Neural computations underpinning the strategic management of influence in advice giving

Belief Updating during Social Interactions: Neural Dynamics and Causal Role of Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex

In competitive interactions, humans have to flexibly update their beliefs about another person's intentions in order to adjust their own choice strategy, such as when believing that the other may exploit their cooperativeness. Here we investigate both the neural dynamics and the causal neural substrate of belief updating processes in humans. We used an adapted prisoner's dilemma game in which participants explicitly predicted the coplayer's actions, which allowed us to quantify the prediction error between expected and actual behavior. First, in an EEG experiment, we found a stronger medial frontal negativity (MFN) for negative than positive prediction errors, suggesting that this medial frontal ERP component may encode unexpected defection of the coplayer. The MFN also predicted subsequent belief updating after negative prediction errors. In a second experiment, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to investigate whether the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) causally implements belief updating after unexpected outcomes. Our results show that dmPFC TMS impaired belief updating and strategic behavioral adjustments after negative prediction errors. Taken together, our findings reveal the time course of the use of prediction errors in social decisions and suggest that the dmPFC plays a crucial role in updating mental representations of others' intentions.

The impact of social hierarchies on neural response to feedback evaluations after advice giving

Advisors generally evaluate advisee-relevant feedback after advice giving. The response to these feedback-(1) whether the advice is accepted and (2) whether the advice is optimal-usually involves prestige. Prior literature has found that prestige is the basis by which individuals attain a superior status in the social hierarchy. However, whether advisors are motivated to attain a superior status when engaging in advice giving remains uncharacterized. Using event-related potentials, this study investigates how advisors evaluate feedback after giving advice to superior (vs. inferior) status advisees. A social hierarchy was first established based on two advisees (one was ranked as superior status and another as inferior status) as well as participants' performance in a dot-estimation task in which all participants were ranked as medium status. Participants then engaged in a game in which they were assigned roles as advisors to a superior or inferior status advisee. Afterward, the participants received feedback in two phases. In Phase 1, participants were told whether the advisees accepted the advice provided. In Phase 2, the participants were informed whether the advice they provided was correct. In these two phases, when the advisee was of superior status, participants exhibited stronger feedback-related negativity and P300 difference in response to (1) whether their advice was accepted, and (2) whether their advice was correct. Moreover, the P300 was notably larger when the participants' correct advice led to a gain for a superior-status advisee. In the context of advice giving, advisors are particularly motivated to attain a superior status when the feedback involving social hierarchies, which is reflected in higher sensitivity to feedback associated with superior status advisees at earlier and later stages during feedback evaluations in brains.

Disentangling the contribution of individual and social learning processes in human advice-taking behavior

The study of social learning examines how individuals learn from others by means of observation, imitation, or compliance with advice. However, it still remains largely unknown whether social learning processes have a distinct contribution to behavior, independent from non-social trial-and-error learning that often occurs simultaneously. 153 participants completed a reinforcement learning task, where they were asked to make choices to gain rewards. Advice from an artificial teacher was presented in 60% of the trials, allowing us to compare choice behavior with and without advice. Results showed a strong and reliable tendency to follow advice (test-retest reliability ~0.73). Computational modeling suggested a unique contribution of three distinct learning strategies: (a) individual learning (i.e., learning the value of actions, independent of advice), (b) informed advice-taking (i.e., learning the value of following advice), and (c) non-informed advice-taking (i.e., a constant bias to follow advice regardless of outcome history). Comparing artificial and empirical data provided specific behavioral regression signatures to both informed and non-informed advice taking processes. We discuss the theoretical implications of integrating internal and external information during the learning process.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Towards a neurocomputational account of social controllability: From models to mental health

Controllability, or the influence one has over their surroundings, is crucial for decision-making and mental health. Traditionally, controllability is operationalized in sensorimotor terms as one's ability to exercise their actions to achieve an intended outcome (also termed "agency"). However, recent social neuroscience research suggests that humans also assess if and how they can exert influence over other people (i.e., their actions, outcomes, beliefs) to achieve desired outcomes ("social controllability"). In this review, we will synthesize empirical findings and neurocomputational frameworks related to social controllability. We first introduce the concepts of contextual and perceived controllability and their respective relevance for decision-making. Then, we outline neurocomputational frameworks that can be used to model social controllability, with a focus on behavioral economic paradigms and reinforcement learning approaches. Finally, we discuss the implications of social controllability for computational psychiatry research, using delusion and obsession-compulsion as examples. Taken together, we propose that social controllability could be a key area of investigation in future social neuroscience and computational psychiatry research.

