Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

Bridging flexible goal-directed cognition and consciousness: The Goal-Aligning Representation Internal Manipulation theory

Goal-directed manipulation of internal representations is a key element of human flexible behaviour, while consciousness is commonly associated with higher-order cognition and human flexibility. Current perspectives have only partially linked these processes, thus preventing a clear understanding of how they jointly generate flexible cognition and behaviour. Moreover, these limitations prevent an effective exploitation of this knowledge for technological scopes. We propose a new theoretical perspective that extends our 'three-component theory of flexible cognition' toward higher-order cognition and consciousness, based on the systematic integration of key concepts from Cognitive Neuroscience and AI/Robotics. The theory proposes that the function of conscious processes is to support the alignment of representations with multi-level goals. This higher alignment leads to more flexible and effective behaviours. We analyse here our previous model of goal-directed flexible cognition (validated with more than 20 human populations) as a starting GARIM-inspired model. By bridging the main theories of consciousness and goal-directed behaviour, the theory has relevant implications for scientific and technological fields. In particular, it contributes to developing new experimental tasks and interpreting clinical evidence. Finally, it indicates directions for improving machine learning and robotics systems and for informing real-world applications (e.g., in digital-twin healthcare and roboethics).

Working memory forgetting: Bridging gaps between human and animal studies

The causes of forgetting in working memory (WM) remain a source of debate in cognitive psychology, partly because it has always been challenging to probe the complex neural mechanisms that govern rapid cognitive processes in humans. In this review, we argue that neural, and more precisely animal models, provide valuable tools for exploring the precise mechanisms of WM forgetting. First, we discuss theoretical perspectives concerning WM forgetting in humans. Then, we present neuronal correlates of WM in animals, starting from the initial evidence of delay activity observed in the prefrontal cortex to the later synaptic theory of WM. In the third part, specific theories of WM are discussed, including the notion that silent versus non-silent activity is more consistent with the processes of refreshing and decay proposed in human cognitive models. The review concludes with an exploration of the relationship between long-term memory and WM, revealing connections between these two forms of memory through the long-term synaptic hypothesis, which suggests that long-term storage of interference can potentially disrupt WM.

Meso-scale reorganization of local-global brain networks under mild sedation of propofol anesthesia

The fragmentation of the functional brain network has been identified through the functional connectivity (FC) analysis in studies investigating anesthesia-induced loss of consciousness (LOC). However, it remains unclear whether mild sedation of anesthesia can cause similar effects. This paper aims to explore the changes in local-global brain network topology during mild anesthesia, to better understand the macroscopic neural mechanism underlying anesthesia sedation. We analyzed high-density EEG from 20 participants undergoing mild and moderate sedation of propofol anesthesia. By employing a local-global brain parcellation in EEG source analysis, we established binary functional brain networks for each participant. Furthermore, we investigated the global-scale properties of brain networks by estimating global efficiency and modularity, and examined the changes in meso-scale properties of brain networks by quantifying the distribution of high-degree and high-betweenness hubs and their corresponding rich-club coefficients. It is evident from the results that the mild sedation of anesthesia does not cause a significant change in the global-scale properties of brain networks. However, network components centered on SomMot L show a significant decrease, while those centered on Default L, Vis L and Limbic L exhibit a significant increase during the transition from wakefulness to mild sedation (p<0.05). Compared to the baseline state, mild sedation almost doubled the number of high-degree hubs in Vis L, DorsAttn L, Limbic L, Cont L, and reduced by half the number of high-degree hubs in SomMot R, DorsAttn R, SalVentAttn R. Further, mild sedation almost doubled the number of high-betweenness hubs in Vis L, Vis R, Limbic R, Cont R, and reduced by half the number of high-betweenness hubs in SomMot L, SalVentAttn L, Default L, and SomMot R. Our results indicate that mild anesthesia cannot affect the global integration and segregation of brain networks, but influence meso-scale function for integrating different resting-state systems involved in various segregation processes. Our findings suggest that the meso-scale brain network reorganization, situated between global integration and local segregation, could reflect the autonomic compensation of the brain for drug effects. As a direct response and adjustment of the brain network system to drug administration, this spontaneous reorganization of the brain network is aimed at maintaining consciousness in the case of sedation.

The Relation Between Subjective and Objective Measures of Visual Awareness: Current Evidence, Attempt of a Synthesis and Future Research Directions

Within the realm of consciousness research, different methods of measuring the content of visual awareness are used: On the one hand, subjective measures require a report of sensory experiences related to a stimulus. On the other hand, objective measures rely on the observer's performance to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus. The most appropriate measure of awareness is currently debated. To contribute to this debate, we review findings on the relation between subjective and objective measures of awareness. Although subjective measures sometimes lag behind objective measures, a substantial number of studies demonstrates a convergence of measures. Based on the reviewed studies, we identify five aspects relevant for achieving a convergence of measures. Future research could then identify and empirically test the boundary conditions, under which a convergence or divergence of subjective and measures of awareness is observed.

A synergistic workspace for human consciousness revealed by Integrated Information Decomposition

How is the information-processing architecture of the human brain organised, and how does its organisation support consciousness? Here, we combine network science and a rigorous information-theoretic notion of synergy to delineate a 'synergistic global workspace', comprising gateway regions that gather synergistic information from specialised modules across the human brain. This information is then integrated within the workspace and widely distributed via broadcaster regions. Through functional MRI analysis, we show that gateway regions of the synergistic workspace correspond to the human brain's default mode network, whereas broadcasters coincide with the executive control network. We find that loss of consciousness due to general anaesthesia or disorders of consciousness corresponds to diminished ability of the synergistic workspace to integrate information, which is restored upon recovery. Thus, loss of consciousness coincides with a breakdown of information integration within the synergistic workspace of the human brain. This work contributes to conceptual and empirical reconciliation between two prominent scientific theories of consciousness, the Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory, while also advancing our understanding of how the human brain supports consciousness through the synergistic integration of information.

