Bifurcation in brain dynamics reveals a signature of conscious processing independent of report

Consciousness makes sense in the light of evolution

I believe consciousness is a property of advanced nervous systems, and as such a product of evolution. Thus, to understand consciousness we need to describe the trajectory leading to its evolution and the selective advantages conferred. A deeper understanding of the neurology would be a significant contribution, but other advanced functions, such as hearing and vision, are explained with a comparable lack of detailed knowledge of the brain processes responsible. In this paper, I try to add details and credence to a previously suggested, evolution-based model of consciousness. According to this model, the feature started to evolve in early amniotes (reptiles, birds, and mammals) some 320 million years ago. The reason was the introduction of feelings as a strategy for making behavioral decisions.

Physical effort modulates perceptual awareness judgment independent of level of processing

Recent studies have emphasized the association between action and perceptual awareness, suggesting that action-related information can contribute to perceptual awareness. Given that the Level of Processing (LoP) hypothesis proposes that the emergence of awareness depends on the level of stimulus processing, the current study examines whether action impacts perceptual awareness across different processing levels. In Experiment 1, participants identified target stimuli's color (low-level task) or category (high-level task) via mouse clicks, followed by visual awareness ratings. Experiment 2 replicated the tasks using hand-grip dynamometers. Results from Experiment 1 support the LoP theory, showing a more gradual emergence of awareness for low-level features and a more dichotomous emergence for high-level features. In Experiment 2, higher reported visual awareness ratings were observed at greater physical effort, regardless of task type. These results suggest that action-related information influences reported awareness of stimuli in the same way at low- and high-level stimulus processing.

Perceptual awareness of near-threshold tones scales gradually with auditory cortex activity and pupil dilation

Negative-going responses in sensory cortex co-vary with perceptual awareness of sensory stimuli. Given that this awareness negativity has also been observed for undetected stimuli, some have challenged its role for perception. To address this question, we combined magnetoencephalography, electroencephalography, and pupillometry to study how sustained attention and response criterion affect the auditory awareness negativity. Participants first detected distractor sounds and denied hearing task-irrelevant near-threshold tones, which evoked neither awareness negativity nor pupil dilation. These same tones evoked both responses when task-relevant, stronger for hit but also present for miss trials. Participants then rated their perception on a six-point scale to test whether response criterion explains the presence of these responses for miss trials. Decreasing perception ratings were associated with gradually reduced evoked responses, consistent with signal detection theory. These results support the concept of an awareness negativity that is modulated by attention but does not require a non-linear threshold mechanism.

Is auditory awareness graded or dichotomous: Electrophysiological correlates of consciousness at different depths of stimulus processing

The level-of-processing (LoP) hypothesis postulates that transition from unaware to aware visual stimuli is either graded or dichotomous depending on the depth of stimulus processing. Humans can be progressively aware of the low-level features, such as colors or shapes, while the high-level features, such as semantic category, enter consciousness in an all-or none fashion. Unlike in vision, sounds always unfold in time, which might require mechanisms dissimilar from visual processing. We tested the LoP hypothesis in hearing for the first time by presenting participants with words of different categories, spoken in different pitches near the perceptual threshold. We also assessed whether different electrophysiological correlates of consciousness, the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) and late positivity (LP), were associated with LoP. Our findings indicate that LoP also applies to the auditory modality. AAN is an early correlate of awareness independent of LoP, while LP was modulated by awareness, performance accuracy and the level of processing.

The influence of feature-based attention and response requirements on ERP correlates of auditory awareness

In search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), it is important to isolate the true NCCs from their prerequisites, consequences, and co-occurring processes. To date, little is known about how attention affects the event-related potential (ERP) correlates of auditory awareness and there is contradictory evidence on whether one of them, the late positivity (LP), is affected by response requirements. By implementing a GO-NOGO design with target and nontarget stimuli, we controlled for feature-based attention and response requirements in the same experiment, while participants rated their awareness using a perceptual awareness scale. The results showed a prolonged auditory awareness negativity (AAN) for aware trials, which was influenced neither by attention nor by response requirement. The LP was affected by both attention and response requirements. Consistent with the levels of processing hypothesis, the LP was related to consciousness as a correlate of the processing of higher-level stimulus features, likely requiring access to a "global workspace." Our findings further suggest that AAN is a proper ERP correlate of auditory consciousness and thus a true NCC in the auditory modality.

Unconscious multisensory integration: behavioral and neural evidence from subliminal stimuli

Introduction

The prevailing theories of consciousness consider the integration of different sensory stimuli as a key component for this phenomenon to rise on the brain level. Despite many theories and models have been proposed for multisensory integration between supraliminal stimuli (e.g., the optimal integration model), we do not know if multisensory integration occurs also for subliminal stimuli and what psychophysical mechanisms it follows.

Methods

To investigate this, subjects were exposed to visual (Virtual Reality) and/or haptic stimuli (Electro-Cutaneous Stimulation) above or below their perceptual threshold. They had to discriminate, in a two-Alternative Forced Choice Task, the intensity of unimodal and/or bimodal stimuli. They were then asked to discriminate the sensory modality while recording their EEG responses.

Results

We found evidence of multisensory integration for supraliminal condition, following the classical optimal model. Importantly, even for subliminal trials participant's performances in the bimodal condition were significantly more accurate when discriminating the intensity of the stimulation. Moreover, significant differences emerged between unimodal and bimodal activity templates in parieto-temporal areas known for their integrative role.

Discussion

These converging evidences - even if preliminary and needing confirmation from the collection of further data - suggest that subliminal multimodal stimuli can be integrated, thus filling a meaningful gap in the debate about the relationship between consciousness and multisensory integration.

