Hallucinations in posttraumatic stress disorder: Insights from predictive coding

Can computational models help elucidate the link between complex trauma and hallucinations?

Recently, a number of predictive coding models have been proposed to account for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)'s symptomatology, including intrusions, flashbacks and hallucinations. These models were usually developed to account for traditional/type-1 PTSD. We here discuss whether these models also apply or can be translated to the case of complex/type-2 PTSD and childhood trauma (cPTSD). The distinction between PTSD and cPTSD is important because the disorders differ in terms of symptomatology and potential mechanisms, how they relate to developmental stages, but also in terms of illness trajectory and treatment. Models of complex trauma could give us insights on hallucinations in physiological/pathological conditions or more generally on the development of intrusive experiences across diagnostic classes.

Explanatory power by vagueness. Challenges to the strong prior hypothesis on hallucinations exemplified by the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome

Predictive processing models are often ascribed a certain generality in conceptually unifying the relationships between perception, action, and cognition or the potential to posit a 'grand unified theory' of the mind. The limitations of this unification can be seen when these models are applied to specific cognitive phenomena or phenomenal consciousness. Our article discusses these shortcomings for predictive processing models of hallucinations by the example of the Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. This case study shows that the current predictive processing account omits essential characteristics of stimulus-independent perception in general, which has critical phenomenological implications. We argue that the most popular predictive processing model of hallucinatory conditions - the strong prior hypothesis - fails to fully account for the characteristics of nonveridical perceptual experiences associated with Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. To fill this explanatory gap, we propose that the strong prior hypothesis needs to include reality monitoring to apply to more than just veridical percepts.

Temporal stability of Bayesian belief updating in perceptual decision-making

Bayesian inference suggests that perception is inferred from a weighted integration of prior contextual beliefs with current sensory evidence (likelihood) about the world around us. The perceived precision or uncertainty associated with prior and likelihood information is used to guide perceptual decision-making, such that more weight is placed on the source of information with greater precision. This provides a framework for understanding a spectrum of clinical transdiagnostic symptoms associated with aberrant perception, as well as individual differences in the general population. While behavioral paradigms are commonly used to characterize individual differences in perception as a stable characteristic, measurement reliability in these behavioral tasks is rarely assessed. To remedy this gap, we empirically evaluate the reliability of a perceptual decision-making task that quantifies individual differences in Bayesian belief updating in terms of the relative precision weighting afforded to prior and likelihood information (i.e., sensory weight). We analyzed data from participants (n = 37) who performed this task twice. We found that the precision afforded to prior and likelihood information showed high internal consistency and good test-retest reliability (ICC = 0.73, 95% CI [0.53, 0.85]) when averaged across participants, as well as at the individual level using hierarchical modeling. Our results provide support for the assumption that Bayesian belief updating operates as a stable characteristic in perceptual decision-making. We discuss the utility and applicability of reliable perceptual decision-making paradigms as a measure of individual differences in the general population, as well as a diagnostic tool in psychiatric research.

Breathing in waves: Understanding respiratory-brain coupling as a gradient of predictive oscillations

Breathing plays a crucial role in shaping perceptual and cognitive processes by regulating the strength and synchronisation of neural oscillations. Numerous studies have demonstrated that respiratory rhythms govern a wide range of behavioural effects across cognitive, affective, and perceptual domains. Additionally, respiratory-modulated brain oscillations have been observed in various mammalian models and across diverse frequency spectra. However, a comprehensive framework to elucidate these disparate phenomena remains elusive. In this review, we synthesise existing findings to propose a neural gradient of respiratory-modulated brain oscillations and examine recent computational models of neural oscillations to map this gradient onto a hierarchical cascade of precision-weighted prediction errors. By deciphering the computational mechanisms underlying respiratory control of these processes, we can potentially uncover new pathways for understanding the link between respiratory-brain coupling and psychiatric disorders.

