The evolution of general intelligence

Unveiling the Core Functional Networks of Cognition: An Ontology-Guided Machine Learning Approach

Deciphering the functional architecture that underpins diverse cognitive functions is fundamental quest in neuroscience. In this study, we employed an innovative machine learning framework that integrated cognitive ontology with functional connectivity analysis to identify brain networks essential for cognition. We identified a core assembly of functional connectomes, primarily located within the association cortex, which showed superior predictive performance compared to two conventional methods widely employed in previous research across various cognitive domains. Our approach achieved a mean prediction accuracy of 0.13 across 16 cognitive tasks, including working memory, reading comprehension, and sustained attention, outperforming the traditional methods' accuracy of 0.08. In contrast, our method showed limited predictive power for sensory, motor, and emotional functions, with a mean prediction accuracy of 0.03 across 9 relevant tasks, slightly lower than the traditional methods' accuracy of 0.04. These cognitive connectomes were further characterized by distinctive patterns of resting-state functional connectivity, structural connectivity via white matter tracts, and gene expression, highlighting their neurogenetic underpinnings. Our findings reveal a domain-general functional network fingerprint that pivotal to cognition, offering a novel computational approach to explore the neural foundations of cognitive abilities.

Age-related effects on a hierarchical structure of canine cognition

The current study investigates whether there are statistically independent age-related influences on the canine cognitive structure and how individual factors moderate cognitive aging on both cross-sectional and longitudinal samples. A battery of seven tasks was administered to 129 pet dogs, on which exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were employed to unveil the correlational structure underlying individual differences in cognitive performance. The best-fitting model featured a hierarchical structure with two first-order cognitive domains (individual problem solving, learning) and a second-order common factor. These higher order factors exhibited consistency over a period of at least 2.5 years. External validation linked the common factor positively to discrimination and reversal learning performance, exploration, neophilia, activity/excitability, and training level while negatively to cognitive dysfunction symptoms, suggesting that it is a good candidate for a general cognitive factor (canine g). Structural equation models identified three distinct age-related influences, operating on associative learning, on memory, and on canine g. Health status moderated the negative age-canine g relationship, with a stronger association observed in dogs with poorer health status, and no relationship for dogs in good health. On a longitudinal sample (N = 99), we showed that the direction and magnitude of change in canine g over up to 3 years is affected by various interactions between the dogs' age, communication score, baseline performance, and time elapsed since the baseline measurement. These findings underscore the presence of a general cognitive factor in dogs and reveal intriguing parallels between human and canine aging, affirming the translational value of dogs in cognition and aging research.

Cognitive flexibility in a Tanganyikan bower-building cichlid, Aulonocranus dewindti

Cognitive flexibility, the ability to modify one's decision rules to adapt to a new situation, has been extensively studied in many species. In fish, though, data on cognitive flexibility are scarce, especially in the wild. We studied a lekking species of cichlid fish in Lake Tanganyika, Aulonocranus dewindti. Males create sand bowers as spawning sites and maintain them by removing any objects falling into it. In the first part of our experiment, we investigated the existence of spontaneous decision rules for the maintenance of the bowers. We showed that if a snail shell and a stone are placed in their bower, fish prefer to remove the shell first. In the second phase of our experiment, we took advantage of this spontaneous decision rule to investigate whether this rule was flexible. We tested five individuals in a choice against preference task, in which the fish had to modify their preference rule and remove the stone first to be allowed to then remove the shell and have a clean bower. While there was no overall trend towards flexibility in this task, there was variation at an individual level. Some individuals increased their preference for removing the shell first, deciding quickly and with little exploration of the objects. Others were more successful at choosing against preference and showed behaviours suggesting self-regulatory inhibition abilities. Bower-building cichlids could therefore be a promising model to study cognitive flexibility, and other aspects of animal cognition in the wild.

Cognitive performance is linked to fitness in a wild primate

Cognitive performance varies widely across animal species, but the processes underlying cognitive evolution remain poorly known. For cognitive abilities to evolve, performance must be linked to individual fitness benefits, but these links have been rarely studied in primates even though they exceed most other mammals in these traits. We subjected 198 wild gray mouse lemurs to four cognitive and two personality tests and subsequently monitored their survival in a mark-recapture study. Our study revealed that survival was predicted by individual variation in cognitive performance as well as body mass and exploration. Because cognitive performance covaried negatively with exploration, individuals gathering more accurate information enjoyed better cognitive performance and lived longer, but so did heavier and more explorative individuals. These effects may reflect a speed-accuracy trade-off, with alternative strategies yielding similar overall fitness. The observed intraspecific variation in selective benefits of cognitive performance, if heritable, can provide the basis for the evolution of cognitive abilities in members of our lineage.

Great ape cognition is structured by stable cognitive abilities and predicted by developmental conditions

Great ape cognition is used as a reference point to specify the evolutionary origins of complex cognitive abilities, including in humans. This research often assumes that great ape cognition consists of cognitive abilities (traits) that account for stable differences between individuals, which change and develop in response to experience. Here, we test the validity of these assumptions by assessing repeatability of cognitive performance among captive great apes (Gorilla gorilla, Pongo abelii, Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes) in five tasks covering a range of cognitive domains. We examine whether individual characteristics (age, group, test experience) or transient situational factors (life events, testing arrangements or sociality) influence cognitive performance. Our results show that task-level performance is generally stable over time; four of the five tasks were reliable measurement tools. Performance in the tasks was best explained by stable differences in cognitive abilities (traits) between individuals. Cognitive abilities were further correlated, suggesting shared cognitive processes. Finally, when predicting cognitive performance, we found stable individual characteristics to be more important than variables capturing transient experience. Taken together, this study shows that great ape cognition is structured by stable cognitive abilities that respond to different developmental conditions.