The single- and dual-brain mechanisms underlying the adviser's confidence expression strategy switching during influence management

Effective influence management during advice-giving requires individuals to express confidence in the advice properly and switch timely between the 'competitive' strategy and the 'defensive' strategy. However, how advisers switch between these two strategies, and whether and why there exist individual differences during this process remain elusive. We used an advice-giving game that manipulated incentive contexts (Incentivized/Non-Incentivized) to induce the adviser's confidence expression strategy switching and measured the brain activities of adviser and advisee concurrently using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Behaviorally, we observed individual differences in strategy switching. Some advisers applied the 'defensive' strategy when incentivized and the 'competitive' strategy when not incentivized, while others applied the 'competitive' strategy when incentivized and the 'defensive' strategy when not incentivized. This effect was mediated by the adviser's perceived stress in each condition and was reflected by the frequencies of advice-taking in the advisees. Neurally, brain activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) supported strategy switching, as well as interpersonal neural synchronization (INS) in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) that supported influence management. This two-in-one process, i.e., confidence expression strategy switching and the corresponding influence management, was linked and modulated by the strength of DLPFC-TPJ functional connectivity in the adviser. We further developed a descriptive model that contributed to understanding the adviser's strategy switching during influence management.

Role of right temporoparietal junction for counterfactual evaluation of partner's decision in ultimatum game

Humans assess the distributions of resources based on their aversion to unfairness. If a partner distributes in an unfair manner even though the partner had a less unfair distribution option, a recipient will believe that the partner should have chosen the counterfactual option. In this study, we investigated the neural basis for fairness evaluation of actual and counterfactual options in the ultimatum game. In this task, a partner chose one distribution option out of two options, and a participant accepted or rejected the option. The behavioral results showed that the acceptance rate was influenced by counterfactual evaluation (CE), among others, as defined by the difference of monetary amount between the actual and counterfactual options. The functional magnetic resonance imaging results showed that CE was associated with the right ventral angular gyrus (vAG) that provided one of convergent inputs to the supramarginal gyrus related to decision utility, which reflects gross preferences for the distribution options. Furthermore, inhibitory repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation administered to the right vAG reduced the behavioral component associated with CE. These results suggest that our acceptance/rejection of distribution options relies on multiple processes (monetary amount, disadvantageous inequity, and CE) and that the right vAG causally contributes to CE.

On the social nature of abstraction: cognitive implications of interaction and diversity

The human capacity for abstraction is remarkable. We effortlessly form abstract representations from varied experiences, generalizing and flexibly transferring experiences and knowledge between contexts, which can facilitate reasoning, problem solving and learning across many domains. The cognitive process of abstraction, however, is often portrayed and investigated as an individual process. This paper addresses how cognitive processes of abstraction-together with other aspects of human reasoning and problem solving-are fundamentally shaped and modulated by online social interaction. Starting from a general distinction between convergent thinking, divergent thinking and processes of abstraction, we address how social interaction shapes information processing differently depending on cognitive demands, social coordination and task ecologies. In particular, we suggest that processes of abstraction are facilitated by the interactive sharing and integration of varied individual experiences. To this end, we also discuss how the dynamics of group interactions vary as a function of group composition; that is, in terms of the similarity and diversity between the group members. We conclude by outlining the role of cognitive diversity in interactive processes and consider the importance of group diversity in processes of abstraction. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'.

Neural activity tracking identity and confidence in social information

Humans learn about the environment either directly by interacting with it or indirectly by seeking information about it from social sources such as conspecifics. The degree of confidence in the information obtained through either route should determine the impact that it has on adapting and changing behaviour. We examined whether and how behavioural and neural computations differ during non-social learning as opposed to learning from social sources. Trial-wise confidence judgements about non-social and social information sources offered a window into this learning process. Despite matching exactly the statistical features of social and non-social conditions, confidence judgements were more accurate and less changeable when they were made about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition to subjective reports of confidence, differences were also apparent in the Bayesian estimates of participants' subjective beliefs. Univariate activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and posterior temporoparietal junction more closely tracked confidence about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition, the multivariate patterns of activity in the same areas encoded identities of social information sources compared to non-social information sources.