Canalization and plasticity in psychopathology

This theoretical article revives a classical bridging construct, canalization, to describe a new model of a general factor of psychopathology. To achieve this, we have distinguished between two types of plasticity, an early one that we call 'TEMP' for 'Temperature or Entropy Mediated Plasticity', and another, we call 'canalization', which is close to Hebbian plasticity. These two forms of plasticity can be most easily distinguished by their relationship to 'precision' or inverse variance; TEMP relates to increased model variance or decreased precision, whereas the opposite is true for canalization. TEMP also subsumes increased learning rate, (Ising) temperature and entropy. Dictionary definitions of 'plasticity' describe it as the property of being easily shaped or molded; TEMP is the better match for this. Importantly, we propose that 'pathological' phenotypes develop via mechanisms of canalization or increased model precision, as a defensive response to adversity and associated distress or dysphoria. Our model states that canalization entrenches in psychopathology, narrowing the phenotypic state-space as the agent develops expertise in their pathology. We suggest that TEMP - combined with gently guiding psychological support - can counter canalization. We address questions of whether and when canalization is adaptive versus maladaptive, furnish our model with references to basic and human neuroscience, and offer concrete experiments and measures to test its main hypotheses and implications. This article is part of the Special Issue on "National Institutes of Health Psilocybin Research Speaker Series".

Restructuring insight: An integrative review of insight in problem-solving, meditation, psychotherapy, delusions and psychedelics

Occasionally, a solution or idea arrives as a sudden understanding - an insight. Insight has been considered an "extra" ingredient of creative thinking and problem-solving. Here we propose that insight is central in seemingly distinct areas of research. Drawing on literature from a variety of fields, we show that besides being commonly studied in problem-solving literature, insight is also a core component in psychotherapy and meditation, a key process underlying the emergence of delusions in schizophrenia, and a factor in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics. In each case, we discuss the event of insight and its prerequisites and consequences. We review evidence for the commonalities and differences between the fields and discuss their relevance for capturing the essence of the insight phenomenon. The goal of this integrative review is to bridge the gap between the different views and inspire interdisciplinary research efforts for understanding this central process of human cognition.

Dissociation, trauma and the experience of visual hallucinations in post-traumatic stress disorder and schizophrenia

Dissociative behaviours and hallucinations are often reported in trauma-exposed people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Auditory hallucinations are the most commonly reported type of hallucination, but often co-occur with experiences in other sensory modalities. The phenomenology and the neurobiological systems involved in visual experiences are not well characterised. Are these experiences similar in nature, content or severity among people with schizophrenia and/or PTSD? What are the neurobiological bases of these visual experiences and what is the role of dissociative behaviours in the formation of these experiences? A study by Wearne and colleagues in BJPsych Open aimed to characterise these phenomenological systems in groups of people with PTSD, schizophrenia or both (schizophrenia + PTSD).

Computational psychiatry: from synapses to sentience

This review considers computational psychiatry from a particular viewpoint: namely, a commitment to explaining psychopathology in terms of pathophysiology. It rests on the notion of a generative model as underwriting (i) sentient processing in the brain, and (ii) the scientific process in psychiatry. The story starts with a view of the brain-from cognitive and computational neuroscience-as an organ of inference and prediction. This offers a formal description of neuronal message passing, distributed processing and belief propagation in neuronal networks; and how certain kinds of dysconnection lead to aberrant belief updating and false inference. The dysconnections in question can be read as a pernicious synaptopathy that fits comfortably with formal notions of how we-or our brains-encode uncertainty or its complement, precision. It then considers how the ensuing process theories are tested empirically, with an emphasis on the computational modelling of neuronal circuits and synaptic gain control that mediates attentional set, active inference, learning and planning. The opportunities afforded by this sort of modelling are considered in light of in silico experiments; namely, computational neuropsychology, computational phenotyping and the promises of a computational nosology for psychiatry. The resulting survey of computational approaches is not scholarly or exhaustive. Rather, its aim is to review a theoretical narrative that is emerging across subdisciplines within psychiatry and empirical scales of investigation. These range from epilepsy research to neurodegenerative disorders; from post-traumatic stress disorder to the management of chronic pain, from schizophrenia to functional medical symptoms.

