Rethinking people's conceptions of mental life

Dimensions of wisdom perception across twelve countries on five continents

Wisdom is the hallmark of social judgment, but how people across cultures recognize wisdom remains unclear-distinct philosophical traditions suggest different views of wisdom's cardinal features. We explore perception of wise minds across 16 socio-economically and culturally diverse convenience samples from 12 countries. Participants assessed wisdom exemplars, non-exemplars, and themselves on 19 socio-cognitive characteristics, subsequently rating targets' wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. Analyses reveal two positively related dimensions-Reflective Orientation and Socio-Emotional Awareness. These dimensions are consistent across the studied cultural regions and interact when informing wisdom ratings: wisest targets-as perceived by participants-score high on both dimensions, whereas the least wise are not reflective but moderately socio-emotional. Additionally, individuals view themselves as less reflective but more socio-emotionally aware than most wisdom exemplars. Our findings expand folk psychology and social judgment research beyond the Global North, showing how individuals perceive desirable cognitive and socio-emotional qualities, and contribute to an understanding of mind perception.

Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models

Technological advances raise new puzzles and challenges for cognitive science and the study of how humans think about and interact with artificial intelligence (AI). For example, the advent of large language models and their human-like linguistic abilities has raised substantial debate regarding whether or not AI could be conscious. Here, we consider the question of whether AI could have subjective experiences such as feelings and sensations ('phenomenal consciousness'). While experts from many fields have weighed in on this issue in academic and public discourse, it remains unknown whether and how the general population attributes phenomenal consciousness to AI. We surveyed a sample of US residents (n = 300) and found that a majority of participants were willing to attribute some possibility of phenomenal consciousness to large language models. These attributions were robust, as they predicted attributions of mental states typically associated with phenomenality-but also flexible, as they were sensitive to individual differences such as usage frequency. Overall, these results show how folk intuitions about AI consciousness can diverge from expert intuitions-with potential implications for the legal and ethical status of AI.

Consciousness isn't "hard"-it's human psychology that makes it so!

Consciousness arguably presents a "hard problem" for scholars. An influential position asserts that the "problem" is rooted in ontology-it arises because consciousness "is" distinct from the physical. "Problem intuitions" are routinely taken as evidence for this view. In so doing, it is assumed that (i) people do not consider consciousness as physical and (ii) their intuitions faithfully reflect what exists (or else, intuitions would not constitute evidence). New experimental results challenge both claims. First, in some scenarios, people demonstrably view consciousness as a physical affair that registers in the body (brain). Second, "problem intuitions" are linked to psychological biases, so they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is. I conclude that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological. Accordingly, its resolution requires careful characterization of the psychological mechanisms that engender "problem intuitions."

The Human Affectome

Over the last decades, theoretical perspectives in the interdisciplinary field of the affective sciences have proliferated rather than converged due to differing assumptions about what human affective phenomena are and how they work. These metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions, shaped by academic context and values, have dictated affective constructs and operationalizations. However, an assumption about the purpose of affective phenomena can guide us to a common set of metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. In this capstone paper, we home in on a nested teleological principle for human affective phenomena in order to synthesize metaphysical and mechanistic assumptions. Under this framework, human affective phenomena can collectively be considered algorithms that either adjust based on the human comfort zone (affective concerns) or monitor those adaptive processes (affective features). This teleologically-grounded framework offers a principled agenda and launchpad for both organizing existing perspectives and generating new ones. Ultimately, we hope the Human Affectome brings us a step closer to not only an integrated understanding of human affective phenomena, but an integrated field for affective research.

When does "no" mean no? Insights from sex robots

Although sexual assault is widely accepted as morally wrong, not all instances of sexual assault are evaluated in the same way. Here, we ask whether different characteristics of victims affect people's moral evaluations of sexual assault perpetrators, and if so, how. We focus on sex robots (i.e., artificially intelligent humanoid social robots designed for sexual gratification) as victims in the present studies because they serve as a clean canvas onto which we can paint different human-like attributes to probe people's moral intuitions regarding sensitive topics. Across four pre-registered experiments conducted with American adults on Prolific (N = 2104), we asked people to evaluate the wrongness of sexual assault against AI-powered robots. People's moral judgments were influenced by the victim's mental capacities (Studies 1 & 2), the victim's interpersonal function (Study 3), the victim's ontological type (Study 4), and the transactional context of the human-robot relationship (Study 4). Overall, by investigating moral reasoning about transgressions against AI robots, we were able to gain unique insights into how people's moral judgments about sexual transgressions can be influenced by victim attributes.

