True- and false-belief reasoning in children and adults: an event-related potential study of theory of mind

Agreeableness modulates mental state decoding: Electrophysiological evidence

Agreeableness is one of the five personality traits which is associated with theory of mind (ToM) abilities. One of the critical processes involved in ToM is the decoding of emotional cues. In the present study, we investigated whether this process is modulated by agreeableness using electroencephalography (EEG) while taking into account task complexity and sex differences that are expected to moderate the relationship between emotional decoding and agreeableness. This approach allowed us to identify at which stage of the neural processing agreeableness kicks in, in order to distinguish the impact on early, perceptual processes from slower, inferential processing. Two tasks were employed and submitted to 62 participants during EEG recording: the reading the mind in the eyes (RME) task, requiring the decoding of complex mental states from eye expressions, and the biological (e)motion task, involving the perception of basic emotional actions through point-light body stimuli. Event-related potential (ERP) results showed a significant correlation between agreeableness and the contrast for emotional and non-emotional trials in a late time window only during the RME task. Specifically, higher levels of agreeableness were associated with a deeper neural processing of emotional versus non-emotional trials within the whole and male samples. In contrast, the modulation in females was negligible. The source analysis highlighted that this ERP-agreeableness association engages the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our findings expand previous research on personality and social processing and confirm that sex modulates this relationship.

Recursive structures modulate the electrophysiological correlates of visual perspective taking

An increasing number of studies have focused on the neural basis of complex mental inferences, which requires an understanding of the recursive nature of thought; however, the precise electrophysiological response to a recursive structure remains unclear. The present event-related potential (ERP) study investigated the recursive structure effect on the neural correlates of visual perspective taking by modifying a third-person visual perspective-taking task. Participants were required to determine how many dots in the presented scenes could be seen from the cued perspective, including the perspectives in the self, other, and recursive (one avatar's belief of another avatar) conditions. The ERP results showed that the N100 and P200 components specific to the recursive-perspective condition showed greater attentional allocation; the N200 component increased in the recursive condition and was related to the conflict process; and larger late slow waves were found in the other- and recursive-perspective conditions compared with those in the self-perspective condition, which reflected the decoupling mechanism. The results suggested that high-order perspective taking requires more attentional resources and conflict processing for further decoupling from the self-perspective.

Prospective associations between maternal mind-mindedness, child theory of mind, and brain morphology in school-aged children

Mentalizing is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. In the context of parental behavior, parents' tendency to comment on their child's mental activities refers to the concept of mind-mindedness (MM). MM has been positively associated with various developmental outcomes in children, notably their own ability to mentalize, known as theory of mind (ToM). Although parental (MM) and child (ToM) mentalizing have important implications during childhood, their associations with children's neural structures are largely unknown. Among 62 mother-child dyads, maternal MM was rated from free-play sequences when children were aged 1 year, child ToM was assessed using a first-order false-belief task at 4 years of age, and structural MRI images were acquired at 10 years of age. Maternal MM was positively associated with gray matter volumes (GMV) in the dorsal prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal pole. Child ToM abilities were positively associated with GMV in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Though cortical regions associated with MM and ToM showed no anatomical overlap, many are functionally connected through a neural network highly involved in self-referential strategies for mentalizing. These findings suggest that MM and ToM may contribute to distinct sub-processes that collectively support social cognition development.

P300 as a correlate of false beliefs and false statements

INTRODUCTION

This study investigates P300 as a component for false belief and false statement processing with and without a communicative context. The purpose is to understand why P300 has been shown to be commonly involved in false belief and lie processing.

METHODS

Participants were presented with a story in which the protagonist holds a true belief and makes a true statement of it (true belief), holds a false belief and makes a true statement (false belief), or holds a true belief and makes a false statement (false statement) while electroencephalograms were recorded.

RESULTS

In Experiment 1, featuring a solitary protagonist, stronger posterior P300 was shown in the false belief condition than the true belief and false statement condition. With the installation of a communicative context by including a second character listening to the protagonist, Experiment 2 showed enhanced frontal P300 in the false statement condition compared to the true belief and false belief condition. A late slow wave was more prominent in the false belief condition than in the other two conditions in Experiment 2.

CONCLUSION

The present results suggest a situation-dependent nature of P300. The signal captures the discrepancy between belief and reality more readily than that between belief and words under a noncommunicative context. It becomes more sensitive to the discrepancy between belief and words than that between belief and reality in a communicative situation with an audience, which makes any false statement practically a lie.

What naturalistic stimuli tell us about pronoun resolution in real-time processing

Studies on pronoun resolution have mostly utilized short texts consisting of a context and a target sentence. In the current study we presented participants with nine chapters of an audio book while recording their EEG to investigate the real-time resolution of personal and demonstrative pronouns in a more naturalistic setting. The annotation of the features of the pronouns and their antecedents registered a surprising pattern: demonstrative pronouns showed an interpretive preference for subject/agent antecedents, although they are described to have an anti-subject or anti-agent preference. Given the presence of perspectival centers in the audio book, this however confirmed proposals that demonstrative pronouns are sensitive to perspectival centers. The ERP results revealed a biphasic N400–Late Positivity pattern at posterior electrodes for the demonstrative pronoun relative to the personal pronoun, thereby confirming previous findings with highly controlled stimuli. We take the observed N400 for the demonstrative pronoun as an indication for more demanding processing costs that occur due to the relative unexpectedness of this referential expression. The Late Positivity is taken to reflect the consequences of attentional reorientation: since the demonstrative pronoun indicates a possible shift in the discourse structure, it induces updating of the discourse structure. In addition to the biphasic pattern, the data showed an enhanced positivity at frontal electrode sites for the demonstrative pronoun relative to the personal pronoun. We suggest that this frontal positivity reflects self-relevant engagement and identification with the perspective holder. Our study suggests that by using naturalistic stimuli, we get one step closer to understanding the implementation of language processing in the brain during real life language processing.