Quality space computations for consciousness

The quality space hypothesis about conscious experience proposes that conscious sensory states are experienced in relation to other possible sensory states. For instance, the colour red is experienced as being more like orange, and less like green or blue. Recent empirical findings suggest that subjective similarity space can be explained in terms of similarities in neural activation patterns. Here, we consider how localist, workspace, and higher-order theories of consciousness can accommodate claims about the qualitative character of experience and functionally support a quality space. We review existing empirical evidence for each of these positions, and highlight novel experimental tools, such as altering local activation spaces via brain stimulation or behavioural training, that can distinguish these accounts.

Pre-frontal cortex guides dimension-reducing transformations in the occipito-ventral pathway for categorization behaviors

To interpret our surroundings, the brain uses a visual categorization process. Current theories and models suggest that this process comprises a hierarchy of different computations that transforms complex, high-dimensional inputs into lower-dimensional representations (i.e., manifolds) in support of multiple categorization behaviors. Here, we tested this hypothesis by analyzing these transformations reflected in dynamic MEG source activity while individual participants actively categorized the same stimuli according to different tasks: face expression, face gender, pedestrian gender, and vehicle type. Results reveal three transformation stages guided by the pre-frontal cortex. At stage 1 (high-dimensional, 50-120 ms), occipital sources represent both task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimulus features; task-relevant features advance into higher ventral/dorsal regions, whereas task-irrelevant features halt at the occipital-temporal junction. At stage 2 (121-150 ms), stimulus feature representations reduce to lower-dimensional manifolds, which then transform into the task-relevant features underlying categorization behavior over stage 3 (161-350 ms). Our findings shed light on how the brain's network mechanisms transform high-dimensional inputs into specific feature manifolds that support multiple categorization behaviors.

Distinct dynamic connectivity profiles promote enhanced conscious perception of auditory stimuli

The neuroscience of consciousness aims to identify neural markers that distinguish brain dynamics in healthy individuals from those in unconscious conditions. Recent research has revealed that specific brain connectivity patterns correlate with conscious states and diminish with loss of consciousness. However, the contribution of these patterns to shaping conscious processing remains unclear. Our study investigates the functional significance of these neural dynamics by examining their impact on participants' ability to process external information during wakefulness. Using fMRI recordings during an auditory detection task and rest, we show that ongoing dynamics are underpinned by brain patterns consistent with those identified in previous research. Detection of auditory stimuli at threshold is specifically improved when the connectivity pattern at stimulus presentation corresponds to patterns characteristic of conscious states. Conversely, the occurrence of these conscious state-associated patterns increases after detection, indicating a mutual influence between ongoing brain dynamics and conscious perception. Our findings suggest that certain brain configurations are more favorable to the conscious processing of external stimuli. Targeting these favorable patterns in patients with consciousness disorders may help identify windows of greater receptivity to the external world, guiding personalized treatments.

Propofol anesthesia destabilizes neural dynamics across cortex

Every day, hundreds of thousands of people undergo general anesthesia. One hypothesis is that anesthesia disrupts dynamic stability-the ability of the brain to balance excitability with the need to be stable and controllable. To test this hypothesis, we developed a method for quantifying changes in population-level dynamic stability in complex systems: delayed linear analysis for stability estimation (DeLASE). Propofol was used to transition animals between the awake state and anesthetized unconsciousness. DeLASE was applied to macaque cortex local field potentials (LFPs). We found that neural dynamics were more unstable in unconsciousness compared with the awake state. Cortical trajectories mirrored predictions from destabilized linear systems. We mimicked the effect of propofol in simulated neural networks by increasing inhibitory tone. This in turn destabilized the networks, as observed in the neural data. Our results suggest that anesthesia disrupts dynamical stability that is required for consciousness.

Exploring complex and integrated information during sleep

The Integrated Information Theory is a theoretical framework that aims to elucidate the nature of consciousness by postulating that it emerges from the integration of information within a system, and that the degree of consciousness depends on the extent of information integration within the system. When consciousness is lost, the core complex of consciousness proposed by the Integrated Information Theory disintegrates, and Φ measures, which reflect the level of integrated information, are expected to diminish. This study examined the predictions of the Integrated Information Theory using the global brain network acquired via functional magnetic resonance imaging during various tasks and sleep. We discovered that the complex located within the frontoparietal network remained constant regardless of task content, while the regional distribution of the complex collapsed in the initial stages of sleep. Furthermore, Φ measures decreased as sleep progressed under limited analysis conditions. These findings align with predictions made by the Integrated Information Theory and support its postulates.

Lateral frontoparietal effective connectivity differentiates and predicts state of consciousness in a cohort of patients with traumatic disorders of consciousness

Neuroimaging studies have suggested an important role for the default mode network (DMN) in disorders of consciousness (DoC). However, the extent to which DMN connectivity can discriminate DoC states-unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) and minimally conscious state (MCS)-is less evident. Particularly, it is unclear whether effective DMN connectivity, as measured indirectly with dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of resting EEG can disentangle UWS from healthy controls and from patients considered conscious (MCS+). Crucially, this extends to UWS patients with potentially "covert" awareness (minimally conscious star, MCS*) indexed by voluntary brain activity in conjunction with partially preserved frontoparietal metabolism as measured with positron emission tomography (PET+ diagnosis; in contrast to PET- diagnosis with complete frontoparietal hypometabolism). Here, we address this gap by using DCM of EEG data acquired from patients with traumatic brain injury in 11 UWS (6 PET- and 5 PET+) and in 12 MCS+ (11 PET+ and 1 PET-), alongside with 11 healthy controls. We provide evidence for a key difference in left frontoparietal connectivity when contrasting UWS PET- with MCS+ patients and healthy controls. Next, in a leave-one-subject-out cross-validation, we tested the classification performance of the DCM models demonstrating that connectivity between medial prefrontal and left parietal sources reliably discriminates UWS PET- from MCS+ patients and controls. Finally, we illustrate that these models generalize to an unseen dataset: models trained to discriminate UWS PET- from MCS+ and controls, classify MCS* patients as conscious subjects with high posterior probability (pp > .92). These results identify specific alterations in the DMN after severe brain injury and highlight the clinical utility of EEG-based effective connectivity for identifying patients with potential covert awareness.

