environments.

Individual differences moderate effects in an Unusual Disease paradigm: A psychophysical data collection lab approach and an online experiment

We report two studies investigating individual intuitive-deliberative cognitive-styles and risk-styles as moderators of the framing effect in Tversky and Kahneman's famous Unusual Disease problem setting. We examined framing effects in two ways: counting the number of frame-inconsistent choices and comparing the proportions of risky choices depending on gain-loss framing. Moreover, in addition to gain-loss frames, we systematically varied the number of affected people, probabilities of surviving/dying, type of disease, and response deadlines. Study 1 used a psychophysical data collection approach and a sample of 43 undergraduate students, each performing 480 trials. Study 2 was an online study incorporating psychophysical elements in a social science approach using a larger and more heterogeneous sample, i.e., 262 participants performed 80 trials each. In both studies, the effect of framing on risky choice proportions was moderated by risk-styles. Cognitive-styles measured on different scales moderated the framing effect only in study 2. The effects of disease type, probability of surviving/dying, and number of affected people on risky choice frequencies were also affected by cognitive-styles and risk-styles but different for both studies and to different extents. We found no relationship between the number of frame-inconsistent choices and cognitive-styles or risk-styles, respectively.

Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Its Measurement

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is measured by items that tap the willingness to consider alternative opinions, sensitivity to evidence contradictory to current beliefs, the willingness to postpone closure, and reflective thought. AOT scales are strong predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks and of the avoidance of reasoning traps such as superstitious thinking and belief in conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, AOT is most commonly measured with questionnaires rather than performance indicators. Questionnaire contamination becomes even more of a danger as the AOT concept is expanded into new areas such as the study of fake news, misinformation, ideology, and civic attitudes. We review our 25-year history of studying the AOT concept and developing our own AOT scale. We present a 13-item scale that both is brief and accommodates many previous criticisms and refinements. We include a discussion of why AOT scales are such good predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks. We conclude that it is because such scales tap important processes of cognitive decoupling and decontextualization that modernity increasingly requires. We conclude by discussing the paradox that although AOT scales are potent predictors of performance on most rational thinking tasks, they do not predict the avoidance of myside thinking, even though it is virtually the quintessence of the AOT concept.

Thinking without knowing: Psychological and behavioral consequences of unjustified confidence regarding blackjack strategy

In two studies, we explored potential psychological and behavioral consequences of unjustified confidence, including outcome expectations, anxiety, risk taking, and information search and consideration. Study 1 employed an individual-differences approach to examine how participants' confidence regarding their knowledge of blackjack strategy, controlling for their actual knowledge, correlated with these hypothesized psychological and behavioral variables. Study 2 manipulated participants' confidence levels to examine these effects. Across the two studies, greater unjustified confidence led to larger bets (a measure of risk taking) and reduced use of hints designed to improve play (information search and consideration). Unjustified confidence also increased participants' outcome expectations and lowered anxiety levels. Implications of these findings, such as for educational interventions, are discussed.

Individual Differences in Judgment and Decision-Making: Novel Predictors of Counterproductive Work Behavior

The current paper proposed individual differences in judgment and decision-making (JDM)-namely, the skill associated with recognizing social norms, decision-making styles, and risk-benefit perceptions-as a novel set of predictors of counterproductive work behavior (CWB). We hypothesized that the skill associated with recognizing social norms, rational decision-making style, and perceived riskiness of unethical behavior would be related negatively to CWB, whereas the avoidant decision-making style, spontaneous decision-making style, and perceived benefits of unethical behavior would be related positively to CWB. Moreover, we hypothesized that JDM-focused individual differences would exhibit incremental validity above and beyond the traditional individual difference predictors of CWB (personality, trait affect, and cognitive ability). Results from three independent samples provided strong support for the hypotheses. The strongest predictor of CWB was individual differences in perceived benefits of unethical behavior (meta-analytic correlation across the three samples = .487). This result suggests a simple insight, yet one almost completely missing from the existing CWB literature: People who believe unethical behavior is likely to benefit them will tend to enact more CWB than those who do not. Additionally, across the three samples, the novel JDM-focused individual difference predictors performed well in comparison to the traditional individual difference predictors, suggesting their usefulness to research and practice. We therefore suggest several avenues for future research on JDM-focused individual differences as predictors of CWB. Additionally, vis-à-vis practical implications, we discuss the possibility of using JDM-focused individual differences in employee selection and organizational intervention contexts with the aim of reducing CWB.