How childhood maltreatment alters perception and cognition - the predictive processing account of borderline personality disorder

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental disorder, comprised of heterogeneous psychological and neurobiological pathologies. Here, we propose a predictive processing (PP) account of BPD to integrate these seemingly unrelated pathologies. In particular, we argue that the experience of childhood maltreatment, which is highly prevalent in BPD, leaves a developmental legacy with two facets: first, a coarse-grained, alexithymic model of self and others - leading to a rigidity and inflexibility concerning beliefs about self and others. Second, this developmental legacy leads to a loss of confidence or precision afforded beliefs about the consequences of social behavior. This results in an over reliance on sensory evidence and social feedback, with concomitant lability, impulsivity and hypersensitivity. In terms of PP, people with BPD show a distorted belief updating in response to new information with two opposing manifestations: rapid changes in beliefs and a lack of belief updating despite disconfirmatory evidence. This account of distorted information processing has the potential to explain both the instability (of affect, self-image, and interpersonal relationships) and the rigidity (of beliefs about self and others) which is typical of BPD. At the neurobiological level, we propose that enhanced levels of dopamine are associated with the increased integration of negative social feedback, and we also discuss the hypothesis of an impaired inhibitory control of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of negative social information. Our account may provide a new understanding not only of the clinical aspects of BPD, but also a unifying theory of the corresponding neurobiological pathologies. We conclude by outlining some directions for future research on the behavioral, neurobiological, and computational underpinnings of this model, and point to some clinical implications of it.

Testing Bayesian models of belief updating in the context of depressive symptomatology

OBJECTIVES

Predictive processing approaches to belief updating in depression propose that depression is related to more negative and more precise priors. Also, belief updating is assumed be negatively biased in comparison to normative Bayesian updating. There is a lack of efficient methods to mathematically model belief updating in depression.

METHODS

We validated a novel performance belief updating paradigm in a nonclinical sample (N = 133). Participants repeatedly participated in a non-self-related emotion recognition task and received false feedback. Effects of the feedback manipulation and differences in depressive symptoms on belief updating were analysed in Bayesian multilevel analyses.

RESULTS

Beliefs were successfully manipulated through the feedback provided. Depressive symptoms were associated with more negative updating than normative Bayesian updating but results were influenced by few cases. No evidence of biased change in beliefs or overly precise priors was found. Depressive symptoms were associated with more negative updating of generalised performance beliefs.

CONCLUSIONS

There was cautious support for negatively biased belief updating associated with depressive symptoms, especially for generalised beliefs. The content of the task may not be self-relevant enough to cause strong biases. Further explication of Bayesian models of depression and replication in clinical samples is needed.

Revisiting the seven pillars of RDoC

BACKGROUND

In 2013, a few years after the launch of the National Institute of Mental Health's Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative, Cuthbert and Insel published a paper titled "Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis: the seven pillars of RDoC." The RDoC project is a translational research effort to encourage new ways of studying psychopathology through a focus on disruptions in normal functions (such as reward learning or attention) that are defined jointly by observable behavior and neurobiological measures. The paper outlined the principles of the RDoC research framework, including emphases on research that acquires data from multiple measurement classes to foster integrative analyses, adopts dimensional approaches, and employs novel methods for ascertaining participants and identifying valid subgroups.

DISCUSSION

To mark the first decade of the RDoC initiative, we revisit the seven pillars and highlight new research findings and updates to the framework that are related to each. This reappraisal emphasizes the flexible nature of the RDoC framework and its application in diverse areas of research, new findings related to the importance of developmental trajectories within and across neurobehavioral domains, and the value of computational approaches for clarifying complex multivariate relations among behavioral and neurobiological systems.

CONCLUSION

The seven pillars of RDoC have provided a foundation that has helped to guide a surge of new studies that have examined neurobehavioral domains related to mental disorders, in the service of informing future psychiatric nosology. Building on this footing, future areas of emphasis for the RDoC project will include studying central-peripheral interactions, developing novel approaches to phenotyping for genomic studies, and identifying new targets for clinical trial research to facilitate progress in precision psychiatry.

Useful misrepresentation: perception as embodied proactive inference

According to the predictive processing framework, perception is geared to represent the environment in terms of embodied action opportunities as opposed to objective truth. Here, we argue that such an optimisation is reflected by biases in expectations (i.e., prior predictive information) that facilitate 'useful' inferences of external sensory causes. To support this, we highlight a body of literature suggesting that perception is systematically biased away from accurate estimates under conditions where utility and accuracy conflict with one another. We interpret this to reflect the brain's attempt to adjudicate between conflicting sources of prediction error, as external accuracy is sacrificed to facilitate actions that proactively avoid physiologically surprising outcomes. This carries important theoretical implications and offers new insights into psychopathology.