Evolution of consciousness: phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia

Panpsychism and dualism in the science of consciousness

A resurgence of panpsychism and dualism is a matter of ongoing debate in modern neuroscience. Although metaphysically hostile, panpsychism and dualism both persist in the science of consciousness because the former is proposed as a straightforward answer to the problem of integrating consciousness into the fabric of physical reality, whereas the latter proposes a simple solution to the problem of free will by endowing consciousness with causal power as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. I take the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a paradigmatic exemplar of a theory of consciousness (ToC) that makes its commitments to panpsychism and dualism within a unified framework. These features are not, however, unique for IIT. Many ToCs are implicitly prone to some degree of panpsychism whenever they strive to propose a universal definition of consciousness, associated with one or another known phenomenon. Yet, those ToCs that can be characterized as strongly emergent are at risk of being dualist. A remedy against both covert dualism and uncomfortable corollaries of panpsychism can be found in the evolutionary theory of life, called here "bioprotopsychism" and generalized in terms of autopoiesis and the free energy principle. Bioprotopsychism provides a biologically inspired basis for a minimalist approach to consciousness via the triad "chemotaxis-efference copy mechanism-counterfactual active inference" by associating the stream of weakly emergent conscious states with an amount of information (best guesses) of the brain, engaged in unconscious predictive processing.

Single-dose 1cp-LSD administration for canine anxiety: a pilot study

Anxiety affects 14-20% of dogs. Pharmacological treatments often fail. Psychedelics have shown to be useful for anxiety and depression in humans, but their veterinary use remains unexplored. We aimed to determine the effects of low-dose 1-cyclopropionyl-d-lysergic acid diethylamide (1cp-LSD) administered in a single dose to a dog, to observe the effect and establish the safety of the substance. The patient was a 13-year-old female dog, weighing 13 kg, mixed breed, and spayed. A total of 5 µg was administered orally, equivalent to 0.38 µg/kg. The animal has had a history of separation related behavioral problems throughout her life. To objectively assess the degree of anxiety in the dog, a validated scale was utilized. The trial was scheduled at the house where the animal lives. The owner was present throughout the experience. Informed consent was obtained prior to the assay. The trial began at 12:15 p.m. on January 10, 2024, lasting for 5 and a half hours. The response to anxiety-inducing stimuli was equally anxious during the first two hours. From that point onwards, a significant change in the animal's behavior was observed, with no signs/mild signs of anxiety. The trial concluded without any adverse effects on the animal. The patient did not show signs of having a psychedelic experience. This is the first time that a study of this nature has been conducted and reported in the canine species. 1cp-LSD proved to be safe and exerted the desired effect on the animal's behavior, significantly reducing the patient's anxiety.

Anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness

In the 19th century, the discovery of general anesthesia revolutionized medical care. In the 21st century, anesthetics have become indispensable tools to study consciousness. Here, I review key aspects of the relationship between anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness, including interfaces of sleep and anesthetic mechanisms, anesthesia and primary sensory processing, the effects of anesthetics on large-scale functional brain networks, and mechanisms of arousal from anesthesia. I discuss the implications of the data derived from the anesthetized state for the science of consciousness and then conclude with outstanding questions, reflections, and future directions.

Visuotactile integration facilitates mirror-induced self-directed behavior through activation of hippocampal neuronal ensembles in mice

Remembering the visual features of oneself is critical for self-recognition. However, the neural mechanisms of how the visual self-image is developed remain unknown because of the limited availability of behavioral paradigms in experimental animals. Here, we demonstrate a mirror-induced self-directed behavior (MSB) in mice, resembling visual self-recognition. Mice displayed increased mark-directed grooming to remove ink placed on their heads when an ink-induced visual-tactile stimulus contingency occurred. MSB required mirror habituation and social experience. The chemogenetic inhibition of dorsal or ventral hippocampal CA1 (vCA1) neurons attenuated MSB. Especially, a subset of vCA1 neurons activated during the mirror exposure was significantly reactivated during re-exposure to the mirror and was necessary for MSB. The self-responding vCA1 neurons were also reactivated when mice were exposed to a conspecific of the same strain. These results suggest that visual self-image may be developed through social experience and mirror habituation and stored in a subset of vCA1 neurons.

The evolutionary origins of the Global Neuronal Workspace in vertebrates

The Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness offers an explicit functional architecture that relates consciousness to cognitive abilities such as perception, attention, memory, and evaluation. We show that the functional architecture of the Global Neuronal Workspace, which is based mainly on human studies, corresponds to the cognitive-affective architecture proposed by the Unlimited Associative Learning theory that describes minimal consciousness. However, we suggest that when applied to basal vertebrates, both models require important modifications to accommodate what has been learned about the evolution of the vertebrate brain. Most importantly, comparative studies suggest that in basal vertebrates, the Global Neuronal Workspace is instantiated by the event memory system found in the hippocampal homolog. This proposal has testable predictions and implications for understanding hippocampal and cortical functions, the evolutionary relations between memory and consciousness, and the evolution of unified perception.

Low-intensity transcranial ultrasound stimulation modulates neural activities in mice under propofol anaesthesia

BACKGROUND

Previous studies have reported that transcranial focused ultrasound stimulation can significantly decrease the time to emergence from intraperitoneal ketamine-xylazine anaesthesia in rats. However, how transcranial focused ultrasound stimulation modulates neural activity in anaesthetized rats is unclear.

METHODS

In this study, to answer this question, we used low-intensity transcranial ultrasound stimulation (TUS) to stimulate the brain tissue of propofol-anaesthetized mice, recorded local field potentials (LFPs) in the mouse motor cortex and electromyography (EMG) signals from the mouse neck, and analysed the emergence and recovery time, mean absolute power, relative power and entropy of local field potentials.

RESULTS

We found that the time to emergence from anaesthesia in the TUS group (20.3 ± 1.7 min) was significantly less than that in the Sham group (32 ± 2.6 min). We also found that compared with the Sham group, 20 min after low-intensity TUS during recovery from anaesthesia, (1) the absolute power of local field potentials in mice was significantly reduced in the [1-4 Hz] and [13-30 Hz] frequency bands and significantly increased in the [55-100 Hz], [100-140 Hz] and [140-200 Hz] frequency bands; (2) the relative power of local field potentials in mice was enhanced at [30-45 Hz], [100-140 Hz] and [140-200 Hz] frequency bands; (3) the entropy of local field potentials ([1-200 Hz]) was increased.