Need for cognition moderates the impairment of decision making caused by nightshift work in nurses

The current study explores the effect of nightshift work on the decision-making competence and performance of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and analyzes whether individual differences in the need for cognition (NFC) can moderate this effect. A total of 107 female nurses were recruited to complete the decision-making competence scale and IGT at two times, after a night shift and after a day shift. The results revealed that the IGT scores and decision-making competence of nurses after nightshift work significantly declined, and also that the decrease in decision-making competence was related to the nurses’ performance of the IGT. Additionally, the decreasing degree of IGT and decision-making competence scores of the high-NFC group were significantly lower than those of the low-NFC group after nightshift work. In can be concluded that the decrease in decision-making competence which was related with poor decision-making due to nightshift work. NFC moderated the effect of nightshift work on decision-making.

The Impact of Cognitive Biases on Professionals' Decision-Making: A Review of Four Occupational Areas

The author reviewed the research on the impact of cognitive biases on professionals' decision-making in four occupational areas (management, finance, medicine, and law). Two main findings emerged. First, the literature reviewed shows that a dozen of cognitive biases has an impact on professionals' decisions in these four areas, overconfidence being the most recurrent bias. Second, the level of evidence supporting the claim that cognitive biases impact professional decision-making differs across the areas covered. Research in finance relied primarily upon secondary data while research in medicine and law relied mainly upon primary data from vignette studies (both levels of evidence are found in management). Two research gaps are highlighted. The first one is a potential lack of ecological validity of the findings from vignette studies, which are numerous. The second is the neglect of individual differences in cognitive biases, which might lead to the false idea that all professionals are susceptible to biases, to the same extent. To address that issue, we suggest that reliable, specific measures of cognitive biases need to be improved or developed.

How Fuzzy-trace Theory Predicts Development of Risky Decision Making, with Novel Extensions to Culture and Reward Sensitivity

Comprehensive meta-analyses of risky decision making in children, adolescents, and adults have revealed that age trends in disambiguated laboratory tasks confirmed fuzzy-trace theory's prediction that preference for risk decreases monotonically from childhood to adulthood. These findings are contrary to predictions of dual systems or neurobiological imbalance models. Assumptions about increasing developmental reliance on mental representations of the gist of risky options are essential to account for this developmental trend. However, dual systems theory appropriately emphasizes how cultural context changes behavioral manifestation of risk preferences across age and neurobiological imbalance models appropriately emphasize developmental changes in reward sensitivity. All of the major theories include the assumption of increasing behavioral inhibition. Here, we integrate these theoretical constructs-representation, cultural context, reward sensitivity, and behavioral inhibition-to provide a novel framework for understanding and improving risky decision making in youth. We also discuss the roles of critical tests, scientific falsification, disambiguating assessments of psychological and neurological processes, and the misuse of such concepts as ecological validity and reverse inference. We illustrate these concepts by extending fuzzy-trace theory to explain why youth are a major conduit of viral infections, including the virus that causes COVID-19. We conclude by encouraging behavioral scientists to embrace new ways of thinking about risky decision making that go beyond traditional stereotypes about adolescents and that go beyond conceptualizing ideal decision making as trading off degrees of risk and reward.

Exploring condom use decision-making among adolescents: the synergistic role of affective and rational processes

BACKGROUND

Condom use remains the most effective behavioural method for the prevention of HIV and unplanned pregnancies. However, condom use remains inconsistent among young people. Exploring the condom use decision-making processes that adolescents engage in might provide information that would assist in the prevention of many challenges related to poor sexual and reproductive health outcomes. This study therefore aimed to explore the factors that influenced decision-making about sexual debut and condom use of adolescents from two schools in the Western Cape, South Africa.

