Animal consciousness: a synthetic approach

Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness ('C-tests') are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them.

Behavioral indicators of heterogeneous subjective experience in animals across the phylogenetic spectrum: Implications for comparative animal phenomenology

This behavioral study was undertaken to provide empirical evidence in favor of or opposed to the notion that animals across a wide breadth of the animal kingdom have subjective (personal) experience that varies with their lifestyles, ecological constraints, or phylogeny. Twelve species representing two invertebrate phyla and six vertebrate classes were observed unobtrusively in 15-min episodes, during which three modes of behavior (volitional, interactive, and egocentric) were quantified according to the frequency, variety, and dynamism of each mode. Volitional behavior was the most prevalent and dynamic mode for nearly all species, largely without regard to phylogenetic position. Interactive behavior likewise varied inconsistently across the entire evolutionary spectrum. Egocentric behavior was concentrated among the avian and mammalian species, but evidence of it were observed in the invertebrate species as well. Diagrams of the matrix constructed from the three qualitative modes and three quantitative attributes for each mode provide a metaphorical representation of the unique experiential profile of each species. To the extent that these behavioral measures correlate with the nature of the animal's subjective experience, they support the growing view that phenomenology is heterogeneous, multimodal, and non-linear in extent across the animal kingdom.

Octopus vulgaris Exhibits Interindividual Differences in Behavioural and Problem-Solving Performance

By presenting individual Octopus vulgaris with an extractive foraging problem with a puzzle box, we examined the possible correlation between behavioural performances (e.g., ease of adaptation to captive conditions, prevalence of neophobic and neophilic behaviours, and propensity to learn individually or by observing conspecifics), biotic (body and brain size, age, sex) and abiotic (seasonality and place of origin) factors. We found more neophilic animals showing shorter latencies to approach the puzzle box and higher probability of solving the task; also, shorter times to solve the task were correlated with better performance on the individual learning task. However, the most neophilic octopuses that approached the puzzle box more quickly did not reach the solution earlier than other individuals, suggesting that strong neophilic tendency may lead to suboptimal performance at some stages of the problem-solving process. In addition, seasonal and environmental characteristics of location of origin appear to influence the rate of expression of individual traits central to problem solving. Overall, our analysis provides new insights into the traits associated with problem solving in invertebrates and highlights the presence of adaptive mechanisms that promote population-level changes in octopuses' behavioural traits.

The feasibility of artificial consciousness through the lens of neuroscience

Interactions with large language models (LLMs) have led to the suggestion that these models may soon be conscious. From the perspective of neuroscience, this position is difficult to defend. For one, the inputs to LLMs lack the embodied, embedded information content characteristic of our sensory contact with the world around us. Secondly, the architectures of present-day artificial intelligence algorithms are missing key features of the thalamocortical system that have been linked to conscious awareness in mammals. Finally, the evolutionary and developmental trajectories that led to the emergence of living conscious organisms arguably have no parallels in artificial systems as envisioned today. The existence of living organisms depends on their actions and their survival is intricately linked to multi-level cellular, inter-cellular, and organismal processes culminating in agency and consciousness.

Ethical Considerations for Echinoderms: New Initiatives in Welfare

This paper explores the ethical considerations surrounding research on echinoderms, a group of invertebrates that has recently garnered attention in the scientific community. The importance of responsible animal handling and the need for an ethical framework that encompasses echinoderms are emphasized. The 3Rs principle, advocating for the replacement of conscious living vertebrates with non-sentient material in research, is discussed as a guiding tool in current animal research practices. As invertebrates are generally classified as non-sentient animals, the replacement dimension tends to favor them as prevalent models in experimental research. While it currently lacks the means to assess the mental states of invertebrates, there is undeniable evidence of social behavior in many species, suggesting that a lack of interactions with these organisms could potentially adversely affect their wellbeing. In the last few years, considerable progress has been made in developing an ethical framework that takes invertebrates into account, particularly cephalopods, crustaceans, and echinoderms. In this context, we discuss the development of a broader conceptual framework of 5Rs that includes responsibility and respect, which may guide practices ensuring welfare in echinoderms, even in the absence of any particular normative.

Cephalopods and the law

In this My word Daniel Osorio explains why cephalopod molluscs were protected by a European Union directive on laboratory animal legislation in 2013, and how the scientific community responded to the challenges posed by this development.

The evolutionary origins of the Global Neuronal Workspace in vertebrates

The Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness offers an explicit functional architecture that relates consciousness to cognitive abilities such as perception, attention, memory, and evaluation. We show that the functional architecture of the Global Neuronal Workspace, which is based mainly on human studies, corresponds to the cognitive-affective architecture proposed by the Unlimited Associative Learning theory that describes minimal consciousness. However, we suggest that when applied to basal vertebrates, both models require important modifications to accommodate what has been learned about the evolution of the vertebrate brain. Most importantly, comparative studies suggest that in basal vertebrates, the Global Neuronal Workspace is instantiated by the event memory system found in the hippocampal homolog. This proposal has testable predictions and implications for understanding hippocampal and cortical functions, the evolutionary relations between memory and consciousness, and the evolution of unified perception.

