Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test

The role of truth and bias in parents' judgments of children's science interests

Parents' judgments about their children's level of interest in different science topics may affect the science-learning opportunities they provide their children. However, little is known about how parents judge these interests. We used the truth and bias model of judgment of West and Kenny (Psychological Review [2011], Vol. 118, pp. 357-378) to examine factors that may affect parents' judgments of their children's science interests such as the truth (children's self-reported interest) and potential sources of parental bias. We also investigated whether several individual difference measures moderated the effect of truth or bias on judgments. Children (N = 139, ages 7-11 years) rated their level of interest in five science and five non-science topics. Separately, parents (N = 139) judged their children's interest in the same topics. Overall, parents accurately judged their children's science interests, but we also found evidence of some forms of bias, namely that parents generally under-estimated their children's science interests. In addition, parents' personal science attitudes were related to judgments of science interests, such that parents more favorable of science tended to rate their children's interest in science topics higher than parents with a less favorable view. We did not find evidence that individual differences among parents moderated the effect of truth or bias on judgments; however, parents were more accurate at judging the non-science interests of older children than younger children. Parents should be aware that they may be under-estimating their children's interest in science topics and that their personal attitudes about science may be influencing their judgments of their children's science interests.

Comparing experience- and description-based economic preferences across 11 countries

Recent evidence indicates that reward value encoding in humans is highly context dependent, leading to suboptimal decisions in some cases, but whether this computational constraint on valuation is a shared feature of human cognition remains unknown. Here we studied the behaviour of n = 561 individuals from 11 countries of markedly different socioeconomic and cultural makeup. Our findings show that context sensitivity was present in all 11 countries. Suboptimal decisions generated by context manipulation were not explained by risk aversion, as estimated through a separate description-based choice task (that is, lotteries) consisting of matched decision offers. Conversely, risk aversion significantly differed across countries. Overall, our findings suggest that context-dependent reward value encoding is a feature of human cognition that remains consistently present across different countries, as opposed to description-based decision-making, which is more permeable to cultural factors.

Computational Mechanisms Underlying Multi-Step Planning Deficits in Methamphetamine Use Disorder

Current theories suggest individuals with methamphetamine use disorder (iMUDs) have difficulty considering long-term outcomes in decision-making, which could contribute to risk of relapse. Aversive interoceptive states (e.g., stress, withdrawal) are also known to increase this risk. The present study analyzed computational mechanisms of planning in iMUDs, and examined the potential impact of an aversive interoceptive state induction. A group of 40 iMUDs and 49 healthy participants completed two runs of a multi-step planning task, with and without an anxiogenic breathing resistance manipulation. Computational modeling revealed that iMUDs had selective difficulty identifying the best overall plan when this required enduring negative short-term outcomes - a mechanism referred to as aversive pruning. Increases in reported craving before and after the induction also predicted greater aversive pruning in iMUDs. These results highlight a novel mechanism that could promote poor choice in recovering iMUDs and create vulnerability to relapse.

Studying and improving reasoning in humans and machines

In the present study, we investigate and compare reasoning in large language models (LLMs) and humans, using a selection of cognitive psychology tools traditionally dedicated to the study of (bounded) rationality. We presented to human participants and an array of pretrained LLMs new variants of classical cognitive experiments, and cross-compared their performances. Our results showed that most of the included models presented reasoning errors akin to those frequently ascribed to error-prone, heuristic-based human reasoning. Notwithstanding this superficial similarity, an in-depth comparison between humans and LLMs indicated important differences with human-like reasoning, with models' limitations disappearing almost entirely in more recent LLMs' releases. Moreover, we show that while it is possible to devise strategies to induce better performance, humans and machines are not equally responsive to the same prompting schemes. We conclude by discussing the epistemological implications and challenges of comparing human and machine behavior for both artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology.

Teleological reasoning bias is predicted by pupil dynamics: Evidence for the extensive integration account of bias in reasoning

Teleological reasoning is the tendency for humans to see purpose and intentionality in natural phenomena when there is none. In this study, we assess three competing theories on how bias in reasoning arises by examining performance on a teleological reasoning task while measuring pupil size and response times. We replicate that humans (N = 45) are prone to accept false teleological explanations. Further, we show that errors on the teleological reasoning task are associated with slower response times, smaller baseline pupil size, and larger pupil dilations. The results are in line with the single-process extensive integration account and directly oppose predictions from dual-processing accounts. Lastly, by modeling responses with a drift-diffusion model, we find that larger baseline pupil size is associated with lower decision threshold and higher drift rate, whereas larger pupil dilations are associated with higher decision threshold and lower drift rate. The results highlight the role of neural gain and the Locus Coeruleus-Norepinephrine system in modulating evidence integration and bias in reasoning. Thus, teleological reasoning and susceptibility to bias likely arise due to extensive processing rather than through fast and effortless processing.

Individuals with Methamphetamine Use Disorder Show Reduced Directed Exploration and Learning Rates Independent of an Aversive Interoceptive State Induction

Methamphetamine Use Disorder (MUD) is associated with substantially reduced quality of life. Yet, decisions to use persist, due in part to avoidance of anticipated withdrawal states. However, the specific cognitive mechanisms underlying this decision process, and possible modulatory effects of aversive states, remain unclear. Here, 56 individuals with MUD and 58 healthy comparisons (HCs) performed a decision task, both with and without an aversive interoceptive state induction. Computational modeling measured the tendency to test beliefs about uncertain outcomes (directed exploration) and the ability to update beliefs in response to outcomes (learning rates). Compared to HCs, those with MUD exhibited less directed exploration and slower learning rates, but these differences were not affected by aversive state induction. These results suggest novel, state-independent computational mechanisms whereby individuals with MUD may have difficulties in testing beliefs about the tolerability of abstinence and in adjusting behavior in response to consequences of continued use.