METHODS

A sample of 16 adolescents were selected using purposive sampling. Data were collected using semi-structured, individual interviews. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data generated.

RESULTS

The link between sexual debut and affective processes was frequently discussed in condom use decision-making. Decisions about sexual debut were influenced by the belief that sex was a perceived symbol of 'true love' on the one hand, and respect for perceived parental expectations of age-appropriate sex, on the other. Condom use decision-making was shaped by adolescents' concerns about their future and lack of stability in their lives. Adolescents' fears of pregnancy, parenthood and disease shaped their condom use decision-making. It became evident that rational and affective decision-making in condom use choice were not mutually exclusive, but that these processes happened simultaneously.

CONCLUSIONS

The study highlighted the role of affective states as part of the process of examining alternatives when deciding to use a condom or not. Interventions to strengthen condom use decision-making should therefore incorporate not only rational but also affective processes to improve adolescent sexual and reproductive outcomes.

Decision-making in suicidal behavior: A systematic review and meta-analysis

Impaired decision-making (DM) is well-known in suicidal behavior (SB). We aimed to review the evidence on DM and its mediating factors in SB and perform a meta-analysis on DM assessed using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). We conducted a search on databases of papers published on DM and SB up to 2020: 46 studies were included in the systematic review, and 18 in the meta-analysis. For meta-analysis, we compared DM performance between suicide attempters (SAs) and patients (PCs) or healthy controls (HCs). The systematic review showed that SAs have greater difficulties in all DM domains. The meta-analysis found worse IGT performance among SAs in comparison with PCs and HCs. A meta-regression did not find differences for age, gender, psychiatric disorder, and clinical status. Our findings indicate that SAs exhibited deficits in DM under conditions of risk though not ambiguity. Worse DM was independent of age, gender, psychiatric disorder, and suggested that DM impairment could be considered a cognitive trait of suicidal vulnerability, a risk factor and an attribute of SAs.

The association between decision-making skills and subjective decision outcomes among administrative officers in the Swedish Social Insurance Agency

Social insurance administrative officers' decision-making skills influence their efficiency at work and their general well-being. At work their tasks are characterised by complexity and a need for order and accountability. Moreover, cases should usually be handled and finalised within the imposed time frames. We investigated skills related to decision-making success among social insurance officers. In total, 118 administrative officers at the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (66% response rate) responded to questions on scales and measures relating to cognitive-rational, socio-emotional and time approach features of decision-making skill. In addition, they responded to questions on three scales pertaining to outcomes of everyday decisions in terms of subjective everyday difficulties, tendencies to burnout and depressive symptoms. The results showed that cognitive-rational competence was associated with lower reports of subjective everyday difficulties and depressive symptoms and thereby contributed to the explained variance in decision outcomes. Furthermore, socio-emotional and time approach features of decision-making skills contributed to the explanation for subjective everyday difficulties, tendencies to burnout and depressive symptoms. The results corroborate the basic assumption and usefulness of a broad approach in the definition and assessment of decision-making skills in human service professions in general, and of administrative officers in social insurance agencies in particular. Recommendations for future research and the implications of the results are discussed.

An empirical evaluation of tech interventions to improve financial decision-making

Purpose

This paper aims to empirically compare the degree to which two technological interventions, based on the computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL) and the technology acceptance model (TAM), were associated with a different incidence of financial biases.

Design/methodology/approach

The study adopted a quasi-experimental research design. The authors randomly assigned the participants (N = 507) to one of two training conditions or a control group, and in turn, we assessed the incidence of financial biases after the training interventions.

Findings

Participants who took part in the TAM-based group reported lower financial biases than those in the CSCL-based training group and the control group.

Research limitations/implications

Literature suggests that two educational approaches, i.e. the CSCL and the TAM, can implement individuals’ financial decision-making. These educational approaches involve technology to support individuals in reducing the incidence of cognitive biases. This study contributes by advancing empirical evidence on technological supports for interventions to improve financial decision-making.

