Stimulus-classification and stimulus-action associations: Effects of repetition learning and durability

One-shot stimulus-control associations generalize over different stimulus viewpoints and exemplars

Cognitive control processes are central to adaptive behavior, but how control is applied in a context-appropriate manner is not fully understood. One way to produce context-sensitive control is by mnemonically linking particular control settings to specific stimuli that demanded those settings in a prior encounter. In support of this episodic reinstatement of control hypothesis, recent studies have produced evidence for the formation of stimulus-control associations in one-shot, prime-probe learning paradigms. However, since those studies employed perceptually identical stimuli across prime and probe presentations, it is not yet known how generalizable one-shot stimulus-control associations are. In the current study, we therefore probed whether associations formed between a prime object and the control process of task-switching would generalize to probe objects seen from a different viewpoint (Experiment 1), to different exemplars of the same object type (Experiment 2), and to different members of the object category (Experiment 3). We replicated prior findings of one-shot control associations for identical prime/probe stimuli. Importantly, we additionally found that these episodic control effects are expressed regardless of changes in viewpoint and exemplar, but do not seem to generalize to other category members. These findings elucidate the scope of generalization of the episodic reinstatement of cognitive control.

The reactivation of task rules triggers the reactivation of task-relevant items

Working memory (WM) describes the temporary storage of task-relevant items and procedural rules to guide action. Despite its central importance for goal-directed behavior, the interplay between WM and long-term memory (LTM) remains poorly understood. Recent studies have shown that repeated use of the same task-relevant item in WM results in a hand-off of the storage of that item to LTM, and switching to a new item reactivates WM. To further elucidate the rules governing WM-LTM interactions, we here planned to probe whether a change in task rules, independent of a switch in task-relevant items, would also lead to WM reactivation of maintained items. To this end, we used scalp-recorded electroencephalogram (EEG) data, specifically the contralateral delay activity (CDA), to track WM item storage while manipulating repetitions and changes in task rules and task-relevant items across trials in a visual WM task. We tested two rival hypotheses: If changes in task rules result in a reactivation of the target item representation, then the CDA should increase when a task change is cued even when the same target has been repeated across trials. However, if the reactivation of a task-relevant item only depends on the mnemonic availability of the item itself instead of the task it is used for, then only the changes in task-relevant items should reactivate the representations. Accordingly, the CDA amplitude should decrease for repeated task-relevant items independently of a task change. We found a larger CDA on task-switch compared to task-repeat trials, suggesting that the reactivation of task rules triggers the reactivation of task-relevant items in WM. By demonstrating that WM reactivation of LTM is interdependent for task rules and task-relevant items, this study informs our understanding of visual WM and its interplay with LTM. PREREGISTERED STAGE 1 PROTOCOL: https://osf.io/zp9e8 (date of in-principle acceptance: 19/12/2021).

Sleep consolidates stimulus-response learning

Performing a motor response to a sensory stimulus creates a memory trace whose behavioral correlates are classically investigated in terms of repetition priming effects. Such stimulus-response learning entails two types of associations that are partly independent: (1) an association between the stimulus and the motor response and (2) an association between the stimulus and the classification task in which it is encountered. Here, we tested whether sleep supports long-lasting stimulus-response learning on a task requiring participants (1) for establishing stimulus-classification associations to classify presented objects along two different dimensions ("size" and "mechanical") and (2) as motor response (action) to respond with either the left or right index finger. Moreover, we examined whether strengthening of stimulus-classification associations is preferentially linked to nonrapid eye movement (non-REM) sleep and strengthening of stimulus-action associations to REM sleep. We tested 48 healthy volunteers in a between-subjects design comparing postlearning retention periods of nighttime sleep versus daytime wakefulness. At postretention testing, we found that sleep supports consolidation of both stimulus-action and stimulus-classification associations, as indicated by increased reaction times in "switch conditions"; that is, when, at test, the acutely instructed classification task and/or correct motor response for a given stimulus differed from that during original learning. Polysomnographic recordings revealed that both kinds of associations were correlated with non-REM spindle activity. Our results do not support the view of differential roles for non-REM and REM sleep in the consolidation of stimulus-classification and stimulus-action associations, respectively.