An experimental test of whether financial incentives constitute undue inducement in decision-making

Around the world, laws limit the incentives that can be paid for transactions such as human research participation, egg donation or gestational surrogacy. A key reason is concerns about 'undue inducement'-the influential but empirically untested hypothesis that incentives can cause harm by distorting individual decision-making. Here I present two experiments (n = 671 and n = 406), including one based on a highly visceral transaction (eating insects). Incentives caused biased information search-participants offered a higher incentive to comply more often sought encouragement to do so. However, I demonstrate theoretically that such behaviour does not prove that incentives have harmful effects; it is consistent with Bayesian rationality. Empirically, although a substantial minority of participants made bad decisions, incentives did not magnify them in a way that would suggest allowing a transaction but capping incentives. Under the conditions of this experiment, there was no evidence that higher incentives could undermine welfare for transactions that are permissible at low incentives.

Sex Differences in Cognitive Reflection: A Meta-Analysis

The current study presents a meta-analytic review of the differences between men and women in cognitive reflection (CR). The study also explores whether the type of CR test (i.e., numerical tests and verbal tests) moderates the relationship between CR and sex. The results showed that men score higher than women on CR, although the magnitude of these differences was small. We also found out that the type of CR test moderates the sex differences in CR, especially in the numerical tests. In addition, the results showed that the length of numerical tests (i.e., number of items) does not affect the differences between men and women in CR. Finally, the implications of these results are discussed, and future research is suggested.

Connective Comprehension in Adults: The Influence of Lexical Transparency, Frequency, and Individual Differences

The comprehension of connectives is crucial for understanding the discourse relations that make up a text. We studied connective comprehension in English to investigate whether adult comprehenders acquire the meaning and intended use of connectives to a similar extent and how connective features and individual differences impact connective comprehension. A coherence judgment study indicated that differences in how well people comprehend connectives depend on the lexical transparency but not on the frequency of the connective. Furthermore, individual variation between participants can be explained by their vocabulary size, nonverbal IQ, and cognitive reasoning style. Print exposure was not found to be relevant. These findings provide further insight into the factors that influence discourse processing and highlight the need to consider individual differences in discourse comprehension research as well as the need to examine a wider range of connectives in empirical studies of discourse markers.

Assessing the perceived effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions on SARS-Cov-2 transmission risk: an experimental study in Europe

We conduct a large (N = 6567) online experiment to measure the features of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) that citizens of six European countries perceive to lower the risk of transmission of SARS-Cov-2 the most. We collected data in Bulgaria (n = 1069), France (n = 1108), Poland (n = 1104), Italy (n = 1087), Spain (n = 1102) and Sweden (n = 1097). Based on the features of the most widely adopted public health guidelines to reduce SARS-Cov-2 transmission (mask wearing vs not, outdoor vs indoor contact, short vs 90 min meetings, few vs many people present, and physical distancing of 1 or 2 m), we conducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to estimate the public's perceived risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in scenarios that presented mutually exclusive constellations of these features. Our findings indicate that participants' perception of transmission risk was most influenced by the NPI attributes of mask-wearing and outdoor meetings and the least by NPI attributes that focus on physical distancing, meeting duration, and meeting size. Differentiating by country, gender, age, cognitive style (reflective or intuitive), and perceived freight of COVID-19 moreover allowed us to identify important differences between subgroups. Our findings highlight the importance of improving health policy communication and citizens' health literacy about the design of NPIs and the transmission risk of SARS-Cov-2 and potentially future viruses.

Rationally blind? Rationality polarizes policy support for colour blindness versus multiculturalism

Do White Americans prefer society to be 'colour-blind' by rising above racial identities, or 'multicultural' by openly discussing and considering them? We developed an ideology-rationality model to understand support for these diversity perspectives. Specifically, since people endorse a diversity perspective in line with their ideological values, we hypothesized that conservatism is related to a relative preference for colour blindness over multiculturalism. However, since colour blindness and multiculturalism are complex and multi-layered ideologies, we further hypothesized that the relationship between conservatism and a preference for colour blindness over multiculturalism is especially pronounced under higher levels of rationality. Results confirmed the hypotheses, either when rationality was operationalized within a dual process theory (Study 1, N = 496) or experimentally induced within a tripartite model of cognition (Study 2, N = 497). Higher levels of rationality guided White Americans high in conservatism towards a stronger preference for colour-blindness, but those low in conservatism towards a stronger preference for multiculturalism. These results suggest that among White Americans the endorsement of colour blindness versus multiculturalism stems from the interplay between ideological orientation and rationality and that rational considerations about racial policies may further divide rather than unify along ideological lines.