Quality space computations for consciousness

The quality space hypothesis about conscious experience proposes that conscious sensory states are experienced in relation to other possible sensory states. For instance, the colour red is experienced as being more like orange, and less like green or blue. Recent empirical findings suggest that subjective similarity space can be explained in terms of similarities in neural activation patterns. Here, we consider how localist, workspace, and higher-order theories of consciousness can accommodate claims about the qualitative character of experience and functionally support a quality space. We review existing empirical evidence for each of these positions, and highlight novel experimental tools, such as altering local activation spaces via brain stimulation or behavioural training, that can distinguish these accounts.

Content-state dimensions characterize different types of neuronal markers of consciousness

Identifying the neuronal markers of consciousness is key to supporting the different scientific theories of consciousness. Neuronal markers of consciousness can be defined to reflect either the brain signatures underlying specific conscious content or those supporting different states of consciousness, two aspects traditionally studied separately. In this paper, we introduce a framework to characterize markers according to their dynamics in both the "state" and "content" dimensions. The 2D space is defined by the marker's capacity to distinguish the conscious states from non-conscious states (on the x-axis) and the content (e.g. perceived versus unperceived or different levels of cognitive processing on the y-axis). According to the sign of the x- and y-axis, markers are separated into four quadrants in terms of how they distinguish the state and content dimensions. We implement the framework using three types of electroencephalography markers: markers of connectivity, markers of complexity, and spectral summaries. The neuronal markers of state are represented by the level of consciousness in (i) healthy participants during a nap and (ii) patients with disorders of consciousness. On the other hand, the neuronal markers of content are represented by (i) the conscious content in healthy participants' perception task using a visual awareness paradigm and (ii) conscious processing of hierarchical regularities using an auditory local-global paradigm. In both cases, we see separate clusters of markers with correlated and anticorrelated dynamics, shedding light on the complex relationship between the state and content of consciousness and emphasizing the importance of considering them simultaneously. This work presents an innovative framework for studying consciousness by examining neuronal markers in a 2D space, providing a valuable resource for future research, with potential applications using diverse experimental paradigms, neural recording techniques, and modeling investigations.

Distinct dynamic connectivity profiles promote enhanced conscious perception of auditory stimuli

The neuroscience of consciousness aims to identify neural markers that distinguish brain dynamics in healthy individuals from those in unconscious conditions. Recent research has revealed that specific brain connectivity patterns correlate with conscious states and diminish with loss of consciousness. However, the contribution of these patterns to shaping conscious processing remains unclear. Our study investigates the functional significance of these neural dynamics by examining their impact on participants' ability to process external information during wakefulness. Using fMRI recordings during an auditory detection task and rest, we show that ongoing dynamics are underpinned by brain patterns consistent with those identified in previous research. Detection of auditory stimuli at threshold is specifically improved when the connectivity pattern at stimulus presentation corresponds to patterns characteristic of conscious states. Conversely, the occurrence of these conscious state-associated patterns increases after detection, indicating a mutual influence between ongoing brain dynamics and conscious perception. Our findings suggest that certain brain configurations are more favorable to the conscious processing of external stimuli. Targeting these favorable patterns in patients with consciousness disorders may help identify windows of greater receptivity to the external world, guiding personalized treatments.

Beyond task response-Pre-stimulus activity modulates contents of consciousness

The current discussion on the neural correlates of the contents of consciousness (NCCc) focuses mainly on the post-stimulus period of task-related activity. This neglects the substantial impact of the spontaneous or ongoing activity of the brain as manifest in pre-stimulus activity. Does the interaction of pre- and post-stimulus activity shape the contents of consciousness? Addressing this gap in our knowledge, we review and converge two recent lines of findings, that is, pre-stimulus alpha power and pre- and post-stimulus alpha trial-to-trial variability (TTV). The data show that pre-stimulus alpha power modulates post-stimulus activity including specifically the subjective features of conscious contents like confidence and vividness. At the same time, alpha pre-stimulus variability shapes post-stimulus TTV reduction including the associated contents of consciousness. We propose that non-additive rather than merely additive interaction of the internal pre-stimulus activity with the external stimulus in the alpha band is key for contents to become conscious. This is mediated by mechanisms on different levels including neurophysiological, neurocomputational, neurodynamic, neuropsychological and neurophenomenal levels. Overall, considering the interplay of pre-stimulus intrinsic and post-stimulus extrinsic activity across wider timescales, not just evoked responses in the post-stimulus period, is critical for identifying neural correlates of consciousness. This is well in line with both processing and especially the Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC).

Perceptual Awareness in Human Infants: What is the Evidence?

Perceptual awareness in infants during the first year of life is understudied, despite the philosophical, scientific, and clinical importance of understanding how and when consciousness emerges during human brain development. Although parents are undoubtedly convinced that their infant is conscious, the lack of adequate experimental paradigms to address this question in preverbal infants has been a hindrance to research on this topic. However, recent behavioral and brain imaging studies have shown that infants are engaged in complex learning from an early age and that their brains are more structured than traditionally thought. I will present a rapid overview of these results, which might provide indirect evidence of early perceptual awareness and then describe how a more systematic approach to this question could stand within the framework of global workspace theory, which identifies specific signatures of conscious perception in adults. Relying on these brain signatures as a benchmark for conscious perception, we can deduce that it exists in the second half of the first year, whereas the evidence before the age of 5 months is less solid, mainly because of the paucity of studies. The question of conscious perception before term remains open, with the possibility of short periods of conscious perception, which would facilitate early learning. Advances in brain imaging and growing interest in this subject should enable us to gain a better understanding of this important issue in the years to come.

Multiband task related components enhance rapid cognition decoding for both small and similar objects

The cortically-coupled target recognition system based on rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) has a wide range of applications in brain computer interface (BCI) fields such as medical and military. However, in the complex natural environment backgrounds, the identification of event-related potentials (ERP) of both small and similar objects that are quickly presented is a research challenge. Therefore, we designed corresponding experimental paradigms and proposed a multi-band task related components matching (MTRCM) method to improve the rapid cognitive decoding of both small and similar objects. We compared the areas under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) between MTRCM and other 9 methods under different numbers of training sample using RSVP-ERP data from 50 subjects. The results showed that MTRCM maintained an overall superiority and achieved the highest average AUC (0.6562 ± 0.0091). We also optimized the frequency band and the time parameters of the method. The verification on public data sets further showed the necessity of designing MTRCM method. The MTRCM method provides a new approach for neural decoding of both small and similar RSVP objects, which is conducive to promote the further development of RSVP-BCI.