Neurocomputational mechanisms of confidence in self and others

Computing confidence in one’s own and others’ decisions is critical for social success. While there has been substantial progress in our understanding of confidence estimates about oneself, little is known about how people form confidence estimates about others. Here, we address this question by asking participants undergoing fMRI to place bets on perceptual decisions made by themselves or one of three other players of varying ability. We show that participants compute confidence in another player’s decisions by combining distinct estimates of player ability and decision difficulty – allowing them to predict that a good player may get a difficult decision wrong and that a bad player may get an easy decision right. We find that this computation is associated with an interaction between brain systems implicated in decision-making (LIP) and theory of mind (TPJ and dmPFC). These results reveal an interplay between self- and other-related processes during a social confidence computation.

Social relationship modulates advisor's brain response to advice-giving outcome evaluation: Evidence from an event-related potential study

Introduction

Advice-giving is a double-edged sword in social interaction, which could bring benefits or considerable losses for the advisee. However, whether the social relationship affects the time course of advisor's brain response to outcome evaluation after the advice-giving remains unclear.

Methods

In the present study, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the modulation of social relationships on advisor's outcome feedback processing after the advice-giving and related neural activities.

Results

The results showed larger feedback-related negativity (FRN) to a loss than to a gain both when the friends accepted and rejected the advice, whereas this effect only existed when the strangers rejected the advice, but not when they accepted it. In contrast, the P3 results demonstrated the enhanced neural sensitivity when the strangers accepted the advice than rejected it despite leading to a loss, while a larger P3 amplitude was found when the friends accepted the advice than rejected it and brought a gain. The theta oscillation results in the friend group revealed stronger theta power to loss when the advisee accepted the advice than rejected it. However, this effect was absent in the stranger group.

Discussion

These results suggested that outcome evaluation in advice-giving was not only influenced by feedback valence and social reward, but also modulated by social relationships. Our findings contributed to the understanding of the neural mechanisms of advice-giving outcome evaluation in a social context.

Neural implementation of computational mechanisms underlying the continuous trade-off between cooperation and competition

Social interactions evolve continuously. Sometimes we cooperate, sometimes we compete, while at other times we strategically position ourselves somewhere in between to account for the ever-changing social contexts around us. Research on social interactions often focuses on a binary dichotomy between competition and cooperation, ignoring people's evolving shifts along a continuum. Here, we develop an economic game - the Space Dilemma - where two players change their degree of cooperativeness over time in cooperative and competitive contexts. Using computational modelling we show how social contexts bias choices and characterise how inferences about others' intentions modulate cooperativeness. Consistent with the modelling predictions, brain regions previously linked to social cognition, including the temporo-parietal junction, dorso-medial prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate gyrus, encode social prediction errors and context-dependent signals, correlating with shifts along a cooperation-competition continuum. These results provide a comprehensive account of the computational and neural mechanisms underlying the continuous trade-off between cooperation and competition.

Neurocomputations of strategic behavior: From iterated to novel interactions

Strategic interactions, where an individual's payoff depends on the decisions of multiple intelligent agents, are ubiquitous among social animals. They span a variety of important social behaviors such as competition, cooperation, coordination, and communication, and often involve complex, intertwining cognitive operations ranging from basic reward processing to higher‐order mentalization. Here, we review the progress and challenges in probing the neural and cognitive mechanisms of strategic behavior of interacting individuals, drawing an analogy to recent developments in studies of reward‐seeking behavior, in particular, how research focuses in the field of strategic behavior have been expanded from adaptive behavior based on trial‐and‐error to flexible decisions based on limited prior experience. We highlight two important research questions in the field of strategic behavior: (i) How does the brain exploit past experience for learning to behave strategically? and (ii) How does the brain decide what to do in novel strategic situations in the absence of direct experience? For the former, we discuss the utility of learning models that have effectively connected various types of neural data with strategic learning behavior and helped elucidate the interplay among multiple learning processes. For the latter, we review the recent evidence and propose a neural generative mechanism by which the brain makes novel strategic choices through simulating others' goal‐directed actions according to rational or bounded‐rational principles obtained through indirect social knowledge.