EXPRESS: Encoding Arm and Leg Movements in the Same or Opposite Direction

This study examined whether working memory performance for arm and leg movements differed when encoding in the same or opposite direction (relative to the observed direction) and which direction was better for encoding these two kinds of movements. The results showed that encoding direction regulated the comparison between arm and leg movements in working memory performance. In the same-direction encoding condition, arm movements performed better than leg movements, whereas in the opposite-direction encoding condition, arm movements performed worse. Additionally, arm movements performed better when they were encoded in the same direction, while encoding leg movements in the same direction did not differ from encoding them in the opposite direction. Therefore, we should move appropriate body parts for the same and opposite learning directions. The same direction is suitable for learning arm movements but not leg movements; the opposite direction is suitable for learning leg movements but not arm movements. We should also consider the appropriate learning direction for arm movements rather than leg movements. Arm movements are encoded more effectively in the same direction than in the opposite direction.

Evidence for a Selective Influence of Short-Term Experiences on the Retrieval of Item-Specific Long-Term Bindings

Human behavior is guided by prior experience such as bindings between stimuli and responses. Experimentally, this is evident in performance changes when features of the stimulus-response episode reoccur either in the short-term or in the long-term. So far, effects of short-term and long-term bindings are assumed to be independent from one another. In a large-scale re-analysis of eight item-specific stimulus-response priming experiments that orthogonally varied task-specific classifications and actions in the short-term (trial N-1 to trial N) and, item-specifically, in the long-term (lag of several trials), we tested this independence assumption. In detail, we tested whether short-term experiences (repetitions of classification and action features in two consecutive trials) affected the retrieval of item-specific long-term stimulus-classification (S-C) and stimulus-action (S-A) bindings as well as potential long-term C-A bindings. The retrieval of item-specific long-term S-C bindings (i.e., the size of item-specific S-C priming effects) was affected by the persisting activation of classifications from trial N-1 (short-term priming). There were no further interactions between short-term experiences and long-term bindings. These results suggest a feature-specific, selective influence of short-term priming on long-term binding retrieval (e.g., based on shared feature representations). In contrast, however, we found evidence against an influence of short-term C-A bindings on long-term binding retrieval. This finding suggests that the processes contributing to short-term priming and long-term binding retrieval are dissociable from short-term binding and retrieval processes. Our results thus inform current theories on how short-term and long-term bindings are bound and retrieved (e.g., the BRAC framework).

Instructing item-specific switch probability: expectations modulate stimulus-action priming

Both active response execution and passive listening to verbal codes (a form of instruction) in single prime trials lead to item-specific repetition priming effects when stimuli re-occur in single probe trials. This holds for task-specific classification (stimulus-classification, SC priming, e.g., apple-small) and action (stimulus-action, SA priming, e.g., apple-right key press). To address the influence of expectation on item-specific SC and SA associations, we tested if item-specific SC and SA priming effects were modulated by the instructed probability of re-encountering individual SC or SA mappings (25% vs. 75% instructed switch probability). Importantly, the experienced item-specific switch probability was always 50%. In Experiment 1 (N = 78), item-specific SA/SC switch  expectations affected SA, but not SC priming effects exclusively following active response execution. Experiment 2 (N = 40) was designed to emphasize SA priming by only including item-specific SC repetitions. This yielded stronger SA priming for 25% vs. 75% expected switch probability, both following response execution as in Experiment 1 and also following verbally coded SA associations. Together, these results suggest that SA priming effects, that is, the encoding and retrieval of SA associations, is modulated by item-specific switch expectation. Importantly, this expectation effect cannot be explained by item-specific associative learning mechanisms, as stimuli were primed and probed only once and participants experienced item-specific repetitions/switches equally often across stimuli independent of instructed switch probabilities. This corroborates and extends previous results by showing that SA priming effects are modulated by  expectation not only based on experienced item-specific switch probabilities, but also on mere instruction.

Mind wandering at encoding, but not at retrieval, disrupts one-shot stimulus-control learning

The one-shot pairing of a stimulus with a specific cognitive control process, such as task switching, can bind the two together in memory. The episodic control-binding hypothesis posits that the formation of temporary stimulus-control bindings, which are held in event-files supported by episodic memory, can guide the contextually appropriate application of cognitive control. Across two experiments, we sought to examine the role of task-focused attention in the encoding and implementation of stimulus-control bindings in episodic event-files. In Experiment 1, we obtained self-reports of mind wandering during encoding and implementation of stimulus-control bindings. Results indicated that, whereas mind wandering during the implementation of stimulus-control bindings does not decrease their efficacy, mind wandering during the encoding of these control-state associations interferes with their successful deployment at a later point. In Experiment 2, we complemented these results by using trial-by-trial pupillometry to measure attention, again demonstrating that attention levels at encoding predict the subsequent implementation of stimulus-control bindings better than attention levels at implementation. These results suggest that, although encoding stimulus-control bindings in episodic memory requires active attention and engagement, once encoded, these bindings are automatically deployed to guide behavior when the stimulus recurs. These findings expand our understanding of how cognitive control processes are integrated into episodic event files.