Experimental expansion of relative telencephalon size improves the main executive function abilities in guppy

Executive functions are a set of cognitive control processes required for optimizing goal-directed behavior. Despite more than two centuries of research on executive functions, mostly in humans and nonhuman primates, there is still a knowledge gap in what constitutes the mechanistic basis of evolutionary variation in executive function abilities. Here, we show experimentally that size changes in a forebrain structure (i.e. telencephalon) underlie individual variation in executive function capacities in a fish. For this, we used male guppies (Poecilia reticulata) issued from artificial selection lines with substantial differences in telencephalon size relative to the rest of the brain. We tested fish from the up- and down-selected lines not only in three tasks for the main core executive functions: cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and working memory, but also in a basic conditioning test that does not require executive functions. Individuals with relatively larger telencephalons outperformed individuals with smaller telencephalons in all three executive function assays but not in the conditioning assay. Based on our findings, we propose that the telencephalon is the executive brain in teleost fish. Together, it suggests that selective enlargement of key brain structures with distinct functions, like the fish telencephalon, is a potent evolutionary pathway toward evolutionary enhancement of advanced cognitive abilities in vertebrates.

Human and chimpanzee shared and divergent neurobiological systems for general and specific cognitive brain functions

A long-standing topic of interest in human neurosciences is the understanding of the neurobiology underlying human cognition. Less commonly considered is to what extent such systems may be shared with other species. We examined individual variation in brain connectivity in the context of cognitive abilities in chimpanzees (n = 45) and humans in search of a conserved link between cognition and brain connectivity across the two species. Cognitive scores were assessed on a variety of behavioral tasks using chimpanzee- and human-specific cognitive test batteries, measuring aspects of cognition related to relational reasoning, processing speed, and problem solving in both species. We show that chimpanzees scoring higher on such cognitive skills display relatively strong connectivity among brain networks also associated with comparable cognitive abilities in the human group. We also identified divergence in brain networks that serve specialized functions across humans and chimpanzees, such as stronger language connectivity in humans and relatively more prominent connectivity between regions related to spatial working memory in chimpanzees. Our findings suggest that core neural systems of cognition may have evolved before the divergence of chimpanzees and humans, along with potential differential investments in other brain networks relating to specific functional specializations between the two species.

Extended parental provisioning and variation in vertebrate brain sizes

Large brains provide adaptive cognitive benefits but require unusually high, near-constant energy inputs and become fully functional well after their growth is completed. Consequently, young of most larger-brained endotherms should not be able to independently support the growth and development of their own brains. This paradox is solved if the evolution of extended parental provisioning facilitated brain size evolution. Comparative studies indeed show that extended parental provisioning coevolved with brain size and that it may improve immature survival. The major role of extended parental provisioning supports the idea that the ability to sustain the costs of brains limited brain size evolution.

The Associations between Results in Different Domains of Cognitive and Psychomotor Abilities Measured in Medical Students

We aimed to investigate the associations between intelligence quotient test scores obtained using the Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) and psychomotor testing using the Complex Reactionmeter Drenovac (CRD) test battery, while taking into account previous theoretical approaches recognizing intelligent behavior as the cumulative result of a general biological speed factor reflected in the reaction time for perceptual detections and motor decisions. A total of 224 medical students at the University of Split School of Medicine were recruited. Their IQ scores were assessed using Raven's APM, while the computerized tests of CRD-series were used for testing the reaction time of perception to visual stimulus (CRD311), psychomotor limbs coordination task (CRD411), and solving simple arithmetic operations (CRD11). The total test-solving (TTST) and the minimum single-task-solving (MinT) times were analyzed. On the CRD11 test, task-solving times were shorter in students with higher APM scores (r = -0.48 for TTST and r = -0.44 for MinT; p < 0.001 for both). Negative associations between task-solving times and APM scores were reported on CRD311 (r = -0.30 for TTST and r = -0.33 for MinT, p < 0.001 for both). Negative associations between task-solving times in CRD411 and APM scores (r = -0.40 for TTST and r = -0.30 for MinT, p < 0.001 for both) were found. Faster reaction time in psychomotor limbs coordination tasks, the reaction time of perception to visual stimulus, and the reaction time of solving simple arithmetic operations were associated with a higher APM score in medical students, indicating the importance of mental speed in intelligence test performance. However, executive system functions, such as attention, planning, and goal weighting, might also impact cognitive abilities and should be considered in future research.

Brain morphology correlates of learning and cognitive flexibility in a fish species (Poecilia reticulata)

Determining how variation in brain morphology affects cognitive abilities is important to understand inter-individual variation in cognition and, ultimately, cognitive evolution. Yet, despite many decades of research in this area, there is surprisingly little experimental data available from assays that quantify cognitive abilities and brain morphology in the same individuals. Here, we tested female guppies (Poecilia reticulata) in two tasks, colour discrimination and reversal learning, to evaluate their learning abilities and cognitive flexibility. We then estimated the size of five brain regions (telencephalon, optic tectum, hypothalamus, cerebellum and dorsal medulla), in addition to relative brain size. We found that optic tectum relative size, in relation to the rest of the brain, correlated positively with discrimination learning performance, while relative telencephalon size correlated positively with reversal learning performance. The other brain measures were not associated with performance in either task. By evaluating how fast learning occurs and how fast an animal adjusts its learning rules to changing conditions, we find support for that different brain regions have distinct functional correlations at the individual level. Importantly, telencephalon size emerges as an important neural correlate of higher executive functions such as cognitive flexibility. This is rare evidence supporting the theory that more neural tissue in key brain regions confers cognitive benefits.

The economics of brain size evolution in vertebrates

Across the animal kingdom, we see remarkable variation in brain size. This variation has even increased over evolutionary time. Traditionally, studies aiming to explain brain size evolution have looked at the fitness benefits of increased brain size in relation to its increased cognitive performance in the social and/or ecological domain. However, brains are among the most energetically expensive tissues in the body and also require an uninterrupted energy supply. If not compensated, these energetic demands inevitably lead to a reduction in energy allocation to other vital functions. In this review, we summarize how an increasing number of studies show that to fully comprehend brain size evolution and the large variation in brain size across lineages, it is important to look at the economics of brains, including the different pathways through which the high energetic costs of brains can be offset. We further show how numerous studies converge on the conclusion that cognitive abilities can only drive brain size evolution in vertebrate lineages where they result in an improved energy balance through favourable ecological preconditions. Cognitive benefits that do not directly improve the organism's energy balance can only be selectively favoured when they produce such large improvements in reproduction or survival that they outweigh the negative energetic effects of the large brain.