This article is categorized under:

Economics > Interactive Decision‐Making

Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making

Neuroscience > Cognition

Blend in or stand out: social anxiety levels shape information-sharing strategies

Although living in social groups provides many benefits for group members, such groups also serve as a setting for social competition over rank and influence. Evolutionary accounts suggest that social anxiety plays a role in regulating in-group conflict, as individuals who are concerned about social threat may choose to defer to others to maintain the hierarchical status quo. Here, we examine how social anxiety levels are related to the advice-giving style an individual adopts: a competitive influence-seeking strategy or a defensive blend-in strategy. We begin by demonstrating that similarity to others drives activity in the brain's valuation system, even during a competitive advice-taking task. Then, in three behavioural experiments, we show that social anxiety levels are related to the tendency to give advice resembling the advice given by rival advisers and to refrain from status-seeking behaviour. Social anxiety was also associated with negative social comparisons with rival advisers. Our findings highlight the role of competing social goals in shaping information sharing.

A Model of Trust

Trust is central to a large variety of social interactions. Different research fields have empirically and theoretically investigated trust, observing trusting behaviors in different situations and pinpointing their different components and constituents. However, a unifying, computational formalization of those diverse components and constituents of trust is still lacking. Previous work has mainly used computational models borrowed from other fields and developed for other purposes to explain trusting behaviors in empirical paradigms. Here, I computationally formalize verbal models of trust in a simple model (i.e., vulnerability model) that combines current and prospective action values with beliefs and expectancies about a partner’s behavior. By using the classic investment game (IG)—an economic game thought to capture some important features of trusting behaviors in social interactions—I show how variations of a single parameter of the vulnerability model generates behaviors that can be interpreted as different “trust attitudes”. I then show how these behavioral patterns change as a function of an individual’s loss aversion and expectations of the partner’s behavior. I finally show how the vulnerability model can be easily extended in a novel IG paradigm to investigate inferences on different traits of a partner. In particular, I will focus on benevolence and competence—two character traits that have previously been described as determinants of trustworthiness impressions central to trust. The vulnerability model can be employed as is or as a utility function within more complex Bayesian frameworks to fit participants’ behavior in different social environments where actions are associated with subjective values and weighted by individual beliefs about others’ behaviors. Hence, the vulnerability model provides an important building block for future theoretical and empirical work across a variety of research fields.

Distinct neurocomputational mechanisms support informational and socially normative conformity

A change of mind in response to social influence could be driven by informational conformity to increase accuracy, or by normative conformity to comply with social norms such as reciprocity. Disentangling the behavioural, cognitive, and neurobiological underpinnings of informational and normative conformity have proven elusive. Here, participants underwent fMRI while performing a perceptual task that involved both advice-taking and advice-giving to human and computer partners. The concurrent inclusion of 2 different social roles and 2 different social partners revealed distinct behavioural and neural markers for informational and normative conformity. Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) BOLD response tracked informational conformity towards both human and computer but tracked normative conformity only when interacting with humans. A network of brain areas (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ)) that tracked normative conformity increased their functional coupling with the dACC when interacting with humans. These findings enable differentiating the neural mechanisms by which different types of conformity shape social changes of mind.

Political coherence and certainty as drivers of interpersonal liking over and above similarity

Affective polarization and political segregation have become a serious threat to democratic societies. One standard explanation for these phenomena is that people like and prefer interacting with similar others. However, similarity may not be the only driver of interpersonal liking in the political domain, and other factors, yet to be uncovered, could play an important role. Here, we hypothesized that beyond the effect of similarity, people show greater preference for individuals with politically coherent and confident opinions. To test this idea, we performed two behavioral studies consisting of one-shot face-to-face pairwise interactions. We found that people with ambiguous or ambivalent views were nonreciprocally attracted to confident and coherent ingroups. A third experimental study confirmed that politically coherent and confident profiles are rated as more attractive than targets with ambiguous or ambivalent opinions. Overall, these findings unfold the key drivers of the affability between people who discuss politics.

Adaptive Empathy: A Model for Learning Empathic Responses in Response to Feedback

Empathy is usually deployed in social interactions. Nevertheless, common measures and examinations of empathy study this construct in isolation from the person in distress. In this article we seek to extend the field of examination to include both empathizer and target to determine whether and how empathic responses are affected by feedback and learned through interaction. Building on computational approaches in feedback-based adaptations (e.g., no feedback, model-free and model-based learning), we propose a framework for understanding how empathic responses are learned on the basis of feedback. In this framework, adaptive empathy, defined as the ability to adapt one's empathic responses, is a central aspect of empathic skills and can provide a new dimension to the evaluation and investigation of empathy. By extending existing neural models of empathy, we suggest that adaptive empathy may be mediated by interactions between the neural circuits associated with valuation, shared distress, observation-execution, and mentalizing. Finally, we propose that adaptive empathy should be considered a prominent facet of empathic capabilities with the potential to explain empathic behavior in health and psychopathology.

