Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making

Cooperation and deception through stigmergic interactions in human groups

Stigmergy is a generic coordination mechanism widely used by animal societies, in which traces left by individuals in a medium guide and stimulate their subsequent actions. In humans, new forms of stigmergic processes have emerged through the development of online services that extensively use the digital traces left by their users. Here, we combine interactive experiments with faithful data-based modeling to investigate how groups of individuals exploit a simple rating system and the resulting traces in an information search task in competitive or noncompetitive conditions. We find that stigmergic interactions can help groups to collectively find the cells with the highest values in a table of hidden numbers. We show that individuals can be classified into three behavioral profiles that differ in their degree of cooperation. Moreover, the competitive situation prompts individuals to give deceptive ratings and reinforces the weight of private information versus social information in their decisions.

Embracing Complexity: A Review of Negotiation Research

In this review, we identify emerging trends in negotiation scholarship that embrace complexity, finding moderators of effects that were initially described as monolithic, examining the nuances of social interaction, and studying negotiation as it occurs in the real world. We also identify areas in which research is lacking and call for scholarship that offers practical advice. All told, the existing research highlights negotiation as an exciting context for examining human behavior, characterized by features such as strong emotions, an intriguing blend of cooperation and competition, the presence of fundamental issues such as power and group identity, and outcomes that deeply affect the trajectory of people's personal and professional lives.

Deception in negotiations: Insights and opportunities

Deception pervades negotiations and shapes both the negotiation process and outcomes. In this article, we review recent scholarship investigating deception in negotiations. We offer an integrative review of recent theoretical and empirical research, and we argue that the dominant experimental paradigms that scholars have used to study deception have limited our understanding of deception in negotiations. We call for future work to develop new paradigms to investigate the role of relationships, reputations, emotions, and negotiation experience. We also call for future work to expand our understanding of practical prescriptions to curtail a negotiator's risk of being deceived.

From Claiming to Creating Value: The Psychology of Negotiations on Common Resource Dilemmas

Current sustainability challenges often reflect common resource dilemmas where peoples’ short-term self-interests are at odds with collective interests in the present and future. In this article, we highlight the key role of joint decision-making processes in negotiations to facilitate the management of common resource dilemmas and to promote the transition toward sustainability. By reflecting on psychological drivers and barriers, we argue that the limited availability, the restricted accessibility, and the dynamic alterability of resources in negotiations on common resource dilemmas may cause a myopic mindset that fosters value claiming strategies and, ultimately, results in distributive-consumptive negotiation outcomes. To promote value creation in negotiations on common resource dilemmas, we argue that agents must perform a mindset shift with an inclusive social identity on a superordinate group level, an embracive prosocial motivation for other parties’ interests at and beyond the table, and a forward-looking cognitive orientation towards long-term consequences of their joint decisions. By shifting their mindset from a myopic towards a holistic cognitive orientation, agents may explore negotiation strategies to create value through increasing the availability, improving the accessibility, and using the alterability of resources. Applying these value creation strategies may help achieve integrative-transformative negotiation outcomes and promote sustainable agreements aimed at intersectional, interlocal, and intergenerational justice. We conclude by discussing additional psychological factors that play a pivotal role in negotiations on common resource dilemmas as well as further developments for future research.

Top Ten Behavioral Biases in Project Management: An Overview

Behavioral science has witnessed an explosion in the number of biases identified by behavioral scientists, to more than 200 at present. This article identifies the 10 most important behavioral biases for project management. First, we argue it is a mistake to equate behavioral bias with cognitive bias, as is common. Cognitive bias is half the story; political bias the other half. Second, we list the top 10 behavioral biases in project management: (1) strategic misrepresentation, (2) optimism bias, (3) uniqueness bias, (4) the planning fallacy, (5) overconfidence bias, (6) hindsight bias, (7) availability bias, (8) the base rate fallacy, (9) anchoring, and (10) escalation of commitment. Each bias is defined, and its impacts on project management are explained, with examples. Third, base rate neglect is identified as a primary reason that projects underperform. This is supported by presentation of the most comprehensive set of base rates that exist in project management scholarship, from 2,062 projects. Finally, recent findings of power law outcomes in project performance are identified as a possible first stage in discovering a general theory of project management, with more fundamental and more scientific explanations of project outcomes than found in conventional theory.