Does social rigidity predict cognitive rigidity? Profiles of socio-cognitive polarization

Recent research has proposed a relationship between rigid political ideologies and underlying 'cognitive styles'. However, there remain discrepancies in how both social and cognitive rigidity are defined and measured. Problem-solving, or the ability to generate novel ideas by exploring unusual reasoning paths and challenging rigid perspectives around us, is often used to operationalize cognitive flexibility. Thus, we hypothesized a relation between forms of social rigidity, including Socio-cognitive polarization (i.e., a factor capturing conservative political ideology, absolutism/intolerance of ambiguity, and xenophobia), bullshit receptivity (i.e., overestimating pseudo-profound statements), overclaiming (tendency to self-enhance), and cognitive rigidity (i.e., problem-solving). Our results showed differences in performance on problem-solving tasks between four latent profiles of social rigidity identified in our sample. Specifically, those low in socio-cognitive polarization, bullshit, and overclaiming (i.e., less rigid) performed the best on problem-solving. Thus, we conclude that social and cognitive rigidity may share an underlying socio-cognitive construct, wherein those who are more socially rigid are also more likely to be also cognitively rigid when processing non-social information.

Prevalence of questionable health behaviours in Serbia and their psychological roots: protocol for a nationally representative survey

INTRODUCTION

We will launch a national survey in Serbia to document the prevalence of two types of questionable health behaviours: (1) intentional non-adherence to medical recommendations and (2) use of traditional, complementary and alternative medicine practices, as well as the relation between the two. We will also investigate their psychological roots, including (a) 'distal' predictors such as HEXACO personality traits (plus Disintegration) and thinking dispositions (rational/experiential thinking and cognitive reflexivity), and (b) 'proximal' predictors under the umbrella 'irrational mindset' (set of unfounded beliefs consisting of conspiratorial thinking, superstition, magical health beliefs as well as selected cognitive biases), which have more content-wise overlap with the health behaviours.

METHODS AND ANALYSIS

In this cross-sectional study, a research agency will collect data from a nationally representative sample (n=1043; age 18-75 years; estimated start/end-June/November 2021) recruited online (approximately, 70% of the sample, aged 18-54; 11 years) and face-to-face (approximately, 30% of the sample, aged 55-75 years). Participants will complete a battery of tests assessing questionable health behaviours, basic personality traits, thinking dispositions, irrational mindset, sociopolitical beliefs, sociodemographic and health-related variables. Prevalence rates will be calculated using descriptive statistics. To explore the relation between (psychological) predictors and questionable health behaviours, we will use hierarchical regression and partial mediation models (path analysis or full SEM models).

ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION

Ethical Committees of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade (#935/1), Faculty of Special Education and Rehabilitation (#139/1) and Faculty of Media and Communications (#228) approved the protocol. Only participants who provide informed consent will participate in the study. A research report based on the study results will be submitted to peer-reviewed journals and results will be made available to stakeholders through reports on the project website https://reasonforhealth.f.bg.ac.rs/en/ and disseminated via social media.

TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER

NCT05808660.

Mindfulness-based stress reduction is linked with an improved Cognitive Reflection Test score

Initially, dual-process theories suggested that the existence of two different cognitive systems explained why many participants do not find the correct answer in many reasoning tasks. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is one such task. It contains three questions with incorrect answers (typically associated with intuition and thus system 1 which processes information automatically) and correct answers (typically associated with deliberate thinking and thus system 2 which involves the conscious processing of information). More recent theories suggest system 1 is responsible for both incorrect and correct responses, with system 2 being used to resolve the conflict between these different intuitions. Since mindfulness training improves self-regulation and cognitive flexibility, we believe it could improve CRT scores by reducing the relative weight of initial intuitions by strengthening alternative intuitions, thus increasing the probability of triggering deliberate reasoning. To test this hypothesis, we recruited 36 participants, all registered in the same Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) training. Of those 36 participants, 18 answered the CRT before the training and 18 answered it after 8 weeks of training. Results show that participants who followed MBSR training had better CRT scores than those without training. This is coherent with our hypothesis that mindfulness training could reduce the relative weight of initial intuitions and facilitate deliberate thinking.

New ways to cope with depression-study protocol for a randomized controlled mixed methods trial of bouldering psychotherapy (BPT) and mental model therapy (MMT)

BACKGROUND

Due to the growing gap between the demand and supply of therapeutic services for people suffering from depression, with this study, we are investigating the effectiveness and factors of influence of new approaches in group treatments for depression. Two previous studies have already identified bouldering psychotherapy (BPT) as an effective option. It combines psychotherapeutic interventions with action- and body-oriented bouldering exercises. Mental model therapy (MMT) is a new cognitive-behavioral approach for treating depression. It focuses on identifying cognitive distortions, biases in decision making, and false assumptions and aims to correct and replace them with useful mental models. We aim to investigate the effectiveness of the interventions compared with a control group (CG) and to assess the factors of influence in a mixed methods approach.

METHODS

The study is being conducted as a randomized controlled intervention trial. Adult participants with unipolar depression are being randomized into three groups (BPT, MMT, or CG), and the first two groups are undergoing a 10-week treatment phase. CG follows their individual standard treatment as usual. A priori power analysis revealed that about 120 people should be included to capture a moderate effect. The primary outcome of the study is depression rated with the Montgomery and Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS) before (t0), directly after (t1), and 12 months after the intervention phase (t2). Data are being collected via questionnaires, computer-assisted video interviews, and physical examinations. The primary hypotheses will be statistically analyzed by mixed model ANOVAs to compare the three groups over time. For secondary outcomes, further multivariate methods (e.g., mixed model ANOVAs and regression analyses) will be conducted. Qualitative data will be evaluated on the basis of the qualitative thematic analysis.