The role of reciprocity in human-robot social influence

Humans are constantly influenced by others’ behavior and opinions. Of importance, social influence among humans is shaped by reciprocity: we follow more the advice of someone who has been taking into consideration our opinions. In the current work, we investigate whether reciprocal social influence can emerge while interacting with a social humanoid robot. In a joint task, a human participant and a humanoid robot made perceptual estimates and then could overtly modify them after observing the partner’s judgment. Results show that endowing the robot with the ability to express and modulate its own level of susceptibility to the human’s judgments represented a double-edged sword. On the one hand, participants lost confidence in the robot’s competence when the robot was following their advice; on the other hand, participants were unwilling to disclose their lack of confidence to the susceptible robot, suggesting the emergence of reciprocal mechanisms of social influence supporting human-robot collaboration.

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If a social robot is susceptible to our advice, we lose confidence in it

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However, robot’s susceptibility does not deteriorate social influence

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These effects do not appear during interaction with a computer

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Susceptible robots can promote reciprocity but also hinder social learning

Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence

Competition for social influence is a major force shaping societies, from baboons guiding their troop in different directions, to politicians competing for voters, to influencers competing for attention on social media. Social influence is invariably a competitive exercise with multiple influencers competing for it. We study which strategy maximizes social influence under competition. Applying game theory to a scenario where two advisers compete for the attention of a client, we find that the rational solution for advisers is to communicate truthfully when favored by the client, but to lie when ignored. Across seven pre-registered studies, testing 802 participants, such a strategic adviser consistently outcompeted an honest adviser. Strategic dishonesty outperformed truth-telling in swaying individual voters, the majority vote in anonymously voting groups, and the consensus vote in communicating groups. Our findings help explain the success of political movements that thrive on disinformation, and vocal underdog politicians with no credible program.

Trusting and learning from others: immediate and long-term effects of learning from observation and advice

Social learning underpins our species's extraordinary success. Learning through observation has been investigated in several species, but learning from advice-where information is intentionally broadcast-is less understood. We used a pre-registered, online experiment (n = 1492) combined with computational modelling to examine learning through observation and advice. Participants were more likely to immediately follow advice than to copy an observed choice, but this was dependent upon trust in the adviser: highly paranoid participants were less likely to follow advice in the short term. Reinforcement learning modelling revealed two distinct patterns regarding the long-term effects of social information: some individuals relied fully on social information, whereas others reverted to trial-and-error learning. This variation may affect the prevalence and fidelity of socially transmitted information. Our results highlight the privileged status of advice relative to observation and how the assimilation of intentionally broadcast information is affected by trust in others.

Precision and the Bayesian brain

Scientific thinking about the minds of humans and other animals has been transformed by the idea that the brain is Bayesian. A cornerstone of this idea is that agents set the balance between prior knowledge and incoming evidence based on how reliable or 'precise' these different sources of information are - lending the most weight to that which is most reliable. This concept of precision has crept into several branches of cognitive science and is a lynchpin of emerging ideas in computational psychiatry - where unusual beliefs or experiences are explained as abnormalities in how the brain estimates precision. But what precisely is precision? In this Primer we explain how precision has found its way into classic and contemporary models of perception, learning, self-awareness, and social interaction. We also chart how ideas around precision are beginning to change in radical ways, meaning we must get more precise about how precision works.

Computational modelling of social cognition and behaviour-a reinforcement learning primer

Social neuroscience aims to describe the neural systems that underpin social cognition and behaviour. Over the past decade, researchers have begun to combine computational models with neuroimaging to link social computations to the brain. Inspired by approaches from reinforcement learning theory, which describes how decisions are driven by the unexpectedness of outcomes, accounts of the neural basis of prosocial learning, observational learning, mentalizing and impression formation have been developed. Here we provide an introduction for researchers who wish to use these models in their studies. We consider both theoretical and practical issues related to their implementation, with a focus on specific examples from the field.