Among-individual differences in auditory and physical cognitive abilities in zebra finches

Among-individual variation in performance on cognitive tasks is ubiquitous across species that have been examined, and understanding the evolution of cognitive abilities requires investigating among-individual variation because natural selection acts on individual differences. However, relatively little is known about the extent to which individual differences in cognition are determined by domain-specific compared with domain-general cognitive abilities. We examined individual differences in learning speed of zebra finches across seven different tasks to determine the extent of domain-specific versus domain-general learning abilities, as well as the relationship between learning speed and learning generalization. Thirty-two zebra finches completed a foraging board experiment that included visual and structural discriminations, and then these same birds went through an acoustic operant discrimination experiment that required discriminating between different natural categories of acoustic stimuli. We found evidence of domain-general learning abilities as birds' relative performance on the seven learning tasks was weakly repeatable and a principal components analysis found a first principal component that explained 36% of the variance in performance across tasks with all tasks loading unidirectionally on this component. However, the few significant correlations between tasks and high repeatability within each experiment suggest the potential for domain-specific abilities. Learning speed did not influence an individual's ability to generalize learning. These results suggest that zebra finch performance across visual, structural, and auditory learning relies upon some common mechanism; some might call this evidence of "general intelligence"(g), but it is also possible that this finding is due to other noncognitive mechanisms such as motivation.

Individual differences in co-representation in three monkey species (Callithrix jacchus, Sapajus apella and Macaca tonkeana) in the joint Simon task: the role of social factors and inhibitory control

Behavioral coordination is involved in many forms of primate interactions. Co-representation is the simultaneous mental representation of one’s own and the partner’s task and actions. It often underlies behavioral coordination and cooperation success. In humans, the dyadic social context can modulate co-representation. Here, we first investigated whether individual differences in co-representation in the joint Simon task in capuchin monkeys and Tonkean macaques can be explained by social factors, namely dyadic grooming and sociality index, rank difference and eigenvector centrality. These factors did not predict variation in co-representation. However, in this specific task, co-representation reduces rather than facilitates joint performance. Automatic co-representation therefore needs to be inhibited or suppressed to maximize cooperation success. We therefore also investigated whether general inhibitory control (detour-reaching) would predict co-representation in the joint Simon task in Tonkean macaques, brown capuchin and marmoset monkeys. Inhibitory control did neither explain individual differences nor species differences, since marmosets were most successful in their joint performance despite scoring lowest on inhibitory control. These results suggest that the animals’ ability to resolve conflicts between self and other representation to increase cooperation success in this task is gradually learned due to frequent exposure during shared infant care, rather than determined by strong general inhibitory control. Further, we conclude that the joint Simon task, while useful to detect co-representation non-invasively, is less suitable for identifying the factors explaining individual differences and thus a more fruitful approach to identify these factors is to design tasks in which co-representation favors, rather than hinders cooperation success.

Long-term repeatability of cognitive performance

Measures of cognitive performance, derived from psychometric tasks, have yielded important insights into the factors governing cognitive variation. However, concerns remain over the robustness of these measures, which may be susceptible to non-cognitive factors such as motivation and persistence. Efforts to quantify short-term repeatability of cognitive performance have gone some way to address this, but crucially the long-term repeatability of cognitive performance has been largely overlooked. Quantifying the long-term repeatability of cognitive performance provides the opportunity to determine the stability of cognitive phenotypes and the potential for selection to act on them. To this end, we quantified long-term repeatability of cognitive performance in wild Australian magpies over a three-year period. Cognitive performance was repeatable in two out of four cognitive tasks-associative learning and reversal-learning performance was repeatable, but spatial memory and inhibitory control performance, although trending toward significance, was not. Measures of general cognitive performance, obtained from principal components analyses carried out on each cognitive test battery, were highly repeatable. Together, these findings provide evidence that at least some cognitive phenotypes are stable, which in turn has important implications for our understanding of cognitive evolution.

Relative Brain Size and Cognitive Equivalence in Fishes

Scientists have long struggled to establish how larger brains translate into higher cognitive performance across species. While absolute brain size often yields high predictive power of performance, its positive correlation with body size warrants some level of correction. It is expected that larger brains are needed to control larger bodies without any changes in cognitive performance. Potentially, the mean value of intraspecific brain-body slopes provides the best available estimate for an interspecific correction factor. For example, in primates, including humans, an increase in body size translates into an increase in brain size without changes in cognitive performance. Here, we provide the first evaluation of this hypothesis for another clade, teleost fishes. First, we obtained a mean intraspecific brain-body regression slope of 0.46 (albeit with a relatively large range of 0.26-0.79) from a dataset of 51 species, with at least 10 wild adult specimens per species. This mean intraspecific slope value (0.46) is similar to that of the encephalisation quotient reported for teleosts (0.5), which can be used to predict mean cognitive performance in fishes. Importantly, such a mean value (0.46) is much higher than in endothermic vertebrate species (≤0.3). Second, we used wild-caught adult cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus as a case study to test whether variation in individual cognitive performance can be explained by body size. We first obtained the brain-body regression slope for this species from two different datasets, which gave slope values of 0.58 (MRI scan data) and 0.47 (dissection data). Then, we used another dataset involving 69 adult cleaners different from those tested for their brain-body slope. We found that cognitive performance from four different tasks that estimated their learning, numerical, and inhibitory control abilities was not significantly associated with body size. These results suggest that the intraspecific brain-body slope captures cognitive equivalence for this species. That is, individuals that are on the brain-body regression line are cognitively equal. While rather preliminary, our results suggest that fish and mammalian brain organisations are fundamentally different, resulting in different intra- and interspecific slopes of cognitive equivalence.