DISCUSSION

This study is investigating psychological and physical effects of BPT and MMT and its factors of influence on outpatients suffering from depression compared with a CG in a highly naturalistic design. The study could therefore provide insight into the modes of action of group therapy for depression and help to establish new short-term group treatments. Methodological limitations of the study might be the clinical heterogeneity of the sample and confounding effects due to simultaneous individual psychotherapy.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

ISRCTN, ISRCTN12347878. Registered 28 March 2022, https://www.isrctn.com/ISRCTN12347878 .

Intuitive thinking predicts false memory formation due to a decrease in inhibitory efficiency

False memory formation is usually studied using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM), in which individuals incorrectly remember words that were not originally presented. In this paper, we systematically investigated how two modes of thinking (analytical vs. intuitive) can influence the tendency to create false memories. The increased propensity of intuitive thinkers to generate more false memories can be explained by one or both of the following hypotheses: a decrease in the inhibition of the lure words that come to mind, or an increased reliance on the familiarity heuristic to determine if the word has been previously studied. In two studies, we conducted tests of both recognition and recall using the DRM paradigm. Our observations indicate that a decrease in inhibitory efficiency plays a larger role in false memory formation compared to the use of the familiarity heuristic.

Evaluation of misinformation among pro-Ukrainian Latvians - the role of prior attitude, analytical thinking, and emotions

In this exploratory study with a community sample (N = 115), we look at the perception of pro-Russia and pro-Ukraine misinformation, mimicking content shared by naive Facebook users, and the factors related to it among pro-Ukraine Latvians. Our results support the integrative model in the perception of misinformation-we found strong evidence of myside bias, as pro-Russia misinformation was judged to be significantly less accurate than pro-Ukraine misinformation. Analytical thinking, measured with the seven-item cognitive reflection test, was associated with lower levels of pro-Ukraine misinformation accuracy judgments and lower overall misinformation accuracy judgments; however, there was no correlation between analytical thinking and pro-Russian misinformation accuracy judgments. Pro-Ukrainian misinformation accuracy judgments were positively related to positive emotions elicited by misinformation, the level of support for Ukraine, and the participant's age. In addition, participants indicated a higher likelihood of engaging with misinformation if they came across it online, trusted the information, and if it elicited positive emotions. Thus, our findings emphasize the role of one's attitude, analytical thinking, and emotions in one's perception, evaluation, and engagement with congruent and incongruent misinformation.

Is it cognitive effort you measure? Comparing three task paradigms to the Need for Cognition scale

Measuring individual differences in cognitive effort can be elusive as effort is a function of motivation and ability. We report six studies (N = 663) investigating the relationship of Need for Cognition and working memory capacity with three cognitive effort measures: demand avoidance in the Demand Selection Task, effort discounting measured as the indifference point in the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm, and rational reasoning score with items from the heuristic and bias literature. We measured perceived mental effort with the NASA task load index. The three tasks were not correlated with each other (all r's < .1, all p's > .1). Need for Cognition was positively associated with effort discounting (r = .168, p < .001) and rational reasoning (r = .176, p < .001), but not demand avoidance (r = .085, p = .186). Working memory capacity was related to effort discounting (r = .185, p = .004). Higher perceived effort was related to poorer rational reasoning. Our data indicate that two of the tasks are related to Need for Cognition but are also influenced by a participant's working memory capacity. We discuss whether any of the tasks measure cognitive effort.

Humans versus AI: whether and why we prefer human-created compared to AI-created artwork

With the recent proliferation of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) models capable of mimicking human artworks, AI creations might soon replace products of human creativity, although skeptics argue that this outcome is unlikely. One possible reason this may be unlikely is that, independent of the physical properties of art, we place great value on the imbuement of the human experience in art. An interesting question, then, is whether and why people might prefer human-compared to AI-created artworks. To explore these questions, we manipulated the purported creator of pieces of art by randomly assigning a "Human-created" or "AI-created" label to paintings actually created by AI, and then assessed participants' judgements of the artworks across four rating criteria (Liking, Beauty, Profundity, and Worth). Study 1 found increased positive judgements for human- compared to AI-labelled art across all criteria. Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend Study 1 with additional ratings (Emotion, Story, Meaningful, Effort, and Time to create) intended to elucidate why people more-positively appraise Human-labelled artworks. The main findings from Study 1 were replicated, with narrativity (Story) and perceived effort behind artworks (Effort) moderating the label effects ("Human-created" vs. "AI-created"), but only for the sensory-level judgements (Liking, Beauty). Positive personal attitudes toward AI moderated label effects for more-communicative judgements (Profundity, Worth). These studies demonstrate that people tend to be negatively biased against AI-created artworks relative to purportedly human-created artwork, and suggest that knowledge of human engagement in the artistic process contributes positively to appraisals of art.

Thinking, fast and slow on the autism spectrum

What is already known about the topicDaniel Kahneman wrote a highly influential book titled 'thinking, fast and slow'. He proposes that people usually think in a rapid, automatic, intuitive style. When people realise their intuitive thinking may be wrong, a slower, effortful, deliberative style of thinking takes over. It has recently been proposed that thinking in autistic individuals can be characterised as usually thinking in the deliberative style (rather than the intuitive style that non-autistic people usually think in).What this paper addsAs intuitive thinking is fast and deliberative thinking is slow, this research manipulated the time available to complete a series of reasoning questions. These questions have been developed to have intuitive answers (which are incorrect) and deliberative answers (which are correct). For the first time, a fast time manipulation (you must answer quickly) and slow (you must think about your answer before responding) was undertaken with autistic individuals. Autistic participants did produce more deliberative answers than the non-autistic participants. However, both groups produced comparably more intuitive answers and less deliberative answers in the fast condition. This shows that while autistic people tend not to use their intuition, autistic people can be encouraged to use their intuition.Implications for practice, research or policyUsing rapid intuition can be useful in fast-changing contexts, such as some social situations. Future research can explore how to support autistic individuals to use their intuition when the need arises. In addition, the propensity for deliberation resulting in unbiased, correct responses reflects a strengths-based account of autism. This requires more mental effort and is less susceptible to bias and errors. This is called 'Dual Process Theory'.