Study-test congruence of response levels in item stimulus-response priming

We investigated stimulus-response (S-R) memory links during object priming using a binary associative size judgement paradigm. At study, participants decided which of two objects was bigger in real life and, at test, made the same or the reverse judgement. We examined the effects of response congruence on item S-R priming in the associative paradigm. In Experiment 1, a task reversal manipulation had minimal impact on RT priming when classifications were congruent for both recombined objects between study and test. Experiment 2 found that RT priming was more disrupted by classification incongruence of the selected than of the nonselected item alone, with incongruence of the nonselected object having no effect on RTs. Experiment 3, however, found that classification incongruence of both items eliminated RT priming, indicating that a significant effect of classification incongruence for the nonselected item is only evident if both items are classification-incongruent. Finally, across all experiments, we found that accuracy was more sensitive than RTs to decision/action incongruence. We interpret these findings in light of a two-stream account of S-R priming, and suggest a few extensions to account for interactions between S-R links of recombined items.

Automatic effects of covert practice

Automatic behaviour is supposedly underlain by the unintentional retrieval of processing episodes, which are stored during the repeated overt practice of a task or activity. In the present study, we investigated whether covertly practicing a task (e.g., repeatedly imagining responding to a stimulus) also leads to the storage of processing episodes and thus to automatic behaviour. Participants first either responded overtly or covertly to stimuli according to a first categorization task in a practice phase. We then measured the presence of automatic response-congruency effects in a subsequent test phase that involved a different categorization task but the same stimuli and responses. Our results indicate that covert practice can lead to a response-congruency effect. We conclude that covert practice can lead to automatic behaviour and discuss the different components of covert practice, such as motor imagery, visual imagery, and inner speech, that contribute to the formation of processing episodes in memory.

David and Goliath-size does matter: size modulates feature-response binding of irrelevant features

Stimulus and response features are integrated together in episodic traces. A repetition of any of the features results in the retrieval of the entire episodic trace, including the response features. Such S-R bindings have been suggested to account for different priming effects like repetition priming, negative priming and so on. Previous studies on repetition priming have found priming effects to be size invariant. The present study examines whether the size invariance in previous priming studies was due to the absence of size-response binding. In two experiments, size was varied orthogonally to the response, either without varying any other stimulus features (Experiment 1) or while varying another stimulus feature (Experiment 2). A significant size-response binding effect was observed in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. The results suggest that size is involved in feature-response binding and can retrieve the response upon repetition. However, this retrieval is extinguished if another stimulus feature is varied simultaneously. The results are discussed against the background of S-R binding as the mechanism underlying repetition priming.

Erasing the Homunculus as an Ongoing Mission: A Reply to the Commentaries

In our recent article (Schmidt, Liefooghe, & De Houwer, 2020, this volume), we presented an adaptation of the Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) model for simulating instruction following and task-switching behaviour. In this paper, we respond to five commentaries on our article: Monsell & McLaren (2020), Koch & Lavric (2020), Meiran (2020), Longman (2020), and Pfeuffer (2020). The commentaries discuss potential future modelling goals, deeper reflections on cognitive control, and some potential challenges for our theoretical perspective and associated model. We focus primarily on the latter. In particular, we clarify that we (a) acknowledge the role of cognitive control in task switching, and (b) are arguing that certain task-switching effects do not serve as a good measure of said cognitive control. We also discuss some ambiguities in terminological uses (e.g., the meaning of "task-set reconfiguration"), along with some future experimental and modelling research directions.

Item-Specificity and Intention in Episodic Memory

Schmidt et al.'s (2020) PEP model accurately reflects the complexity of task switching based on bottom-up assumptions and episodic memory, re-evaluating the contribution of commonly presumed top-down processes. Extending it to long-term bindings and their item-specific effects could eludicate puzzling findings regarding the independence of long-term bindings between stimuli, responses, and task-specific categorizations as well as the relation between short-term and long-term bindings. Moreover, ideomotor theories of action control provide a bottom-up basis of incorporating volition and intentional action into the PEP model which is currently restricted to stimulus-based action.