The Self Course: Lessons Learned from Students' Weekly Questions

In this paper, I tentatively answer 50 questions sampled from a pool of over 10,000 weekly questions formulated by students in a course entitled "The Self". The questions pertain to various key topics related to self-processes, such as self-awareness, self-knowledge, self-regulation, self-talk, self-esteem, and self-regulation. The students' weekly questions and their answers highlight what is currently known about the self. Answers to the student questions also allow for the identification of some recurrent lessons about the self. Some of these lessons include: all self-processes are interconnected (e.g., prospection depends on autobiography), self-terms must be properly defined (e.g., self-rumination and worry are not the same), inner speech plays an important role in self-processes, controversies are numerous (are animals self-aware?), measurement issues abound (e.g., self-recognition as an operationalization of self-awareness), deficits in some self-processes can have devastating effects (e.g., self-regulatory deficits may lead to financial problems), and there are lots of unknowns about the self (e.g., gender differences in Theory-of-Mind).

Creation of an albino squid line by CRISPR-Cas9 and its application for in vivo functional imaging of neural activity

Cephalopods are remarkable among invertebrates for their cognitive abilities, adaptive camouflage, novel structures, and propensity for recoding proteins through RNA editing. Due to the lack of genetically tractable cephalopod models, however, the mechanisms underlying these innovations are poorly understood. Genome editing tools such as CRISPR-Cas9 allow targeted mutations in diverse species to better link genes and function. One emerging cephalopod model, Euprymna berryi, produces large numbers of embryos that can be easily cultured throughout their life cycle and has a sequenced genome. As proof of principle, we used CRISPR-Cas9 in E. berryi to target the gene for tryptophan 2,3 dioxygenase (TDO), an enzyme required for the formation of ommochromes, the pigments present in the eyes and chromatophores of cephalopods. CRISPR-Cas9 ribonucleoproteins targeting tdo were injected into early embryos and then cultured to adulthood. Unexpectedly, the injected specimens were pigmented, despite verification of indels at the targeted sites by sequencing in injected animals (G0s). A homozygote knockout line for TDO, bred through multiple generations, was also pigmented. Surprisingly, a gene encoding indoleamine 2,3, dioxygenase (IDO), an enzyme that catalyzes the same reaction as TDO in vertebrates, was also present in E. berryi. Double knockouts of both tdo and ido with CRISPR-Cas9 produced an albino phenotype. We demonstrate the utility of these albinos for in vivo imaging of Ca²⁺ signaling in the brain using two-photon microscopy. These data show the feasibility of making gene knockout cephalopod lines that can be used for live imaging of neural activity in these behaviorally sophisticated organisms.

Transcriptome-wide selection and validation of a solid set of reference genes for gene expression studies in the cephalopod mollusk Octopus vulgaris

Octopus vulgaris is a cephalopod mollusk and an active marine predator that has been at the center of a number of studies focused on the understanding of neural and biological plasticity. Studies on the machinery involved in e.g., learning and memory, regeneration, and neuromodulation are required to shed light on the conserved and/or unique mechanisms that these animals have evolved. Analysis of gene expression is one of the most essential means to expand our understanding of biological machinery, and the selection of an appropriate set of reference genes is the prerequisite for the quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR). Here we selected 77 candidate reference genes (RGs) from a pool of stable and relatively high-expressed transcripts identified from the full-length transcriptome of O. vulgaris, and we evaluated their expression stabilities in different tissues through geNorm, NormFinder, Bestkeeper, Delta-CT method, and RefFinder. Although various algorithms provided different assemblages of the most stable reference genes for the different kinds of tissues tested here, a comprehensive ranking revealed RGs specific to the nervous system (Ov-RNF7 and Ov-RIOK2) and Ov-EIF2A and Ov-CUL1 across all considered tissues. Furthermore, we validated RGs by assessing the expression profiles of nine target genes (Ov-Naa15, Ov-Ltv1, Ov-CG9286, Ov-EIF3M, Ov-NOB1, Ov-CSDE1, Ov-Abi2, Ov-Homer2, and Ov-Snx20) in different areas of the octopus nervous system (gastric ganglion, as control). Our study allowed us to identify the most extensive set of stable reference genes currently available for the nervous system and appendages of adult O. vulgaris.

The Morphospace of Consciousness: Three Kinds of Complexity for Minds and Machines

In this perspective article, we show that a morphospace, based on information-theoretic measures, can be a useful construct for comparing biological agents with artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The axes of this space label three kinds of complexity: (i) autonomic, (ii) computational and (iii) social complexity. On this space, we map biological agents such as bacteria, bees, C. elegans, primates and humans; as well as AI technologies such as deep neural networks, multi-agent bots, social robots, Siri and Watson. A complexity-based conceptualization provides a useful framework for identifying defining features and classes of conscious and intelligent systems. Starting with cognitive and clinical metrics of consciousness that assess awareness and wakefulness, we ask how AI and synthetically engineered life-forms would measure on homologous metrics. We argue that awareness and wakefulness stem from computational and autonomic complexity. Furthermore, tapping insights from cognitive robotics, we examine the functional role of consciousness in the context of evolutionary games. This points to a third kind of complexity for describing consciousness, namely, social complexity. Based on these metrics, our morphospace suggests the possibility of additional types of consciousness other than biological; namely, synthetic, group-based and simulated. This space provides a common conceptual framework for comparing traits and highlighting design principles of minds and machines.