CONCLUSION

These results demonstrate that low-intensity TUS can effectively modulate neural activities in both awake and anaesthetized mice and has a positive effect on recovery from propofol anaesthesia in mice.

The Conscious Nematode: Exploring Hallmarks of Minimal Phenomenal Consciousness in Caenorhabditis Elegans

While subcellular components of cognition and affectivity that involve the interaction between experience, environment, and physiology -such as learning, trauma, or emotion- are being identified, the physical mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness remain more elusive. We are interested in exploring whether ancient, simpler organisms such as nematodes have minimal consciousness. Is there something that feels like to be a worm? Or are worms blind machines? 'Simpler' models allow us to simultaneously extract data from multiple levels such as slow and fast neural dynamics, structural connectivity, molecular dynamics, behavior, decision making, etc., and thus, to test predictions of the current frameworks in dispute. In the present critical review, we summarize the current models of consciousness in order to reassess in light of the new evidence whether Caenorhabditis elegans, a nematode with a nervous system composed of 302 neurons, has minimal consciousness. We also suggest empirical paths to further advance consciousness research using C. elegans.

Blurred Lines: Memory, Perceptions, and Consciousness: Commentary on "Consciousness as a Memory System" by Budson et al (2022)

In the previous issue, Budson, Richman, and Kensinger (2022) put forth the intriguing proposal that consciousness may have evolved from the episodic memory system. In addition to providing a possible evolutionary trajectory for consciousness, I believe that viewing consciousness as an extension of memory in this way is particularly useful for understanding some of the puzzling temporal complexities that are inherent to consciousness. For example, due to neural transmission delays, our conscious experience must necessarily lag the outside world, which creates a paradox for both conscious perception (Do we see the past, rather than the present?) and action (How can we make rapid decisions if it takes so long to become conscious of something?). These paradoxes can be elegantly solved by treating consciousness as a memory system. Finally, the proposal put forth by Budson and colleagues (2022) aligns with the emerging perspective that consciousness, like memory, represents a narrative time line of events rather than any single instant. However, I believe that this conceptualization can be further extended to include not only the past, but also the future. In this way, consciousness can be provocatively viewed as the remembered past, present, and future.

Profiles of animal consciousness: A species-sensitive, two-tier account to quality and distribution

The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive capacities which serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. The two-tier account achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong and weak indicators of the presence of consciousness. Second, these indicators include not only different specific contents but also differences in the way particular contents are processed (by processes of learning, reasoning or abstraction). Third, evidence of consciousness from each dimension can be combined to derive the distinctive multi-dimensional consciousness profile of various species. Thus, the two-tier account shows how the kind of conscious experience of different species can be systematically compared.

Job satisfaction has differential associations with delay discounting and risk-taking

Low job satisfaction has been associated with both negative health and negative organizational outcomes. Knowledge on which factors influence job satisfaction remains limited. This study assesses the associations between job satisfaction and three personality traits related to cognitive- and inhibitory control: delay discounting, risk-taking and sensation seeking (DRS-traits). Delay discounting and sensation seeking were inferred using self-reported behavioral data and health measurements for 80,676 participants in the UK Biobank. Multiple linear regression analysis produced beta coefficients and confidence intervals for each DRS-trait and job satisfaction. Analyses were adjusted for age, socioeconomic status and sleep quality. A combination of the three DRS-traits (CDRS) was assessed as well. Delay discounting and risk-taking were associated with, respectively, lower and higher job satisfaction in both sexes. Sensation seeking had no significant association with job satisfaction for either sex. The combined score, CDRS, was only negatively associated with job satisfaction in females but not in males. We discuss that the negative association between delay discounting and job satisfaction may be due to career related delay discounting effects, but also highlight that low job satisfaction itself may also lead to increased delay discounting. Additionally, we discuss why increased risk-taking behavior may have a positive effect on job satisfaction.

Consciousness, embodied Quantum Entanglement

We have systematically misconstrued the nature of consciousness by overlooking our own physiology as that awareness. The following is a way to rectify this error through a deep understanding of what life 'means' in order to further advance our knowledge of who and what we are. The evolution of consciousness from the cell membrane to physiology is revealed by the effect of microgravity on phenotypic identity, revealing the two levels of consciousness experimentally. As does the classic Double-Slit experiment, exposing the dual way in which consciousness functions as both the day-to-day of the cell membrane and the transcendent property of our physiology.

From the origins to the stream of consciousness and its neural correlates

There are now dozens of very different theories of consciousness, each somehow contributing to our understanding of its nature. The science of consciousness needs therefore not new theories but a general framework integrating insights from those, yet not making it a still-born "Frankenstein" theory. First, the framework must operate explicitly on the stream of consciousness, not on its static description. Second, this dynamical account must also be put on the evolutionary timeline to explain the origins of consciousness. The Cognitive Evolution Theory (CET), outlined here, proposes such a framework. This starts with the assumption that brains have primarily evolved as volitional subsystems of organisms, inherited from primitive (fast and random) reflexes of simplest neural networks, only then resembling error-minimizing prediction machines. CET adopts the tools of critical dynamics to account for metastability, scale-free avalanches, and self-organization which are all intrinsic to brain dynamics. This formalizes the stream of consciousness as a discrete (transitive, irreflexive) chain of momentary states derived from critical brain dynamics at points of phase transitions and mapped then onto a state space as neural correlates of a particular conscious state. The continuous/discrete dichotomy appears naturally between the brain dynamics at the causal level and conscious states at the phenomenal level, each volitionally triggered from arousal centers of the brainstem and cognitively modulated by thalamocortical systems. Their objective observables can be entropy-based complexity measures, reflecting the transient level or quantity of consciousness at that moment.

Through the looking glass: how do marked dolphins use mirrors and what does it mean?