What does decoding from the PFC reveal about consciousness?

Disputes between rival theories of consciousness have often centered on whether perceptual contents can be decoded from the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Failures to decode from the PFC are taken to challenge 'cognitive' theories of consciousness such as the global workspace theory and higher-order monitoring theories, and decoding successes have been taken to confirm these theories. However, PFC decoding shows both too much and too little. Too much because cognitive theories of consciousness do not need PFC rerepresentation of perceptual contents since pointers to perceptual representations suffice. Too little because there is evidence that PFC decoding of perceptual content reflects postperceptual cognitive representation, such as thoughts that have those perceptual contents rather than conscious percepts.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

Early Electrophysiological Correlates of Perceptual Consciousness Are Affected by Both Exogenous and Endogenous Attention

It has been proposed that visual awareness negativity (VAN), which is an early ERP component, constitutes a neural correlate of visual consciousness that is independent of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms. In the present study, we investigated whether VAN is indeed a specific marker of phenomenal awareness or rather reflects the involvement of attention. To this end, we reanalyzed data collected in a previously published EEG experiment in which awareness of visual stimuli and two aspects that define attentional involvement, namely, the inherent saliency and task relevance of a stimulus, were manipulated orthogonally. During the experimental procedure, participants (n = 41) were presented with images of faces that were backward-masked or unmasked, fearful or neutral, and defined as task-relevant targets or task-irrelevant distractors. Single-trial ERP analysis revealed that VAN was highly dependent on attentional manipulations in the early time window (140-200 msec), up to the point that the effect of awareness was not observed for attentionally irrelevant stimuli (i.e., neutral faces presented as distractors). In the late time window (200-350 msec), VAN was present in all attentional conditions, but its amplitude was significantly higher in response to fearful faces and task-relevant face images than in response to neutral ones and task-irrelevant ones, respectively. In conclusion, we demonstrate that the amplitude of VAN is highly dependent on both exogenous (stimulus saliency) and endogenous attention (task requirements). Our results challenge the view that VAN constitutes an attention-independent correlate of phenomenal awareness.

An integrative view of the role of prefrontal cortex in consciousness

The involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in consciousness is an ongoing focus of intense investigation. An important question is whether representations of conscious contents and experiences in the PFC are confounded by post-perceptual processes related to cognitive functions. Here, I review recent findings suggesting that neuronal representations of consciously perceived contents-in the absence of post-perceptual processes-can indeed be observed in the PFC. Slower ongoing fluctuations in the electrophysiological state of the PFC seem to control the stability and updates of these prefrontal representations of conscious awareness. In addition to conscious perception, the PFC has been shown to play a critical role in controlling the levels of consciousness as observed during anesthesia, while prefrontal lesions can result in severe loss of perceptual awareness. Together, the convergence of these processes in the PFC suggests its integrative role in consciousness and highlights the complex nature of consciousness itself.

An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.

Conscious perception of fear in faces: Insights from high-density EEG and perceptual awareness scale with threshold stimuli

Contrary to the extensive research on processing subliminal and/or unattended emotional facial expressions, only a minority of studies have investigated the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) of emotions conveyed by faces. In the present high-density electroencephalography (EEG) study, we first employed a staircase procedure to identify each participant's perceptual threshold of the emotion expressed by the face and then compared the EEG signals elicited in trials where the participants were aware with the activity elicited in trials where participants were unaware of the emotions expressed by these, otherwise identical, faces. Drawing on existing knowledge of the neural mechanisms of face processing and NCCs, we hypothesized that activity in frontal electrodes would be modulated in relation to participants' awareness of facial emotional content. More specifically, we hypothesized that the NCC of fear seen on someone else's face could be detected as a modulation of a later and more anterior (i.e., at frontal sites) event-related potential (ERP) than the face-sensitive N170. By adopting a data-driven approach and cluster-based statistics to the analysis of EEG signals, the results were clear-cut in showing that visual awareness of fear was associated with the modulation of a frontal ERP component in a 150-300 msec interval. These insights are dissected and contextualized in relation to prevailing theories of visual consciousness and their proposed NCC benchmarks.

Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses

How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.

Feedforward connectivity patterns from visual areas to the front of the brain contain information about sensory stimuli regardless of awareness or report

Current theories of consciousness can be categorized to some extent by their predictions about the putative role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in conscious perception. One family of the theories proposes that the PFC is necessary for conscious perception. The other postulates that the PFC is not necessary and that other areas (e.g., posterior cortical areas) are more important for conscious perception. No-report paradigms could potentially arbitrate the debate as they disentangle task reporting from conscious perception. While previous no-report paradigms tend to point to a reduction in PFC activity, they have not examined the critical role of the PFC in "monitoring" or "reading out" the patterns of activity in the sensory cortex to generate conscious perception. To address this, we reanalysed electroencephalography (EEG) data from a no-report inattentional blindness paradigm (Shafto & Pitts, 2015). We examined the role of feedforward input patterns to the PFC from sensory cortices. We employed nonparametric spectral Granger causality and quantified the amount of information that reflected the contents of consciousness using multivariate classifiers. Unexpectedly, regardless of whether the stimulus was consciously seen or not, we found that information relating to the current sensory stimulus was present in the pattern of inputs from visual areas to the PFC. In light of these findings, we suggest various theories of consciousness need to be revised to accommodate the fact that the contents of consciousness are decodable from the input patterns from posterior sensory regions to the PFC, regardless of awareness (or report).