Self-deception: Distorted metacognitive process in ambiguous contexts

As one of the commonly used folk psychological concepts, self-deception has been intensively discussed yet is short of solid ground from cognitive neuroscience. Self-deception is a biased cognitive process of information to obtain or maintain a false belief that could be both self-enhancing or self-diminishing. Study 1 (N = 152) captured self-deception by adopting a modified numerical discrimination task that provided cheating opportunities, quantifying errors in predicting future performance (via item-response theory model), and measuring the belief of how good they are at solving the task (i.e., self-efficacy belief). By examining whether self-efficacy belief is based upon actual ability (true belief) or prediction errors (false belief), Study 1 showed that self-deception occurred in the effortless (easier access to answer cues) rather than effortful (harder access to answer cues) cheating opportunity conditions, suggesting high ambiguity in attributions facilitates self-deception. Studies 2 and 3 probed the neural source of self-deception, linking self-deception with the metacognitive process. Both studies replicated behavioral results from Study 1. Study 2 (ERP study; N = 55) found that the amplitude of frontal slow wave significantly differed between participants with positive/self-enhancing and negative/self-diminishing self-deceiving tendencies in incorrect predictions while remaining similar in correct predictions. Study 3 (functional magnetic resonance imaging study; N = 33) identified self-deceiving associated activity in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex and showed that effortless cheating context increased cheating behaviors that further facilitated self-deception. Our findings suggest self-deception is a false belief associated with a distorted metacognitive mental process that requires ambiguity in attributions of behaviors.

Characterising the spatial and oscillatory unfolding of Theory of Mind in adults using fMRI and MEG

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a core social cognitive skill that refers to the ability to attribute mental states to others. ToM involves understanding that others have beliefs, thoughts and desires that may be different from one's own and from reality. ToM is crucial to predict behaviour and navigate social interactions. This study employed the complementary methodological advantages of both functional MRI (fMRI) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) to examine the neural underpinnings of ToM in adults. Twenty healthy adults were first recruited to rate and describe 28 videos (15s long), each containing three moving shapes designed to depict either social interactions or random motion (control condition). The first sample of adults produced consistent narratives for 6 of those social videos and of those, 4 social videos and 4 control videos were chosen to include in the neuroimaging study. Another sample of twenty-five adults were then recruited to complete the neuroimaging in MEG and fMRI. In fMRI, we found increased activation in frontal-parietal regions in the social compared to the control condition corroborating previous fMRI findings. In MEG, we found recruitment of ToM networks in the social condition in theta, beta and gamma bands. The right supramarginal and angular gyri (right temporal parietal junction), right inferior parietal lobe and right temporal pole were recruited in the first 5s of the videos. Frontal regions such as the superior frontal gyrus were recruited in the second time window (5–10s). Brain regions such as the bilateral amygdalae were also recruited (5–10s), indicating that various social processes were integrated in understanding the social videos. Our study is one of the first to combine multi-modal neuroimaging to examine the neural networks underlying social cognitive processes, combining the strengths of the spatial resolution of fMRI and temporal resolution of MEG. Understanding this information from both modalities helped delineate the mechanism by which ToM processing unfolds over time in healthy adults. This allows us to determine a benchmark against which clinical populations can be compared.

An Electrocortical Measure Associated with Metarepresentation Mediates the Relationship between Autism Symptoms and Theory of Mind

Impairments in theory of mind (ToM) - long considered common among individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) - are in fact highly heterogeneous across this population. While such heterogeneity should be reflected in differential recruitment of neural mechanisms during ToM reasoning, no research has yet uncovered a mechanism that explains these individual differences. In this study, 78 (48 ASD) adolescents viewed ToM vignettes and made mental state inferences about characters' behavior while participant electrophysiology was concurrently recorded. Two candidate event-related potentials (ERPs) - the Late Positive Complex (LPC) and the Late Slow Wave (LSW) - were successfully elicited. LPC scores correlated positively with ToM accuracy and negatively with ASD symptom severity. Notably, the LPC partially mediated the relationship between ASD symptoms and ToM accuracy, suggesting this ERP component, thought to represent cognitive metarepresentation, may help explain differences in ToM performance in some individuals with ASD.

Theory of mind in dysphoric and non--dysphoric adults: An ERP study of true-- and false--belief reasoning

Theory of mind (ToM) - the understanding that others' behaviors are connected with internal mental states - is an important part of everyday social cognition. There is increasing behavioral evidence that ToM reasoning can be affected by mood. To gain insight into the ways sad mood may affect the underlying mechanisms of ToM reasoning, we recorded event-related brain potentials (ERPs) as dysphoric (N = 16) and non-dysphoric (N = 24) participants reasoned about a protagonist's true or false beliefs about an object's location. Results showed significant group effects on early components of the ERP - individuals in the dysphoric group showed greater amplitudes for the anterior N1 and N2/P2 components relative to those in the non-dysphoric group. Later in the ERP, non-dysphoric individuals showed evidence of neurocognitive dissociations between true and false belief. Dysphoric individuals, however, did not show evidence for these later dissociations. This evidence suggests that dysphoria may be associated with effortful reasoning about other's mental states, even when that effort is not necessary (i.e., when reasoning about true beliefs). We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how mood affects ToM reasoning and for how especially deliberative ToM processing in dysphoria may lead to social difficulties.

Temporal dynamics of explicit and implicit moral evaluations

Explicit moral evaluation is often accompanied with active attention and explicit responses to moral information, while implicit moral evaluation happens in passive attention and implicit response to moral information. Previous studies have pointed out the differences in the neural mechanisms underlying explicit and implicit moral processing on the spatial dimension, however, the temporal differences between these two processes have not been clear. This study aimed at comparing the temporal dynamics between explicit and implicit moral evaluation of harm/care-related moral scenarios with high/low emotional arousal by using event-related potentials (ERP) technique. The behavioral results showed that the accuracy of the explicit task is higher than that of the implicit task, especially for high-arousal moral actions. The ERP results mainly revealed that regardless of the task type, the brain responses to moral evaluations can be divided into early emotional arousal processing indexed by the frontal N1, moral intuition indexed by the frontal N2, and middle/late stages of processing integration of emotional arousal and moral cognition which involve elaborative processing and cognitive control, reflected by the frontal P2, parietal P3, parietal LPP, and FSW. Moreover, explicit and implicit moral evaluations mainly differed in the late stage of moral processing indexed by the P3, LPP and FSW. Our findings provide robust evidence for the "hybrid" model supposed by Huebner, which suggested that both explicit and implicit moral evaluations involved a complex interaction between emotional processes and moral cognition, and the later ERP results strongly supported that explicit and implicit moral evaluations represented two relatively independent processes, fitting the multinomial model supposed by Cameron.