Mirror-guided self-inspection is seen as a cognitive hallmark purportedly indicating the existence of self-recognition. Only a few species of great apes have been reported to pass a standard mark test for mirror self-recognition in which animals attempt to touch a mark. In addition, evidence for passing the mark test was also reported for Asian elephants, two species of corvids, and a species of cleaner fish. Mirror self-recognition has also been claimed for bottlenose dolphins, using exposure of marked areas to a mirror as evidence. However, what counts as self-directed behaviour to see the mark and what does not has been debated. To avoid this problem, we marked the areas around both eyes of the animals at the same time, one with visible and the other with transparent dye to control for haptic cues. This allowed the animal to see the mark easily and us to investigate what side was exposed to the mirror as an indicator for mark observation. We found that the animals actively chose to inspect their visibly marked side while they did not show an increased interest in a marked conspecific in the pool. These results demonstrate that dolphins use the mirror to inspect their marks and, therefore, likely recognise a distinction between self and others.

Awareness and consciousness in humans and animals - neural and behavioral correlates in an evolutionary perspective

Awareness or consciousness in the context of stimulus perception can directly be assessed in well controlled test situations with humans via the persons' reports about their subjective experiences with the stimuli. Since we have no direct access to subjective experiences in animals, their possible awareness or consciousness in stimulus perception tasks has often been inferred from behavior and cognitive abilities previously observed in aware and conscious humans. Here, we analyze published human data primarily on event-related potentials and brain-wave generation during perception and responding to sensory stimuli and extract neural markers (mainly latencies of evoked-potential peaks and of gamma-wave occurrence) indicating that a person became aware or conscious of the perceived stimulus. These neural correlates of consciousness were then applied to sets of corresponding data from various animals including several species of mammals, and one species each of birds, fish, cephalopods, and insects. We found that the neural markers from studies in humans could also successfully be applied to the mammal and bird data suggesting that species in these animal groups can become subjectively aware of and conscious about perceived stimuli. Fish, cephalopod and insect data remained inconclusive. In an evolutionary perspective we have to consider that both awareness of and consciousness about perceived stimuli appear as evolved, attention-dependent options added to the ongoing neural activities of stimulus processing and action generation. Since gamma-wave generation for functional coupling of brain areas in aware/conscious states is energetically highly cost-intensive, it remains to be shown which animal species under which conditions of lifestyle and ecological niche may achieve significant advantages in reproductive fitness by drawing upon these options. Hence, we started our discussion about awareness and consciousness in animals with the question in how far these expressions of brain activity are necessary attributes for perceiving stimuli and responding in an adaptive way.

Towards an animal model of consciousness based on the platform theory

The evolution of intellectual capacities has brought forth a continuum of consciousness levels subserved by neuronal networks of varying complexity. Brain pathologies, neurodegenerative, and mental diseases affect conscious cognition and behavior. Although impairments in consciousness are among the most devastating consequences of neurological and mental diseases, valid and reliable animal models of consciousness, that could be used for preclinical research are missing. The platform theory holds that the brain enters a conscious operation mode, whenever mental representations of stimuli, associations, concepts, memories, and experiences are effortfully maintained (in working memory) and actively manipulated. We used the platform theory as a framework and evaluation standard to categorize behavioral paradigms with respect to the level of consciousness involved in task performance. According to the platform theory, a behavioral paradigm involves conscious cognitive operations, when the problem posed is unexpected, novel or requires the maintenance and manipulation of a large amount of information to perform cognitive operations on them. Conscious cognitive operations are associated with a relocation of processing resources and the redirection of attentional focus. A consciousness behavioral test battery is proposed that is composed of tests which are assumed to require higher levels of consciousness as compared to other tasks and paradigms. The consciousness test battery for rodents includes the following tests: Working memory in the radial arm maze, episodic-like memory, prospective memory, detour test, and operant conditioning with concurrent variable-interval variable-ratio schedules. Performance in this test battery can be contrasted with the performance in paradigms and tests that require lower levels of consciousness. Additionally, a second more comprehensive behavioral test battery is proposed to control for behavioral phenotypes not related to consciousness. Our theory could serve as a guidance for the decryption of the neurobiological basis of consciousness.

An evolutionary perspective on chordate brain organization and function: insights from amphioxus, and the problem of sentience

The similarities between amphioxus and vertebrate brains, in their regional subdivision, cell types and circuitry, make the former a useful benchmark for understanding the evolutionary innovations that shaped the latter. Locomotory control systems were already well developed in basal chordates, with the ventral neuropile of the dien-mesencephalon serving to set levels of activity and initiate locomotory actions. A chief deficit in amphioxus is the absence of complex vertebrate-type sense organs. Hence, much of vertebrate story is one of progressive improvement both to these and to sensory experience more broadly. This has two aspects: (i) anatomical and neurocircuitry innovations in the organs of special sense and the brain centres that process and store their output, and (ii) the emergence of primary consciousness, i.e. sentience. With respect to the latter, a bottom up, evolutionary perspective has a different focus from a top down human-centric one. At issue: the obstacles to the emergence of sentience in the first instance, the sequence of addition of new contents to evolving consciousness, and the homology relationship between them. A further question, and a subject for future investigation, is how subjective experience is optimized for each sensory modality. This article is part of the theme issue 'Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory'.

Sliding Scale Theory of Attention and Consciousness/Unconsciousness

Attention defined as focusing on a unit of information plays a prominent role in both consciousness and the cognitive unconscious, due to its essential role in information processing. Existing theories of consciousness invariably address the relationship between attention and conscious awareness, ranging from attention is not required to crucial. However, these theories do not adequately or even remotely consider the contribution of attention to the cognitive unconscious. A valid theory of consciousness must also be a robust theory of the cognitive unconscious, a point rarely if ever considered. Current theories also emphasize human perceptual consciousness, primarily visual, despite evidence that consciousness occurs in diverse animal species varying in cognitive capacity, and across many forms of perceptual and thought consciousness. A comprehensive and parsimonious perspective applicable to the diversity of species demonstrating consciousness and the various forms—sliding scale theory of attention and consciousness/unconsciousness—is proposed with relevant research reviewed. Consistent with the continuous organization of natural events, attention occupies a sliding scale in regards to time and space compression. Unconscious attention in the form of the “cognitive unconscious” is time and spaced diffused, whereas conscious attention is tightly time and space compressed to the present moment. Due to the special clarity derived from brief and concentrated signals, the tight time and space compression yields conscious awareness as an emergent property. The present moment enhances the time and space compression of conscious attention, and contributes to an evolutionary explanation of conscious awareness.