State-Dependent tACS Effects Reveal the Potential Causal Role of Prestimulus Alpha Traveling Waves in Visual Contrast Detection

The intricate relationship between prestimulus alpha oscillations and visual contrast detection variability has been the focus of numerous studies. However, the causal impact of prestimulus alpha traveling waves on visual contrast detection remains largely unexplored. In our research, we sought to discern the causal link between prestimulus alpha traveling waves and visual contrast detection across different levels of mental fatigue. Using electroencephalography alongside a visual detection task with 30 healthy adults (13 females; 17 males), we identified a robust negative correlation between prestimulus alpha forward traveling waves (FTWs) and visual contrast threshold (VCT). Inspired by this correlation, we utilized 45/-45° phase-shifted transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) in a sham-controlled, double-blind, within-subject experiment with 33 healthy adults (23 females; 10 males) to directly modulate these alpha traveling waves. After the application of 45° phase-shifted tACS, we observed a substantial decrease in FTW and an increase in backward traveling waves, along with a concurrent increase in VCT, compared with the sham condition. These changes were particularly pronounced under a low fatigue state. The findings of state-dependent tACS effects reveal the potential causal role of prestimulus alpha traveling waves in visual contrast detection. Moreover, our study highlights the potential of 45/-45° phase-shifted tACS in cognitive modulation and therapeutic applications.

Beyond task response-Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness

The current discussion on the neural correlates of the contents of consciousness (NCCc) focuses mainly on the post-stimulus period of task-related activity. This neglects the substantial impact of the spontaneous or ongoing activity of the brain as manifest in pre-stimulus activity. Does the interaction of pre- and post-stimulus activity shape the contents of consciousness? Addressing this gap in our knowledge, we review and converge two recent lines of findings, that is, pre-stimulus alpha power and pre- and post-stimulus alpha trial-to-trial variability (TTV). The data show that pre-stimulus alpha power modulates post-stimulus activity including specifically the subjective features of conscious contents like confidence and vividness. At the same time, alpha pre-stimulus variability shapes post-stimulus TTV reduction including the associated contents of consciousness. We propose that non-additive rather than merely additive interaction of the internal pre-stimulus activity with the external stimulus in the alpha band is key for contents to become conscious. This is mediated by mechanisms on different levels including neurophysiological, neurocomputational, neurodynamic, neuropsychological and neurophenomenal levels. Overall, considering the interplay of pre-stimulus intrinsic and post-stimulus extrinsic activity across wider timescales, not just evoked responses in the post-stimulus period, is critical for identifying neural correlates of consciousness. This is well in line with both processing and especially the Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC).

Homeostatic Feelings and the Emergence of Consciousness

In this article, we summarize our views on the problem of consciousness and outline the current version of a novel hypothesis for how conscious minds can be generated in mammalian organisms. We propose that a mind can be considered conscious when three processes are in place: the first is a continuous generation of interoceptive feelings, which results in experiencing of the organism's internal operations; the second is the equally continuous production of images, generated according to the organism's sensory perspective relative to its surround; the third combines feeling/experience and perspective resulting in a process of subjectivity relative to the image contents. We also propose a biological basis for these three components: the peripheral and central physiology of interoception and exteroception help explain the implementation of the first two components, whereas the third depends on central nervous system integration, at multiple levels, from spinal cord, brainstem, and diencephalic nuclei, to selected regions of the mesial cerebral cortices.

Unravelling consciousness and brain function through the lens of time, space, and information

Disentangling how cognitive functions emerge from the interplay of brain dynamics and network architecture is among the major challenges that neuroscientists face. Pharmacological and pathological perturbations of consciousness provide a lens to investigate these complex challenges. Here, we review how recent advances about consciousness and the brain's functional organisation have been driven by a common denominator: decomposing brain function into fundamental constituents of time, space, and information. Whereas unconsciousness increases structure-function coupling across scales, psychedelics may decouple brain function from structure. Convergent effects also emerge: anaesthetics, psychedelics, and disorders of consciousness can exhibit similar reconfigurations of the brain's unimodal-transmodal functional axis. Decomposition approaches reveal the potential to translate discoveries across species, with computational modelling providing a path towards mechanistic integration.

Perceptual Awareness in Human Infants: What is the Evidence?

Perceptual awareness in infants during the first year of life is understudied, despite the philosophical, scientific, and clinical importance of understanding how and when consciousness emerges during human brain development. Although parents are undoubtedly convinced that their infant is conscious, the lack of adequate experimental paradigms to address this question in preverbal infants has been a hindrance to research on this topic. However, recent behavioral and brain imaging studies have shown that infants are engaged in complex learning from an early age and that their brains are more structured than traditionally thought. I will present a rapid overview of these results, which might provide indirect evidence of early perceptual awareness and then describe how a more systematic approach to this question could stand within the framework of global workspace theory, which identifies specific signatures of conscious perception in adults. Relying on these brain signatures as a benchmark for conscious perception, we can deduce that it exists in the second half of the first year, whereas the evidence before the age of 5 months is less solid, mainly because of the paucity of studies. The question of conscious perception before term remains open, with the possibility of short periods of conscious perception, which would facilitate early learning. Advances in brain imaging and growing interest in this subject should enable us to gain a better understanding of this important issue in the years to come.

Contributions of Basal Ganglia Circuits to Perception, Attention, and Consciousness

Research into ascending sensory pathways and cortical networks has generated detailed models of perception. These same cortical regions are strongly connected to subcortical structures, such as the basal ganglia (BG), which have been conceptualized as playing key roles in reinforcement learning and action selection. However, because the BG amasses experiential evidence from higher and lower levels of cortical hierarchies, as well as higher-order thalamus, it is well positioned to dynamically influence perception. Here, we review anatomical, functional, and clinical evidence to demonstrate how the BG can influence perceptual processing and conscious states. This depends on the integrative relationship between cortex, BG, and thalamus, which allows contributions to sensory gating, predictive processing, selective attention, and representation of the temporal structure of events.

The experimental study of consciousness: Is psychology travelling back to the future?

