Resource-rational decision making

Contextualizing predictive minds

The structure of human memory seems to be optimized for efficient prediction, planning, and behavior. We propose that these capacities rely on a tripartite structure of memory that includes concepts, events, and contexts-three layers that constitute the mental world model. We suggest that the mechanism that critically increases adaptivity and flexibility is the tendency to contextualize. This tendency promotes local, context-encoding abstractions, which focus event- and concept-based planning and inference processes on the task and situation at hand. As a result, cognitive contextualization offers a solution to the frame problem-the need to select relevant features of the environment from the rich stream of sensorimotor signals. We draw evidence for our proposal from developmental psychology and neuroscience. Adopting a computational stance, we present evidence from cognitive modeling research which suggests that context sensitivity is a feature that is critical for maximizing the efficiency of cognitive processes. Finally, we turn to recent deep-learning architectures which independently demonstrate how context-sensitive memory can emerge in a self-organized learning system constrained by cognitively-inspired inductive biases.

Bounded Rational Decision Networks With Belief Propagation

Complex information processing systems that are capable of a wide variety of tasks, such as the human brain, are composed of specialized units that collaborate and communicate with each other. An important property of such information processing networks is locality: there is no single global unit controlling the modules, but information is exchanged locally. Here, we consider a decision-theoretic approach to study networks of bounded rational decision makers that are allowed to specialize and communicate with each other. In contrast to previous work that has focused on feedforward communication between decision-making agents, we consider cyclical information processing paths allowing for back-and-forth communication. We adapt message-passing algorithms to suit this purpose, essentially allowing for local information flow between units and thus enabling circular dependency structures. We provide examples that show how repeated communication can increase performance given that each unit's information processing capability is limited and that decision-making systems with too few or too many connections and feedback loops achieve suboptimal utility.

Exposure to detectable inaccuracies makes children more diligent fact-checkers of novel claims

How do children decide when to believe a claim? Here we show that children fact-check claims more and are better able to catch misinformation when they have been exposed to detectable inaccuracies. In two experiments (N = 122), 4-7-year-old children exposed to falsity (as opposed to all true information) sampled more evidence before verifying a test claim in a novel domain. Children's evidentiary standards were graded: fact-checking increased with higher proportions of false statements heard during exposure. A simulation suggests that children's behaviour is adaptive, because increased fact-checking in more dubious environments supports the discovery of potential misinformation. Importantly, children were least diligent at fact-checking a new claim when all prior information was true, suggesting that sanitizing children's informational environments may inadvertently dampen their natural scepticism. Instead, these findings support the counterintuitive possibility that exposing children to some nonsense may scaffold vigilance towards more subtle misinformation in the future.

Humans flexibly integrate social information despite interindividual differences in reward

There has been much progress in understanding human social learning, including recent studies integrating social information into the reinforcement learning framework. Yet previous studies often assume identical payoffs between observer and demonstrator, overlooking the diversity of social information in real-world interactions. We address this gap by introducing a socially correlated bandit task that accommodates payoff differences among participants, allowing for the study of social learning under more realistic conditions. Our Social Generalization (SG) model, tested through evolutionary simulations and two online experiments, outperforms existing models by incorporating social information into the generalization process, but treating it as noisier than individual observations. Our findings suggest that human social learning is more flexible than previously believed, with the SG model indicating a potential resource-rational trade-off where social learning partially replaces individual exploration. This research highlights the flexibility of humans' social learning, allowing us to integrate social information from others with different preferences, skills, or goals.

(Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia

Humans need to be on their toes when interacting with competitive others to avoid being taken advantage of. Too much caution out of context can, however, be detrimental and produce false beliefs of intended harm. Here, we offer a formal account of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind. We simulate agents of different depths of mentalizing within a simple game theoretic paradigm and show how, if aligned well, deep recursive mentalization gives rise to both successful deception as well as reasonable skepticism. However, we also show that if a self is mentalizing too deeply - hyper-mentalizing - false beliefs arise that a partner is trying to trick them maliciously, resulting in a material loss to the self. Importantly, we show that this is only true when hypermentalizing agents believe observed actions are generated intentionally. This theory offers a potential cognitive mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial ideation. Rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may arise from the application of overly strategic thinking to ingenuous behaviour.

Author Summary

Interacting competitively requires vigilance to avoid deception. However, excessive caution can have adverse effects, stemming from false beliefs of intentional harm. So far there is no formal cognitive account of what may cause this suspiciousness. Here we present an examination of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind - the cognitive ability to consider the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others. By simulating interacting computer agents we illustrate how well-aligned agents can give rise to successful deception and justified skepticism. Crucially, we also reveal that overly cautious agents develop false beliefs that an ingenuous partner is attempting malicious trickery, leading to tangible losses. As well as formally defining a plausible mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial thinking, our theory indicates that rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may involve an over-application of strategy to genuine behaviour.