In search for consciousness in animals: Using working memory and voluntary attention as behavioral indicators

Whether animals have subjective experiences about the content of their sensory input, i.e., whether they are aware of stimuli, is a notoriously difficult question to answer. If consciousness is present in animals, it must share fundamental characteristics with human awareness. Working memory and voluntary/endogenous attention are suggested as diagnostic features of conscious awareness. Behavioral evidence shows clear signatures of both working memory and voluntary attention as minimal criterium for sensory consciousness in mammals and birds. In contrast, reptiles and amphibians show no sign of either working memory or volitional attention. Surprisingly, some species of teleost fishes exhibit elementary working memory and voluntary attention effects suggestive of possibly rudimentary forms of subjective experience. With the potential exception of honeybees, evidence for conscious processing is lacking in invertebrates. These findings suggest that consciousness is not ubiquitous in the animal kingdom but also not exclusive to humans. The phylogenetic gap between animal taxa argues that evolution does not rely on specific neural substrates to endow distantly related species with basic forms of consciousness.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

Awareness and consciousness in humans and animals – neural and behavioral correlates in an evolutionary perspective

Awareness or consciousness in the context of stimulus perception can directly be assessed in well controlled test situations with humans via the persons’ reports about their subjective experiences with the stimuli. Since we have no direct access to subjective experiences in animals, their possible awareness or consciousness in stimulus perception tasks has often been inferred from behavior and cognitive abilities previously observed in aware and conscious humans. Here, we analyze published human data primarily on event-related potentials and brain-wave generation during perception and responding to sensory stimuli and extract neural markers (mainly latencies of evoked-potential peaks and of gamma-wave occurrence) indicating that a person became aware or conscious of the perceived stimulus. These neural correlates of consciousness were then applied to sets of corresponding data from various animals including several species of mammals, and one species each of birds, fish, cephalopods, and insects. We found that the neural markers from studies in humans could also successfully be applied to the mammal and bird data suggesting that species in these animal groups can become subjectively aware of and conscious about perceived stimuli. Fish, cephalopod and insect data remained inconclusive. In an evolutionary perspective we have to consider that both awareness of and consciousness about perceived stimuli appear as evolved, attention-dependent options added to the ongoing neural activities of stimulus processing and action generation. Since gamma-wave generation for functional coupling of brain areas in aware/conscious states is energetically highly cost-intensive, it remains to be shown which animal species under which conditions of lifestyle and ecological niche may achieve significant advantages in reproductive fitness by drawing upon these options. Hence, we started our discussion about awareness and consciousness in animals with the question in how far these expressions of brain activity are necessary attributes for perceiving stimuli and responding in an adaptive way.

The Feelings of Goals Hypothesis: Emotional Feelings are Non-Conceptual, Non-Motoric Representations of Goals

This paper proposes and develops the feelings of goals hypothesis (FGH). It has two aims: first, to describe the evolutionary function of emotional feelings (EFs), and second, to describe the content and the format of EFs. According to FGH, the evolutionary function of EFs is to enable motoric flexibility. Specifically, EFs are a component of a psychological mechanism that permits differential motoric reactions to the same stimulus. Further, according to FGH, EF is a special type of mental representation with the content of an action goal, and with a non-motoric, non-conceptual format. This paper thoroughly clarifies the assumptions underlying FGH and discusses its theoretical implications and empirical predictions.

Identification of LINE retrotransposons and long non-coding RNAs expressed in the octopus brain

Background

Transposable elements (TEs) widely contribute to the evolution of genomes allowing genomic innovations, generating germinal and somatic heterogeneity, and giving birth to long non-coding RNAs (lncRNAs). These features have been associated to the evolution, functioning, and complexity of the nervous system at such a level that somatic retrotransposition of long interspersed element (LINE) L1 has been proposed to be associated to human cognition. Among invertebrates, octopuses are fascinating animals whose nervous system reaches a high level of complexity achieving sophisticated cognitive abilities. The sequencing of the genome of the Octopus bimaculoides revealed a striking expansion of TEs which were proposed to have contributed to the evolution of its complex nervous system. We recently found a similar expansion also in the genome of Octopus vulgaris. However, a specific search for the existence and the transcription of full-length transpositionally competent TEs has not been performed in this genus.

Results

Here, we report the identification of LINE elements competent for retrotransposition in Octopus vulgaris and Octopus bimaculoides and show evidence suggesting that they might be transcribed and determine germline and somatic polymorphisms especially in the brain. Transcription and translation measured for one of these elements resulted in specific signals in neurons belonging to areas associated with behavioral plasticity. We also report the transcription of thousands of lncRNAs and the pervasive inclusion of TE fragments in the transcriptomes of both Octopus species, further testifying the crucial activity of TEs in the evolution of the octopus genomes.

Conclusions

The neural transcriptome of the octopus shows the transcription of thousands of putative lncRNAs and of a full-length LINE element belonging to the RTE class. We speculate that a convergent evolutionary process involving retrotransposons activity in the brain has been important for the evolution of sophisticated cognitive abilities in this genus.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12915-022-01303-5.