Isolating Neural Signatures of Conscious Speech Perception with a No-Report Sine-Wave Speech Paradigm

Identifying neural correlates of conscious perception is a fundamental endeavor of cognitive neuroscience. Most studies so far have focused on visual awareness along with trial-by-trial reports of task-relevant stimuli, which can confound neural measures of perceptual awareness with postperceptual processing. Here, we used a three-phase sine-wave speech paradigm that dissociated between conscious speech perception and task relevance while recording EEG in humans of both sexes. Compared with tokens perceived as noise, physically identical sine-wave speech tokens that were perceived as speech elicited a left-lateralized, near-vertex negativity, which we interpret as a phonological version of a perceptual awareness negativity. This response appeared between 200 and 300 ms after token onset and was not present for frequency-flipped control tokens that were never perceived as speech. In contrast, the P3b elicited by task-irrelevant tokens did not significantly differ when the tokens were perceived as speech versus noise and was only enhanced for tokens that were both perceived as speech and relevant to the task. Our results extend the findings from previous studies on visual awareness and speech perception and suggest that correlates of conscious perception, across types of conscious content, are most likely to be found in midlatency negative-going brain responses in content-specific sensory areas.

A fractional-order Wilson-Cowan formulation of cortical disinhibition

This work presents a fractional-order Wilson-Cowan model derivation under Caputo's formalism, considering an order of 0 < α ≤ 1 . To that end, we propose memory-dependent response functions and average neuronal excitation functions that permit us to naturally arrive at a fractional-order model that incorporates past dynamics into the description of synaptically coupled neuronal populations' activity. We then shift our focus on a particular example, aiming to analyze the fractional-order dynamics of the disinhibited cortex. This system mimics cortical activity observed during neurological disorders such as epileptic seizures, where an imbalance between excitation and inhibition is present, which allows brain dynamics to transition to a hyperexcited activity state. In the context of the first-order mathematical model, we recover traditional results showing a transition from a low-level activity state to a potentially pathological high-level activity state as an external factor modifies cortical inhibition. On the other hand, under the fractional-order formulation, we establish novel results showing that the system resists such transition as the order is decreased, permitting the possibility of staying in the low-activity state even with increased disinhibition. Furthermore, considering the memory index interpretation of the fractional-order model motivation here developed, our results establish that by increasing the memory index, the system becomes more resistant to transitioning towards the high-level activity state. That is, one possible effect of the memory index is to stabilize neuronal activity. Noticeably, this neuronal stabilizing effect is similar to homeostatic plasticity mechanisms. To summarize our results, we present a two-parameter structural portrait describing the system's dynamics dependent on a proposed disinhibition parameter and the order. We also explore numerical model simulations to validate our results.

Disruption of consciousness depends on insight in OCD and on positive symptoms in schizophrenia

Disruption of conscious access contributes to the advent of psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia but could also explain lack of insight in other psychiatric disorders. In this study, we explored how insight and psychotic symptoms related to disruption of consciousness. We explored consciousness in patients with schizophrenia, patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) with good vs. poor insight and matched controls. Participants underwent clinical assessments and performed a visual masking task allowing us to measure individual consciousness threshold. We used a principal component analysis to reduce symptom dimensionality and explored how consciousness measures related to symptomatology. We found that clinical dimensions could be well summarized by a restricted set of principal components which also correlated with the extent of consciousness disruption. More specifically, positive symptoms were associated with impaired conscious access in patients with schizophrenia whereas the level of insight delineated two subtypes of OCD patients, those with poor insight who had consciousness impairments similar to patients with schizophrenia, and those with good insight who resemble healthy controls. Our study provides new insights about consciousness disruption in psychiatric disorders, showing that it relates to positive symptoms in schizophrenia and with insight in OCD. In OCD, it revealed a distinct subgroup sharing neuropathological features with schizophrenia. Our findings refine the mapping between symptoms and cognition, paving the way for a better treatment selection.

The nature of consciousness in anaesthesia

Neuroscientists agree on the value of locating the source of consciousness within the brain. Anaesthesiologists are no exception, and have their own operational definition of consciousness based on phenomenological observations during anaesthesia. The full functional correlates of consciousness are yet to be precisely identified, however rapidly evolving progress in this scientific domain has yielded several theories that attempt to model the generation of consciousness. They have received variable support from experimental observations, including those involving anaesthesia and its ability to reversibly modulate different aspects of consciousness. Aside from the interest in a better understanding of the mechanisms of consciousness, exploring the functional tenets of the phenomenological consciousness states of general anaesthesia has the potential to ultimately improve patient management. It could facilitate the design of specific monitoring devices and approaches, aiming at reliably detecting each of the possible states of consciousness during an anaesthetic procedure, including total absence of mental content (unconsciousness), and internal awareness (sensation of self and internal thoughts) with or without conscious perception of the environment (connected or disconnected consciousness, respectively). Indeed, it must be noted that unresponsiveness is not sufficient to infer absence of connectedness or even absence of consciousness. This narrative review presents the current knowledge in this field from a system-level, underlining the contribution of anaesthesia studies in supporting theories of consciousness, and proposing directions for future research.

Behavioral and brain responses to verbal stimuli reveal transient periods of cognitive integration of the external world during sleep

Sleep has long been considered as a state of behavioral disconnection from the environment, without reactivity to external stimuli. Here we questioned this 'sleep disconnection' dogma by directly investigating behavioral responsiveness in 49 napping participants (27 with narcolepsy and 22 healthy volunteers) engaged in a lexical decision task. Participants were instructed to frown or smile depending on the stimulus type. We found accurate behavioral responses, visible via contractions of the corrugator or zygomatic muscles, in most sleep stages in both groups (except slow-wave sleep in healthy volunteers). Across sleep stages, responses occurred more frequently when stimuli were presented during high cognitive states than during low cognitive states, as indexed by prestimulus electroencephalography. Our findings suggest that transient windows of reactivity to external stimuli exist during bona fide sleep, even in healthy individuals. Such windows of reactivity could pave the way for real-time communication with sleepers to probe sleep-related mental and cognitive processes.