Why Should We Study the Foreign Language Effect: Debiasing through Affecting Metacognition?

Debiasing is a method of improving people's decisions by reducing their reliance on salient intuitions causing them to behave suboptimally or biasedly. However, many of the known debiasing techniques have limited effectiveness or can only remedy a one-shot decision, rather than having a lasting impact. In this work, I focus on the role of metacognition in debiasing decision-making and discuss how it can be better understood through the lens of the foreign language effect. The foreign language effect suggests that using a foreign language can sometimes benefit people's decision-making without providing them with additional information or instructions regarding the task. However, we do not fully understand how the foreign language effect works and its limitations. I conclude by urging scientists to research this effect with the hope of having a lasting positive impact on society.

Numeracy, gist, literal thinking and the value of nothing in decision making

The onus on the average person is greater than ever before to make sense of large amounts of readily accessible quantitative information, but the ability and confidence to do so are frequently lacking. Many people lack practical mathematical skills that are essential for evaluating risks, probabilities and numerical outcomes such as survival rates for medical treatments, income from retirement savings plans or monetary damages in civil trials. In this Review, we integrate research on objective and subjective numeracy, focusing on cognitive and metacognitive factors that distort human perceptions and foment systematic biases in judgement and decision making. Paradoxically, an important implication of this research is that a literal focus on objective numbers and mechanical number crunching is misguided. Numbers can be a matter of life and death but a person who uses rote strategies (verbatim representations) cannot take advantage of the information contained in the numbers because 'rote' strategies are, by definition, processing without meaning. Verbatim representations (verbatim is only surface form, not meaning) treat numbers as data as opposed to information. We highlight a contrasting approach of gist extraction: organizing numbers meaningfully, interpreting them qualitatively and making meaningful inferences about them. Efforts to improve numerical cognition and its practical applications can benefit from emphasizing the qualitative meaning of numbers in context - the gist - building on the strengths of humans as intuitive mathematicians. Thus, we conclude by reviewing evidence that gist training facilitates transfer to new contexts and, because it is more durable, longer-lasting improvements in decision making.

The Psychology of COVID-19 Booster Hesitancy, Acceptance and Resistance in Australia

COVID-19 booster vaccinations have been recommended as a primary line of defence against serious illness and hospitalisation. This study identifies and characterises distinct profiles of attitudes towards vaccination, particularly the willingness to get a booster dose. A sample of 582 adults from Australia completed an online survey capturing COVID-related behaviours, beliefs and attitudes and a range of sociodemographic, psychological, political, social and cultural variables. Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) identified three subgroups: Acceptant (61%), Hesitant (30%) and Resistant (9%). Compared to the Acceptant group, the Hesitant and Resistant groups were less worried about catching COVID-19, used fewer official COVID-19 information sources, checked the news less, were lower on the agreeableness personality dimension and reported more conservatism, persecutory thinking, amoral attitudes and need for chaos. The Hesitant group also reported checking the legitimacy of information sources less, scored lower on the openness to new experiences personality dimension and were more likely than the Resistant and Acceptant groups to report regaining freedoms (e.g., travel) and work requirements or external pressures as reasons to get a booster. The Resistant group were higher on reactance, held more conspiratorial beliefs and rated their culture as being less tolerant of deviance than the Hesitant and Acceptant groups. This research can inform tailored approaches to increasing booster uptake and optimal strategies for public health messaging.

Tell Us What You Really Think: A Think Aloud Protocol Analysis of the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test

The standard interpretation of cognitive reflection tests assumes that correct responses are reflective and lured responses are unreflective. However, prior process-tracing of mathematical reflection tests has cast doubt on this interpretation. In two studies (N = 201), we deployed a validated think-aloud protocol in-person and online to test how this assumption is satisfied by the new, validated, less familiar, and non-mathematical verbal Cognitive Reflection Test (vCRT). Verbalized thoughts in both studies revealed that most (but not all) correct responses involved reflection and that most (but not all) lured responses lacked reflection. The think-aloud protocols seemed to reflect business-as-usual performance: thinking aloud did not disrupt test performance compared to a control group. These data suggest that the vCRT usually satisfies the standard interpretation of the reflection tests (albeit not without exceptions) and that the vCRT can be a good measure of the construct theorized by the two-factor explication of 'reflection' (as deliberate and conscious).

Revisiting the self-generation effect in proofreading

The self-generation effect refers to the finding that people's memory for information tends to be better when they generate it themselves. Counterintuitively, when proofreading, this effect may make it more difficult to detect mistakes in one's own writing than in others' writing. We investigated the self-generation effect and sources of individual differences in proofreading performance in two eye-tracking experiments. Experiment 1 failed to reveal a self-generation effect. Experiment 2 used a studying manipulation to induce overfamiliarity for self-generated text, revealing a weak but non-significant self-generation effect. Overall, word errors (i.e., wrong words) were detected less often than non-word errors (i.e., misspellings), and function word errors were detected less often than content word errors. Fluid intelligence predicted proofreading performance, whereas reading comprehension, working memory capacity, processing speed, and indicators of miserly cognitive processing did not. Students who made more text fixations and spent more time proofreading detected more errors.