The Possible Role of Body Temperature in Modulating Brain and Body Sizes in Hominin Evolution

Many models have posited that the concomitant evolution of large brains and body sizes in hominins was constrained by metabolic costs. In such studies, the impact of body temperature has arguably not been sufficiently addressed despite the well-established fact that the rates of most physiological processes are manifestly temperature-dependent. Hence, the potential role of body temperature in regulating the number of neurons and body size is investigated by means of a heuristic quantitative model. It is suggested that modest deviations in body temperature (i.e., by a couple of degrees Celsius) might allow for substantive changes in brain and body parameters. In particular, a higher body temperature may prove amenable to an increased number of neurons, a higher brain-to-body mass ratio and fewer hours expended on feeding activities, while the converse could apply when the temperature is lowered. Future studies should, therefore, endeavor to explore and incorporate the effects of body temperature in metabolic theories of hominin evolution, while also integrating other factors such as foraging efficiency, diet, and fire control in tandem.

Exploring Higher-Order Conceptual Learning in an Arthropod with a Large Multisensory Processing Center

Simple Summary

It is difficult to measure animal intelligence because the definition of ‘intelligence’ varies, and many animals are good at specific tasks used to measure intelligence or cognition. To address this, scientists often look for evidence of common cognitive abilities. One such ability, the ability to learn concepts, is thought to be rare in animals, especially invertebrates. Concepts include the ideas of ‘same’ and ‘different’. These concepts can be applied to anything in the environment while also being independent of those objects and can help animals understand and survive their environment. Amblypygids, a relative of spiders, live in tropical and subtropical areas, are very good learners, and have a large, complex brain region known to process information from multiple senses. We tested whether amblypygids could learn the concept of ‘same’ by training them to move toward a stimulus that matched with an initial stimulus. We also trained some individuals to learn the concept ‘different’ by training them to move toward a non-matching stimulus. When we used new stimuli, the amblypygids did not move toward the correct stimulus significantly more often than the incorrect stimulus, suggesting either they are unable to learn these higher-order concepts or our experimental design failed to elicit that ability.

Abstract

Comparative cognition aims to understand the evolutionary history and current function of cognitive abilities in a variety of species with diverse natural histories. One characteristic often attributed to higher cognitive abilities is higher-order conceptual learning, such as the ability to learn concepts independent of stimuli—e.g., ‘same’ or ‘different’. Conceptual learning has been documented in honeybees and a number of vertebrates. Amblypygids, nocturnal enigmatic arachnids, are good candidates for higher-order learning because they are excellent associational learners, exceptional navigators, and they have large, highly folded mushroom bodies, which are brain regions known to be involved in learning and memory in insects. In Experiment 1, we investigate if the amblypygid Phrynus marginimaculatus can learn the concept of same with a delayed odor matching task. In Experiment 2, we test if Paraphrynus laevifrons can learn same/different with delayed tactile matching and nonmatching tasks before testing if they can transfer this learning to a novel cross-modal odor stimulus. Our data provide no evidence of conceptual learning in amblypygids, but more solid conclusions will require the use of alternative experimental designs to ensure our negative results are not simply a consequence of the designs we employed.

General intelligence disentangled via a generality metric for natural and artificial intelligence

Success in all sorts of situations is the most classical interpretation of general intelligence. Under limited resources, however, the capability of an agent must necessarily be limited too, and generality needs to be understood as comprehensive performance up to a level of difficulty. The degree of generality then refers to the way an agent's capability is distributed as a function of task difficulty. This dissects the notion of general intelligence into two non-populational measures, generality and capability, which we apply to individuals and groups of humans, other animals and AI systems, on several cognitive and perceptual tests. Our results indicate that generality and capability can decouple at the individual level: very specialised agents can show high capability and vice versa. The metrics also decouple at the population level, and we rarely see diminishing returns in generality for those groups of high capability. We relate the individual measure of generality to traditional notions of general intelligence and cognitive efficiency in humans, collectives, non-human animals and machines. The choice of the difficulty function now plays a prominent role in this new conception of generality, which brings a quantitative tool for shedding light on long-standing questions about the evolution of general intelligence and the evaluation of progress in Artificial General Intelligence.

Do sex differences in construction behavior relate to differences in physical cognitive abilities?

Nest-building behaviour in birds may be particularly relevant to investigating the evolution of physical cognition, as nest building engages cognitive mechanisms for the use and manipulation of materials. We hypothesized that nest-building ecology may be related to physical cognitive abilities. To test our hypothesis, we used zebra finches, which have sex-differentiated roles in nest building. We tested 16 male and 16 female zebra finches on three discrimination tasks in the following order: length discrimination, flexibility discrimination, and color discrimination, using different types of string. We predicted that male zebra finches, which select and deposit the majority of nesting material and are the primary nest builders in this species, would learn to discriminate string length and flexibility-structural traits relevant to nest building-in fewer trials compared to females, but that the sexes would learn color discrimination (not structurally relevant to nest building) in a similar number of trials. Contrary to these predictions, male and female zebra finches did not differ in their speed to learn any of the three tasks. There was, however, consistent among-individual variation in performance: learning speed was positively correlated across the tasks. Our findings suggest that male and female zebra finches either (1) do not differ in their physical cognitive abilities, or (2) any cognitive sex differences in zebra finches are more specific to tasks more closely associated with nest building. Our experiment is the first to examine the potential evolutionary relationship between nest building and physical cognitive abilities.

Heterogeneity of performances in several inhibitory control tasks: male rhesus macaques are more easily distracted than females

Inhibitory control, the ability to override a dominant response, is crucial in many aspects of everyday life. In animal studies, striking individual variations are often largely ignored and their causes rarely considered. Hence, our aims were to systematically investigate individual variability in inhibitory control, to replicate the most common causes of individual variation (age, sex and rank) and to determine if these factors had a consistent effect on three main components of inhibitory control (inhibition of a distraction, inhibition of an action, inhibition of a cognitive set). We tested 21 rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) in a battery of validated touchscreen tasks. We first found individual variations in all inhibitory control performances. We then demonstrated that males had poorer performances to inhibit a distraction and that middle-aged individuals exhibited poorer performance in the inhibition of a cognitive set. Hence, the factors of age and sex were not consistently associated with the main components of inhibitory control, suggesting a multi-faceted structure. The rank of the subjects did not influence any inhibitory control performances. This study adopts a novel approach for animal behaviour studies and gives new insight into the individual variability of inhibitory control which is crucial to understand its evolutionary underpinnings.