Practical implications

Suboptimal decision-making may lead to adverse consequences both at the individual and social levels. This paper contributes to the literature on debiasing interventions by offering initial evidence on technological-based interventions in the domain of financial decision-making. The authors discuss the application of this evidence in lifelong training.

Originality/value

This study provides evidence on how different technological interventions are associate with a lower incidence of financial biases.

Gender differences in the risk and protective factors of marijuana use among U.S. College students

Gender differences in the risk and protective factors of marijuana use among college students were explored by analyzing online survey responses from 464 undergraduates. Women perceived higher risk and used marijuana less than men, with no gender difference in peer disapproval. In addition, women had higher objective knowledge regarding the health effects of marijuana, although they exhibited lower confidence in their knowledge. In subsequent regression analyses, health knowledge, confidence in knowledge, perceived risk, and peer disapproval predicted women's marijuana use, whereas only confidence in knowledge and perceived risk predicted men's use. These findings can help devise effective intervention strategies.

The Measurement of Individual Differences in Cognitive Biases: A Review and Improvement

Individual differences have been neglected in decision-making research on heuristics and cognitive biases. Addressing that issue requires having reliable measures. The author first reviewed the research on the measurement of individual differences in cognitive biases. While reliable measures of a dozen biases are currently available, our review revealed that some measures require improvement and measures of other key biases are still lacking (e.g., confirmation bias). We then conducted empirical work showing that adjustments produced a significant improvement of some measures and that confirmation bias can be reliably measured. Overall, our review and findings highlight that the measurement of individual differences in cognitive biases is still in its infancy. In particular, we suggest that contextualized (in addition to generic) measures need to be improved or developed.

Decision-Making Deficits in ADHD Are Not Related to Risk Seeking But to Suboptimal Decision-Making: Meta-Analytical and Novel Experimental Evidence

Objective: ADHD is related to decision-making deficits in real-life (e.g., substance abuse) and on experimental tasks (increased preference for risky options). In most tasks, risk and expected value are confounded (risky options have lowest expected value), making it impossible to disentangle risky from suboptimal (i.e., not choosing highest expected value) decision-making. We differentiated between risky and suboptimal decision-making in ADHD in two studies. Method and Results: First, on a multilevel meta-regression analysis (k = 48, n_ADHD = 1,144, n_Control = 1,108), ADHD and controls differed if the risky option was suboptimal (ADHD choosing more risky/suboptimal), whereas groups performed similar if the risky option was not suboptimal. Second, an empirical study showed that adults with ADHD (n = 40) made more suboptimal, but not more risky choices than controls (n = 40). Conclusion: These results contribute to a growing body of evidence that decision-making deficits in ADHD are driven by suboptimal decision-making and not by risk seeking.

Developmental trajectory classes in psychological dysregulation predict later decision-making competence

Adolescence and emerging adulthood are developmental periods associated with increased risk taking, including alcohol and substance use and antisocial behaviors. Typical psychological growth from adolescence into early adulthood reflects increases in traits related to psychological regulation (e.g., greater emotional stability and less impulsivity), which are typically considered protective factors against risk behaviors. However, individuals may vary greatly in their development of these characteristics. This study examines the degree to which heterogeneity in developmental trajectories of psychological regulation are associated with later performance on decision-making skills battery. In this study, psychological regulation was assessed at age 10-12, with follow-up assessments at 14, 16, and 19 years. At age 19, we administered the Youth Decision-Making Competence (DMC; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) measure. Correlational analyses revealed that lower psychological regulation, as early as age 10, was associated with lower DMC scores. A latent class growth mixture model yielded three distinct developmental trajectory classes of psychological dysregulation: (a) a Moderate-Stable group, a modal class that demonstrated stable and average regulative tendencies throughout adolescence, (b) a Low-Decreasing group, which demonstrated greater self-regulation throughout childhood, and a (c) High-Increasing group, which demonstrated low self-regulative tendencies (higher dysregulation) at age 10 that became increasingly dysregulated throughout adolescence. Individuals in the High-Increasing group demonstrated lower DMC performance than those in the Moderate-Stable and Low-Decreasing groups. Our findings also reinforce past work that indicates considerable individual differences in intra-individual change across adolescence, and that early patterns of psychological dysregulation development can impact later decision-making tendencies.