Reward prediction error neurons implement an efficient code for reward

We use efficient coding principles borrowed from sensory neuroscience to derive the optimal neural population to encode a reward distribution. We show that the responses of dopaminergic reward prediction error neurons in mouse and macaque are similar to those of the efficient code in the following ways: the neurons have a broad distribution of midpoints covering the reward distribution; neurons with higher thresholds have higher gains, more convex tuning functions and lower slopes; and their slope is higher when the reward distribution is narrower. Furthermore, we derive learning rules that converge to the efficient code. The learning rule for the position of the neuron on the reward axis closely resembles distributional reinforcement learning. Thus, reward prediction error neuron responses may be optimized to broadcast an efficient reward signal, forming a connection between efficient coding and reinforcement learning, two of the most successful theories in computational neuroscience.

Rare and extreme outcomes in risky choice

Many real-world decisions involving rare events also involve extreme outcomes. Despite this confluence, decisions-from-experience research has only examined the impact of rarity and extremity in isolation. With rare events, people typically choose as if they underestimate the probability of a rare outcome happening. Separately, people typically overestimate the probability of an extreme outcome happening. Here, for the first time, we examine the confluence of these two biases in decisions-from-experience. In a between-groups behavioural experiment, we examine people's risk preferences for rare extreme outcomes and for rare non-extreme outcomes. When outcomes are both rare and extreme, people's risk preferences shift away from traditional risk patterns for rare events: they show reduced underweighting for events that are both rare and extreme. We simulate these results using a small-sample model of decision-making that accounts for both the underweighting of rare events and the overweighting of extreme events. These separable influences on risk preferences suggest that to understand real-world risk for rare events we must also consider the extremity of the outcomes.

Applying Generative Artificial Intelligence to cognitive models of decision making

Introduction

Generative Artificial Intelligence has made significant impacts in many fields, including computational cognitive modeling of decision making, although these applications have not yet been theoretically related to each other. This work introduces a categorization of applications of Generative Artificial Intelligence to cognitive models of decision making.

Methods

This categorization is used to compare the existing literature and to provide insight into the design of an ablation study to evaluate our proposed model in three experimental paradigms. These experiments used for model comparison involve modeling human learning and decision making based on both visual information and natural language, in tasks that vary in realism and complexity. This comparison of applications takes as its basis Instance-Based Learning Theory, a theory of experiential decision making from which many models have emerged and been applied to a variety of domains and applications.

Results

The best performing model from the ablation we performed used a generative model to both create memory representations as well as predict participant actions. The results of this comparison demonstrates the importance of generative models in both forming memories and predicting actions in decision-modeling research.

Discussion

In this work, we present a model that integrates generative and cognitive models, using a variety of stimuli, applications, and training methods. These results can provide guidelines for cognitive modelers and decision making researchers interested in integrating Generative AI into their methods.

Bayesian Reinforcement Learning With Limited Cognitive Load

All biological and artificial agents must act given limits on their ability to acquire and process information. As such, a general theory of adaptive behavior should be able to account for the complex interactions between an agent's learning history, decisions, and capacity constraints. Recent work in computer science has begun to clarify the principles that shape these dynamics by bridging ideas from reinforcement learning, Bayesian decision-making, and rate-distortion theory. This body of work provides an account of capacity-limited Bayesian reinforcement learning, a unifying normative framework for modeling the effect of processing constraints on learning and action selection. Here, we provide an accessible review of recent algorithms and theoretical results in this setting, paying special attention to how these ideas can be applied to studying questions in the cognitive and behavioral sciences.

Human decision making balances reward maximization and policy compression

Policy compression is a computational framework that describes how capacity-limited agents trade reward for simpler action policies to reduce cognitive cost. In this study, we present behavioral evidence that humans prefer simpler policies, as predicted by a capacity-limited reinforcement learning model. Across a set of tasks, we find that people exploit structure in the relationships between states, actions, and rewards to "compress" their policies. In particular, compressed policies are systematically biased towards actions with high marginal probability, thereby discarding some state information. This bias is greater when there is redundancy in the reward-maximizing action policy across states, and increases with memory load. These results could not be explained qualitatively or quantitatively by models that did not make use of policy compression under a capacity limit. We also confirmed the prediction that time pressure should further reduce policy complexity and increase action bias, based on the hypothesis that actions are selected via time-dependent decoding of a compressed code. These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how humans adapt their decision-making strategies under cognitive resource constraints.

Political reinforcement learners

Politics can seem home to the most calculating and yet least rational elements of humanity. How might we systematically characterize this spectrum of political cognition? Here, we propose reinforcement learning (RL) as a unified framework to dissect the political mind. RL describes how agents algorithmically navigate complex and uncertain domains like politics. Through this computational lens, we outline three routes to political differences, stemming from variability in agents' conceptions of a problem, the cognitive operations applied to solve the problem, or the backdrop of information available from the environment. A computational vantage on maladies of the political mind offers enhanced precision in assessing their causes, consequences, and cures.