Differential cortical network engagement during states of un/consciousness in humans

What happens in the human brain when we are unconscious? Despite substantial work, we are still unsure which brain regions are involved and how they are impacted when consciousness is disrupted. Using intracranial recordings and direct electrical stimulation, we mapped global, network, and regional involvement during wake vs. arousable unconsciousness (sleep) vs. non-arousable unconsciousness (propofol-induced general anesthesia). Information integration and complex processing we`re reduced, while variability increased in any type of unconscious state. These changes were more pronounced during anesthesia than sleep and involved different cortical engagement. During sleep, changes were mostly uniformly distributed across the brain, whereas during anesthesia, the prefrontal cortex was the most disrupted, suggesting that the lack of arousability during anesthesia results not from just altered overall physiology but from a disconnection between the prefrontal and other brain areas. These findings provide direct evidence for different neural dynamics during loss of consciousness compared with loss of arousability.

The exclusionary approach to consciousness

The standard approach in the field of consciousness research involves identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) by comparing neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials. However, this method has been met with criticism due to the lack of consensus on how to operationalize and measure consciousness. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach: the exclusionary approach. Rather than utilizing near-threshold conditions to contrast conscious and unconscious trials, this approach leverages the widely accepted notion that subjective reports are reliable under normal conditions. I propose that this can be done by assessing whether consciousness remains stable across trials while manipulating other factors such as reports, tasks, stimulation, or attention. We can use the resulting contrast to exclude certain kinds of neural activity as candidate NCCs. This method produces results that are less contentious, allowing for the establishment of hard criteria for theories of consciousness. Additionally, this approach does not require the development of new research paradigms, but can incorporate existing studies, particularly those aimed at identifying confounding factors in the standard approach. It is important to note, however, that the proposed exclusionary approach does not negate the value of the identification approach. Rather, they should be considered as complementary methods.

Depth of anaesthesia monitoring: time to reject the index?

Depth of anaesthesia monitors can fail to detect consciousness under anaesthesia, primarily because they rely on the frontal EEG, which does not arise from a neural correlate of consciousness. A study published in a previous issue of the British Journal of Anaesthesia showed that indices produced by the different commercial monitors can give highly discordant results when analysing changes in the frontal EEG. Anaesthetists could benefit from routinely assessing the raw EEG and its spectrogram, rather than relying solely on an index produced by a depth of anaesthesia monitor.

Fronto-parietal networks shape human conscious report through attention gain and reorienting

How do attention and consciousness interact in the human brain? Rival theories of consciousness disagree on the role of fronto-parietal attentional networks in conscious perception. We recorded neural activity from 727 intracerebral contacts in 13 epileptic patients, while they detected near-threshold targets preceded by attentional cues. Clustering revealed three neural patterns: first, attention-enhanced conscious report accompanied sustained right-hemisphere fronto-temporal activity in networks connected by the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) II-III, and late accumulation of activity (>300 ms post-target) in bilateral dorso-prefrontal and right-hemisphere orbitofrontal cortex (SLF I-III). Second, attentional reorienting affected conscious report through early, sustained activity in a right-hemisphere network (SLF III). Third, conscious report accompanied left-hemisphere dorsolateral-prefrontal activity. Task modeling with recurrent neural networks revealed multiple clusters matching the identified brain clusters, elucidating the causal relationship between clusters in conscious perception of near-threshold targets. Thus, distinct, hemisphere-asymmetric fronto-parietal networks support attentional gain and reorienting in shaping human conscious experience.

About the compatibility between the perturbational complexity index and the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness

This paper investigates the compatibility between the theoretical framework of the global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) of conscious processing and the perturbational complexity index (PCI). Even if it has been introduced within the framework of a concurrent theory (i.e. Integrated Information Theory), PCI appears, in principle, compatible with the main tenet of GNWT, which is a conscious process that depends on a long-range connection between different cortical regions, more specifically on the amplification, global propagation, and integration of brain signals. Notwithstanding this basic compatibility, a number of limited compatibilities and apparent differences emerge. This paper starts from the description of brain complexity, a notion that is crucial for PCI, to then summary of the main features of PCI and the main tenets of GNWT. Against this background, the text explores the compatibility between PCI and GNWT. It concludes that GNWT and PCI are fundamentally compatible, even though there are some partial disagreements and some points to further examine.

Low-dimensional organization of global brain states of reduced consciousness

Brain states are frequently represented using a unidimensional scale measuring the richness of subjective experience (level of consciousness). This description assumes a mapping between the high-dimensional space of whole-brain configurations and the trajectories of brain states associated with changes in consciousness, yet this mapping and its properties remain unclear. We combine whole-brain modeling, data augmentation, and deep learning for dimensionality reduction to determine a mapping representing states of consciousness in a low-dimensional space, where distances parallel similarities between states. An orderly trajectory from wakefulness to patients with brain injury is revealed in a latent space whose coordinates represent metrics related to functional modularity and structure-function coupling, increasing alongside loss of consciousness. Finally, we investigate the effects of model perturbations, providing geometrical interpretation for the stability and reversibility of states. We conclude that conscious awareness depends on functional patterns encoded as a low-dimensional trajectory within the vast space of brain configurations.