U.S. College Students' Marijuana Information Sources, Confidence in Knowledge, and Objective Knowledge

In recent years, marijuana use on U.S. college campuses reached the highest point while the perceptions of risk and social disapproval registered the lowest since the early 1980s. However, little attention has been paid to the sources of the marijuana-related messages and their relationships with marijuana knowledge and confidence in knowledge, proximate protective/risk factors. To fill this gap, a convenience sample of students (N = 249) on a campus located in a U.S. recreational marijuana legal state were surveyed to identify their marijuana information sources and explore the relationships among the sources, confidence in marijuana knowledge, and objective knowledge. Peers/media were the most important sources and they were used more than other sources. Use of peers/media sources was related to lower health knowledge and higher confidence in knowledge. Although students named parents and education/science sources as important, these were less frequently used than siblings, the sources they named as the least important. This study advanced our understanding of the various sources of marijuana information used by U.S. college students and the relationships between the information sources and confidence in knowledge and objective knowledge, two emerging risk/protective factors in the era of marijuana deregulation.

The Network Structure of Decision-Making Competence in Chinese Adults

Decision-making competence refers to the ability to make better decisions, as defined by decision-making principles posited by models of rational choice. The adult decision-making competence (A-DMC) scale is a relatively mature evaluation tool used for decision-making competence. However, the A-DMC is yet far from other mature psychological evaluation tools, and especially the structure of A-DMC remains unclear. In the current study, we estimated a regularized partial correlation network of decision-making competence in a Chinese sample consisting of 339 adults who were evaluated by the A-DMC, and then the centrality indicators were calculated. The results revealed that all nodes of the decision-making competence networks are positively associated, except for the association of resistance to framing (RF) and resistance to sunk costs (SC). The strongest edge was between RF and applying decision rules (DR; regularized partial correlation = 0.37). The centrality indicators of RF and applying DR were highest, revealing that these two variables may play important roles in the decision-making competence network. Our study conceptualizes the decision-making competence from network perspectives, so as to provide some insights for future researches.

Comparing fast thinking and slow thinking: The relative benefits of interventions, individual differences, and inferential rules

Research on judgment and decision making has suggested that the System 2 process of slow thinking can help people to improve their decision making by reducing well-established statistical decision biases (including base rate neglect, probability matching, and the conjunction fallacy). In a large pre-registered study with 1,706 participants and 23,292 unique observations, we compare the effects of individual differences and behavioral interventions to test the relative benefits of slow thinking on performance in canonical judgment and decision-making problems, compared to a control condition, a fast thinking condition, an incentive condition, and a condition that combines fast and slow thinking. We also draw on the rule-based reasoning literature to examine the benefits of having access to a simple form of the rule needed to solve a specific focal problem. Overall, we find equivocal evidence of a small benefit from slow thinking, evidence for a small benefit to accuracy incentives, and clear evidence of a larger cost from fast thinking. The difference in performance between fast-thinking and slow-thinking interventions is comparable to a one-scale point difference on the 4-point Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Inferential rules contribute unique explanatory power and interact with individual differences to support the idea that System 2 benefits from a combination of slower processes and knowledge appropriate to the problem.

Decision-Making Competence: More Than Intelligence?

Decision-making competence refers to the ability to make better decisions, as defined by decision-making principles posited by models of rational choice. Historically, psychological research on decision-making has examined how well people follow these principles under carefully manipulated experimental conditions. When individual differences received attention, researchers often assumed that individuals with higher fluid intelligence would perform better. Here, we describe the development and validation of individual-differences measures of decision-making competence. Emerging findings suggest that decision-making competence may tap not only into fluid intelligence but also into motivation, emotion regulation, and experience (or crystallized intelligence). Although fluid intelligence tends to decline with age, older adults may be able to maintain decision-making competence by leveraging age-related improvements in these other skills. We discuss implications for interventions and future research.