It was with the promise of rendering an experimental approach to consciousness that psychology started its trajectory as an independent science more than 150 years ago. Here, we will posit that the neurosciences were instrumental in leading psychology to resume the study of consciousness by projecting an empirical agenda for the future. First, we will start by showing how scientists were able to venture into the consciousness of supposedly unconscious patients, opening the door for the identification of important neural correlates of distinct consciousness states. Then, we will describe how different technological advances and elegant experimental paradigms helped in establishing important neuronal correlates of global consciousness (i.e., being conscious at all), perceptual consciousness (i.e., being conscious of something), and self-consciousness (i.e., being conscious of itself). Finally, we will illustrate how the study of complex consciousness experiences may contribute to the clarification of the mechanisms associated with global consciousness, the relationship between perceptual and self-consciousness, and the interface among distinct self-consciousness domains. In closing, we will elaborate on the road ahead of us for re-establishing psychology as a science of consciousness.

Common functional mechanisms underlying dynamic brain network changes across five general anesthetics: A rat fMRI study

BACKGROUND

Reversible loss of consciousness is the primary therapeutic endpoint of general anesthesia; however, the drug-invariant mechanisms underlying anesthetic-induced unconsciousness are still unclear. This study aimed to investigate the static, dynamic, topological and organizational changes in functional brain network induced by five clinically-used general anesthetics in the rat brain.

METHOD

Male Sprague-Dawley rats (n = 57) were randomly allocated to received propofol, isoflurane, ketamine, dexmedetomidine, or combined isoflurane plus dexmedetomidine anesthesia. Resting-state functional magnetic resonance images were acquired under general anesthesia and analyzed for changes in dynamic functional brain networks compared to the awake state.

RESULTS

Different general anesthetics induced distinct patterns of functional connectivity inhibition within brain-wide networks, resulting in multi-level network reorganization primarily by impairing the functional connectivity of cortico-subcortical networks as well as by reducing information transmission capacity, intrinsic connectivity, and network architecture stability of subcortical regions. Conversely, functional connectivity and topological properties were preserved within cortico-cortical networks, albeit with fewer dynamic fluctuations under general anesthesia.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings highlighted the effects of different general anesthetics on functional brain network reorganization, which might shed light on the drug-invariant mechanism of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.

Intracranial neural representation of phenomenal and access consciousness in the human brain

After more than 30 years of extensive investigation, impressive progress has been made in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). However, the functional role of spatiotemporally distinct consciousness-related neural activity in conscious perception is debated. An influential framework proposed that consciousness-related neural activities could be dissociated into two distinct processes: phenomenal and access consciousness. However, though hotly debated, its authenticity has not been examined in a single paradigm with more informative intracranial recordings. In the present study, we employed a visual awareness task and recorded the local field potential (LFP) of patients with electrodes implanted in cortical and subcortical regions. Overall, we found that the latency of visual awareness-related activity exhibited a bimodal distribution, and the recording sites with short and long latencies were largely separated in location, except in the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC). The mixture of short and long latencies in the lPFC indicates that it plays a critical role in linking phenomenal and access consciousness. However, the division between the two is not as simple as the central sulcus, as proposed previously. Moreover, in 4 patients with electrodes implanted in the bilateral prefrontal cortex, early awareness-related activity was confined to the contralateral side, while late awareness-related activity appeared on both sides. Finally, Granger causality analysis showed that awareness-related information flowed from the early sites to the late sites. These results provide the first LFP evidence of neural correlates of phenomenal and access consciousness, which sheds light on the spatiotemporal dynamics of NCC in the human brain.

What does decoding from the PFC reveal about consciousness?

Disputes between rival theories of consciousness have often centered on whether perceptual contents can be decoded from the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Failures to decode from the PFC are taken to challenge 'cognitive' theories of consciousness such as the global workspace theory and higher-order monitoring theories, and decoding successes have been taken to confirm these theories. However, PFC decoding shows both too much and too little. Too much because cognitive theories of consciousness do not need PFC rerepresentation of perceptual contents since pointers to perceptual representations suffice. Too little because there is evidence that PFC decoding of perceptual content reflects postperceptual cognitive representation, such as thoughts that have those perceptual contents rather than conscious percepts.

Unconscious Perception of Vernier Offsets

The comparison between conscious and unconscious perception is a cornerstone of consciousness science. However, most studies reporting above-chance discrimination of unseen stimuli do not control for criterion biases when assessing awareness. We tested whether observers can discriminate subjectively invisible offsets of Vernier stimuli when visibility is probed using a bias-free task. To reduce visibility, stimuli were either backward masked or presented for very brief durations (1-3 milliseconds) using a modern-day Tachistoscope. We found some behavioral indicators of perception without awareness, and yet, no conclusive evidence thereof. To seek more decisive proof, we simulated a series of Bayesian observer models, including some that produce visibility judgements alongside type-1 judgements. Our data are best accounted for by observers with slightly suboptimal conscious access to sensory evidence. Overall, the stimuli and visibility manipulations employed here induced mild instances of blindsight-like behavior, making them attractive candidates for future investigation of this phenomenon.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

Assessment of impaired consciousness using EEG-based connectivity features and convolutional neural networks

Growing electroencephalogram (EEG) studies have linked the abnormities of functional brain networks with disorders of consciousness (DOC). However, due to network data's high-dimensional and non-Euclidean properties, it is difficult to exploit the brain connectivity information that can effectively detect the consciousness levels of DOC patients via deep learning. To take maximum advantage of network information in assessing impaired consciousness, we utilized the functional connectivity with convolutional neural network (CNN) and employed three rearrangement schemes to improve the evaluation performance of brain networks. In addition, the gradient-weighted class activation mapping (Grad-CAM) was adopted to visualize the classification contributions of connections among different areas. We demonstrated that the classification performance was significantly enhanced by applying network rearrangement techniques compared to those obtained by the original connectivity matrix (with an accuracy of 75.0%). The highest classification accuracy (87.2%) was achieved by rearranging the alpha network based on the anatomical regions. The inter-region connections (i.e., frontal-parietal and frontal-occipital connectivity) played dominant roles in the classification of patients with different consciousness states. The effectiveness of functional connectivity in revealing individual differences in brain activity was further validated by the correlation between behavioral performance and connections among specific regions. These findings suggest that our proposed assessment model could detect the residual consciousness of patients.