Self-discrepancies in mind perception for actual, ideal, and ought selves and partners

Defining and measuring self-discrepancies in mind perception between how an individual sees their actual self in comparison to their ideal or ought self has a long but challenging history in psychology. Here we present a new approach for measuring and operationalizing discrepancies of mind by employing the mind perception framework that has been applied successfully to a variety of other psychological constructs. Across two studies (N = 265, N = 205), participants were recruited online to fill in a modified version of the mind perception survey with questions pertaining to three domains (actual, ideal, ought) and two agents (self versus partner). The results revealed that participants idealized and thought they ought to have greater agency (the ability to do) and diminished experience (the ability to feel) for both themselves and their partner. Sex differences were also examined across both studies, and while minor differences emerged, the effects were not robust across the collective evidence from both studies. The overall findings suggest that the mind perception approach can be used to distill a large number of qualities of mind into meaningful facets for interpretation in relation to self-discrepancy theory. This method can breathe new life into the field with future investigations directed at understanding self-discrepancies in relation to prosocial behaviour and psychological well-being.

Aesthetic Motivation Impacts Judgments of Others' Prosociality and Mental Life

The ability to infer others' prosocial vs. antisocial behavioral tendencies from minimal information is core to social reasoning. Aesthetic motivation (the value or appreciation of aesthetic beauty) is linked with prosocial tendencies, raising the question of whether this factor is used in interpersonal reasoning and in the attribution of mental capacities. We propose and test a model of this reasoning, predicting that evidence of others' aesthetic motivations should impact judgments of others' prosocial (and antisocial) tendencies by signaling a heightened capacity for emotional experience. In a series of four pre-registered experiments (total N = 1440), participants saw pairs of characters (as photos/vignettes), and judged which in each pair showed more of a mental capacity of interest. Distractor items prevented participants from guessing the hypothesis. For one critical pair of characters, both characters performed the same activity (music listening, painting, cooking, exercising, being in nature, doing math), but one was motivated by the activities' aesthetic value, and the other by its functional value. Across all activities, participants robustly chose aesthetically-motivated characters as more likely to behave compassionately (Exp. 1; 3), less likely to behave selfishly/manipulatively (Exp. 1; 3), and as more emotionally sensitive, but not more intelligent (Exp. 2; 3; 4). Emotional sensitivity best predicted compassionate behavior judgements (Exp. 3). Aesthetically-motivated characters were not reliably chosen as more helpful; intelligence best predicted helpfulness judgements (Exp. 4). Evidence of aesthetic motivation conveys important social information about others, impacting fundamental interpersonal judgments about others' mental life and social behavior.

Young infants' expectations about a self-propelled agent's body

What intuitive biological understandings do infants have? Recent work reports that 8-month-olds seem to identify self-propelled agents as animals and expect them to have a closed body. The present study examined a group of 6.5-month-old infants' (N = 50, 52% female, 84% White) biological expectations. The infants seemed to grasp the causal link between a novel self-propelled box agent's functioning and its body because they expected a temporary operation (i.e., an experimenter opening the box, exposing its insides, and closing it) to impair its ability to move. Further, infants accepted what was shown inside the box during the operation; whether it had an internal cuboid did not affect the results. Together, this suggests that infants at this young age appear to recognize the importance of having an intact body to a novel self-propelled agent's mobility but have no specific knowledge about what should be inside such an entity. These findings thus shed new light on the developmental origins of biological understandings.

What is (and was) a person? Evidence on historical mind perceptions from natural language

An important philosophical tradition identifies persons as those entities that have minds, such that mind perception is a window into person perception. Psychological research has found that human perceptions of mind consist of at least two distinct dimensions: agency (e.g. planning, deciding) and experience (e.g. feeling, hungering). Taking this insight into the semantic space of natural language, we develop a generalizable, scalable computational-linguistics method for measuring variation in perceived agency and experience in large archives of plain-text documents. The resulting text-based rankings of entities along these dimensions correspond to human judgments of perceived agency and experience assessed in blind surveys. We then map both dimensions of mind in historical English-language corpora over the last 200 years and identify two salient trends. First, we find that while women are now described as having similar levels of agency as men, they are still described as more experience-oriented. Second, we find that domesticated animals have gained higher attributions of experience (but not agency) relative to wild animals, especially since the rise of the global animal rights movement in the 1980s.