A hierarchical model for interpersonal verbal communication

The ability to use language makes us human. For decades, researchers have been racking their minds to understand the relation between language and the human brain. Nevertheless, most previous neuroscientific research has investigated this issue from a ‘single-brain’ perspective, thus neglecting the nature of interpersonal communication through language. With the development of modern hyperscanning techniques, researchers have begun probing the neurocognitive processes underlying interpersonal verbal communication and have examined the involvement of interpersonal neural synchronization (INS) in communication. However, in most cases, the neurocognitive processes underlying INS are obscure. To tentatively address this issue, we propose herein a hierarchical model based on the findings from a growing amount of hyperscanning research. We suggest that three levels of neurocognitive processes are primarily involved in interpersonal verbal communication and are closely associated with distinctive patterns of INS. Different levels of these processes modulate each other bidirectionally. Furthermore, we argued that two processes (shared representation and interpersonal predictive coding) might coexist and work together at each level to facilitate successful interpersonal verbal communication. We hope this model will inspire further innovative research in several directions within the fields of social and cognitive neuroscience.

Dynamic modulation of social influence by indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity is a pervasive social norm that promotes human cooperation. Helping someone establishes a good reputation, increasing the probability of receiving help from others. Here we hypothesize that indirect reciprocity regulates not only cooperative behavior but also the exchange of opinions within a social group. In a novel interactive perceptual task (Experiment 1), we show that participants relied more on the judgments of an alleged human partner when a second alleged peer had been endorsing participants' opinions. By doing so, participants did not take into account the reliability of their partners' judgments and did not maximize behavioral accuracy and monetary reward. This effect declined when participants did not expect future interactions with their partners, suggesting the emergence of downstream mechanisms of reciprocity linked to the management of reputation. Importantly, all these effects disappeared when participants knew that the partners' responses were computer-generated (Experiment 2). Our results suggest that, within a social group, individuals may weight others' opinions through indirect reciprocity, highlighting the emergence of normative distortions in the process of information transmission among humans.

The neural underpinnings of allocentric thinking in a novel signaling task

The ability to adopt the perspectives of others is fundamental to effective communication in social interactions. However, the neural correlates of allocentric thinking in communicative signaling remain unclear. We adapted a novel signaling task in which the signaler was given the target word and must choose a one-word signal to help the receiver guess the target. Behavioral results suggest that speakers can use allocentric thinking to choose signals that are salient from the perspective of the receiver rather than their own point of view. At the neural level, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data reveal that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), ventral striatum, and temporal-parietal junction are more activated when signalers engage in allocentric than egocentric thinking. Moreover, functional connectivity between the mPFC and ventral striatum predicted individuals' perspective-taking ability during successful communication. These findings reveal that neural representations in the mPFC-striatum network support perspective-taking in complex social decision making, providing a new perspective on how the brain arbitrates between allocentric thinking and egocentric thinking in communication and social coordination.

Self-competence increases the willingness to pay for social influence

Theoretical works in social psychology and neuroscientific evidence have proposed that social rewards have intrinsic value, suggesting that people place a high premium on the ability to influence others. To test this hypothesis, we asked whether, and under what conditions, people are willing to forgo monetary reward for the sake of influencing others' decisions. In four experiments, online and lab-based participants competed with a rival for influence over a client. The majority of participants sacrificed some of their financial reward to increase their chance of being selected over their rival within the experiment. Willingness to pay was affected by the participant's current level of influence and performance, as participants were most likely to pay to promote their competence after having given good advice that had been ignored by the client using a situation where monetary incentives fail to explain human motivations, our experiments highlight the intrinsic value of social influence.

Private-public mappings in human prefrontal cortex

A core feature of human cognition is an ability to separate private states of mind - what we think or believe - from public actions - what we say or do. This ability is central to successful social interaction - with different social contexts often requiring different mappings between private states and public actions in order to minimise conflict and facilitate communication. Here we investigated how the human brain supports private-public mappings, using an interactive task which required subjects to adapt how they communicated their confidence about a perceptual decision to the social context. Univariate and multivariate analysis of fMRI data revealed that a private-public distinction is reflected in a medial-lateral division of prefrontal cortex - with lateral frontal pole (FPl) supporting the context-dependent mapping from a private sense of confidence to a public report. The concept of private-public mappings provides a promising framework for understanding flexible social behaviour.