Irruption Theory: A Novel Conceptualization of the Enactive Account of Motivated Activity

Cognitive science is lacking conceptual tools to describe how an agent's motivations, as such, can play a role in the generation of its behavior. The enactive approach has made progress by developing a relaxed naturalism, and by placing normativity at the core of life and mind; all cognitive activity is a kind of motivated activity. It has rejected representational architectures, especially their reification of the role of normativity into localized "value" functions, in favor of accounts that appeal to system-level properties of the organism. However, these accounts push the problem of reification to a higher level of description, given that the efficacy of agent-level normativity is completely identified with the efficacy of non-normative system-level activity, while assuming operational equivalency. To allow normativity to have its own efficacy, a new kind of nonreductive theory is proposed: irruption theory. The concept of irruption is introduced to indirectly operationalize an agent's motivated involvement in its activity, specifically in terms of a corresponding underdetermination of its states by their material basis. This implies that irruptions are associated with increased unpredictability of (neuro)physiological activity, and they should, hence, be quantifiable in terms of information-theoretic entropy. Accordingly, evidence that action, cognition, and consciousness are linked to higher levels of neural entropy can be interpreted as indicating higher levels of motivated agential involvement. Counterintuitively, irruptions do not stand in contrast to adaptive behavior. Rather, as indicated by artificial life models of complex adaptive systems, bursts of arbitrary changes in neural activity can facilitate the self-organization of adaptivity. Irruption theory therefore, makes it intelligible how an agent's motivations, as such, can make effective differences to their behavior, without requiring the agent to be able to directly control their body's neurophysiological processes.

Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness

Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience.

Neural correlates of conscious processing of emotional faces: Evidence from event-related potentials

There is a theoretical debate between the early and late neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Previous studies using neutral face stimuli supported an early NCC and suggested that visual awareness negativity (VAN) is associated with consciousness, while late positivity (LP) reflects post-perceptual activity. However, emotional faces may help to examine the relationship between LP and consciousness due to the differences in late processing between emotional and neutral faces. To explore the effects of facial emotional information on NCCs, the present study manipulated consciousness with the inattentional blindness paradigm and used happy, fearful, and neutral faces as visual stimuli. The results showed that the conscious processing of emotional faces was correlated with VAN and LP, while the conscious processing of neutral faces was associated with VAN. First, the results suggest that VAN is an NCC, and the relationship between LP and consciousness is affected by facial emotional information. Second, VAN reflects the early perceptual experience of emotional faces, whereas LP may reflect the late conscious processing of emotional faces. Furthermore, source localization analysis showed that the LPs of emotional faces were mainly located in the frontal and parietal lobes, whereas those of neutral faces showed no significant activation. This suggests that facial emotional information may affect the brain regions associated with conscious processing. Time-frequency analysis showed that conscious processing is related to the enhancement of alpha and theta oscillation, indicating that conscious processing may be associated with the suppression of irrelevant stimuli. Overall, the present study suggests that the integration of the theories that support early and late NCCs helps explain the conscious processing of emotional faces.

The effects of visual working memory load on detection and neural processing of task-unrelated auditory stimuli

While perceptual load has been proposed to reduce the processing of task-unrelated stimuli, theoretical arguments and empirical findings for other forms of task load are inconclusive. Here, we systematically investigated the detection and neural processing of auditory stimuli varying in stimulus intensity during a stimuli-unrelated visual working memory task alternating between low and high load. We found, depending on stimulus strength, decreased stimulus detection and reduced P3, but unaffected N1 amplitudes of the event-related potential to auditory stimuli under high as compared to low load. In contrast, load independent awareness effects were observed during both early (N1) and late (P3) time windows. Findings suggest a late neural effect of visual working memory load on auditory stimuli leading to lower probability of reported awareness of these stimuli.

Case-by-case: neural markers of emotion and task stimulus significance

The present study assessed the hypothesis that electrophysiological markers of emotional and task stimulus significance can be demonstrated in concert at the level of the individual case. Participants (n = 18, 9 females) viewed low and high-arousing pictures selected from behavior systems of sexual reproduction, disease avoidance, and predator fear. Furthermore, to concurrently manipulate task relevance, participants performed an explicit emotion categorization task with either low or high-arousing pictures alternating as target stimuli in separate experimental blocks. Pooled across behavior systems, event-related components sensitive to emotional significance reached statistical significance in 100% of the tests for the early posterior negativity and in 96% of the tests for the late positive potential. Regarding explicit task relevance, the target P3 effect was significant in 96% of the tests. These findings demonstrate that neural markers of stimulus significance driven by emotional picture content and explicit task demands can be assessed at the individual level. Replicating an effect case-after-case provides strong support for an effect common-to-all and may support individual inferences. Contributions of the case-by-case approach to reveal reproducible effects and implications for the development of neural biomarkers for specific affective and cognitive component processes are discussed.

Stimulus representations in visual cortex shaped by spatial attention and microsaccades

Microsaccades (MSs) are commonly associated with spatially directed attention, but how they affect visual processing is still not clear. We studied MSs in a task in which the animal was randomly cued to attend to a target stimulus and ignore distractors, and it was rewarded for detecting a color change in the target. We found that the enhancement of firing rates normally found with attention to a cued stimulus was delayed until the first MS directed towards that stimulus. Once that MS occurred, attention to the target was engaged and there were persistent effects of attention on firing rates for the remainder of the trial. These effects were found in the superficial and deep layers of V4 as well as the lateral pulvinar and IT cortex. Although the tuning curves of V4 cells do not change depending on the locus of spatial attention, we found pronounced effects of MS direction on stimulus representations that persisted for the length of the trial in V4. In intervals following a MS towards the target in the RF, stimulus decoding from population activity was substantially better than in intervals following a MS away from the target. Likewise, turning curves of cells were substantially sharper following a MS towards the target in the RF. This sharpening appeared to result from both a "refreshing" of the initial transient sensory response to stimulus onset, and a magnification of the effects of attention in this condition. MSs to the target also enhanced the neuronal response to the behaviorally relevant target color change and led to faster reaction times. These results thus reveal a major link between spatial attention, object processing and its coordination with eye movements.