Monkey see, monkey feel? Marmoset reactions towards conspecifics' arousal

Consolation has been observed in several species, including marmoset monkeys, but it is often unclear to what extent they are empathy-based. Marmosets perform well in at least two of three components of empathy-based consolation, namely understanding others and prosociality, but it is unknown to what extent they show matching with others. We, therefore, tested whether non-aroused individuals would become aroused themselves when encountering an aroused group member (indicated by piloerection of the tail). We found a robust contagion effect: group members were more likely to show piloerection themselves after having encountered an aroused versus relaxed conspecific. Moreover, group members offered consolation behaviours (affiliative approaches) towards the aroused fellow group members rather than the latter requesting it. Importantly, this pattern was shown by both aroused and non-aroused individuals, which suggests that they did not do this to reduce their own arousal but rather to console the individual in distress. We conclude that marmosets have all three components of empathy-based consolation. These results are in line with observations in another cooperative breeder, the prairie vole.

Memory enhances problem solving in the fawn-footed mosaic-tailed rat Melomys cervinipes

Problem solving is important for survival, allowing animals to access novel food resources or escape from predators. It was originally thought to rely on an animal's intelligence; however, studies examining the relationship between individual cognitive ability and problem solving performance show mixed results, and studies are often restricted to only one cognitive and one problem solving task. We investigated the relationship between general cognitive ability and problem solving across multiple tasks in the fawn-footed mosaic-tailed rat Melomys cervinipes. We measured general cognitive ability across different domains (memory in an odour learning association task, recognition in a novel object recognition task, size discrimination using different sized pieces of food, and learning across multiple presentations of a food-baited activity board). We also measured problem solving across different contexts (food-baited puzzle boxes in home cage, obstruction task, and food-baited activity board in a novel arena). Mosaic-tailed rats showed a general cognitive ability, with average problem solving latency, memory ability, and learning in the tile task being correlated. As such, individuals that were able to remember an association and learned to solve the tile task solved the problems faster than individuals that could not remember or learn. Our results suggest that problem solving in mosaic-tailed rats likely relies on some forms of simple cognition, particularly memory, but could also depend on other traits, such as an individual's persistence.

A Farewell to the Encephalization Quotient: A New Brain Size Measure for Comparative Primate Cognition

Both absolute and relative brain sizes vary greatly among and within the major vertebrate lineages. Scientists have long debated how larger brains in primates and hominins translate into greater cognitive performance, and in particular how to control for the relationship between the noncognitive functions of the brain and body size. One solution to this problem is to establish the slope of cognitive equivalence, i.e., the line connecting organisms with an identical bauplan but different body sizes. The original approach to estimate this slope through intraspecific regressions was abandoned after it became clear that it generated slopes that were too low by an unknown margin due to estimation error. Here, we revisit this method. We control for the error problem by focusing on highly dimorphic primate species with large sample sizes and fitting a line through the mean values for adult females and males. We obtain the best estimate for the slope of circa 0.27, a value much lower than those constructed using all mammal species and close to the value expected based on the genetic correlation between brain size and body size. We also find that the estimate of cognitive brain size based on cognitive equivalence fits empirical cognitive studies better than the encephalization quotient, which should therefore be avoided in future studies on primates and presumably mammals and birds in general. The use of residuals from the line of cognitive equivalence may change conclusions concerning the cognitive abilities of extant and extinct primate species, including hominins.

The cultural evolution of cultural evolution

What makes fast, cumulative cultural evolution work? Where did it come from? Why is it the sole preserve of humans? We set out a self-assembly hypothesis: cultural evolution evolved culturally. We present an evolutionary account that shows this hypothesis to be coherent, plausible, and worthy of further investigation. It has the following steps: (0) in common with other animals, early hominins had significant capacity for social learning; (1) knowledge and skills learned by offspring from their parents began to spread because bearers had more offspring, a process we call CS1 (or Cultural Selection 1); (2) CS1 shaped attentional learning biases; (3) these attentional biases were augmented by explicit learning biases (judgements about what should be copied from whom). Explicit learning biases enabled (4) the high-fidelity, exclusive copying required for fast cultural accumulation of knowledge and skills by a process we call CS2 (or Cultural Selection 2) and (5) the emergence of cognitive processes such as imitation, mindreading and metacognition-'cognitive gadgets' specialized for cultural learning. This self-assembly hypothesis is consistent with archaeological evidence that the stone tools used by early hominins were not dependent on fast, cumulative cultural evolution, and suggests new priorities for research on 'animal culture'. This article is part of the theme issue 'Foundations of cultural evolution'.

Sex differences in the cognitive abilities of a sex-changing fish species Labroides dimidiatus

Males and females of the same species are known to differ at least in some cognitive domains, but such differences are not systematic across species. As a consequence, it remains unclear whether reported differences generally reflect adaptive adjustments to diverging selective pressures, or whether differences are mere side products of physiological differences necessary for reproduction. Here, we show that sex differences in cognition occur even in a sex-changing species, a protogynous hermaphroditic species where all males have previously been females. We tested male and female cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus in four cognitive tasks to evaluate their learning and inhibitory control abilities first in an abstract presentation of the tasks, then in more ecologically relevant contexts. The results showed that males were better learners than females in the two learning tasks (i.e. reversal learning as an abstract task and a food quantity assessment task as an ecologically relevant task). Conversely, females showed enhanced abilities compared with males in the abstract inhibitory control task (i.e. detour task); but both sexes performed equally in the ecologically relevant inhibitory control task (i.e. 'audience effect' task). Hence, sex-changing species may offer unique opportunities to study proximate and/or ultimate causes underlying sex differences in cognitive abilities.

Understanding Human Cognitive Uniqueness

Humanity has regarded itself as intellectually superior to other species for millennia, yet human cognitive uniqueness remains poorly understood. Here, we evaluate candidate traits plausibly underlying our distinctive cognition (including mental time travel, tool use, problem solving, social cognition, and communication) as well as domain generality, and we consider how human cognitive uniqueness may have evolved. We conclude that there are no traits present in humans and absent in other animals that in isolation explain our species' superior cognitive performance; rather, there are many cognitive domains in which humans possess unusually potent capabilities compared to those found in other species. Humans are flexible cognitive all-rounders, whose proficiency arises through interactions and reinforcement between cognitive domains at multiple scales.