Active reinforcement learning versus action bias and hysteresis: control with a mixture of experts and nonexperts

Active reinforcement learning enables dynamic prediction and control, where one should not only maximize rewards but also minimize costs such as of inference, decisions, actions, and time. For an embodied agent such as a human, decisions are also shaped by physical aspects of actions. Beyond the effects of reward outcomes on learning processes, to what extent can modeling of behavior in a reinforcement-learning task be complicated by other sources of variance in sequential action choices? What of the effects of action bias (for actions per se) and action hysteresis determined by the history of actions chosen previously? The present study addressed these questions with incremental assembly of models for the sequential choice data from a task with hierarchical structure for additional complexity in learning. With systematic comparison and falsification of computational models, human choices were tested for signatures of parallel modules representing not only an enhanced form of generalized reinforcement learning but also action bias and hysteresis. We found evidence for substantial differences in bias and hysteresis across participants-even comparable in magnitude to the individual differences in learning. Individuals who did not learn well revealed the greatest biases, but those who did learn accurately were also significantly biased. The direction of hysteresis varied among individuals as repetition or, more commonly, alternation biases persisting from multiple previous actions. Considering that these actions were button presses with trivial motor demands, the idiosyncratic forces biasing sequences of action choices were robust enough to suggest ubiquity across individuals and across tasks requiring various actions. In light of how bias and hysteresis function as a heuristic for efficient control that adapts to uncertainty or low motivation by minimizing the cost of effort, these phenomena broaden the consilient theory of a mixture of experts to encompass a mixture of expert and nonexpert controllers of behavior.

Rationality, preferences, and emotions with biological constraints: it all starts from our senses

Is the role of our sensory systems to represent the physical world as accurately as possible? If so, are our preferences and emotions, often deemed irrational, decoupled from these 'ground-truth' sensory experiences? We show why the answer to both questions is 'no'. Brain function is metabolically costly, and the brain loses some fraction of the information that it encodes and transmits. Therefore, if brains maximize objective functions that increase the fitness of their species, they should adapt to the objective-maximizing rules of the environment at the earliest stages of sensory processing. Consequently, observed 'irrationalities', preferences, and emotions stem from the necessity for our early sensory systems to adapt and process information while considering the metabolic costs and internal states of the organism.

What's in a sample? Epistemic uncertainty and metacognitive awareness in risk taking

In a fundamentally uncertain world, sound information processing is a prerequisite for effective behavior. Given that information processing is subject to inevitable cognitive imprecision, decision makers should adapt to this imprecision and to the resulting epistemic uncertainty when taking risks. We tested this metacognitive ability in two experiments in which participants estimated the expected value of different number distributions from sequential samples and then bet on their own estimation accuracy. Results show that estimates were imprecise, and this imprecision increased with higher distributional standard deviations. Importantly, participants adapted their risk-taking behavior to this imprecision and hence deviated from the predictions of Bayesian models of uncertainty that assume perfect integration of information. To explain these results, we developed a computational model that combines Bayesian updating with a metacognitive awareness of cognitive imprecision in the integration of information. Modeling results were robust to the inclusion of an empirical measure of participants' perceived variability. In sum, we show that cognitive imprecision is crucial to understanding risk taking in decisions from experience. The results further demonstrate the importance of metacognitive awareness as a cognitive building block for adaptive behavior under (partial) uncertainty.

Computational Social Psychology

Social psychologists attempt to explain how we interact by appealing to basic principles of how we think. To make good on this ambition, they are increasingly relying on an interconnected set of formal tools that model inference, attribution, value-guided decision making, and multi-agent interactions. By reviewing progress in each of these areas and highlighting the connections between them, we can better appreciate the structure of social thought and behavior, while also coming to understand when, why, and how formal tools can be useful for social psychologists.

Wayfinding across ocean and tundra: what traditional cultures teach us about navigation

Research on human navigation by psychologists and neuroscientists has come mainly from a limited range of environments and participants inhabiting western countries. By contrast, numerous anthropological accounts illustrate the diverse ways in which cultures adapt to their surrounding environment to navigate. Here, we provide an overview of these studies and relate them to cognitive science research. The diversity of cues in traditional navigation is much higher and multimodal compared with navigation experiments in the laboratory. It typically involves an integrated system of methods, drawing on a detailed understanding of the environmental cues, specific tools, and forms part of a broader cultural system. We highlight recent methodological developments for measuring navigation skill and modelling behaviour that will aid future research into how culture and environment shape human navigation.

An Information-Theoretic Account of Availability Effects in Language Production

I present a computational-level model of language production in terms of a combination of information theory and control theory in which words are chosen incrementally in order to maximize communicative value subject to an information-theoretic capacity constraint. The theory generally predicts a tradeoff between ease of production and communicative accuracy. I apply the theory to two cases of apparent availability effects in language production, in which words are selected on the basis of their accessibility to a speaker who has not yet perfectly planned the rest of the utterance. Using corpus data on English relative clause complementizer dropping and experimental data on Mandarin noun classifier choice, I show that the theory reproduces the observed phenomena, providing an alternative account to Uniform Information Density and a promising general model of language production which is tightly linked to emerging theories in computational neuroscience.