The "Hard Problem of Consciousness" Arises from Human Psychology

Consciousness presents a "hard problem" to scholars. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. Why consciousness is "hard", however, is uncertain. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology-because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. Here, I show how the "hard problem" emerges from two intuitive biases that lie deep within human psychology: Essentialism and Dualism. To determine whether a subjective experience is transformative, people judge whether the experience pertains to one's essence, and per Essentialism, one's essence lies within one's body. Psychological states that seem embodied (e.g., "color vision" ∼ eyes) can thus give rise to transformative experience. Per intuitive Dualism, however, the mind is distinct from the body, and epistemic states (knowledge and beliefs) seem particularly ethereal. It follows that conscious perception (e.g., "seeing color") ought to seem more transformative than conscious knowledge (e.g., knowledge of how color vision works). Critically, the transformation arises precisely because the conscious perceptual experience seems readily embodied (rather than distinct from the physical body, as the ontological account suggests). In line with this proposal, five experiments show that, in laypeople's view (a) experience is transformative only when it seems anchored in the human body; (b) gaining a transformative experience effects a bodily change; and (c) the magnitude of the transformation correlates with both (i) the perceived embodiment of that experience, and (ii) with Dualist intuitions, generally. These results cannot solve the ontological question of whether consciousness is distinct from the physical. But they do suggest that the roots of the "hard problem" are partly psychological.

Do Companies Think and Feel? Mind Perception of Organizations

How do people perceive the minds of organizations? Existing work on organizational mind perception highlights two key debates: whether organizational groups are ascribed more agency than experience, and whether people are really perceiving minds in organizational groups at all. Our current paper and its data weigh in on these debates and suggest that organizations can indeed be ascribed experiential minds. We present a "member and goals" framework for systematically understanding the mind perception of organization. This framework suggests that people can perceive the organizational mind through its elemental building blocks: members (people who form the organization) and goals (its aims). Four studies reveal that people ascribe agency and experience to organizations based on whether the members of organizations and the goals of the organization are characterized by agency or experience. Study 1 finds that past work on mind perception often examines for-profit corporations, which consist of agentic members (corporate professionals) and agentic goals (market competition). Studies 2 and 3 reveal that when an organization with members and goals high (vs. low) in experience, people imbue its mind with perceived experience-equal to that of a person-and that even emotions low in warmth (i.e., anger) can imbue an organization with such perceptions. Study 4 shows the moral consequences of emphasizing experience: after organizational wrongdoing, experiential organizations are seen to deliver more sincere apologies and are more forgiven.

Socially intelligent machines that learn from humans and help humans learn

A hallmark of human intelligence is the ability to understand and influence other minds. Humans engage in inferential social learning (ISL) by using commonsense psychology to learn from others and help others learn. Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are raising new questions about the feasibility of human-machine interactions that support such powerful modes of social learning. Here, we envision what it means to develop socially intelligent machines that can learn, teach, and communicate in ways that are characteristic of ISL. Rather than machines that simply predict human behaviours or recapitulate superficial aspects of human sociality (e.g. smiling, imitating), we should aim to build machines that can learn from human inputs and generate outputs for humans by proactively considering human values, intentions and beliefs. While such machines can inspire next-generation AI systems that learn more effectively from humans (as learners) and even help humans acquire new knowledge (as teachers), achieving these goals will also require scientific studies of its counterpart: how humans reason about machine minds and behaviours. We close by discussing the need for closer collaborations between the AI/ML and cognitive science communities to advance a science of both natural and artificial intelligence. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Cognitive artificial intelligence'.

Précis of What Babies Know

Where does human knowledge begin? Research on human infants, children, adults, and nonhuman animals, using diverse methods from the cognitive, brain, and computational sciences, provides evidence for six early emerging, domain-specific systems of core knowledge. These automatic, unconscious systems are situated between perceptual systems and systems of explicit concepts and beliefs. They emerge early in infancy, guide children's learning, and function throughout life.

The illusion of the mind-body divide is attenuated in males

A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists-they tend to perceive the mind as ethereal, distinct from the body. Here, we ask whether Dualism emanates from within the human psyche, guided, in part, by theory of mind (ToM). Past research has shown that males are poorer mind-readers than females. If ToM begets Dualism, then males should exhibit weaker Dualism, and instead, lean towards Physicalism (i.e., they should view bodies and minds alike). Experiments 1-2 show that males indeed perceive the psyche as more embodied-as more likely to emerge in a replica of one's body, and less likely to persist in its absence (after life). Experiment 3 further shows that males are less inclined towards Empiricism-a putative byproduct of Dualism. A final analysis confirms that males' ToM scores are lower, and ToM scores further correlate with embodiment intuitions (in Experiments 1-2). These observations (from Western participants) cannot establish universality, but the association of Dualism with ToM suggests its roots are psychological. Thus, the illusory mind-body divide may arise from the very workings of the human mind.