The Dynamic Differences between Self- and Other-Oriented Mental Inferences: An ERP Study on a False-Belief Task

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to infer others' mental states. In our everyday lives, we need to interact constantly and appropriately with others. Not only is ToM involved in understanding others' mental states (other-oriented mental inferences), but it also helps to keep our own mental states (self-oriented mental inferences). In this study, we designed a false-belief task using event-related potential (ERP) measures to investigate the dynamic differences between the two types of mental inferences. In the false-belief task, participants were prompted with a cue to attribute a belief to either themselves (self-oriented) or another person (other-oriented). Results showed that other-oriented false-belief attribution elicited a larger late positive component (LPC; 320~440 ms post-cue onset) than the one elicited by self-oriented attribution at bilateral parieto-occipital electrodes, and also a larger late negative component (LNC; 380~500 ms post-cue onset) at frontal-central electrodes. In addition, the difference in amplitude of LPC between the two types of false-belief attribution was positively correlated with self-reported autistic traits measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). Based on prior literature, we propose that the LPC and LNC reflect the processes of self-other distinction and conflict control, respectively. Moreover, the difficulty in distinguishing other from the self is related to one's degree of autistic traits.

Modeling Within-Item Dependencies in Parallel Data on Test Responses and Brain Activation

In this paper, we propose a joint modeling approach to analyze dependency in parallel response data. We define two types of dependency: higher-level dependency and within-item conditional dependency. While higher-level dependency can be estimated with common latent variable modeling approaches, within-item conditional dependency is a unique kind of information that is often not captured with extant methods, despite its potential to shed new insights into the relationship between the two types of response data. We differentiate three ways of modeling within-item conditional dependency by conditioning on raw values, expected values, or residual values of the response data, which have different implications in terms of response processes. The proposed approach is illustrated with the example of analyzing parallel data on response accuracy and brain activations from a Theory of Mind assessment. The consequence of ignoring within-item conditional dependency is investigated with empirical and simulation studies in comparison to conventional dependency analysis that focuses exclusively on relationships between latent variables.

The mechanism of inhibitory control on the development of theory of mind in old age-based on the two-component model of psychological theory

OBJECTIVE

Based on the two-component model of theory of mind, the current study explored the cognitive and emotional theory of mind of the elderly by using false-belief pictures and eye-reading tasks respectively, and examined effects of inhibitory control on elderly adults' cognitive and emotional theory of mind.

METHOD

One-hundred twelve elderly participants were randomly recruited, and the control task, cognitive theory of mind, emotional theory of mind and the Stroop task were used.

RESULTS

The results showed the following: (1) Elderly adults' theory of mind decreased compared with that of young people; specifically, cognitive theory of mind showed an aging trend (aged above 75 years), while emotional theory of mind developed at a relatively gentle speed during old age; (2) Compared with young people, the inhibitory control of the elderly gently declined among those aged above 75 years; (3) Inhibitory control partially mediated the relationship between age and cognitive theory of mind.

CONCLUSION

The cognitive and emotional components of theory of mind in the elderly were distinct. It was difficult for the elderly to complete psychological tasks related to social cognition that required high inhibitory control; however, they could complete psychological tasks that did not require high inhibitory control.

Exploring neurophysiological markers of visual perspective taking: Methodological considerations

RATIONALE

For visual perspective taking (VPT) using the avatar task, examinations of neural processes using event related potentials (ERP) indicate a distinction between an early posterior perspective calculation process (P3) and a later frontal process (LFSW) managing perspective conflict. While it is unknown if these neural processes are affected in clinical populations, it is unclear if the avatar task can be applied to this group, due to the long duration and sensitivity to data loss. Thus, we performed a methodological study of the avatar task, testing the feasibility of a shortened experimental paradigm.

OBJECTIVE

To investigate whether previously reported behavioural and ERP effects in the avatar task can also be seen if analysing all trials (matching/non-matching) jointly, and whether they remain robust if only a subset of the data is analysed.

METHOD

Healthy individuals (n = 20) completed the avatar task with ERP measurement. ERP components (P3, LFSW) and behavioural data were investigated by A) comparing use of only matching trials (n = 384) versus all trials (n = 768), and B) examining if reduced duration of assessment, by analysing only a subset of the data, impacts ERP findings.

RESULTS

We observed minimal differences when analysing data from only matching trial types compared to all trial types. Further, ERP amplitudes and latency findings were replicated when analysing only a subset of the data.

CONCLUSIONS

The duration of the avatar task can be reduced to avoid long testing times, thus making it better suited for use in clinical populations.

Neural and Linguistic Considerations for Assessing Moral Intuitions Using Text-Based Stimuli

This review takes a focused look at neural and linguistic considerations for assessing moral intuitions using text-based stimuli. Relevant neural correlates of moral salience, emotional processing, moral emotions (shame and guilt), semantic processing, implicit stereotype activation (e.g., gender, age, and race stereotypes), and functional brain network development (the default mode network and salience network) are considered insofar as they relate to unique considerations for text-based instruments. What emerge are not only key considerations for researchers assessing moral intuitions using text-based stimuli but also considerations for the study of moral psychology more broadly, especially in developmental and educational contexts.

The neural and cognitive time course of intention reasoning: Electrophysiological evidence from ERPs

Intention is a typical mental state in the theory of mind. However, to date, there have been theoretical debates on the conceptual structure of intention. The neural and cognitive time course of intention reasoning remains unclear. The present event-related potential (ERP) study had two purposes: first, to investigate the neural correlates of intention reasoning based on a differentiated conceptual structure distinguishing desire and intention; second, to investigate the neural basis of intention reasoning for different agents. Thus, we compared the neural activity elicited by intention reasoning for self and for others when the intention matched or mismatched the desire of the agent. The results revealed that three ERP components distinguished among different types of intention reasoning. A negative-going ERP deflection with right frontal distribution between 400 and 500 ms might reflect the cognitive conflict involved in intention reasoning, a right frontal late positive component might be associated with the categorisation of agents, and a centro-parietal late slow wave might indicate the conceptual mental operations associated with decoupling mechanisms in intention processing. These findings implied the neural and cognitive time course of intention reasoning and provided neural evidence for the differentiated conception of intention.