Judgment and Decision Making

The science of judgment and decision making involves three interrelated forms of research: analysis of the decisions people face, description of their natural responses, and interventions meant to help them do better. After briefly introducing the field's intellectual foundations, we review recent basic research into the three core elements of decision making: judgment, or how people predict the outcomes that will follow possible choices; preference, or how people weigh those outcomes; and choice, or how people combine judgments and preferences to reach a decision. We then review research into two potential sources of behavioral heterogeneity: individual differences in decision-making competence and developmental changes across the life span. Next, we illustrate applications intended to improve individual and organizational decision making in health, public policy, intelligence analysis, and risk management. We emphasize the potential value of coupling analytical and behavioral research and having basic and applied research inform one another.

The Fatalistic Decision Maker: Time Perspective, Working Memory, and Older Adults' Decision-Making Competence

Prior research indicates that time perspective (TP; views of past, present, and future) is related to decision-making style. By contrast, no prior study considered relations between TP and decision-making competence. We therefore investigated associations between dimensions of the Swedish Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (S-ZTPI) and performance on the Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) battery in a sample of older adults (60–90 years, N = 346). A structural equation model involving four A-DMC components as indicators of a general DMC factor and the six TP dimensions as the predictors revealed a significant negative association between the Present Fatalistic dimension and DMC. Given that age-related differences were apparent in DMC and that Present Fatalistic orientation increased with age, we tested a model by which the age-related differences in DMC were mediated by age-related differences in Present Fatalistic attitudes and in working memory. The results were consistent with full mediation of the age effects, with Present Fatalistic and working memory jointly accounting for a substantial amount of the variance in DMC (51%). The finding that DMC among older adults, in particular more cognitively demanding aspects such as applying decision rules, can be undermined by increased present fatalistic attitudes and declines in working memory is discussed in terms of theoretical frameworks highlighting the contribution of both motivational and cognitive factors to effective decision making.

Validation of Pre-Adolescent Decision-Making Competence in Turkish students

The objective of this study was to adapt the Pre-Adolescent Decision-Making Competence Test to Turkish, which was originally developed in English by Weller, Levin, Rose and Bossard (2012) for assessing decision-making competence of children between the ages of 9 and 14. For this purpose; a) the test and instructions were translated into Turkish, b) the Turkish test was administered to a group of 398 students as a pilot, c) retest was administered to a group of 97 students, and finally, d) a group of 382 students was subject to a norm study. The Confirmatory Factor Analysis model created by the data of the pilot administration was well adapted, and one-factor model was verified for construct validity. As the construct of the test was altered, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis was performed on the data obtained from the norm study. A construct similar to that acquired from the data of the first test administration and the results obtained have even relatively better fit indices. Although the reliability values were less than what was expected, Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of internal consistency was similar to the results obtained from the original test.

Individual and cultural differences in newsvendor decision making

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate cultural and individual differences in newsvendor decision making.

Design/methodology/approach

The online experiment, programmed in the PHP scripting language, had 107 participants: local managers of four large, well-known and supply chain–intensive firms in China (Lenovo, Shenhua, CMST and GM).

Findings

The authors find that, as compared with American subjects, Chinese subjects engage in more demand chasing, order quantities that are closer to the mean demand, have a lower expected profit and exhibit greater variance in order quantities. However, these observations may not hold when the cross-cultural comparison is conducted for each pair of ethnic subgroups whose members have the same cognitive reflection test score, a measure of individual differences. Moreover, cultural differences also affect how individual differences manifest in newsvendor decisions.

Practical implications

The authors findings have important implications for employee selection, training and management in any cross-cultural business environment.

Originality/value

Little attention has been paid, in the behavioural operations literature, to individual differences and how they interact with culture. This paper is the first to examine the interaction effects of cultural and individual differences in newsvendor decisions, and it highlights an important research area that is currently understudied in operations management.