Socially evaluative contexts facilitate mentalizing

Our ability to understand others' minds stands at the foundation of human learning, communication, cooperation, and social life more broadly. Although humans' ability to mentalize has been well-studied throughout the cognitive sciences, little attention has been paid to whether and how mentalizing differs across contexts. Classic developmental studies have examined mentalizing within minimally social contexts, in which a single agent seeks a neutral inanimate object. Such object-directed acts may be common, but they are typically consequential only to the object-seeking agent themselves. Here, we review a host of indirect evidence suggesting that contexts providing the opportunity to evaluate prospective social partners may facilitate mentalizing across development. Our article calls on cognitive scientists to study mentalizing in contexts where it counts.

Autism attenuates the perception of the mind-body divide

People are intuitive Dualists-they tacitly consider the mind as ethereal, distinct from the body. Here we ask whether Dualism emerges naturally from the conflicting core principles that guide reasoning about objects, on the one hand, and about the minds of agents (theory of mind, ToM), on the other. To address this question, we explore Dualist reasoning in autism spectrum disorder (ASD)-a congenital disorder known to compromise ToM. If Dualism arises from ToM, then ASD ought to attenuate Dualism and promote Physicalism. In line with this prediction, Experiment 1 shows that, compared to controls, people with ASD are more likely to view psychological traits as embodied-as likely to manifest in a replica of one's body. Experiment 2 demonstrates that, unlike controls, people with ASD do not consider thoughts as disembodied-as persistent in the afterlife (upon the body's demise). If ASD promotes the perception of the psyche as embodied, and if (per Essentialism) embodiment suggests innateness, then ASD should further promote Nativism-this bias is shown in Experiment 3. Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrates that, in neurotypical (NT) participants, difficulties with ToM correlate with Physicalism. These results are the first to show that ASD attenuates Dualist reasoning and to link Dualism to ToM. These conclusions suggest that the mind-body distinction might be natural for people to entertain.

Avoiding the Abject and Seeking the Script: Perceived Mind, Morality, and Trust in a Persuasive Social Robot

Social robots are being groomed for human influence, including the implicit and explicit persuasion of humans. Humanlike characteristics are understood to enhance robots’ persuasive impact; however, little is known of how perceptions of two key human capacities—mind and morality—function in robots’ persuasive potential. This experiment tests the possibility that perceived robot mind and morality will correspond with greater persuasive impact, moderated by relational trust for a moral appeal and by capacity trust for a logical appeal. Via online survey, a humanoid robot asks participants to help it learn to overcome CAPTCHA puzzles to access important online spaces—either on grounds that it is logical or moral to do so. Based on three performance indicators and one self-report indicator of compliance, analysis indicates that (a) seeing the robot as able to perceive and act on the world selectively improves compliance and (b) perceiving agentic capacity diminishes compliance, though capacity trust can moderate that reduction. For logical appeals, social-moral mental capacities promote compliance, moderated by capacity trust. Findings suggest that, in this compliance scenario, the accessibility of schemas and scripts for engaging robots as social-moral actors may be central to whether/how perceived mind, morality, and trust function in machine persuasion.

Evidence of the unidimensional structure of mind perception

The last decade has witnessed intense interest in how people perceive the minds of other entities (humans, non-human animals, and non-living objects and forces) and how this perception impacts behavior. Despite the attention paid to the topic, the psychological structure of mind perception-that is, the underlying properties that account for variance across judgements of entities-is not clear and extant reports conflict in terms of how to understand the structure. In the present research, we evaluated the psychological structure of mind perception by having participants evaluate a wide array of human, non-human animal, and non-animal entities. Using an entirely within-participants design, varied measurement approaches, and data-driven analyses, four studies demonstrated that mind perception is best conceptualized along a single dimension.

Expectations of how machines use individuating information and base-rates

Machines are increasingly used to make decisions. We investigated people’s beliefs about how they do so. In six experiments, participants (total N = 2664) predicted how computer and human judges would decide legal cases on the basis of limited evidence — either individuating information from witness testimony or base-rate information. In Experiments 1 to 4, participants predicted that computer judges would be more likely than human ones to reach a guilty verdict, regardless of which kind of evidence was available. Besides asking about punishment, Experiment 5 also included conditions where the judge had to decide whether to reward suspected helpful behavior. Participants again predicted that computer judges would be more likely than human judges to decide based on the available evidence, but also predicted that computer judges would be relatively more punitive than human ones. Also, whereas participants predicted the human judge would give more weight to individuating than base-rate evidence, they expected the computer judge to be insensitive to the distinction between these kinds of evidence. Finally, Experiment 6 replicated the finding that people expect greater sensitivity to the distinction between individuating and base-rate information from humans than computers, but found that the use of cartoon images, as in the first four studies, prevented this effect. Overall, the findings suggest people expect machines to differ from humans in how they weigh different kinds of information when deciding.