The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution: An EEG study

Despite the ubiquity of knowledge attribution in human social cognition, its associated neural and cognitive mechanisms are poorly documented. A wealth of converging evidence in cognitive neuroscience has identified independent perspective-taking and inhibitory processes for belief attribution, but the extent to which these processes are shared by knowledge attribution isn't presently understood. Here, we present the findings of an EEG study designed to directly address this shortcoming. These findings suggest that belief attribution is not a component process in knowledge attribution, contra a standard attitude taken by philosophers. Instead, observed differences in P3b amplitude indicate that knowledge attribution doesn't recruit the strong self-perspective inhibition characteristic of belief attribution. However, both belief and knowledge attribution were observed to display a late slow wave widely associated with mental state attribution, indicating that knowledge attribution also shares in more general processing of others' mental states. These results provide a new perspective both on how we think about knowledge attribution, as well as Theory of Mind processes generally.

Electrophysiological dynamics of false belief understanding and complementation syntax in school-aged children: Oscillatory brain activity and event-related potentials

A large body of research in developmental psychology has been devoted to the ongoing debate over which aspects of language are fundamental to false belief understanding (FBU). A key proposal from de Villiers and colleagues proposes the essential role of complementation syntax in FBU development. The current study, using scalp electroencephalography (EEG), addressed one opposing hypothesis purporting that complementation is redundant to FBU by characterizing the electrophysiological correlates of FBU and complementation syntax in school-age children. Time-frequency decomposition showed robust parieto-occipital low beta (12-16 Hz) power reduction in the belief versus complementation conditions. This divergence was also supported by event-related potentials (ERPs), with parieto-occipital late slow waves around 600 to 900 ms distinguishing belief and complementation conditions. The false belief condition generated the lowest behavioral response accuracy, suggesting that it is the most challenging condition. Together, the current findings provide evidence showing that complementation is not redundant to FBU.

Trivariate Theory of Mind Data Analysis with a Conditional Joint Modeling Approach

Theory of mind (ToM) is an essential social-cognitive ability to understand one's own and other people's mental states. Neural data as well as behavior data have been utilized in ToM research, but the two types of data have rarely been analyzed together, creating a large gap in the literature. In this paper, we propose and apply a novel joint modeling approach to analyze brain activations with two types of behavioral data, response times and response accuracy, obtained from a multi-item ToM assessment, with the intention to shed new light on the nature of the underlying process of ToM reasoning. Our trivariate data analysis suggested that different levels or kinds of processes might be involved during the ToM assessment, which seem to differ in terms of cognitive efficiency and sensitivity to ToM items and the correctness of item responses. Additional details on the trivariate data analysis results are provided with discussions on their implications for ToM research.

Electrophysiological Correlates of Basic and Higher Order Cognitive and Affective Theory of Mind Processing in Emerging and Early Adulthood—An Explorative Event-Related Potentials Study to Investigate First-, Second-, and Third-Order Theory of Mind Processing Based on Visual Cues

Attributing mental states to others in social interactions [Theory of Mind (ToM)] often depends on visual social cues like eye gaze or mimic. This study presents an event-related potentials task (Brainy-ERP) that was developed in order to investigate the electrophysiological correlates of first-, second-, and third-order cognitive and affective ToM processing. The task was based on social visual cues and involved electroencephalographic event-related potential (ERP) analyses and exact low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography analyses (eLORETA) source localization analyses. Results showed that in cognitive and affective conditions, first-order trials elicited greater Anterior P2 (180–370 ms) amplitudes. In the cognitive condition, third-order trials elicited greatest amplitudes in the broadly distributed early negative slow wave (eNSW, 260–470 ms) and the late NSW (LNSW, 460–1,000 ms). In the affective condition, third-order and second-order trials elicited greatest amplitudes in a broadly distributed NSW (250–1,000 ms). Regarding affective trials in the NSW time span, statistical significant differences and trends were shown regarding activation of underlying brain regions. Third-order trials elicited greatest activation in a number of regions typically associated with the ToM network, especially the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), cuneus, and temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Furthermore, ToM low performers (participants with high accuracy but longer reaction times) showed by trend smaller Posterior N1 and significantly smaller eNSW amplitudes compared to average and high performers. This study offers new insights into electrophysiological correlates of basic and higher order cognitive and affective ToM processing and its precise time course.

Electrophysiological indexes of ToM and non-ToM humor in healthy adults

The cognitive processes involved in humor comprehension were analyzed by directly comparing the time course of brain activity associated with the perception of slapstick humor and that associated with the comprehension of humor requiring theory of mind (ToM). Four different comic strips (strips containing humorous scenes that required ToM, non-ToM humorous strips, non-humorous semantically coherent strips and non-humorous semantically incoherent strips) were presented to participants, while their EEG response was recorded. Results showed that both of the humorous comic strips and the semantically incongruent strip elicited an N400 effect, suggesting similar cognitive mechanisms underlying the processing of incongruent and humorous comic strips. The results also showed that the humorous ToM strips elicited a frontal late positive (LP) response, possibly reflecting the active deployment of ToM abilities such as perspective-taking and empathy that allow for the resolution and interpretation of apparently incongruent situations. In addition, the LP response was positively correlated with ratings of perceived amusement as well as individual empathy scores, suggesting that the increased LP response to ToM humorous strips reflects the combined activation of neural mechanisms involved in the experience of amusement and ToM abilities. Overall, humor comprehension appears to demand distinct cognitive steps such as the detection of incongruent semantic components, the construction of semantic coherence, and the appreciation of humoristic elements such as maladaptive emotional reactions. Our results show that the deployment of these distinct cognitive steps is at least partially dependent on individual empathic abilities.

Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a visual perspective-taking task: ERP and behavioral evidence

Despite being able to rapidly and accurately infer their own and other peoples’ visual perspectives, healthy adults experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives are in conflict; they experience egocentric and altercentric interference. We examine for the first time how the age of an observed person (adult vs. child avatar) influences adults’ visual perspective-taking, particularly the degree to which they experience interference from their own or the other person’s perspective. Participants completed the avatar visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar’s perspective (Experiments 1 and 2) or only from their own perspective (Experiment 3), where the two perspectives could be consistent or in conflict. Age of avatar was manipulated between (Experiment 1) or within (Experiments 2 and 3) participants, and interference was assessed using behavioral (Experiments 1–3) and ERP (Experiment 1) measures. Results revealed that altercentric interference is reduced or eliminated when a child avatar was present, suggesting that adults do not automatically compute a child avatar’s perspective. We attribute this pattern to either enhanced visual processing for own-age others or an inference on reduced mental awareness in younger children. The findings argue against a purely attentional basis for the altercentric effect, and instead support an account where both mentalising and directional processes modulate automatic visual perspective-taking, and perspective-taking effects are strongly influenced by experimental context.

Dissociating neural signatures of mental state retrodiction and classification based on facial expressions

Posed facial expressions of actors have often been used as stimuli to induce mental state inferences, in order to investigate ‘Theory of Mind’ processes. However, such stimuli make it difficult to determine whether perceivers are using a basic or more elaborated mentalizing strategy. The current study used as stimuli covert recordings of target individuals who viewed various emotional expressions, which caused them to spontaneously mimic these expressions. Perceivers subsequently judged these subtle emotional expressions of the targets: in one condition (‘classification’) participants were instructed to classify the target’s expression (i.e. match it to a sample) and in another condition (‘retrodicting’) participants were instructed to retrodict (i.e. infer which emotional expression the target was viewing). When instructed to classify, participants showed more prevalent activations in event-related brain potentials (ERPs) at earlier and mid-latency ERP components N170, P200 and P300–600. By contrast, when instructed to retrodict participants showed enhanced late frontal and fronto-temporal ERPs (N800–1000), with more sustained activity over the right than the left hemisphere. These findings reveal different cortical processes involved when retrodicting about a facial expression compared to merely classifying it, despite comparable performance on the behavioral task.

An Indian, Comic-based, Online-EEG Paradigm for Theory of Mind: An Exploratory, Pilot Study on Schizophrenia Patients

BACKGROUND

False-belief (FB) tasks are used to assess the theory of mind (ToM) functioning, which has been found to be impaired in schizophrenia. FB task stimuli used so far in neuroimaging studies in schizophrenia have been sentence-based ones. We aimed to validate an Indian, colour-comic based FB task by using an online-electroencephalogram (EEG) paradigm discriminating schizophrenia patients and healthy controls.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Fifteen schizophrenia patients and 15 healthy controls performed online FB task during a 256-channel-EEG recording. 'Content' and 'known-groups' validity were examined using offline behavioural measures. Evoked gamma spectral-power in four regions of interest (ROIs) was compared between groups. Social functioning was also assessed.

RESULTS

Strength of classifying the groups was significant for both the number of correct responses and the reaction-times on the FB tasks. Social functioning was found to be poorer in patients. On the comparative analysis of evoked gamma spectral-power in the ROIs, very small effect size and observed power were noted.

CONCLUSION

'Content' and 'known-groups' validity of the culturally undermined comic-based FB task are good. Our findings reiterate that ToM functioning is impaired in schizophrenia. Our results were inconclusive in inferring whether evoked gamma spectral-power could be used as a neural validator for poor ToM functioning.

Age-related decline in emotional perspective-taking: Its effect on the late positive potential

Aging is associated with changes in cognitive and affective functioning, which likely shape older adults' social cognition. As the neural and psychological mechanisms underlying age differences in social abilities remain poorly understood, the present study aims to extend the research in this field. To this purpose, younger (n = 30; M_age = 26.6), middle-aged (n = 30; M_age = 48.4), and older adults (n = 29; M_age = 64.5) performed a task designed to assess affective perspective-taking, during an EEG recording. In this task, participants decided whether a target facial expression of emotion (FEE) was congruent or incongruent with that of a masked intervener of a previous scenario, which portrayed a neutral or an emotional scene. Older adults showed worse performance in comparison to the other groups. Regarding electrophysiological results, while younger and middle-aged adults showed higher late positive potentials (LPPs) after FEEs congruent with previous scenarios than after incongruent FEEs, older adults had similar amplitudes after both. This insensitivity of older adults' LPPs in differentiating congruent from incongruent emotional context-target FEE may be related to their difficulty in generating information about others' inner states and using that information in social interactions.

Exploring the role of self/other perspective-shifting in theory of mind with behavioural and EEG measures

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to compute and attribute mental states to oneself and other people. This study sought to assess the extent of differentiation between "Self" and "Other" in ToM processes, and, of particular importance, the key role of perspective-shifting between "Self" and "Other". Utilizing a newly established false-belief paradigm in a matched design, healthy adult participants completed the task whilst behavioural measures (response times, error rates) and electrophysiological (EEG) recordings were taken. Results revealed that self-oriented belief-attribution was faster and less error-prone than other-oriented belief-attribution, and demonstrated a key role of perspective-shifting. Perspective shifts from Self-to-Other resulted in longer response times and more errors than shifts from Other-to-Self. In contrast, no difference between self and other probes was found in no perspective-shift trials. Reflecting this, EEG recordings showed a significant interaction between Perspective-Shifting and Probe Type at an early onset across right parieto/occipito-lateral areas (250 ms post-stimulus onset), and across frontal-central areas from 500 ms post-stimulus onset, indicating the key role of these areas in ToM engagement. Results demonstrate that "Self" and "Other" can be distinguished at a behavioural level, and highlight the critical role of "Perspective-Shifting" in ToM processes.

Neural correlates of children's emotion understanding

This study aimed to develop an EEG paradigm to identify neural correlates of emotion understanding in children. In Experiment 1, children took part in an emotional story task. In Experiment 2, children completed an emotional task and a physical story task Late Positive Potentials (LPP) were demonstrated in response to emotional content in both studies. Together, The study demonstrates the potential value of the LPP as a flexible probe for studying children's emotion understanding and encourages further work into the specificity versus generality of cognitive processes underpinning the LPP in social information processing.