Cephalopod Behavior: From Neural Plasticity to Consciousness

It is only in recent decades that subjective experience - or consciousness - has become a legitimate object of scientific inquiry. As such, it represents perhaps the greatest challenge facing neuroscience today. Subsumed within this challenge is the study of subjective experience in non-human animals: a particularly difficult endeavor that becomes even more so, as one crosses the great evolutionary divide between vertebrate and invertebrate phyla. Here, we explore the possibility of consciousness in one group of invertebrates: cephalopod molluscs. We believe such a review is timely, particularly considering cephalopods' impressive learning and memory abilities, rich behavioral repertoire, and the relative complexity of their nervous systems and sensory capabilities. Indeed, in some cephalopods, these abilities are so sophisticated that they are comparable to those of some higher vertebrates. Following the criteria and framework outlined for the identification of hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species, here we propose that cephalopods - particularly the octopus - provide a unique test case among invertebrates for examining the properties and conditions that, at the very least, afford a basal faculty of consciousness. These include, among others: (i) discriminatory and anticipatory behaviors indicating a strong link between perception and memory recall; (ii) the presence of neural substrates representing functional analogs of thalamus and cortex; (iii) the neurophysiological dynamics resembling the functional signatures of conscious states in mammals. We highlight the current lack of evidence as well as potentially informative areas that warrant further investigation to support the view expressed here. Finally, we identify future research directions for the study of consciousness in these tantalizing animals.

Sliding Scale Theory of Attention and Consciousness/Unconsciousness

Attention defined as focusing on a unit of information plays a prominent role in both consciousness and the cognitive unconscious, due to its essential role in information processing. Existing theories of consciousness invariably address the relationship between attention and conscious awareness, ranging from attention is not required to crucial. However, these theories do not adequately or even remotely consider the contribution of attention to the cognitive unconscious. A valid theory of consciousness must also be a robust theory of the cognitive unconscious, a point rarely if ever considered. Current theories also emphasize human perceptual consciousness, primarily visual, despite evidence that consciousness occurs in diverse animal species varying in cognitive capacity, and across many forms of perceptual and thought consciousness. A comprehensive and parsimonious perspective applicable to the diversity of species demonstrating consciousness and the various forms—sliding scale theory of attention and consciousness/unconsciousness—is proposed with relevant research reviewed. Consistent with the continuous organization of natural events, attention occupies a sliding scale in regards to time and space compression. Unconscious attention in the form of the “cognitive unconscious” is time and spaced diffused, whereas conscious attention is tightly time and space compressed to the present moment. Due to the special clarity derived from brief and concentrated signals, the tight time and space compression yields conscious awareness as an emergent property. The present moment enhances the time and space compression of conscious attention, and contributes to an evolutionary explanation of conscious awareness.

The role of plasticity in the recovery of consciousness

Disorders of consciousness (DOCs), i.e., coma, vegetative state, and minimally conscious state are the consequences of a severe brain injury that disrupts the brain ability to generate consciousness. Recovery from DOCs requires functional and structural changes in the brain. The sites where these plastic changes take place vary according to the pathophysiology of the DOC. The ascending reticular activating system of the brainstem and its complex connections with the thalamus and cortex are involved in the pathophysiology of coma. Subcortical structures, such as the striatum and globus pallidus, together with thalamocortical and corticothalamic projections, the basal forebrain, and several networks among different cortical areas are probably involved in vegetative and minimally conscious states. Some mechanisms of plasticity that allegedly operate in each of these sites to promote recovery of consciousness will be discussed in this chapter. While some mechanisms of plasticity work at a local level, others produce functional changes in complex neuronal networks, for example by entraining neuronal oscillations. The specific mechanisms of brain plasticity represent potential targets for future treatments aiming to restore consciousness in patients with severe DOCs.

From non-conscious processing to conscious events: a minimalist approach

The minimalist approach that we develop here is a framework that allows to appreciate how non-conscious processing and conscious contents shape human cognition, broadly defined. It is composed of three simple principles. First, cognitive processes are inherently non-conscious, while their inputs and (interim) outputs may be consciously experienced. Second, non-conscious processes and elements of the cognitive architecture prioritize information for conscious experiences. Third, conscious events are composed of series of conscious contents and non-conscious processes, with increased duration leading to more opportunity for processing. The narrowness of conscious experiences is conceptualized here as a solution to the problem of channeling the plethora of non-conscious processes into action and communication processes that are largely serial. The framework highlights the importance of prioritization for consciousness, and we provide an illustrative review of three main factors that shape prioritization-stimulus strength, motivational relevance and mental accessibility. We further discuss when and how this framework (i) is compatible with previous theories, (ii) enables new understandings of established findings and models, and (iii) generates new predictions and understandings.

Consciousness in Jawless Fishes

Jawless fishes were the first vertebrates to evolve. It is thus important to investigate them to determine whether consciousness was acquired in the common ancestor of all vertebrates. Most jawless fish lineages are extinct, and cyclostomes (lampreys and hagfish) are the sole survivors. Here, I review the empirical knowledge on the neurobiology of cyclostomes with special reference to recently proposed "markers" of primary, minimal consciousness. The adult lamprey appears to meet the neuroanatomical criteria but there is a practical limitation to behavioral examination of its learning ability. In addition, the consciousness-related neuroarchitecture of larvae and its reconstruction during metamorphosis remain largely uninvestigated. Even less is known of hagfish neurobiology. The hagfish forebrain forms the central prosencephalic complex, and the homology of its components to the brain regions of other vertebrates needs to be confirmed using modern techniques. Nevertheless, as behavioral responses to olfactory stimuli in aquariums have been reported, it is easier to investigate the learning ability of the hagfish than that of the lamprey. Based on these facts, I finally discuss the potential future directions of empirical studies for examining the existence of consciousness in jawless fishes.