Upward and downward comparisons across monetary and status domains

The ability to accurately infer one's place with respect to others is crucial for social interactions. Individuals tend to evaluate their own actions and outcomes by comparing themselves to others in either an upward or downward direction. We performed two fMRI meta‐analyses on monetary (n = 39; 1,231 participants) and status (n = 23; 572 participants) social comparisons to examine how domain and the direction of comparison can modulate neural correlates of social hierarchy. Overall, both status and monetary downward comparisons activated regions associated with reward processing (striatum) while upward comparisons yielded loss‐related activity. These findings provide partial support for the common currency hypothesis in that downward and upward comparisons from both monetary and status domains resemble gains and losses, respectively. Furthermore, status upward and monetary downward comparisons revealed concordant orbitofrontal cortical activity, an area associated with evaluating the value of goals and decisions implicated in both lesion and empirical fMRI studies investigating social hierarchy. These findings may offer new insight into how people relate to individuals with higher social status and how these social comparisons deviate across monetary and social status domains.

The neural basis of shared preference learning

During our daily lives, we often learn about the similarity of the traits and preferences of others to our own and use that information during our social interactions. However, it is unclear how the brain represents similarity between the self and others. One possible mechanism is to track similarity to oneself regardless of the identity of the other (Similarity account); an alternative is to track each other person in terms of consistency of their choice similarity with respect to the choices they have made before (consistency account). Our study combined functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and computational modelling of reinforcement learning (RL) to investigate the neural processes that underlie learning about preference similarity. Participants chose which of two pieces of artwork they preferred and saw the choices of one agent who usually shared their preference and another agent who usually did not. We modelled neural activation with RL models based on the similarity and consistency accounts. Our results showed that activity in brain areas linked to reward and social cognition followed the consistency account. Our findings suggest that impressions of other people can be calculated in a person-specific manner, which assumes that each individual behaves consistently with their past choices.

Confirmation bias in the utilization of others' opinion strength

Humans tend to discount information that undermines past choices and judgments. This confirmation bias has significant impact on domains ranging from politics to science and education. Little is known about the mechanisms underlying this fundamental characteristic of belief formation. Here we report a mechanism underlying the confirmation bias. Specifically, we provide evidence for a failure to use the strength of others' disconfirming opinions to alter confidence in judgments, but adequate use when opinions are confirmatory. This bias is related to reduced neural sensitivity to the strength of others' opinions in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex when opinions are disconfirming. Our results demonstrate that existing judgments alter the neural representation of information strength, leaving the individual less likely to alter opinions in the face of disagreement.

Advice-taking as a bridge between decision neuroscience and mental capacity

A person's capacity to process advice is an important aspect of decision making in the real world. For example, in decisions about treatment, the way patients respond to the advice of family, friends and medical professionals may be used (intentionally or otherwise) as a marker of the "use or weigh" requirement of decision-making capacity. Here we explore neuroscientific research on decision-making to identify features of advice-taking that help conceptualize this requirement. We focus on studies of the neural and computational basis of decision-making in laboratory settings. These studies originally investigated simple perceptual decisions about ambiguous stimuli, but have more recently been extended to more complex "value-based" decisions involving the comparison of subjective preferences. Value-based decisions are a useful model system for capacity-related decision-making as they do not have an objectively 'correct' answer and are instead based on subjective preferences. In this context, advice-taking can be seen as a process in which new evidence for one or other option is integrated, leading to altered behaviour or choices. We use this framework to distinguish between different types of advice-taking: private compliance consists of updating one's privately held beliefs based on new evidence, whereas in the case of public compliance, people change their behaviour at a surface level without shifting their privately-held beliefs. Importantly, both types of advice-taking may lead to similar outcomes but rely on different decision processes. We suggest that understanding how multiple mechanisms drive advice-taking holds promise for targeting decision-making support and improving our understanding of the use and weigh requirement in cases of contested capacity.

Anodal tDCS Over the Right Temporoparietal Junction Lowers Overbidding in Contests

Overbidding, which means bidding over the Nash equilibrium, is commonly observed in competitive social interactions, such as a contest or auction. Recent neuroscience studies show that the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) is related to overbidding and associated with inferring the intentions of others during competitive interactions. The present study investigates the neural underpinnings of overbidding and how the rTPJ impacts bidding behavior by using tDCS to modulate the activation of the rTPJ. Participants completed a two-person proportional prize contest, in which overbidding was frequently observed and each participant's share of the prize was equal to the individual's expenditure divided by the aggregated expenditure. We observed a significant tDCS effect, i.e., participants' average expenditure and overbidding rate were significantly reduced in the anodal stimulation compared with the cathodal and sham stimulation. Possible explanations include that enhanced activity in the rTPJ via the anodal stimulation increased the accuracy of a participant's inference of the strategies of others, or a participant's concern for others, and thus helped the participant bid optimally. Our findings provide evidence supporting that the activation of the rTPJ in contests affects overbidding and bidding strategy, and further confirm that the rTPJ is involved in the inference of mental states in a competition context.