Toward a General Framework of Biased Reasoning: Coherence-Based Reasoning

A considerable amount of experimental research has been devoted to uncovering biased forms of reasoning. Notwithstanding the richness and overall empirical soundness of the bias research, the field can be described as disjointed, incomplete, and undertheorized. In this article, we seek to address this disconnect by offering "coherence-based reasoning" as a parsimonious theoretical framework that explains a sizable number of important deviations from normative forms of reasoning. Represented in connectionist networks and processed through constraint-satisfaction processing, coherence-based reasoning serves as a ubiquitous, essential, and overwhelmingly adaptive apparatus in people's mental toolbox. This adaptive process, however, can readily be overrun by bias when the network is dominated by nodes or links that are incorrect, overweighted, or otherwise nonnormative. We apply this framework to explain a variety of well-established biased forms of reasoning, including confirmation bias, the halo effect, stereotype spillovers, hindsight bias, motivated reasoning, emotion-driven reasoning, ideological reasoning, and more.

Developmental changes in exploration resemble stochastic optimization

Human development is often described as a 'cooling off' process, analogous to stochastic optimization algorithms that implement a gradual reduction in randomness over time. Yet there is ambiguity in how to interpret this analogy, due to a lack of concrete empirical comparisons. Using data from n = 281 participants ages 5 to 55, we show that cooling off does not only apply to the single dimension of randomness. Rather, human development resembles an optimization process of multiple learning parameters, for example, reward generalization, uncertainty-directed exploration and random temperature. Rapid changes in parameters occur during childhood, but these changes plateau and converge to efficient values in adulthood. We show that while the developmental trajectory of human parameters is strikingly similar to several stochastic optimization algorithms, there are important differences in convergence. None of the optimization algorithms tested were able to discover reliably better regions of the strategy space than adult participants on this task.

An information-theoretic approach to the typology of spatial demonstratives

We explore systems of spatial deictic words (such as 'here' and 'there') from the perspective of communicative efficiency using typological data from over 200 languages Nintemann et al. (2020). We argue from an information-theoretic perspective that spatial deictic systems balance informativity and complexity in the sense of the Information Bottleneck (Zaslavsky et al., (2018). We find that under an appropriate choice of cost function and need probability over meanings, among all the 21,146 theoretically possible spatial deictic systems, those adopted by real languages lie near an efficient frontier of informativity and complexity. Moreover, we find that the conditions that the need probability and the cost function need to satisfy for this result are consistent with the cognitive science literature on spatial cognition, especially regarding the source-goal asymmetry. We further show that the typological data are better explained by introducing a notion of consistency into the Information Bottleneck framework, which is jointly optimized along with informativity and complexity.

Worth the Work? Monkeys Discount Rewards by a Subjective Adapting Effort Cost

All life must solve how to allocate limited energy resources to maximize benefits from scarce opportunities. Economic theory posits decision makers optimize choice by maximizing the subjective benefit (utility) of reward minus the subjective cost (disutility) of the required effort. While successful in many settings, this model does not fully account for how experience can alter reward-effort trade-offs. Here, we test how well the subtractive model of effort disutility explains the behavior of two male nonhuman primates (Macaca mulatta) in a binary choice task in which reward quantity and physical effort to obtain were varied. Applying random utility modeling to independently estimate reward utility and effort disutility, we show the subtractive effort model better explains out-of-sample choice behavior when compared with parabolic and exponential effort discounting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that effort disutility depends on previous experience of effort: in analogy to work from behavioral labor economics, we develop a model of reference-dependent effort disutility to explain the increased willingness to expend effort following previous experience of effortful options in a session. The result of this analysis suggests that monkeys discount reward by an effort cost that is measured relative to an expected effort learned from previous trials. When this subjective cost of effort, a function of context and experience, is accounted for, trial-by-trial choices can be explained by the subtractive cost model of effort. Therefore, in searching for net utility signals that may underpin effort-based decision-making in the brain, careful measurement of subjective effort costs is an essential first step.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT All decision-makers need to consider how much effort they need to expend when evaluating potential options. Economic theories suggest that the optimal way to choose is by cost-benefit analysis of reward against effort. To be able to do this efficiently over many decision contexts, this needs to be done flexibly, with appropriate adaptation to context and experience. Therefore, in aiming to understand how this might be achieved in the brain, it is important to first carefully measure the subjective cost of effort. Here, we show monkeys make reward-effort cost-benefit decisions, subtracting the subjective cost of effort from the subjective value of rewards. Moreover, the subjective cost of effort is dependent on the monkeys' experience of effort in previous trials.