An adversarial collaboration protocol for testing contrasting predictions of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory

The relationship between conscious experience and brain activity has intrigued scientists and philosophers for centuries. In the last decades, several theories have suggested different accounts for these relationships. These theories have developed in parallel, with little to no cross-talk among them. To advance research on consciousness, we established an adversarial collaboration between proponents of two of the major theories in the field, Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory. Together, we devised and preregistered two experiments that test contrasting predictions of these theories concerning the location and timing of correlates of visual consciousness, which have been endorsed by the theories' proponents. Predicted outcomes should either support, refute, or challenge these theories. Six theory-impartial laboratories will follow the study protocol specified here, using three complementary methods: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Magneto-Electroencephalography (M-EEG), and intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG). The study protocol will include built-in replications, both between labs and within datasets. Through this ambitious undertaking, we hope to provide decisive evidence in favor or against the two theories and clarify the footprints of conscious visual perception in the human brain, while also providing an innovative model of large-scale, collaborative, and open science practice.

Neural correlates of consciousness in an attentional blink paradigm with uncertain target relevance

Several event-related potentials (ERPs) have been proposed as neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), most prominently the early visual awareness negativity (VAN) and the late P3b component. Highly influential support for the P3b comes from studies utilizing the attentional blink (AB), where conscious perception of a first visual target (T1) impairs reporting a second target (T2) presented shortly afterwards. Recent no-report studies using other paradigms suggest that the P3b component may reflect post-perceptual processes associated with decision-making rather than awareness. However, no-report studies are limited in their awareness assessment, and their conclusions have not been tested in an AB paradigm. The present study (N = 38) addressed these issues using a novel AB paradigm, which reduced decision-making processes by omitting a discrimination task on T2 stimuli and rendering their relevance uncertain. Nevertheless, awareness was assessed trial by trial. Comparing ERPs in response to seen versus unseen T2 stimuli revealed a VAN but no enhanced P3b regardless of whether they were marked as distinct from distractor stimuli or not. Our results corroborate the VAN and challenge the P3b as NCC despite rigorous trial-by-trial assessment of conscious perception. Thus, they support the idea that awareness emerges during early sensory processing.

Representations and decodability of diverse cognitive functions are preserved across the human cortex, cerebellum, and subcortex

Which part of the brain contributes to our complex cognitive processes? Studies have revealed contributions of the cerebellum and subcortex to higher-order cognitive functions; however, it has been unclear whether such functional representations are preserved across the cortex, cerebellum, and subcortex. In this study, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging data with 103 cognitive tasks and construct three voxel-wise encoding and decoding models independently using cortical, cerebellar, and subcortical voxels. Representational similarity analysis reveals that the structure of task representations is preserved across the three brain parts. Principal component analysis visualizes distinct organizations of abstract cognitive functions in each part of the cerebellum and subcortex. More than 90% of the cognitive tasks are decodable from the cerebellum and subcortical activities, even for the novel tasks not included in model training. Furthermore, we show that the cerebellum and subcortex have sufficient information to reconstruct activity in the cerebral cortex.

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

Spontaneous neuronal avalanches as a correlate of access consciousness

Decades of research have advanced our understanding of the biophysical mechanisms underlying consciousness. However, an overarching framework bridging between models of consciousness and the large-scale organization of spontaneous brain activity is still missing. Based on the observation that spontaneous brain activity dynamically switches between epochs of segregation and large-scale integration of information, we hypothesize a brain-state dependence of conscious access, whereby the presence of either segregated or integrated states marks distinct modes of information processing. We first review influential works on the neuronal correlates of consciousness, spontaneous resting-state brain activity and dynamical system theory. Then, we propose a test experiment to validate our hypothesis that conscious access occurs in aperiodic cycles, alternating windows where new incoming information is collected but not experienced, to punctuated short-lived integration events, where conscious access to previously collected content occurs. In particular, we suggest that the integration events correspond to neuronal avalanches, which are collective bursts of neuronal activity ubiquitously observed in electrophysiological recordings. If confirmed, the proposed framework would link the physics of spontaneous cortical dynamics, to the concept of ignition within the global neuronal workspace theory, whereby conscious access manifest itself as a burst of neuronal activity.

Decoding perceptual awareness across the brain with a no-report fMRI masking paradigm

Does perceptual awareness arise within the sensory regions of the brain or within higher-level regions (e.g., the frontal lobe)? To answer this question, researchers traditionally compare neural activity when observers report being aware versus being unaware of a stimulus. However, it is unclear whether the resulting activations are associated with the conscious perception of the stimulus or the post-perceptual processes associated with reporting that stimulus. To address this limitation, we used both report and no-report conditions in a visual masking paradigm while participants were scanned using functional MRI (fMRI). We found that the overall univariate response to visible stimuli in the frontal lobe was robust in the report condition but disappeared in the no-report condition. However, using multivariate patterns, we could still decode in both conditions whether a stimulus reached conscious awareness across the brain, including in the frontal lobe. These results help reconcile key discrepancies in the recent literature and provide a path forward for identifying the neural mechanisms associated with perceptual awareness.

Early and late electrophysiological correlates of gradual perceptual awareness in- and outside the Attentional Blink window

There is an ongoing debate on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the attentional blink (AB). Theoretical accounts propose that NCC during the attentional blink occur late in the processing hierarchy and that this quality is specific to the AB. We investigated this question by recording event-related potentials during an AB experiment with faces as T2. We analyzed ERPs to T2 stimuli inside (short lag) and outside (long lag) the AB window after carefully calibrating T2 stimuli to ensure equal visibility ratings across lags. We found that the N170, the visual awareness negativity (VAN), and the P3b showed an increased amplitude for seen compared to unseen face stimuli regardless of stimulus lag and that all these components scale linearly with subjective visibility. These findings suggest similar early and late mechanisms of graded perceptual awareness within and outside the AB across perceptual (N170, VAN) and post-perceptual (P3b) processing stages.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

Awareness and consciousness in humans and animals – neural and behavioral correlates in an evolutionary perspective