Negative emotion can be “more negative” for those with high metacognitive abilities when problem-solving

Introduction

Metacognitive monitoring ability enables you to learn and solve problems more efficiently through appropriate strategies. At the same time, those who are high in monitoring ability are known to allocate more cognitive resources to the perception and control of negative emotions, as compared to those with low metacognitive ability. Therefore, while monitoring emotions may help reduce the negative emotion by enabling efficient control, it could also interrupt the use of an efficient strategy when problem-solving, as cognitive resources may be depleted.

Methods

To confirm this, we divided participants into groups with high and low monitoring abilities and manipulated emotions by presenting emotional videos. Subsequent to the manipulation, problem solving strategies were examined using items from the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).

Results

Results showed that those who were high in monitoring ability were shown to use more efficient problem-solving strategies than those who were lower in monitoring ability, but only in situations when positive or no emotions were manipulated. However, as hypothesized, when negative emotion was aroused, the CRT scores of high monitoring ability group were significantly lowered, decreasing to the same performance as those with low monitoring ability. We also found that metacognitive monitoring ability, when interacting with emotion, indirectly affected CRT scores, and that monitoring and control, when affected by emotion, were mediated in the process.

Discussion

These findings suggest a novel and complicated interaction between emotion and metacognition and warrant further research.

Push Outcomes Bias Perceptions of Scratch Card Games

In the domain of scratch card gambling, "pushes" refer to outcomes in which a prize is won that is equal to the cost of a scratch card game. Despite resulting in no net monetary gain, these outcomes are categorized as wins by lottery operators, effectively inflating published scratch card information (e.g., posted odds of winning). Additionally, the experience of obtaining a push shares similarities (e.g., the revealing of matching symbols) with the experience of obtaining a win and thus may be experienced similarly to wins by gamblers. Across four studies (N = 1502), we examined the impact of push outcomes on participants' perceptions of scratch card games. In Studies 1 and 2, participants reported feeling more likely to win, more excitement to play, and a stronger urge to gamble when presented with a scratch card that categorized push outcomes as wins compared to when presented a scratch card that did not categorize these outcomes as wins. In Study 3, participants experiencing a push outcome prior to a loss reported feeling more likely to win compared to those not experiencing a push outcome yet experiencing the same net monetary loss. In Study 4, push outcomes were found to elicit more excitement and a stronger urge to gamble compared to losses but less excitement and a weaker urge to gamble compared to wins. Overall, the present investigation suggests that push outcomes, a prevalent feature of scratch card games, can bias gambling-related judgments and increase the appeal of scratch card games.

Using Icon Arrays to Communicate Gambling Information Reduces the Appeal of Scratch Card Games

Past work has demonstrated that presenting statistical information in a foreground-background icon array can improve risk understanding, reduce decision-making biases, and decrease the salience of low-probability risks. In the present study, we assess whether presenting readily available gambling information within a foreground-background icon array influences individuals' gambling-related judgments (e.g., their perceived likelihood of winning a prize). Across two experiments (N = 1151), we find that using icon arrays to present gambling information reduces the appeal of scratch card games. That is, participants presented with gambling information in a foreground-background icon array, as opposed to a non-graphical numerical format, reported feeling less likely to win a prize, less excitement to play, and less urge to gamble on a scratch card game presented in a hypothetical gambling task. Overall, we conclude that presenting gambling information in an icon array format represents a simple yet promising tool for correcting gamblers' often overly-optimistic perceptions and reducing the appeal of negative expected value scratch card games.

Actively Open-Minded Thinking and Its Measurement

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is measured by items that tap the willingness to consider alternative opinions, sensitivity to evidence contradictory to current beliefs, the willingness to postpone closure, and reflective thought. AOT scales are strong predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks and of the avoidance of reasoning traps such as superstitious thinking and belief in conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, AOT is most commonly measured with questionnaires rather than performance indicators. Questionnaire contamination becomes even more of a danger as the AOT concept is expanded into new areas such as the study of fake news, misinformation, ideology, and civic attitudes. We review our 25-year history of studying the AOT concept and developing our own AOT scale. We present a 13-item scale that both is brief and accommodates many previous criticisms and refinements. We include a discussion of why AOT scales are such good predictors of performance on heuristics and biases tasks. We conclude that it is because such scales tap important processes of cognitive decoupling and decontextualization that modernity increasingly requires. We conclude by discussing the paradox that although AOT scales are potent predictors of performance on most rational thinking tasks, they do not predict the avoidance of myside thinking, even though it is virtually the quintessence of the AOT concept.

Game based assessments of cognitive ability in recruitment: Validity, fairness and test-taking experience

Gamification and machine learning are emergent technologies in recruitment, promising to improve the user experience and fairness of assessments. We test this by validating a game based assessment of cognitive ability with a machine learning based scoring algorithm optimised for validity and fairness. We use applied data from 11,574 assessment completions. The assessment has convergent validity (r = 0.5) and test-retest reliability (r = 0.68). It maintains fairness in a separate sample of 3,107 job applicants, showing that fairness-optimised machine learning can improve outcome parity issues with cognitive ability tests in recruitment settings. We show that there are no significant gender differences in test taking anxiety resulting from the games, and that anxiety does not directly predict game performance, supporting the notion that game based assessments help with test taking anxiety. Interactions between anxiety, gender and performance are explored. Feedback from 4,778 job applicants reveals a Net Promoter score of 58, indicating more applicants support than dislike the assessment, and that games deliver a positive applicant experience in practise. Satisfaction with the format is high, but applicants raise face validity concerns over the abstract games. We encourage the use of gamification and machine learning to improve the fairness and user experience of psychometric tests.