Information-theoretic principles in incremental language production

I apply a recently emerging perspective on the complexity of action selection, the rate-distortion theory of control, to provide a computational-level model of errors and difficulties in human language production, which is grounded in information theory and control theory. Language production is cast as the sequential selection of actions to achieve a communicative goal subject to a capacity constraint on cognitive control. In a series of calculations, simulations, corpus analyses, and comparisons to experimental data, I show that the model directly predicts some of the major known qualitative and quantitative phenomena in language production, including semantic interference and predictability effects in word choice; accessibility-based ("easy-first") production preferences in word order alternations; and the existence and distribution of disfluencies including filled pauses, corrections, and false starts. I connect the rate-distortion view to existing models of human language production, to probabilistic models of semantics and pragmatics, and to proposals for controlled language generation in the machine learning and reinforcement learning literature.

Not Playing by the Rules: Exploratory Play, Rational Action, and Efficient Search

Recent studies suggest children's exploratory play is consistent with formal accounts of rational learning. Here we focus on the tension between this view and a nearly ubiquitous feature of human play: In play, people subvert normal utility functions, incurring seemingly unnecessary costs to achieve arbitrary rewards. We show that four-and-five-year-old children not only infer playful behavior from observed violations of rational action (Experiment 1), but themselves take on unnecessary costs during both retrieval (Experiment 2) and search (Experiments 3A-B) tasks, despite acting efficiently in non-playful, instrumental contexts. We discuss the value of such apparently utility-violating behavior and why it might serve learning in the long run.

Strategically managing learning during perceptual decision making

Making optimal decisions in the face of noise requires balancing short-term speed and accuracy. But a theory of optimality should account for the fact that short-term speed can influence long-term accuracy through learning. Here, we demonstrate that long-term learning is an important dynamical dimension of the speed-accuracy trade-off. We study learning trajectories in rats and formally characterize these dynamics in a theory expressed as both a recurrent neural network and an analytical extension of the drift-diffusion model that learns over time. The model reveals that choosing suboptimal response times to learn faster sacrifices immediate reward, but can lead to greater total reward. We empirically verify predictions of the theory, including a relationship between stimulus exposure and learning speed, and a modulation of reaction time by future learning prospects. We find that rats' strategies approximately maximize total reward over the full learning epoch, suggesting cognitive control over the learning process.

Contextual inference in learning and memory

Context is widely regarded as a major determinant of learning and memory across numerous domains, including classical and instrumental conditioning, episodic memory, economic decision-making, and motor learning. However, studies across these domains remain disconnected due to the lack of a unifying framework formalizing the concept of context and its role in learning. Here, we develop a unified vernacular allowing direct comparisons between different domains of contextual learning. This leads to a Bayesian model positing that context is unobserved and needs to be inferred. Contextual inference then controls the creation, expression, and updating of memories. This theoretical approach reveals two distinct components that underlie adaptation, proper and apparent learning, respectively referring to the creation and updating of memories versus time-varying adjustments in their expression. We review a number of extensions of the basic Bayesian model that allow it to account for increasingly complex forms of contextual learning.

Humans account for cognitive costs when finding shortcuts: An information-theoretic analysis of navigation

When faced with navigating back somewhere we have been before we might either retrace our steps or seek a shorter path. Both choices have costs. Here, we ask whether it is possible to characterize formally the choice of navigational plans as a bounded rational process that trades off the quality of the plan (e.g., its length) and the cognitive cost required to find and implement it. We analyze the navigation strategies of two groups of people that are firstly trained to follow a "default policy" taking a route in a virtual maze and then asked to navigate to various known goal destinations, either in the way they want ("Go To Goal") or by taking novel shortcuts ("Take Shortcut"). We address these wayfinding problems using InfoRL: an information-theoretic approach that formalizes the cognitive cost of devising a navigational plan, as the informational cost to deviate from a well-learned route (the "default policy"). In InfoRL, optimality refers to finding the best trade-off between route length and the amount of control information required to find it. We report five main findings. First, the navigational strategies automatically identified by InfoRL correspond closely to different routes (optimal or suboptimal) in the virtual reality map, which were annotated by hand in previous research. Second, people deliberate more in places where the value of investing cognitive resources (i.e., relevant goal information) is greater. Third, compared to the group of people who receive the "Go To Goal" instruction, those who receive the "Take Shortcut" instruction find shorter but less optimal solutions, reflecting the intrinsic difficulty of finding optimal shortcuts. Fourth, those who receive the "Go To Goal" instruction modulate flexibly their cognitive resources, depending on the benefits of finding the shortcut. Finally, we found a surprising amount of variability in the choice of navigational strategies and resource investment across participants. Taken together, these results illustrate the benefits of using InfoRL to address navigational planning problems from a bounded rational perspective.