Mental State Attribution to Robots: A Systematic Review of Conceptions, Methods, and Findings

The topic of mental state attribution to robots has been approached by researchers from a variety of disciplines, including psychology, neuroscience, computer science, and philosophy. As a consequence, the empirical studies that have been conducted so far exhibit considerable diversity in terms of how the phenomenon is described and how it is approached from a theoretical and methodological standpoint. This literature review addresses the need for a shared scientific understanding of mental state attribution to robots by systematically and comprehensively collating conceptions, methods, and findings from 155 empirical studies across multiple disciplines. The findings of the review include that: (1) the terminology used to describe mental state attribution to robots is diverse but largely homogenous in usage; (2) the tendency to attribute mental states to robots is determined by factors such as the age and motivation of the human as well as the behavior, appearance, and identity of the robot; (3) there is a computer < robot < human pattern in the tendency to attribute mental states that appears to be moderated by the presence of socially interactive behavior; (4) there are conflicting findings in the empirical literature that stem from different sources of evidence, including self-report and non-verbal behavioral or neurological data. The review contributes toward more cumulative research on the topic and opens up for a transdisciplinary discussion about the nature of the phenomenon and what types of research methods are appropriate for investigation.

Caught COVID-19? Covidiot!

Abstract. Many governments’ COVID-19 prevention messages highlighted individual accountability and the stigmatization of individuals who violate lockdown rules. The present study examined French people’s ( N = 567) attributions of humanness to and willingness to punish (i.e., whether the target deserved medical care, helping intentions toward the target) an individual who respected versus violated the rules of the country’s first (March to May) versus second (November to December) lockdowns. Participants attributed less humanness to and were more willing to punish the deviant target than the compliant target. These effects were stronger during the first lockdown than during the second lockdown. Perceived threat of COVID-19 to the national ingroup moderated these effects, and attributions of humanness mediated willingness to punish the target.

Who Wants to Grant Robots Rights?

The robot rights debate has thus far proceeded without any reliable data concerning the public opinion about robots and the rights they should have. We have administered an online survey (n = 439) that investigates layman's attitudes toward granting particular rights to robots. Furthermore, we have asked them the reasons for their willingness to grant them those rights. Finally, we have administered general perceptions of robots regarding appearance, capacities, and traits. Results show that rights can be divided in sociopolitical and robot dimensions. Reasons can be distinguished along cognition and compassion dimensions. People generally have a positive view about robot interaction capacities. We found that people are more willing to grant basic robot rights such as access to energy and the right to update to robots than sociopolitical rights such as voting rights and the right to own property. Attitudes toward granting rights to robots depend on the cognitive and affective capacities people believe robots possess or will possess in the future. Our results suggest that the robot rights debate stands to benefit greatly from a common understanding of the capacity potentials of future robots.

A growth mindset about human minds promotes positive responses to intelligent technology

Perceiving minds in technology agents, for example, robots designed with artificial intelligence (AI), is common and crucial in modern life. However, past studies have revealed that robots with a high level of minds elicit polarized responses. From a human-robot interaction perspective, we proposed that people' responses to robots, in part, originate from differences between fixed and growth mindsets about human minds-the beliefs regarding whether humans' mental capacities are fixed or incremental. We conducted five studies to test this assumption. A growth mindset about human minds was associated with or led to lower levels of negative feelings about robots (Study 1), more perceptions of robots as allies versus enemies (Study 2), more support for robotic research (Studies 3 and 4), and greater willingness to interact with robots (Study 5). Furthermore, the effect of a growth mindset about human minds on favorable responses to robots was more pronounced when robots were perceived as having high (versus low) levels of minds (Studies 3-5) and mediated by decreased concerns about robots (Study 5). By emphasizing the nuanced role of mindset beliefs about human minds in responses to intelligent technology, this research provides not only a new perspective on research into minds but also important implications for human-technology relationships.

Advancing the RDoC initiative through the assessment of caregiver social processes

The relationships infants and young children have with their caregivers are fundamental to their survival and well-being. Theorists and researchers across disciplines have attempted to describe and assess the variation in these relationships, leading to a general acceptance that caregiving is critical to understanding child functioning, including developmental psychopathology. At the same time, we lack consensus on how to assess these fundamental relationships. In the present paper, we first review research documenting the importance of the caregiver-child relationship in understanding environmental risk for psychopathology. Second, we propose that the National Institute of Mental Health's Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative provides a useful framework for extending the study of children's risk for psychopathology by assessing their caregivers' social processes. Third, we describe the units of analysis for caregiver social processes, documenting how the specific subconstructs in the domain of social processes are relevant to the goal of enhancing knowledge of developmental psychopathology. Lastly, we highlight how past research can inform new directions in the study of caregiving and the parent-child relationship through this innovative extension of the RDoC initiative.