Accounting for Individual Differences in Decision-Making Competence: Personality and Gender Differences

Emerging research has highlighted the utility of measuring individual differences in decision-making competence (DMC), showing that consistently following normatively rational principles is associated with positive psychosocial and health behaviors. From another level of analysis, functional theories of personality suggest that broad trait dimensions represent variation in underlying self-regulatory systems, providing a mechanistic account for robust associations between traits and similar life outcomes. Yet, the degree to which broad dispositional personality dimensions predict global tendencies to respond rationally is less understood. In a large online community sample (N = 804), we tested the associations between HEXACO personality dimensions, a 6-factor structural trait model, and a subset of DMC indicators (Applying Decision Rules, Resistance to Framing, Recognizing Social Norms, and Consistency in Risk Perception). Additionally, we examined gender differences across the DMC, first considering the potential for measurement non-invariance across groups for the DMC. We observed partial measurement invariance between men and women; only the Applying Decision Rules scale showed evidence of differential functioning across groups. Controlling for these differences, analyses revealed that higher Conscientiousness, Honesty/Humility, and Openness were associated with higher DMC scores. In contrast, Emotionality and Extraversion demonstrated gender-specific associations. Specifically, low Extraversion was associated with higher DMC scores for men, whereas higher Emotionality was associated with higher DMC scores for women. Our results suggest that traits related to self-regulatory functions of cognitive and behavioral control, and cognitive flexibility are associated with an increased tendency to engage in rational thought.

Measuring Subjective Probabilities: The Effect of Response Mode on the Use of Focal Responses, Validity, and Respondents' Evaluations

Subjective probabilities are central to risk assessment, decision making, and risk communication efforts. Surveys measuring probability judgments have traditionally used open-ended response modes, asking participants to generate a response between 0% and 100%. A typical finding is the seemingly excessive use of 50%, perhaps as an expression of "I don't know." In an online survey with a nationally representative sample of the Dutch population, we examined the effect of response modes on the use of 50% and other focal responses, predictive validity, and respondents' survey evaluations. Respondents assessed the probability of dying, getting the flu, and experiencing other health-related events. They were randomly assigned to a traditional open-ended response mode, a visual linear scale ranging from 0% to 100%, or a version of that visual linear scale on which a magnifier emerged after clicking on it. We found that, compared to the open-ended response mode, the visual linear and magnifier scale each reduced the use of 50%, 0%, and 100% responses, especially among respondents with low numeracy. Responses given with each response mode were valid, in terms of significant correlations with health behavior and outcomes. Where differences emerged, the visual scales seemed to have slightly better validity than the open-ended response mode. Both high-numerate and low-numerate respondents' evaluations of the surveys were highest for the visual linear scale. Our results have implications for subjective probability elicitation and survey design.

Sensitivity to "sunk costs" in mice, rats, and humans

Sunk costs are irrecoverable investments that should not influence decisions, because decisions should be made on the basis of expected future consequences. Both human and nonhuman animals can show sensitivity to sunk costs, but reports from across species are inconsistent. In a temporal context, a sensitivity to sunk costs arises when an individual resists ending an activity, even if it seems unproductive, because of the time already invested. In two parallel foraging tasks that we designed, we found that mice, rats, and humans show similar sensitivities to sunk costs in their decision-making. Unexpectedly, sensitivity to time invested accrued only after an initial decision had been made. These findings suggest that sensitivity to temporal sunk costs lies in a vulnerability distinct from deliberation processes and that this distinction is present across species.

Validation of Adult Decision-Making Competence in Chinese college students

The present study was conducted to validate the Chinese version of the Adult Decision-Making Competence scale. 364 college students were recruited from four universities in China. The results indicate the Chinese Adult Decision-Making Competence subscales have good internal consistency and the two-factor structure in the study of Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) was confirmed. Gender differences were found in Resistance to Sunk Cost. Differences of Applying Decision Rules and Consistency in Risk Perception were found between participants with different education background. Overall, the Chinese Adult Decision-Making Competence scale is validated in China.