Medical decision making beyond evidence: Correlates of belief in complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) and homeopathy

Many people believe in and use complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) to address health issues or prevent diseases. Empirical evidence for those treatments is either lacking or controversial due to methodological weaknesses. Thus, practitioners and patients primarily rely on subjective references rather than credible empirical evidence from systematic research. This study investigated whether cognitive and personality factors explain differences in belief in CAM and homeopathy. We investigated the robustness of 21 predictors when examined together to obtain insights into key determinants of such beliefs in a sample of 599 participants (60% female, 18-81 years). A combination of predictors explained 20% of the variance in CAM belief (predictors: ontological confusions, spiritual epistemology, agreeableness, death anxiety, gender) and approximately 21% of the variance in belief in homeopathy (predictors: ontological confusions, illusory pattern perception, need for cognitive closure, need for cognition, honesty-humility, death anxiety, gender, age). Individuals believing in CAM and homeopathy have cognitive biases and certain individual differences which make them perceive the world differently. Findings are discussed in the context of previous literature and in relation to other unfounded beliefs.

Cognitive reflection test: The effects of the items sequence on scores and response time

This paper aims to expand the literature on the determinants of the Cognitive Reflection Test scores, exploring the effects that the items sequence has on (1) Cognitive Reflection Test scores, (2) response time, (3) the relationship between Cognitive Reflection Test scores and response time, and (4) Cognitive Reflection scores, response time, and the relationship between both variables on men and women. The current study also explored the sex differences on Cognitive Reflection Test and response time according to items sequence. The results showed that manipulating the items sequence, the performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test improved significantly, but the response time were not significantly affected, although the results suggest that first items of the sequence could be working as training items. A positive relationship between Cognitive Reflection Test scores and response time was also found, except when the scores were maximized. Finally, some differences between men and women on the results were also found. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Insight Problem Solving Ability Predicts Reduced Susceptibility to Fake News, Bullshit, and Overclaiming

The information humans are exposed to has grown exponentially. This has placed increased demands upon our information selection strategies resulting in reduced fact-checking and critical-thinking time. Prior research shows that problem solving (traditionally measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test-CRT) negatively correlates with believing in false information. We argue that this result is specifically related to insight problem solving. Solutions via insight are the result of parallel processing, characterized by filtering external noise, and, unlike cognitively controlled thinking, it does not suffer from the cognitive overload associated with processing multiple sources of information. We administered the Compound Remote Associate Test (problems used to investigate insight problem solving) as well as the CRT, 20 fake and real news headlines, the bullshit, and overclaiming scales to a sample of 61 participants. Results show that insight problem solving predicts better identification of fake news and bullshit (over and above traditional measures i.e., the CRT), and is associated with reduced overclaiming. These results have implications for understanding individual differences in susceptibility to believing false information.

Testing the validity and reliability of the Matching Familiar Figures Test-2021: An updated behavioral measure of reflection–impulsivity

The Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT) is a well-known and extensively used behavioral measure of reflection-impulsivity. However, the instrument has several deficiencies, including images designed for school-age children in the United States during the 1960s. Most importantly, an adult version of the instrument is currently unavailable and the lack of a single repository for the images raises questions regarding the MFFT’s validity and reliability. We developed a 21st century version of the MFFT using images that are familiar to adults and reside in a freely accessible repository. We conducted two studies examining validity and reliability issues. In Study 1, participants interacting with the MFFT-2021, versus those interacting with the original MFFT20, spent more time on the task, took more time in making their first response, and were more likely to complete the task without errors, even though the average number of errors was higher than the comparison group. The coherence of these results is evidence of convergent validity. Regarding predictive validity, the MFFT-2021 remained a reliable predictor of rational thinking, such that participants who demonstrated more reflection (less impulsivity) tended to avoid rational thinking errors. Also, performance on the MFFT-2021 predicted higher quality judgments in processing job characteristic cues with embedded interactions, a form of configural information processing. We also found evidence of concurrent validity: performance on the MFFT-2021 differed in a predictable manner for participants grouped by their performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test. In Study 2, we tested discriminant validity by comparing participant performance on the MFFT-2021 to their performance on the Information Sampling Task (IST), another behavioral measure of reflection-impulsivity used in studies of psychopharmacological and addiction behaviors. For our participants (undergraduate business students), we found that the MFFT was a stronger predictor of performance on rational thinking tasks, and, contrary to prior studies, our exploratory factor analysis identified separate factors for the MFFT-2021 and the IST, supporting discriminant validity, indicating that these two instruments measure different subtypes of reflection-impulsivity.