An Episodic Model of Task Switching Effects: Erasing the Homunculus from Memory

The Parallel Episodic Processing (PEP) model is a neural network for simulating human performance in speeded response time tasks. It learns with an exemplar-based memory store and it is capable of modelling findings from various subdomains of cognition. In this paper, we show how the PEP model can be designed to follow instructions (e.g., task rules and goals). The extended PEP model is then used to simulate a number of key findings from the task switching domain. These include the switch cost, task-rule congruency effects, response repetition asymmetries, cue repetition benefits, and the full pattern of means from a recent feature integration decomposition of cued task switching (Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016). We demonstrate that the PEP model fits the participant data well, that the model does not possess the flexibility to match any pattern of results, and that a number of competing task switching models fail to account for key observations that the PEP model produces naturally. Given the parsimony and unique explanatory power of the episodic account presented here, our results suggest that feature-integration biases have a far greater power in explaining task-switching performance than previously assumed.

Memories of control: One-shot episodic learning of item-specific stimulus-control associations

The repeated pairing of a particular stimulus with a specific cognitive control process, such as task switching, can bind the two together in memory, resulting in the formation of stimulus-control associations. These bindings are thought to guide the context-sensitive application of cognitive control, but it is not presently known whether such stimulus-control associations are only acquired through slow, incremental learning or could also be mediated by episodic memories of a single experience, so-called one-shot learning. Here, we tested this episodic control-binding hypothesis by probing whether a single co-occurrence of a stimulus and the control process of task switching would lead to significant performance benefits (reduced task switch cost) when that stimulus later re-occurred under the same as opposed to different control demands. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that item-specific stimulus-control associations can be formed based on a single exposure, providing the first strong evidence for episodic memory guidance of cognitive control.

On the Assimilation of Instructions: Stimulus-response Associations are Implemented but not Stimulus-task Associations

The assimilation of instructions consists of two stages. First, a task model is formed on the basis of instructions. Second, this model is implemented, resulting in highly accessible representations, which enable reflexive behavior that guides the application of instructions. Research frequently demonstrated that instructions can lead to automatic response activation, which indicates that stimulus-response associations can be implemented on the basis of a task model. However, instructions not only indicate how to respond (stimulus-response mappings) but also when (i.e., the conditions under which mappings apply). Accordingly, we tested whether instruction implementation leads both to the activation of stimulus-response associations and of associations between stimuli and the context or task in which the instructed stimulus-response mappings are relevant (i.e., stimulus-task associations). In four experiments, we measured if implementing newly instructed stimulus-response mappings also leads to bivalence costs (i.e., shorter latencies when a stimulus can only occur in one task compared to when it can occur in two tasks), which indicate the presence of stimulus-task associations. We consistently observed automatic response activation on the basis of instructions, but no bivalence costs. A discrepancy thus exists between information conveyed in an instructed task model and the elements of that task model that are implemented. We propose that future research on automatic effects of instructions should broaden its scope and focus both on the formation of an instructed task model and its subsequent implementation.

Execution-based and verbal code-based stimulus-response associations: proportion manipulations reveal conflict adaptation processes in item-specific priming

Stimulus-response (S-R) associations consist of two independent components: Stimulus-classification (S-C) and stimulus-action (S-A) associations. Here, we examined whether these S-C and S-A associations were modulated by cognitive control operations. In two item-specific priming experiments, we systematically manipulated the proportion of trials in which item-specific S-C and/or S-A mappings repeated or switched between the single encoding (prime) and single retrieval (probe) instance of each stimulus (i.e., each stimulus appeared only twice). Thus, we assessed the influence of a list-level proportion switch manipulation on the strength of item-specific S-C and S-A associations. Participants responded slower and committed more errors when item-specific S-C or S-A mappings switched rather than repeated between prime and probe (i.e., S-C/S-A switch effects). S-C switch effects were larger when S-C repetitions rather than switches were frequent on the list-level. Similarly, S-A switch effects were modulated by S-A switch proportion. Most importantly, our findings rule out contingency learning and temporal learning as explanations of the observed results and point towards a conflict adaptation mechanism that selectively adapts the encoding and/or retrieval for each S-R component. Finally, we outline how cognitive control over S-R associations operates in the context of item-specific priming.