EEG-representational geometries and psychometric distortions in approximate numerical judgment

When judging the average value of sample stimuli (e.g., numbers) people tend to either over- or underweight extreme sample values, depending on task context. In a context of overweighting, recent work has shown that extreme sample values were overly represented also in neural signals, in terms of an anti-compressed geometry of number samples in multivariate electroencephalography (EEG) patterns. Here, we asked whether neural representational geometries may also reflect a relative underweighting of extreme values (i.e., compression) which has been observed behaviorally in a great variety of tasks. We used a simple experimental manipulation (instructions to average a single-stream or to compare dual-streams of samples) to induce compression or anti-compression in behavior when participants judged rapid number sequences. Model-based representational similarity analysis (RSA) replicated the previous finding of neural anti-compression in the dual-stream task, but failed to provide evidence for neural compression in the single-stream task, despite the evidence for compression in behavior. Instead, the results indicated enhanced neural processing of extreme values in either task, regardless of whether extremes were over- or underweighted in subsequent behavioral choice. We further observed more general differences in the neural representation of the sample information between the two tasks. Together, our results indicate a mismatch between sample-level EEG geometries and behavior, which raises new questions about the origin of common psychometric distortions, such as diminishing sensitivity for larger values.

Tracking human skill learning with a hierarchical Bayesian sequence model

Humans can implicitly learn complex perceptuo-motor skills over the course of large numbers of trials. This likely depends on our becoming better able to take advantage of ever richer and temporally deeper predictive relationships in the environment. Here, we offer a novel characterization of this process, fitting a non-parametric, hierarchical Bayesian sequence model to the reaction times of human participants' responses over ten sessions, each comprising thousands of trials, in a serial reaction time task involving higher-order dependencies. The model, adapted from the domain of language, forgetfully updates trial-by-trial, and seamlessly combines predictive information from shorter and longer windows onto past events, weighing the windows proportionally to their predictive power. As the model implies a posterior over window depths, we were able to determine how, and how many, previous sequence elements influenced individual participants' internal predictions, and how this changed with practice. Already in the first session, the model showed that participants had begun to rely on two previous elements (i.e., trigrams), thereby successfully adapting to the most prominent higher-order structure in the task. The extent to which local statistical fluctuations in trigram frequency influenced participants' responses waned over subsequent sessions, as participants forgot the trigrams less and evidenced skilled performance. By the eighth session, a subset of participants shifted their prior further to consider a context deeper than two previous elements. Finally, participants showed resistance to interference and slow forgetting of the old sequence when it was changed in the final sessions. Model parameters for individual participants covaried appropriately with independent measures of working memory and error characteristics. In sum, the model offers the first principled account of the adaptive complexity and nuanced dynamics of humans' internal sequence representations during long-term implicit skill learning.

Bounded rational decision-making models suggest capacity-limited concurrent motor planning in human posterior parietal and frontal cortex

While traditional theories of sensorimotor processing have often assumed a serial decision-making pipeline, more recent approaches have suggested that multiple actions may be planned concurrently and vie for execution. Evidence for the latter almost exclusively stems from electrophysiological studies in posterior parietal and premotor cortex of monkeys. Here we study concurrent prospective motor planning in humans by recording functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during a delayed response task engaging movement sequences towards multiple potential targets. We find that also in human posterior parietal and premotor cortex delay activity modulates both with sequence complexity and the number of potential targets. We tested the hypothesis that this modulation is best explained by concurrent prospective planning as opposed to the mere maintenance of potential targets in memory. We devise a bounded rationality model with information constraints that optimally assigns information resources for planning and memory for this task and determine predicted information profiles according to the two hypotheses. When regressing delay activity on these model predictions, we find that the concurrent prospective planning strategy provides a significantly better explanation of the fMRI-signal modulations. Moreover, we find that concurrent prospective planning is more costly and thus limited for most subjects, as expressed by the best fitting information capacities. We conclude that bounded rational decision-making models allow relating both behavior and neural representations to utilitarian task descriptions based on bounded optimal information-processing assumptions.

When the future is uncertain, it can be beneficial to concurrently plan several action possibilities in advance. Electrophysiological research found evidence in monkeys that brain regions in posterior parietal and promotor cortex are indeed capable of planning several actions in parallel. We now used fMRI to study brain activity in these brain regions in humans. For our analyses we applied bounded rationality models that optimally assign information resources to fMRI activity in a complex motor planning task. We find that theoretical information costs of concurrent prospective planning explained fMRI activity profiles significantly better than assuming alternative memory-based strategies. Moreover, exploiting the model allowed us to quantify the individual capacity limit for concurrent planning and to relate these individual limits to both subjects’ behavior and to their neural representations of planning.

Vigor, Effort-Related Aspects of Motivation and Anhedonia

In this chapter we provide an overview of the pharmacological and circuit mechanisms that determine the willingness to expend effort in pursuit of rewards. A particular focus will be on the role of the mesolimbic dopamine system, as well the contributing roles of limbic and cortical brains areas involved in the evaluation, selection, and invigoration of goal-directed actions. We begin with a review of preclinical studies, which have provided key insights into the brain systems that are necessary and sufficient for effort-based decision-making and have characterized novel compounds that enhance selection of high-effort activities. Next, we summarize translational studies identifying and expanding this circuitry in humans. Finally, we discuss the relevance of this work for understanding common motivational impairments as part of the broader anhedonia symptom domain associated with mental illness, and the identification of new treatment targets within this circuitry to improve motivation and effort-expenditure.