The application of computational models to social neuroscience: promises and pitfalls

Interactions with conspecifics are key to any social species. In order to navigate this social world, it is crucial for individuals to learn from and about others. From learning new skills by observing parents perform them to making complex collective decisions, understanding the mechanisms underlying social cognitive processes has been of considerable interest to psychologists and neuroscientists. Here, we review studies that have used computational modelling techniques, combined with neuroimaging, to shed light on how people learn and make decisions in social contexts. As opposed to standard social neuroscience methods, the computational approach allows one to directly examine where in the brain particular computations, as estimated by models of behavior, are implemented. Findings suggest that people use several strategies to learn from others: vicarious reward learning, where one learns from observing the reward outcomes of another agent; action imitation, which relies on encoding a prediction error between the expected and actual actions of the other agent; and social inference, where one learns by inferring the goals and intentions of others. These computations are implemented in distinct neural networks, which may be recruited adaptively depending on task demands, the environment and other social factors.

Reciprocity of social influence

Humans seek advice, via social interaction, to improve their decisions. While social interaction is often reciprocal, the role of reciprocity in social influence is unknown. Here, we tested the hypothesis that our influence on others affects how much we are influenced by them. Participants first made a visual perceptual estimate and then shared their estimate with an alleged partner. Then, in alternating trials, the participant either revised their decisions or observed how the partner revised theirs. We systematically manipulated the partner’s susceptibility to influence from the participant. We show that participants reciprocated influence with their partner by gravitating toward the susceptible (but not insusceptible) partner’s opinion. In further experiments, we showed that reciprocity is both a dynamic process and is abolished when people believed that they interacted with a computer. Reciprocal social influence is a signaling medium for human-to-human communication that goes beyond aggregation of evidence for decision improvement.

Humans give and receive social influence—e.g. advice—in many situations, but it is not known whether social influence is a reciprocal process, like trade. Here, the authors show that people are more likely to follow a partner's advice if that partner has previously complied with their advice.

Social comparison in the brain: A coordinate-based meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies on the downward and upward comparisons

Social comparison is ubiquitous across human societies with dramatic influence on people's well-being and decision making. Downward comparison (comparing to worse-off others) and upward comparison (comparing to better-off others) constitute two types of social comparisons that produce different neuropsychological consequences. Based on studies exploring neural signatures associated with downward and upward comparisons, the current study utilized a coordinate-based meta-analysis to provide a refinement of understanding about the underlying neural architecture of social comparison. We identified consistent involvement of the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in downward comparison and consistent involvement of the anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex in upward comparison. These findings fit well with the "common-currency" hypothesis that neural representations of social gain or loss resemble those for non-social reward or loss processing. Accordingly, we discussed our findings in the framework of general reinforcement learning (RL) hypothesis, arguing how social gain/loss induced by social comparisons could be encoded by the brain as a domain-general signal (i.e., prediction errors) serving to adjust people's decisions in social settings. Although the RL account may serve as a heuristic framework for the future research, other plausible accounts on the neuropsychological mechanism of social comparison were also acknowledged. Hum Brain Mapp 39:440-458, 2018. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Neural computations underpinning the strategic management of influence in advice giving

Research on social influence has focused mainly on the target of influence (e.g., consumer and voter); thus, the cognitive and neurobiological underpinnings of the source of the influence (e.g., politicians and salesmen) remain unknown. Here, in a three-sided advice-giving game, two advisers competed to influence a client by modulating their own confidence in their advice about which lottery the client should choose. We report that advisers’ strategy depends on their level of influence on the client and their merit relative to one another. Moreover, blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) signal in the temporo-parietal junction is modulated by adviser’s current level of influence on the client, and relative merit prediction error affects activity in medial-prefrontal cortex. Both types of social information modulate ventral striatum response. By demonstrating what happens in our mind and brain when we try to influence others, these results begin to explain the biological mechanisms that shape inter-individual differences in social conduct.

Though it's important to influence others' decisions, the neural correlates of persuasive strategies are not known. Here, authors show that people change their advice based on its accuracy and whether they are being listened to, and identify the distinct brain regions underpinning each strategy.