Innovative problem solving in macaws

Behavioural innovations with tool-like objects in non-habitually tool-using species are thought to require complex physical understanding, but the underlying cognitive processes remain poorly understood. A few parrot species are capable of innovating tool-use and borderline tool-use behaviours. We tested this capacity in two species of macaw (Ara ambiguus, n = 9; Ara glaucogularis, n = 8) to investigate if they could solve a problem-solving task through manufacture of a multi-stone construction. Specifically, after having functional experience with a pre-inserted stick tool to push a reward out of a horizontal tube, the subjects were required to insert five stones consecutively from one side to perform the same function as the stick tool with the resulting multi-component construction. One Ara glaucogularis solved the task and innovated the stone construction after the experience with the stick tool. Two more subjects (one of each species) did so after having further functional experience of a single stone pushing a reward out of a shortened tube. These subjects were able to consistently solve the task, but often made errors, for example counter-productive stone insertions from the opposing end, even in some of the successful trials. Conversely, multiple trials without errors also suggested a strong goal direction. Their performance in the follow-up tasks was inconclusive since they sometimes inserted stones into un-baited or blocked ‘dummy tubes’, but this could have been an attention-deficit behaviour as subjects had not encountered these ‘dummy tubes’ before. Overall, the successful subjects’ performance was so erratic that it proved difficult to conclude whether they had functional understanding of their multi-stone constructions.

How general is cognitive ability in non-human animals? A meta-analytical and multi-level reanalysis approach

General intelligence has been a topic of high interest for over a century. Traditionally, research on general intelligence was based on principal component analyses and other dimensionality reduction approaches. The advent of high-speed computing has provided alternative statistical tools that have been used to test predictions of human general intelligence. In comparison, research on general intelligence in non-human animals is in its infancy and still relies mostly on factor-analytical procedures. Here, we argue that dimensionality reduction, when incorrectly applied, can lead to spurious results and limit our understanding of ecological and evolutionary causes of variation in animal cognition. Using a meta-analytical approach, we show, based on 555 bivariate correlations, that the average correlation among cognitive abilities is low (r = 0.185; 95% CI: 0.087-0.287), suggesting relatively weak support for general intelligence in animals. We then use a case study with relatedness (genetic) data to demonstrate how analysing traits using mixed models, without dimensionality reduction, provides new insights into the structure of phenotypic variance among cognitive traits, and uncovers genetic associations that would be hidden otherwise. We hope this article will stimulate the use of alternative tools in the study of cognition and its evolution in animals.

Mitochondrial Functions, Cognition, and the Evolution of Intelligence: Reply to Commentaries and Moving Forward

In response to commentaries, I address questions regarding the proposal that general intelligence (g) is a manifestation of the functioning of intramodular and intermodular brain networks undergirded by the efficiency of mitochondrial functioning (Geary 2018). The core issues include the relative contribution of mitochondrial functioning to individual differences in g; studies that can be used to test associated hypotheses; and, the adaptive function of intelligence from an evolutionary perspective. I attempt to address these and related issues, as well as note areas in which other issues remain to be addressed.

Linking ecology and cognition: does ecological specialisation predict cognitive test performance?

Variation in cognitive abilities is thought to be linked to variation in brain size, which varies across species with either social factors (Social Intelligence Hypothesis) or ecological challenges (Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis). However, the nature of the ecological processes invoked by the Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis, like adaptations to certain habitat characteristics or dietary requirements, remains relatively poorly known. Here, we review comparative studies that experimentally investigated interspecific variation in cognitive performance in relation to a species’ degree of ecological specialisation. Overall, the relevant literature was biased towards studies of mammals and birds as well as studies focusing on ecological challenges related to diet. We separated ecological challenges into those related to searching for food, accessing a food item and memorising food locations. We found interspecific variation in cognitive performance that can be explained by adaptations to different foraging styles. Species-specific adaptations to certain ecological conditions, like food patch distribution, characteristics of food items or seasonality also broadly predicted variation in cognitive abilities. A species’ innovative problem-solving and spatial processing ability, for example, could be explained by its use of specific foraging techniques or search strategies, respectively. Further, habitat generalists were more likely to outperform habitat specialists. Hence, we found evidence that ecological adaptations and cognitive performance are linked and that the classification concept of ecological specialisation can explain variation in cognitive performance only with regard to habitat, but not dietary specialisation.

Enhancing Teaching in Biomedical, Health and Exercise Science with Real-Time Physiological Visualisations

Muscle physiology constitutes a core curriculum for students and researchers within biomedical, health and exercise science disciplines. The variations between skeletal and smooth muscle, mechanisms underlying excitation-contraction coupling, as well as the relationships between muscle anatomy and physiology are commonly taught from illustrations, static models or textbooks. However, this does not necessarily provide students with the required comprehension surrounding the dynamic nature of muscle contractions or neuromuscular activities. This chapter will explore alternative methods of visualising skeletal and smooth muscle physiology in real-time. Various recording hardware, isolated tissues bath experiments, neurophysiological applications and computer-based software will be discussed to provide an overview of the evidence-based successes and case studies for using these techniques when assisting students with their understanding of the complex mechanisms underlying muscle contractions.