Suboptimal human inference can invert the bias-variance trade-off for decisions with asymmetric evidence

Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between: 1) bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies, and 2) variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to forms of inference based on suboptimal strategies. We examined inference problems applied to rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that varied in form and complexity. In general, subjects using more complex strategies tended to have lower bias and variance, but with a dependence on the form of strategy that reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but higher bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but lower, near-normative bias. Our results help define new principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that can be sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality, of the inference process.

People use diverse strategies to make inferences about the world around them, often based on limited evidence. Such inference strategies may be simple but prone to systematic errors or more complex and accurate, but such trends need not always be the rule. We modeled and measured how human participants made rare-event decisions in a preregistered, online study. The participants tended to use suboptimal decision strategies that reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: some used complex, nearly normative strategies with mistuned evidence weights that corresponded to relatively high choice biases but lower choice variance, whereas others used simpler heuristic strategies that corresponded to lower biases but higher variance. These relationships illustrate structure in suboptimality that can be used to identify systematic sources of human errors.

A reference-based theory of motivation and effort allocation

Motivation is key for performance in domains such as work, sport, and learning. Research has established that motivation and the willingness to invest effort generally increase as a function of reward. However, this view struggles to explain some empirical observations-for example, in the domain of sport, athletes sometimes appear to lose motivation when playing against weak opponents-this despite objective rewards being high. This and similar evidence highlight the role of subjective value in motivation and effort allocation. To capture this, here, we advance a novel theory and computational model where motivation and effort allocation arise from reference-based evaluation processes. Our proposal argues that motivation (and the ensuing willingness to exert effort) stems from subjective value, which in turns depends on one's standards about performance and on the confidence about these standards. In a series of simulations, we show that the model explains puzzling motivational dynamics and associated feelings. Crucially, the model identifies realistic standards (i.e., those matching one's own actual ability) as those more beneficial for motivation and performance. On this basis, the model establishes a normative solution to the problem of optimal allocation of effort, analogous to the optimal allocation of neural and computational resources as in efficient coding.

Hyperreactivity to uncertainty is a key feature of subjective cognitive impairment

With an increasingly ageing global population, more people are presenting with concerns about their cognitive function, but not all have an underlying neurodegenerative diagnosis. Subjective cognitive impairment (SCI) is a common condition describing self-reported deficits in cognition without objective evidence of cognitive impairment. Many individuals with SCI suffer from depression and anxiety, which have been hypothesised to account for their cognitive complaints. Despite this association between SCI and affective features, the cognitive and brain mechanisms underlying SCI are poorly understood. Here, we show that people with SCI are hyperreactive to uncertainty and that this might be a key mechanism accounting for their affective burden. Twenty-seven individuals with SCI performed an information sampling task, where they could actively gather information prior to decisions. Across different conditions, SCI participants sampled faster and obtained more information than matched controls to resolve uncertainty. Remarkably, despite their ‘urgent’ sampling behaviour, SCI participants were able to maintain their efficiency. Hyperreactivity to uncertainty indexed by this sampling behaviour correlated with the severity of affective burden including depression and anxiety. Analysis of MRI resting functional connectivity revealed that SCI participants had stronger insular-hippocampal connectivity compared to controls, which also correlated with faster sampling. These results suggest that altered uncertainty processing is a key mechanism underlying the psycho-cognitive manifestations in SCI and implicate a specific brain network target for future treatment.

Time pressure changes how people explore and respond to uncertainty

How does time pressure influence exploration and decision-making? We investigated this question with several four-armed bandit tasks manipulating (within subjects) expected reward, uncertainty, and time pressure (limited vs. unlimited). With limited time, people have less opportunity to perform costly computations, thus shifting the cost-benefit balance of different exploration strategies. Through behavioral, reinforcement learning (RL), reaction time (RT), and evidence accumulation analyses, we show that time pressure changes how people explore and respond to uncertainty. Specifically, participants reduced their uncertainty-directed exploration under time pressure, were less value-directed, and repeated choices more often. Since our analyses relate uncertainty to slower responses and dampened evidence accumulation (i.e., drift rates), this demonstrates a resource-rational shift towards simpler, lower-cost strategies under time pressure. These results shed light on how people adapt their exploration and decision-making strategies to externally imposed cognitive constraints.

Rational inattention in mice

Behavior exhibited by humans and other organisms is generally inconsistent and biased and, thus, is often labeled irrational. However, the origins of this seemingly suboptimal behavior remain elusive. We developed a behavioral task and normative framework to reveal how organisms should allocate their limited processing resources such that sensory precision and its related metabolic investment are balanced to guarantee maximal utility. We found that mice act as rational inattentive agents by adaptively allocating their sensory resources in a way that maximizes reward consumption in previously unexperienced stimulus-reward association environments. Unexpectedly, perception of commonly occurring stimuli was relatively imprecise; however, this apparent statistical fallacy implies "awareness" and efficient adaptation to their neurocognitive limitations. Arousal systems carry reward distribution information of sensory signals, and distributional reinforcement learning mechanisms regulate sensory precision via top-down normalization. These findings reveal how organisms efficiently perceive and adapt to previously unexperienced environmental contexts within the constraints imposed by neurobiology.