Awareness or consciousness in the context of stimulus perception can directly be assessed in well controlled test situations with humans via the persons’ reports about their subjective experiences with the stimuli. Since we have no direct access to subjective experiences in animals, their possible awareness or consciousness in stimulus perception tasks has often been inferred from behavior and cognitive abilities previously observed in aware and conscious humans. Here, we analyze published human data primarily on event-related potentials and brain-wave generation during perception and responding to sensory stimuli and extract neural markers (mainly latencies of evoked-potential peaks and of gamma-wave occurrence) indicating that a person became aware or conscious of the perceived stimulus. These neural correlates of consciousness were then applied to sets of corresponding data from various animals including several species of mammals, and one species each of birds, fish, cephalopods, and insects. We found that the neural markers from studies in humans could also successfully be applied to the mammal and bird data suggesting that species in these animal groups can become subjectively aware of and conscious about perceived stimuli. Fish, cephalopod and insect data remained inconclusive. In an evolutionary perspective we have to consider that both awareness of and consciousness about perceived stimuli appear as evolved, attention-dependent options added to the ongoing neural activities of stimulus processing and action generation. Since gamma-wave generation for functional coupling of brain areas in aware/conscious states is energetically highly cost-intensive, it remains to be shown which animal species under which conditions of lifestyle and ecological niche may achieve significant advantages in reproductive fitness by drawing upon these options. Hence, we started our discussion about awareness and consciousness in animals with the question in how far these expressions of brain activity are necessary attributes for perceiving stimuli and responding in an adaptive way.

Theory of the Multiregional Neocortex: Large-Scale Neural Dynamics and Distributed Cognition

The neocortex is a complex neurobiological system with many interacting regions. How these regions work together to subserve flexible behavior and cognition has become increasingly amenable to rigorous research. Here, I review recent experimental and theoretical work on the modus operandi of a multiregional cortex. These studies revealed several general principles for the neocortical interareal connectivity, low-dimensional macroscopic gradients of biological properties across cortical areas, and a hierarchy of timescales for information processing. Theoretical work suggests testable predictions regarding differential excitation and inhibition along feedforward and feedback pathways in the cortical hierarchy. Furthermore, modeling of distributed working memory and simple decision-making has given rise to a novel mathematical concept, dubbed bifurcation in space, that potentially explains how different cortical areas, with a canonical circuit organization but gradients of biological heterogeneities, are able to subserve their respective (e.g., sensory coding versus executive control) functions in a modularly organized brain.

Theories of consciousness

Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.

Effects of the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Binaural Beat Brain Stimulation and Short-Term Training on Simultaneously Assessed Visuospatial and Verbal Working Memories, Signal Detection Measures, Response Times, and Intrasubject Response Time Variabilities: A Within-Subject Randomized Placebo-Controlled Clinical Trial

Introduction

Binaural beats (BBs) are phantom sound illusions perceived when two sounds of slightly different frequencies are separately transmitted to the ears. It is suggested that some BB frequencies might entrain the brain and enhance certain cognitive functions such as working memory or attention. Nevertheless, studies in this regard are very scarce, quite controversial, and merely covering a very small portion of this vast field of research (e.g., testing only a few BB frequencies), not to mention adopting some limited methodologies (e.g., no assessment of the loudness of the BB sound, adopting only between-subject analyses, and testing only one perceptual modality). Hence, we aimed to assess the potential effects of alpha, beta, and gamma BBs on cognitive-behavioral parameters of working memory and attention examined simultaneously in two different modalities (visuospatial and auditory-verbal).

Methods

This within-subject five-arm randomized placebo-controlled clinical trial included 155 trials in 31 healthy right-handed subjects (17 women, 14 men, 30.84 ± 6.16 years old). Each subject listened to 8-minute sessions of 10 Hz, 16 Hz, and 40 Hz binaural beats versus 240 Hz pure tone and silence (in random orders). In each 8-minute block, they played a dual 2-back task with feedback enabled. Their cognitive-behavioral parameters (working memory capacities, signal detection measures (hit rate, false alarm rate, sensitivity, and response bias), and reaction speed measures (response time and intrasubject response time variability)) were calculated. The effects of the sound interventions and short-term training on these working memory and attention measures were assessed statistically using mixed-model linear regressions, repeated-measures ANOVAs and ANCOVAs, Bonferroni post hoc tests, and one-sample t-tests (α = 0.05).

Results

The following are some major statistically significant findings (P ≤ 0.05): In the visuospatial modality, the 10 Hz BB reduced the response time and intrasubject response time variability and reduced the extent of decline over time in the case of visuospatial working memory, sensitivity, and hit rate. In the auditory-verbal modality, the 10 Hz intervention reduced the hit rate, false alarm rate, and sensitivity. The 10 Hz intervention also caused the lowest intermodality discrepancies in hit rates and false alarm rates, the highest response time discrepancies, and negative discrepancies in working memories and sensitivities (indicating the superiority of the visuospatial modality). The response biases tended to be liberal-to-neutral in the verbal modality and rather conservative in the visuospatial modality. Reactions were faster in the visuospatial modality than the auditory-verbal one, while the intrasubject variability of reaction times was smaller in the auditory-verbal modality. Short-term training can increase the hit rate, working memory, and sensitivity and can decrease the false alarm rate and response time. Aging and reduced sound intervention volume may slow down responses and increase the intrasubject variability of response time. Faster reactions might be correlated with greater hit rates, working memories, and sensitivities and also with lower false alarm rates.

Conclusions

The 8-minute alpha-band binaural beat entrainment may have a few, slight enhancing effects within the visuospatial modality, but not in both modalities combined. Short-term training can improve working memory and some cognitive parameters of attention. Some BB interventions can affect the intermodality discrepancies. There may be differences between the two modalities in terms of the response speeds and intrasubject response time variabilities. Aging can slow down the response, while increasing the volume of audio interventions may accelerate it.