Consciousness and the Dying Brain

The near-death experience has been reported since antiquity and is often characterized by the perception of light, interactions with other entities, and life recall. Near-death experiences can occur in a variety of situations, but they have been studied systematically after in-hospital cardiac arrest, with an incidence of 10 to 20%. Long attributed to metaphysical or supernatural causes, there have been recent advances in understanding the neurophysiologic basis of this unique category of conscious experience. This article reviews the epidemiology and neurobiology of near-death experiences, with a focus on clinical and laboratory evidence for a surge of neurophysiologic gamma oscillations and cortical connectivity after cardiac and respiratory arrest.

Classification of musical intervals by spiking neural networks: Perfect student in solfége classes

We investigate a spike activity of a network of excitable FitzHugh-Nagumo neurons, which is under constant two-frequency auditory signals. The neurons are supplemented with linear frequency filters and nonlinear input signal converters. We show that it is possible to configure the network to recognize a specific frequency ratio (musical interval) by selecting the parameters of the neurons, input filters, and coupling between neurons. A set of appropriately configured subnetworks with different topologies and coupling strengths can serve as a classifier for musical intervals. We have found that the selective properties of the classifier are due to the presence of a specific topology of coupling between the neurons of the network.

Toward a universal theory of consciousness

While falsifiability has been broadly discussed as a desirable property of a theory of consciousness, in this paper, we introduce the meta-theoretic concept of "Universality" as an additional desirable property for a theory of consciousness. The concept of universality, often assumed in physics, posits that the fundamental laws of nature are consistent and apply equally everywhere in the universe and remain constant over time. This assumption is crucial in science, acting as a guiding principle for developing and testing theories. When applied to theories of consciousness, universality can be defined as the ability of a theory to determine whether any fully described dynamical system is conscious or non-conscious. Importantly, for a theory to be universal, the determinant of consciousness needs to be defined as an intrinsic property of a system as opposed to replying on the interpretation of the external observer. The importance of universality originates from the consideration that given that consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it could in principle manifest in any physical system that satisfies a certain set of conditions whether it is biological or non-biological. To date, apart from a few exceptions, most existing theories do not possess this property. Instead, they tend to make predictions as to the neural correlates of consciousness based on the interpretations of brain functions, which makes those theories only applicable to brain-centric systems. While current functionalist theories of consciousness tend to be heavily reliant on our interpretations of brain functions, we argue that functionalist theories could be converted to a universal theory by specifying mathematical formulations of the constituent concepts. While neurobiological and functionalist theories retain their utility in practice, we will eventually need a universal theory to fully explain why certain types of systems possess consciousness.

An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn't the content NCC

Recent years have seen the rise of several theories saying that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a neural correlate of visual consciousness (NCC). Especially popular here are theories saying that the PFC is the 'content NCC' for vision, i.e. it contains those brain areas that are not only necessary for consciousness, but also determine 'what' it is that we visually experience (e.g. whether we experience green or red). This article points out how this "upper-deck" form of PFC theory is at odds with the character of visual experience: on the one hand, visual consciousness appears to contain copious amounts of content, with many properties (such as object, shape, or color) being simultaneously represented in many parts of the visual field. On the other hand, the functions that the PFC carries out (e.g. attention and working memory) are each dedicated to processing only a relatively small subset of available visual stimuli. In short, the PFC probably does not produce enough or the right kind of visual representations for it to supply all of the content found in visual experience, in which case the idea that the PFC is the content NCC for vision is probably false. This article also discusses data thought to undercut the idea that visual experience is informationally rich (inattentional blindness, etc.), along with theories of vision according to which "ensemble statistics" are used to represent features in the periphery of the visual field. I'll argue that these lines of evidence fail to close the apparently vast gap between the amount of visual content represented in the visual experience and the amount represented in the PFC.

Exploring effects of anesthesia on complexity, differentiation, and integrated information in rat EEG

To investigate mechanisms underlying loss of consciousness, it is important to extend methods established in humans to rodents as well. Perturbational complexity index (PCI) is a promising metric of "capacity for consciousness" and is based on a perturbational approach that allows inferring a system's capacity for causal integration and differentiation of information. These properties have been proposed as necessary for conscious systems. Measures based on spontaneous electroencephalography recordings, however, may be more practical for certain clinical purposes and may better reflect ongoing dynamics. Here, we compare PCI (using electrical stimulation for perturbing cortical activity) to several spontaneous electroencephalography-based measures of signal diversity and integrated information in rats undergoing propofol, sevoflurane, and ketamine anesthesia. We find that, along with PCI, the spontaneous electroencephalography-based measures, Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZ) and geometric integrated information (ΦG), were best able to distinguish between awake and propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia. However, PCI was anti-correlated with spontaneous measures of integrated information, which generally increased during propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia, contrary to expectations. Together with an observed divergence in network properties estimated from directed functional connectivity (current results) and effective connectivity (earlier results), the perturbation-based results seem to suggest that anesthesia disrupts global cortico-cortical information transfer, whereas spontaneous activity suggests the opposite. We speculate that these seemingly diverging results may be because of suppressed encoding specificity of information or driving subcortical projections from, e.g., the thalamus. We conclude that certain perturbation-based measures (PCI) and spontaneous measures (LZ and ΦG) may be complementary and mutually informative when studying altered states of consciousness.

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

Thalamic contributions to the state and contents of consciousness

Consciousness can be conceptualized as varying along at least two dimensions: the global state of consciousness and the content of conscious experience. Here, we highlight the cellular and systems-level contributions of the thalamus to conscious state and then argue for thalamic contributions to conscious content, including the integrated, segregated, and continuous nature of our experience. We underscore vital, yet distinct roles for core- and matrix-type thalamic neurons. Through reciprocal interactions with deep-layer cortical neurons, matrix neurons support wakefulness and determine perceptual thresholds, whereas the cortical interactions of core neurons maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. We further propose that conscious integration, segregation, and continuity depend on the convergent nature of corticothalamic projections enabling dimensionality reduction, a thalamic reticular nucleus-mediated divisive normalization-like process, and sustained coherent activity in thalamocortical loops, respectively. Overall, we conclude that the thalamus plays a central topological role in brain structures controlling conscious experience.

Anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness

In the 19th century, the discovery of general anesthesia revolutionized medical care. In the 21st century, anesthetics have become indispensable tools to study consciousness. Here, I review key aspects of the relationship between anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness, including interfaces of sleep and anesthetic mechanisms, anesthesia and primary sensory processing, the effects of anesthetics on large-scale functional brain networks, and mechanisms of arousal from anesthesia. I discuss the implications of the data derived from the anesthetized state for the science of consciousness and then conclude with outstanding questions, reflections, and future directions.

An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.

Late Positivity Correlates with Subjective Reports: Evidence from the Low-frequency and High-frequency Reporting Tasks

Identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is an important way to understand the fundamental nature of consciousness. By recording event-related potentials (ERPs) using EEG, researchers have found three potential electrophysiological NCCs: early positive correlate of consciousness (enhanced P1), visual awareness negativity (VAN), and late positivity (LP). However, LP may reflect post-perceptual processing associated with subjective reports rather than consciousness per se. The present experiment investigated the relationship between LP and subjective reports. We adopted two subjective reporting tasks that differed in the requirement for subjective reports. In the low-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in 25% of trials, whereas in the high-frequency reporting task, participants needed to report whether they saw the target picture in each trial. Behavioral results showed that the hit rates were lower and false alarm rates were higher on reporting trials in low-frequency reporting tasks than on reporting trials in high-frequency reporting tasks. Unexpectedly, VAN was larger on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task. Importantly, our ERP results showed that LP was larger on reporting trials in the high-frequency reporting task than on reporting trials in the low-frequency reporting task. Thus, our findings indicated that when the frequency of reports was increased, the task relevance of the stimuli increased, which led to larger LP amplitudes. These findings suggest that LP correlates with subjective reports.

Artificial intelligence, human cognition, and conscious supremacy

The computational significance of consciousness is an important and potentially more tractable research theme than the hard problem of consciousness, as one could look at the correlation of consciousness and computational capacities through, e.g., algorithmic or complexity analyses. In the literature, consciousness is defined as what it is like to be an agent (i.e., a human or a bat), with phenomenal properties, such as qualia, intentionality, and self-awareness. The absence of these properties would be termed "unconscious." The recent success of large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, has raised new questions about the computational significance of human conscious processing. Although instances from biological systems would typically suggest a robust correlation between intelligence and consciousness, certain states of consciousness seem to exist without manifest existence of intelligence. On the other hand, AI systems seem to exhibit intelligence without consciousness. These instances seem to suggest possible dissociations between consciousness and intelligence in natural and artificial systems. Here, I review some salient ideas about the computational significance of human conscious processes and identify several cognitive domains potentially unique to consciousness, such as flexible attention modulation, robust handling of new contexts, choice and decision making, cognition reflecting a wide spectrum of sensory information in an integrated manner, and finally embodied cognition, which might involve unconscious processes as well. Compared to such cognitive tasks, characterized by flexible and ad hoc judgments and choices, adequately acquired knowledge and skills are typically processed unconsciously in humans, consistent with the view that computation exhibited by LLMs, which are pretrained on a large dataset, could in principle be processed without consciousness, although conversations in humans are typically done consciously, with awareness of auditory qualia as well as the semantics of what are being said. I discuss the theoretically and practically important issue of separating computations, which need to be conducted consciously from those which could be done unconsciously, in areas, such as perception, language, and driving. I propose conscious supremacy as a concept analogous to quantum supremacy, which would help identify computations possibly unique to consciousness in biologically practical time and resource limits. I explore possible mechanisms supporting the hypothetical conscious supremacy. Finally, I discuss the relevance of issues covered here for AI alignment, where computations of AI and humans need to be aligned.

Distributed and dynamical communication: a mechanism for flexible cortico-cortical interactions and its functional roles in visual attention

Perceptual and cognitive processing relies on flexible communication among cortical areas; however, the underlying neural mechanism remains unclear. Here we report a mechanism based on the realistic spatiotemporal dynamics of propagating wave patterns in neural population activity. Using a biophysically plausible, multiarea spiking neural circuit model, we demonstrate that these wave patterns, characterized by their rich and complex dynamics, can account for a wide variety of empirically observed neural processes. The coordinated interactions of these wave patterns give rise to distributed and dynamic communication (DDC) that enables flexible and rapid routing of neural activity across cortical areas. We elucidate how DDC unifies the previously proposed oscillation synchronization-based and subspace-based views of interareal communication, offering experimentally testable predictions that we validate through the analysis of Allen Institute Neuropixels data. Furthermore, we demonstrate that DDC can be effectively modulated during attention tasks through the interplay of neuromodulators and cortical feedback loops. This modulation process explains many neural effects of attention, underscoring the fundamental functional role of DDC in cognition.

Electrophysiological correlates of sustained conscious perception

Previous research on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in visual perception revealed an early event-related potential (ERP), the visual awareness negativity (VAN), to be associated with stimulus awareness. However, due to the use of brief stimulus presentations in previous studies, it remains unclear whether awareness-related negativities represent a transient onset-related response or correspond to the duration of a conscious percept. Studies are required that allow prolonged stimulus presentation under aware and unaware conditions. The present ERP study aimed to tackle this challenge by using a novel stimulation design. Male and female human participants (n = 62) performed a visual task while task-irrelevant line stimuli were presented in the background for either 500 or 1000 ms. The line stimuli sometimes contained a face, which needed so-called visual one-shot learning to be seen. Half of the participants were informed about the presence of the face, resulting in faces being perceived by the informed but not by the uninformed participants. Comparing ERPs between the informed and uninformed group revealed an enhanced negativity over occipitotemporal electrodes that persisted for the entire duration of stimulus presentation. Our results suggest that sustained visual awareness negativities (SVAN) are associated with the duration of stimulus presentation.

State-related Electroencephalography Microstate Complexity during Propofol- and Esketamine-induced Unconsciousness

BACKGROUND

Identifying the state-related "neural correlates of consciousness" for anesthetics-induced unconsciousness is challenging. Spatiotemporal complexity is a promising tool for investigating consciousness. The authors hypothesized that spatiotemporal complexity may serve as a state-related but not drug-related electroencephalography (EEG) indicator during an unconscious state induced by different anesthetic drugs (e.g., propofol and esketamine).