False Belief Reasoning in Adults with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder: Similarities and Differences

A central diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is the qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction and a prominent hypotheses that tried to explain this impairment is the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit hypotheses. On a behavioral level the critical test for having a ToM, the understanding of false beliefs (FB), is often used for testing ToM abilities in individuals with ASD. Investigating the neural underpinnings several neuroimaging studies revealed a network of areas involved in FB reasoning in neurotypical individuals. For ASD individuals the neural correlates of false belief processing are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and an adapted unexpected transfer task, that makes it possible to distinguish between the computation of diverging beliefs and the selection of a belief-associated response, we investigated a group of adult high-functioning individuals with ASD (N = 15) and an age and IQ matched group of neurotypical adults (NT; N = 15). On the behavioral level we found no group differences. On the neural level, results were two-fold: In the story phase, in which participants had to compute whether the character's belief is congruent or incongruent to their own belief, there were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with ASD. But, in the subsequent question phase, participants with ASD showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex, the left posterior frontal cortex, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the left temporoparietal area. These results suggest that during the story phase in which the participants processed observable actions the neural correlates do not differ between adult individuals with ASD and NT individuals. But in the question phase in which participants had to infer an unobservable mental state results revealed neural differences between the two groups. Possibly, these subtle neural processing differences may contribute to the fact that adult ASD individuals are able to master explicit false belief tasks but fail to apply their strategies during everyday social interaction.

Oscillatory brain activity differentially reflects false belief understanding and complementation syntax processing

False belief understanding (FBU) enables people to consider conflicting beliefs about the same situation. While language has been demonstrated to be a correlate of FBU, there is still controversy about the extent to which a specific aspect of language, complementation syntax, is a necessary condition for FBU. The present study tested an important notion from the debate proposing that complementation syntax task is redundant to FBU measures. Specifically, we examined electrophysiological correlates of false belief, false complementation, and their respective true conditions in adults using electroencephalography (EEG), focusing on indices of oscillatory brain activity and large-scale connectivity. The results showed strong modulation of parieto-occipital alpha (8-12 Hz) and beta (13-20 Hz) power by the experimental manipulations, with heightened sustained alpha power reflective of effortful internal processing observed in the false compared to the true conditions and reliable beta power reductions sensitive to mentalizing and/or syntactic demands in the belief versus the complementation conditions. In addition, higher coupling between parieto-occipital regions and widespread frontal sites in the beta band was found for the false-belief condition selectively. The result of divergence in beta oscillatory activity and in connectivity between false belief and false complementation does not support the redundancy hypothesis.

Neural correlates of "Theory of Mind" in very preterm born children

Very preterm (VPT) birth (<32 weeks' gestational age) has been implicated in social-cognitive deficits including Theory of Mind (ToM); the ability to attribute mental states to others and understand that those beliefs can differ from one's own or reality. The neural bases for ToM deficits in VPT born children have not been examined. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) for its excellent spatial and temporal resolution to determine the neural underpinnings of ToM in 24 VPT and 24 full-term born (FT) children (7-13 years). VPT children performed more poorly on neuropsychological measures of ToM but not inhibition. In the MEG task, both FT children and VPT children recruited regions involved in false belief processing such as the rIFG (VPT: 275-350 ms, FT: 250-375 ms) and left inferior temporal gyrus (VPT: 375-450 ms, FT: 325-375 ms) and right fusiform gyrus (VPT: 150-200 ms, FT: 175-250 ms). The rIPL (included in the temporal-parietal junction) was recruited in FT children (475-575 ms) and the lTPJ in VPT children (500-575 ms). However, activations in all regions were reduced in the VPT compared to the FT group. We suggest that with increasing social-cognitive demands such as varying the type of scenarios in the standardized measure of ToM, reduced activations in the rIFG and TPJ in the VPT group may reflect the decreased performance. With access to both spatial and temporal information, we discuss the role of domain general and specific regions of the ToM network in both groups. Hum Brain Mapp 38:5577-5589, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Autistic Traits Affect P300 Response to Unexpected Events, regardless of Mental State Inferences

Limited use of contextual information has been suggested as a way of understanding cognition in people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). However, it has also been argued that individuals with ASD may have difficulties inferring others' mental states. Here, we examined how individuals with different levels of autistic traits respond to contextual deviations by measuring event-related potentials that reflect context usage. The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) was used to quantify autistic-like traits in 28 university students, and 19 participants were defined as Low or High AQ groups. To additionally examine inferences about mental state, two belief conditions (with or without false belief) were included. Participants read short stories in which the final sentence included either an expected or an unexpected word and rated the word's degree of deviation from expectation. P300 waveform analysis revealed that unexpected words were associated with larger P300 waveforms for the Low AQ group, but smaller P300 responses in the High AQ group. Additionally, AQ social skill subscores were positively correlated with evaluation times in the Unexpected condition, whether a character's belief was false or not. This suggests that autistic traits can affect responses to unexpected events, possibly because of decreased availability of context information.

The rTPJ's overarching cognitive function in networks for attention and theory of mind

Cortical networks underpinning attentional control and mentalizing converge at the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). It is debated whether the rTPJ is fractionated in neighboring, but separate functional modules underpinning attentional control and mentalizing, or whether one overarching cognitive mechanism explains the rTPJ's role in both domains. Addressing this question, we combined attentional control and mentalizing in a factorial design within one task. We added a social context condition, in which another individual's mental states became apparently task-relevant, to a spatial cueing paradigm. This allowed for assessing cue validity- and context-dependent functional activity and effective connectivity of the rTPJ within corresponding cortical networks. We found two discriminable rTPJ subregions, an anterior and a posterior one. Yet, we did not observe a sharp functional dissociation between these two, as both regions responded to attention cueing and social context manipulation. The results suggest that the rTPJ is part of both the ventral attention and the ToM network and that its function is defined by context-dependent coupling with the respective network. We argue that the rTPJ as a functional unit underpins an overarching cognitive mechanism in attentional control and mentalizing and discuss how the present results help to further specify this mechanism.

Neural correlates of judgments of learning - An ERP study on metacognition

Metacognitive assessment of performance has been revealed to be one of the most powerful predictors of human learning success and academic achievement. Yet, little is known about the functional nature of cognitive processes supporting judgments of learning (JOLs). The present study investigated the neural underpinnings of JOLs, using event-related brain potentials. Participants were presented with picture pairs and instructed to learn these pairs. After each pair, participants received a task cue, which instructed them to make a JOL (the likelihood of remembering the target when only presented with the cue) or to make a control judgment. Results revealed that JOLs were accompanied by a positive slow wave over medial frontal areas and a bilateral negative slow wave over occipital areas between 350ms and 700ms following the task cue. The results are discussed with respect to recent accounts on the neural correlates of judgments of learning.