Impact of the baseline payoff on evolutionary outcomes

Do individuals enjoying a higher baseline payoff behave similarly in competitive scenarios compared to their counterparts? The classical replicator equation does not answer such a question since it is invariant to the background or baseline payoff of individuals. In reality, however, if one's baseline payoff is higher than the possible payoffs of an interaction (or game), the individual may respond generously or indifferently if s(he) is satisfied with the prevailing benchmark payoff. This work intends to explore such a phenomenon within the realm of pairwise interactions-taking the prisoner's dilemma as a metaphor-in well-mixed finite and infinite populations. In this framework, a player uses the payoff (comprising baseline and game payoffs) -expectation difference to estimate a degree of eagerness and, with that degree of eagerness, revises his or her strategy with a certain probability. We adopt two approaches to explore such a context, naming them as the Fermi and imitation processes, in which the former uses a pairwise Femi function and the latter considers the relative fitness to estimate probabilities for strategy revision. In a finite population, we examine the effect of intensities to payoff-expectation and strategic payoff differences (denoted by k_{1} and k_{2}, respectively) as well as the level of contentment (ω) on the fixation probability and fixation time (for a single defector). We observe that the fixation probability surges with the increase of intensity parameters. Nevertheless, the maximum fixation probability may require a substantially larger time to fixate, especially when the expectation is lower than the baseline payoff. This means that cooperators can persist for a longer period of time. A higher expectation or greed, however, considerably reduces the fixation time. Interestingly, our numerical simulation reveals that both approaches are equivalent under weak k_{2}(≪1) in the Fermi process. We further derive mean-field equations for both approaches in the context of an infinite population, where we observe two possible evolutionary consequences: either full-scale defection or the persistence of the initial frequency of cooperators. The latter scenario indicates players' uninterested or neutral behavior in relation to the interaction due to their satisfaction on the baseline payoff.

No more Mr. Nice Guy: social value orientation and abusive supervision

Purpose

The present research examined the interactive effect of subordinates' and their supervisors' social value orientations (SVO) on abusive supervision and its consequence for in-role performance.

Design/methodology/approach

In study 1, we provided a survey to 420 subordinates and 115 supervisors from 42 organizations. HLM was used to test the hypothesized cross-level moderated mediation model. In study 2, 78 participants were asked to imagine they were a supervisor and responded to a potential scenario where supervisor and subordinate prosocial and proself orientations toward the organization were manipulated (2 × 2 design).

Findings

Study 1 showed that when supervisors have a higher prosocial motivation, subordinates who are more self-interested (proself) report more abuse than those with a higher prosocial motivation, with negative consequences for in-role performance. Study 2 replicated the pattern: participants (in the role as supervisor) with induced prosocial goals rated abusive supervision behaviors as more justified and acceptable toward a proself employee than they did toward a prosocial employee.

Originality/value

This research is innovative by bridging SVO and organizational literatures and demonstrating that a dyadic interaction between a proself subordinate and a prosocial supervisor may produce a reactive perpetrator – provocative victim relationship characterized by higher abusive supervision.

Team Sports Off the Field: Competing Excludes Cooperating for Individual but Not for Team Athletes

Both team and individual sports require competition, whereas cooperation is more prevalent in team than in individual sports. In particular, team athletes have to compete (for starting roles) while cooperating (for team success) with the same teammates. For team athletes, competition and cooperative behavior, two mutually exclusive constructs according to earlier psychological research, might therefore be less incompatible than for individual athletes. In Study 1, team athletes attributed a higher demand to compete and cooperate with the same teammates or training partners to their sport than individual athletes to their sport. Study 2 showed that experiencing competition (vs. control) undermines information sharing less for team than for individual athletes. In addition, Study 2 demonstrated that priming competition undermines the accessibility of cooperative thoughts less for team than for individual athletes. Therefore, team athletes might be better at competing without ceasing to cooperate. Implications for collaboration in groups are discussed.