Cerebrotypes in Cephalopods: Brain Diversity and Its Correlation With Species Habits, Life History, and Physiological Adaptations

Here we analyze existing quantitative data available for cephalopod brains based on classical contributions by J.Z. Young and colleagues, to cite some. We relate the relative brain size of selected regions (area and/or lobe), with behavior, life history, ecology and distribution of several cephalopod species here considered. After hierarchical clustering we identify and describe ten clusters grouping 52 cephalopod species. This allows us to describe cerebrotypes, i.e., differences of brain composition in different species, as a sign of their adaptation to specific niches and/or clades in cephalopod molluscs for the first time. Similarity reflecting niche type has been found in vertebrates, and it is reasonable to assume that it could also occur in Cephalopoda. We also attempted a phylogenetic PCA using data by Lindgren et al. (2012) as input tree. However, due to the limited overlap in species considered, the final analysis was carried out on <30 species, thus reducing the impact of this approach. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that the phylogenetic signal alone cannot be a justification for the grouping of species, although biased by the limited set of data available to us. Based on these preliminary findings, we can only hypothesize that brains evolved in cephalopods on the basis of different factors including phylogeny, possible development, and the third factor, i.e., life-style adaptations. Our results support the working hypothesis that the taxon evolved different sensorial and computational strategies to cope with the various environments (niches) occupied in the oceans. This study is novel for invertebrates, to the best of our knowledge.

Computational animal welfare: towards cognitive architecture models of animal sentience, emotion and wellbeing

To understand animal wellbeing, we need to consider subjective phenomena and sentience. This is challenging, since these properties are private and cannot be observed directly. Certain motivations, emotions and related internal states can be inferred in animals through experiments that involve choice, learning, generalization and decision-making. Yet, even though there is significant progress in elucidating the neurobiology of human consciousness, animal consciousness is still a mystery. We propose that computational animal welfare science emerges at the intersection of animal behaviour, welfare and computational cognition. By using ideas from cognitive science, we develop a functional and generic definition of subjective phenomena as any process or state of the organism that exists from the first-person perspective and cannot be isolated from the animal subject. We then outline a general cognitive architecture to model simple forms of subjective processes and sentience. This includes evolutionary adaptation which contains top-down attention modulation, predictive processing and subjective simulation by re-entrant (recursive) computations. Thereafter, we show how this approach uses major characteristics of the subjective experience: elementary self-awareness, global workspace and qualia with unity and continuity. This provides a formal framework for process-based modelling of animal needs, subjective states, sentience and wellbeing.

A neural correlate of sensory consciousness in a corvid bird

Subjective experiences that can be consciously accessed and reported are associated with the cerebral cortex. Whether sensory consciousness can also arise from differently organized brains that lack a layered cerebral cortex, such as the bird brain, remains unknown. We show that single-neuron responses in the pallial endbrain of crows performing a visual detection task correlate with the birds’ perception about stimulus presence or absence and argue that this is an empirical marker of avian consciousness. Neuronal activity follows a temporal two-stage process in which the first activity component mainly reflects physical stimulus intensity, whereas the later component predicts the crows’ perceptual reports. These results suggest that the neural foundations that allow sensory consciousness arose either before the emergence of mammals or independently in at least the avian lineage and do not necessarily require a cerebral cortex.

Subjectivity as an Emergent Property of Information Processing by Neuronal Networks

Here, we examine subjectivity and consciousness as emergent properties of the computational complexity of information processing by the brain, rather than metaphysical phenomena. While Psychology concentrates on the emergent properties and Neurobiology examines the properties of the biological substrate, Neurophysiology and Cognitive Neuroscience link the two levels by investigating the mechanisms and processes by which the functions of the brain emerge from the anatomical, cellular and network properties of the nervous system. Our purpose here is not to locate the neural structures that sustain subjectivity or other psychic functions; rather, we examine the operating modes of neurons and neural circuits: they reveal an intrinsically relational quality; sensory elaboration itself proves to be relational and self-centred, necessarily associated with the vital, hedonic, emotional relevance of each experience and external cue, and intrinsically oriented to a behavioral interaction with the latter. The hippocampus adds to this self-centred relational perspective the capability of transforming the identification and the spatial location of objects into a contextualized representation of reality. Since the hippocampus is strongly interconnected with the archaic structures that evaluate vital and hedonic relevance and generate emotional responses, the contextualized information, emotionally colored, is transformed into a comprehensive individual experience. This way, a subjective, self-centred, affectively colored perspective arises in animals due to the intrinsic properties of neuronal circuits in the brain. We conclude that neuronal network processing is strongly characterized per se by a relational and self-centred (subjective) and emotionally colored, motivationally oriented (personal) perspective. The properties and features of neural processing discussed here constitute well-established knowledge in the neuroscientific community. Yet, from a layman’s perception, subjectivity still mysteriously arises in our brain due to the action of consciousness, and in epistemological and philosophical debates, the question often arises as to how consciousness may add the subjective and personal perspective to neural elaboration. The answer appears to be simple: it does not; subjectivity is already there, present ab initio in neuronal processing and not added a posteriori by some other “consciousness” function of unclear neural basis.