And Remember the Truth That Once Was Spoken

Whenever individuals reveal personally relevant information to a stranger, they have to remember their self-disclosure for future interactions. Relying on instance-based theories of automaticity, we hypothesized that knowledge about having revealed private information to someone unfamiliar is retrieved automatically whenever this person is encountered again. In two studies, participants were orally interviewed by two different persons and instructed to be honest to one of them and to lie to the other. This instruction was either related to the identity of the interviewers (Experiment 1) or their gender (Experiment 2). Afterward, the target words honest and dishonest had to be identified in a categorization task in which pictures of the interviewers and of unknown persons served as task-irrelevant prime stimuli. In line with the hypothesis, results revealed congruence effects, indicating faster identification of the target word honest following the picture of a person whom one had told the truth.

Learning in the absence of overt practice: a novel (previously unseen) stimulus can trigger retrieval of an unpracticed response

Skilled performance is traditionally thought to develop via overt practice. Recent research has demonstrated that merely instructed stimulus-response (S-R) bindings can influence later performance and readily transfer across response modalities. In the present study, we extended this to include instructed category-response (C-R) associations. That is, we investigated whether merely instructed C-R bindings can trigger an unpracticed response (in a different modality) on perception of a novel (previously unseen) stimulus. In a learning-test design, participants had to classify stimuli by comparing them to perceptual category templates (Experiment 1) or semantic category descriptions (Experiment 2) presented prior to each block. During learning blocks, participants had to respond manually, respond vocally, or listen passively to the correct response being spoken. A manual response was always required at test. In test blocks, the categories could either be novel or repeated from the learning block, whereas half of the stimuli were always novel and half were always repeated from the learning block. Because stimulus and category repetitions were manipulated orthogonally, it was possible to directly compare the relative contribution of S-R and C-R associations to performance. In Experiment 1, test performance was enhanced by repeating the C-R bindings independently of the stimulus. In Experiment 2, there was also evidence of an S-R repetition benefit independent of the classification. Critically, instructed associations formed in one response modality were robust to changes in the required response, even when no overt response was required during training, indicating the need to update the traditional view of associative learning.

How long is long-term priming? Classification and action priming in the scale of days

Previous research has shown that stimulus–response associations comprise associations between the stimulus and the task (a classification task in particular) and the stimulus and the action performed as a response. These associations, contributing to the phenomenon of priming, affect behaviour after a delay of hundreds of trials and they are resistant against overwriting. Here, we investigate their longevity, testing their effects in short-term (seconds after priming) and long-term (24 hr and 1 week after priming) memory. Three experiments demonstrated that both stimulus–classification (S-C) and stimulus–action (S-A) associations show long-term memory effects. The results also show that retrieval of these associations can be modulated by the amount of engagement on the same task between encoding and retrieval, that is, how often participants performed this task between prime and probe sessions. Finally, results show that differences in processing time during encoding are linked to the amount of conflict caused during retrieval of S-C, but not S-A associations. These findings add new information to the existing model of priming as a memory system and pose questions about the interactions of priming and top-down control processes.

Dissociation of binding and learning processes

A single encounter of a stimulus together with a response can result in a short-lived association between the stimulus and the response [sometimes called an event file, see Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, (2001) Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 910-926]. The repetition of stimulus-response pairings typically results in longer lasting learning effects indicating stimulus-response associations (e.g., Logan & Etherton, (1994) Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20, 1022-1050]. An important question is whether or not what has been described as stimulus-response binding in action control research is actually identical with an early stage of incidental learning (e.g., binding might be seen as single-trial learning). Here, we present evidence that short-lived binding effects can be distinguished from learning of longer lasting stimulus-response associations. In two experiments, participants always responded to centrally presented target letters that were flanked by response irrelevant distractor letters. Experiment 1 varied whether distractors flanked targets on the horizontal or vertical axis. Binding effects were larger for a horizontal than for a vertical distractor-target configuration, while stimulus configuration did not influence incidental learning of longer lasting stimulus-response associations. In Experiment 2, the duration of the interval between response n - 1 and presentation of display n (500 ms vs. 2000 ms) had opposing influences on binding and learning effects. Both experiments indicate that modulating factors influence stimulus-response binding and incidental learning effects in different ways. We conclude that distinct underlying processes should be assumed for binding and incidental learning effects.