Social value orientation modulates the processing of outcome evaluation involving others

Social value orientation (SVO) is a stable personality trait that reflects how people evaluate interdependent outcomes for themselves and others in social environments. Generally, people can be classified into two types: proselfs and prosocials. The present study examined how SVO affects the processing of outcome evaluation temporally using the event-related potential (ERP). Young adults with two different SVO types participated in a simple gambling task in which they received outcome distributions for themselves and others. The results showed that for the self outcomes, the feedback-related negativity (FRN) was more negative for self-loss than self-gain, and the P3 and late positive component (LPC) was larger for self-gain than self-loss in both prosocial and proself groups. For the other outcomes, however, the FRN, P3 and LPC were sensitive to other’s gain and loss only in the prosocial group but not in the proself group. These findings suggest that outcomes for oneself and others are processed differently at different stages of evaluation processing in the brains of individuals with distinct SVOs.

Keeping up appearances: Strategic information exchange by disidentified group members

Information exchange is a crucial process in groups, but to date, no one has systematically examined how a group member’s relationship with a group can undermine this process. The current research examined whether disidentified group members (i.e., members who have a negative relationship with their group) strategically undermine the group outcome in information exchange. Disidentification has been found to predict negative group-directed behaviour, but at the same time disidentified members run the risk of being punished or excluded from the group when displaying destructive behaviour. In three studies we expected and found that disidentified group members subtly act against the interest of the group by withholding important private information, while at the same time they keep up appearances by sharing important information that is already known by the other group members. These findings stress the importance of taking a group member’s relationship with a group into account when considering the process of information exchange.

Perceived warmth and competence of others shape voluntary deceptive behaviour in a morally relevant setting

The temptation to deceive others compares to a moral dilemma: it involves a conflict between the temptation to obtain some benefit and the desire to conform to personal and social moral norms or avoid aversive social consequences. Thus, people might feel different levels of emotional and moral conflict depending on the target of the deception. Here we explored, in a morally relevant setting, how social judgements based on two fundamental dimensions of human social cognition - 'warmth' and 'competence' - impact on the decision to deceive others. Results revealed independent effects for warmth and competence. Specifically, while people are less inclined to deceive for self-gain those individuals they perceive as warm, they also tend to lie more to highly competent others. Furthermore, the perceived warmth and competence modulated the general tendency to reduce deceptive behaviour when there was a risk of disclosure compared to when the lying was anonymous, highlighting the importance of these judgements in social evaluation processes. Together, our results demonstrate that the emotional costs and personal moral standards that inhibit engagement in deceptive behaviour are not stable but rather malleable according to the target and the consequences of the deception.

Personality and Social Framing in Privacy Decision-Making: A Study on Cookie Acceptance

Despite their best intentions, people struggle with the realities of privacy protection and will often sacrifice privacy for convenience in their online activities. Individuals show systematic, personality dependent differences in their privacy decision making, which makes it interesting for those who seek to design 'nudges' designed to manipulate privacy behaviors. We explore such effects in a cookie decision task. Two hundred and ninety participants were given an incidental website review task that masked the true aim of the study. At the task outset, they were asked whether they wanted to accept a cookie in a message that either contained a social framing 'nudge' (they were told that either a majority or a minority of users like themselves had accepted the cookie) or contained no information about social norms (control). At the end of the task, participants were asked to complete a range of personality assessments (impulsivity, risk-taking, willingness to self-disclose and sociability). We found social framing to be an effective behavioral nudge, reducing cookie acceptance in the minority social norm condition. Further, we found personality effects in that those scoring highly on risk-taking and impulsivity were significantly more likely to accept the cookie. Finally, we found that the application of a social nudge could attenuate the personality effects of impulsivity and risk-taking. We explore the implications for those working in the privacy-by-design space.