METHODS

The authors recorded EEG from patients with unconsciousness induced by propofol (n = 10) and esketamine (n = 10). Both conventional microstate parameters and microstate complexity were analyzed. Spatiotemporal complexity was constructed by microstate sequences and complexity measures. Two different EEG microstate complexities were proposed to quantify the randomness (type I) and complexity (type II) of the EEG microstate series during the time course of the general anesthesia.

RESULTS

The coverage and occurrence of microstate E (prefrontal pattern) and the duration of microstate B (right frontal pattern) could distinguish the states of preinduction wakefulness, unconsciousness, and recovery under both anesthetics. Type I EEG microstate complexity based on mean information gain significantly increased from awake to unconsciousness state (propofol: from mean ± SD, 1.562 ± 0.059 to 1.672 ± 0.023, P < 0.001; esketamine: 1.599 ± 0.051 to 1.687 ± 0.013, P < 0.001), and significantly decreased from unconsciousness to recovery state (propofol: 1.672 ± 0.023 to 1.537 ± 0.058, P < 0.001; esketamine: 1.687 ± 0.013 to 1.608 ± 0.028, P < 0.001) under both anesthetics. In contrast, type II EEG microstate fluctuation complexity significantly decreased in the unconscious state under both drugs (propofol: from 2.291 ± 0.771 to 0.782 ± 0.163, P < 0.001; esketamine: from 1.645 ± 0.417 to 0.647 ± 0.252, P < 0.001), and then increased in the recovery state (propofol: 0.782 ± 0.163 to 2.446 ± 0.723, P < 0.001; esketamine: 0.647 ± 0.252 to 1.459 ± 0.264, P < 0.001).

CONCLUSIONS

Both type I and type II EEG microstate complexities are drug independent. Thus, the EEG microstate complexity measures that the authors proposed are promising tools for building state-related neural correlates of consciousness to quantify anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.

EDITOR’S PERSPECTIVE

Association of bidirectional network cores in the brain with conscious perception and cognition

The brain comprises a complex network of interacting regions. To understand the roles and mechanisms of this complex network, its structural features related to specific cognitive functions need to be elucidated. Among such relationships, recent developments in neuroscience highlight the link between network bidirectionality and conscious perception. Given the essential roles of both feedforward and feedback signals in conscious perception, it is surmised that subnetworks with bidirectional interactions are critical. However, the link between such subnetworks and conscious perception remains unclear due to the network's complexity. In this study, we propose a framework for extracting subnetworks with strong bidirectional interactions-termed the "cores" of a network-from brain activity. We applied this framework to resting-state and task-based fMRI data to identify regions forming strongly bidirectional cores. We then explored the association of these cores with conscious perception and cognitive functions. The central cores predominantly included cerebral cortical regions, which are crucial for conscious perception, rather than subcortical regions. Furthermore, the cores were composed of previously reported regions in which electrical stimulation altered conscious perception. These results suggest a link between the bidirectional cores and conscious perception. A meta-analysis and comparison of the core structure with a cortical functional connectivity gradient suggested that the central cores were related to lower-order sensorimotor functions. An ablation study emphasized the importance of incorporating bidirectionality, not merely interaction strength for these outcomes. The proposed framework provides novel insight into the roles of network cores with strong bidirectional interactions in conscious perception and lower-order sensorimotor functions.

Conscious perception of fear in faces: Insights from high-density EEG and perceptual awareness scale with threshold stimuli

Contrary to the extensive research on processing subliminal and/or unattended emotional facial expressions, only a minority of studies have investigated the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) of emotions conveyed by faces. In the present high-density electroencephalography (EEG) study, we first employed a staircase procedure to identify each participant's perceptual threshold of the emotion expressed by the face and then compared the EEG signals elicited in trials where the participants were aware with the activity elicited in trials where participants were unaware of the emotions expressed by these, otherwise identical, faces. Drawing on existing knowledge of the neural mechanisms of face processing and NCCs, we hypothesized that activity in frontal electrodes would be modulated in relation to participants' awareness of facial emotional content. More specifically, we hypothesized that the NCC of fear seen on someone else's face could be detected as a modulation of a later and more anterior (i.e., at frontal sites) event-related potential (ERP) than the face-sensitive N170. By adopting a data-driven approach and cluster-based statistics to the analysis of EEG signals, the results were clear-cut in showing that visual awareness of fear was associated with the modulation of a frontal ERP component in a 150-300 msec interval. These insights are dissected and contextualized in relation to prevailing theories of visual consciousness and their proposed NCC benchmarks.

Breakdown of effective information flow in disorders of consciousness: Insights from TMS-EEG

BACKGROUND

The complexity of the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying human consciousness is widely acknowledged, with information processing and flow originating in cortex conceived as a core mechanism of consciousness emergence. Combination of transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (TMS-EEG) is considered as a promising technique to understand the effective information flow associated with consciousness.

OBJECTIVES

To investigate information flow with TMS-EEG and its relationship to different consciousness states.

METHODS

We applied an effective information flow analysis by combining time-varying multivariate adaptive autoregressive model and adaptive directed transfer function on TMS-EEG data of frontal, motor and parietal cortex in patients with disorder of consciousness (DOC), including 14 vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) patients, 21 minimally conscious state (MCS) patients, and 22 healthy subjects.

RESULTS

TMS in DOC patients, particularly VS/UWS, induced a significantly weaker effective information flow compared to healthy subjects. The bidirectional directed information flow was lost in DOC patients with TMS of frontal, motor and parietal cortex. The interactive ROI rate of the information flow network induced by TMS of frontal and parietal cortex was significantly lower in VS/UWS than in MCS. The interactive ROI rate correlated with DOC clinical scales.

CONCLUSIONS

TMS-EEG revealed a physiologically relevant correlation between TMS-induced information flow and levels of consciousness. This suggests that breakdown of effective cortical information flow serves as a viable marker of human consciousness.

SIGNIFICANCE

Findings offer a unique perspective on the relevance of information flow in DOC, thus providing a novel way of understanding the physiological basis of human consciousness.

Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness ('C-tests') are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them.