The Curing Coma Campaign: Framing Initial Scientific Challenges-Proceedings of the First Curing Coma Campaign Scientific Advisory Council Meeting

Coma and disordered consciousness are common manifestations of acute neurological conditions and are among the most pervasive and challenging aspects of treatment in neurocritical care. Gaps exist in patient assessment, outcome prognostication, and treatment directed specifically at improving consciousness and cognitive recovery. In 2019, the Neurocritical Care Society (NCS) launched the Curing Coma Campaign in order to address the "grand challenge" of improving the management of patients with coma and decreased consciousness. One of the first steps was to bring together a Scientific Advisory Council including coma scientists, neurointensivists, neurorehabilitationists, and implementation experts in order to address the current scientific landscape and begin to develop a framework on how to move forward. This manuscript describes the proceedings of the first Curing Coma Campaign Scientific Advisory Council meeting which occurred in conjunction with the NCS Annual Meeting in October 2019 in Vancouver. Specifically, three major pillars were identified which should be considered: endotyping of coma and disorders of consciousness, biomarkers, and proof-of-concept clinical trials. Each is summarized with regard to current approach, benefits to the patient, family, and clinicians, and next steps. Integration of these three pillars will be essential to the success of the Curing Coma Campaign as will expanding the "curing coma community" to ensure broad participation of clinicians, scientists, and patient advocates with the goal of identifying and implementing treatments to fundamentally improve the outcome of patients.

That dog won't fit: body size awareness in dogs

With very few exceptions, no coherent model of representing the self exists for nonhuman species. According to our hypothesis, understanding of the Self as an object' can also be found in a wide range of animals including the dog, a fast-moving terrestrial predator/scavenger, with highly developed senses and complex cognitive capacity. We tested companion dogs in three experiments in which they faced three different variations of the same physical challenge: passing through an opening in a wall. We predicted that if dogs are capable of representing their own body size, they will react differently when faced with adequate or too small openings. We found that dogs started to move towards and approached the too small openings with significantly longer latencies than the suitable ones; and upon reaching it, they did not try to get through the too small openings. In another experiment, the medium-size (still large enough) opening was approached with latencies that fell between the latencies measured in the cases of the very large or the too small openings. Having discussed the potential underlying mechanisms, we concluded that our results convincingly assume that dogs can represent their own body size in novel contexts.

Animal affect and decision-making

The scientific study of animal affect (emotion) is an area of growing interest. Whilst research on mechanism and causation has predominated, the study of function is less advanced. This is not due to a lack of hypotheses; in both humans and animals, affective states are frequently proposed to play a pivotal role in coordinating adaptive responses and decisions. However, exactly how they might do this (what processes might implement this function) is often left rather vague. Here we propose a framework for integrating animal affect and decision-making that is couched in modern decision theory and employs an operational definition that aligns with dimensional concepts of core affect and renders animal affect empirically tractable. We develop a model of how core affect, including short-term (emotion-like) and longer-term (mood-like) states, influence decision-making via processes that we label affective options, affective predictions, and affective outcomes and which correspond to similar concepts in schema of the links between human emotion and decision-making. Our framework is generalisable across species and generates questions for future research.

Towards a comparative science of emotion: Affect and consciousness in humans and animals

The componential view of human emotion recognises that affective states comprise conscious, behavioural, physiological, neural and cognitive elements. Although many animals display bodily and behavioural changes consistent with the occurrence of affective states similar to those seen in humans, the question of whether and in which species these are accompanied by conscious experiences remains controversial. Finding scientifically valid methods for investigating markers for the subjective component of affect in both humans and animals is central to developing a comparative understanding of the processes and mechanisms of affect and its evolution and distribution across taxonomic groups, to our understanding of animal welfare, and to the development of animal models of affective disorders. Here, contemporary evidence indicating potential markers of conscious processing in animals is reviewed, with a view to extending this search to include markers of conscious affective processing. We do this by combining animal-focused approaches with investigations of the components of conscious and non-conscious emotional processing in humans, and neuropsychological research into the structure and functions of conscious emotions.

Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach

In today's society, it becomes increasingly important to assess which non-human and non-verbal beings possess consciousness. This review article aims to delineate criteria for consciousness especially in animals, while also taking into account intelligent artifacts. First, we circumscribe what we mean with "consciousness" and describe key features of subjective experience: qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality and interpretation, integration and the combination of dynamic and stabilizing properties. We argue that consciousness has a biological function, which is to present the subject with a multimodal, situational survey of the surrounding world and body, subserving complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This survey reflects the brain's capacity for internal modeling of external events underlying changes in sensory state. Next, we follow an inside-out approach: how can the features of conscious experience, correlating to mechanisms inside the brain, be logically coupled to externally observable ("outside") properties? Instead of proposing criteria that would each define a "hard" threshold for consciousness, we outline six indicators: (i) goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; (ii) anatomic and physiological substrates for generating integrative multimodal representations; (iii) psychometrics and meta-cognition; (iv) episodic memory; (v) susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and (vi) specific visuospatial behaviors. Rather than emphasizing a particular indicator as being decisive, we propose that the consistency amongst these indicators can serve to assess consciousness in particular species. The integration of scores on the various indicators yields an overall, graded criterion for consciousness, somewhat comparable to the Glasgow Coma Scale for unresponsive patients. When considering theoretically derived measures of consciousness, it is argued that their validity should not be assessed on the basis of a single quantifiable measure, but requires cross-examination across multiple pieces of evidence, including the indicators proposed here. Current intelligent machines, including deep learning neural networks (DLNNs) and agile robots, are not indicated to be conscious yet. Instead of assessing machine consciousness by a brief Turing-type of test, evidence for it may gradually accumulate when we study machines ethologically and across time, considering multiple behaviors that require flexibility, improvisation, spontaneous problem-solving and the situational conspectus typically associated with conscious experience.