Fear or greed? Oxytocin regulates inter-individual conflict by enhancing fear in men

People may choose non-cooperation in social dilemmas either out of fear (if others choose to defect) or out of greed (when others choose to cooperate). Previous studies have shown that exogenous oxytocin motivates a "tend and defend" pattern in inter-group conflict in which oxytocin stimulates in-group cooperation and out-group defense. Using a double-blind placebo-controlled design combined with a modified Prisoner's dilemma game (PDG), we examined the effect of oxytocin on social motivations in inter-individual conflict in men. Results showed that compared with the placebo group, oxytocin-exposed participants were less cooperative in general. Specifically, oxytocin amplified the effect of fear on defection but did not influence the effect of greed. Another non-social control study confirmed participants' decisions were sensitive to social factors. Our findings suggest that even when social group conflict is removed, oxytocin promotes distrust of strangers in "me and you" inter-individual conflict by elevating social fear in men.

Grading Hampers Cooperative Information Sharing in Group Problem Solving

We hypothesized that individual grading in group work, a widespread practice, hampers information sharing in cooperative problem solving. Experiment 1 showed that a condition in which members’ individual contribution was expected to be visible and graded, as in most graded work, led to less pooling of relevant, unshared information and more pooling of less-relevant, shared information than two control conditions where individual contribution was not graded, but either visible or not. Experiment 2 conceptually replicated this effect: Group members primed with grades pooled less of their unshared information, but more of their shared information, compared to group members primed with neutral concepts. Thus, grading can hinder cooperative work and impair information sharing in groups.

Justifications shape ethical blind spots

To some extent, unethical behavior results from people's limited attention to ethical considerations, which results in an ethical blind spot. Here, we focus on the role of ambiguity in shaping people's ethical blind spots, which in turn lead to their ethical failures. We suggest that in ambiguous settings, individuals' attention shifts toward tempting information, which determines the magnitude of their lies. Employing a novel ambiguous-dice paradigm, we asked participants to report the outcome of the die roll appearing closest to the location of a previously presented fixation cross on a computer screen; this outcome would determine their pay. We varied the value of the die second closest to the fixation cross to be either higher (i.e., tempting) or lower (i.e., not tempting) than the die closest to the fixation cross. Results of two experiments revealed that in ambiguous settings, people's incorrect responses were self-serving. Tracking participants' eye movements demonstrated that people's ethical blind spots are shaped by increased attention toward tempting information.

Trust and Deception in Negotiation: Culturally Divergent Effects

We investigate how trust reduces the tendency to use deception in negotiations from a culturally contextual perspective. We find culturally divergent patterns across Chinese and American negotiators. Specifically, for Chinese negotiators, cognition-based trust decreases the approval of using negative emotional and informational deception, whereas affect-based trust increases the approval of using informational deception. For American negotiators, affect-based trust decreases the approval of using negative emotional deception. We discuss theoretical and practical implications on the need for culturally specific strategies in managing deceptions in negotiations.

The first-mover disadvantage: the folly of revealing compatible preferences

The current research establishes a first-mover disadvantage in negotiation. We propose that making the first offer in a negotiation will backfire when the sender reveals private information that an astute recipient can leverage to his or her advantage. In two experiments, we manipulated whether the first offer was purely distributive or revealed that the sender's preferences were compatible with the recipient's preferences (i.e., the negotiators wanted the same outcome on an issue). When first offers contained only distributive issues, the classic first-mover advantage occurred, and first offers predicted final prices. However, a first-mover disadvantage emerged when senders opened with offers that revealed compatible preferences. These effects were moderated by negotiators' social value orientation: Proself negotiators were more likely to take advantage of compatible information than were prosocial negotiators. Overall, the key factor that determined whether the first-mover advantage or disadvantage emerged was whether the offer revealed compatible preferences. These results demonstrate that first offers not only provide numerical value but also convey qualitative information.

Self-reported ethical risk taking tendencies predict actual dishonesty

Are people honest about the extent to which they engage in unethical behaviors? We report an experiment examining the relation between self-reported risky unethical tendencies and actual dishonest behavior. Participants’ self-reported risk taking tendencies were assessed using the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) questionnaire, while actual self-serving dishonesty was assessed using a private coin tossing task. In this task, participants predicted the outcome of coin tosses, held the predictions in mind, and reported whether their predictions were correct. Thus, the task allowed participants to lie about whether their predictions were correct. We manipulated whether reporting higher correct scores increased (vs. not) participants monetary payoff. Results revealed a positive relation between self-reported unethical risky tendencies and actual dishonesty. The effect was limited to the condition in which dishonesty was self-serving. Our results suggest liars are aware of their dishonest tendencies and are potentially not ashamed of them.