Recovery of consciousness and cognition after general anesthesia in humans

Understanding how the brain recovers from unconsciousness can inform neurobiological theories of consciousness and guide clinical investigation. To address this question, we conducted a multicenter study of 60 healthy humans, half of whom received general anesthesia for 3 hr and half of whom served as awake controls. We administered a battery of neurocognitive tests and recorded electroencephalography to assess cortical dynamics. We hypothesized that recovery of consciousness and cognition is an extended process, with differential recovery of cognitive functions that would commence with return of responsiveness and end with return of executive function, mediated by prefrontal cortex. We found that, just prior to the recovery of consciousness, frontal-parietal dynamics returned to baseline. Consistent with our hypothesis, cognitive reconstitution after anesthesia evolved over time. Contrary to our hypothesis, executive function returned first. Early engagement of prefrontal cortex in recovery of consciousness and cognition is consistent with global neuronal workspace theory.

Repetitive Anodal Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Hastens Isoflurane-Induced Emergence and Recovery and Enhances Memory in Healthy Rats

BACKGROUND

Attaining a rapid and smooth return to consciousness after general anesthesia is a goal for clinical anesthesiologists. This study aimed to investigate the effects of repeated anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (atDCS) on emergence and recovery from isoflurane anesthesia in rats.

METHODS

Four days after surgery for atDCS socket implantation, rats received either sham stimulation or repetitive anodal direct electrical current of 0.2 mA intensity applied to the right motor cortex for 20 minutes/d for 10 consecutive days. Isoflurane potency and emergence and recovery from a 2-hour isoflurane challenge were evaluated 24 hours after the last atDCS session. Cognitive performance on novel object recognition and spontaneous alternation Y-maze tests were measured 48 hours after the last atDCS session. Locomotor activity was assessed via automated counting of electric infrared beam crossings.

RESULTS

Data are expressed as mean ± standard error of mean (SEM). Isoflurane potency was not affected by atDCS (sham: 1.69% ± 0.06%, transcranial direct current stimulation [tDCS]: 1.73% ± 0.11%, mean difference [MD]: 0.045, 95% confidence interval [CI]: -0.22 to 0.30; P = .72). However, the time to appearance of emergence behavioral marker (eg, return of righting reflex) was hastened in rats receiving atDCS (sham: 486 ± 31 seconds, tDCS: 330 ± 45 seconds, MD: 157, 95% CI: 30-284; P = .008). Similarly, time to acknowledgment of adhesive tape ("sticky dot" applied while anesthetized) was also decreased in atDCS-treated rats as compared to sham (sham: 1374 ± 179 seconds, tDCS: 908 ± 151 seconds, MD: 466, 95% CI: 73-858; P = .015), indicating a faster recovery of isoflurane anesthesia. Rats treated with atDCS spent more time exploring the novel object and environment when compared to sham without affecting activity cycles, indicating visual and working memory can be enhanced by atDCS.

CONCLUSIONS

Taken together, our findings suggest that atDCS over cortical areas might hasten recovery from isoflurane anesthesia and could potentially be used as a preventative strategy for disruptions in higher order functions related to sedation/anesthesia.

Disentangling perceptual awareness from nonconscious processing in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Scholars have long debated whether animals, which display impressive intelligent behaviors, are consciously aware or not. Yet, because many complex human behaviors and high-level functions can be performed without conscious awareness, it was long considered impossible to untangle whether animals are aware or just conditionally or nonconsciously behaving. Here, we developed an empirical approach to address this question. We harnessed a well-established cross-over double dissociation between nonconscious and conscious processing, in which people perform in completely opposite ways when they are aware of stimuli versus when they are not. To date, no one has explored if similar performance dissociations exist in a nonhuman species. In a series of seven experiments, we first established these signatures in humans using both known and newly developed nonverbal double-dissociation tasks and then identified similar signatures in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). These results provide robust evidence for two distinct modes of processing in nonhuman primates. This empirical approach makes it feasible to disentangle conscious visual awareness from nonconscious processing in nonhuman species; hence, it can be used to strip away ambiguity when exploring the processes governing intelligent behavior across the animal kingdom. Taken together, these results strongly support the existence of both nonconscious processing as well as functional human-like visual awareness in nonhuman animals.

Integrated information structure collapses with anesthetic loss of conscious arousal in Drosophila melanogaster

The physical basis of consciousness remains one of the most elusive concepts in current science. One influential conjecture is that consciousness is to do with some form of causality, measurable through information. The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) proposes that conscious experience, filled with rich and specific content, corresponds directly to a hierarchically organised, irreducible pattern of causal interactions; i.e. an integrated informational structure among elements of a system. Here, we tested this conjecture in a simple biological system (fruit flies), estimating the information structure of the system during wakefulness and general anesthesia. Consistent with this conjecture, we found that integrated interactions among populations of neurons during wakefulness collapsed to isolated clusters of interactions during anesthesia. We used classification analysis to quantify the accuracy of discrimination between wakeful and anesthetised states, and found that informational structures inferred conscious states with greater accuracy than a scalar summary of the structure, a measure which is generally championed as the main measure of IIT. In stark contrast to a view which assumes feedforward architecture for insect brains, especially fly visual systems, we found rich information structures, which cannot arise from purely feedforward systems, occurred across the fly brain. Further, these information structures collapsed uniformly across the brain during anesthesia. Our results speak to the potential utility of the novel concept of an “informational structure” as a measure for level of consciousness, above and beyond simple scalar values.

The physical basis of consciousness remains elusive. Efforts to measure consciousness have generally been restricted to simple, scalar quantities which summarise the complexity of a system, inspired by integrated information theory, which links a multi-dimensional, informational structure to the contents of experience in a system. Due to the complexity of the definition of the structure, assessment of its utility as a measure of conscious arousal in a system has largely been ignored. In this manuscript we evaluate the utility of such an information structure in measuring the level of arousal in the fruit fly. Our results indicate that this structure can be more informative about the level of arousal in a system than even the single-value summary proposed by the theory itself. These results may push consciousness research towards the notion of multi-dimensional informational structures, instead of traditional scalar summaries.