An fMRI study on the comparison of different types of false belief reasoning: False belief-based emotion and behavior attribution

False belief (FB) reasoning is a key Theory of Mind (ToM) competence. By 4 years of age, children understand that a person's behavior can be based on a FB about reality. Children cannot understand that a person's emotion can also be based on a FB before the age of six. In order to generate hypothesis on basic processes distinguishing these two types of belief reasoning, the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study in adults directly compares functional activity associated with these two FB tasks. Both tasks were associated with activity in the ToM network including the medial prefrontal cortex and the left temporo-parietal junction. Differential activity was observed in the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for FB-based emotion relative to behavior attribution. Contrary to FB behavior attribution, FB-based emotion attribution requires the processing of two different mental states: a belief and an emotion and their relation to each other. The activity pattern may reflect the differential demands on cognitive processes associated with the two different belief-based attribution processes. These results shed new light on the still ongoing debate about the nature of the developmental lag between the two FB tasks.

The Neural Correlates Underlying Belief Reasoning for Self and for Others: Evidence from ERPs

Belief reasoning is typical mental state reasoning in theory of mind (ToM). Although previous studies have explored the neural bases of belief reasoning, the neural correlates of belief reasoning for self and for others are rarely addressed. The decoupling mechanism of distinguishing the mental state of others from one’s own is essential for ToM processing. To address the electrophysiological bases underlying the decoupling mechanism, the present event-related potential study compared the time course of neural activities associated with belief reasoning for self and for others when the belief belonging to self was consistent or inconsistent with others. Results showed that during a 450–600 ms period, belief reasoning for self elicited a larger late positive component (LPC) than for others when beliefs were inconsistent with each other. The LPC divergence is assumed to reflect the categorization of agencies in ToM processes.

Characterizing an ERP correlate of intentions understanding using a sequential comic strips paradigm

Chronometric properties of theory of mind and intentions understanding more specifically are well documented. Notably, it was demonstrated using magnetoencephalography that the brain regions involved were recruited as soon as 200 ms post-stimulus. We used event-related potentials (ERPs) to characterize an electrophysiological marker of attribution of intentions. We also explored the robustness of this ERP signature under two conditions corresponding to either explicit instructions to focus on others' intentions or implicit instructions with no reference to mental states. Two matched groups of 16 healthy volunteers each received either explicit or no instructions about intentions and performed a nonverbal attribution of intentions task based on sequential four-image comic strips depicting either intentional or physical causality. A bilateral posterior positive component, ranging from 250 to 650 ms post-stimulus, showed greater amplitude in intentional than in physical condition (the intention ERP effect). This effect occurs during the third image only, suggesting that it reflects the integration of information depicted in the third image to the contextual cues given by the first two. The intention effect was similar in the two groups of subjects. Overall, our results identify a clear ERP marker of the first hundreds of milliseconds of intentions processing probably related to a contextual integrative mechanism and suggest its robustness by showing its blindness to task demands manipulation.

Me or you? Neural correlates of moral reasoning in everyday conflict situations in adolescents and adults

Throughout adolescence, progress in the understanding of the moral domain as well as changes in moral behavior is observable. We tested 16 adolescents (14-16 years of age) and 16 healthy adults (22-31 years of age) on the developmental changes in everyday moral decision making using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Using verbal stories describing everyday moral conflict situations, subjects had to decide between a moral standard or a personal desire. In the moral conflict situations, adolescents not only chose significantly more often the hedonistic alternative than adults, but they also reported higher certainty ratings. Contrasted with everyday social conflict situations that required a decision between a social-oriented behavior and a personal need, moral conflict situations induced an activity increase in frontal areas, the middle temporal gyrus, the thalamus, and the parahippocampal gyrus in adolescents compared to adults. Moreover, a closer look at the moral conflict situations revealed that adolescents showed more activity than adults in brain areas that are also centrally involved in theory of mind (ToM) during morally oriented decisions in contrast to personal-oriented decisions. This indicated that the development of moral reasoning may be strongly correlated with the development of ToM reasoning.

Functional activity and effective connectivity of the posterior medial prefrontal cortex during processing of incongruent mental states

The neurocognitive components of Theory of Mind reasoning remain poorly understood. In particular the role of the posterior medial prefrontal cortex in the processing of other's mental states such as beliefs that are incongruent with one's own knowledge of reality is not clear-cut. It is unknown whether this region is involved in computing discrepant mental states or in subsequently resolving a response conflict between the discrepant others' and one's own beliefs. To test this, we adapted a false belief paradigm for the separate inspection of functional brain activity related to (1) the computation of diverging beliefs and (2) the subsequent consideration and selection of another's or one's own belief. Based on statistical parametric findings from functional neuroimaging, we employed dynamic causal modelling combined with Bayesian model selection to further characterize the interplay of resulting brain regions. In the initial computation of diverging beliefs, the posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC) and the bilateral temporoparietal cortex were crucially involved. The findings suggest that the bilateral temporal cortex engages in the construction and adjustment of diverging mental states by encoding relevant environmental information. The pMPFC inhibits this stimulus-bound processing which helps to compute discrepant mental states and process another's false belief decoupled from one's own perception of reality. In the subsequent question phase the right temporoparietal cortex showed increased activity related to switching to and reconsidering another's beliefs in order to select the correct response.