Too good to be true: Suspicion-based rejections of high offers

It is a common belief that high offers are more readily accepted than low offers. In contrast to this general notion, the current set of studies shows that there is a limit to the beneficial effects of making high offers and that becoming too generous may backfire. This paradoxical finding is observed when offers are made in an ambiguous situation of asymmetric information. In three studies, we found that when bargaining opponents had private information over the total amount that was to be distributed, participants became suspicious about high offers (i.e., offers that were beneficial to themselves), but not about low or equal offers. Due to suspicion, participants rejected high offers more often than equal offers.

From glue to gasoline: how competition turns perspective takers unethical

Perspective taking is often the glue that binds people together. However, we propose that in competitive contexts, perspective taking is akin to adding gasoline to a fire: It inflames already-aroused competitive impulses and leads people to protect themselves from the potentially insidious actions of their competitors. Overall, we suggest that perspective taking functions as a relational amplifier. In cooperative contexts, it creates the foundation for prosocial impulses, but in competitive contexts, it triggers hypercompetition, leading people to prophylactically engage in unethical behavior to prevent themselves from being exploited. The experiments reported here establish that perspective taking interacts with the relational context--cooperative or competitive--to predict unethical behavior, from using insidious negotiation tactics to materially deceiving one's partner to cheating on an anagram task. In the context of competition, perspective taking can pervert the age-old axiom "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" into "do unto others as you think they will try to do unto you."

How do incentives lead to deception in advisor-client interactions? Explicit and implicit strategies of self-interested deception

When confronted with important questions we like to rely on the advice of experts. However, uncertainty can occur regarding advisors’ motivation to pursue self-interest and deceive the client. This can especially occur when the advisor has the possibility to receive an incentive by recommending a certain alternative. We investigated how the possibility to pursue self-interest led to explicit strategic behavior (bias in recommendation and transfer of information) and to implicit strategic behavior (bias in information processing: evaluation and memory). In Study 1 explicit strategic behavior could be identified: self-interested advisors recommended more often the self-serving alternative and transferred more self-interested biased information to their client compared to the advisor without specific interest. Also deception through implicit strategic behavior was identified: self-interested advisors biased the evaluation of information less in favor of the client compared to the control group. Self-interested advisors also remembered conflicting information regarding their self-interest worse compared to advisors without self-interest. In Study 2 beside self-interest we assessed accountability which interacted with self-interest and increased the bias: when accountability was high advisor’s self-interest led to higher explicit strategic behavior (less transfer of conflicting information), and to higher implicit strategic behavior (devaluated and remembered less conflicting information). Both studies identified implicit strategic behavior as mediator which can explain the relation between self-interest and explicit strategic behavior. Results of both studies suggest that self-interested advisors use explicit and implicit strategic behavior to receive an incentive. Thus, advisors do not only consciously inform their clients “self-interested,” but they are influenced unconsciously by biased information processing – a tendency which even increased with high accountability.

Personality and ethical decision-making in research: the role of perceptions of self and others

THIS STUDY EXAMINED BASIC PERSONALITY characteristics, narcissism, and cynicism as predictors of ethical decision-making among graduate students training for careers in the sciences. Participants completed individual difference measures along with a scenario-based ethical decision-making measure that captures the complex, multifaceted nature of ethical decision-making in scientific research. The results revealed that narcissism and cynicism (individual differences influencing self-perceptions and perceptions of others) showed consistently negative relationships with aspects of ethical decision-making, whereas more basic personality characteristics (e.g., conscientiousness, agreeableness) were less consistent and weaker. Further analyses examined the relationship of personality to metacognitive reasoning strategies and socialbehavioral response patterns thought to underlie ethical decision-making. The findings indicated that personality was associated with many of these social-cognitive mechanisms which might, in part, explain the association between personality and ethical decisions.