Understanding the Effects of Anesthesia on Cortical Electrophysiological Recordings: A Scoping Review

General anesthesia in animal experiments is an ethical must and is required for all the procedures that are likely to cause more than slight or momentary pain. As anesthetics are known to deeply affect experimental findings, including electrophysiological recordings of brain activity, understanding their mechanism of action is of paramount importance. It is widely recognized that the depth and type of anesthesia introduce significant bias in electrophysiological measurements by affecting the shape of both spontaneous and evoked signals, e.g., modifying their latency and relative amplitude. Therefore, for a given experimental protocol, it is relevant to identify the appropriate anesthetic, to minimize the impact on neuronal circuits and related signals under investigation. This review focuses on the effect of different anesthetics on cortical electrical recordings, examining their molecular mechanisms of action, their influence on neuronal microcircuits and, consequently, their impact on cortical measurements.

The Biology of General Anesthesia from Paramecium to Primate

General anesthesia serves a critically important function in the clinical care of human patients. However, the anesthetized state has foundational implications for biology because anesthetic drugs are effective in organisms ranging from paramecia, to plants, to primates. Although unconsciousness is typically considered the cardinal feature of general anesthesia, this endpoint is only strictly applicable to a select subset of organisms that are susceptible to being anesthetized. We review the behavioral endpoints of general anesthetics across species and propose the isolation of an organism from its environment - both in terms of the afferent arm of sensation and the efferent arm of action - as a generalizable definition. We also consider the various targets and putative mechanisms of general anesthetics across biology and identify key substrates that are conserved, including cytoskeletal elements, ion channels, mitochondria, and functionally coupled electrical or neural activity. We conclude with a unifying framework related to network function and suggest that general anesthetics - from single cells to complex brains - create inefficiency and enhance modularity, leading to the dissociation of functions both within an organism and between the organism and its surroundings. Collectively, we demonstrate that general anesthesia is not restricted to the domain of modern medicine but has broad biological relevance with wide-ranging implications for a diverse array of species.

The (Un)Conscious Mouse as a Model for Human Brain Functions: Key Principles of Anesthesia and Their Impact on Translational Neuroimaging

In recent years, technical and procedural advances have brought functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to the field of murine neuroscience. Due to its unique capacity to measure functional activity non-invasively, across the entire brain, fMRI allows for the direct comparison of large-scale murine and human brain functions. This opens an avenue for bidirectional translational strategies to address fundamental questions ranging from neurological disorders to the nature of consciousness. The key challenges of murine fMRI are: (1) to generate and maintain functional brain states that approximate those of calm and relaxed human volunteers, while (2) preserving neurovascular coupling and physiological baseline conditions. Low-dose anesthetic protocols are commonly applied in murine functional brain studies to prevent stress and facilitate a calm and relaxed condition among animals. Yet, current mono-anesthesia has been shown to impair neural transmission and hemodynamic integrity. By linking the current state of murine electrophysiology, Ca2+ imaging and fMRI of anesthetic effects to findings from human studies, this systematic review proposes general principles to design, apply and monitor anesthetic protocols in a more sophisticated way. The further development of balanced multimodal anesthesia, combining two or more drugs with complementary modes of action helps to shape and maintain specific brain states and relevant aspects of murine physiology. Functional connectivity and its dynamic repertoire as assessed by fMRI can be used to make inferences about cortical states and provide additional information about whole-brain functional dynamics. Based on this, a simple and comprehensive functional neurosignature pattern can be determined for use in defining brain states and anesthetic depth in rest and in response to stimuli. Such a signature can be evaluated and shared between labs to indicate the brain state of a mouse during experiments, an important step toward translating findings across species.

Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

We review the central tenets and neuroanatomical basis of the global neuronal workspace (GNW) hypothesis, which attempts to account for the main scientific observations regarding the elementary mechanisms of conscious processing in the human brain. The GNW hypothesis proposes that, in the conscious state, a non-linear network ignition associated with recurrent processing amplifies and sustains a neural representation, allowing the corresponding information to be globally accessed by local processors. We examine this hypothesis in light of recent data that contrast brain activity evoked by either conscious or non-conscious contents, as well as during conscious or non-conscious states, particularly general anesthesia. We also discuss the relationship between the intertwined concepts of conscious processing, attention, and working memory.

Self and the Brain. The Immune Metaphor

One of the fundamental questions in neuroscience is how brain activity relates to conscious experience. Even though self-consciousness is considered an emergent property of the brain network, a quantum physics-based theory assigns a momentum of consciousness to the single neuron level. In this work, we present a brain self theory from an evolutionary biological perspective by analogy with the immune self. In this scheme, perinatal reactivity to self inputs would guide the selection of neocortical neurons within the subplate, similarly to T lymphocytes in the thymus. Such self-driven neuronal selection would enable effective discrimination of external inputs and avoid harmful "autoreactive" responses. Multiple experimental and clinical evidences for this model are provided. Based on this self tenet, we outline the postulates of the so-called autophrenic diseases, to then make the case for schizophrenia, an archetypic disease with rupture of the self. Implications of this model are discussed, along with potential experimental verification.

Quantitative age-dependent differences in human brainstem myelination assessed using high-resolution magnetic resonance mapping

Previous in-vivo magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)-based studies of age-related differences in the human brainstem have focused on volumetric morphometry. These investigations have provided pivotal insights into regional brainstem atrophy but have not addressed microstructural age differences. However, growing evidence indicates the sensitivity of quantitative MRI to microstructural tissue changes in the brain. These studies have largely focused on the cerebrum, with very few MR investigations addressing age-dependent differences in the brainstem, in spite of its central role in the regulation of vital functions. Several studies indicate early brainstem alterations in a myriad of neurodegenerative diseases and dementias. The paucity of MR-focused investigations is likely due in part to the challenges imposed by the small structural scale of the brainstem itself as well as of substructures within, requiring accurate high spatial resolution imaging studies. In this work, we applied our recently developed approach to high-resolution myelin water fraction (MWF) mapping, a proxy for myelin content, to investigate myelin differences with normal aging within the brainstem. In this cross-sectional investigation, we studied a large cohort (n = 125) of cognitively unimpaired participants spanning a wide age range (21-94 years) and found a decrease in myelination with age in most brainstem regions studied, with several regions exhibiting a quadratic association between myelin and age. We believe that this study is the first investigation of MWF differences with normative aging in the adult brainstem. Further, our results provide reference MWF values.

Hierarchical control systems for the regulation of physiological homeostasis and affect: Can their interactions modulate mood and anhedonia?