Robustness of Decision-Making Competence: Evidence from two measures and an 11-year longitudinal study

Decision-making competence is the ability to follow normative principles when making decisions. In a longitudinal analysis, we examine the robustness of decision-making competence over time, as measured by two batteries of paper-and-pencil tasks. Participants completed the youth version (Y-DMC) at age 19 and/or the adult version (A-DMC) eleven years later at age 30, as part of a larger longitudinal study. Both measures are comprised of tasks adapted from ones used in experimental studies of decision-making skills. Results supported the robustness of these measures and the usefulness of the construct. Response patterns for Y-DMC were similar to those observed with a smaller initial sample drawn from the same population. Response patterns for A-DMC were similar to those observed with an earlier community sample. Y-DMC and A-DMC were significantly correlated, for participants who completed both measures, 11 years apart, even after controlling for measures of cognitive ability. Nomological validity was observed in correlations of scores on both tests with measures of cognitive ability, cognitive style, and environmental factors with predicted relationships to decision-making competence, including household SES, neighborhood disadvantage, and paternal substance abuse. Higher Y-DMC and A-DMC scores were also associated with lower rates of potentially risky and antisocial behaviors, including adolescent delinquency, cannabis use, and early sexual behavior. Thus, the Y-DMC and A-DMC measures appear to capture a relatively stable, measurable construct that increases with supportive environmental factors and is associated with constructive behaviors.

Decision-Making Competence, Social Orientation, Time Style, and Perceived Stress

Peoples' decision-making competence, defined as tendency to follow normative rational principles in their decision making, is important as it may influence the extent that requirements are met and levels of perceived stress. In addition, perceived stress could be influenced by social orientation and time style; for example, decisions need to comply with given deadlines and the expectations of others. In two studies, with students (n = 118) and professionals (police investigators, n = 90), we examined how the three individual difference features: decision-making competence, social orientation, and time approach relate to perceived stress. Results showed that social orientation and time approach were related to levels of perceived stress, but decision-making competence was not. These results indicate that social orientation and time approach are important to consider in relation to perceived stress, but the role of decision-making competence may be less important for perceived stress. However, the role of decision-making competence for perceived stress needs to be further researched.

Neural Oscillation Correlates Chemistry Decision-Making

This study explored the electroencephalography (EEG) dynamics during a chemistry-related decision-making task and further examined whether the correctness of the decision-making performance could be reflected by EEG activity. A total of 66 undergraduate students’ EEG were collected while they participated in a chemistry-related decision-making task in which they had to retrieve the relevant chemistry concepts in order to make correct decisions for each task item. The results showed that it was only in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) cluster that distinct patterns in EEG dynamics were displayed for the correct and incorrect responses. The logistic regression results indicated that ACC theta power from 300[Formula: see text]ms to 250[Formula: see text]ms before stimulus onset was the most informative factor for estimating the likelihood of making correct decisions in the chemistry-related decision-making task, while it was the ACC low beta power from 150[Formula: see text]ms to 250[Formula: see text]ms after stimulus onset. The results suggested that the ACC theta augmentation before the stimulus onset serves to actively maintain the relevant information for retrieval from long-term memory, while the ACC low beta augmentation after the stimulus onset may serve the function of mapping the encoded stimulus onto the relevant criteria that the given participant has held within his or her mind to guide the decision-making responses.

Thinking dynamics and individual differences: Mouse-tracking analysis of the denominator neglect task

Most decision-making models describing individual differences in heuristics and biases tasks build on the assumption that reasoners produce a first incorrect answer in a quick, automatic way which they may or may not override later and that the advantage of high capacity reasoners arises from this late correction mechanism. To investigate this assumption, we developed a mouse-tracking analysis technique to capture individuals’ first answers and subsequent thinking dynamics. Across two denominator neglect task experiments, we observed that individuals initially move the mouse cursor towards the correct answer option in a substantial number of cases suggesting that reasoners may not always produce an incorrect answer first. Furthermore, we observed that, compared to low capacity reasoners, high capacity individuals revise their first answer more frequently if it is incorrect and make fewer changes if it is correct. However, we did not find evidence that high capacity individuals produce correct initial answers more frequently. Consistent with the predictions of previous decision-making models, these results suggest that in the denominator neglect task the capacity-normativity relationship arises after the initial response is formulated. The present work demonstrates how the analysis of mouse trajectories can be utilized to investigate individual differences in decision-making and help us better apprehend the dynamics of thinking behind decision biases.