Constrained Choice: Children's and Adults' Attribution of Choice to a Humanoid Robot

Young children, like adults, understand that human agents can flexibly choose different actions in different contexts, and they evaluate these agents based on such choices. However, little is known about children's tendencies to attribute the capacity to choose to robots, despite increased contact with robotic agents. In this paper, we compare 5- to 7-year-old children's and adults' attributions of free choice to a robot and to a human child by using a series of tasks measuring agency attribution, action prediction, and choice attribution. In morally neutral scenarios, children ascribed similar levels of free choice to the robot and the human, while adults were more likely to ascribe free choice to the human. For morally relevant scenarios, however, both age groups considered the robot's actions to be more constrained than the human's actions. These findings demonstrate that children and adults hold a nuanced understanding of free choice that is sensitive to both the agent type and constraints within a given scenario.

Similarities and differences in concepts of mental life among adults and children in five cultures

How do concepts of mental life vary across cultures? By asking simple questions about humans, animals and other entities - for example, 'Do beetles get hungry? Remember things? Feel love?' - we reconstructed concepts of mental life from the bottom up among adults (N = 711) and children (ages 6-12 years, N = 693) in the USA, Ghana, Thailand, China and Vanuatu. This revealed a cross-cultural and developmental continuity: in all sites, among both adults and children, cognitive abilities travelled separately from bodily sensations, suggesting that a mind-body distinction is common across diverse cultures and present by middle childhood. Yet there were substantial cultural and developmental differences in the status of social-emotional abilities - as part of the body, part of the mind or a third category unto themselves. Such differences may have far-reaching social consequences, whereas the similarities identify aspects of human understanding that may be universal.

Considering Victims' Minds in the Evaluation of Harmful Agents' Moral Standing

An agent's moral standing is considered as depending on the agent's mind and their harmfulness toward a victim, but a victim's mind and species may also matter. To examine whether a victim's species (i.e., human or another) and a victim's mind are considered in the judgment of a harmful agent's moral standing, the present study modulated the mental capacities of an imaginary species. Only humans' suffering was considered when the other species' mental capacities were presumed to be low (Study 1), but humans' and the other species' suffering were equally considered when the other species had mental capacities that were presumed to be equivalent to those of humans (Study 2). The results suggest that our judgments of the moral standing of an agent 1) depend not only on the agent's mind but also on the victim's mind and 2) are not human species-oriented but human mind-oriented.

Gender Categories as Dual-Character Concepts?

Seminal work by Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) distinguished a set of concepts, which they named "dual-character concepts." Unlike traditional concepts, they require two distinct criteria for determining category membership. For example, the prototypical dual-character concept "artist" has both a concrete dimension of artistic skills, and an abstract dimension of aesthetic sensibility and values. Therefore, someone can be a good artist on the concrete dimension but not truly an artist on the abstract dimension. Does this analysis capture people's understanding of cornerstone social categories, such as gender, around which society and everyday life have traditionally been organized? Gender, too, may be conceived as having not only a concrete dimension but also a distinct dimension of abstract norms and values. As with dual-character concepts, violations of abstract norms and values may result in someone being judged as not truly a man/woman. Here, we provide the first empirical assessment of applying the dual-character framework to people's conception of gender. We found that, on some measures that primarily relied on metalinguistic cues, gender concepts did indeed resemble dual-character concepts. However, on other measures that depicted transgressions of traditional gender norms, neither "man" nor "woman" appeared dual-character-like, in that participants did not disqualify people from being truly a man or truly a woman. In a series of follow-up studies, we examined whether moral norms have come to replace gender role norms for the abstract dimension. Implications for the evolution of concepts and categories are explored.

Tree-Huggers Versus Human-Lovers: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization Predict Valuing Nature Over Outgroups

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade-offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals ("tree-huggers") would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others ("human-lovers") would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero-sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree-huggers and human-lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree-huggers and human-lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one-third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree-huggers and human-lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree-huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members-thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds.