Nonconscious Cognitive Suffering: Considering Suffering Risks of Embodied Artificial Intelligence

Strong arguments have been formulated that the computational limits of disembodied artificial intelligence (AI) will, sooner or later, be a problem that needs to be addressed. Similarly, convincing cases for how embodied forms of AI can exceed these limits makes for worthwhile research avenues. This paper discusses how embodied cognition brings with it other forms of information integration and decision-making consequences that typically involve discussions of machine cognition and similarly, machine consciousness. N. Katherine Hayles’s novel conception of nonconscious cognition in her analysis of the human cognition-consciousness connection is discussed in relation to how nonconscious cognition can be envisioned and exacerbated in embodied AI. Similarly, this paper offers a way of understanding the concept of suffering in a way that is different than the conventional sense of attributing it to either a purely physical state or a conscious state, instead of grounding at least a type of suffering in this form of cognition.

Origin and evolution of human consciousness

The study of the origin and evolution of consciousness presents several problems. The first problem concerns terminology. The word consciousness comes from the Latin term conscĭentĭa that means "knowledge shared with others." However, the term consciousness also refers to several other aspects involving both its levels (sleep, coma, dreams and waking state) and contents (subjective, phenomenal and objective). A second issue is the problem of other minds, namely, the possibility to establish whether others have minds very like our own. Moreover, human consciousness has been linked to three different forms of memory: procedural/implicit, semantic and episodic. All these different aspects of consciousness will be discussed in the first part of the chapter. In the second part, we discuss different neuroscientific theories on consciousness and examine how research from developmental psychology, clinical neurology (epilepsy, coma, vegetative state and minimal state of consciousness), neuropsychology (blindsight, agnosia, neglect, split-brain and ocular rivalry), and comparative neuropsychophysiology contribute to the study of consciousness. Finally, in the last part of the chapter we discuss the distinctive features of human consciousness and in particular the ability to travel mentally through time, the phenomenon of joint intentionality, theory of mind and language.

The survey and reference assisted assembly of the Octopus vulgaris genome

The common octopus, Octopus vulgaris, is an active marine predator known for the richness and plasticity of its behavioral repertoire, and remarkable learning and memory capabilities. Octopus and other coleoid cephalopods, cuttlefish and squid, possess the largest nervous system among invertebrates, both for cell counts and body to brain size. O. vulgaris has been at the center of a long-tradition of research into diverse aspects of its biology. To leverage research in this iconic species, we generated 270 Gb of genomic sequencing data, complementing those available for the only other sequenced congeneric octopus, Octopus bimaculoides. We show that both genomes are similar in size, but display different levels of heterozygosity and repeats. Our data give a first quantitative glimpse into the rate of coding and non-coding regions and support the view that hundreds of novel genes may have arisen independently despite the close phylogenetic distance. We furthermore describe a reference-guided assembly and an open genomic resource (CephRes-gdatabase), opening new avenues in the study of genomic novelties in cephalopods and their biology.

Design Type(s)	species comparison design • sequence analysis objective • sequence assembly objective
Measurement Type(s)	whole genome sequencing assay
Technology Type(s)	DNA sequencing
Factor Type(s)
Sample Characteristic(s)	Octopus vulgaris • testis • ocean biome

Machine-accessible metadata file describing the reported data (ISA-Tab format)

Grow Smart and Die Young: Why Did Cephalopods Evolve Intelligence?

Intelligence in large-brained vertebrates might have evolved through independent, yet similar processes based on comparable socioecological pressures and slow life histories. This convergent evolutionary route, however, cannot explain why cephalopods developed large brains and flexible behavioural repertoires: cephalopods have fast life histories and live in simple social environments. Here, we suggest that the loss of the external shell in cephalopods (i) caused a dramatic increase in predatory pressure, which in turn prevented the emergence of slow life histories, and (ii) allowed the exploitation of novel challenging niches, thus favouring the emergence of intelligence. By highlighting convergent and divergent aspects between cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates we illustrate how the evolution of intelligence might not be constrained to a single evolutionary route.

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

There is compelling evidence that the "what it feels like" subjective experience of sensory stimuli arises in the cerebral cortex in both humans as well as mammalian experimental animal models. Humans are alone in their ability to verbally communicate their experience of the external environment. In other species, sensory awareness is extrapolated on the basis of behavioral indicators. For instance, cephalopods have been claimed to be sentient on the basis of their complex behavior and anecdotal reports of human-like intelligence. We have interrogated the findings of avoidance learning behavioral paradigms and classical brain lesion studies and conclude that there is no evidence for cephalopods feeling pain. This analysis highlighted the questionable nature of anthropometric assumptions about sensory experience with increased phylogenetic distance from humans. We contend that understanding whether invertebrates such as molluscs are sentient should first begin with defining the computational processes and neural circuitries underpinning subjective awareness. Using fundamental design principles, we advance the notion that subjective awareness is dependent on observer neural networks (networks that in some sense introspect the neural processing generating neural representations of sensory stimuli). This introspective process allows the observer network to create an internal model that predicts the neural processing taking place in the network being surveyed. Predictions arising from the internal model form the basis of a rudimentary form of awareness. We develop an algorithm built on parallel observer networks that generates multiple levels of sensory awareness. A network of cortical regions in the human brain has the appropriate functional properties and neural interconnectivity that is consistent with the predicted circuitry of the algorithm generating pain awareness. By contrast, the cephalopod brain lacks the necessary neural circuitry to implement such an algorithm. In conclusion, we find no compelling behavioral, functional, or neuroanatomical evidence to indicate that cephalopods feel pain.