Multiple priming instances increase the impact of practice-based but not verbal code-based stimulus-response associations

Stimulus-response (S-R) associations, the basis of learning and behavioral automaticity, are formed by the (repeated) co-occurrence of stimuli and responses and render stimuli able to automatically trigger associated responses. The strength and behavioral impact of these S-R associations increases with the number of priming instances (i.e., practice). Here we investigated whether multiple priming instances of a special form of instruction, verbal coding, also lead to the formation of stronger S-R associations in comparison to a single instance of priming. Participants either actively classified stimuli or passively attended to verbal codes denoting responses once or four times before S-R associations were probed. We found that whereas S-R associations formed on the basis of active task execution (i.e., practice) were strengthened by multiple priming instances, S-R associations formed on the basis of verbal codes (i.e., instruction) did not benefit from additional priming instances. These findings indicate difference in the mechanisms underlying the encoding and/or retrieval of previously executed and verbally coded S-R associations.

Transfer of learned category-response associations is modulated by instruction

Although instructions often emphasize categories (e.g., odd number→left hand response) rather than specific stimuli (e.g., 3→left hand response), learning is often interpreted in terms of stimulus-response (S-R) bindings or, less frequently, stimulus-classification (S-C) bindings with little attention being paid to the importance of category-response (C-R) bindings. In a training-transfer paradigm designed to investigate the early stages of category learning, participants were required to classify stimuli according to the category templates presented prior to each block (Experiments 1-4). In some transfer blocks the stimuli, categories and/or responses could be novel or repeated from the preceding training phase. Learning was assessed by comparing the transfer-training performance difference across conditions. Participants were able to rapidly transfer C-R associations to novel stimuli but evidence of S-C transfer was much weaker and S-R transfer was largely limited to conditions where the stimulus was classified under the same category. Thus, even though there was some evidence that learned S-R and S-C associations contributed to performance, learned C-R associations seemed to play a much more important role. In a final experiment (Experiment 5) the stimuli themselves were presented prior to each block, and the instructions did not mention the category structure. In this experiment, the evidence for S-R learning outweighed the evidence for C-R learning, indicating the importance of instructions in learning. The implications for these findings to the learning, cognitive control, and automaticity literatures are discussed.

Defining stimulus representation in stimulus-response associations formed on the basis of task execution and verbal codes

Responding to stimuli leads to the formation of stimulus-response (S-R) associations that allow stimuli to subsequently automatically trigger associated responses. A recent study has shown that S-R associations are established not only by active task execution, but also by the simultaneous presentation of stimuli and verbal codes denoting responses in the absence of own action [Pfeuffer et al. (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 43:328-347, 2017)]. Here, we used an item-specific priming paradigm to investigate whether the stimulus part of S-R associations formed based on task execution and verbal codes is represented in abstract or specific format by examining whether S-R associations are retrieved for perceptually different forms of the same stimulus or not. Between the prime and probe instance of a stimulus, its format switched from image to word or vice versa. We found that, irrespective of whether stimuli were primed by task execution or verbal coding, performance was impaired when S-R mappings switched rather than repeated between the prime and probe instance of a stimulus. The finding that prime S-R mappings affected probe performance even when stimulus format switched indicates that stimuli were represented in abstract form in S-R association based on both task execution and verbal coding. Furthermore, we found no performance benefits for stimuli primed and probed in the same format rather than different formats, suggesting that stimuli were not additionally represented in specific format. Overall, our findings demonstrate the adaptability of automatized behaviors and indicate that abstract stimulus representations allow S-R associations to generalize across perceptually different stimulus formats.

Distractor-based stimulus-response bindings retrieve decisions independent of motor programs

Research on the distractor response binding (DRB) effect (Frings, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2007) suggests that distractors are integrated with target responses into an event file or stimulus-response (SR) episode. The whole event file is retrieved when the distractor is repeated and as a consequence distractors can retrieve previous responses. Nett, Bröder, and Frings (2015) argued that even decisions under uncertainty are integrated into event files and can later on be retrieved by distractors. However, their paradigm did not allow disentangling the retrieval of decisions from the retrieval of motor programs. Here we disentangled the retrieval of decisions and motor programs by assuring that retrieved decisions were not confounded by the repetitions of motor programs. In particular, in two experiments using a sequential prime-probe distractor priming task participants used other keys or other effectors for prime and probe responses; nevertheless repeated task-irrelevant distractors increased the probability that participants repeated the prime decision irrespective of motor programs. Thus, decision features can become part of an event-file and directly be retrieved by irrelevant information suggesting that bindings have an even higher flexibility and ubiquity than previously assumed.