Belief and sign, true and false: the unique of false belief reasoning

For a long time, a controversy has been proposed that whether the process of theory of mind is a result of domain-specific or domain-general changes (Wellman in The handbook of childhood cognitive development. Blackwell Publication, New Jersey, 2011). This event-related potential study explored the neural time course of domain-general and domain-specific components in belief reasoning. Fourteen participants completed location transfer false belief (FB), true belief (TB), false sign (FS) and true sign (TS) tasks, in which two pictures told a story related to a dog that ran from a green into a red box. In the TB and FB tasks, a boy saw or did not see the transfer of the dog, respectively. In the FS and TS tasks, an arrow that pointed to the green box either altered its direction to the red box or did not alter following the transfer of the dog. Participants then inferred where the boy thought of, or the arrow indicated the location of the dog. FB and TB reasoning elicited lower N2 amplitudes than FS and TS reasoning, which is associated with domain-general components, the detection, and classification. The late slow wave (LSW) for FB was more positive at frontal, central, and parietal sites than FS because of the domain-specific component involved in FB reasoning. However, the LSW was less positive for TB than for FB but did not differ from the TS condition, which implies that mental representation might not be involved in TB reasoning.

What's behind a P600? Integration operations during irony processing

The combined knowledge of word meanings and grammatical rules does not allow a listener to grasp the intended meaning of a speaker’s utterance. Pragmatic inferences on the part of the listener are also required. The present work focuses on the processing of ironic utterances (imagine a slow day being described as “really productive”) because these clearly require the listener to go beyond the linguistic code. Such utterances are advantageous experimentally because they can serve as their own controls in the form of literal sentences (now imagine an active day being described as “really productive”) as we employ techniques from electrophysiology (EEG). Importantly, the results confirm previous ERP findings showing that irony processing elicits an enhancement of the P600 component (Regel et al., 2011). More original are the findings drawn from Time Frequency Analysis (TFA) and especially the increase of power in the gamma band in the 280–400 time-window, which points to an integration among different streams of information relatively early in the comprehension of an irony. This represents a departure from traditional accounts of language processing which generally view pragmatic inferences as late-arriving. We propose that these results indicate that unification operations between the linguistic code and contextual information play a critical role throughout the course of irony processing and earlier than previously thought.

Same or different? ERP correlates of pretense and false belief reasoning in children

Pretend play, emerging at about 18 months, and explicit false belief (FB) understanding, arising around 4 years, constitute two pivotal milestones in the development of a Theory of Mind since both involve the ability to separate real from non-real content. The developmental lag has evoked vivid discussion with respect to whether or not pretense (PT) involves a metarepresentational understanding similar to FB. However, in children PT and FB have not yet been contrasted on a neural level to reveal whether they are subserved by the same neurocognitive mechanism. Therefore, the present event-related potential (ERP) study compared PT to a FB and to a non-mental control condition in 6- to 8-year-old children. Results revealed distinct ERP components for PT and FB. PT elicited a parietal P2, which was assumed to reflect the detection of incongruence, and a negative frontal slow wave (290-600 ms), which was associated with the identification of the intention underlying the pretend behavior. In contrast, FB evoked the characteristic positive fronto-central late slow wave (290-920 ms) that is supposed to indicate metarepresentation. Further, the broad distribution of the anterior slow-wave patterns associated with PT and FB reasoning was assumed to reflect the ongoing structural development and neural specialization of the respective areas, indicating the developmental progress in conceptualizing the mental domain. Given the differences in latency, polarity, and topography, PT and FB seem to rely on distinct neural substrates in children. The early negative frontal slow wave indicates that for PT reasoning children may use simple mentalizing processes such as intention processing, whereas the late positive slow-wave shows that for FB children may engage in metarepresentational processing. Therefore, the present findings seem to substantiate theoretical accounts postulating simple mentalistic reasoning for PT in children.

Distinct neural correlates underlying pretense and false belief reasoning: evidence from ERPs

Two important milestones characterize the development of a theory of mind (ToM): The emergence of pretend play (PT) in which infants as young as 18 months separate the real world from fictional or imagined worlds. And the explicit understanding of false beliefs (FB) which develops around the age of about 4 years and demands a differentiation between mental states and reality. Although there is an outstanding debate about whether or not PT play involves metarepresentation understanding, to date, the neural correlates of FB and PT reasoning have not been investigated within one paradigm. The present study investigated PT and FB in comparison to reality understanding (RE) in an ERP paradigm presenting cartoon stories to 24 healthy adults. Results revealed a sequence of ERP components that distinguished between the conditions. PT compared to FB and RE was associated with a higher P2-amplitude at parieto-occipital sites and a late slow wave divergence (270-600 ms) at left frontal and left posterior positions. These components may indicate the processing of incongruity between the protagonist's knowledge and behavior and the identifying of the intentional character of the pretended action. In accordance with previous ERP studies on FB reasoning, we found late anterior activation (600-900 ms) for FB reasoning, probably indicating the decoupling mechanism involved in metarepresentation. These temporal and topographic differences indicate distinct underlying neural substrates for FB and PT processing, and do not support metarepresentational interpretations of PT.

Do false belief and verb non-factivity share similar neural circuits?

The present study investigates whether the complement falsity elicited by strong non-factive verbs and the false belief activated by a standard nonverbal false belief task produce similar electrophysiological activities in the brain. The hypothesis is based on the notion that both complement falsity and false belief involve decoupling a false mental representation from reality. Some previous studies have reported a behavioral correlation between children's false belief reasoning and interpretation of strong non-factive verbs together with their false complements, but a neural basis for this correlation has not been found. Our event-related potential (ERP) results with normal adults showed that both nonverbal false belief and strong non-factive verb comprehension elicited a negative late slow waveform divergence compared to their respective baselines. Although these slow waves due to the two types of stimuli had slightly different scalp distributions, both were regarded as reflecting primarily frontal activation. Such ERP similarity provides evidence for a common neural basis shared by nonverbal false belief reasoning and comprehension of strong non-factive verbs.

The neural correlates of passively viewed sequences of true and false beliefs

The ability to infer other people's mental states such as desires, emotions, intentions and beliefs is essential for successful social interactions, and it is usually referred to as theory of mind (ToM). In particular, the ability to detect and understand that people have beliefs about reality that may be false is considered an important hallmark of ToM. This experiment reports on the results of 18 participants who viewed photographic sequences of an actress performing actions as a consequence of true and false beliefs. Consistent with prior work, results from the passive viewing of stimuli depicting true belief indicated an increased response over frontal, central and parietal regions when compared with the amplitude for the false belief condition. These results show that (i) frontal activity is required for processing false belief tasks and (ii) parietal effects reported in previous studies to reflect specific cognitive process of monitoring others' beliefs can be elicited in the absence of an explicit instruction for mentalizing.