An Argument for an Ecosystemic AI: Articulating Connections across Prehuman and Posthuman Intelligences

As an art collective Cesar & Lois develops projects that examine sociotechnical systems, attempting to challenge anthropocentric technological pathways while linking to intelligences sourced in biological circuitry. As artists we imagine new configurations for what we understand as (social, economic, technological) networks and intelligences. With this ecosystemic approach we consider the possibility of an artificial intelligence (AI) that supports well-being in a broad sense, accommodating relationships across different layers of living worlds and involving local and global communities of all kinds. This thinking is grounded in research by theorists across disciplines, including communications and media theory, microbiology, anthropology, decolonial studies, social ecology, sociology and environmental psychology. At a time when human beings and their ecosystems face grave threats due to climate change and a global pandemic, we are rethinking the basis for our AIs, and for the resulting decision-making on behalf of societies and ecosystems. Creative projects by Cesar & Lois provide alternative conceptual models for thinking across networks, reframing the artists’ and potentially viewers’ understanding of what motivates and shapes societies. Referencing a series of artworks and the theories that underpin them, this article envisages a sociotechnical framework that takes into account ecosystems and challenges the philosophical orientations that guide society. Degenerative Cultures is an artwork in which the artists overlap microbiological organisms, AI and human systems as a speculative restructuring of networks across human and nonhuman entities. The push for ecosystemic technologies and intelligences is linked to the expansion of community to include planetary constituents, such as nonhuman beings and environments. The artists posit that such ecosystemic networks would be capable of taking into account the planet’s human societies as well as nonhuman species and their environments, broadening the concept of community well-being and shifting the technological architecture to meet the complex needs of the planet and its constituent parts. The experimental series, [ECO]nomic Revolution, layers Physarum polycephalum, or slime mold, over the mapped demographics of human cities. The species polycephalum references multi-brains, and implies a decentralized logic, which for the non-neurological microbiological network translates to the sharing of nutrients and regulated growth across a culture. Assuming a perspective based in the arts, this proposition imagines a shift from the dominant conceptions of AI as an individual intelligence and frames it as part of a network that necessarily includes ecosystems. We envision the creation of sociotechnical systems that could be modeled on networked lifeforms that have optimized themselves across millions of years, like the organism Physarum polycephalum, which occurs globally in moist environments, or like those microbial populations within and outside of human bodies, whose percussive biological processing interacts with and alters many layers of lifeforms. We argue that an environmentally responsive intelligence based on relationships across living systems potentially serves a broad community composed of diverse human populations, nonhuman beings and ecosystems.

Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia

Macphail’s “null hypothesis,” that there are no differences in intelligence, qualitative, or quantitative, between non-human vertebrates has been controversial. This controversy can be useful if it encourages interest in acquiring a detailed understanding of how non-human animals express flexible problem-solving capacity (“intelligence”), but limiting the discussion to vertebrates is too arbitrary. As an example, we focus here on Portia, a spider with an especially intricate predatory strategy and a preference for other spiders as prey. We review research on pre-planned detours, expectancy violation, and a capacity to solve confinement problems where, in each of these three contexts, there is experimental evidence of innate cognitive capacities and reliance on internal representation. These cognitive capacities are related to, but not identical to, intelligence. When discussing intelligence, as when discussing cognition, it is more useful to envisage a continuum instead of something that is simply present or not; in other words, a continuum pertaining to flexible problem-solving capacity for “intelligence” and a continuum pertaining to reliance on internal representation for “cognition.” When envisaging a continuum pertaining to intelligence, Daniel Dennett’s notion of four Creatures (Darwinian, Skinnerian, Popperian, and Gregorian) is of interest, with the distinction between Skinnerian and Popperian Creatures being especially relevant when considering Portia. When we consider these distinctions, a case can be made for Portia being a Popperian Creature. Like Skinnerian Creatures, Popperian Creatures express flexible problem solving capacity, but the manner in which this capacity is expressed by Popperian Creatures is more distinctively cognitive.

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not "One Cognition"

Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally "smart" species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term "cognition" has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not "one cognition". Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which-although always at the forefront of biology-has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.

The transition of object to mental manipulation: beyond a species-specific view of intelligence

Many attempts have been made to classify and evaluate the nature of intelligence in humans and other species (referred to as the 'g' factor in the former and the G factor in the latter). The search for this essential structure of mental life has generated various models and definitions, yet open questions remain. Specifically, referring to intelligence by overemphasizing the anthropocentric terminology and its ethnocentric overlay is insufficient to account for individual differences and limits its generalizability in biological and cultural contexts. The present work is an attempt to adopt a different perspective on the 'g/G' factor and its measurement. We suggest that intelligence, or g/G, is reflected in a biological capacity that evolved from object manipulation in animals, into mental manipulation in humans, in response to various environmental conditions.

Kea show three signatures of domain-general statistical inference

One key aspect of domain-general thought is the ability to integrate information across different cognitive domains. Here, we tested whether kea (Nestor notabilis) can use relative quantities when predicting sampling outcomes, and then integrate both physical information about the presence of a barrier, and social information about the biased sampling of an experimenter, into their predictions. Our results show that kea exhibit three signatures of statistical inference, and therefore can integrate knowledge across different cognitive domains to flexibly adjust their predictions of sampling events. This result provides evidence that true statistical inference is found outside of the great apes, and that aspects of domain-general thinking can convergently evolve in brains with a highly different structure from primates. This has important implications not only for our understanding of how intelligence evolves, but also for research focused on how to create artificial domain-general thought processes.

Modelling the evolution of cognitive styles

BACKGROUND

Individuals consistently differ in behaviour, exhibiting so-called personalities. In many species, individuals differ also in their cognitive abilities. When personalities and cognitive abilities occur in distinct combinations, they can be described as 'cognitive styles'. Both empirical and theoretical investigations produced contradicting or mixed results regarding the complex interplay between cognitive styles and environmental conditions.

RESULTS

Here we use individual-based simulations to show that, under just slightly different environmental conditions, different cognitive styles exist and under a variety of conditions, can also co-exist. Co-existences are based on individual specialization on different resources, or, more generally speaking, on individuals adopting different niches or microhabitats.

CONCLUSIONS

The results presented here suggest that in many species, individuals of the same population may adopt different cognitive styles. Thereby the present study may help to explain the variety of styles described in previous studies and why different, sometimes contradicting, results have been found under similar conditions.

Population densities predict forebrain size variation in the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus

The 'social brain hypothesis' proposes a causal link between social complexity and either brain size or the size of key brain parts known to be involved in cognitive processing and decision-making. While previous work has focused on comparisons between species, how social complexity affects plasticity in brain morphology at the intraspecific level remains mostly unexplored. A suitable study model is the mutualist 'cleaner' fish Labroides dimidiatus, a species that removes ectoparasites from a variety of 'client' fishes in iterative social interactions. Here, we report a positive relationship between the local density of cleaners, as a proxy of both intra- and interspecific sociality, and the size of the cleaner's brain parts suggested to be associated with cognitive functions, such as the diencephalon and telencephalon (that together form the forebrain). In contrast, the size of the mesencephalon, rhombencephalon, and brain stem, assumed more basal in function, were independent of local fish densities. Selective enlargement of brain parts, that is mosaic brain adjustment, appears to be driven by population density in cleaner fish.