Predominant concepts assert that conscious willful processes do not assert a significant influence on autonomic functions associated with physiological homeostasis (e.g., thermal regulation). The singular purpose of this review is to promote a reappraisal of concepts regarding the circumscribed role of hierarchical control systems. To effect this reappraisal, we assess the interaction between top-down and bottom-up regulatory mechanisms, specifically by highlighting the intersection between the "physiological" (specifically thermoregulatory pathways) and the "psychological" (specifically mood/anhedonia related processes). This reappraisal suggests that the physiological and psychological processes can interact in unanticipated ways, and is grounded in multiple lines of recent experimental evidence. For example, behavioral techniques that through a combination of hormesis (forced breathing, cold exposure) and meditation appear to exert unusual effects on homeostatic function (cold tolerance) and suppression of aberrant auto-immune responses. The molecular correlates of these effects (the putative release of endogenous cannabinoids and endorphins) may exert salutary effects on mood/anhedonia, even more significant than those exerted by cognitive behavioral techniques or meditation alone. By focusing on this interaction, we present a putative mechanistic model linking physiology with psychology, with particular implications for disturbances of mood/anhedonia. We suggest that volitional changes in breathing patterns can activate primary control centers for descending pain/cold stimuli in periaqueductal gray, initiating a stress-induced analgesic response mediated by endocannabinoid/endorphin release. The analgesic effects, and the feelings of euphoria generated by endocannbinoid release are prolonged via a top-down "outcome expectancy" control mechanism regulated by cortical areas. By focusing on modification strategies that principally target homeostatic function (but may also exert ancillary effects on mood), we articulate a novel framework for how hierarchical control systems for the regulation of physiological homeostasis and affect interact. This interaction may allow practitioners of focused modification strategies to assert increased control over key components of the affective system, allowing for viable treatment approaches for patients with disturbances of mood/anhedonia.

Sex effects on behavioral markers of emergence from propofol and isoflurane anesthesia in rats

Clinical studies have demonstrated sex-related differences in recovery from surgical anesthesia. This study aimed to characterize the emergence pattern following two anesthesia regimens in both sexes of rats. We considered six different markers of emergence from anesthesia: sigh, eye blinking, forelimb movement, mastication, neck extension, and recovery of the righting reflex (RORR). Spontaneous motor activity 24 h after the anesthesia induction was also examined. Our results showed that the rank order of the emergence latency after intraperitoneal propofol, PRO, exposure was forelimb movement < sigh < blink < mastication < neck extension < RORR, while after inhaled isoflurane, ISO, anesthesia the sequence was changed as sigh < blink < mastication < forelimb movement < neck extension < RORR in both male and female rats. Moreover, the latency to emergence after PRO in female rats was significantly higher than male rats, although following ISO there was no difference between the sexes (P < 0.001; P > 0.05, respectively). Open-field testing revealed no difference in PRO and ISO spontaneous locomotor activity due to drug administration (P > 0.05). These two anesthetics presented different emergence sequences. Although clinical data suggests that females arouse faster than males from anesthesia with propofol, our intraperitoneal technique in a rodent model had the opposite effect. Pharmacokinetic analysis demonstrated increased absorption of injected propofol for the female rats in our study, emphasizing the role of sexual dimorphism in drug distribution in rodents. Despite these pharmacokinetic differences, the pharmacodynamic effects of the drugs were remarkably consistent among both sexes through emergence.

Origin and evolution of human consciousness

The study of the origin and evolution of consciousness presents several problems. The first problem concerns terminology. The word consciousness comes from the Latin term conscĭentĭa that means "knowledge shared with others." However, the term consciousness also refers to several other aspects involving both its levels (sleep, coma, dreams and waking state) and contents (subjective, phenomenal and objective). A second issue is the problem of other minds, namely, the possibility to establish whether others have minds very like our own. Moreover, human consciousness has been linked to three different forms of memory: procedural/implicit, semantic and episodic. All these different aspects of consciousness will be discussed in the first part of the chapter. In the second part, we discuss different neuroscientific theories on consciousness and examine how research from developmental psychology, clinical neurology (epilepsy, coma, vegetative state and minimal state of consciousness), neuropsychology (blindsight, agnosia, neglect, split-brain and ocular rivalry), and comparative neuropsychophysiology contribute to the study of consciousness. Finally, in the last part of the chapter we discuss the distinctive features of human consciousness and in particular the ability to travel mentally through time, the phenomenon of joint intentionality, theory of mind and language.

Sentience and Consciousness in Single Cells: How the First Minds Emerged in Unicellular Species

A reductionistic, bottom-up, cellular-based concept of the origins of sentience and consciousness has been put forward. Because all life is based on cells, any evolutionary theory of the emergence of sentience and consciousness must be grounded in mechanisms that take place in prokaryotes, the simplest unicellular species. It has been posited that subjective awareness is a fundamental property of cellular life. It emerges as an inherent feature of, and contemporaneously with, the very first life-forms. All other varieties of mentation are the result of evolutionary mechanisms based on this singular event. Therefore, all forms of sentience and consciousness evolve from this original instantiation in prokaryotes. It has also been identified that three cellular structures and mechanisms that likely play critical roles here are excitable membranes, oscillating cytoskeletal polymers, and structurally flexible proteins. Finally, basic biophysical principles are proposed to guide those processes that underly the emergence of supracellular sentience from cellular sentience in multicellular organisms.

Anaesthetics stop diverse plant organ movements, affect endocytic vesicle recycling and ROS homeostasis, and block action potentials in Venus flytraps

Background and Aims

Anaesthesia for medical purposes was introduced in the 19th century. However, the physiological mode of anaesthetic drug actions on the nervous system remains unclear. One of the remaining questions is how these different compounds, with no structural similarities and even chemically inert elements such as the noble gas xenon, act as anaesthetic agents inducing loss of consciousness. The main goal here was to determine if anaesthetics affect the same or similar processes in plants as in animals and humans.

Methods

A single-lens reflex camera was used to follow organ movements in plants before, during and after recovery from exposure to diverse anaesthetics. Confocal microscopy was used to analyse endocytic vesicle trafficking. Electrical signals were recorded using a surface AgCl electrode.

Key Results

Mimosa leaves, pea tendrils, Venus flytraps and sundew traps all lost both their autonomous and touch-induced movements after exposure to anaesthetics. In Venus flytrap, this was shown to be due to the loss of action potentials under diethyl ether anaesthesia. The same concentration of diethyl ether immobilized pea tendrils. Anaesthetics also impeded seed germination and chlorophyll accumulation in cress seedlings. Endocytic vesicle recycling and reactive oxygen species (ROS) balance, as observed in intact Arabidopsis root apex cells, were also affected by all anaesthetics tested.