Developmental risk sensitivity theory: the effects of socio-economic status on children's risky gain and loss decisions

Evolutionary developmental theories propose that early environments shape human risk preferences. Developmental risk sensitivity theory (D-RST) focuses on the plasticity of risk preferences during childhood and makes predictions about the effect of reward size based on a child's social environment. By contrast, prospect theory predicts risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses regardless of environment or status. We presented 4 to 10-year-olds (n = 194) with a set of trials in which they chose between a certain amount and a chance to receive more or nothing. Two trials were equal expected value choices that differed by stake size and two were unequal expected value choices. Children either received gain trials or loss trials. Social environment was assessed using socio-economic status (SES) and subjective social status. Results confirmed the predictions of D-RST for gains based on SES. Children from lower-SES families differentiated between the high- and low-value trials and made more risky decisions for the high-value reward compared with higher-SES children. Children from higher-SES families were more risk averse for both trial types. Decisions for loss trials did not conform completely to either theory. We discuss the results in relation to evolutionary developmental theories.

Do medium and Context Matter when learning from multiple complementary Digital texts and videos?

Students more than ever learn from online sources, such as digital texts or videos. Little research has compared processes and outcomes across these two mediums. Using a between-participants experimental design, this study investigated whether medium (texts vs. videos) and context (less authoritative vs. more authoritative), independently and in concert, affected students' engagement, integrated understanding, and calibration. The two mediums presented identical information on the topic of social media, which was distributed across two complementary texts in the text condition and across two complementary videos in the video condition. In the less authoritative context, the two information sources (texts or videos) were posted by a friend on Facebook; in the more authoritative context, the same information sources (texts or videos) were posted by a professor on Moodle. Results showed a main effect of medium on behavioral engagement in terms of processing time, as students used longer time watching the two videos than reading the two digital texts. No other main medium or context effects were statistically significant; nor were there any interaction effects of medium with context on any of the outcome variables. The findings are discussed in light of the alternative hypotheses that guided the study and the directions it suggests for future research.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11251-022-09591-8.

How Stable are Moral Judgments?

Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three times, 6-8 days apart. In addition to investigating the stability of our participants' ratings over time, we also explored some potential explanations for instability. To end, we will discuss these and other potential psychological sources of moral stability (or instability) and highlight possible philosophical implications of our findings.

Trustors' disregard for trustees deciding quickly or slowly in three experiments with time constraints

Many decisions in the economic and social domain are made under time constraints, be it under time pressure or forced delay. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly often elicit different responses. Time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important, such as in market and organizational design. In three Trust Game experiments (total number of participants = 1872), including within- and between-subjects designs, we test whether individuals trust (more) someone who is forced to respond quickly (intuitively) or slowly (reflectively). We find that trustors do not adjust their behavior (or their beliefs) to the trustee’s time conditions. This seems to be an appropriate response because time constraints do not affect trustees’ behavior, at least when the game decisions are binary (trust vs. don’t trust; reciprocate vs. don’t reciprocate) and therefore mistakes cannot explain choices. Thus, delayed decisions per se do not seem to elicit distrust.

I Think I Should Get Vaccinated, I Feel I Should Not. Individual Differences in Information Processing and Vaccination Behavior (COVID-19)

Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the scientific community responded promptly by developing effective vaccines. Still, even though effective vaccines against COVID-19 became available, many people did not seem to be in a rush to become immunized. Community protection can be enhanced if more people decide to vaccinate, and thus it is necessary to identify relevant factors involved in vaccination behavior to find better ways of encouraging it. Vaccination behavior is the result of a decision process that might vary according to individual differences in information processing. We investigated the role of cognitive reflection ability and thinking styles in predicting self-reported vaccination behavior against COVID-19. A sample of 274 Romanian participants was surveyed for the present study, out of which 217 (M_age = 24.58, SD = 8.31; 53% female) declared they had the possibility to become vaccinated. Results showed that a higher level of cognitive reflection ability significantly increased the odds of becoming vaccinated. A rational thinking style was not linked to vaccination behavior. However, an experiential thinking style indirectly predicted vaccination behavior by means of attitudes towards vaccination. Since individual differences in information processing are, to a certain extent, linked to vaccination behavior, the design of vaccination campaigns could consider that people have specific information needs and address them as such.

Stress and risk — Preferences versus noise

We analyze the impact of acute stress on risky choice in a pre-registered laboratory experiment with 194 participants. We test the causal impact of stress on the stability of risk preferences by separating noise in decision-making from an actual shift in preferences. We find no significant differences in risk attitudes across conditions on the aggregate, using both descriptive analyses as well as structural estimations for risk aversion and different noise structures. Additionally, in line with the previous literature, we find statistically significant evidence for lower cognitive abilities being correlated with more noise in decision-making in general. We do not find a significant interaction effect between cognitive abilities and stress on noise levels.

Does cognitive reflection predict attentional control in visual tasks?

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) measures the ability to suppress an intuitive, but incorrect, answer that easily comes to mind. The relationship between the CRT and different cognitive biases has been widely studied. However, whether cognitive reflection is related to attentional control is less well studied. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the inhibitory component of the CRT, measured by the number of non-intuitive answers of the CRT (Inhibitory Control Score), is related to the control of visual attention in visual tasks that involve overriding a bias in what to attend: an anti-saccade task and a visual search task. To test this possibility, we analyzed whether the CRT-Inhibitory Control Score (CRT-ICS) predicted attention allocation in each task. We compared the relationship between the CRT-ICS to two other potential predictors of attentional control: numeracy and visual working memory (VWM). Participants who scored lower on the CRT-ICS made more errors in the "look-away" trials in the anti-saccade task. Participants who scored higher on the CRT-ICS looked more often towards more informative color subsets in the visual search task. However, when controlling for numeracy and visual working memory, CRT-ICS scores were only related to the control of visual attention in the anti-saccade task.