The whole prefrontal cortex is premotor cortex

We propose that the entirety of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) can be seen as fundamentally premotor in nature. By this, we mean that the PFC consists of an action abstraction hierarchy whose core function is the potentiation and depotentiation of possible action plans at different levels of granularity. We argue that the apex of the hierarchy should revolve around the process of goal-selection, which we posit is inherently a form of optimization over action abstraction. Anatomical and functional evidence supports the idea that this hierarchy originates on the orbital surface of the brain and extends dorsally to motor cortex. Accordingly, our viewpoint positions the orbitofrontal cortex in a key role in the optimization of goal-selection policies, and suggests that its other proposed roles are aspects of this more general function. Our proposed perspective will reframe outstanding questions, open up new areas of inquiry and align theories of prefrontal function with evolutionary principles. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

Gated recurrence enables simple and accurate sequence prediction in stochastic, changing, and structured environments

From decision making to perception to language, predicting what is coming next is crucial. It is also challenging in stochastic, changing, and structured environments; yet the brain makes accurate predictions in many situations. What computational architecture could enable this feat? Bayesian inference makes optimal predictions but is prohibitively difficult to compute. Here, we show that a specific recurrent neural network architecture enables simple and accurate solutions in several environments. This architecture relies on three mechanisms: gating, lateral connections, and recurrent weight training. Like the optimal solution and the human brain, such networks develop internal representations of their changing environment (including estimates of the environment’s latent variables and the precision of these estimates), leverage multiple levels of latent structure, and adapt their effective learning rate to changes without changing their connection weights. Being ubiquitous in the brain, gated recurrence could therefore serve as a generic building block to predict in real-life environments.

Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions

The Nash equilibrium is one of the most central solution concepts to study strategic interactions between multiple players and has recently also been shown to capture sensorimotor interactions between players that are haptically coupled. While previous studies in behavioural economics have shown that systematic deviations from Nash equilibria in economic decision-making can be explained by the more general quantal response equilibria, such deviations have not been reported for the sensorimotor domain. Here we investigate haptically coupled dyads across three different sensorimotor games corresponding to the classic symmetric and asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma, where the quantal response equilibrium predicts characteristic shifts across the three games, although the Nash equilibrium stays the same. We find that subjects exhibit the predicted deviations from the Nash solution. Furthermore, we show that taking into account subjects' priors for the games, we arrive at a more accurate description of bounded rational response equilibria that can be regarded as a quantal response equilibrium with non-uniform prior. Our results suggest that bounded rational response equilibria provide a general tool to explain sensorimotor interactions that include the Nash equilibrium as a special case in the absence of information processing limitations.

Neural implementations of Bayesian inference

Bayesian inference has emerged as a general framework that captures how organisms make decisions under uncertainty. Recent experimental findings reveal disparate mechanisms for how the brain generates behaviors predicted by normative Bayesian theories. Here, we identify two broad classes of neural implementations for Bayesian inference: a modular class, where each probabilistic component of Bayesian computation is independently encoded and a transform class, where uncertain measurements are converted to Bayesian estimates through latent processes. Many recent experimental neuroscience findings studying probabilistic inference broadly fall into these classes. We identify potential avenues for synthesis across these two classes and the disparities that, at present, cannot be reconciled. We conclude that to distinguish among implementation hypotheses for Bayesian inference, we require greater engagement among theoretical and experimental neuroscientists in an effort that spans different scales of analysis, circuits, tasks, and species.

Biases and Variability from Costly Bayesian Inference

When humans infer underlying probabilities from stochastic observations, they exhibit biases and variability that cannot be explained on the basis of sound, Bayesian manipulations of probability. This is especially salient when beliefs are updated as a function of sequential observations. We introduce a theoretical framework in which biases and variability emerge from a trade-off between Bayesian inference and the cognitive cost of carrying out probabilistic computations. We consider two forms of the cost: a precision cost and an unpredictability cost; these penalize beliefs that are less entropic and less deterministic, respectively. We apply our framework to the case of a Bernoulli variable: the bias of a coin is inferred from a sequence of coin flips. Theoretical predictions are qualitatively different depending on the form of the cost. A precision cost induces overestimation of small probabilities, on average, and a limited memory of past observations, and, consequently, a fluctuating bias. An unpredictability cost induces underestimation of small probabilities and a fixed bias that remains appreciable even for nearly unbiased observations. The case of a fair (equiprobable) coin, however, is singular, with non-trivial and slow fluctuations in the inferred bias. The proposed framework of costly Bayesian inference illustrates the richness of a 'resource-rational' (or 'bounded-rational') picture of seemingly irrational human cognition.