Conclusions

Plants are sensitive to several anaesthetics that have no structural similarities. As in animals and humans, anaesthetics used at appropriate concentrations block action potentials and immobilize organs via effects on action potentials, endocytic vesicle recycling and ROS homeostasis. Plants emerge as ideal model objects to study general questions related to anaesthesia, as well as to serve as a suitable test system for human anaesthesia.

Faster emergence behavior from ketamine/xylazine anesthesia with atipamezole versus yohimbine

Recent interest in reversal of the hypnotic effects of anesthesia has mainly focused on overcoming a surge in GABA-mediated inhibitory signaling through activation of subcortical arousal circuits or antagonizing GABA receptors. Here we examine the reversal of anesthesia produced from non-GABA agents ketamine/xylazine and the effects of antagonists of adrenoreceptors. These antagonists vary in selectivity and produce temporally unique waking behavior post-anesthesia. We compared two antagonists with differential selectivity for α₁- vs. α₂-receptors, yohimbine (YOH, 1:40 selectivity) and atipamezole (ATI, 1:8500). Adult mice received intraperitoneal injections of either YOH (4.3 mg/kg), ATI (0.4 mg/kg), or saline after achieving sustained loss of righting following injection of ketamine/xylazine (ketamine: 65.0 mg/kg; xylazine: 9.9 mg/kg). Behaviors indicative of the post-anesthesia, re-animation sequence were carefully monitored and the timing of each behavior relative to anesthesia induction was compared. Both YOH and ATI hastened behaviors indicative of emergence, but ATI was faster than YOH to produce certain behaviors, including whisker movement (YOH: 21.9±1.5 min, ATI: 17.5±0.5 min, p = 0.004) and return of righting reflex (RORR) (YOH: 40.6±8.8 min, ATI: 26.0±1.2 min, p<0.001). Interestingly, although YOH administration hastened early behavioral markers of emergence relative to saline (whisking), the completion of the emergence sequence (time from first marker to appearance of RORR) was delayed with YOH. We attribute this effect to antagonism of α₁ receptors by yohimbine. Also notable was the failure of either antagonist to hasten the re-establishment of coordinated motor behavior (e.g., attempts to remove adhesive tape on the forepaw placed during anesthesia) relative to the end of emergence (RORR). In total, our work suggests that in addition to pharmacokinetic effects, re-establishment of normal waking behaviors after anesthesia involves neuronal circuits dependent on time and/or activity.

Biological evolution as defense of 'self'

Although the origin of self-referential consciousness is unknown, it can be argued that the instantiation of self-reference was the commencement of the living state as phenomenal experientiality. As self-referential cognition is demonstrated by all living organisms, life can be equated with the sustenance of cellular homeostasis in the continuous defense of 'self'. It is proposed that the epicenter of 'self' is perpetually embodied within the basic cellular form in which it was instantiated. Cognition-Based Evolution argues that all of biological and evolutionary development represents the perpetual autopoietic defense of self-referential basal cellular states of homeostatic preference. The means by which these states are attained and maintained is through self-referential measurement of information and its communication. The multicellular forms, either as biofilms or holobionts, represent the cellular attempt to achieve maximum states of informational distinction and energy efficiency through individual and collective means. In this frame, consciousness, self-consciousness and intelligence can be identified as forms of collective cellular phenotype directed towards the defense of fundamental cellular self-reference.

Senomic view of the cell: Senome versus Genome

In the legacy of Thomas Henry Huxley, and his 'epigenetic' philosophy of biology, cells are proposed to represent a trinity of three memory-storing media: Senome, Epigenome, and Genome that together comprise a cell-wide informational architecture. Our current preferential focus on the Genome needs to be complemented by a similar focus on the Epigenome and a here proposed Senome, representing the sum of all the sensory experiences of the cognitive cell and its sensing apparatus. Only then will biology be in a position to embrace the whole complexity of the eukaryotic cell, understanding its true nature which allows the communicative assembly of cells in the form of sentient multicellular organisms.

Reconceptualizing delirium as a disorder of complex system failure

Delirium is conceptually elusive and falls outside of conventional biomedical models. Positivist theoretical paradigms of single linear causality are therefore insufficient to provide mechanistic enlightenment. Delirium does, however, share parallels with features of failure within a complex system. Lessons from complex system theory provide important potential healthcare dividends with respect to delirium. The brain is complex and exhibits emergence, a feature of consciousness, which is crucially impacted in delirium. Volatility, non-linear relationships and multiple point failures are cardinal features of complex system failure, thence delirium. An alternative emphasis away from end of chain analysis and oversimplification of cause and an attempt to avoid introduction of new forms of failure in a responsive healthcare environment are lessons from complex system theory. Insights from complex systems provide potentially important mechanistic underpinnings and new lines of research enquiry for delirium. Not least, a fuller understanding of delirium from a complex system viewpoint may help transform management and outcomes in one of the biggest challenges of acute healthcare.

Human primitive brain displays negative mitochondrial-nuclear expression correlation of respiratory genes

Oxidative phosphorylation (OXPHOS), a fundamental energy source in all human tissues, requires interactions between mitochondrial (mtDNA)- and nuclear (nDNA)-encoded protein subunits. Although such interactions are fundamental to OXPHOS, bi-genomic coregulation is poorly understood. To address this question, we analyzed ∼8500 RNA-seq experiments from 48 human body sites. Despite well-known variation in mitochondrial activity, quantity, and morphology, we found overall positive mtDNA-nDNA OXPHOS genes' co-expression across human tissues. Nevertheless, negative mtDNA-nDNA gene expression correlation was identified in the hypothalamus, basal ganglia, and amygdala (subcortical brain regions, collectively termed the "primitive" brain). Single-cell RNA-seq analysis of mouse and human brains revealed that this phenomenon is evolutionarily conserved, and both are influenced by brain cell types (involving excitatory/inhibitory neurons and nonneuronal cells) and by their spatial brain location. As the "primitive" brain is highly oxidative, we hypothesized that such negative mtDNA-nDNA co-expression likely controls for the high mtDNA transcript levels, which enforce tight OXPHOS regulation, rather than rewiring toward glycolysis. Accordingly, we found "primitive" brain-specific up-regulation of lactate dehydrogenase B (LDHB), which associates with high OXPHOS activity, at the expense of LDHA, which promotes glycolysis. Analyses of co-expression, DNase-seq, and ChIP-seq experiments revealed candidate RNA-binding proteins and CEBPB as the best regulatory candidates to explain these phenomena. Finally, cross-tissue expression analysis unearthed tissue-dependent splice variants and OXPHOS subunit paralogs and allowed revising the list of canonical OXPHOS transcripts. Taken together, our analysis provides a comprehensive view of mito-nuclear gene co-expression across human tissues and provides overall insights into the bi-genomic regulation of mitochondrial activities.