Aging bodies, aging emotions: Interoceptive differences in emotion representations and self-reports across adulthood

Bodily sensations are closely linked to emotional experiences. However, most research assessing the body-emotion link focuses on young adult samples. Inspired by prior work showing age-related declines in autonomic reactivity and interoception, we present 2 studies investigating age-related differences in the extent to which adults (18-75 years) associate interoceptive or internal bodily sensations with emotions. Study 1 (N = 150) used a property association task to assess age effects on adults' tendencies to associate interoceptive sensations, relative to behaviors or situations, with negative emotion categories (e.g., anger, sadness). Study 2 (N = 200) used the Day Reconstruction experience sampling method to assess the effect of age on adults' tendencies to report interoceptive sensations and emotional experiences in daily life. Consistent with prior literature suggesting that older adults have more muted physiological responses and interoceptive abilities than younger adults, we found that older adults' mental representations (Study 1) and self-reported experiences (Study 2) of emotion are less associated with interoceptive sensations than are those of younger adults. Across both studies, age effects were most prominent for high arousal emotions (e.g., anger, fear) and sensations (e.g., racing heart) that are often associated with peripheral psychophysiological concomitants in young adults. These findings are consistent with psychological constructionist models and a "maturational dualism" account of emotional aging, suggesting additional pathways by which emotions may differ across adulthood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Repetitive Robot Behavior Impacts Perception of Intentionality and Gaze-Related Attentional Orienting

Gaze behavior is an important social signal between humans as it communicates locations of interest. People typically orient their attention to where others look as this informs about others' intentions and future actions. Studies have shown that humans can engage in similar gaze behavior with robots but presumably more so when they adopt the intentional stance toward them (i.e., believing robot behaviors are intentional). In laboratory settings, the phenomenon of attending toward the direction of others' gaze has been examined with the use of the gaze-cueing paradigm. While the gaze-cueing paradigm has been successful in investigating the relationship between adopting the intentional stance toward robots and attention orienting to gaze cues, it is unclear if the repetitiveness of the gaze-cueing paradigm influences adopting the intentional stance. Here, we examined if the duration of exposure to repetitive robot gaze behavior in a gaze-cueing task has a negative impact on subjective attribution of intentionality. Participants performed a short, medium, or long face-to-face gaze-cueing paradigm with an embodied robot while subjective ratings were collected pre and post the interaction. Results show that participants in the long exposure condition had the smallest change in their intention attribution scores, if any, while those in the short exposure condition had a positive change in their intention attribution, indicating that participants attributed more intention to the robot after short interactions. The results also show that attention orienting to robot gaze-cues was positively related to how much intention was attributed to the robot, but this relationship became more negative as the length of exposure increased. In contrast to subjective ratings, the gaze-cueing effects (GCEs) increased as a function of the duration of exposure to repetitive behavior. The data suggest a tradeoff between the desired number of trials needed for observing various mechanisms of social cognition, such as GCEs, and the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance toward a robot.

Which Visual Modality Is Important When Judging the Naturalness of the Agent (Artificial Versus Human Intelligence) Providing Recommendations in the Symbolic Consumption Context?

This study aimed to explore how the type and visual modality of a recommendation agent’s identity affect male university students’ (1) self-reported responses to agent-recommended symbolic brand in evaluating the naturalness of virtual agents, human, or artificial intelligence (AI) and (2) early event-related potential (ERP) responses between text- and face-specific scalp locations. Twenty-seven participants (M = 25.26, SD = 5.35) whose consumption was more motivated by symbolic needs (vs. functional) were instructed to perform a visual task to evaluate the naturalness of the target stimuli. As hypothesized, the subjective evaluation showed that they had lower attitudes and perceived higher unnaturalness when the symbolic brand was recommended by AI (vs. human). Based on this self-report, two epochs were segmented for the ERP analysis: human-natural and AI-unnatural. As revealed by P100 amplitude modulation on visual modality of two agents, their evaluation relied more on face image rather than text. Furthermore, this tendency was consistently observed in that of N170 amplitude when the agent identity was defined as human. However, when the agent identity was defined as AI, reversed N170 modulation was observed, indicating that participants referred more to textual information than graphical information to assess the naturalness of the agent.

The Minds of God(s) and Humans: Differences in Mind Perception in Fiji and North America

Previous research suggests that how people conceive of minds depends on the culture in which they live, both in determining how they interact with other human minds and how they infer the unseen minds of gods. We use exploratory factor analysis to compare how people from different societies with distinct models of human minds and different religious traditions perceive the minds of humans and gods. In two North American samples (American adults, N = 186; Canadian students, N = 202), we replicated a previously found two-factor agency/experience structure for both human and divine minds, but in Fijian samples (Indigenous iTaukei Fijians, N = 77; Fijians of Indian descent, N = 214; total N = 679) we found a three-factor structure, with the additional containing items related to social relationships. Further, Fijians' responses revealed a different three-factor structure for human minds and gods' minds. We used these factors as dimensions in the conception of minds to predict (a) expectations about human and divine tendencies towards punishment and reward; and (b) conception of gods as more embodied (an extension of experience) or more able to know people's thoughts (an extension of agency). We found variation in how these factors predict conceptions of agents across groups, indicating further theory is needed to explain how culturally generated concepts of mind lead to other sorts of social inferences. We conclude that mind perception is shaped by culturally defined social expectations and recommend further work in different cultural contexts to examine the interplay between culture and social cognition.