Rethinking the Effects of Body Size on the Study of Brain Size Evolution

Body size correlates with most structural and functional components of an organism’s phenotype – brain size being a prime example of allometric scaling with animal size. Therefore, comparative studies of brain evolution in vertebrates rely on controlling for the scaling effects of body size variation on brain size variation by calculating brain weight/body weight ratios. Differences in the brain size-body size relationship between taxa are usually interpreted as differences in selection acting on the brain or its components, while selection pressures acting on body size, which are among the most prevalent in nature, are rarely acknowledged, leading to conflicting and confusing conclusions. We address these problems by comparing brain-body relationships from across >1,000 species of birds and non-avian reptiles. Relative brain size in birds is often assumed to be 10 times larger than in reptiles of similar body size. We examine how differences in the specific gravity of body tissues and in body design (e.g., presence/absence of a tail or a dense shell) between these two groups can affect estimates of relative brain size. Using phylogenetic comparative analyses, we show that the gap in relative brain size between birds and reptiles has been grossly exaggerated. Our results highlight the need to take into account differences between taxa arising from selection pressures affecting body size and design, and call into question the widespread misconception that reptile brains are small and incapable of supporting sophisticated behavior and cognition.

Heritabilities and co-variation among cognitive traits in red junglefowl

Natural selection can act on between-individual variation in cognitive abilities, yet evolutionary responses depend on the presence of underlying genetic variation. It is, therefore, crucial to determine the relative extent of genetic versus environmental control of these among-individual differences in cognitive traits to understand their causes and evolutionary potential. We investigated heritability of associative learning performance and of a cognitive judgement bias (optimism), as well as their covariation, in a captive pedigree-bred population of red junglefowl (Gallus gallus, n > 300 chicks over 5 years). We analysed performance in discriminative and reversal learning (two facets of associative learning), and cognitive judgement bias, by conducting animal models to disentangle genetic from environmental contributions. We demonstrate moderate heritability for reversal learning, and weak to no heritability for optimism and discriminative learning, respectively. The two facets of associative learning were weakly negatively correlated, consistent with hypothesized trade-offs underpinning individual cognitive styles. Reversal, but not discriminative learning performance, was associated with judgement bias; less optimistic individuals reversed a previously learnt association faster. Together these results indicate that genetic and environmental contributions differ among traits. While modular models of cognitive abilities predict a lack of common genetic control for different cognitive traits, further investigation is required to fully ascertain the degree of covariation between a broader range of cognitive traits and the extent of any shared genetic control.This article is part of the theme issue 'Causes and consequences of individual differences in cognitive abilities'.

The impact of environmental interventions among mouse siblings on the heritability and malleability of general cognitive ability

General cognitive ability can be highly heritable in some species, but at the same time, is very malleable. This apparent paradox could potentially be explained by gene-environment interactions and correlations that remain hidden due to experimental limitations on human research and blind spots in animal research. Here, we shed light on this issue by combining the design of a sibling study with an environmental intervention administered to laboratory mice. The analysis included 58 litters of four full-sibling genetically heterogeneous CD-1 male mice, for a total of 232 mice. We separated the mice into two subsets of siblings: a control group (maintained in standard laboratory conditions) and an environmental-enrichment group (which had access to continuous physical exercise and daily exposure to novel environments). We found that general cognitive ability in mice has substantial heritability (24% for all mice) and is also malleable. The mice that experienced the enriched environment had a mean intelligence score that was 0.44 standard deviations higher than their siblings in the control group (equivalent to gains of 6.6 IQ points in humans). We also found that the estimate of heritability changed between groups (55% in the control group compared with non-significant 15% in the enrichment group), analogous to findings in humans across socio-economic status. Unexpectedly, no evidence of gene-environment interaction was detected, and so the change in heritability might be best explained by higher environmental variance in the enrichment group. Our findings, as well as the 'sibling intervention procedure' for mice, may be valuable to future research on the heritability, mechanisms and evolution of cognition.This article is part of the theme issue 'Causes and consequences of individual differences in cognitive abilities'.

Measuring and understanding individual differences in cognition

Individuals vary in their cognitive performance. While this variation forms the foundation of the study of human psychometrics, its broader importance is only recently being recognized. Explicitly acknowledging this individual variation found in both humans and non-human animals provides a novel opportunity to understand the mechanisms, development and evolution of cognition. The papers in this special issue highlight the growing emphasis on individual cognitive differences from fields as diverse as neurobiology, experimental psychology and evolutionary biology. Here, we synthesize this body of work. We consider the distinct challenges in quantifying individual differences in cognition and provide concrete methodological recommendations. In particular, future studies would benefit from using multiple task variants to ensure they target specific, clearly defined cognitive traits and from conducting repeated testing to assess individual consistency. We then consider how neural, genetic, developmental and behavioural factors may generate individual differences in cognition. Finally, we discuss the potential fitness consequences of individual cognitive variation and place these into an evolutionary framework with testable hypotheses. We intend for this special issue to stimulate researchers to position individual variation at the centre of the cognitive sciences.This article is part of the theme issue 'Causes and consequences of individual differences in cognitive abilities'.

The reach of gene-culture coevolution in animals

Culture (behaviour based on socially transmitted information) is present in diverse animal species, yet how it interacts with genetic evolution remains largely unexplored. Here, we review the evidence for gene-culture coevolution in animals, especially birds, cetaceans and primates. We describe how culture can relax or intensify selection under different circumstances, create new selection pressures by changing ecology or behaviour, and favour adaptations, including in other species. Finally, we illustrate how, through culturally mediated migration and assortative mating, culture can shape population genetic structure and diversity. This evidence suggests strongly that animal culture plays an important evolutionary role, and we encourage explicit analyses of gene-culture coevolution in nature.