Amphioxus neurocircuits, enhanced arousal, and the origin of vertebrate consciousness

Gene expression studies have recently identified the amphioxus homolog of a domain comprising the combined caudal diencephalon plus midbrain, regions implicated in locomotory control and some forms of primary consciousness in vertebrates. The results of EM-level reconstructions of the larval brain of amphioxus, reviewed here, highlight the importance of inputs to this region for light and physical contact, both of which impinge on the same synaptic zone. The neural circuitry provides a starting point for understanding the organization and evolution of locomotory control and arousal in vertebrates, and implies that one of the tasks of midbrain-based consciousness, as it first emerged in vertebrates, would have been to distinguish between light and physical contact, probably sharp pain in the latter case, by assigning different qualia to each. If so, investigating midbrain circuitry more fully could lead to a better understanding of the neural basis of some forms of sensory experience.

High-energy brain dynamics during anesthesia-induced unconsciousness

Characterizing anesthesia-induced alterations to brain network dynamics provides a powerful framework to understand the neural mechanisms of unconsciousness. To this end, increased attention has been directed at how anesthetic drugs alter the functional connectivity between brain regions as defined through neuroimaging. However, the effects of anesthesia on temporal dynamics at functional network scales is less well understood. Here, we examine such dynamics in view of the free-energy principle, which postulates that brain dynamics tend to promote lower energy (more organized) states. We specifically engaged the hypothesis that such low-energy states play an important role in maintaining conscious awareness. To investigate this hypothesis, we analyzed resting-state BOLD fMRI data from human volunteers during wakefulness and under sevoflurane general anesthesia. Our approach, which extends an idea previously used in the characterization of neuron-scale populations, involves thresholding the BOLD time series and using a normalized Hamiltonian energy function derived from the Ising model. Our major finding is that the brain spends significantly more time in lower energy states during eyes-closed wakefulness than during general anesthesia. This effect is especially pronounced in networks thought to be critical for maintaining awareness, suggesting a crucial cognitive role for both the structure and the dynamical landscape of these networks.

We show that activity in the human brain, as captured by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), is more organized during wakefulness than during general anesthesia. This increased organization corresponds to a decrease in a statistical-physics-inspired energy measure among brain regions of shared functional specialization (resting-state networks) that have putative roles in conscious awareness and attention. Characterizing the energy distributions in this way reveals significant changes in the dynamics of brain activity in different states of consciousness, insights that are not observable in the average functional connectivity data alone. Our results indicate that the ability of brain networks to sustain stable representations, via their dynamics, may be crucial for consciousness and cognition.

From cholesterol to consciousness

The nature of consciousness has been debated for centuries. It can be understood as part and parcel of the natural progression of life from unicellular to multicellular, calcium fluxes mediating communication within and between cells. Consciousness is the vertical integration of calcium fluxes, mediated by the Target of Rapamycin gene integrated with the cytoskeleton. The premise of this paper is that there is a fundamental physiologic integration of the organism with the environment that constitutes consciousness.

Global reduction of information exchange during anesthetic-induced unconsciousness

During anesthetic-induced unconsciousness (AIU), the brain undergoes a dramatic change in its capacity to exchange information between regions. However, the spatial distribution of information exchange loss/gain across the entire brain remains elusive. In the present study, we acquired and analyzed resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rsfMRI) data in rats during wakefulness and graded levels of consciousness induced by incrementally increasing the concentration of isoflurane. We found that, regardless of spatial scale, the functional connectivity (FC) change (i.e., ∆FC) was proportionally dependent on the FC strength at the awake state across all connections. This dependency became stronger at higher doses of isoflurane. In addition, the relative FC change at each anesthetized condition (i.e., ∆FC normalized to the corresponding FC strength at the awake state) was exclusively negative across the whole brain, indicating a global loss of meaningful information exchange between brain regions during AIU. To further support this notion, we showed that during unconsciousness, the entropy of rsfMRI signal increased to a value comparable to random noise while the mutual information decreased appreciably. Importantly, consistent results were obtained when unconsciousness was induced by dexmedetomidine, an anesthetic agent with a distinct molecular action than isoflurane. This result indicates that the observed global reduction in information exchange may be agent invariant. Taken together, these findings provide compelling neuroimaging evidence suggesting that the brain undergoes a widespread disruption in the exchange of meaningful information during AIU and that this phenomenon may represent a common system-level neural mechanism of AIU.

The thalamus as a relay station and gatekeeper: relevance to brain disorders

Here, we provide a review of behavioural, cognitive, and neural studies of the thalamus, including its role in attention, consciousness, sleep, and motor processes. We further discuss neuropsychological and brain disorders associated with thalamus function, including Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, Korsakoff’s syndrome, and sleep disorders. Importantly, we highlight how thalamus-related processes and disorders can be explained by the role of the thalamus as a relay station.

Dynamic Connectivity Patterns in Conscious and Unconscious Brain

Brain functional connectivity undergoes dynamic changes from the awake to unconscious states. However, how the dynamics of functional connectivity patterns are linked to consciousness at the behavioral level remains elusive. In this study, we acquired resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging data during wakefulness and graded levels of consciousness in rats. Data were analyzed using a dynamic approach combining the sliding window method and k-means clustering. Our results demonstrate that whole-brain networks contained several quasi-stable patterns that dynamically recurred from the awake state into anesthetized states. Remarkably, two brain connectivity states with distinct spatial similarity to the structure of anatomical connectivity were strongly biased toward high and low consciousness levels, respectively. These results provide compelling neuroimaging evidence linking the dynamics of whole-brain functional connectivity patterns and states of consciousness at the behavioral level.