Trait knowledge forms a common structure across social cognition

Researchers have noted the resemblance across core models of social cognition, in which trait inferences centre on others' intentions and abilities (for example, warmth, competence). Current views posit that this common 'trait space' originates from the adaptive utility of the dimensions, predicting a relatively fixed and universal architecture. In contrast, we hypothesize that perceivers learn conceptual knowledge of how traits correlate, which shapes trait inferences similarly across domains (for example, faces, person knowledge, stereotypes), from which a common trait space emerges. Here we show substantial overlap between the structures of perceivers' conceptual and social perceptual trait spaces, across perceptual domains (studies 1-4) and that conceptual associations directly shape trait space (study 5). Furthermore, we find evidence that conceptual trait space is learned from social perception and actual personality structure (studies 6 and 7). Our findings suggest conceptual trait associations serve as a cornerstone in social perception, providing broad implications for the study of social behaviour.

Stereotypes, emotions, and behaviors associated with animals: A causal test of the stereotype content model and BIAS map

Using the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) and the behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) map (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007), two experiments tested the effect of animal stereotypes on emotions and behavioral tendencies toward animals. As a novel approach, Study 1 ( N = 165) manipulated warmth and competence traits of a fictitious animal species (“wallons”) and tested their effect on emotions and behaviors toward those animals. Stereotypical warm-competent and cold-incompetent “wallons” elicited fondness/delight and contempt/disgust, respectively. Cold-competent “wallons” primarily elicited threat but not awe. Warm-incompetent “wallons” were elusive targets, not eliciting specific emotions. The warmth dimension determined active behaviors, promoting facilitation (support/help) and reducing harm (kill/trap). The competence dimension determined passive behaviors, eliciting facilitation (conserve/monitor) and reducing harm (ignore/let them die off). Study 2 ( N = 112) tested the relation between animal stereotypes for 25 species and realistic scenarios concerning behavioral tendencies toward animals. Similar to Study 1, stereotypically warm (vs. cold) animals matched with active scenarios, eliciting more facilitation (i.e., national health campaign) but less harm (i.e., fighting animals). Stereotypically competent (vs. incompetent) animals matched with passive scenarios, eliciting more facilitation (i.e., restricted areas) but less harm (i.e., accidental mortality). Accordingly, stereotypes limited the suitability of scenarios toward animals. Although findings are consistent with the SCM/BIAS map framework, several unpredicted results emerged. The mixed support is discussed in detail, along with the implications of an intergroup approach to animals.

Avatars in Pain: Visible Harm Enhances Mind Perception in Humans and Robots

Previous research has shown that when people read vignettes about the infliction of harm upon an entity appearing to have no more than a liminal mind, their attributions of mind to that entity increased. Currently, we investigated if the presence of a facial wound enhanced the perception of mental capacities (experience and agency) in response to images of robotic and human-like avatars, compared with unharmed avatars. The results revealed that harmed versions of both robotic and human-like avatars were imbued with mind to a higher degree, irrespective of the baseline level of mind attributed to their unharmed counterparts. Perceptions of capacity for pain mediated attributions of experience, while both pain and empathy mediated attributions of abilities linked to agency. The findings suggest that harm, even when it appears to have been inflicted unintentionally, may augment mind perception for robotic as well as for nearly human entities, at least as long as it is perceived to elicit pain.

Trust Repair Strategies with Self-Driving Vehicles: An Exploratory Study

Trust is important for any relationship, especially so with self-driving vehicles: passengers must trust these vehicles with their life. Given the criticality of maintaining passenger’s trust, yet the dearth of self-driving trust repair research relative to the growth of the self-driving industry, we conducted two studies to better understand how people view errors committed by self-driving cars, as well as what types of trust repair efforts may be viable for use by self-driving cars. Experiment 1 manipulated error type and driver types to determine whether driver type (human versus self-driving) affected how participants assessed errors. Results indicate that errors committed by both driver types are not assessed differently. Given the similarity, experiment 2 focused on self-driving cars, using a wide variety of trust repair efforts to confirm human-human research and determine which repairs were most effective at mitigating the effect of violations on trust. We confirmed the pattern of trust repairs in human-human research, and found that some apologies were more effective at repairing trust than some denials. These findings help focus future research, while providing broad guidance as to potential methods for approaching trust repair with self-driving cars.