Cephalopod Brains: An Overview of Current Knowledge to Facilitate Comparison With Vertebrates

Cephalopod and vertebrate neural-systems are often highlighted as a traditional example of convergent evolution. Their large brains, relative to body size, and complexity of sensory-motor systems and behavioral repertoires offer opportunities for comparative analysis. Despite various attempts, questions on how cephalopod 'brains' evolved and to what extent it is possible to identify a vertebrate-equivalence, assuming it exists, remain unanswered. Here, we summarize recent molecular, anatomical and developmental data to explore certain features in the neural organization of cephalopods and vertebrates to investigate to what extent an evolutionary convergence is likely. Furthermore, and based on whole body and brain axes as defined in early-stage embryos using the expression patterns of homeodomain-containing transcription factors and axonal tractography, we describe a critical analysis of cephalopod neural systems showing similarities to the cerebral cortex, thalamus, basal ganglia, midbrain, cerebellum, hypothalamus, brain stem, and spinal cord of vertebrates. Our overall aim is to promote and facilitate further, hypothesis-driven, studies of cephalopod neural systems evolution.

The Current State of Cephalopod Science and Perspectives on the Most Critical Challenges Ahead From Three Early-Career Researchers

Here, three researchers who have recently embarked on careers in cephalopod biology discuss the current state of the field and offer their hopes for the future. Seven major topics are explored: genetics, aquaculture, climate change, welfare, behavior, cognition, and neurobiology. Recent developments in each of these fields are reviewed and the potential of emerging technologies to address specific gaps in knowledge about cephalopods are discussed. Throughout, the authors highlight specific challenges that merit particular focus in the near-term. This review and prospectus is also intended to suggest some concrete near-term goals to cephalopod researchers and inspire those working outside the field to consider the revelatory potential of these remarkable creatures.

The Affective Core of the Self: A Neuro-Archetypical Perspective on the Foundations of Human (and Animal) Subjectivity

Psychologists usually considered the "Self" as an object of experience appearing when the individual perceives its existence within the conscious field. In accordance with such a view, the self-representing capacity of the human mind has been related to corticolimbic learning processes taking place within individual development. On the other hand, Carl Gustav Jung considered the Self as the core of our personality, in its conscious and unconscious aspects, as well as in its actual and potential forms. According to Jung, the Self originates from an inborn dynamic structure integrating the essential drives of our "brain-mind," and leading both to instinctual behavioral actions and to archetypal psychological experiences. Interestingly, recent neuroethological studies indicate that our subjective identity rests on ancient neuropsychic processes that humans share with other animals as part of their inborn constitutional repertoire. Indeed, brain activity within subcortical midline structures (SCMSs) is intrinsically related to the emergence of prototypical affective states, that not only influence our behavior in a flexible way, but alter our conscious field, giving rise to specific feelings or moods, which constitute the first form of self-orientation in the world. Moreover, such affective dynamics play a central role in the organization of individual personality and in the evolution of all other (more sophisticated) psychological functions. Therefore, on the base of the convergence between contemporary cutting-edge scientific research and some psychological intuitions of Jung, we intend here to explore the first neuroevolutional layer of human mind, that we call the affective core of the Self.

Four-Dimensional Graded Consciousness

Both the multidimensional phenomenon and the polysemous notion of consciousness continue to prove resistant to consistent measurement and unambiguous definition. This is hardly surprising, given that there is no agreement even as regards the most fundamental issues they involve. One of the basic disagreements present in the continuing debate about consciousness pertains to its gradational nature. The general aim of this article is to show how consciousness might be graded and multidimensional at the same time. We therefore focus on the question of what it is, exactly, that is or could be graded in cases of consciousness, and how we can measure it. Ultimately, four different gradable aspects of consciousness will be described: quality, abstractness, complexity and usefulness, which belong to four different dimensions, these being understood, respectively, as phenomenal, semantic, physiological, and functional. Consequently, consciousness may be said to vary with respect to phenomenal quality, semantic abstraction, physiological complexity, and functional usefulness. It is hoped that such a four-dimensional approach will help to clarify and justify claims about the hierarchical nature of consciousness. The approach also proves explanatorily advantageous, as it enables us not only to draw attention to certain new and important differences in respect of subjective measures of awareness and to justify how a given creature may be ranked higher in one dimension of consciousness and lower in terms of another, but also allows for innovative explanations of a variety of well-known phenomena (amongst these, the interpretations of blindsight and locked-in syndrome will be briefly outlined here). Moreover, a 4D framework makes possible many predictions and hypotheses that may be experimentally tested (We point out a few such possibilities pertaining to interdimensional dependencies).

The Neuroethological Paradox of Animal Consciousness

The more advanced our understanding of the brain of an animal is, the less likely that this animal is a conscious being. This provocative logical paradox is explained and analyzed, leading to the conclusion that to advance understanding of animal consciousness it is necessary to resolve first how our consciousness is produced by our brain.