The hidden structure of consciousness

According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms. However, the studies conducted over the last three decades do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience. One possible way to bridge the explanatory gap is to seek the structure of consciousness within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience. First, this analysis leads us to identify the explanandum concerning the simplest forms of experience not in qualia but in the unitary set of qualities found in early vision. Second, it leads us to hypothesize that consciousness is also made up of non-apparent parts, and that there exists a hidden structure of consciousness. This structure, corresponding to a simple early visual experience, is constituted by a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other. Each individual Spatial Belonging is formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary content can be traced in the perceptibility of the contents we can distinguish in the phenomenal field. The primary space is responsible for the perceptibility of the content and is not perceptible in itself. However, the phenomenon I refer to as subtraction of visibility allows us to characterize it as phenomenally negative. The hierarchical relationships between Spatial Belongings can ensure the qualitative nature of components of perceptual organization, such as object, background, and detail. The hidden structure of consciousness presents aspects that are decidedly counterintuitive compared to our idea of phenomenal experience. However, on the one hand, the Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings can explain the qualities of early vision and their appearance as a unitary whole, while on the other hand, it might be more easily explicable in terms of brain organization. In other words, the hidden structure of consciousness can be considered a bridge structure which, placing itself at an intermediate level between experience and physical properties, can contribute to bridging the explanatory gap.

The cognitive reality monitoring network and theories of consciousness

Theories of consciousness abound. However, it is difficult to arbitrate reliably among competing theories because they target different levels of neural and cognitive processing or anatomical loci, and only some were developed with computational models in mind. In particular, theories of consciousness need to fully address the three levels of understanding of the brain proposed by David Marr: computational theory, algorithms and hardware. Most major theories refer to only one or two levels, often indirectly. The cognitive reality monitoring network (CRMN) model is derived from computational theories of mixture-of-experts architecture, hierarchical reinforcement learning and generative/inference computing modules, addressing all three levels of understanding. A central feature of the CRMN is the mapping of a gating network onto the prefrontal cortex, making it a prime coding circuit involved in monitoring the accuracy of one's mental states and distinguishing them from external reality. Because the CRMN builds on the hierarchical and layer structure of the cerebral cortex, it may connect research and findings across species, further enabling concrete computational models of consciousness with new, explicitly testable hypotheses. In sum, we discuss how the CRMN model can help further our understanding of the nature and function of consciousness.

Awareness is needed for contextual effects in ambiguous object recognition

Despite its centrality to human experience, the functional role of conscious awareness is not yet known. One hypothesis suggests that consciousness is necessary for allowing high-level information to refine low-level processing in a "top-down" manner. To test this hypothesis, in this work we examined whether consciousness is needed for integrating contextual information with sensory information during visual object recognition, a case of top-down processing that is automatic and ubiquitous to our daily visual experience. In three experiments, 137 participants were asked to determine the identity of an ambiguous object presented to them. Crucially, a scene biasing the interpretation of the object towards one option over another (e.g., a picture of a tree when the object could equally be perceived as a fish or a leaf) was presented either before, after, or alongside the ambiguous object. In all three experiments, the scene biased perception of the ambiguous object when it was consciously perceived, but not when it was processed unconsciously. The results therefore suggest that conscious awareness may be needed for top-down contextual processes.

Information decomposition and the informational architecture of the brain

To explain how the brain orchestrates information-processing for cognition, we must understand information itself. Importantly, information is not a monolithic entity. Information decomposition techniques provide a way to split information into its constituent elements: unique, redundant, and synergistic information. We review how disentangling synergistic and redundant interactions is redefining our understanding of integrative brain function and its neural organisation. To explain how the brain navigates the trade-offs between redundancy and synergy, we review converging evidence integrating the structural, molecular, and functional underpinnings of synergy and redundancy; their roles in cognition and computation; and how they might arise over evolution and development. Overall, disentangling synergistic and redundant information provides a guiding principle for understanding the informational architecture of the brain and cognition.

Hierarchical consciousness: the Nested Observer Windows model

Foremost in our experience is the intuition that we possess a unified conscious experience. However, many observations run counter to this intuition: we experience paralyzing indecision when faced with two appealing behavioral choices, we simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs, and the content of our thought is often characterized by an internal debate. Here, we propose the Nested Observer Windows (NOW) Model, a framework for hierarchical consciousness wherein information processed across many spatiotemporal scales of the brain feeds into subjective experience. The model likens the mind to a hierarchy of nested mosaic tiles-where an image is composed of mosaic tiles, and each of these tiles is itself an image composed of mosaic tiles. Unitary consciousness exists at the apex of this nested hierarchy where perceptual constructs become fully integrated and complex behaviors are initiated via abstract commands. We define an observer window as a spatially and temporally constrained system within which information is integrated, e.g. in functional brain regions and neurons. Three principles from the signal analysis of electrical activity describe the nested hierarchy and generate testable predictions. First, nested observer windows disseminate information across spatiotemporal scales with cross-frequency coupling. Second, observer windows are characterized by a high degree of internal synchrony (with zero phase lag). Third, observer windows at the same spatiotemporal level share information with each other through coherence (with non-zero phase lag). The theoretical framework of the NOW Model accounts for a wide range of subjective experiences and a novel approach for integrating prominent theories of consciousness.

(Dis)confirming theories of consciousness and their predictions: towards a Lakatosian consciousness science

The neuroscience of consciousness is undergoing a significant empirical acceleration thanks to several adversarial collaborations that intend to test different predictions of rival theories of consciousness. In this context, it is important to pair consciousness science with confirmation theory, the philosophical discipline that explores the interaction between evidence and hypotheses, in order to understand how exactly, and to what extent, specific experiments are challenging or validating theories of consciousness. In this paper, I examine this intricate relationship by adopting a Lakatosian lens. I propose that Lakatos' philosophy of science can aid consciousness scientists to better interpret adversarial collaborations in consciousness science and, more generally, to develop a confirmation-theoretic model of theory-appraisal in this field. I do so by suggesting that such a model be built upon three Lakatos-inspired criteria for assessing the relationship between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions: (i) the model should represent the 'distinction between prediction and accommodation'; (ii) the model should represent the 'structural relevance' of predictions; (iii) the model should represent the 'boldness' of the predictions. I argue that a Lakatosian model of theory-appraisal has both normative and descriptive virtues, and can move the debate forward by acknowledging that theory-appraisal needs to consider the diachronic development of theories, their logical structure, and their relationship with background beliefs and knowledge.